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Resilience Thinking for Peacebuilders*

Patrik Johansson

Abstract

The concept of resilience is currently making its way into the field of peace and conflict studies, but it is a concept with different meanings and implications. The argument advanced in this paper is that in order to make the most of resilience thinking, the field should not conceive of resilience merely as the ability to bounce back to an original state after a disturbance, a conceptualization usually referred to as “engineering resilience.” Instead, it should engage with “ecological resilience,” which refers to the amount of disturbance that a system can absorb before being pushed across a threshold from one stable state to another. I also relate these different types of resilience to another distinction between specified resilience to anticipated disturbances and general resilience to unknown ones. Finally, I consider a few other implications of resilience thinking for research on peace and conflict.

Introduction

Resilience is one of those terms that combine positive connotations with elasticity of meaning and therefore become popular in all sorts of contexts. Structures and machinery, children and grown-ups, ecosystems and societies are all expected to be resilient in order to withstand crisis, survive and function in a complex world. The most basic definition of resilience is “the ability to bounce back,” but the manifestations of resilience among children are obviously very different from the manifestations of resilience among machinery or ecosystems, and consequently a wide range of definitions have been formulated (see e.g., CARRI, 2013; McAslan, 2010; Sudmeier-Rieux, 2014).

In the fields of peace and development resilience has been taken on board by policy makers and researchers. UNDP markets its Strategic Plan (2018–2021) as addressing “three broad development contexts: eradicating poverty; structural transformations; and building resilience” (UNDP, 2018). The World Bank uses the concept in some of its recent World Development Reports, with chapters such as “From violence to resilience”, and “Fostering resilience and prosperity through a vibrant enterprise sector” (World Bank, 2011a; 2013). It is also a central, but not very specific, concept in the European Union Global Strategy (EU, 2016, 24):

Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.

In research on peace and development, resilience is not yet as prevalent as many other concepts. A search for peace resilien* (not in quotation marks) as topic on Social Science Citation Index in early October 2018 resulted in 167 hits, 85 of which were published in 2015 or later. The corresponding figures for peace sustainab* were 826 total/406 from 2015 or later; for peace stability 991/370; and for peace security 3602/1334.

However, researchers are increasingly turning to resilience to understand and analyze the governance of complexity (Chandler, 2012; 2015), the connection between natural disasters and conflict (Harrowell & Özerdem, 2018; Vivekananda, Schilling & Smith, 2014), and new strategies of and approaches to peacebuilding more broadly (Bachmann & Schouten, 2018; Bargués-Pedreny, 2015; De Coning, 2016; 2018; Fontan, 2012; Stepputat, 2018). In this research, resilience is sometimes related to security and stability, sometimes to the local turn and context sensitivity and sometimes to non-linearity and...
self-regulation, illustrating the variety of understandings of resilience also within peace and conflict studies. In this paper I want to focus on one particular distinction between different ways to understand resilience—as stability or as adaptability. This distinction reflects very different assumptions about and implications of resilience, but it is seldom expressly formulated.

Briefly, one way to look at resilience is as the ability to bounce back after crisis and trauma. It is about returning to a pre-crisis state or situation, it is about returning back to normal, to where things function the way they should function. However, there is not always a “normal” to return to or a particular way such systems “should” function. This is especially true for adaptive systems such as ecological and social systems that may function in very different ways depending on the circumstances. Here, resilience becomes a question of being able to adapt to foreseen and unforeseen change. In line with Gunderson (2003) and others, I will refer to the bouncing-back version as engineering resilience and to the adaptive version as ecological resilience. The purpose of this paper is to describe these different understandings of resilience and to discuss their very different implications for peacebuilding, as well as for peace and conflict studies more broadly.

Resilience is entering the discourse on peacebuilding at a time when the international engagement is both very extensive and highly criticized. Over the past quarter century, the United Nations have launched around 50 peace operations in more than 30 countries across the globe, from Croatia to Timor Leste, from Angola to El Salvador. The mandates of these operations have often been significantly more detailed and ambitious than those of peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era, and they are much more likely to contain enforcement measures (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2016; Thakur, 2017; Wallensteen & Johansson, 2016). An important feature of this development has been the standardization of peacebuilding into what is referred to as the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. This paradigm has long been criticized as representing a narrow “peacebuilding consensus” (Richmond, 2010, 22) insensitive to context, and which has resulted in “template-style peace implementation” (Mac Ginty, 2006, 7). Liberal peacebuilding is perceived as being closer to state building, meaning the establishment of formal institutions, than to peacebuilding, which refers to understanding context, integrating local culture and decision making, and engaging with the everyday lives of people. This way, according to Richmond (2010, 24–25), “liberal peacebuilding has been turned into a system of governance rather than a process of reconciliation.” Jabri (2010, 54), in the same volume, argues that “[s]ecurity is hence the ultimate imperative of the liberal peace project.” In other words, ideas about resilience is entering the field of peacebuilding at a time when conventional practice is being continually criticized for being too heavily tilted toward stability.

The next section outlines the concept of resilience, emphasizing the distinction between engineering resilience and ecological resilience. The third section relates resilience thinking to peacebuilding by discussing how the aims and strategies of peacebuilding would differ depending on whether they were influenced by ideas about resilience as stability or resilience as adaptability. The fourth section considers three other implications of resilience thinking for peace and conflict studies. Finally, the argument is summarized, and a few conclusions are presented.

Resilience

The term resilience comes from the Latin resilere, which means to rebound or recoil. McAslan (2010, 1) describes the development of resilience as a scholarly concept from its first use in the early 19th century to describe the ability of timber to resist breaking from heavy loads to later being used to describe a property of “species, ecosystems, people, communities, organizations and even nations.” Resilience should not be confused with efficiency. On the contrary there is a trade-off between resilience and efficiency, and this is the case for engineering as well as ecological resilience. As expressed by Pariès (2011, 26–27):

Proceduralisation and automation both try to reduce the uncertainty in the system by reducing variety, diversity, deviation, instability. But the side effect is that this also reduces autonomy, creativity, and reactivity. Increasing order, conformity, stability, predictability, discipline, anticipation, makes the systems better (more efficient, more reliable), possibly cheaper and
generally safer within the confines of their standard environment. They also make them increasingly brittle (less resilient) outside the boundaries of the normal envelope.

Similarly, Walker & Salt (2006, 77) argue that as it becomes increasingly efficient, “a system is increasingly stable—but over a decreasing range of conditions.” Increasing efficiency is about reducing redundancy and because redundancy is what allows margins of error increasing efficiency means reducing margins of error. In other words, increasing the efficiency of a system means making it less and less able to respond to internal stress or external shock. For example, the short-term suppression of forest fires to ensure high timber output may lead to the accumulation of fuel for larger fires at a later time. Relatedly, the market economic mantra of reducing fixed costs may induce manufacturers to minimize storage costs by having materials delivered just when they are needed, making them highly vulnerable to supply shortages (Anderies, Janssen & Ostrom, 2004; Folke, Colding & Berkes, 2003). Increasing efficiency becomes increasing rigidity, and with “extreme and growing rigidity, all systems become accidents waiting to happen” (Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 45).

Sometimes of course resilience is a higher priority than efficiency. For example, this is why Boeing uses a system of three computers from three different retailers, all based on different hardware and different software, to control the fly-by-wire system of its 777 airliners (Maruyama & Minami, 2013, 4). This is how a resilience approach is distinct from a liberal approach. Whereas the liberal approach wants to achieve stability through market principles, competition, and efficiency, resilience thinking is based on the virtues of redundancy.

**Engineering Resilience and Ecological Resilience**

Resilience can be understood as the ability to bounce back to normal after a crisis or trauma, or as the ability to adapt to change. The labels engineering and ecological resilience largely correspond to how the concept is understood in those respective fields of research, but both types are used in other fields as well (Gunderson, 2003, 34–35; Hollnagel, 2014, 221). When these types of resilience are contrasted engineering resilience can be understood as the amount of time it takes for a system to return to normal after a disturbance. This view assumes that there is only one stable state for a system to be in and that the system can either function or not. Conversely, ecological resilience refers to the amount of disturbance that a system can absorb before being pushed across a threshold from one stable state to another. This means that the reinforcing feedbacks of a system can reinforce different things depending on which stable state the system is currently in (Gunderson, 2003, 34–35; Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 27–28). In the literature on ecological resilience these stable states are also called as “equilibria,” “regimes” or “basins of attraction” and refer not to a situation where nothing changes, but to one where the feedbacks of the system reinforce each other so the system maintains basically the same components and functions.

The idea of systems equilibria and the two ways of conceptualizing resilience can be visualized a ball (the system) in a bowl (the equilibrium). A deep bowl with steep edges would represent a more resilient system than a wide bowl with low edges; cf. Figure 2 below.
B. Ecological resilience (R).

Figure 1: Engineering resilience and ecological resilience (cf. Gunderson, 2003, 35).

Figure 1 illustrates the difference between single-equilibrium engineering resilience and multiple-equilibrium ecological resilience. The ball represents the system, and the basins represent the equilibria. For engineering resilience there is one equilibrium. The system can be disturbed and needs a bit of time to get back to normal in order to function. This tends to be how we view engineered systems—systems that are constructed for a specific purpose and either work in a particular way or not at all. For ecological resilience there are two (or more) equilibria, meaning that the system can function in more than one way. A minor disturbance can put the system off track, but allow it to remain in its “original” state; a major disturbance can push the system across a threshold into another state where new types of feedbacks make the system function differently than before.

An ecological example of multiple stable states can be illustrated with a shallow lake filled with small submerged plants and various fishes (Scheffer, 2009, 110–115). Ecological feedback mechanisms are beneficial to both plants and animals, and contribute to keeping the lake in a clear state. Fertilization in surrounding areas can increase nutrient loadings in the lake, particularly of phosphorous and nitrogen. This stimulates the growth of phytoplankton, and increased turbidity, which often leads to loss or disappearance of aquatic vegetation. As hiding places in the vegetation disappear, zooplankton become easier prey for fish, which reduces their number, in turn removing an important controller of phytoplankton biomass. Next, fish that live off sediment-dwelling small animals come to dominate the lake, and their search for food in the sediment both amplifies turbidity and releases more phosphorous. At this stage, the reduction of nutrients alone is unlikely to have much effect on the lake, as ecological feedback mechanisms have been altered, and now work to keep the lake in its new state. These new feedback mechanisms can be highly resilient to attempts at pushing the system back into a clear state.

A system that moves from one stable state to another crosses a threshold. Ecological resilience therefore requires us to be concerned with threshold effects. Threshold effects occur in non-linear relationships when an independent variable increases beyond a certain level resulting in a jump in the dependent variable. Threshold effects can be reversible, meaning that when the dependent variable decreases back below the threshold, the dependent variable follows along. More relevant in the context of ecological resilience are non-reversible threshold effects. If a threshold effect is non-reversible, once the threshold is passed decreasing the independent variable back to a previous value may have little or no effect on the dependent variable, such as in the example with the turbid lake described above.

Another important feature of resilience thinking is adaptive cycle theory, the notion that systems do not merely change and develop but that they go through adaptive cycles. The adaptive cycle (Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 32–49) consists of four phases: exploitation (r), conservation (K), release (ω), and reorganization (α). The first two phases—exploitation and conservation—represent the traditional view of ecosystem succession, “a familiar, slow, fairly predictable pattern of growth” (Scheffer, 2009, 76). However, in the adaptive cycle theory, they form the forward loop, which is this is only half the story—or
half the cycle. The other two phases—release and reorganization—constitute an often rapid and unpredictable back loop. During the back loop, “[a]ccumulated resources are released from their bound, sequestered, and controlled state, connections are broken, and feedback regulatory controls weaken” (Holling & Gunderson, 2002, 45). Resilience is at its strongest during the change from reorganization to exploitation, and then decreases as the conservation phase becomes more rigid, before expanding again during the back loop. The result is episodic upheaval and change.

Holling and Gunderson describe adaptive cycle theory in an ecological context, but it is equally useful for understanding social systems. It was in fact originally formulated by Schumpeter to describe the cyclical fluctuations he observed in market economies. He argued (Schumpeter, 1950, 83) that the process as a whole works incessantly however, in the sense that there always is either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution, both together forming what are known as business cycles. - - - This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.

The implication of adaptive cycle theory and the process of creative destruction is not that all systems continuously break down. Instead, some systems manage to stay in the exploitation phase of the forward loop for a long time. They do that by allowing smaller-scale disturbance to take place; instead of becoming more and more efficient and rigid, they retain a certain level of redundancy and resilience. As Scheffer (2009, 78) explains:

One might see the forward loop in the Holling cycle as a process of digging a deep basin of attraction. The fact that the basin is deep corresponds to a strong performance. However, it also keeps the system as it is in place in a rigid way. Slow larger-scale developments inevitably change the overall stability landscape in such a way that this basin of attraction ends up being a tiny valley in some scary high place. Eventually, a large catastrophic transformation out of this situation is inevitable. If the self-dug stability basin had been less deep, changes in the stability landscape might have led to earlier adaptation and resettlement into another place.

To refer back to the examples above, by allowing smaller fires to reduce the outtake of timber from time to time the devastating disaster of the major fire may be prevented, and by accepting slightly lower profits by keeping goods in storage a manufacturer can continue production even during brief recessions.

**Specified and General Resilience**

Resilience can be specified or general (a distinction that does not overlap with engineering and ecological resilience). Walker and Salt (2006, 120) describe specified or targeted resilience as the resilience of specific parts of a system to specific disturbance—“the resilience ‘of what, to what.’” Assessing specified resilience therefore means identifying “known and possible thresholds between alternate states (or regimes) the system can be in” (Walker & Salt, 2012, 68). In an ecological system feedback changes can be related to such factors as rainfall or temperature and assessing specified resilience would mean determining the levels of rainfall or temperature that would risk altering the system and to prepare for managing high levels of those particular factors. At the same time, resilience thinking warns against the optimization of anything including specified resilience. “Optimizing for one form of resilience can reduce other forms of resilience” (Walker & Salt, 2006, 121).

More fundamental therefore is general resilience, that is, the ability to absorb novel, unforeseen disturbances. Three important features of general resilience are diversity, modularity, and tightness of feedbacks (Walker & Salt, 2006, 120–122). In practice, they features tend to overlap and reinforce one another, but in an attempt at delineating the implications of resilience thinking for peacebuilders, it makes sense to keep them theoretically distinct.

The first feature is diversity, which is a question of variety in the number of species, people and institutions in a social-ecological system. Diversity is about flexibility and keeping your options open.
Diversity increases the resilience of the system by allowing different voices to be heard in planning and decision making, by sustaining different ways of picking up on discontent and the need for change, and by avoiding the fallacies of groupthink. The contradiction between efficiency and resilience mentioned above is closely related to the question of diversity, which allows a system to maintain various functions even in the face of challenges that harm or undermine the ability of some of the system components to fulfil those particular functions.

The second feature is modularity, which is about how the different components of a system are connected. A modular system is one that contains subgroups with strong internal connections, but with weak connections between subgroups. Modularity increases the resilience of the system by allowing most subgroups to continue to function even when some fail. Conversely, failure spreads quickly in a non-modular system, where all components are highly interconnected. The need for modularity calls for encouraging the self-sufficiency of different regions or groups in a society.

The third feature of general resilience is tightness of feedbacks. This refers to the way change in one part of the system is conveyed throughout the system. Tightness of feedbacks increases the resilience of the system by allowing change in one part of the system to be perceived in other parts of the system. The sooner this can be done the more likely that the system can make the necessary adjustments in time to avoid crossing a major threshold at a later stage.

Resilience and Peacebuilding

How would resilience thinking play out in the context of peacebuilding? In this section I discuss peacebuilding from the perspectives of engineering resilience and ecological resilience focusing on the implications of understanding resilience as stability or as adaptability. Importantly, these two perspectives do not merely present different solutions to the same problem, but they represent different understandings of what the problem is—and even more fundamentally, different understandings of what kind of system a society is.

Low et al (2003, 103) argue that social systems are more adaptive than most because, in addition to other characteristics of complex systems, social systems also involve learning and innovation. Still social science has tended to draw more on non-adaptive physical analogies (including engineering resilience) to understand the behavior of complex systems, than on adaptive analogies from biology and ecology. What are the implications of this for peacebuilding?

In order to apply ecological resilience to peacebuilding we need to conceive of the peaceful, non-violent society as an adaptive system. This can involve both the function of the system—what it does—and the structure of the system—what it is Hollnagel (2011). The resilient peace system should not resolve all conflicts once and for all, but build and preserve the ability to (re)distribute resources in a society in a peaceful, legitimate, and authoritative manner. Or, in the words of Cousens (2001, 12),

Peacebuilding is not designed to eliminate conflict but to develop effective mechanisms by which a polity can resolve its rival claims, grievances, and competition over common resources.

To capture the structure of the system I’m going to turn to the peace triangle, Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs’ take of the conflict triangle as a basis for understanding different kinds of peace beyond the absence of war (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010). Note that in this section I use the peace triangle to discuss how a peaceful society can be conceived of as an adaptive system; below I use the peace triangle to illustrate how specified resilience can be applied to peacebuilding.

