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Imagining a Nation: Society, Regionalism, and National Identity in the Greek War of Independence

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ABSTRACT: Modern Greece has held a marginal existence in the study of nationalism, and yet there is a wealth of information that it provides which can broaden our understanding of nationalism and state-building, especially in the Balkans. The purpose of this article is to examine the various facets of Greek identity during the outbreak of the independence movement, and how that identity shaped and affected the movement itself. This article argues that socioeconomics paired with Greek regional identities hindered the creation of a strongly defined national identity. Furthermore, this lack of national identity led to several years of civil war during the independence movement and to the political strife that characterised the newly formed state. This article examines the complexities of the Greek War of Independence and the weak sense of Greek national identity through a distinctive examination of socioeconomic identity within the Greek-speaking lands.

In the winter of 1832, nearly twelve years after fighting began, the members of the independent Greek state welcomed their new ruler. As the Bavarian-born King Otto arrived in the Bay of Nafplion, many Greeks “in their varied and picturesque dresses, hailed the young monarch as the deliverer from a state of society as intolerable as Turkish tyranny...The uniforms of many armies and

navies, and the sound of many languages, testified that most civilised nations had sent deputies to inaugurate the festival of the regeneration of Greece.”¹ Otto had inherited a new state that, after several years of discord, was established by the Great Powers without any input from a Greek delegation. It was a state where a host of separatist identities gave birth to a hotbed of factionalism and disunity, which were further magnified during the Greek movement for independence.

The Greek aspiration for independence was part and parcel of European ideas of freedom associated with the establishment of sovereign nation-states during the Age of Revolution. During this time, Enlightenment ideologies that pushed for more liberal societies led to the formation of new states throughout Europe, and this revolutionary fervor touched the people of the Greek world as they developed a strong desire for revolution and independence from Ottoman rule.² In the spring of 1821, a revolt broke out in the Peloponnesus, marking the start of the Greek War of Independence. The war against the Ottoman Empire, which would last for nearly a decade, was characterized on the Greek side by ill-preparedness, heavy fragmentation, civil war, and geopolitical maneuverings. It did ultimately result in the establishment of the Greek state, but this state was one established by the Great Powers, void of Greek representation, and with boundaries far smaller than had been hoped for by the Greek people.

In the study of the Greek independence movement, it is important to remember that although Greece has had a place in written history for over two millennia, its formal identity as a nation is less than two centuries old. Greece has always been at the “crossroads” of cultural exchange and this in turn has created a large mosaic of identity, interlocking various groups into a

¹ George Finlay, *History of The Greek Revolution*, vol. 2 (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), 291.

² John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, introduction to *Nationalism*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7; Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 35.

culturally Greek realm.³ Dating from the establishment and expansion of the Byzantine Empire, the Orthodox Church and the Greek language functioned as the two primary factors that bound south-eastern Europe together, creating an “expansive multi-ethnic, religious, and linguistic domain,” which in turn led to a loosely defined Greek identity.⁴ This Greek identity was allowed to continue under Ottoman rule due to Istanbul’s *millet* system, which was a policy that allowed religious and cultural freedom at the price of a heavy tax burden. However, it is because of this elasticity in Greek identity—many Greek speakers identified more closely with their regions and specific locales—as well as the socioeconomic conditions under the Ottoman Empire that we see such regional diversity in the Greek world emerge during the 400 year period of Ottoman influence (a period also known as the *Tourkokratia*).

The scholarly literature on nations and nationalism is vast. However, in the discussion of Greek identity and the formation of the state, vital questions can be posed through the seminal work of Benedict Anderson and his idea of the nation as an “imagined community.” Anderson analyzes the nation not only as an “imagined political community,” but also one that is simultaneously “limited and sovereign.” As he explains, the nation is imagined “because most of the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community.”⁵ Typically members of these communities, with the help of print capitalism to disseminate ideas, come together under the basis of several factors: language, religion, culture, history, and political ideologies. Nationalism, as posited by Ernest Gellner, is the process that “invents” nations through narrating

³ B. Dobratz and Y. Kourvetaris, *A Profile of Modern Greece in Search on Identity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 1.

⁴ Robert S. Peckham, *Natural Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 2-3.

⁵ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 1983), 6.

national “histories” and “high culture.”⁶ This terminology as defined by Anderson and Gellner leads to questions about the Greek struggle for freedom from the Ottomans.

Given that the Greek independence movement was spearheaded by an educated and wealthy diaspora, how would a local population that is unlettered envision a Greek state that was similar to the one imagined by the diaspora? In other words, whose imagined community was it? Also, with an agrarian population loyal to local notables and characterised by regional identities, how would the new national Greek identity and boundaries of the state be defined? Although many revolutions and independence movements have corollaries of factionalism, as well as foreign influence and involvement, what can be seen in the Greek struggle for independence is a strong disconnect of unity amongst the Greek people that plagued the movement from its conception and became magnified throughout the war itself. It is through a thorough examination of the independence movement that the lack of a prior strong national identity can be observed.

Outside of Greece, the topic of Greek nationalism has held a marginal existence in the collective study of nationalism; however, it is precisely through understanding how nationalism played a role in nineteenth-century Balkan history that one can better contextualise identity and state-building in the declining Ottoman Empire. By closely examining the factionalism in the Greek War of Independence, one can gain historical insight into nationalist movements that emerge under empires, as well as parse the crucial role of diversity in identity and how it can and did affect them. It is also important to note when studying Greek nationalism during the revolution that, although it has been called the Greek Revolution or War of Independence in European scholarship, it is referred to by Turkish historians as the Greek Rebellion, which indicates that there are always multiple perspectives in the study of nationalist movements. By stepping away from the study of the Orthodox Church and geopolitics, both

⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson), 3.

of which have dominated the scholarship on the topic, one can also bring to light the aspect of social and regional identities during the movement.

