In the Name of Humanity

Eddie Banks

The "Ca'd'oro"

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Recommended Citation

Banks, Eddie (2003) "In the Name of Humanity," Journal of Mine Action : Vol. 7 : Iss. 2 , Article 19. Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cISR-journal/vol7/iss2/19

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Table 3: Victim Assistance Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Total #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Implementing the victim assistance strategy</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Developing the victim assistance strategy</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Training 100 youth victims per year, including three righting specialist for each</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Developing a case management system for the 2007-2008 support</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Training 50 youth victims in Albania's legal support strategy</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Training the victims from northern Albania in all social and legal procedures (education and awareness) over the period</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Funding 2002-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>FUNDING 2002</th>
<th>BUDGET 2002</th>
<th>MOBILIZED</th>
<th>SHORTFALL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demining EOD</td>
<td>U.S. $27,000</td>
<td>U.S. $27,000</td>
<td>$27,000</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining DC AST</td>
<td>ACT funded $30,000</td>
<td>ACT funded $30,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demining DC AST</td>
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<td>Art/Infrastructure</td>
<td>$57,550</td>
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**Conclusion**

There is a significant mine and UXO threat in northern Albania, but there is also an increased awareness and commitment to solving the problem. The year 2007 was the turning point for the Albania mine action program, and 2008 will be crucial. Albania can now set the pace in the region on issues such as stockpile destruction. The focus this year will be on accurately determining the extent of the mine and UXO problem and initiating the transition strategy to realize the strategic objective of making Albania free from mines and UXO by 2008.

**Transition Strategy**

The Albanian government will assume full responsibility of its mine action programme by the end of 2008. After 2005, there will be a reduced mine action programme allowing for a leaner structure with only low-impact areas left to demine. An Albanian capacity for demining and victim assistance will be fully established by 2005; the MRE and IMAs will mostly have been reached, and a solid resource mobilization base will have been established.

**Funding**

Previous and current donor include the UNDP, EU, DFID, ITE, ICRC, and the Canadian, Danish, German, Swiss, Turkish, and U.S. governments. In June 2002, the EU reached a consensus to fund mine action in Albania "as far as possible" through the CARD programme (Integrated Border Management Project). Of the $5.068 million budget for 2003, $4.49 million has already been funded, leaving a shortfall of $0.578 million. The total budget for 2004 will be $5.068 million, and until 2005, it will be around $3.9 million per annum.

**Results**

The results of the study identified a number of significant factors, including conflicting political objectives, institutional rivalry and organizational management, donor support that is disproportionate to its limited output.

**Data Collection and Performance Comparison Performance**

In order to undertake a full comparison between various organizations with different approaches in the field, the study was supplemented with an independent financial and social support, such as the United Nations, Civil Protection units, NGOs and commercial companies. It was necessary to have detailed information on a range of factors. Some of these factors are not fully known primarily because a number of international organizations, institutions and organizations refused to provide such information.

**Introduction**

The continued suffering inflicted by landmines and UXO must be eliminated in the shortest possible time interval, indeed, the international community acknowledges that obligation. The Ottawa Treaty, Dayton Peace Agreement and the London and Bonn Peace Implementation Conferences all form legal obligations addressing mine action that BHAs has formally agreed to. BHAs is the Balkan country to destroy its entire stockpile of AP mines, with the exception of a few minor for training and research and development (R&D), allowed within the scope of the Ottawa Convention.

Underpinning the obligation to eliminate landmines is the financial support provided by the donor community to assist the landmine action groups with the legal and moral obligations. By removing the cause of the landmine threat quickly other aspects of human development and settlement development such as rehabilitation, relief, reconstruction and reconciliation, can be achieved, which in turn are strategies to realize the strategic objective of making Albania free from mines and UXO by 2008.

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Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2003

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**FOCUS**

Landmines in Europe & the Caucasus

In the Name of Humanity

A recent study of the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) mine action programme demonstrates the effectiveness of use of donations from political, financial and productivity perspectives. The premise of the study was that similar tasks, undertaken by a similar work force, with similar training and equipment, in the same time period, should be achieved with comparable timeframes and costs. Analysis and evaluation of the BiH programme from the past several years are discussed below.

by Eddie Banks, Project Director, E and I

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analysed. It was also recognized that commercial organisations include all aspects in their costs, including profit margins, while NGOs could utilise multiple donations for the same project and might have equipment donated, and, for replenished, through additional donations, thus considerably reducing operational costs. In late 1997, 1998 and early 1999, when commercial funding was at its highest, yet the majority of commercial tasks were started in the worst period for effective demining. The total of all tasks started in this five-month period (1998-2002) was 1,067 while in the most favourable months, (March and April, October and November) only 72 tasks were initiated. It was demonstrated that the more time-consuming and costly method of manual and mechanical demining.