In the original conflict triangle (Galtung, 1969) the three corners represent attitudes, behavior and conflict (or incompatibility, or issue of contention) and the idea is that hostile attitudes, conflictual behavior and disagreement over salient issues tend to reinforce each other. This is why a conflictual society can be highly resilient to attempts at conflict resolution, which shows that resilience, per se, is not necessarily a positive quality. I return to this below.
These same aspects can be used to describe a peaceful society, or a society in a state between war and peace. A peaceful society can be conceived of as being characterized by friendly attitudes and peaceful behavior, meaning that disagreement even over salient issues can be resolved or managed without the resort to violence, whether through negotiation, sharing, third-party control, democratic elections or other methods of conflict management and resolution. According to this way of understanding social systems and feedbacks peace and war are both alternatives states that a society can be in and they can be studied as such. And in addition there are many different more or less stable states in between.

**Engineering resilience peacebuilding**

The engineering-type conceptualization of resilience—as the ability to bounce back—means that is it more concerned with specified than with general resilience. To some extent it has the same basic aim of stability and security as the liberal peace paradigm. However, because of the necessary trade-off between resilience and efficiency, the two approaches have different strategies for strengthening stability as well as partly different understandings of what that stability entails. While the liberal approach wants build a society that can avoid challenges, the engineering resilience approach would expect challenges to occur and instead prepare to be able to manage them. Engineering resilience also places greater emphasis on local context and capabilities. A resilience approach “(re)directs attention to local resources and practices and away from ready-made blueprints that are parachuted into conflict zones” (Wagner & Anholt, 2016, 417).

To some extent each case is unique and calls for a unique solution, but there are still similarities across cases that we can learn from. As a middle ground between a unique solution for each case and a single solution for all cases we can think of different groups of cases that need similar solutions. One way of identifying such groups is the peace triangle, to which I now turn again. Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs identify nine types of peace beyond the absence of war characterized by the relative presence or absence in post-war societies of remaining conflict issues, remaining violence and insecurity and remaining conflict attitudes (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs, 2010, 376–384, as developed further below). These types of peace beyond the absence of war can help determining factors that may put a society at risk and that may require special attention.

Continuing the analogy of balls in basins of attraction used above, peace beyond the absence of war can be illustrated as in Figure 2, as a situation between peace and war, which may be pushed across minor thresholds either back into war (a situation where conflictual dynamics become self-reinforcing) or further on into peace (where peaceful dynamics become self-reinforcing).
The shallow basins in Figure 2 represent situations that are less resilient than the ones in Figure 1 above. Particularly the middle-state of “peace beyond the absence of war” is very shallow, meaning that rather small challenges or disturbances can push it across a low threshold either back to a state of war or into a somewhat more resilient state of peace.

On the issues dimension Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs describe unresolved peace as situations where key issues are left unresolved, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of the 1990s, and Kosovo since 1999. Restored peace refers to situations where peace is restored but there is no transformation of society, because the underlying causes of conflict are left unattended, such as Liberia after the Abuja Agreement of 1996, and Sierra Leone after 2002. Contested peace is situations where the peace-settlement generates new conflicts. Examples include Lebanon after the Ta’if accords, and the independence of East Timor in 2002.

On the behavior dimension, they describe partial peace as situations where one or more parties continue to use armed force, but where the peace still holds in some respects. Examples include post-1991 Cambodia and post-2011 Myanmar. Regional peace refers to situations where residual violence occurs in certain parts of a country, such as post-settlement violence in the provinces of Equateur, Katanga and Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Insecure peace refers to situations where the end of the war is followed by widespread criminal violence, often exacerbated by the ready availability of arms. Examples include El Salvador and South Africa, which both saw high levels of criminal violence in the aftermath of the solutions to the political conflicts.

The attitudes dimension comprises polarized peace where conflict attitudes remain polarized despite a peace settlement. Sometimes, as in Northern Ireland, polarization may even increase in the aftermath of the settlement. There is also unjust peace which is characterized by impunity and the absence of reconciliation. An example is post-war Guatemala, where the signing of the peace agreement was followed by the adoption of a broad amnesty. Fearful peace, finally, refers to situations where large-scale violence has been replaced by political control and repression, an example being Liberia under Charles Taylor after the 1996 Abuja agreement.

Without going into how all these different types of peace beyond the absence of war can be made more resilient, the point is that attention to these differences and to the local context more broadly means that efforts to prevent the recurrence of violence can be tailored to likely problems with critical consequences. This may be necessary in the short to medium term after a peace settlement, but in the longer run such optimization risks undermining the equally necessary adaptive capacity of a society. This brings us to ecological and general resilience.

**Ecological resilience peacebuilding: peace through adaptability and capitalizing on challenges**

Ecological resilience peacebuilding suggests building peace by strengthening the adaptive capacity of post-war societies. This involves a shift of focus from specified resilience, the resilience of what, to what, to general resilience, the ability to absorb novel, unforeseen disturbances through such features as diversity, modularity and tightness of feedbacks described above (Walker & Salt, 2006). Similarly, Rodin describes five characteristics of the resilience framework: being aware, diverse, integrated, self-regulating and adaptive. (The following is based on Rodin, 2015, 9–42.)

Being aware means that a system knows about “its strengths and assets, liabilities and
vulnerabilities, and the threats and risks it faces” (Rodin, 2015, 14), basically Walker and Salt’s specified resilience. But being aware also involves a readiness to consider new information and to adjust to it when necessary. Being diverse is about preserving variation. Diversity strengthens resilience by limiting the dependence on a singular type of actor or institution to perform essential tasks and instead preserves alternative options, it means not relying completely on any one element for a critical function. In a social system this would refer to the provision of social services, media, decision making and more. Rather than streamlining such functions in order to make for example the provision of services as efficient as possible, a concern with diversity would encourage the preservation of redundant capacity including alternative capabilities, ideas, sources of information and people.

Being integrated helps a society to bring those diverse capabilities, ideas and people together into cohesive solutions and coordinated actions. It involves transparent communication and the presence of feedback loops which allows different parts of the system to perceive changes and challenges in other parts and to react and adjust before disruptions spread throughout the system. Being integrated largely corresponds to Walker and Salt’s tightness of feedbacks. Being self-regulating allows a system to “fail safely”, to contain problems and disruptions and avoid a collapse of the whole system. In a post-war society strengthening self-regulation would involve decentralized governance, but possibly also preservation of some more traditional forms of social organization on village or extended family level. This is close to Walker and Salt’s modularity. Finally, being adaptive means being flexible, having “the ability to apply existing resources to new purposes or for one element to take on multiple roles” (Rodin, 2015, 14). Basically it means having the ability to act upon the four other characteristics—being aware, being diverse, being integrated and being self-regulating.

Similarly Taleb and Treverton (2015, 88) describe the principal sources of societal fragility as “a centralized governing system, an undiversified economy, excessive debt and leverage, a lack of political variability, and no history of surviving past shocks.” They illustrate their argument with a comparison between Syria and Lebanon in the context of the Arab Spring. In Syria centralized control of the economy and top-down management of society created a rigidity that made highly vulnerable to disruption. Conversely, in Lebanon the civil war had helped decentralizing the state, which in combination with a free-market economy may have appeared chaotic but paradoxically (so far) turned out to be resilient. The conclusion is that we should not try to avoid failure at all cost. Instead we should build our capability to cope with failure, and use it to our advantage. “In a complex and fluid reality, failing better is seen to be a much more realistic goal than narrow short-term understandings of policy ‘success’.” (Chandler, 2014, 12)

In sum, there is a lot of criticism against the liberal blueprint-type of peacebuilding and its focus on stability through statebuilding rather than emancipation through peacebuilding, including with reference to resilience. The argument of this paper is that resilience does not offer one single alternative. On the one hand, engineering resilience means preparing for likely challenges so that they do not push the system completely off track but merely result in minor detours from which the system can return to the right track as soon as possible. In combination with its concern for local context and capabilities resilience engineering peacebuilding might therefore be conceived of as a map-type process. On the other hand, from the perspective of ecological resilience and the possibility of multiple equilibria we might not even know exactly where we are going. The system can make use of challenges to strengthen its ability to learn and adapt. Peace can take different forms and it can change over time and it is therefore built neither according a blueprint nor by following a map, but with the help of a guidebook. This means that if a certain destination or mode of transport turns out to be unsuitable, other options are or can be made available. This perspective constitutes a more fundamental challenge the liberal paradigm—and is more in line with other critical approaches to peace and conflict studies. This argument can be summed up as in Table 1.

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<td>capitalize on</td>
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Other implications

So far, this paper has highlighted a few aspects of resilience and what they might mean in a peacebuilding context, such as the need to accept and prepare for change, and the need to consider both specified and general resilience. In this section, I will briefly outline three other important implications of resilience thinking for peace and conflict studies. First, the idea of multiple equilibria means that just as resilience keep a society in a peaceful state it can also keep a society in a conflictual state. Second, ecological resilience means that rather than bouncing back from crisis to a previous state, a crisis can be conceived of as an opportunity to learn, develop, and move forward. Third, resilience thinking requires a different understanding of conflict termination.

The resilience of conflict

From the perspective of ecological resilience and the assumption of multiple equilibria a social system can find itself in a peaceful state, where various feedbacks between the attitudes, behavior and issues dimensions reinforce each other and keep the system in its peaceful state; or it can find itself in a conflictual state. Both states can be resilient to change. Once a threshold is crossed—once the lake becomes turbid, once methane is being released from thawing tundra, or once large-scale violence begins to feed hostile stereotypes—it can be difficult to push the system back across the threshold to a more positive state again. In the words of Holling & Gunderson (2002, 32): “Resilience can be the enemy of adaptive change.” This means that calls for “building resilience” need to be clear about what it is that is to be made resilient. The notion of protracted social conflicts is well known in peace studies (see e.g., Azar 1990). Researchers are also using the term resilience to describe such situations, for example Wallensteen et al (2009, 258), who argue that “internal conflicts throughout the world tend to be resilient to conflict management initiatives.” Relatedly, the World Bank (2011b, 172) uses resilience in the context of social norms preventing women rights:

Social norms are typically most resilient in areas that directly affect power or control. Those who would lose power under a change in the social norm actively resist change, and those who would gain often are too weak to impose change. The resilience of dysfunctional social norms may also stem from the difficulty of the potential gainers to credibly commit to compensate the losers after the change is made.

From this perspective, peace and conflict are different states that a society can be in rather than completely different phenomena. The same theoretical framework of systems, thresholds, stable states, feedbacks and adaptability can therefore be used to analyze societies both at peace and in conflict.

Inducing Disturbance

A crisis is often perceived as a window of opportunity among other things to address vulnerabilities and initiate change. “Never let a good crisis go to waste,” as Churchill expressed it (Rodin, 2015, 241). Similarly, according to Friedman (1982, ix) “[o]nly a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.” In resilience terminology, novelty is suppressed during the more rigid phases of the adaptive cycle, as growth results in established structures that leave little room for change. Then, as the cycle enters the release phase it effectively experiences a crisis, which opens windows of opportunity for change and novelty (Scheffer, 2009, 76–77).
Accepting or even inducing small-scale disturbance can serve both as a safety vent, to address problems early on rather than suppressing them until they become more serious, and as a type of social stress inoculation, improving the ability to react constructively to later, larger disturbances, although other factors are, of course, also important (Oldehinkel et al., 2014). The same argument has recently been made for countries’ ability to deal with disorder:

Countries that have survived past bouts of chaos tend to be vaccinated against future ones. Thus, the best indicator of a country’s future stability is not past stability but moderate volatility in the recent past. (Taleb & Treverton, 2015, 88)

These “past bouts of chaos” do not have to take the form of violent upheaval. On the contrary, as expressed by Holling, Gunderson & Peterson (2002, 95):

Modern democratic societies (…) have invented ways to diffuse large episodes of creative destruction by creating smaller cycles of renewal and change through periodic political elections. So long as there is a literate and attentive citizenry, that invention demonstrates that the painful lessons from episodic collapses of whole societal panarchies [linkages between adaptive systems at different levels] might be transferred to faster learning at smaller scales.

Regular elections can function as a safety vent for democratic societies. It helps them to avoid the accumulation of pressure for reform, which could otherwise erupt in the form of violent protest.

**Conflict termination**

While there are many ways of measuring the durability or sustainability of conflict terminations, the lasting absence of direct violence remains a standard minimum requirement. The absence of armed conflict for at least five years has been a common operationalization of durable peace (Walter, 2002), but both longer and shorter periods have been used, as well as more than one cut-off point, and minimum levels of democracy or respect for human rights have served as qualifiers. (Downs & Stedman, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Druckman & Albin, 2011; Johansson, 2010; Ohlson, 1998). However, all these measures have one thing in common: if and when conflict breaks out again, peace has failed—irrespective of the duration and severity of the renewed conflict.

However, this is when resilience is really put to the test. Does the situation escalate to large-scale, long-term warfare, or is the recurring violence limited and brief? Is the system pushed across a threshold back into a conflictual equilibrium, or is it resilient enough to absorb the disturbance and remain in the essentially peaceful equilibrium? Does a short-term relapse into violence even represent an opportunity for learning about remaining vulnerabilities, and for addressing these vulnerabilities to make the society better prepared to handle the next setback? From a resilience perspective then, the recurrence of violence is not in itself reason enough to write off a case as a failure.

**Conclusions**

The premise of this paper was that as peace and conflict studies takes on the concept of resilience, there is reason to be aware of different understandings of the concept. I described two versions of resilience: engineering resilience, based on the assumption of a single equilibrium and conceiving of resilience as the time it takes for a system to bounce back to its original state after a disturbance; and ecological resilience, based on the assumption of multiple equilibria and conceiving of resilience as the amount of disturbance a system can absorb before being pushed across a threshold from one stable state to another.

Common to both conceptualizations of resilience is a contradiction, or at least a necessary trade-off, between efficiency and resilience. Efficiency is about reducing redundancy, but redundancy is what makes up the margins of error necessary for resilience. This means that resilience should not be mistaken for an extended version of stability, or even as the ability to remain stable in the face of change. On the contrary, resilience thinking implies the inevitability of change and the need to prepare for that change.
Resilience thinking therefore means that peacebuilding cannot be about “template-style peace implementation.” Building resilient peace is not about getting closer and closer to an ideal social system, over time meeting more and more of a range of positive-peace-criteria, and being done when all the boxes are ticked. Instead, resilient peace is a continuously ongoing process, and building resilient peace is about strengthening the ability to manage a continuously evolving and changing social system in ways that avoid, as far as possible, the use of violence as a means of advancing political goals. It is about assisting a society to develop the capacity and skills, materially and intellectually, to avoid a major breakdown of the conservation phase, and to do that through the timely inducement of small-scale disturbance. This will support the defining priority of peacebuilding, namely “the construction or strengthening of authoritative and, eventually, legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal conflict without violence” (Cousens, 2001, 4 original emphasis).

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**References**


Commemoration of War Dead for Peace Education: Implications from the Case of Germany

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Abstract

This article focuses on challenges in the commemoration of war dead for peace education, drawing on modes of remembrance of the war dead in Germany as an informative case: In Germany’s official remembrance culture ‘all victims of war’ are mourned. Yet in public and in private divided narratives and interpretations have been cultivated. In this ‘memory competition,’ the vanishing of the contemporary witnesses of World War II entails challenges but it also offers opportunities for peace education. To take advantage of these, questions must be tackled publicly about what the (different) war dead may mean to us today, and to future generations. A reflective remembrance culture requires historical accuracy but also recognition of the complexity that belies the notion of there being one collective memory.

Introduction

In the summer of 2017, when election campaigns started for the German federal elections and the European Union had been confronted by a wave of ‘Euro scepticism’ including ‘Brexit,’ the banking crisis in Greece and resurging nationalist parties in some member states, the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V. – in short ‘Volksbund’ – a humanitarian organization founded in 1919 and tasked by the German government with recording, maintaining and caring for the graves of German war casualties abroad, launched an unusual poster campaign against Euroscepticism: Images of war cemeteries were depicted together with the slogan ‘therefore Europe’; or else with the following statement made by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, on different occasions over the past ten years: ‘Those who have doubts about Europe should visit our war cemeteries.’

In the face of the upsurge of nationalist parties across Europe and beyond, it appears in fact to be true that there is a necessity, seventy years after World War II and a hundred after World War I, to remind Europeans of the death toll attributable to ethno-nationalist politics in the past, and of the progress that the European Union represents as a peace project; it has brought about the longest period in history without a war waged between European nations. Nevertheless, the allusion to war dead alone does not make for convincing peace education. It has become a routine phrase in official remembrance practices that ‘the dead from wars past shall remind the living to keep the peace.’ Yet, is the meaning of their deaths so clear? What exactly is the lesson that we today should or could draw from the – many different – dead of past wars? Most generally speaking, they do remind the living of the preciousness of peace. But that has always been true and has never prevented wars in human history. How can peace education embrace this knowledge and not end in disillusionment?