Anglophone scholarship about the Greek War of Independence is minimal. The works produced on the topic over the past few decades have nearly all addressed the conflict through the paradigm of the so-called Eastern Question.⁷ More recent works, such as Prousis's *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution* and Pizanias's *The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event*, continue the trend of examining the independence movement through the lens of the European Powers.⁸ While these works do contribute to our understanding of the Greek War of Independence, they fail to investigate the war from a primarily Greek perspective and attribute the war itself, and internal issues, to geopolitics or a Greek desire to model itself after the Great Powers. Other works have tended to romanticize the movement through the figure of Lord Byron, creating an overwhelming British philhellenic interpretation.⁹

Many Greek historians who have written about the Greek War of Independence usually gloss over factionalism in order to posit that the Greeks came together in unity to free themselves from Ottoman oppression. These arguments are typically built

⁷ The Eastern Question was originally a nineteenth-century diplomatic term that referred to the competition between major European powers, such as Great Britain and Russia, to influence and control the perceived decline of the Ottoman Empire. For a detailed study of this subject, please see: Lucien J. Fray and Mara Kozelsky, eds., *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2014).

⁸ Prousis examines the Greek independence movement through the response of the Russian Empire due to the need to protect others of the Orthodox faith and against a regional enemy, the Ottoman Empire, in Theophilus C. Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution* (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994); Pizanias examines the Greek Revolution as a European event in which the Great Powers became involved in order to gain influence in the Balkans, in Petros Pizanias, *The Greek Revolution: A European Event* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011).

⁹ For a recent interpretation of British Philhellenism, see: Roderick Beaton, *Byron's War: Romantic Rebellion, Greek Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

upon the work of the prominent Greek historian, Douglas Dakin, who suggested that, although the independence movement had its pockets of “lawlessness and factionalism,” the Greek people were nonetheless brought together by a “sense of nationhood” in which regional groups supported centralized government.¹⁰ However, through the use of memoirs, travelogues, government documents, and secondary literature, and by examining the various social groups and regional identities within the Greek world, this article suggests that rather than a “sense of nationhood,” it was the common goal of freedom from the Ottoman yoke among the peasants of mainland Greece that produced any sense of unification that did emerge. Moreover, it was precisely because various regional groups did not support centralized government, but rather regional governments, that civil war erupted during the independence movement. What becomes apparent is that even though there was a sense of nationalism in the Greek struggle for independence, the social and regional identities that were present within the Greek world, and the educated diaspora’s particular vision of a Greek state, deeply affected the movement. It was because of the inability of the Greek people to create a cohesive national identity that the Greek War of Independence assumed a specific character of being dominated by factionalism and civil war.

This article will begin by introducing the regions and main socioeconomic groups within the Greek world prior to and during the independence movement, as well as showing how each group was viewed and characterized by others. After the introduction of these main groups, this work will briefly assess the Greek War of Independence, the formation of provisional governments, and the civil wars that occurred during the movement to show how deeply socioeconomic and regional groups clashed with one another,

¹⁰ Douglas Dakin, “The Formation of the Greek State, 1821-1833,” in *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972), 159-177.

creating disunity and hindering the formation of a national Greek identity.

Regional and Social Identity

The Greek world, which was able to culturally survive under Ottoman rule, was vast and encompassed most of south-eastern Europe. In terms of Greek identity, the lines were blurred due to the fact that Greek had remained the *lingua franca* of the Balkans because of the Orthodox Church. However, when it came to the actual Greek War of Independence, the revolutionary fighting stayed within Greece proper. For purposes of nomenclature, Greece proper refers roughly to the borders of the modern-day country. It is divided into three regions: Morea (modern-day Peloponnesus), Rumeli (present-day northern Greece and into Macedonia and Bulgaria), and the Aegean islands. Historically, Rumeli was further partitioned into east and west. In the context of this essay, the term diaspora refers to any Greeks living outside of Greece proper. Furthermore, the people of the rural areas within these regions typically conceived of themselves as provincial units in which the concept of a *Patrida* (fatherland) and loyalty was confined to locales as they formed “a kind of republic.”¹¹ The existence of local “republics” also shows that the concept of Greece and the definition of Greek identity were up for grabs by various regional groups during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

To understand how identity played a role in the movement, it is crucial to examine the socioeconomic groups that developed within the Greek sphere during the *Tourkokratia*. The three main groups were the: *Phanariots*, merchants, and peasants. The *Phanariots* were Greeks who were able to procure wealth by obtaining local government positions from the central Ottoman government, known as the “Porte,” in Istanbul. Given the semi-

¹¹ Benjamin Brue, *Journal de la campagne que la Grand vesir Ali Pacha á faite en 1715 pour la Conquête de la Moreé* (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1870), 38.

autonomous rule allowed throughout Greece and the Danubian principalities, the Ottoman Empire relied on these *Phanariots* to govern western regions and to collect heavy taxes, while the *Phanariots* themselves enjoyed “special tax privileges.”¹² As the empire slowly declined, the Ottomans found it necessary to rely on the *Phanariots* to enact governmental control in Eastern Europe and in their dealings with the Christian West.¹³ The seats of power obtained by *Phanariots* became synonymous with family and corruption as the positions would pass from father to son, keeping it within a patrilineal framework.

While the *Phanariots* came to enjoy their power and influence within the empire, they slowly separated themselves from the rest of the Greek people, exuding an almost Ottoman identity. Unlike some of the other Greek social groups during this time, which had gained wealth and affluence through commerce and other means of their own production, the *Phanariots* used the Turkish government to build pecuniary power and to bolster their self-interests. Some of their contemporaries believed that prominent *Phanariots* swindled the Ottoman government for personal gain by syphoning off the taxes they collected and by misadvising Turkish authorities in order to suit their own interests. Further, these actions were continuously executed not with the accession of other Greeks, but because they were a “body united in their own interests.”¹⁴

The governmental authority and power bestowed upon the *Phanariots* by the Ottomans created a group of Greeks who wished to maintain and expand their power—in doing so, they often embraced Ottoman customs and fashioned themselves after them. During his travels through the Eastern Mediterranean, American army officer William Eaton noted that “the most observable

¹² Richard Clogg, introduction to *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972), 2.

¹³ Clogg, introduction, 9-10.

