Mine Action Support Group Update

Stacy Davis
United States Department of State

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal

Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol10/iss1/42
set up in Lane 1 to maximum sensitivity, and in the other lanes the ground compensation was carried out as available. The maximum sensitivity in Lane 1 to maximum sensitivity, and in the other lanes
then the max sensitivity test in air carried out. For this, in accordance with the ground conditions, the targets were buried in the lanes and the achieved maximum depth was registered.

The following detectors were included:
- PM-2 and PM-8 detectors with neutralized fused tips
- Type 7 and 72-380 AP simulators, locally used and produced
- RZM 2 fuzes mounted in 60-mm diameter clear plastic holders
- ITOP fuzes inserted Mo, Ks, Io

They were used in bags, 5, 7, 10, 12, and 15-mm diameter, placed in wooden containers.

Conclusions and recommendations of the report include:

- The sensitivity loss from L1 to L7 for the detectors without ground compensation was so large that some targets could be comfortably detected to the required depth of 130 mm in L1 could not be detected even much nearer to the surface in the higher numbered lanes.
- For detectors with very substantial sensitivity loss from L1 to L7, it is important that users are aware of the ground conditions and check the reliability of the detector’s ability to sense the exposed mines in the working area.
- In general, in air maximum detection height was measured with the detectors set up for a particular type of ground, are not equal to the in-soil maximum detection depth in the same ground. Minimum-metal mines are still the main detection problem. Even the detectors with good soil compensation could not detect some targets to the required depth in all lanes.
- Ground magnetic properties (magnetic susceptibility, ground reference height) should be measured and recorded as a survey task because they have to be known for planning and proper use of the detector fleet.

For the execution of the trial, we received excellent support from the Maukumbe National Demining Institute the Accelerated Demining Programs and other national organizations. Note: These are a very limited number of hard copys of the report available for people who have limited access to the Internet. If you do not have access to the Internet, please contact Adam Lewis to obtain a printed copy.

See Evaluation, page 112.

News Brief

Colombian Police Train Mine-sniffing Rats

With the highest number of landmine-related deaths and injuries in recent years, Colombia has been keen on interest in seeking cost-effective demining methods. Consequently, the government recently trained six rats to locate explosive devices, which are often exploded by rebel forces and drug dealers.

Recent interest in training rats arose not simply because the animal has an uncanny aptitude for the task, but also because training mine-detecting dogs is more costly and time-consuming. Dog handlers are often injured if their canines set off an explosive device nearby. Unlike their heavier canine counterparts, rats are usually too light to detonate landmines.

Coalition for Mine Action Support Group Update

The following highlight the recent activities of the Mine Action Support Group from the first quarterly U.N. newsletter of 2006, including updates on the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF.

Excerpted by Stacy Davis [U.S. Department of State]

T he MAG is an informal forum of 26 members that meets quarterly to exchange information between donors and the U.N. Secretariat on mine-action activities and research. Representatives from mine-afflicted countries, nongovernmental organizations and experts are invited to report on the status of mine action in their countries. The MAG also works to achieve greater donor coordination and facilitate funding. The United States was unanimously decided to chair the committee in December 2005 and will continue to do so until 2007.

UNMAS

On 20 April 2006, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action adopted the United Nations’ Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy 2006–2010. The strategy complements the inter-agency policy on mine action and effective coordination that IAGC–MAG principals adopted in June 2005. It also reflects lessons learned over the course of the implementation of the United Nations’ Mine Action Strategy 2001–2005. Above all, the new strategy is results-based—its strategic goal and four strategic objectives focus on the impact, or the anticipated outcome, of U.N. mine action by 2010. The previous Strategy listed some 48 activities as “strategic objectives.” These were appropriate for departmental and agency planning but did not assist in the organization of priorities and measurement of results. The content of the new Strategy is a significant improvement.

The text provides a situational analysis describing the assumptions, risks and challenges defining the context within which the United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2001–2010 will be implemented. The strategy identifies the four strategic objectives—highlighting that the United Nations Mine Action Strategy and four strategic objectives focus on the impact, or the anticipated outcome, of U.N. mine action by 2010. The United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2001–2010 is a results-based approach, identifying the expected outcomes and measurable indicators. The new Strategy will assist in the organization of priorities and measurement of results.