In this article, I want to scrutinize some conventional assumptions associated with practices of commemorating war casualties that are meant to serve as a reminder to the living to preserve peace. The development of today’s established modes of remembrance of the war dead in Germany will serve as an exemplary case to discuss the inherent complexity and challenges connected with the growing distance of time. Here, remembrance of the dead from World War II has been connected with a specific uneasiness: The
historical knowledge that Germany initiated the war and inflicted mass atrocities rendered previous conventions regarding how the war dead are commemorated by the general public unacceptable: The dead German Wehrmacht soldiers could not be regarded as defenders of a good cause nor had the German civilian population been uninvolved in the political developments leading to the war, to displacements of large populations and to genocide. German society immediately after World War II, however, was not ready to engage in defining causes and effects, or perpetrators and victims. The dilemmas entailed in mourning the dead have only occasionally been the subject of societal and political processing and have instead been covered up with the routine compromise to mourn publicly for ‘all victims of war and tyranny.’ In this field of tensions, the imminent ‘vanishing of the contemporary witnesses’ (Frei, 2005) of World War II means a particular set of challenges and opportunities for peace education: Very soon this generation will no longer be present and be able to contribute to, or ‘bear witness’ as we attempt to understand the complicated relationship between individual historical perspectives and collective accountability. At the same time, the loss of so many idiosyncratic experiences and interpretations which were directly co-shaped by personal involvement also offers chances for the development of a more reflective remembrance culture grounded in historical accuracy, without passing over the suffering, nor the individual responsibility for engagement in collective violence (see Parent, 2017, for a related analysis of the postwar intergroup situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

If remembrance of the war dead is to assume significance beyond personal emotionalism and functionalization for particular group identities (and interests), questions need to be tackled publicly about what the life paths of the dead may tell us today and even future generations, in view of our interest in keeping the peace. This peace education perspective requires a conceptual shift in the way we understand and actually make memories with our cultural and social practice, for it makes it necessary to take into account the many heterogeneous factors involved in a historical situation, and not to simply reduce them to a common denominator such as the one of tragic ‘victimhood.’ In fact, the case of Germany is a very good demonstration that ‘those who understand memory as a form of competition see only winners and losers in the struggle for collective articulation and recognition’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 5), and thus hampers a deeper understanding of the complexity of every (not just historical) situation that leads to political violence. My article thus argues for a broadening of the perspectives that guide our perceptions of the past that could let us understand the German experience in a more general context.

To this end, I will explain in a first step why the inevitable passing away of the generation of historical World War II witnesses may offer a chance to develop a more reflective relationship with the past in terms of peace education. The specific fault lines in German public remembrance of the war dead will be presented next, in order to make the problematic consequences of an ‘inability to mourn’ visible (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich, 1967), which is not a phenomenon limited to Germany only but which has become very clear in this particular case. Finally, I will draw conclusions concerning the implications of this case for peace education goals: To prevent group-specific narratives (and their partly apologetic functions) being left untouched as if they were a private matter only, public commemoration must also tackle the ‘difficult dead’ whose individual shares in the paths towards collective violence vary. In the interest of a positive peace, a relationship with war history should be promoted that transcends indifferent victimhood narratives and instead employs multiple perspectives to make the complexity of root causes and concrete individual as well as societal conditions for political violence accessible.

Challenge and chance: The passing away of historical witnesses from World War II

Though the sheer magnitude of the 60 to 80 million people who lost their lives during World War II is impossible to comprehend, it does give us some impression of how great an impact the personal losses must have had on the populations of all the affected nations. For the majority of the War’s survivors, their personal
memories are connected with mourning, whether for family members, friends or neighbors. Moreover, many survivors – civilians as well as members of the military – had themselves experienced traumatizing violence, dehumanization, or permanent injuries. Their sufferings and traumatization were mass phenomena in the war-afflicted countries but have come to be represented in the official national remembrance cultures selectively and in very different ways. Postwar political positions obviously tinged the kind of lessons that were drawn from past atrocities and the group of war victims who were to be mourned in the first place to symbolize these core lessons. In effect, many survivors kept their individual traumata in the subconscious for decades. They were manifested as emotional handicaps or psychosomatic symptoms and had an impact on the next generation; yet these forms of victimhood were largely treated as personal or private issues, and thus disassociated from collective memory, i.e., the ‘metanarrative, which a community shares and within which individual biographies are oriented’ (Eyerman, 2004, p. 66). The question has thus long remained unsettled how the relationship between individual suffering and the societal processes of defining lessons from past wars or other phenomena of mass violence can be made to ‘talk to each other’ in such a way that memories are not instrumentalized for apologetic purposes or a purported competition between the histories of suffering, but instead made fruitful for societal self-enlightenment and peace education.

These questions are of lasting importance whereas the lifetime of surviving witnesses from World War II is reaching its end. Once this generation of the directly affected passes away, so too will the private mourning for those killed during the War, whether they were civilians or soldiers. Remembrance will thus take on an altered significance. As opposed to the generation for which the War was a part of their personal or immediate family biography, the commemoration of the war dead will most probably take on a passed-down meaning for the following generation. If remembrance of the dead should be intentionally maintained beyond the timeframe of the so called ‘communicative memory’, questions of ‘Why?’ and ‘How?’ will inevitably arise. Private mourning undertaken by war survivors for the sake of coming to terms with personal losses does not require any justification. This stands in contrast to public remembrance, replacing personal involvement with a message directed towards the present and the future: Public, and especially state-led, commemoration practices aim at preserving certain experiences as well as moral and political lessons within the collective memory. Yet, what do the deaths from back then have to say to us today, and especially to future generations?

Questions of the future relevance and possible forms of remembrance of the past’s war dead also have a material dimension: What significance – if any – could the existing war grave sites have beyond their functions as cemeteries? The departure of the generation of contemporary witnesses marks the loss of personal memories, making possible and also necessitating renewed forms of historical appropriation. This transition will have implications for the ways in which the graves are made use of, and also for the institutions dealing with them: With regard to the German case, the original task of the Volksbund, namely the establishment of war graves, will be completed in the near future. Members, along with donors from the generation of surviving witnesses, have supported this task and the related maintenance work for decades. But their personal concerns lay primarily in the cemetery function of the war graves: The remains of the dead were to be retrieved, insofar as this was possible, and given a proper burial, thus emphasizing their inviolable human dignity and creating a concrete space for mourning. This latter meaning is soon to be lost, and would relegate the official duty of preserving existing war graves eternally – as it is a norm enshrined in humanitarian international law – to cemetery garden work. From the perspective of peace education, such a shift would be a squandered opportunity. War grave sites in themselves have never in history functioned as peace messengers, but they need to be developed as an educational resource if they are to serve such a purpose. Many grave sites from World War II and more recent collective atrocities, such as during the civil wars in former Yugoslavia, may qualify as sites of historically-informed peace education which draws on research and documentation of the concrete paths that led to the breakdown of civility and left behind so many victims.
Whether or not later generations become conscious of such implications and their meaning for social and political practice depends, inter alia, on the extent to which knowledge is made accessible about the different responsibilities for concrete deaths. In light of this, a need exists (not just) in Germany to catch up in terms of critical reflection on and more differentiated examination of the various groups affected, for instance those that are commemorated together on public memorial days as ‘the victims of war and tyranny’; this phrase, which is worded as a compromise while also concealing certain truths, is proof that the different strands of remembrance cultures that have arisen since 1945 each have their own grounding and often run counter to one another (see Margalit, 2010). Germany is an informative case in this regard because fundamental interpretative conflicts in addressing the war dead of the Nazi period and the related war histories become apparent in this context. As moral and political lessons play an influential role in the public practices of remembering, the question how we could or should remember those Germans who were killed or injured through bombing and other acts of war inflicted by the Allied Forces during World War II without relativizing German war guilt is still open. The very ambiguity surrounding this relationship between individual biographies, historical responsibilities and collective memory imposes complexity beyond the specific shape it has taken in postwar Germany.

Between moral norms and the desire to forget: German public remembrance of the war dead

Conveying historical experiences to the next generation through public and especially state-led commemorations – such as the festive and ceremonial focus of anniversaries and memorial days; the designation of remembrance sites, along with the construction of memorials and symbolic practices such as wreath laying; the selection and presentation of topics dealt with in state schools – are all meant to carry supra-individual historical relevance and ethical and political lessons to the younger generation. Public memory and shared remembrance seek to anchor certain interpretations of the past within the collective memory. In other words, it requires a minimum amount of consensus in how history is interpreted and using this as a basis for the fundamental characteristics projected as a common political identity. For public remembrance of the deceased, this means commemorating, first and foremost, those who sacrificed their lives for the current political community and the central values it represents. In this vein, Reinhart Kosseleck has related the significance-granting interpretation of the public cult of the deceased to the ‘pledge of the surviving’ (Kosseleck, 1994, p. 9) – meaning that the survivors and those born later enjoy the fruits of what the deceased fought for or defended, and are thus obliged to give their thanks. The prerequisites that would have provided a political foundation for such a framing of commemoration of the war dead did not, however, exist in postwar Germany: ‘As horrible as defeat and death in war may be, their atrocity would have been alleviated by the moral triumph of a collective project that could have persisted even after a defeat and could even have earned the tacit respect of the victors – a heroic war of liberation and independence, for example. But moral justification of the war was entirely and radically denied for the Germans. The aim, the form, and the circumstances of the war were criminal and were so labeled by the victors. The shame connected with the German name from then on was a matter of collective identity. The trauma of 1945 did not only result from ruin and rape, death and defeat, but also from the sudden loss of self-respect and moral integrity’ (Giesen, 2004, p. 115).

And yet, in spite of this collective loss of moral integrity, the German survivors of World War II, among them millions who were bombed out, became widows or orphans, were disabled or displaced, were, without a doubt, far from uniform in terms of their concrete historical responsibility, political judgment, orientation and expectations. This must also have been the case in their retrospective evaluation of the Nazi regime, in their opinions about who was to blame for the war, belligerence, conduct of the war and armistice, about the role of the Wehrmacht in the war of extermination in the East, and about responsibility for the mass murder of Europe’s Jewish population as well as millions of other victims of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Although a few well-known intellectuals such as Martin Niemöller and Karl Jaspers or the attorney general Fritz Bauer soon became engaged in questions of guilt and the concrete identification of historical responsibility, many Germans willingly pushed these conflict lines aside, remaining silent about them or suppressing them: ‘Postwar Germany responded to the disclosure of the Holocaust by a “communicative silence” (Lübbe, 1981) about the unspeakable or inconceivable horror (…)’ (Giesen, 2004, p. 116), that is, through a tacit agreement to not make it an issue. In respect of their own possible sufferings during the war, this eloquent silence implied the ‘inability to mourn’ (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich, 1967), and for a variety of reasons. Not only did the victimhood of the Germans appear slight next to the war crimes and atrocities that had been committed by the Germans, but the generations that had been born and raised in the first decades of the 20th century had been exposed to educational ideals and practices which rewarded the suppression of emotions. During the Nazi period this had become systematic with the aim of generating willing and emotionally cold soldiers. To this end, mothers were for instance advised in the standard guide book for ‘the German mother’ not to satisfy their babies’ needs immediately but to leave a crying child alone. Such disturbances of bonding in early childhood have had long-term effects on emotional regulation capacities (Kratzer, 2018): This kind of socialization contributed to the production of ‘willing executioners’ of Nazi policies, whether it is regarded as a mass phenomenon (Goldhagen, 1996) or not; and it amplified the ‘inability to mourn’ that Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (1967) drew attention to.

Moreover, in the everyday life of the postwar world it was apparently not hard to give priority to pragmatic mastering of daily necessities, to organizing personal survival, and often to rationalizing or forgetting personal participation in or else unopposed tolerance of the crimes carried out by the Nazi regime. The transition to normal life and the reconstruction of postwar Germany in the 1950s that led to the ‘economic miracle’ in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was testament to the fact that critical self-reflection was not the main desire in the country at the time. On the other hand, considering that parts of the population were still enmeshed in Nazi ideology, and taking into account the disparate individual suffering and/or even profits gained from the War, along with very widely varying conditions at play at the supposed ‘zero hour’, such willingness for self-inquiry and societal self-enlightenment could hardly have been expected. One ought not to talk about rope in the house of the hangman, lest one face resentment, said Theodor Adorno, referring to the unspoken agreement of guilt deflection in postwar West German society. Yet encapsulated in the eloquent silence was also a traumatic shock. Sociologist Bernhard Giesen named this conflation of shame and trauma as cause for the effective ‘coalition of silence,’ for ‘those who had directly participated in the genocide, obviously, stayed silent in order to avoid imprisonment. Neither the individual trauma of rape, death, and dehumanization, nor the collective trauma of guilt and defeat could be turned into the theme of conversation’ (Giesen, 2004, p. 117).

Apart from the fact of Germany being divided, which resulted in differing official historical perspectives for East and West Germany, the dissociation from individual blame and compliancy entailed questions which were generally too complex to permit the articulation of interpretations supported by society of the country’s Nazi past and World War II immediately after 1945. The very ambivalence towards the complex separation between (criminal) offenders and victimized groups, as well as between individual blame and spreading responsibility across society, has been one reason for the denial and outright truth avoidance by criminals and accomplices among the generation of the involved. What dominated societal practice was initially the desire to simply pass over the Nazi and war past and keep remembrance within the realm of private mourning for ‘their own’ dead. Nevertheless, in both halves of divided post-World War II Germany, by the late 1940s an apologetic narrative had already emerged. In his book on German commemoration after 1945, Gilad Margalit (2010) calls this first overarching narrative ‘the reconciliation narrative.’ It stressed the sufferings of so-called average Germans, and played down individual as well as shared responsibilities for past crimes and for the war.
While official commemoration policies were established under the recognizable influence of the different occupation forces, focused on remembrance of fallen Red Army soldiers and the victims of the Communist resistance in eastern Germany, and on the Nazi persecution of political opponents and Jews in western Germany, respectively, the tradition of a ‘Day of National Mourning’ had already been revived by 1948, that is, even before the official establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. This particular commemorative ritual was an invention of the Volksbund at the end of World War I with the intention of expressing national solidarity with the surviving dependents of the fallen soldiers. Its reintroduction is a telling expression of the commemoration narrative which had emerged during the late 1940s among Germans and which did not tackle the set of complex problems connected with public mourning for the fallen members of the Wehrmacht. Alexandra Kaiser’s study of the history and the changing practices of the ‘Day of National Mourning’ (Kaiser, 2010) shows clearly that from an early point in time the dead Wehrmacht soldiers were viewed uncritically as ‘victims’ on this occasion. The Volksbund functioned in fact as a medium for channeling nationalist heroism in the post-World War II years. It was not until the late 1960s, when criminal tribunals against Nazi atrocities took center stage, that the questionability of such continuity in national remembrance was raised for discussion in the wider West German public. The prosecution of judicial offences and debates about what fell within the domain of litigation and what did not were crucial for the gradual development of self-criticism in the political culture of the Federal Republic. However, attention initially remained fixed on concentration and extermination camps and thus produced what Margalit (2010) identifies as the second master narrative in the culture of remembrance in postwar Germany, namely ‘the Jewish Holocaust narrative’ which took hold in West German society from the 1960s onwards. The related reckoning with German society’s participation in Nazi crimes made more differentiated perspectives on the Nazi history emerge, and challenged not just the ‘coalition of silence’ still being observed in society but also convenient self-inclusion in the framing of all-encompassing suffering in the war and victimhood.

In spite of this shift in attention towards one particular group of true victims, the war crimes committed by soldiers of the Wehrmacht and this military institution’s key role in the murder of the Jewish population only entered the scope of attention very much later. Hence, the tension between the two ‘master narratives’ of remembrance remained unresolved, but was increasingly merged into the compromise formula of collective grieving for the ‘victims of war and tyranny.’ The ceremonial commemoration of the dead on the Day of National Mourning begins with these words, and since 1993 this common denominator has also been quoted in the Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, dedicated to ‘the victims of war and dictatorship,’ the ‘Neue Wache’ in Berlin. At least this latter memorial sparked far more controversy while it was being planned, to wit, that victimhood is represented in the ‘Neue Wache’ by the Pietà statue ‘Mother with her Dead Son’ which Käthe Kollwitz created in memory of her son who had died a soldier in World War I.