¹⁴ Photios Khrysanthopoulos and Satvros Andropoulos, *Apomnimonovemata peri tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos 1821-1828*, vol. 1 (Athens: Epikairoseta, 1899), 32-33.

difference in the Grecian character is between those of Constantinople and their countrymen of the islands...but there is a race of Greeks who call themselves nobles, and affect to despise those of the islands.” He continued by asserting that *Phanariots* cared nothing more than to preserve the “opulence” that was afforded to them as they fashioned themselves after the Ottomans and maintained power over their fellow Greeks. They were also “the only part of the nation [Greece] who have totally *relinquished* the ancient Greek spirit; they seem not anxious as the islanders are for liberty, but delight in false magnificence.”¹⁵ Various *Phanariots* would play an integral role in the struggle for independence by inciting revolution, through their involvement in provisional government, and by heading factions of revolutionary militia. However, it is easy to see with such disparities between the wealthy *Phanariots* and their poor peasant brethren—who would constitute most of the military forces—some of the fault lines that became apparent during the fight for a Greek state. The *Phanariots*’ desire to blend themselves within the Ottoman system and their eagerness to maintain their power would only create disdain among the people of Greece proper.

Like the *Phanariots*, Greek merchants slowly accumulated wealth and produced powerful families, essentially creating a Greek bourgeois class. However, merchant families amassed their fortunes through their own endeavours, frequently by exploiting the laxity in Ottoman trade laws.¹⁶ Many of these wealthy families left Greece proper during the *Tourkokratia* and constituted the Greek diaspora of Western Europe and the Russian Empire. As the British physician and writer Henry Holland suggested: “The active spirit of the Greeks, deprived in great measure of political or national objectives, has taken a general direction towards commerce.”¹⁷ The Ottoman leniency in regulating how these

¹⁵ William Eaton, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire* (London: T Caldwell and W. Davies, 1809), 331. Emphasis added.

¹⁶ Clogg, introduction, 12.

¹⁷ Henry Holland, *Travels in the Ionian Isles, Albania, Thessaly, Macedonia & c. during the years 1812 and 1813* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, Paternoster-Row, 1819), 148.

Greeks developed commercial strength within the empire allowed them to expand their enterprise beyond their homes and into neighbouring areas. Holland also noted how these families gained power by emigrating into “adjacent countries,” and he gives an example of the dispersal of four brothers from a single family: “one was settled in Ioannina, another at Moscow, a third at Constantinople, and the fourth in some part of Germany; all connected together in their concerns.”¹⁸

It was outside of the Ottoman Empire that many of these merchants set up Greek communities and began to build up their wealth. Because of these communities throughout Russia and the West, many families of the diaspora were able to hold on to their Greek identity while adopting Western culture and attending the universities of Europe. This in turn created a wealthy and educated group far removed from Greece proper and the conditions within the Ottoman Empire. While *Phanariot* families were almost explicitly viewed with popular disdain, wealthy merchant families were seen in a mixed light: they sometimes received praise but at other times had their moral character called into question because of the way they accumulated wealth.¹⁹ Just like the *Phanariots*, the merchants became a distinct wealthy group within the Greek world, but they were mainly outside of Greece proper and led lives that were far different than those of their fellow Greeks in the Peloponnesus where the revolution was centred. Just like the ideologies they encountered through education, the merchants desired a Greek nation with a liberal government modeled after the emerging governments in the West. Much of this can be seen at the beginning of the push for independence, as the primary visionaries of the movement were from merchant families.

While some members of the diaspora were able to further develop wealth and power outside of the Ottoman Empire, the people of Greece proper were subjected to a power struggle between the Venetians and Ottomans until the area finally came

¹⁸ Holland, *Travels in the Ionian Isles*, 149.

¹⁹ Samuel G. Howe, *An Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution* (New York: White, Gallaher & White, 1828), 18.

under full Ottoman control in the late eighteenth century. The population of Greece proper consisted mainly of peasants, who were confined to subsistence farming and working the land of local wealthy notables. The few Greeks who did own land during this period used obligations of allegiance and force to make others cede land ownership, as they would incorporate these new holdings into their own domain and create substantial local power for themselves.²⁰

To understand the differences of social identity especially that of the peasants, one needs to understand how Greek society functioned. In a sociological study on modern Greek society, Richard and Eva Blum used comparative analysis and concluded that nineteenth-century, rural Greek society had remained, for the most part, unchanged since the time of Homer; that is, society in Greece proper had managed to remain agrarian, poorly educated, and centered on loyalty to local leadership and towns.²¹ This continuation in the function of peasant society was not the same for wealthy merchants and the diaspora, who became educated elites within a broader European society. Regardless of these social differences within Greek society, one would suspect that a common vision of a free Greek nation-state would emerge, especially through the dissemination of liberal ideologies by the diaspora; however, this was not the case. The peasants did not “espouse” the same ideologies or vision of the diaspora.²² In fact, the general consensus within the Greek world was that one of the main groups that hindered Greek freedom was the merchants of the diaspora, who were more concerned with life outside of Greece

²⁰ Dionysios Zakythenos, *The Making of Modern Greece: From Byzantium to Independence*, trans. K. Johnstone (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), 24.

²¹ Richard Blum and Eva Blum, *Health and Healing in Rural Greece, a Study of Three Communities* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965).

²² Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 29; Thomas Gallant, *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768-1913* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 74.

proper than the realities faced by the peasants.²³ With the peasants abhorring their wealthy brethren, stark fissures became visible within Greek society.