The key elements of the Strategy are:
- The new Strategy reaffirms the United Nations’ express commitment to supporting and communicating with the normative framework of the United Nations’ Mine Action Strategy and reflects the United Nation’s commitment to continuous, transparent monitoring of progress and periodic reporting on implementation to the General Assembly.
- The United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2001–2010 is a results-based approach, identifying the expected outcomes and measurable indicators.
- The new Strategy will assist in the organization of priorities and measurement of results.
- The key elements of the Strategy are:
  - The new Strategy reaffirms the United Nations’ express commitment to supporting and communicating with the normative framework of the United Nations’ Mine Action Strategy and reflects the United Nation’s commitment to continuous, transparent monitoring of progress and periodic reporting on implementation to the General Assembly.
  - The United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2001–2010 is a results-based approach, identifying the expected outcomes and measurable indicators.

Eritrea

The Eritrea Mine Action Support Group Update is now focusing on planning mine action support to the demarcation of the Eritrean/Ethiopian border. This support will use mechanical, manual and mine-dog capacities to ensure effective clearance of the border.

UNDP

The Chad Mine Action Support Group Update is now focusing on planning mine action support to the demarcation of the Eritrean/Ethiopian border. This support will use mechanical, manual and mine-dog capacities to ensure effective clearance of the border.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.

Key objectives were:
- On 22 March 2006, following an incident at the High Commission for National Demining, the HCND staff was arrested and an interim coordinator was designated. All efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the HCND have suffered from this situation.
The same effort should be used for the mine-risk education pro-
gram, which stopped in December 2005 due to lack of funding. 

• The additional 420 members and provincial representatives of 
  community relay in six villages were trained and 2,511 inhab-
tants of these villages were reached.

Only one project is ongoing in Ikela. Due to a current funding 
shortage, it is not possible to take current MRE initiatives in the 
DRC to scale. In the country, the ongoing situations in some 
areas, incapacity, and communication problems, demin-
g and destruction of mines are being implemented at a slow pace. 

There is a need to continue program implementation and 

strengthening of MRE activities as a necessary life-saving ini-
tiatives assisting affected and vulnerable populations.

UNICEF, through its implementing partner, and with the fed-
eral and regional governments’ involvement, has commenced the 
Village Profiling Project. The Ministry of Rehabilitation and the Na-
tion’s mine-action challenges in a development context, and to 
cole-
data on victims and assistance required for the victims and risk-
takers. Using a participatory approach, mine-affected communities 
are invited to share with UNICEF and RA&D the development challenges 
their villages face on a daily basis. As a contribution to this effort, 
program stakeholders will identify future challenges for the MRE project in Ethiopia. RA&D will encourage the community to take responsibil-
ity for the problems it faces and inform them of available services 
that can help.

Continued on page 91, MASG
The "process support" procedure involves country visits featuring the following:

- One-on-one meetings with officials from relevant ministries to raise awareness of the matter and to stimu-
  late inter-ministerial coordination

- Outreach to relevant international organizations and others to ensure that their efforts in support of the
  State Party in question are both incor-
  porated into and incorporated mine-victim-assistance efforts

- Inter-ministerial workshops to bring together all relevant actors to discuss and consolidate improvements on
  objectives and the development of plans

It should be noted workshops are not con-

considered as stand-alone actions or ends in

themselves. Rather, workshops are part of a State Party’s overall process of objec-
tive-setting, planning and implementing efforts to ensure progress by 2009.

The ultimate aim is a true equalization of oppor-
tunities for landmine survivors and other

persons with disabilities in one’s country broad-er populations.

Conclusion

It would be unrealistic to think of some of the world’s poorest countries with some of the greatest challenges regarding the care,

rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine survivors would be an appropriate setting for the development of national

victim-assistance objectives. Assistance exam-

ins to help countries at risk with these tasks in co-

operation with the Ottawa Convention, those are in a position to do so are obligated to provide it.

However, others cannot do it all, nor should they.

With perfection unattainable, it should be acknowledged that any degree of mean-

ingful progress made by relevant at-risk states in taking charge of these matters will be a major advance. The Ottawa

Convention, after all, was about expanding the traditional understanding of state re-
sponsibility, with states accepting they have important human-security responsibilities.

Ensuring progress in victim assistance by key milestone dates, like the 2009 Second

Review Conference, will help demonstrate the realism of this sense of responsibility.

The work undertaken to date by States Parties suggests they are on the right track.

However, efforts—and processes—will have to continue with vigor in order to make a real and sustainable differ-

ence.