Conflict lines under the umbrella of victimhood

The development of a public culture of remembrance in the Federal Republic of Germany was complicated by the facts: World War II had taken a toll of casualties across a wide range of people who had occupied varying positions prior to the 12-year Nazi regime, in the years preceding and after the Second World War; not even minimal societal consensus had been reached about the evaluation of that recent history. A day for remembering the invasion of Poland by the German Wehrmacht was not specified until a politically-motivated citizen’s association established the 1st of September as Anti-War Day in 1957. It took until the 1960s before any notable public discussion of contemporary history and its root causes was brought about by the capture and deportation of holocaust ‘mastermind’ Adolf Eichmann in Buenos Aires and his subsequent court tribunal in Israel. Public awareness stayed focused on this in the following years because of a series of concentration camp tribunals in West Germany (the Auschwitz proceedings in Frankfurt on Main from 1963-65, the Sobibor
proceedings in Hagen from 1965-66, the second Treblinka proceedings from 1964-65 and the third from 1969-70 in Dusseldorf). Although the Nazi crimes were already known to the public immediately after the War, when the Americans forced Germans to visit sites and watch films of the atrocities committed, this did not trigger any considerable coming to terms with what had happened. Neither were the court proceedings that had been held under the aegis of the Western Allies directly following the War comparable in their effects with the tribunals in the 1960s. These broke the persistent silence, which had been an act of conflict avoidance, denial and trauma suppression by many direct historical witnesses. Micha Brumlik, former director of the Fritz-Bauer Institute in Frankfurt, called the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials the turning point in the German population’s confrontation with its own criminals. While the witnesses in the trials reported on the brutalities of everyday camp life on Hessian Radio (Hessischer Rundfunk), with both German and international newspapers publicizing details of what happened at the Birkenau extermination camp – turning Auschwitz into a symbol of industrial genocide of Europe’s Jewish population par excellence – in December 1963, members of Frankfurt’s police unabashedly saluted SS members being tried (Brumlik, 2004). Such scandals led to growing national as well as international media coverage of the crimes under the Nazi regime, and even though this was driven by only a minority of society at the time, this socio-political history of conflict became formative in West Germany’s remembrance policies. It crystallized in the form of a moral obligation during the 1970s to maintain an authoritative reminder of the plunder and murder of Jewish and politically persecuted peoples in the public remembrance culture.

The more complicated question of whether or not an imperative to commemorate Germany’s remaining civilian and military victims of World War II also existed, as well as how this could eventually be brought into the general remembrance culture, was largely avoided. The problem in addressing these dead lay in the fact that collective attribution of either victim or criminal status clearly did not work: Among the dead left behind by Allied bombings of large German cities, or those who died while fleeing, were fervent Nazis, more traditional nationalists, collaborators who had no political leanings, and ‘internally emigrated’ members of the opposition; but also countless numbers of children, far removed from any political blame. Zealous Nazis could also be counted among the fallen soldiers of the German Wehrmacht, as well as pathological sadists and war criminals. Wehrmacht soldiers were spectators, confidants and accomplices. However, the fallen also included politically indifferent young men with no burning desire to drive the conquest campaign for the German Reich to the far ends of Europe, but wishing rather to simply survive. It is even within the realm of possibility that some of them acted humanely in terms of the modern laws of war.

While it has since been proven that the institution of the Wehrmacht was active in creating the plans and means for conducting the war in Eastern Europe, utilizing the services of forced labor slaves and carrying out or assisting in the extermination of local populations including the Jews, detailed historical investigation remains the only way to determine the innocence or blame of individual war participants. The same applies to the historical fact that Nazi Germany instigated the World War and that the German populace carried through with little resistance the systematic disenfranchisement of Germany’s Jewish population, political opponents, or those labeled hereditarily sick in the years before the war. Individual perpetrators and accomplices also elude identification as do assumptions of innocence without specific knowledge of who acted in what way, because German society was not homogenous, even during Nazi rule. The resulting political and moral dilemmas tended to be covered up with the all-inclusive compromise formulation in the official remembrance discourse that mourns all ‘victims of war and tyranny’ with the intention of glossing over lines of conflict. And yet, the obscuring inclusive phrase, inter alia, has the effect that explicit (and exclusive) mourning for Germany’s civilian and military war dead has turned into an ideal topic for symbolizing opposing interpretations of history and denial of guilt: Historical revisionists and right wing extremists push this point and intentionally stage commemoration acts, for example by means of events remembering only the German civilian victims of war bombings. The perfidious phrase ‘bombing holocaust,’ introduced by National Democratic Party (NPD) politicians and neo-Nazi organizations at their ‘memorial marches’ in Dresden, is one
example of such a targeted political functionalization of one particular group among the war dead, with the aim of blurring the specificity of Nazi crimes and rehabilitating the Wehrmacht. In its political rhetoric, postwar Germany had constructed narratives to encompass exactly this option. Phrases like ‘the dark past,’ or the ‘catastrophe of German history’ (see Dubiel, 1999) moved historical responsibility into a zone of vagueness. Such formulations may have helped keep the societal peace between different groups of war survivors, but they also disguised the agency behind the atrocities.

Commemorating the various victims of war and of persecution under one umbrella made it politically feasible to include German soldiers who fell in World War II in the mourning on National Memorial Day, although they had not fought for a democratic Germany but in an unjust war and in the name of a totalitarian regime. Apart from the official Memorial Day remembrance ceremonies that include them, the fallen soldiers of the Wehrmacht have also been commemorated on memorials in many towns and communities, as well as among the forces of the West German Bundeswehr. Military comrades’ and veterans’ associations that have maintained remembrance of the dead since the end of the last War have regularly done so without broaching the issue of the political and military turning point of 1945, or the differences between the two World Wars. In many communities and at many military sites existing locations for the remembrance of the fallen in the Franco-German wars and/or World War I were simply enlarged with the dates 1939-45 and the names of the local fallen soldiers added. This imparts a kind of timeless, supra-historical aura to the soldiers’ deaths, blurring out the specifics of World War II (see Echternkamp, 2008).

Although the newly-created Army of 1955 was meant to be seen as a new beginning, negating the heritage of the Wehrmacht in the reformation of the West German armed forces, personal continuities and solidarity among army comrades ensured a stubborn and continuing remembrance of the fallen World War II soldiers in barracks of the German Bundeswehr throughout the 1950s and 60s. This clearly contradicted the new normative principle of the democratic ‘citizens in uniform,’ so that Kai-Uwe Hassel, the Defense Secretary at the time, felt obliged to adjust the traditions of the German Bundeswehr per decree: The Prussian military reformers, the military resisters in the Third Reich, and the genuine conception of the German Bundeswehr as a democratically integrated army were the cornerstones of this prescribed understanding of tradition from 1965 on. In 1982 and in 1995, the Defense Secretaries again felt urged to clarify the matter, stating that no tradition could justify the unjust regime of the Third Reich (Hans Apel), and that troop divisions and soldiers of the Wehrmacht were, at its peak, enmeshed in the crimes of the Nazi regime in view of the fact that the Wehrmacht was a core organization of the Third Reich. This meant that the Wehrmacht was ultimately ‘not an institution worthy of forming the basis of a tradition’ (Rühe, 1995, p. 945). For the politics of commemoration, the fallen German soldiers of World War II could therefore not play a role in the sense of having made a public contribution to the meaning of the democratic constitutional state, but rather ‘their political power of symbolism found its complete expression ex negativo’ (Echternkamp, 2008, p.55) – as a sheer reminder of senseless death for a bad cause, even though some individuals possibly went to war in the belief that they were conferring a worthy service for their German fatherland.

**Enduring fault lines over generations?**

The negative assessment of the Nazi period and of the role of the Wehrmacht has certainly not been supported by all, and the refusal to accept the historical judgment was not restricted to the immediate postwar decades. One instance where this troubling fact became evident was in 1985, when then German Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker designated May 8 German Liberation Day (‘Tag der Befreiung der Deutschen’) on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender. His public statement that May 8, 1945 ‘liberated all of us from the inhumanity and tyranny of the National-Socialist regime’ (Weizsäcker, 1985) meant a turning point, especially against the background of Weizsäcker’s own biography, as a former
Wehrmacht member, and his political party affiliation with the conservative Christian Democrats. Explicitly giving it importance ran counter to attempts at disassociating past crimes against humanity from allegedly seduced ‘bona fide’ soldiers and German civilians. Among conservative circles and also within his own party, even as late as 1985, Weizsäcker’s rejection of this narrative met with indignation.

Even though more than 30 years have since passed, there is no doubt that particular remembrance communities continue to exist within German society (see Cornelissen, 2012; Wernstedt, 2005), and their divergent views on German Liberation Day will not fade away automatically as historical witnesses pass away. The recent upsurge of right wing parties across Europe, including those in Germany, has, on the contrary, even widened some of the fault lines and brings a host of relativizing narratives to the fore again. The ‘rupture in civilization’ at Auschwitz (Diner, 1988) has rightly stood in the foreground of historical consciousness since the 1960s, still triggering deep-seated distress among the following generations, leading to history workshops and initiatives for researching Nazi history at the local level. All this, however, is only one part of the historical impact. Repression, denial and even rationalization of the atrocious crimes committed by the Nazis have still resurfaced in every generation. Given the German unification and the fact that East Germany had followed partly different strands in official commemoration, contradictory effects have continued to exist, and competing interpretations of history are continuously being brought into circulation.

The self-victimizing discourse of the ‘children of war’ is illustrative in this regard: In the wake of debates among historians during the 1980s, this term was introduced by contemporary witnesses who had experienced World War II as children and wished to have their victimization recognized. These ‘children of war’, who were psychologically and/or physically damaged by the events they experienced, have started voicing their traumatization in past years. The fact that individual war traumas affected their quality of life negatively is not to be denied. However, the discourse surrounding the German ‘children of war’ is marked by what Michael Rothberg calls the ‘memory competition’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 11): Undoubtedly influenced by their traumatic memories from childhood, these people often over-emphasize their own painful experiences on the home front, thus ignoring collective reflection upon their country’s responsibility for the war, let alone admitting it. This effect of understanding memories as if they were in a competition with other memories and tied to a struggle for recognition has been analyzed as an agonizing problem by Michael Rothberg in which ‘many people assume that the public sphere in which collective memories are articulated is a scarce resource and that the interaction of different collective memories within that sphere takes the form of a zero-sum struggle for preeminence’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 3).

The fact that discrepancies exist between public and private spheres of communication with regard to the narration of historical interpretation sustains Rothberg’s diagnosis of the ‘competitive memory’ problem. While the official public remembrance culture of Germany is morally and politically obliged to pay tribute to the primary victims of persecution and murder, based on the historical facts, quite differing narratives and depictions of the Nazi period and the war can still be communicated in private remembrance practices, and often this seems to follow the zero-sum logic. In other words, private commemoration stories primarily focus on sufferings experienced by family members as the result of bombings, war imprisonment and escape from the Red Army. Mention of the disappearance of the Jews, of the Roma and Sinti population, of the political opposition and other persecuted groups from German public life in the 1930s and early 1940s are practically absent from this private communicative memory, as well as the presence of millions (!) of forced laborers in wartime Germany. One explanation for this is that most do not want to link their family with the crimes of the Nazi period, and that young people also avoid confronting the possibility that their (great-)grandparents may well have been undecided, ignorant or even active in the context of the ideology and related crimes, perhaps bearing irrefutable blame (see the impressive empirical research on this aspect in: Welzer, Moller, and Tschugnall, 2002; Thiessen, 2007).
Parallel practices involving the formation of selective histories of victimization (including legends) around the role of the Wehrmacht and the allegedly limited responsibility individual soldiers had in the war of extermination are documented: ‘The statements, all added together, come to the conclusion that one was not an offender, but rather a victim of history’ (Heer, 2005, p. 114). It must be conceded that – at least – history revisions such as these demonstrate that a societal consensus has developed at the level of negative moral evaluation of the Nazi regime and World War II over the years. They also bear witness to the interests that are being served by different social groups’ narratives of victimization. However, the dialogical interactions among the different historical perspectives remain invisible as long as the ‘competitive memory’ mode that Michael Rothberg’s work draws attention to is not broken open. The gradual passing away of historical witnesses offers an opportunity, inter alia, by means of peace education, to do exactly this and work towards overcoming the competitive positioning of victims in collective memory narratives.

Should the dead bury the dead?

Considering the unease associated with how, concretely, to commemorate the German ‘war victims’ of World War II, would it not be best to just let the matter be, simply accepting the gradual passing away of the historical witnesses, with their personal memories and desire for places of mourning; perhaps even seeing the development of the times as a ‘liberation from the historical witnesses’ (quoted as ‘some people’s view’ in Ueberschär, 2007, p. 6) who insist on their personal views and experiences of the past being recognized? If the assumption holds true that collective memory serves collective identity formation, is there not a necessity to really reconsider what deserves further commemoration, and not focus so strongly on World War II any longer? Not least in importance is the point that the historically dead have in the meantime been joined by more recent ‘war victims’: Germany has been involved in a military conflict in Afghanistan and Bundeswehr soldiers died there. Additionally, Germany’s population has become more heterogeneous in the past decades as the result of immigration, meaning that the generational memories existing in German society have become increasingly pluralistic.

Immigrants mourn the victims of their own wars or genocides, victims who are hardly included in the public conscience in Germany, if at all: refugees of international and civil wars in Sri Lanka, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia or Lebanon. Public remembrance that is exclusively concentrated on World War II would certainly not be just in this situation – also presenting a novel challenge for the didactics of history in state schools. According to historian Christopher Cornelißen, ‘the hermetic metanarratives of national remembrance cultures that were mostly connected exclusively to individual communities have lost their right to exist’ (Cornelißen, 2012, p. 7). In fact, the previously quoted European perspective, which Jean-Claude Juncker directed at German war cemeteries gives expression to a transnational reception of war history that has developed over the past decades. Responding to a question about the meaning of war graves, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Sandweiler German War Cemetery, Juncker said: ‘Those who doubt, those who also are in despair over Europe (…) should visit a cemetery for soldiers. There one can see where ideas of non-Europe, of peoples against peoples, of not desiring to be united, of the inability to be united, are all bound to lead. War cemeteries are therefore (…) permanent testimonies to the sacred obligation to not allow the European friendship to end, so that despite all trials and tribulations, despite all constrains, despite all problems, despite all moments of weakness, despite all doubt and sometimes desperation, it must be resolutely continued.’ (Juncker, 2005)

That war cemeteries unequivocally advance the idea that (mostly) young men have been sent to the battlefield at all times in the name of a reputedly greater cause is nothing new. This is true of the cemeteries for World War I, and also for those of the Franco-German Wars, their existence not having prevented any further violent conflicts. There are primary characteristics of World War II, however, that distinguish it from
previous military conflicts, and thus place its war graves in a different context: (1) the hitherto unprecedented character of Germany’s waging a racist war of extermination in Eastern Europe, where the applicable laws of war were deliberately disregarded and civilians systematically killed on purpose; (2) the fact that it created new alliances and solidarities across national boundaries – also on both sides of the political divide; and (3) the war’s eventual impact on the political will to overcome historical animosities among the nations in postwar Europe, leading traditional enemies to achieve reconciliation under the banner of Europe. For the sake of teaching peace, these moments are important achievements, and are even more important in view of the European Union’s current political and identity crises. Although it may not stand to reason at first, some ‘German’ war graves are, in fact, especially suitable for methodical reflection upon these insights.

One of the peculiarities of World War II – waged as a war of extermination in Eastern Europe, thus, in part, bringing about the ‘denial of all things civilized without precedent’ (Fischer, 2005) – is that it led to war graves which are not exclusively for soldiers. The civilian population had never before been pulled into this sort of ‘total war’ and its accompanying reign of death to such a large extent. This can be experienced at war graves, where, in some cases, executed forced laborers are buried alongside members of the Waffen-SS or Wehrmacht soldiers. Historical research on the differing life paths of people from various parts of Europe that intersect at such cemeteries entail opportunities for education on the conditions that made the mass violence possible in the first place. It is exactly the fact that evidently not all are equal in death that make such war graves ‘useful’ as representations of a particular history of mass violence.

Another dimension that deserves to be studied with an eye to the interpretation of the causes and the costs of war concern the controversies addressing the specific politics of commemoration, which have been debated over time. These include issues such as the layout of mass grave sites as an expression of a particular political imagery (see Fuhrmeister, 2007), the wording of commemorative texts, and the scope of caretaking tasks – carried out on behalf of Germany by and with the Volksbund, but in many cases across Germany also carried out by municipalities. After considerable delay, and at times significant pressure from outside the Volksbund in regard to caring adequately for the remains of deceased victims of Nazi violence (see Kaiser, 2010; Keller, 2000, who works through one exemplary case7), the Volksbund was finally persuaded to provide them with caretaking, the moral norm of humanitarian fairness also implying that these dead should not be buried as nameless ‘war victims,’ where personal identification is possible. Strengthened in part by the generational shift within the institution, historical accuracy in regard to documentation of the graves and the people buried in them on commemorative and memorial plaques has in many instances improved. Such information can be used together with changes documented over time to foster a critical understanding of both political iconography, and what Rothberg (2009) conceptualizes as the ‘multi-directionality of memory’: War graves are at the same time sites, symbols, and results of the ways in which different individual and collective actors engage in the making of memory, and thus ‘demonstrate the stakes of the past in the present’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 6).

The further peculiarities of World War II – the wounds inflicted across nations and the will for European reconciliation built upon the rubble – also give war graves meaning: many have become sites of congresses and work camps organized by the Youth Work Division of the War Graves Commissions. Educational programs8 are enjoying remarkable success as they bring together young people across borders and inform them about the specific facts of a given site and allow young people from various nations to undertake historical research together; for they offer them a space for re-interpretive ‘placemaking’ practices (McEvoy-Levy, 2012) – currently still with support from historical witnesses. Whether this will also be the case in the future, once World War II has become a historical event of times long past, remains an open question. There are no long-term experiences with enterprises of this kind because the use of war gravesites for peace work through international youth congresses was only developed after 1945 and did not exist before that. That young people
of today are drawn to these programs is certainly not totally independent of the fact that the communicative ‘three-generation horizon’ of World War II has so far remained within view.