As the diaspora amassed wealth, the peasants within the Greek world endured deplorable conditions. The disparities between the peasants, regional notables, and the diaspora were described by the French statesman Felix Beaujour when he noted: “the peasants die of hunger while their landlords abound with gold.”²⁴ It was due to this exploitation and the constant threat from Ottoman forces that many peasants fled into the hills and took up brigandage. These bandits were known as *klephts*. They became a thorn in the side of the Ottoman Empire, while they gained a Robin Hood-like image with local peasants, which can be seen in folk ballads such as “Christos Milionis” and “Olympos and Kissabos.”²⁵ Small bands of *klephts* would come down from the hills and engage Ottoman troops in skirmishes, stealing and pillaging in the process. As a countermeasure to the *klephts*, the Ottomans created regional groups of armed forces to combat the brigands; these hired bands of militia were called *armatoloi*. Many men from both groups would often defect back and forth between the two. One of the most famous generals of the war, Theodore Kolokotronis, was once a *klepht*, then became an *armatalos*, and then finally a *klepht* again. Howe wrote: “The klephts, or robbers, were, as the Greeks styled them, wild *armatoloi*—that is, Greeks who live by arms, but unlicensed by the Turks and in hostility to them.” He also noted that military bands developed “under the direction of different Greek chiefs.”²⁶

The peasants generally lacked the education that would have enabled them to envision a Greek nation governed by the

²³ Anonymous, “Elliniki Nomarchia,” in *The Movement for Greek Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg (London: Macmillan, 1976), 106-117.

²⁴ Felix Beaujour, *A View of the Commerce of Greece: Formed after an Average, from 1787 to 1797* (London: H.L. Calabin, 1800), 88.

²⁵ John S. Blackie, *Horae Hellenicae: Essays and Discussions on Some Important Points of Greek Philology and Antiquity* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1874), 308.

²⁶ Howe, *An Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution*, 21-22.

people and founded upon specific Enlightenment principles. However, they could not have failed to desire freedom from economic exploitation and from the poor conditions that accompanied their subjugation. Acknowledging these sentiments, an American traveling through the Aegean wrote that the peasants lived in “wretched Greek houses, in which there is neither chair, table, nor bed, and where the miserable mothers often shut the door in your face, looking at you as a new oppressor, come to plunder them of their little substance.”²⁷ The peasants, whose agrarian lifestyle was essentially controlled by notables, became united regional bodies under the influence of local powerful families. Further, distinct characterizations were drawn amongst the various people when it came to the regions in which they lived. In regards to this regionalism, Thomas Gordon posited that: “Amongst themselves certain shades of distinction are drawn; the Rumeliotes being reckoned brave and hardy, the Moreotes timid and shy, and the islanders of the Archipelago... acute and dexterous, but inclined to indolence and frivolity.”²⁸ It is the peasants who were the bulkhead of the Greek forces during the revolution, fighting under regional banners for freedom from the Ottoman Empire. The stark differences in characterizations suggest more systematic lines of difference, again suggesting how factionalism could become commonplace, even from the conception of the independence movement.

The Push for Independence

The two key pre-revolutionary figures, both of whom are given credit as fathers of the revolution despite their different visions of the movement, are Adamantios Korais and Rigas Feraios. Both men were born into affluent families within the Ottoman Empire but were educated in Western Europe, where they

²⁷ Anonymous, “Visit to Joannina and Ali Pasha,” *The North-American Review and Miscellaneous Journal* 10 (1820): 432.

²⁸ Thomas Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution, and the Wars and Campaigns Arising from the Struggles of the Greek Patriots Emancipating Their Country from the Turkish Yolk*, vol. 1 (London: T. Cavall, 1844), lv.

spent their adult lives creating revolutionary inspired works. By secretly publishing works in Greek, the two men were able to reach a broader audience and create revolutionary fervor within Greece proper. By examining their pro-revolutionary ideologies, it becomes apparent that both men were well aware of the conditions within Greece, but had rather distinct approaches as to how a revolution should be carried out.

Rigas Feraios was born into a wealthy family in Thessaly, where he became well-educated before moving to Istanbul and then later to Vienna. While in Vienna, Feraios was influenced by contemporary events in revolutionary France, which inspired him to envision a free Greece modeled after the new French Republic. Feraios published a Greek-language newspaper from Vienna, *Ephemeris*, in the hopes of reaching the broader Greek-speaking population. The heavy influence of the French Revolution can be seen in the pro-revolutionary works of Feraios such as his own version of *The Declaration of The Rights of Man* and *The New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Islands of the Aegean, and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia*, published in 1797.²⁹

Feraios called for an immediate revolt against the Ottoman Empire and encouraged the unification of the Balkans to form a Pan-Hellenic nation—in a sense a Byzantine revival uniting all Greek-speaking peoples sharing a Greek culture within the region. With no regard to possible “future ethnic divisions,” Feraios believed that the Orthodox Church should play a minor role in the new nation and the official language should be Greek.³⁰ This vision of a Pan-Hellenic nation was exemplified by his 1797 battle cry, “Thourios,” in which Feraios called for all people of the Balkans to rise up against the Ottoman Empire and free themselves

²⁹ Rigas Feraios, “The Declaration of the Rights of Man,” (1797) in *The Movement for Greek Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg, 150-157; Rigas Feraios, “The New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Islands of the Aegean, and the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia” (1797) in *The Movement for Greek Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg, 157-163.

³⁰ Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short History* (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), 72.

from “slavery.”³¹ With the French Revolution transitioning into the Reign of Terror, Austrian officials did not take kindly to such revolutionary activity and Feraios was eventually captured, murdered, and dumped into the Sava River in 1798. Reportedly Feraios’ dying words were: “This is how brave men die. I have sown; the time will soon come when my country will gather the harvest.”³² For Feraios, the vision of a Greek nation was far different from that of his contemporary, Korais.

Feraios’s interlocutor Adamantios Korais was born into a prominent family in Smyrna. He had a passion for education and made money by translating ancient Greek texts into modern languages. Unlike Feraios, Korais did not have a desire to see a unified Balkan Empire, but rather wanted freedom for the people of Greece proper. In particular, he despised the Turks and the thought of “living together with Turks” made him feel as though he could fall “into genuine madness.”³³ In 1788, Korais moved to Paris where he was later heavily influenced by the French Revolution. Korais recognized that the way to institute Enlightenment ideologies was through education.

To Korais, the masses of Greece proper were ill-prepared for a revolution, and he firmly believed that education and national identity needed to be refined within the Greek world. Korais posited that the “spread of education in the French nation gave birth to the love of liberty,” and he believed it was the duty of the wealthy Greeks to “educate our people.”³⁴ In an attempt to begin the process of education, Korais undertook the task of “purifying” the Greek language. In his new Greek language, *Katharevousa*, he sought to reform demotic Greek into a more pure language that closely resembled ancient Greek. However, *Katharevousa* never became widely used and was confined mainly to official

³¹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, 29.