Selection of Implementing Groups
A number of performance-related exercises were undertaken that highlighted marked differences between various types of organisations, but also noticeable similarities between organisations. The study team grouped similar organisations together and identified them as Commercial, NGO (both international and national), National NGO (NNGO), Civil Protection and Entity Armies. The individual groups are self-explanatory, but the use of two groups for NGOs should be explained. In late 1998, the Commission for Demining supported the establishment of three NNGOs, representing the different ethnic groups in BiH. They were initially supported by the UNDP, and the International Trust Fund (ITF). They were to be non-profit but commercially oriented. In other words, they were expected to be both productive and cost-effective. Their results proved conclusively that NGOs can be efficient, productive and effective as commercial organisations, but at a lower cost per sq meter, if they are properly managed.

Funding
While the funding problems of the BiH programme (1997-1999) are well known, the allegations of corruption against the BiH Commission for Demining, it is sufficient to note that every year, while the allegations of corruption against the BiH Commission for Demining, in the optimum period for work being missed. This is particularly apparent in that the manual and manual/machine methods were the most costly and time consuming, while the manual/EDD/machines were, depending on the vegetation, the most effective from a cost, time and effort perspective. While the commercial organisations and the NNGOs utilised the most productive methods, the non-commercial organisations were still bound to support institutional requirements such as schools, IMAs, IMSSM, and the support of institutions that have been

Analysis of Data: Methods
Based on previous work, performance analysis, a simple comparison addressing the various methods was conducted to ascertain the improvements that both EDDs and machines, used in conjunction with the manual process, provided. If operational costs are added to the equipment cost, and the cost per square meter is calculated, it is clear that the most effective methods from a time, effort and cost basis. The results illustrated

Analysis of Data: Effort
Commercial and NNGO organisations do not employ staff if there is no contract and rarely does any contract have more than a few tasks. Non-commercial organisations on the other hand, tend to retain their staff for the complete year. This means that holidays are part of their contractual obligations. In addition, if there is not a work plan (moving teams from one site to the next with no downtime) they encounter additional delays with no obvious benefit to the measured results. Most commercial and NGOs tend to use an eight-man team, including the team leader and medical orderly, increasing and decreasing the number of deminers when necessary. In 1997 and 1998, the United Nations had teams of 20 per site, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had teams of 30 and the Entity Armies usually had teams of 10. These numbers were utilised to ascertain the most effective the respective demining teams were. A table of the square meters cleared, tasks completed and days to complete the tasks is detailed in Table 1.

Seasonal Performance Based on the Clearance Method
By adding the various performance figures of the programme, season by season or year by year, an assessment of improved or decreased performance was achieved. An average performance figure was obtained. While many non-commercial organisations had machines and EDDs, the statistical data illustrated that they did little to improve performance. In a number of cases, commercial equipment was used in an attempt to improve non-commercial performance. In a large number of cases, this additional cost failed to produce a significant improvement. A separate study was undertaken to ascertain the most effective methods from a time, effort and cost basis. The results illustrated

Tables 1-2: Number of tasks, task days and average daily performances.
The management of an integrated policy requires experience, intelligence, tenacity, and the assets and a sound, business-like approach to their utilization. What became evident was that while assets have been introduced and non-commercial entities have been deployed over a long period of time, productivity has not noticeably increased. While commercial organisations offer cost benefits by improved productivity, donors provide non-commercial organisations with EDDs and machines but do not demand an increase in productivity and effectiveness. Therefore, there is an incentive for the non-commercial organisations to offer the cost. If assets are poorly managed, rather than having benefits (in terms of improved safety and/or quality or a greater output) non-commercial organisations may have a greater capital outlay. In effect, donors who provide additional resources such as machines and EDDs, but do not demand an increase in output, simply condemn ineffectiveness.