Peace education’s demands on war dead commemoration

Remembering the war dead of the past is not a self-evident act for succeeding generations, nor does it necessarily serve the promotion of peace, democratic values, or human rights. For peace education to be effective in this latter sense, certain conditions must be met. The onward march of time always brings about a paradigm shift from personal mourning to public remembrance. Through this, the levels of remembrance – Aleida Assmann (2006) distinguishes among individual, social, political and cultural remembrance – are changing, losing their relative importance as a result of the ever-growing temporal distance; opening up the risk of remembrance being reduced to mere performance of rituals. That said, the shift in perspectives also presents new opportunities, in that it contains the potential for greater weight of evidence-based knowledge compared with the interest-based narratives of particular groups. In particular, the new generation is less influenced by the highly potent subjective versions of history told to them by their family members in the context of close-knit social bonds. Rather, their access to history has to rely on varied sources – as is the case for historians – thus increasing the probability that historical facts and differentiated perspectives will be attained, allowing questions regarding appropriate assessment criteria, empathy and explanatory concepts to arise in the midst of divergent interpretations. One of the core aims of peace education concerns exactly the methodical development of such competencies in source assessment and self-reflection, or ‘complexity thinking’ (Ratković and Wintersteiner, 2010): ‘It is a non-linear, complex process to go from the actors, their contradictions, their assumptions and attitudes to the understanding of the structural and cultural deeper dimensions, which propagate the violent conflict constellation’ (Graf, Kramer, and Nicolescu, 2010, p. 79).

In spite of the gains which greater distance promise, some risks are also striking: Historic curiosity is very often inspired by personal relations and an emotional identification with a particular group. The experiences from the youth work programs of the War Graves Commission mentioned above are telling in this respect: young people are moved when they discover how young many soldiers were when they died and develop an interest in finding out more about the events that lie behind a grave. This in itself is, however, not sufficient to produce an awareness that ‘recognizes the aporia of responsibility’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 265). From the perspective of peace education, an essential factor for the future use(fulness) of the remembrance of the war dead is whether or not it is possible to instill within people a level of awareness which considers the causes beyond simplistic codifications of good and evil over a longer and longer period of time. This criterion of a critical remembrance culture requires highly diligent historical specification in regard to the dead of World War II – particularly for the Germans – so that all-encompassing ‘war victim’ semantics that may serve a revisionist blurring of boundaries between groups of victims and perpetrators are replaced with notions that consider the multipart complexity of political mass violence more precisely.

Precision is also necessary in order to counter the frivolous attempts at ‘closing the historical file.’ For this reason, historian Rolf Wernstedt cited the unconditional honoring of the Nazi’s main victims a historical obligation and necessity for any German commemoration practice: ‘For the Germans, these mass crimes must be the starting point for reflection at any remembrance or reappraisal (...) This is history’s yardstick.’ (Wernstedt, 2010, p. 31-34) For peace and human rights education, the ‘extreme history of the 20th century’ means a repository ‘with all forms of politically, socially and culturally initiated violence’ (Knigge, 2010, p. 14) that must not leave the impression that there were no alternatives to the use and toleration of violence. One way of countering such impressions is to study biographies and social situations which illustrate the scope of possible agency even under difficult circumstances. Grave sites of World War II which can prompt this sort of self-guided research should be made use of. It would be a fatal mistake to exclude these sites and
thus reproduce the postwar ‘inability to mourn’ on a different level; or perhaps even insinuate that any consideration of those who died during the war, either as German soldiers or as home front civilians involves having to choose sides. The contemporary resurgence of right-wing nationalism should serve as an inducement to prevent exactly these kinds of false appropriation of the dead.

As cemeteries that are associated with pedagogical endeavor, specific grave sites are in fact confronted with challenges quite similar to the ones faced by sites of Nazi crimes, which turned out to be constitutive in the development of an education on national memorials, and especially so-called ‘holocaust education,’ or an ‘education after Auschwitz.’ The latter is, inter alia, concerned with the question of how the crime scenes of Nazi violence – which are obviously often also cemeteries – can be used to trigger reflection instead of emotions alone, through the use of suitable didactics. Theodor Adorno’s demand of all education was that Auschwitz must not happen again (Adorno, 1971), and whether in paraphrases or in exactly these words the educational goal of violence prevention is found in school curricula all over Germany. Experience proves, however, that the practical application of this principle must go beyond appellative rituals. The fact that societal circumstances change must also be taken into consideration. In the past thirty years, research on conditions for an ‘education after Auschwitz’ has had to consider not just the disappearance of the contemporary witnesses and survivors of the atrocities. Further challenges arise from German society’s increased diversity in terms of national origin and family memories – frequently also containing memories of more recent atrocities – and also from processes of globalization and the impact of European as well as German national unification.

Just like memorials, war grave sites can be used as starting points for historical and civic education that aims at transcending pity for the victims. Remembrance of the past and the learning of human rights in contemporary society and for tomorrow are two sides of the same coin. This should be in the foreground rather than the (presumed) historical authenticity of the places, as this moment tends to mystify the sites rather than make them understandable for purposes of research and education on the causes of violence and on violence prevention. In other words, the primary concern of peace education is to sensitize people to general conditions leading to violence, both in belief and action, aimed at the present and the future. In order to achieve this, connections to the present must be established, such as highlighting current human rights violations and attempting to resolve the animosities persisting in our own world.

Theodor Adorno spoke of the imperative within peace education to make historical events recognizable in their fundamental actuality. He labeled this the ‘turn to the subject,’ and argued that ‘one must recognize the mechanisms that make people capable of committing such acts, identifying these mechanisms oneself and seeking to avoid that they should ever again come into being, and all this by awakening the general consciousness of these mechanisms’ (Adorno, 1971). Turning to the subject implies confrontation with the varied assumptions and frameworks for interpreting the world, and the variance of this is all the greater the more pluralistic ways of life become within society. Along with the context of the subject, which today is socialized into a far more individualized society than during Adorno’s time, the historiographic discourses have also changed. This shift cannot remain without consequences for didactics addressing memorials or the sites of war grave: Attempts at a historiographic universalization of the Nazi crimes (such as the approach fostered by Levy and Sznaider, 2001, 2005; Sznaider, 2016) reframe the historical interpretation so as to uncover the universal meaning of historical examples of political violence; which contains its own dilemmas and risks. A substantial number of historians have pointed this out since the 1990s, as the past collaboration with the Nazi regime among European neighbors and the deportation of the Jewish population have been increasingly dealt with, this has led to a certain ‘Europeanization of the Holocaust.’ Michael Jeismann posed the provocative question of whether ‘blame as Europe’s new foundation myth’ (Jeismann, 2000, p. 454-458) was being constructed, warning of the trivializing effects and of the morally and intellectually arbitrary exploitation of history for the demands of the present day.

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Indeed, a fundamental tension is inherent in employing perspectives that aim at an abstraction from the specificity of concrete historical facts, and peace pedagogical work, whether at the remembrance sites of Nazi crimes or at war grave sites, has to achieve a delicate balance in this regard and negotiate a path between the challenges of interest-based attempts at ‘universalization and historization’ (Gryglewski 2016). Consideration of cross-cutting lines of approach is on one hand especially promising for the normative desire to advance a deep understanding of historical conjunctures. They direct attention to the many dimensions and multi-faceted root causes of historical examples where civilizing norms and humanitarian values were dismantled, ideals turning this into the basis of social action for a peace culture. They must on the other hand not become a handy tool for functionalizing history in such a way that true historical responsibilities are blurred or relativized. Since history is always filtered, documented and understood from a particular perspective, it is among the most important (not only peace) educational goals to provide the key abilities for distinguishing memories from both historiography and from historical facts.

Notes

1 The term ‘communicative memory’ refers to the oral transmission of personal experiences, which is mostly limited to three generations (i.e., 80/90 years) and ends with the death of its participants. The narrations that make up the communicative memory are transient and change with time, but they are characterized by their strong impressiveness: Familial stories are told in the language of close and highly emotional daily relations. This is an extremely effective mechanism for their transmission.

2 The ‘Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V.’ is a non-commercial humanitarian organization. It was founded in 1918 at the end of World War I in order to express solidarity and organize practical help for the families of fallen soldiers. The Volksbund is tasked by the German state with registering the German war dead abroad and with taking care of the graves of the soldiers killed in action who are entitled to eternal resting places by international law. The Volksbund has been advising relatives in matters pertaining to war grave care, a task that has meanwhile changed in character and moved towards the documentation of war graves and registration of those buried. The organization supervises public and private sites, including grave sites on German territory where Prisoners of War (POWs) are buried, supports international cooperation and fosters the engagement of young people in war cemetery care with an international youth encounter program. See http://www.volksbund.de/volksbund/volksbund-en.html.

3 While the murder of the Jewish population was not an issue for public commemoration in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the communist victims of the Nazis and the fallen Red Army soldiers were not present in collective remembrance practices in the FRG.

4 The Prussian castle’s New Guardhouse (Neue Wache) was situated on Eastern territory in divided Berlin. During GDR times, the mortal remains of an unknown concentration camp captive and of an unknown soldier were interred there. Chancellor Helmut Kohl put the reconstruction of the memorial on his agenda after national unification in 1990, having a copy (enlarged by 1.5 meters) of Käthe Kollwitz’s Pietà erected on the site. The words ‘Den Opfern von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft’ (dedicated to the victims of war and tyranny) were engraved on the floor in front of it. With his decision Kohl ignored the public controversy that had shown that the abstraction of the victims through the chosen words, as well as the iconographic aspects and appropriateness of the symbolic meaning connected to the Pietà were highly contested.

5 This was initiated by the ‘antimilitary campaign,’ which was an alliance between the Socialist Youth/the Falcons (Sozialistische Jugend/Die Falken), the Young German Nature Lovers (Naturfreundejugend), and the Association of Conscientious Objectors (Verband der Wehrdienstverweigerer). The Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) decided to accept September 1 as Anti-War Day in 1966, whereas the German Salaried
Employees’ Union (DAG) only agreed to the date in 1983 (the DGB and the DAG were both founded in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949).

6 An issue has been made of this practice in the most recent past only, as the desire to similarly commemorate soldiers who died during German Bundeswehr deployments abroad, which were indeed carried out in the name of justice and freedom: New remembrance plaques were installed or the texts and dates reformulated on memorial sites for the fallen of the two World Wars (e.g., at the Ehrenbreitstein Fortress in Koblenz for members of the army). These sorts of unhistorical ad hoc practices proved that a well-reflected handling of the highly different types of individuals among the war dead had been absent, as was any governmental policy regarding possible soldier deaths in German Bundeswehr out-of-area deployments. In 2007-2009, under the then aegis of Franz-Josef Jung, the Ministry of Defense had a memorial erected in the ministry’s Bendler-Block building in response; probably also for the sake of preventing any unauthorized ‘creative solution’ for honoring the dead within the military in historically problematic framings. Despite a brief spurt of controversy over the plan’s cost estimates, its placement and architectural form, the interests of the political public sphere in the new memorial were, remarkably, kept in check (see Hettling, 2009; Mannitz, 2014).

7 Keller documents the mass murder of forced laborers in Hirzenhain, Hesse, in March, 1945. The victims of this mass shooting were exhumed in May 1945 when the US War Crimes Branch received notice of the events and had their bodies moved to the monastery at nearby Arnsburg, a ‘war victims cemetery’ where Wehrmacht soldiers who quit service upon arrival of the US troops and were shot as deserters by their superiors, members of the Waffen-SS and POWs from several countries were also laid to rest. This site is cared for by the Volksbund together with the local municipality and only after decades of struggle did the Volksbund finally agree to replace the gravestones of supposedly ‘unidentified war dead’ with ones that provided information about the crimes that had actually turned these people into victims and identified them by name. As a result of ongoing research on the historical events, further information has subsequently been made available on the site itself and also via internet resources.

8 There are four purpose-built facilities where working camps and youth encounter workshops are organized on a regular basis: Ysselsteyn (the Netherlands), Lommel (Belgium), Niederbronn (France), Golm on the Island of Usedom (Germany).

9 He first made his famous statement that all education today has to be seen as education after Auschwitz in the radio speech ‘Education after Auschwitz’ in 1966; the radio speeches were five years later published as a book.

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Abstract
This article maps two distinct bodies of thought before moving to a synthesis discussion, which proceeds in dialogue with the contributions of Pope Francis to fostering substantive peace. The first section presents select challenges and promises of employing inter-religious dialogue as a tool for peacebuilding. The article then positions papal contributions coupling inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding. A synthesis section analyzes how Francis is buttressing this connection in particular ways with reference to his notion of building up cultures of dialogue and encounter. The results of this approach will be of interest to nonviolent activists, conflict transformation practitioners, religious studies scholars, and others concerned with dialogue’s potential as a path to peace.

Introduction
Dialogue is at the heart of relationships that build peace. Within a basic framing of positive peace, which sees substantive peace as inclusive of, but consisting of much more than, the mere absence of war (cf. Galtung, 1969), fostering cultures of encounter and dialogue falls within the remit of peacebuilding work (cf. Lederach, 2005). Given the hierarchical organization of the Roman Catholic Church and its too frequently unjust treatment of standouts who do not fit in with its tightly defined norms, it is understandable that peace activists and conflict resolution practitioners would shy away from looking to the top of that hierarchy for inspiration, motivation, or sanction for their work. However, when exploring papal teachings on peace and the popes’ entanglements with peacebuilding, there is a good deal of material to draw upon in this regard that can serve to shift people, who would otherwise be uninvolved, into action across a range of issues relevant to positive peace. Simultaneously, papal teachings offer support for conflict resolution practitioners by providing unique insights flowing from the Catholic Church’s position as both an international diplomatic and transnational actor (see Stummvoll, 2018). Taking inter-religious dialogue as its primary focus, this article evaluates papal teachings and the lived-peace witness of popes for their ability to inspire, make space for, sanction, and enable peacebuilding.

Inter-religious dialogue brought into the service of peacebuilding provides an effective means of unfolding the paradox that religion can be mobilized both to support holy war and foster the proverbial peaceable garden, thus building up cultures of peace (Boulding, 1986, 2000; cf. Gopin, 2000; Swidler, 2016). Inter-religious dialogue as peacebuilding seeks to bring religious energy into the service of fostering substantive peace. This task is facilitated by the fact that most religious traditions recognize peacemaking as a sacred duty (Smock, 2002), even if that duty is sometimes obscured. Nonetheless, there is an all too common disconnect in terms of embodying this duty and there remain significant challenges in employing religious teachings in the service of substantive peace. For instance, a conflict may have been shaded in religious terms for centuries. In this regard, contemplate the Crusades, the history of the Balkans, and the overlapping claims to land on the subcontinent. Yet, there are ample resources for peace activists and conflict resolution practitioners that can be sourced from within world and Indigenous religions. Communicative processes, the ostensibly simple sharing of stories and experiences to enable people to understand one another across otherwise divisive boundaries, is a key method to overcome the type of insularity and isolationism that leads to the ideological justification for religious violence. This is the ultimate telos of fostering cultures of encounter and dialogue. To situate that concept within a representative sample of the literature, below, the authors analyze some reflections from peacebuilders and observers of dialogue processes, which demonstrate
how narrative and an accompanying discursive sharing of insights can be employed to help overcome violence in this world (cf. Senehi, 2000).

This article’s exploration of the intersections between inter-religious dialogue and the politics of peace begins with Hans Küng’s (2005) influential articulation of a framework for dialogue, which is based on two fundamental principles: true humanity and the Golden rule. These principles were stated in the Council of the Parliament of World’s Religions’ (1993) *Chicago Declaration*, confirmed in Cape Town by the Third Parliament of the World’s Religions and then presented in the Manifesto *Crossing the Divide* (Pico et al., 2001) written for the UN Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. According to Küng’s (2005) analysis:

On the basis of these two fundamental principles, four ethical directives, found in all the great traditions of humanity, have to be remembered:

- You shall not murder, torture, torment, or wound. Stated in positive terms: have reverence for life; be committed to a culture of non-violence and reverence for life.
- You shall not lie, deceive, forge, manipulate. Stated in positive terms: speak and act truthfully; be committed to a culture of truthfulness and tolerance.
- You shall not steal, exploit, bribe, or corrupt. Stated in positive terms: deal honestly and fairly; be committed to a culture of fairness and to a just economic order.
- You shall not abuse sexuality, cheat, humiliate, or dishonor. Stated in positive terms: respect and love one another; be committed to a culture of partnership and equal dignity for all (20).

These ethical directives represent a core (or, perhaps, a seed) of the sort that must be in place for cultures of encounter and dialogue between the religions to be fruitful. Küng’s ethical directives, or more properly, the basic moral consensus they represent, thus become a significant prerequisite for sustainable and substantive dialogue. Although stated in individualistic terms, these directives are inherently communitarian in their orientation being focused on individual contributions to a social ethic. Further, these directives extend to inter-group and inter-societal relations, pointing to the sort of active tolerance of difference necessary for avoiding the clash of civilizations and building cultures of peace (cf. Sacks, 2003). Küng (2005) goes on to link these directives to a crucial need for dialogue amongst the religions:

There will be no peace among the nations without peace among the religions.
There will be no peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions.
There will be no dialogue among the religions without global ethical standards.
There will therefore be no survival of this globe without a global ethic (2005, 20).