³² C. Perrevo, *Sintomos Biographia tou Aidimou Riga tou Thattalou* (Athens: John Agelopoulos, 1971), 328.

³³ Adamantios Korais, “Autobiography of Korais,” in *The Movement for Greek Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg, 126.

³⁴ Korais, “Autobiography of Korais,” 127; Yiannis Notaras, *O Patriotikos Agonas tou Korai* (Thessaloniki: Macedonian Studies, 1976), 18.

documents. Even when the revolution erupted in 1821, Korais stood by his sentiments that the Greeks were still too undereducated and unprepared to succeed. The Greeks “have not yet enough learning to understand their true interest,” he noted, stating that “the right time would have been 1850.”³⁵ As shown by these two pre-revolutionary figures, even before the birth of the revolution there was already disagreement on how and when it should begin, as well as problems defining a “motherland” and what its boundaries should be. This problem of defining the Greek state would also be seen in the secret society founded to bring the revolution into existence.

In 1814, three merchants founded the *Philiki Etairia* (Society of Friends) in Odessa. The purpose of the society was to build membership and procure the influence and money needed to unite all Greeks to start a revolution to liberate the motherland.³⁶ The society was slow to start but grew to a considerable size within five years. The *Philiki Etairia* was comprised primarily of wealthy merchants of the diaspora with little representation from Greece proper other than a few regional notables from Rumeli, the islands, and the Peloponnesus, where the revolution would take place.³⁷ As the society grew in size, its first task was to find a prominent person to be a revolutionary figurehead, preferably one who could garner support from a major European power. The first person who was offered the position was the then-Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Greek Ioannis Kapodistrias. He promptly declined and warned the men that Greece was not yet ready for revolution, and that Russia would play no part in backing it. “You must be out of your senses, Sir, to dream of such a project,” Kapodistrias told the *Etairia* member who approached him, “The only advice I can give you is to tell nobody...they must abandon their revolutionary course and live as before.”³⁸ Kapodistrias’ rejection meant the

³⁵ Notaras, *O Patriotikos Agonas tou Korais*, 13-14.

³⁶ Emmanuil Xanthos, *Apomnimonevmata peri tis Philikis Etairias* (Athens: A. Gkarpola, 1845), 4-5.

³⁷ Douglas Dakin, *The Struggle for Greek Independence, 1821-1833* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), 41-49.

³⁸ C.M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria: the Founder of Greek Independence*

society would have to find another influential individual who had ties to a Great Power.

The next person the society approached was the young Alexander Ypsilantis, who was from a prominent *Phanariot* family and gained recognition through his service in the Russian military. The eager Ypsilantis quickly accepted the position as leader with the promise of Russian support, which caused money to flood into the society. With a new prominent leader and its coffers full, the *Philiki Etairia* soon began planning an outbreak of revolution. There were initial plans to have dual points of outbreak, one in the Danubian principalities (Romania) and one in the Peloponnesus. However, only the Danubian Revolt came to fruition with Ypsilantis leading a small army under the call to “fight for faith and Motherland.”³⁹

With no materialization of Russian support, which had been promised by Ypsilantis, the Danubian Revolt quickly became a disaster, ending with heavy losses and Ypsilantis’s imprisonment in Austria. The Danubian Revolt suggests that the Greece that was envisioned by the *Philiki Etairia*—composed mainly of the diaspora—was one with considerably large borders and reminiscent of the Byzantine Empire. One of the biggest problems for the organization was creating a sense of motherland for an agrarian society traditionally loyal to local notables and towns. As suggested by Misha Glenny, the conspirators had a poor grasp of the “idea of the geographical motherland, or who belonged in it.”⁴⁰ The society’s revolutionary influence had been strong, but its weaknesses in defining a motherland proved problematic. Ultimately, the revolt that led to the Greek War of Independence did begin within the Peloponnesus, but at the behest of its inhabitants, not the *Philiki Etairia*.

(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 163.

³⁹ Nestor Kamavianos and Leondros Vranousis, “Athanasiou Xodilou: I Etaireia ton Philikon kai ta prota symvanta tou 1821,” *The Movement for Greek Independence*, ed. Richard Clogg, 201.

⁴⁰ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 26.

The Revolution and Civil War

In March 1821, the people of the Peloponnesus went into open revolt against the Ottoman Empire, beginning the Greek War of Independence within Greece proper. With the early success of the revolt in the Peloponnesus, the people of the islands and Rumeli took up arms as well, fighting effectively throughout Greece proper and creating strongholds for revolutionary activity. The people of the various regions within Greece were simultaneously fighting for the control of numerous cities held by the Ottoman military, which were spread far throughout the whole of Greece proper. One of the first successes of the land war was also one of the first instances in which regional identities became apparent.

From the onset of the revolution, the variations in Greek identity were visible. When forming an initial band of fighters and throughout the war, the famous Peloponnesian General Theodore Kolokotronis, repeatedly labelled his regular troops as “Maniotes,” distinguishing them from other Greeks by indicating they were from the Mani region, and attesting to their fearlessness and fierce fighting abilities.⁴¹ This tendency to label other Greeks shows how Greeks characterized and identified one another by their specific region. At the outbreak of the revolution, a band of Peloponnesian troops blockaded the island citadel of Monemvasia. The Greek forces cut off supply lines to the Ottoman troops in the citadel, starting a siege that would last several months. When the Ottomans were ready to discuss terms of surrender, they refused to speak with the besiegers; instead, they held negotiations with a diaspora representative, Dimitirios Ypsilantis—the brother of the imprisoned Alexander. When they learned of the negotiations, those who were responsible for the siege were angered and said

⁴¹ Theodore Kolokotronis, *Memoirs*, trans. E. Edmonds (London: T. F. Unwin, 1892).

that they, “the Peloponnesians...had used their resources and spilt their blood,” therefore, “the surrender should be to the Greek people, to *Ellinikon ethnos*.”⁴² From the response of the Peloponnesians, it is apparent that there was a sense of disconnect between the people of Greece proper and the diaspora. The term *Ellinikon ethnos* (Greek people) suggests that the Peloponnesians saw themselves as the true representatives of a Greek state, not the member of the diaspora, or any Greeks outside of the Peloponnesus for that matter.