For additional references for this article, please visit http://www.state.gov/j/trs/1016/

See Endnotes, page 113

Toward SMART Victim Assistance

The Co-chairs’ approach to gauging and ensuring progress involved the distri-
bution of a comprehensive questionnaire to the 24 relevant States Parties to help
frame an understanding of concrete vic-
tim assistance objectives by 2009 plans to achieve these objectives; and means to
implement these plans. The main aim of
this questionnaire was to encourage the
24 States Parties in question to establish
so-called SMART objectives:

- Specific objectives that should spec-
ify what these States Parties want to
achieve

- Measurable objectives that would enable all to know whether objectives
l treadmill or on track

- Achievable objectives that are truly attain-
able

- Realistic objectives that could indeed be achieved with resources at the dis-
posal of the State Party in question or with resources that could be realistically
acquired externally

- Time-bound objectives that would be achieved by the time of the Second
Review Conference

Initial responses to the questionnaire were presented at the June 2005 meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Economic Reintegra-
tion with all responses summarized in a lengthy annex to the Sixth Meeting of the States
Parties’ Zagreb Progress Report. It provides the
beginnings of a clearer roadmap regard-
ing what needs to be done between 2005
and the Second Review Conference and how
success pertaining to victim assistance will
be measured in 2009.

Overcoming Remaining
Challenges

While the effort undertaken in 2005 by relevant States Parties was impressive,
the usefulness of the responses is in doubt. Few States Parties actually responded with
SMART objectives. Some States Parties de-
tailed at length their strategies. However, even

thought this should have provided a sound basis for setting objectives, very little was put
forward in terms of what the desired status
would be in 2009. Other States Parties failed to
spell out what is known or not known about their
strategies. In addition, some States Parties did not engage in the effort at all.

Another challenge identified in 2005 relates to the effort to develop victim-

assistance objectives in conjunction with de-

mining officials who have little interaction with the health and social services sectors.

In some instances, the actual provision of as-
sistance to landmine survivors appears to be
the responsibility of mine-action structures,
not health-care or social-service structures.

A further challenge related to fostering
an understanding of victim assistance is

that the idea of “providing adequate assistance to landmine survivors must be seen in a
broader context of development help under
development.” Many States Parties have

prevented poverty-reduction strategy papers,
or national development plans to overcome
broader development challenges, with such
documents containing references to achieve
the care, rehabilitation and in-

114

tegration of landmine survivors. However, in

many instances, the preparation of victim-assistance objectives has not been considered in
these broader national plans.

To overcome these challenges, the States

decided the best way to ensure progress is


to

be

achieved

with

resources

that
could

realistically

be

achieved

with

resources

at

the
dis-
n

po

s

2006 when UNICEF, with the Geneva

International Centre for Humanitarian

Demining, facilitates data analysis and ef-

fective programming for the government and nongovernment organizations. For addi-

tional information about ICRC in Geneva, see Endnotes, page 115

Mine Action Support Group

Stacy Bernard Davis

Mine Action Support Group

Washington, DC 20522 / USA

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

To learn more about MASG and view the new Web site, visit

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

Kerry Brinkert

Midwest Region

MASG, continued from page 87

through data analysis, thereby reducing subjectivity, and it reaches to program imple-
mentation. This project will also help move the surveillance system forward. Results
of this pilot project will be available in May 2006 when UNICEF, with the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian

Demining, facilitates data analysis and ef-

fective programming for the government

and nongovernment organizations. For addi-


tional information about ICRC in Geneva, see Endnotes, page 115

Mine Action Support Group

Stacy Bernard Davis

Mine Action Support Group

Washington, DC 20522 / USA

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

To learn more about MASG and view the new Web site, visit

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

Kerry Brinkert

Midwest Region

MASG, continued from page 87

through data analysis, thereby reducing subjectivity, and it reaches to program imple-
mentation. This project will also help move the surveillance system forward. Results
of this pilot project will be available in May 2006 when UNICEF, with the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian

Demining, facilitates data analysis and ef-

fective programming for the government

and nongovernment organizations. For addi-


tional information about ICRC in Geneva, see Endnotes, page 115

Mine Action Support Group

Stacy Bernard Davis

Mine Action Support Group

Washington, DC 20522 / USA

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

To learn more about MASG and view the new Web site, visit

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

Kerry Brinkert

Midwest Region

MASG, continued from page 87

through data analysis, thereby reducing subjectivity, and it reaches to program imple-
mentation. This project will also help move the surveillance system forward. Results
of this pilot project will be available in May 2006 when UNICEF, with the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian

Demining, facilitates data analysis and ef-

fective programming for the government

and nongovernment organizations. For addi-


tional information about ICRC in Geneva, see Endnotes, page 115

Mine Action Support Group

Stacy Bernard Davis

Mine Action Support Group

Washington, DC 20522 / USA

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.

To learn more about MASG and view the new Web site, visit

www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c17719.htm.