This framework highlights the need to create spaces for dialogue and their relationship to a basic ethical consensus that connects the individual, social, and religious dimensions of human experience with social justice, intergroup harmony, and world peace. Many of the authors under consideration in this article concur that a vision of substantive peace serves to sustain dialogue, particularly among the religions. Countering the notion that inter-religious dialogue is an elite activity, John Dominic Crossan’s (2005) serve to emphasize that the required underlying vision of peace is inseparable from social justice (cf. Paul VI, 1971). Moreover, Crossan (2005) encourages self-examination by religious adherents, as they consider issues of guilt and complicity marking injustices that followers of their traditions have inflicted upon other people (cf. John Paul II, 2001; Madigan and Sarrió-Cucarella, 2017; Khalil, 2017). A cogent example here is offered by one of the most horrific events of the twentieth-century: the Shoah. According to Steven Jacobs’ (2005) analysis, reflecting on intergenerational trauma of the death and destruction of the Shoah provides a significant catalyst moving Christians away from evangelical triumphalism towards the humility and repentance necessary for a
situation of peace to come into being between the religions. Specifically, Jacobs (2005) concludes that no dialogue between Jews and Christians can move forward without such a metamorphosis. Transformation in this mode holds the potential to foster a situation of peace between the religions, even in the face of profound evil, with positive implications for substantive peace.

Based upon his experiences within a minority Christian community in Asia, Wesley Ariarajah (1999) argues that a way to reduce the dominion of such grand manifestations of evil is to enable dialogue not only at level of religious leadership, but also in terms of everyday experience (cf. Varshney, 2002). Ariarajah (1999) sees this as a particularly timely orientation, much needed in the Middle East, wherein violence is perpetuated by a situation whereby ordinary faith-inspired people rarely come together to share in spiritual, social, political, and practical activities (cf. Edwards, 2016; Sehested, 2017). However, when such multimodal interaction takes place dialogue is transformed towards action (Gopin, 2002). When this transformation happens, the limits of discursive dialogue are at once exposed and moved away from exclusionary tendencies, allowing the peaceful results of a multi-dimensional dialogue to spread as a positive contagion throughout a society.

This is one way to understand the commitments to a dialogue of life that can come into being when interfaith and cross-cultural intentional communities are formed around principles of peace. A prime example here being the Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Shalam/Oasis of Peace community where 30 Palestinian and 30 Jewish families who are citizens of Israel live together blending commitments to peace with Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and secular identities in a reflective and spatially literate manner. This then gives a strong basis for the community to act as safe space for education, dialogue, meeting, and outreach work all geared toward building peace from within what is frequently assumed to be an intractable conflict (see Tuv, 2018). While not discounting a role for spontaneous synchronicity in such contexts, the requisite transformation can flow from quite orchestrated activities of the sort that fall within the purview of professional conflict resolution practitioners. For instance, Maria Power’s (2007) work on social action projects in Northern Ireland shows how working together on a matter of common concern, such as the development of a children’s playground, has lead increased understanding and cooperation between people divided along the ethno-national cleavages of the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican and Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist identities. To cite a further example based on his Alternative Conflict Resolution experience working with faith-inspired actors, Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2002) has discerned a logical progression towards dialogue. Unfolding a practical and sequential approach to initiating transformative dialogue, he suggests meeting in small groups to discuss and jointly study each other’s sacred texts. Abu-Nimer (2002) then believes the stage will be set for the formation of deeper connections such as invitations to people’s homes and sharing worship time together. The third and fourth phases, he suggests are more of a state of being, wherein the dialogue participants would be able to actively discern and affirm the presence of messages emanating from the different traditions that are beneficial to people living together in community (Abu-Nimer, 2002; cf. Gopin, 2002, Swidler, 2016).

Aspiring to this state of being, which is concomitant with upholding the peacebuilding dimensions of their faith traditions, can also prompt reflection by dialogue participants in relation to the implications of their values systems for living together in community. For example, considering Islamic traditions, John Kelsey (2005) suggests that a dynamic view of Shari’ah is paramount as a base to move beyond small talk in order for any substantive dialogue to take place (cf. Merdjanova and Brodeur 2009). To illustrate his point, Kelsey (2005) examines the fatwah issued by Osama bin Laden against Western civilization and questions both the declaration’s consequences for inter-religious relations and their authenticity in relation to Islamic traditions.

Kelsey’s example is indicative of how one of the principle factors blocking dialogue is fundamentalism, which, it is important to emphasize, has both secular and religious manifestations. Most especially in the case of religious traditions, fundamentalism is a destroyer of the very conditions that Küng has set as essential for substantive peace. In many ways, this dialogue-destroying element comes into being because of the exclusivist truth claims made by religious fundamentalists. As Charles Kimball (2005) highlights, when the tenets of fundamentalism are fully applied to a specific religion, the result is that absolute truth is invariably located in a particular tradition or text(s) understood as belonging to a single, exclusivist group. Such a stance precludes the necessary level of hearing required to enable dialogue between the
religions to become an instrument of peace (Kimbal, 2005). As an example of a way to counteract such tendencies towards ethical segmentation, Ada Maria Isasi-Díaz (2005) recommends re-examining divisive pasts so that the oppressor and the oppressed may come together to form a vision for a common future thus breaking of the hold of fundamentalism in its social and religious expressions (cf. Câmara, 1971). In line with the insights emerging from Ronald Young’s (2002) case study, co-creating this common future can be particularly effective when the vision is fashioned by members of the historically conflicting groups, including within the lived experience of Diaspora (cf. Young, 2002).

Both Charles Gibbs (2002) and David Steele (2002) advocate that middle-tier elites should be the initial target group for involvement in this process because they share the fate of the larger community but can also serve as faith-inspired multipliers in peace processes (cf. Diamond and MacDonald, 1996; Lederach, 1997; Marshall, 2013). This is an essential move because the future always holds the possibility of successful peacebuilding, with a wide range of constituencies reaping a peace dividend (see Buchanan, 2014). A recent example is the work of Settler-Mennonites on the Canadian Prairies to explore the history of colonialism and violent evangelization in what is now the province of Saskatchewan through justice and reconciliation focussed dialogues with Indigenous partners. This is a significant example of the mixing of oppressed and oppressor identities as the Indigenous partners ancestors were displaced to make space for White Settlers, who themselves were often seeking a life free from oppression. Further, those we were displaced were then subjected to government policies that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) named as “cultural genocide” (p. 1), whose force continues to felt be in Indigenous communities. This is a painful and complex history not the least because Mennonites came to the Prairies keen to live out a life in accord with their pacifist principles. As a result for such dialogue to be successful it had to overcome not only multiple tracks of oppression, notably including women, but also self-aggrandizing narratives and phenomena of selective empathy (Enns, 2015).

Seeing faith in terms of its peacebuilding potential is also necessarily equated with freeing religion from its status as the sole cause or an excuse for conflict (Schneier 2002). When conflict is seen in light of its multiple causes—including ethnicity, political divisions, and economic and regional disparities—religion’s suitability as path to help end violence comes more fully into focus. Each of these categories has implications for actively attempting to foster cultures of encounter and dialogue as a solution to conflict (cf. Byrne, 1996; Power, 2007a, 2007b, 2011; Elliott, 2009).

Such a conclusion need not engender neutrality. Working in the area of economic injustice and regional disparity, and recalling similar dynamics to the Catholic Social Teaching concept of the preferential option for the poor (see John Paul II 1987, 1991; Francis, 2013b; Dorr 2016), Daniel Bell (2005) suggests that it is sometimes appropriate for God to be imaged as taking sides if the peace agenda is to be representative of a just outcome (cf. Boff, 2011). Invoking Latin American Liberation Theology, Bell (2005) shows how economic organization and the unfair distribution of wealth may mean that God is most appropriately placed on the side of the oppressed (cf. Guttiérez, 1971/2002; Francis 2013b, 2015a; Dorr, 2016). In these instances, a dialogue for peace may require that the oppressors make sacrifices and share their wealth before any meaningful dialogue can take place (Bell, 2005; cf. Social Affairs Commission of the Canadian Conference of the Catholic Bishops, 2003).

Comparably, it is difficult to conceive of a peace as just if it subjugates half the human population. In this light, if the dialogue between conflicting parties is to be fully emancipatory, it must also confront gender binaries, something that faith-inspired and political actors have not always adequately considered. Yet, religions can still serve as avenues fostering greater gender equality. For example, the non-sectarian Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, whose approach to dialogue radically altered the contents of the Good Friday Agreement (see Cowell-Meyers, 2014). As Valerie Ziegler (2005) argues, even dialogue between the religions holds the potential to be transformed into a resource for women’s liberation. However, if any communicative process works towards peace while leaving gender equality issues aside, then that dialogue’s validity as a peacebuilding tool must be questioned (cf. Boulding, 2000).

Equality is also a related concern on the geopolitical level. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the United States’ social, cultural, and political power, many commentators mention the implications of inter-religious dialogue for understanding and perhaps even shifting conflict-inducing aspects of US involvement in geopolitics (cf. Ruether, 2007). In this light, Musser, Puchalla, and Sutherland (2005) argue that U.S. foreign
policy can be better understood in light of insights growing out of Jewish-Christian dialogue, which address the apocalyptic implications of the example of the Hebrew prophets (cf. Heschel and Heschel, 2011). In a related manner Martin Cook (2005) has argued that it is imperative to enter into dialogue exploring the validity of Christianity’s just war theory in light of the current context (cf. Evans, 2005; Dower, 2009). In looking at the effects of U.S. foreign policy in its own hemisphere, Bell (2005) goes so far as to put forward a crucifixion analogy (cf. Lassalle-Klein 2009), wherein this policy can be seen as unfair sacrificing the poor of Latin America for the ideology of capitalism (Alas, 2017). John Mohawk (2005) suggests that inter-religious dialogue can remedy systematically violent ills by exposing the liquid foundations of all such ideologies, be they faith-based or secular (cf. Jordan, 2001; Power, 2011).

There are numerous insights to inform conflict resolution praxis that can be harvested from the above-presented theoretical and practical perspectives as they apply to this article’s main focus on inter-religious dialogue as a path to peacebuilding. On a basic level, as Dalil Boubakeur, Pierre Lambert, and Daniel Sibony (2004) emphasise, the resources for peaceful coexistence are present within various world religions (cf. The Golden Rule Poster from Scarboro Missions, nd). They simply need to be brought to the surface by emphasizing those facets of faith traditions which are more oriented towards cultures of dialogue and encounter than triumphalism. Lest, along with Samuel P. Huntington (1996) we would doubt such dialogue-based peaceful coexistence is possible across cultures, we can look to the ideals of European Union (Boubakeur, Celier, Lambert, and Sibony 2004). Despite disruption of Brexit, it is now practically impossible to imagine the French government engaging in another war with Germany. In terms of this article’s subject, Dalil Boubakeur, François Celier, Pierre Lambert, and Daniel Sibony (2004) see great potential for such transformation towards peace and cooperation to extend to relationships amongst Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide.

On a relatively more micro-level, the literature surveyed above combines to provide an accessible vision for bridging the insight-action gap in fostering the incarnation of substantive peace. Dialogue, given its multi-dimensionality is very accessible: most people have the agency necessary to become peacebuilders through dialogue. That is to say, virtually anyone can opt to start creating the conditions necessary for dialogue to take place in their lives and cultures. Whatever case the likes Richard Dawkins (2006/2016) and his interlocutors may be making for contemporary atheism, it would seem foolish to ignore religion in this process. Positively stated, faith-inspired actors talking across religious and political cleavages represent a path for substantive peace to become more firmly coupled to lived human reality. In this light the mantra, “let there be peace on earth and let it begin with me” (Jackson Miller and Miller, 1955) can be seen as connected to bringing peace about among conflicting parties through dialogue. In short, such a mantra is connected to a vision and ethic for substantive peace. Communication and dialogue are poised to show the way. Simply put, religions and political opponents talking to each other will help guide the journey.

**Dialogue and the Contemporary Papacy**

Dialogue, then, is an enabler of positive peace, and dialogue between the religions is essential given that the vast majority of the world’s population identifies with a religious tradition, often as a key aspect of their core identity (Pew-Templeton 2015). Without dialogue and the encounters it engenders, peace can never be substantive. In Northern Ireland, if faith-based groups had not communicated with one another in a meaningful and honest manner, then the transformation of society necessary for peace could not have occurred (see Power 2007, 2007a). The popes, leaders of over 1.2 billion Catholics with influence on every continent (Pew-Templeton 2015), provide multiple endorsements of the value of dialogue for moving across barriers that perpetuate conflict and uphold the importance of synchronicity among religious traditions and international diplomacy in the service of peace (e.g., Benedict XVI 2005, 2006, 2006b). One of the key issues at stake in participatory transformative peacebuilding is the provision of adequate spaces for multiple dialogues among people of varying cultural, political, religious, class, gender, social, and ethnic identities in any given society. As the peace theorist Ho-Won Jeong notes, during his discussion of the possible sources of social conflict:
the absence of social space for facilitating dialogue between diverse identities and values facilitates violent struggles. To prevent unrestrained violence against innocent victims, members of different communities need assistance in recognizing shared interests in survival and long-term prosperity. Solutions to the conflict would eventually have to be grounded in structural arrangements that respect the cultural and political autonomy of different members of society (Jeong 2000, p. 74).

There is an often a crucial role for peacebuilders in facilitating such dialogue. However, it is also important to note that these dialogue-fostering peacebuilders can, and perhaps more fruitfully should, come from a creative or motivated minority within the affected communities themselves (see Buchanan, 2014; cf. Power 2007a). As such, echoing an insight unfolded above, it is perhaps not surprising that the popes frequently turn to the subject of multiple levels of responsibility for fostering dialogue in their World Day for Peace Messages and in other documents that address the Christian imperative to nourish peace in this world. This focus often contains exhortations and reflections that touch on the role of inter-religious dialogue in peacebuilding. This article now moves to analyze a representative selection from these teachings, with a goal of demonstrating how papal statements can provide an impetus for a transformative shift, affecting people who might otherwise remain unmoved.

In his encyclical, *Ecclesiam Suam*, addressing the Catholic Church’s relations with the world, Pope Paul VI (1964) argued for the importance dialogue as a method, including in the above-identified areas of ethics-based cooperation with other-than-Christian religious traditions:

> But we do not wish to turn a blind eye to the spiritual and moral values of the various non-Christian religions, for we desire to join with them in promoting and defending common ideals in the spheres of religious liberty, human brotherhood [sic.], education, culture, social welfare, and civic order. Dialogue is possible in all these great projects, which are our concern as much as theirs, and we will not fail to offer opportunities for discussion in the event of such an offer being favorably received in genuine, mutual respect (§108).

That same year, Paul VI established the Secretariat for Non-Christians, which John Paul II rechristened in 1988 as the Pontifical Council for Inter-Religious Dialogue. This office of the Holy See has the following remit: “1) to promote respect, mutual understanding, and collaboration between Catholics and the followers of others religious traditions; 2) to encourage the study of religions; and 3) to promote the formation of persons dedicated to dialogue” (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 2018). To this effect, for instance, they issue messages on the occasions of major festivals in Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist festivals, welcome religious leaders from non-Christian and non-Jewish traditions to the Vatican and support interreligious events (Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, 2018). In 1965, teaching on behalf of the council fathers, Paul VI went even further than the reflection contained in *Ecclesiam Suam*, explicitly coupling this dialogical orientation to a peacebuilding imperative and extolling the need for dialogue and cooperation between Catholics and all those “thirsting for true peace” (Paul VI 1965b, §90). Remarkably, in the geopolitical context of the Cold War, when the Catholic Church’s political position was challenged on several fronts due to certain communist governments policies, *Gaudium et Spes* asserts that Catholics should work “even with those who oppress the Church...together without violence and deceit in order to build up the world in genuine peace.” (Paul VI 1965b, §92) Perhaps, most importantly, Paul VI also promulgated *Nostra Aetate*, the conciliar document that built on momentum generated for inter-faith dialogue during John XXIII’s pontificate in order to encourage all the members of the Catholic Church “through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions, carried out with prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith and life, ...[to]... recognize, preserve and promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the socio-cultural values found among” the adherents of other religions (Paul VI 1965a, §2).

This general imperative for multidimensional dialogue was given differentiated expression in the writings of John Paul II and Benedict XVI. For both these popes, dialogue was one of the foundation
stones of their definition of positive peace. This connection is reinforced in John Paul II’s linking of dialogue with more obvious peacebuilding issues. For instance, in his World Day for Peace Message for 2002 John Paul II states:

The various Christian confessions, as well as the world’s great religions, need to work together to eliminate the social and cultural causes of terrorism. They can do this by teaching the greatness and dignity of the human person, and by spreading a clearer sense of the oneness of the human family. This is a specific area of ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue and cooperation, a pressing service which religion can offer to world peace (John Paul II 2001, §12. Emphasis in the original).