In July 1821, as the Greek advances became more numerous, Dimitrios Ypsilantis arrived in Greece proper to assert leadership over ground forces and give the diaspora representative leadership. His arrival immediately caused a schism within the movement and this division continued to grow as the war raged on. When Ypsilantis entered Greece proper, he had support from powerful members of the diaspora. However, the military leaders put all their support behind the Peloponnesian General Kolokotronis, and a third faction emerged that supported other Peloponnesian notables. When Ypsilantis suggested that a government be established with him as leader, regional notables objected and discord soon ensued, with troops plotting the demise of various notables. Worried that word of the rising internal tensions would reach the European powers from whom the Greeks hoped to gain support, Kolokotronis stated: “If we kill our own primates, what will the kings say?”⁴³ With his influence, Kolokotronis was able to temporarily quell the agitated troops, but the factions grew further apart when the Greeks began the task of forming a new government.

Six months after the revolution began, regional Greek representatives began to form their own various governments. In the Peloponnesus, primates came together to form a senate, which produced a political entity that sought to continue the war as its

⁴² David Brewer, *The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from Ottoman Oppression and the Birth of the Modern Greek Nation* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001), 85.

⁴³ Kolokotronis, *Memoirs*, 151.

members saw fit.⁴⁴ North of the Peloponnesus, two other regional governments emerged. In eastern Rumeli a government was formed with a prominent *Phanariot*, Alexander Mavrokordatos, as its leader, whereas in western Rumeli, a separate government was formed under the *Phanariot* Theodore Negris. The development of these government bodies led to further factionalism, and to make matter worse, the regional groups viewed each other with particular disdain. As historian John Petropoulos has suggested, the Rumeliots thought the Peloponnesians were “untrustworthy and effete,” while the Peloponnesians saw the Rumeliots as “backward and boorish,” while the people of the islands “displayed an insular contempt for all mainlanders.”⁴⁵ The Greeks realized that to continue with the revolution, a single government needed to be formed, but with discord being brought to the surface by regional tensions, factionalism was about to boil over.

A year into the war, regional representatives met in the Peloponnesian town of Epidaurus to draft a provisional constitution and form a centralized, representative government. The drafting council was heavily influenced by Negris and Mavrokordatos. This constitution was based on an American model, which called for three branches of government to form a system of checks and balances, and was meant to last only for a year until a new constitution was written.⁴⁶ When it came time to decide the leadership of the branches, the influence of the *Phanariots* was apparent as Mavrokordatos became the head of the executive branch, and Negris and Kolettis (Negris a *Phanariot* and Kolettis a wealthy merchant from Epirus) filled the other two seats. Although the goal of the assembly was to create unity, the result was arguably the opposite; there was no dissolution of the regional governments, and no representation for the prominent military

⁴⁴ Spyridon Trikoupis, *Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos*, vol. 1 (Athens: Tolidis, 1996) , 346.

⁴⁵ John Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 21.

⁴⁶ “Provisional Constitution of Greece,” York University, accessed March 27, 2016, http://www.arts.yorku.ca/hist/tgallant/documents/epidavrosconstitution_000.pdf.

leaders who had been so influential in the movement.⁴⁷ In essence, the convention at Epidaurus failed to achieve its main goal, the formation of a strong centralized government.

Immediately after the council, Mavrokordatos returned to his stronghold in Rumeli, where he planned to execute his new presidential powers. With Mavrokordatos away from the Peloponnesus, General Kolokotronis gained increased support and popularity through various military successes. This in turn led many to question if the leadership of the new government had been chosen incorrectly. What resulted from the growing dissatisfaction was essentially two government entities: one based in the Peloponnesus under the influence of Kolokotronis, and another in Rumeli still under the leadership of Mavrokordatos.⁴⁸ As tensions widened the rupture in Greek politics, another council was called in April 1823 to draft a new constitution—albeit a year later than what was originally proposed at the first council.

The representatives present were double that of the original, with more than half coming from the Peloponnesus. At the second council the atmosphere was frantic, and as Trikoupis described it, “disorderly and alarming.”⁴⁹ The main goal of the second assembly was to write a constitution that strengthened central authority and to prove to Europe that Greece was capable of being a modern European nation.⁵⁰ However, tension at the

⁴⁷ Brewer, *The Greek War of Independence*, 131.

⁴⁸ Barbara Jelavich and Charles Jelavich, *A History of East Central Europe: The Establishment of the Balkan Nation States*, vol. 3 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 45-46.

⁴⁹ Spyridon Trikoupis, *Istoria tis Ellinikis Epanastaseos*, vol. 3 (Athens: Tolidis, 1996), 35.

⁵⁰ Grecian Eye-Witness, *The Provisional Constitution of Greece: Translated from the Second Edition of Corinth, Accompanied by the Original Greek: Preceded by a Letter to the Senate of the Grecian Confederation, and by a General View of the Origin and Progress of the Revolution* (London: Hume Tracts, 1823), 6-13; Greek Committee, *Appeal from the Greek Committee to the British Public in General, and Especially the Friends of Religion* (London: Hume Tracts, 1823), 1-4.

council was such that two rival factions, along with their armed militias, ended up staying in different towns. One faction supported Mavrokordatos, while the other supported Kolokotronis. When General Kolokotronis threatened to end the council and take complete control of the military, the executive position was offered to him as a way to ease tension and garner popular support.⁵¹ Kolokotronis accepted the offer, but factionalism remained strong and led to a power struggle between the former executive and now-head of the senate, Mavrokordatos, and his successor Kolokotronis.