An analysis of the NGO data for 2002 illustrated that several new organisations were created in BiH. Increased production was found to be the result of the commercial-style management of these organisations. In one case, a commercial company was also the owner of the NGO. In a number of other cases, the non-commercial organisations utilised commercial company infrastructure and/or the supply of machines or EDDs. This prompts the question of what the difference, from an effectiveness perspective, between NGOs and commercial organisations? Both are undertaking mine action activities and both, therefore, conducting humanitarian work to humanitarian standards. Any humanitarian activity should also require that work be conducted in an efficient and effective manner. One primary difference is that one works for profit and the other does not. In the case of organisations that have no experience, no equipment and no manpower, but still use highly productive sub-contractors to work on their behalf, it also raises the question of whether such groups can successfully pass a technical contract assessment and presumably undergo other more established organisations.

What the Mine Clearance of 34.8 Million Square Meters of Mine-Affected Land Could (or Should) Have Cost

The cost to the donor or client of commercial demining in BiH, on a range of terrains, site difficulties and various methods, fell from an average of more than KM 4.16 ($2.08) U.S. per sq m in 1996-1997, to an average of KM 1.37 ($0.68) in 2002. The average price over the six-year period was KM 3.60 ($1.80) per sq m. The NGOs, also operating in a variety of circumstances and site conditions and using different methods, achieved a price of around KM 2.81 ($1.41) in 1999; their average price in 2002 was below KM 2.50 ($1.25). The average commercial costs from 1998 were under KM 4.00 per sq m. From 2001 to 2002, commercial companies averaged less than KM 3.10 per sq m. The results illustrate that, if the commercial companies had conducted all of the demining, the total costs would have cleared 34.8 million sq m would have been KM 125.5 million ($62.7 million). However, based on commercial and NGO costs, the cost for demining in BiH could have been as little as KM 114.5 million ($57.2 million), instead of between KM 240 million and $299 million (which is a figure that includes additional unrecorded donations that are estimated to be around KM 50 million). This would have been a significant saving that could have been used for other purposes than the Civil Protection and Entity Armies. The facts are that the NGO organisations, working for no profit, in a

A minimum of 160 million (or as high as KM 210 million) has been used by the non-commercial groups. In addition to lowering costs, the commercial/NGO option would have considerably reduced the time taken to complete the tasks, a factor deemed to be just as important, if not more so, than the reduction in costs.

What BiH Demining Could Have Achieved (Based on Available Finance and Known Costs)

If the non-commercial organisations had utilised the same media spend as commercial organisations and NGOs, the estimated costs for the clearing of 34.8 million square meters could have been greatly increased. The study was able to assess the actual costs for a number of organisations, and by so doing estimated how much land could have been cleared using the estimated funds donated by national authorities. Based on a commercial/NGO surplus, and using an assessment of their salary and associated insurance costs (each group was different) the costs per sq meter would range from $2.81 to as low as $2.90.

While the figures show a considerable difference between the commercial/NGO’s and the non-commercial groups, it should be noted that these figures do not include the so-called “missing” donations. A new approach to the calculation of the Civil Protection and Entity Armies. The facts are that the NGO organisations, working for no profit, in a

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similar environment, could potentially have cleared 57 million more sq meters for the same amount of money, as opposed to the 1.14 million sq meters that was achieved in increase of 15.8 million sq meters or 600 percent. The estimate of possible achievement brings together a combination of factors, and illustrates that considerably more clearance could have been achieved had more emphasis been placed on the effective use of donations. It should also be emphasised that with properly prioritised site selection the possible increase could have been as high as 25 percent more than indicated. In other words, for a cost of $1,242 million, an estimated output of 116.9 million sq meters could have arguably been achieved.