Earlier, in another of his World Day for Peace messages, John Paul II correlated (1) the task of inter-religious dialogue in the service peacebuilding with (2) efforts to achieve trust, cooperation, and understanding, rather than an artificial agreement on points of divergence:

In recent years much has been accomplished in the realm of inter-religious understanding to promote an active cooperation in the common tasks facing humanity, on the basis of the many values shared by the great religions. I wish to encourage this cooperation wherever it is possible, as well as the official dialogues currently underway between representatives of the major religious groups (John Paul II 1990, section IV).

After his controversial Ragensburgh Address (Benedict XVI, 2006a), Benedict XVI affirmed the importance of authentic dialogue to overcome socio-political tensions by stating, “inter-religious dialogue is a vital necessity on which, in large measure, our future depends” (2006b). Here, an ethic and method of peacebuilding through the medium of inter-religious dialogue, which is developed by John Paul II and continued by Benedict XVI, can be discerned. Therein, whilst both commonalities and differences ought to be discussed, points of disagreement should not be allowed to act as ‘roadblocks’ in the quest for peace. Peacebuilding and work for social justice, rather than the quest for visible religious unity, were upheld as ideal foci for inter-religious dialogue. This, John Paul II, in particular, argued was the more fruitful path, leading to a substantive peace that would respect difference but which had to be achieved through an active dialogue aimed at cultivating trust and eventually leading to tangible and long-lasting ethical results. For example, in the World Day for Peace Message for 1991, he couples inter-religious cooperation, dialogue, and peace by teaching that:

When undertaken in a spirit of trust, and with respect and sincerity, inter-religious cooperation and dialogue make a real contribution to peace. … This common search — carried out in the light of the law of conscience and of the precepts of one’s own religion, and confronting the causes of present-day social injustices and wars — will lay a solid foundation for cooperation in the search for needed solutions (John Paul II 1990, §13).

Here, Benedict XVI (2006b) adds “in this area our contemporaries expect from us an eloquent witness to show all people the value of the religious dimension of life.” As a natural extension of this emphasis in inter-religious dialogue, throughout their pontificates, both John Paul II and Benedict XVI performed a number of symbolically-charged gestures that underscored this commitment and, in doing so, raised consciousness about nodal connections between inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding. To amplify this effect, they often did so at sites associated with either peace or conflict in the popular imagination. For instance, during the first Apostolic Pilgrimage of his pontificate to Poland in 1979, he prayed in the cell of Maximilian Kolbe in Auschwitz. Kolbe was a Franciscan Priest, who was canonized in 1982, and whose spiritual message that love is stronger than all acts of aggression, led him to give his life in the place of a Jewish man with a young family. As alluded to above, he also notably prayed publically at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, following the Jewish tradition of placing a written version of his petition into one of the spaces in the masonry, this time on Papal letterhead that was easily captured by press
cameras during the final day of his March 2000 Jubilee pilgrimage to the Holy Land. On that occasion he prayed for peace amongst Jews, Christian, Muslims employing a framing of common Abrahamic heritage and covenant:

God of our fathers,  
you chose Abraham and his descendants  
to bring your Name to the Nations:  
we are deeply saddened by the behaviour of those  
who in the course of history  
have caused these children of yours to suffer,  
and asking your forgiveness we wish to commit ourselves  
to genuine brotherhood  
with the people of the Covenant (John Paul II, 2000).

By undertaking such symbolically-charged gestures, which can be read as acts of peacebuilding (cf. Schirch, 2004), John Paul II was emphasizing a commitment to seeing shared human traditions as a nexus between faiths, which is underpinned by a message of substantive peace based upon active nonviolence as represented sharply in his invocation of Kolbe’s example (cf. Jahanbegloo, 2013). Grounding Küng’s (2005) framework, John Paul II (1986) further underscored his respect for the true humanity and message of peacebuilding found in all religions when, in 1986, he invited religious leaders from around the world to Assisi in order to come together, dialogue, and pray for peace and, in so doing, share an experience of unity. Attendees at this event, included the Dalai Lama and the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Moscow and Antioch, who all affirmed a common spiritual and practical commitment to peace (Foldvari, 2016). This commitment was further augmented when John Paul II publicly kissed the Qu’ran in 1999. Such gestures were also made by Benedict XVI, who like his predecessor, but with perhaps less charisma, visited synagogues, mosques, Auschwitz, and employed the geography of peace associated with Assisi to host a gathering of leaders of the world’s faith traditions.

Pope Francis: Dialogue as a Path to Peace

Bringing forward many of the most promising elements of the reflections and actions coupling inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding mapped above, Pope Francis (2013b, 2014a) has explicitly put cultures of dialogue and encounter at the center of his exercise of the papal office. In this regard, Francis connects the concern for social justice identified by Crossan (2005) with communication reaching across barriers, when he stipulates that members of the Catholic Church are called to be “at the service of a difficult dialogue,” which overcomes segregation and violence through bridging the gap between (1) “people who have the means needed to develop their personal and family lives,” and (2) those who are denied access to socio-political opportunity structures to the point they become “‘non-citizens’, ‘half-citizens’ and ‘urban remnants’” (2013b, §74).

Francis continues, “a culture which privileges dialogue as a form of encounter, … [devises means] for building consensus and agreement while seeking the goal of a just, responsive and inclusive society.” (2013b, §239). Mitigating against the manifestations of conflict that serve to fracture integral relationships, and in line with both the teaching of his predecessors and the reflections of Sacks (2003) on the dignity of difference, Francis’s “culture of encounter” actively seeks to foster respect for diversity (2013b §226). The pope takes this ethic of encounter and dialogue further in his landmark encyclical, Laudato Si’. In the opening of his first social encyclical, Francis expresses a personal desire to “enter into dialogue with all people about our common home” (2015b, §1). He employs this framing to help unite people in the service of a “dialogue and action, which would involve each of us as individuals, and also affect international policy” (2015b, §15). Such transformation has implications that spill over into inter-religious relationships. As Thomas Berry (2009) argues, this shift necessarily involves something far beyond concluding that other religions have access to forms of natural reason (cf. Paul VI, 1965a). Indeed, Berry posits that it is only through deep dialogue with other spiritual traditions, a dialogue in which the “floods of light” of other revelatory experiences are mutually recognized, that Christians will ever approach a fuller understanding of the inspiration for human religious life (Berry 2009, p. 16). Francis (2015b) supports this proposition, and like
Berry, specifically notes the need for an embrace of deep diversity: “Given the complexity of the ecological crisis and its multiple causes, we need to realize that the solutions will not emerge from just one way of interpreting and transforming reality. Respect must also be shown for the various cultural riches of different peoples, their art and poetry, their interior life and spirituality” (§3).

Here, taking a new direction in relation to the literature surveyed above, Francis brings a green perspective into the inter-faith conversation when upholding the importance of dialogically-informed respect for diversity in the transformation of problematic realities in this world. It is telling in this regard to consider how Francis’ employed the medium of a homily to address the principle of dialogue and its connection to peacebuilding, while celebrating a Mass in front of some 60,000 people in Sarajevo:

Peace is God’s dream, his plan for humanity, for history, for all creation. And it is a plan which always meets opposition from men and from the evil one. Even in our time, the desire for peace and the commitment to build peace collide against the reality of many armed conflicts presently affecting our world. ...Within this atmosphere of war, like a ray of sunshine piercing the clouds, resound the words of Jesus in the Gospel: “Blessed are the peacemakers” (Mt 5: 9). This appeal is always applicable, in every generation. He does not say: “Blessed are the preachers of peace,” since all are capable of proclaiming peace, even in a hypocritical, or indeed duplicitous, manner. No. He says: “Blessed are the peacemakers,” that is, those who make peace. Crafting peace is a skilled work: it requires passion, patience, experience and tenacity. Blessed are those who sow peace by their daily actions, their attitudes and acts of kindness, of fraternity, of dialogue, of mercy. ...These, indeed, “shall be called children of God,” for God sows peace, always, everywhere; in the fullness of time, he sowed in the world his Son, that we might have peace! Peacemaking is a work to be carried forward each day, step by step, without ever growing tired (Francis 2015b. Emphasis in original).

In addition, the pontiff has incarnated an inter-faith dimension to dialogue and prayer for peacebuilding. For example, Francis joined with the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, Mahmoud Abbas, and Shimon Peres, to plant an Olive Tree in the Vatican gardens symbolically grounding hope for political solutions supporting peace in the Middle East. Then, the Pope and Ecumenical Patriarch, along with other Christian, Jewish, and Muslim leaders, recited multi-linguistic prayers together for “peace in the Holy Land, in the Middle East and in the entire world” (Francis, 2014b). On what was a remarkable day, Francis spoke of peacebuilding in a way that resonates well with the conceptual underpinnings of inter-religious dialogue as a path to fostering positive peace:

Peacemaking calls for courage, much more so than warfare. It calls for the courage to say yes to encounter and no to conflict: yes to dialogue and no to violence; yes to negotiations and no to hostilities; yes to respect for agreements and no to acts of provocation; yes to sincerity and no to duplicity. All of this takes courage, it takes strength and tenacity (Francis, 2014b).

Helping to motivate such courage, which facilitates the crossing inter-religious boundaries, Francis also engages in symbolic actions to promote cultures of encounter and dialogue. Indeed, after being elected bishop of Rome in 2013, Pope Francis’ first pastoral trip outside of central Italy was to the Mediterranean island of Lampedusa. Located only 70 miles from Tunisia but in Italian territorial waters, the island is home to a camp where Africans trying to reach Europe are frequently detained after arriving at Lampedusa’s port in rickety vessels. At that camp and while overlooking a graveyard of migrant boats, Francis said an open air mass. He employed a multi-colored dinghy as his altar and carried a cross, crafted with wood salvaged from a vessel used to transport migrants. That day, he preached a homily calling for compassion for migrants, most of whom are from other-than-Christian faith communities and Francis call for an end to a culture of indifference that is unmoved by migrant deaths as they seek a better life for their families (Francis, 2013a). Here, Francis is firmly connecting the culture of encounter and dialogue with ethical responsibilities towards migrants, thus adding a new dimension to the literature surveyed above. This theme was continued in March 2015 when, during Holy Thursday Mass, Francis washed the feet of male and female Muslim, Catholic, and Hindu refugees from Nigeria, Mali, Syria, India, and Pakistan. Such a gesture
embodied a key principle supporting inter-religious dialogue as a path for peacebuilding, namely, that all cultures and religions are worthy of deep respect precisely because they are understood to thirst for peace. As the Pope stated afterwards: “We have different cultures and religions, but we are brothers and we want to live in peace” (Francis quoted in Matharu, 2015).

Inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding between (1) what are frequently called the “world religions” and (2) Indigenous integrative religions is largely overlooked in the academic literature surveyed in this article. On the level of principle, it seems logical that the process of dialogue advocated by the selected scholars should extend to form connections with integrative Indigenous religions. In harmony with that instinct and in what is a welcome addition not often found in the literature on inter-religious dialogue, Francis also proposes something akin to a preferential option for Indigenous peoples, especially when first peoples are being displaced from their lands in the service of agricultural and mining enterprises that harm socio-ecological flourishing, stating, “it is essential to show special care for Indigenous communities and their cultural traditions. They are not merely one minority among others, but should be the principal dialogue partners” (Francis 2015b, §146). As a prime example of a fruit of dialogue in this regard, invoking John Paul II and the Gospel call to peacemakers Pope Francis (2015c) apologized for the sins of colonialism perpetrated against Indigenous people in the name of religion during the conquest of the Americas.

Given that Indigenous cultures and religions are frequently inseparable, here we see a prime example of how Francis is both a synthesizer and an innovator in his treatment of the inter-religious implications of cultures of dialogue and encounter. It is also significant that the call for all people to build up a positive peace is never far from the surface in this aspect of Francis’ teaching and lived example. The question this article now turns to address in its conclusion is how this dialogical imperative is received amongst Catholics.

**Conclusion: Shifting the Center**

In parallel with the discussion of fundamentalism above, most peace activists will always be doves and it may be hard to soften the hearts of ardent hawks. However, there is a large constituency of Roman Catholics, political leaders and international diplomats amongst them, who fall somewhere near the center of this dichotomy. This group can be reached and persuaded to act by the teachings and lived example of their popes. For such Catholics, a major issue can be the catholicity of working for peace. Here is where the magisterial teachings and lived examples mapped above come in their own, helping to firmly situate the building of positive peace within the category of Catholic moral orthodoxy. By adding the weight of the papal voice to an endorsement of the importance of cultures of encounter and dialogue in the service of peacebuilding, the popes remove the tinge of radicalism that otherwise skeptical centrist Catholics may feel, moving them beyond their comfort zones when confronted by a hugely jarring narrative of positive peace with all the moral responsibilities that it entails. As a result, this movement disrupts the prevailing culture of violence and war that, as contemporary popes have helped to demonstrate, is ubiquitous within society. Such consciousness-raising disruptions can prove fertile ground for growing a holistic peacebuilding ethic. This grounding of an otherwise lofty moral imperative brings into focus one of the most promising potentialities of the contemporary papal endorsement of dialogue between conflicting parties as an important a path toward substantive peace—transforming those who might otherwise be unmoved into peacebuilders.

**References**


A Comparison Study of the Typologies of Terrorist Organizations Using Geographic Information Systems

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Abstract
This study uses a geographic information system (GIS) and a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model to evaluate if terrorist organizations that display a higher level of abstract/universal characteristics are more lethal in individual terrorist attacks than those organizations that exhibit a higher level of limited/political characteristics. The results from the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model indicate that indeed there is an association between organizations that demonstrate a higher degree of abstract/universal characteristics and higher fatality rates in individual attacks. Likewise, terrorist organizations with a greater degree of limited/political characteristics were determined to produce less fatalities in individual attacks.

Introduction
Terrorism has become one of the central issues of our time. Academic interest in the phenomenon has crossed disciplines as widely diverse as economics, political science, sociology, psychology, and criminology. Much of this scholarship classifies terrorism as a single phenomenon that moves across time and space, from country to country, and from situation to situation. However, viewing terrorism as a single social phenomenon drastically minimizes the unique differences that exist among terrorist organizations in terms of their motives, ideologies, leadership styles, organizational structures, and methods of operation. In short, there is not one type of terrorist organization but many. These differences in the typologies of terrorist organizations may be seen in how their ideological motivations have drastically changed over time. For most of the 20th century, the motivations behind terrorism were largely confined to nationalism, separatism, and Marxism, but since the end of the Cold War, a new kind of international terrorism has started to take shape: one that ascribes more ethereal objectives to its governing ideology—often influenced by extreme religious viewpoints (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, and Steen, 2010, p.829; Rapoport, 2001, p. 421-422).

The current study focuses on how the uniqueness in the typologies of terrorist organizations impacts their behavior in terms of their lethality. The study begins by describing the socio-demographic characteristics of the terrorist organizations themselves and of their members and provides a review of the literature concerning the typologies of terrorist organizations. In the methodology portion of the study, the geographic information system (GIS) software ArcGIS was utilized to provide a visual portrait of the fatality rates for 20 of the most active terrorist organizations for the years 1970 – 2015. Each of the 20 organizations used in this study were ranked on a continuum between organizations with limited/political characteristics and organizations with abstract/universal characteristics. A zero-inflated negative binomial regression model was then used to assess how organizations that display a high degree of abstract/universal characteristics compare with organizations that display a high degree of limited/political characteristics in terms of their fatality rates. The paper concludes with a discussion of the study’s findings, implications for policymakers concerning the construction of counterterrorism policies, and suggestions for future research.
Literature Review

What is Terrorism

The first step in any research endeavor devoted to the study of terrorism is to define what terrorism is, or perhaps more importantly, what it is not. Unfortunately, terrorism is notoriously tricky to define. No known universal legal definition of it has ever been officially established (Schmid, 2012, p. 158). Even the most fundamental of questions such as: What is terrorism? What makes an act a terrorist act? What makes a group a terrorist group? – are still actively being debated among scholars in the field today (Silke, 2002). However, one cannot even approach the study of terrorism until parameters are set establishing exactly what the phenomenon to be studied truly is. Otherwise, the lines between what is and what is not terrorism may too easily become blurred. For example: Can acts committed by state actors be considered terrorist events? Do guerilla warfare tactics conducted in the context of legitimate warfare count as terrorism? Since establishing a definitive definition of terrorism is well beyond the scope of this study, an operation definition of terrorism has been adopted to advance the study forward. Therefore, this study uses the following definition of terrorism: The premeditated use or threat of use of systematic violence by sub-national groups in order to obtain political, religious, and/or ideological objectives through intimidation of a larger audience (or audiences) outside the immediate victims, usually not directly involved in the decision making process (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & Steen, 2010; Enders & Sandler 2000, 2012).

Individual Characteristics

Concerning the demographic information of individual terrorists, it is almost universally accepted by scholars that acts of terrorism are predominantly conducted by young males (Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Sageman, 2008; Russell & Miller, 1977). Traditionally, research has identified perpetrators of terror as being unmarried (Berrebi, 2007; Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015). However, to the contrary, Sageman (2008) determined that the vast majority of jihadist terrorists are married and have children. Most researchers have found that terrorists are generally well educated, and come from middle to upper-class backgrounds (Berrebi, 2007; Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Sageman, 2008). The fact that terrorists are often well educated and come from upper-class backgrounds is quite intriguing since the very opposite is true for individuals who engage in most other forms of social deviance. This highlights how distinct the individual motivations of terrorist are from those of the common criminal and suggests that terrorism needs to be studied as a unique form of social deviancy.