Civil war soon ensued between two regional government bodies, one backed by the Peloponnesus and the other by Rumeli and the islands. For the next two years of the revolution, consecutive civil wars engulfed Greece, pitting the regions of Greece proper against one another.⁵² While a power struggle definitely played a part in the factionalism that developed within the movement, it is also important to understand how regional identity acted as a driving force behind the conflicts. As infighting plagued Greece proper, the leader of the Rumelian government, Mavrokordatos, stayed at his stronghold in Messolonghi. In a letter to Mavrokordatos, the statesman Spyridon Trikoupis suggested that the leader not join efforts to militarily suppress Peloponnesian power, but rather stay in Messolonghi and “attend to the interests of his own region.”⁵³

What can be inferred from this correspondence is that, not only did Trikoupis acknowledge that power interests ran along regional lines rather than solely within small factions, but he also suggested that the civil war was characterised by regionalism. Additionally, the Peloponnesian leader Andreas Zaimis wrote to his regional counterpart, Andreas Londos, that the inhabitants of the islands (who were allied with Rumeli) sought “the elimination

⁵¹ Geroge Christopoulos and Yannis Bastias, *Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous*, vol. 12 (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1975), 300-301.

⁵² Jalevich and Jalevich, *The Establishment of the Balkan Nation States*, 46.

⁵³ Quoted in E.G. Protopsaltis, *Alexandros N. Mavrokordatos* (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin Ophelimon Biblion, 1982), 126.

of any Peloponnesians with substantial power and influence,” further suggesting regionalism as the basis for the ongoing power struggle.⁵⁴

Another way in which we can understand how many Greeks saw themselves within the Greek world, is to look to the memoirs of the Rumelian commander, Yannis Makriyannis. Upon examination of Makriyannis’ writings it is apparent that, although all those involved considered themselves Greek, they specifically saw themselves as regional Greeks; that is, a Rumelian Greek, or a Morean Greek, etc. It was commonplace for Greek people to preface their Greek identity with regional or city monikers. This regional identification during the civil wars, as well as the power struggle between regional notables is apparent when Makriyannis wrote: “other Rumeliots and the Peloponnesians as well wish to keep you slaves and advance their own interests... and stir up one civil war after another.” Furthermore, Makriyannis referred to the members of the diaspora involved in the war as simply “those who come from over the border.”⁵⁵ This rhetoric gives insight into how the Greeks of Greece proper viewed the diaspora. It is this adherence to regionalism that proved to be a hindering factor in creating a strong national Greek identity during the war of independence. These regional identities and the civil wars during the independence movement are also reminiscent of the polis system of classical Greece and the Peloponnesian War; regional identities and alliances fuelled a power struggle between all Greeks.

While the Greeks were occupied by three years of infighting, Egyptian forces entered the war to aid the Ottomans. In 1825, the Egyptians began taking back many of the Ottoman losses in the Peloponnesus and stripped the Greeks of their most important strongholds. With heavy losses and the massacre of Greeks in numerous Peloponnesian villages, Greek aspirations for

⁵⁴ Quoted in Christopoulos and Bastias, *Istoria tou Elliniki Ethnous*, 354.

⁵⁵ Yannis Makriyannis, *The Memoirs of General Makriyannis, 1797-1862*, trans. H.A. Lidderdale (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 44-46.

freedom began to look ominous to those fighting against the Ottomans. Amidst these new developments, the Greeks temporarily put their differences aside and united once again. With the promise of foreign intervention, Greek forces began to push back the Ottoman advances. In 1827, after numerous appeals from the Greeks, Britain, France, and Russia finally intervened and the Greek War of Independence was won at the Battle of Navarino. It was at the Battle of Navarino that the famous British admiral Edward Codrington nearly lost a leg and was so badly injured that the Duke of Wellington relieved him of his duties, although the official reason given was Codrington's failure to adhere to orders.⁵⁶

Because of the intervention of the Great Powers at Navarino, historians have debated whether or not foreign intervention came due to the emergence of notions of Philhellenism, or because of the desire of the European nations to curb Ottoman dominance in the region. What is less debated is whether or not the Greeks would have gained independence without the involvement of the Great Powers; scholars insist they most certainly would not have.⁵⁷ After the defeat of the Ottomans, the people of Greece experienced a period of interim government before finally achieving statehood in 1830. Ironically, the person who filled the position of interim president was none other than the former Russian Foreign Minister and the man who declined the *Philiki Etairia*, Kapodistrias.

Kapodistrias made it his task to unify the regional groups still present within Greece, but factionalism between these camps remained high and he was ultimately unsuccessful.⁵⁸ In 1831, members of the Mavromichalis family—notables from the Peloponnesus—assassinated Kapodistrias, which prompted the Great Powers to hold the London Conference and establish the Greek state as a constitutional monarchy. It was during this

⁵⁶ Henry Codrington and Lady Bouchier, *Selections from the Letters, Private and Professional, of Sir H. Codrington* (London: Spottiswoode & Company, 1880), 33-34.

⁵⁷ Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short Story*, 88.

⁵⁸ Glenny, *The Balkans*, 37.

conference that the national borders and the new monarch were decided, but the conference was lacking Greek representation and the decisions were made without any Greek consultation.⁵⁹ After the Treaty of Constantinople was signed and enacted in July 1832, the Greeks solidified their independence and an autonomous Greek nation was officially recognised by Europe. Greece was now a monarchical state under King Otto, a Bavarian prince, and the country's borders consisted of the most southern portion of Rumeli, the Peloponnesus, and a handful of Aegean islands. The establishment of the new government by the Great Powers created even more factionalism amongst the Greeks as a royalist versus non-royalist divide emerged, and the development of political parties influenced by the British, French, and Russians added even more aspects to identity and nationhood.

Conclusion

The Greek War of Independence was successful in that the Greek people were able to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire, but it is less clear to what extent it succeeded in creating a unified Greek state and national identity. As many historians have agreed, the Greeks would have never succeeded with their revolution had the European powers not intervened. It is through this intervention that the Greek state was established in 1832, although the nation born was a very “truncated” version of what was hoped for at the onset of revolution.⁶⁰ From the outbreak of the revolution, the Greek struggle was heavily marked by internal struggle that continually manifested itself in infighting and political tumult. Greece itself, though imagined as a cultural and political entity in the minds of people for over two thousand years, had never been a tangible nation-state. Even before the Age of Pericles and the Hellenistic era ushered in by the achievements of

⁵⁹ Jelavich and Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan Nation States*, 50-51.