Summary

The study attempted to review every aspect of the demining process, comparing organisation types and their individual and collective demining effort. It also reviewed a number of other aspects that have an influence on effectiveness, such as the need for a balanced response to funding, the importance of timely donations and the selection of the most suitable ground conditions. In addition, an example line was taken on timing, efficient methods and costs illustrated the importance, not just of time and site selection, but also the selection of the most effective method. In order to work effectively throughout the year, many decisions about when, where and how to work need to be made. Realistically, it will not always be possible to achieve the ideal effectiveness optimisation. The study proved that at present, many of the critical elements for achieving effectiveness are not even considered. The facts are that:

- Many donations are not made available in time to achieve the most effective results.
- Site selection, based on the best conditions to achieve effective demining, is rarely considered.
- Commercial and NNGOs completed more sq meter/KM ($) than the non-commercial with fewer personnel.
- Commercial and NNGOs have completed more tasks/KM ($) than the non-commercial.
- Commercial and NNGOs have destroyed more mines/KM ($) than the non-commercial.
- The average cost per sq meter undertaken by the non-commercial groups is at least five times higher than the average cost per sq meter of the commercial/NNGOs groups.
- The commercial/NNGOs work more hours per day and more days per month than the non-commercial sector.
- Many donors stated that they are “not interested” in their donation being utilised more effectively.
- In BHL, political, institutional and personal views have had a negative impact on the effective use of donations; political and institutional objectives have delayed the effective creation of a sustainable national capacity.
- Donors are supporting more projects that have little or no effect on improving productivity, cost effectiveness or the removal of the cause.
- While annual output has remained at around 6 to 6.7 million sq meters, the number of tasks and mines destroyed has gradually decreased since 2000; yet, technical survey and the increased number of deminers since 1999 shoulder dramatically increased the sq meters cleared and number of tasks completed.

The lack of a balanced, business-like approach that addresses safety, quality, productivity and effectiveness, at international, institutional and organisational levels, as well as at the national mine action programme level, is obvious. The lack of that balanced approach, coupled with ineffective management of those responsible for implementing donors unnecessarily, prolongs the suffering of affected populations. Yet, we still have those donations "in the name of humanity." We are truly humanitarian we need to focus more on removing the threat of landmines quickly and as safely as possible so that affected countries can begin the long process of post-conflict recovery.

In order to view the full study, check out www.eandi.com.

*All graphics courtesy of the author.

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From Kosovo to Afghanistan, Cluster Bombs Again

Cluster bombs have created problems in several countries, as they are one of the many unexploded hazards often left behind after a conflict. This article gives an overview of the threat and shows how the organization Interzeros has been working to help clear up the problem.

by Fernando Termentini, Interzeros

Background

Cluster bomb units (CBUs) are well known from the Gulf War to post-Dayton Bosnia, but they were completely forgotten by the Ottawa Treaty, which didn’t recognize them as APLs. In Kosovo and in Afghanistan, they have proven to be more dangerous than APLs.

Cluster bombs are UXOs that became known in Italy when some fishermen found them in their nets in the Adriatic Sea. Apart from the fishermen, whose security was threatened, nobody at that time spoke out in Italy about the future danger: hundreds of these UXOs would spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory, killing and injuring people, mostly children. In fact, CBUs don’t have self-destructing device that disables them if they do not explode, so they remain as a long-lasting danger for civilians, and they can explode with a slight touch or upon removal.

Modern CBU models are BL-7 and BL-755, made in the United States, and MK-41, made in the United Kingdom. They are the “elder sisters” of the weapons used in Kuwait and in the KB-1 used by Serbs and Muslim Bosnian people during the Balkan Wars.

CBUs differ from APLs in their appearance, the former being more colourful and intriguing, so that they can trigger people’s curiosity. An APL is basically a defensive ordnance with a local target, while a CBU is an offensive ordnance with a wide-area target. CBUs are real unexploded traps with much more explosive capacity than APLs, as an APL can kill at a range of 50 m, while a CBU can be fatal at a range of 150 m.

In fact, CBUs are dropped during air raids in dispensers with a capacity of more than 200 more bombs each, landing randomly on the ground. When they do not explode, they hide in the grass or under the ground, up to 50 cm deep, so that nobody can really tell where they are. In principle, APLs should be mapped, making their identification, marking and clearance easier and allowing civilians to avoid them. CBU impact areas, instead, are very wide targets, difficult to identify and map before systematic surveys and clearances are carried out. They can be identified starting from their drop point, if known, or by tracing them on the ground in a sequence.

In those days, we knew exactly where 90 percent of Kosovo’s mines were, because the Serbs handed over the maps of registered mined areas to the international community. But we didn’t know with the same accuracy where CBUs had been dropped. In fact, we had little news on Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates of dropping points, which made is virtually impossible to fix the affected land area and quantify the real problem.

In Chapter 7, we will see that basin of a million surrounds the territority and whose...