⁶⁰ Clogg, *A Concise History of Modern Greece*, 28.

Alexander the Great, the Greek realm and its influence had expanded and contracted over the centuries.

Variation in identity and internal warfare can be traced back to ancient times and be seen in examples such as the Ionian-Dorian divide and the Peloponnesian War. Once the people of the Byzantine Empire had fallen under Ottoman control, the semi-autonomous governments that the Greeks were afforded during the *Tourkokratia* only helped to strengthen regional identities and develop stark differences in the socioeconomic groups of the Greek world. Although some historians may question the term regionalism, it is appropriate in the case of the Greek War of Independence. Even though it can be argued that regionalism would suggest that a Peloponnesian or Rumelian state would have been established, it is hard to say without asserting inevitability what the independence movement's eventual outcome would have been without the aid of the Great Powers. However, given the pockets of regional governments and the lack of centralized authority, more than likely the various regions would have become their own governing entities.

Although some Greeks were afforded wealth and power under Ottoman rule, specifically the *Phanariots*, there was a growing trend towards freedom amongst the Greeks as a whole. At the same time that Greek nationalism was on the rise, so too were the differences in Greek society. The formation of the *Philiki Etairia* and its subsequent undertakings can almost certainly be credited for the start of the Greek War of Independence, but the organization itself was founded by men who had built their wealth and had been educated outside of the Greek peninsula, living in situations much different than those found in Greece proper. Moreover, although the onset of revolution can be attributed to the *Philiki Etairia*, it produced vague goals, and was unable to properly define what constituted the motherland or help create cohesion in identity.⁶¹ It is because of this reason that after the failed Danubian Revolt and the Peloponnesians' successful uprising without the diaspora, that the *Philiki Etairia* had little

⁶¹ Dakin, *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, 71.

representation once the war began. As suggested by Richard Clogg, the national ardor created by the Greek diaspora was not necessarily shared by the “unlettered” people of Greece proper, and this led to problems for the Greeks when it came to imagining what an autonomous Greek state would look like.⁶²

When the independence movement finally became a reality, the various wants and goals of the different Greek social groups were too divergent to create a symbiotic relationship amongst them. After the war against the Ottoman Empire began, the dissimilarities and the subsidiary aims of the different groups came to the forefront. The Greek elites wanted to maintain political power bereft of the Ottomans, the military leaders wanted to create their own centers of power, and the peasants wanted a chance at owning land and improving their living situations.⁶³ Nowhere were these differences echoed more loudly than in Greece proper, due the fact that it was in a semi-autonomous state under Ottoman rule. This lack of an Ottoman presence allowed for the creation of regional identities and power vacuums under wealthy landowners that only turned into pronounced factionalism once the revolution started.⁶⁴

The factor of regional identity can be seen in the memoirs of the famous general Makriyannis, who acknowledged that the diaspora were different than other Greeks, repeatedly referred to himself as Rumelian, described others by their region—such as Peloponnesian—and only sporadically used the term Greek as a collective identifier.⁶⁵ It was conventional for one to have allegiance to their specific locale and distinguish themselves as from that region or town before recognizing themselves as Greek. When it comes to identity, Greek historian Theodore Zervas has recently posited that the modern Greek national identity did not emerge until after the establishment of the state, and that it was

⁶² Clogg, *A Concise History of Modern Greece*, 29.

⁶³ Dakin, *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, 78.

⁶⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, 18th and 19th Centuries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 215.

⁶⁵ Yannis Makriyannis, *The Memoirs of General Makriyannis*, 44-46.

through language and education reforms that it was ultimately developed.⁶⁶

Although there was the main goal and unifying factor of freedom from Ottoman rule, it was the obvious diversity in Greek identity that made the War of Independence and creation of the state a very disruptive and tumultuous period, characterized by spurts of “anarchy” and “fratricidal conflicts.”⁶⁷ Even retrospectively, many Greeks found the regional variations of identity and language too overwhelming to create true national cohesion, and some also found ways to poke fun at this aspect of the Greek world. Less than a decade after the end of the revolution, Dimitrios Vyzantios satirized the extreme diversity of the Greeks in his comedy *Babel*. In this comedy, which was set in the time frame immediately after the Battle of Navarino, Vyzantios described different scenarios of near chaos caused by the meeting of all these different Greeks, and likened it to the biblical story of Babel.⁶⁸ Ever since the formation of the state, Greece’s legacy has been tarnished by political strife, upheaval, and constant reorganization. While historians on the topic readily acknowledge the turmoil that plagued the revolution, they have traditionally attributed this post-revolutionary factionalism to foreign involvement. Although this outside involvement did antagonize the factions within Greece, it merely helped to magnify an already existing problem.

During the *Tourkokratia*, Greek populations were spread throughout the expansive Ottoman Empire, creating different Greek socioeconomic groups and strengthening the differences in regional identities. Greek regional commitments played a strong role in obstructing a national identity, and it was the regionalism

⁶⁶ Theodore Zervas, *The Making of a Modern Greek Identity: Education, Nationalism, and the Teaching of a Greek National Past* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 2012), 4.

⁶⁷ Dakin, *The Struggle for Greek Independence*, 71.

⁶⁸ Dimitrios Vyzantios, “Babel,” in *Discourses on Collective Identity in Central and and Southeast Europe (1770-1945): Texts and Commentary*, vol. 2, eds. Michal Kopecek and Balázs Trencsény (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), 138-142.

present within the Greek world, coupled with the competing goals of the groups involved, which hindered the success of the Greek Revolution. Yes, the Greeks were successful in gaining their independence from Ottoman rule, but they were unable to establish a cohesive Greek national identity that was needed to foster unification under a centralized government, and a create state that was not characterized and plagued by internal discord. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Greek state were ultimately executed by the Great Powers, but this was not the definitive reason for the subsequent political turmoil; it only acted to compound the factors of disunity that were already present.