Targets and Operational Methods

Regarding how terrorist groups choose targets and carry out operations, some of the most common quarries of terror are military installations, public transportation systems, major business-related institutions, and tourist destinations. The majority of terrorist attacks are directed at civilian businesses and infrastructure. These targets are likely chosen more frequently than political and military sites due to their accessible and limited security measures (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 829). Often, terror attacks occur randomly in order to achieve a high level of paranoia among the general populace and to give the impression that terror is unpredictable and can occur anywhere (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 828). Although the seeming randomness and unpredictability of terrorist attacks often strikes much fear into the hearts of the general public, historically speaking, most terrorist attacks have not been very lethal. More than half of the terrorist attacks since 1970 involved no fatalities (LaFree, 2011, p.425). Many terrorist attacks target property rather than civilians. Of the ones that do target civilians, many of them fail. In some cases, terrorist groups have provided advance warning to civilians before carrying out their assaults. This was a commonly known practice for organizations like the ETA, IRA, and Weather Underground (LaFree, 2011, p. 425-426).
Terrorist attacks are practically divided into two categories: domestic and transnational. Domestic terrorism occurs when perpetrators carry out an incident in their home-county. Transnational terrorism occurs when an incident in one country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments or citizens of another country (Enders & Sandler, 2012). In recent times, international terrorism has been able to make its ascension through the nourishment provided by the expansion of globalization, communication technologies, and the liberalization of trade, investment, and finance practices (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 830-831). The results of this has led the terror networks of today to be more fragmented, fluid, and erratic than their more structuralized predecessors. Many of today’s terrorist operatives function throughout the world as lone actors or in small intimate groups; radicalized through websites and social media, and are physically disconnected from the powerbases to which they have aligned themselves with. This liquidation and scattering of terror networks have made their global threat more opaque with an almost omnipresent capacity (Sageman, 2008). When considering the quantity of domestic versus transnational attacks, it is apparent that the vast majority of terrorist operations are domestic attacks. When studying the attack patterns of fifty-three foreign organizations that were identified by the U.S. government as especially dangerous to the United States for the years 1970 – 2007, LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009), discovered that more than 93% of terrorist attacks were domestic attacks.

Although terrorist attacks have occurred in many parts of the world, attacks do tend to be concentrated in specific areas. Over time, the regions of the world where terrorism has aggregated has varied considerably. Historically, terrorism has been viewed as a way in which marginalized groups could retaliate against much stronger government forces. This means that terrorists were most likely to direct their grievances at strong and stable governments. This idea is empirically demonstrated by the fact that, from 1970 – 1980, 54% of all terrorist attacks occurred in North America and Western Europe (Hendrix & Young, 2014, p. 330). However, this trend seems to have made a rather drastic shift in recent years. Following the end of the Cold War, 54% of attacks occurred in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. During this same period of time, North America and Western Europe experienced only 10% of the global total of terrorist attacks (Czinkota et al., 2010; Hendrix & Young, 2014, 330). Hendrix and Young (2014) summarizes this alteration in the regional concentration of terrorism through the statement, “Terrorism, long considered a weapon of the weak, may now be more accurately characterized as a weapon targeting the weak” (p. 330).

Furthermore, even within the regions of the world where terrorism is most prevalent, acts of terrorism are often restrained to a relatively few number of countries. From 1970 – 2007, the top twenty countries in terms of terrorist attacks accounted for 72% of all terrorist attacks, but only 10% of all the countries in the world (LaFree, 2011). This is validated further by a report from the Institute for Economics and Peace (2016) which found that five countries within the Middle East and North African (MENA) (Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria) were responsible for 72% of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. With regard to how acts of terrorism have been aimed at the United States, LaFree et al. (2009) found that, from 1970 – 2004, just 3% of attacks by organizations identified as being anti-U.S. were actually directed at the United States. Moreover, 99% of attacks targeting the United States did not occur on U.S. soil but were aimed at U.S. targets in other countries.

**Typologies of Terrorism**

When viewing terrorism through a historical lens, it becomes quite clear that the goals, ideology, and behavior of terrorist organizations have altered substantially over the years. Rapoport (2001) expounds upon this idea in the author’s formation of four waves of modern global terrorism: anarchism, anti-colonialism, left-wing radicalism, and religious terrorism. In the first wave, anarchists believed that the state was the source of all evil and through its elimination, a utopian society would be brought about. In the second wave, anti-colonialists believed the independence from colonial powers would lead to political and economic prosperity for their countries. In the third wave, radical leftist believed that capitalism was the root of all of society’s evils and its elimination would lead to more equity for all people. Today, in the fourth wave, radical jihadist organizations associate Western cultural with secularism, materialism, globalization, mass media, tolerance, and diversity.
From their perspective, they believe that they are struggling to restore a social order based on the fundamentals of religion, family, and community (things they believe Western society denigrates and discards).

For sure, there are many similarities to be found in the four waves of terrorism described above. All these situations involve a great deal of external social upheaval and social polarization among ideologically incompatible groups. All the groups mentioned above are similar in that they tend to justify their use of terror through the viewpoint that they are engaged in a morally just struggle to restore the social order against a rootless dominant culture which is leading their societies towards an abyss (Black, 1990; de la Roche, 1996; Rapoport, 2001; Rosenfeld, 2004). However, the exact circumstances under which these overarching paradigms exist vary considerably from environment to environment and from organization to organization. Terrorism, at its most basic level, should not be viewed as a single ideological perspective adopted by a particular type of organization, but rather as a method of operation assumed by a variety of organizations to advance their particular cause forward (Laqueur, 2003, p.8; Mullins & Thurman, 2011).

By and large, scholars have refrained from classifying the unique differences among terrorist organizations into distinct categories. Nor have there been many empirical examinations into how these differences impact the behavior of these organizations. Two notable exceptions to this are Asal and Rethermeyer (2008) and Piazza (2009). In examining the organizational characteristics of terrorist groups (e.g., ideology, size, age, state sponsorship, alliances, connections, and control of territory) Asal and Rethermeyer (2008) answers the question: “Why are some terrorist organizations so much more deadly than others?” (p. 2). Their findings show that size, ideology, territorial control, and connectedness are essential predictors of lethality while state sponsorship, organizational age, and host country characteristics are not. In another evaluation of casualty rates of terrorist attacks, Piazza (2009) examined the organizational and goal-structure of Islamic terrorist groups. The author concluded that terror attacks perpetrated by strategic groups (those focused primarily on political and territorial ends) had significantly fewer casualties than abstract/universal groups (those focused primarily on religious or intangible ends).

Expanding on the ideas of Piazza (2009), the current study looks specifically at 20 of the most active terrorist organizations in terms how many attacks they conducted during the years 1970 – 2015. Unlike Pizza (2009), the current study does not just focus on organizations which have affiliations with the Islamic religion but includes organizations from all across the spectrum. Further, the current study does not classify the terrorist organizations under consideration into dichotomous variables (i.e., strategic or abstract/universal) but instead uses set criteria to score each organization along a continuum with two polarized typologies existing at either end. On one side of the continuum contains a species of terrorism which is very pragmatic and secular in nature. These types of organization usually operate under the direction of well defined political aspirations which are both limited and achievable. The Marxist/leftist groups are great exemplars of this. These mostly nationalistic organizations were focused on bringing political change to their country of origin and employed terrorist tactics in order to gain enough leverage to aid them in their attempts. This end of the terrorist organizational continuum is titled limited/political. On the other end of the continuum, are terrorist organizations with very abstract goals which attach no boundaries to their scope and ambition. These mostly international organizations devoutly operate under a universalized ideology which they intend to project upon the world. This form of terrorism is expressed most clearly by radical jihadist organizations. This end of the terrorist organizational continuum is titled abstract/universal. When comparing these two ends of the continuum, it seems reasonable to suspect that organizations that display a higher degree of abstract/universal characteristics are deadlier than organizations that display a higher degree of limited/political characteristics. This is because politically motivated terrorist groups tend to be somewhat self-conscious about their public image due to their desire to gain support from those who sympathize with their cause. They wish that others will see them as liberators rather than as murders. Contrastingly, organizations with a higher level of abstract/universal characteristics are often so singularly focused on and feel justified through their ideology that they give little regard to public perception or making any kind of appeal to sympathizers. Therefore, these types of organizations are often less discriminating about whom they target and use little if any discretion in their methods of operation (Hoffman, 1998).
Hypotheses

Two hypotheses were proposed in this study:

H1. The higher a terrorist organization’s total abstract/university score is the more fatalities they will produce in individual terrorist attacks.

H2. The higher a terrorist organization’s total limited/political score is the less fatalities they will produce in individual terrorist attacks.

Methodology

To answer the two research questions posed above ArcGIS was utilized so that trends in the lethality of some of the most active terrorist organizations from 1970 – 2015 could be presented in visual form. In addition, correlation and zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses were conducted to assess the relationships between where terrorist organizations fell on the organizational continuum and the fatality rates of these organizations in individual attacks.

Data on terrorist organization was obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD is an open source database operated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. GTD contains information on over 150,000 domestic and transnational terrorist attack from 1970 – 2015 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], 2016). From these data, 20 terrorist organizations were selected based on which organizations engaged in the highest frequency of attacks during the years 1970 – 2015. Each organization was then rated on a three-point Likert scale consisting of five indicators representing the ideal organization with limited/political characteristics. These scores were then added up for a total limited/political score (the highest possible score being 15). Next, the same 20 organizations were again rated on a three-point Likert scale consisting of five indicators representing the ideal organization with abstract/universal characteristics. These scores were then added up for a total abstract/universal score (the highest possible score being 15) (see Appendices A and B for the criteria used for classifying terrorist organizations). Finally, a total fatality rate for each of the 20 organizations was calculated based on the number of people killed during terrorist attacks conducted by these organizations during the years 1970 – 2015. These data were then be graphed onto shapefiles using ArcGIS to create four maps so that the lethality of these organizations could be visually assessed and contrasted based on where the organizations fell on the terrorist typology continuum. Data for each organization were geographically placed onto ArcGIS maps in accordance with the host country of the organization.

In addition to using ArcGIS, Pearson correlation and zero-inflated negative binomial regression analyses were conducted using the statistical software STATA. The zero-inflated negative binomial regression analysis assessed how organizations that display a high degree of abstract/universal characteristics compare with organizations that display a high degree of limited/political characteristics in terms of their fatality rates. A zero-inflated negative binomial regression model was chosen specifically because GTD is an event dataset, and the dependent variable – total fatality rate – was measured as a discrete count rather than as a continuous variable. Therefore, a negative binomial regression model was selected as a suitable method of analysis because it is an alternative approach to the Poisson distribution which is useful when carrying out analyses using count data. The reason for this is because variables that are designed to measure the count of some phenomenon do not follow a normal distribution. Instead, count variables measuring rare events (e.g., incidents of terrorism) often display three distinct characteristics: one, they do not contain negative numbers; two, the numbers are discrete integers; and three, count variables often measure rare phenomena resulting in a tail skewed to the right or what is known as a Poisson distribution (Hoffmann, 2004).
However, one stringent assumption of a Poisson regression model is that the mean must equal the variance. In cases where the variance is larger than the mean, the distribution is said to be overdispersed. In such situations, a negative binomial model, which accounts for overdispersion, is usually found to be the better fit (Hoffmann, 2004). The data used in this study was found to be overdispersed, and therefore, a negative binomial regression model was utilized. Moreover, a zero-inflated binomial regression model was chosen to be the best fit for the data because a zero-inflated model allows for frequent zero-valued observations in the distribution. The underlying rationale for the excess zeros is that some observations within a population have a zero percent chance of occurring, while others had a chance of occurring but ultimately did not. Zero-inflated models are designed to measure both of these processes simultaneously (Hoffmann, 2004).

Results

Figures 1 – 4 are ArcGIS maps displaying information regarding the 20 terrorist organizations of interest in this study, the host countries of these organizations, and the total number of people killed by each organization in individual attacks for the years 1970 – 2015.

Figure 1 presents the host countries of the terrorist organizations and uses a graduated color scheme to show the total number of people killed in individual terrorist attacks conducted by the organizations of interest. As shown on the map, the highest number of fatalities were generally concentrated in the countries of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Additionally, the organizations which operate within this region tend to rank higher in terms of abstract/universal characteristics.

![Figure 1. Countries Associated with 20 Terrorist Organizations and Fatality Rates 1970-2015](image)

Figure 2 offers a more concentrated view of the terrorist organizations within Europe (i.e., IRA and ETA) and shows the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks committed by these two groups for the years 1970 – 2015. Figure 2 indicates that these organizations produce relatively minor fatality rates. Further, these two organizations ranked much higher in terms of limited/political characteristics than they did in terms of abstract/universal characteristics.
Figure 3 displays the organizations associated with the countries of MENA region (i.e., PKK, ISIL, Taliban, TTP, CPI-Maoist, NPA, LTTE, Huthi Extremists, and Al-Shabaab) and the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks committed by these groups for the years 1970 – 2015. Figure 3 clearly shows that the fatality rates produced by these organizations were high. In addition, the majority of these organizations tended to rank high in terms of abstract/universal characteristics.

Figure 2. European Terrorist Organizations and Fatality Rates 1970-2015

Figure 3. MENA Region Terrorist Organizations and Fatality Rates 1970-2015
Figure 4 shows the terrorist organizations associated with the countries of South America (i.e., FDN, FARC, SL, and FPMR) and the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks committed by these groups for the years 1970 – 2015. Figure 3 shows that the fatality rates produced by these organizations were moderately high to very low. These organizations ranked much higher in terms of limited/political characteristics than abstract/universal characteristics. The moderately high fatality rates might seem to somewhat mitigate the idea that organizations with a high degree of abstract/universal characteristics are more lethal than those with a higher degree of limited/political characteristics, but the organizations within these regions, generally, were active for very long periods of time. For example, FARC has been active for over 40 years. Therefore, the long time span of these groups existence might be more of a factor in their moderately high fatality rates than the actual typologies of the groups. The regression analysis used in this study accounts for the wide variations in time spans in which terrorist organizations were active by measuring fatality rates in terms of individual attacks rather than as the combined total number of people killed.

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for terrorist organizations’ abstract/universal score totals, limited/political score totals, and fatality rates are presented in Table 1 below.
As shown in Table 1, the mean for the 20 terrorist organizations total abstract/universal scores was calculated to be 8.489 with a standard deviation of 3.71 for a total of 40,625 observations. The minimum total abstract/universal score was 4 and the maximum 15. The skewness and kurtosis for this variable were .4227 and 1.798 respectively. The mean for the 20 terrorist organizations total limited/political scores was 11.66 with a standard deviation of 3.87 for a total of 40,625 observations. The minimum total limited/political score was 3 and the maximum 15. The skewness and kurtosis for this variable were -1.9023 and 3.052 respectively. Finally, the mean number of fatalities from the terrorist incidents committed by these organizations was 3.281 with a standard deviation of 16.688 for a total of 37,268 observations. To clarify, some cases within the GTD database do not include an actual number for the variable representing the number of people killed in an individual terrorist event; this is most likely due to some confusion regarding the actual outcome of the incident. These missing cases are what accounts for the difference between the total number of observations for the 20 terror groups (40,625) and the total number of observations for fatalities (37,268). The minimum number killed in individual attacks was 0, and the maximum was 1,500. The skewness and kurtosis for this variable were 55.07 and 4,373.843 respectively.

**Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to determine if there is a significant relationship between terrorist organizations’ total limited/political score, total abstract/universal score, and fatality rates in incidents of terrorism. The results are presented in the form of a correlation matrix in Table 2 below.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract/Universal</td>
<td>40,625</td>
<td>8.489</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.4227</td>
<td>1.798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited/Political</td>
<td>40,625</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-1.9023</td>
<td>3.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalities</td>
<td>37,268</td>
<td>3.281</td>
<td>16.688</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>55.07</td>
<td>4,373.843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation Results**

As seen in Table 2, a weak negative correlation (-0.0988 = p < .001) was found between total limited/political scores and fatality rates. This suggests that there is an association between terrorist organizations ranking high in terms of limited/political characteristics and fewer people dying in terror incidents committed by these organizations. Similarly, a weak positive correlation was found 0.0937 = p < .001) between total abstract/universal scores and fatality rates. This indicates that there is an association between terrorist organizations ranking high in terms of abstract/universal characteristics and more people dying in individual attacks perpetrated by these organizations. As can be seen from the correlation matrix, total limited/political and abstract/universal scores were found to have a strong negative correlation (- 0.9338 = p < .001). Having such a strong correlation between these two variables suggests that these two typologies are actually measuring a single dimension in terms of the way they categorize terrorist organizations. In other words, the same terrorist organizations that were high in abstract/universal
characteristics were low in limited/political characteristics and vice versa. Therefore, because these two variables were shown to essentially be measuring the same thing twice – just from opposite perspectives – it was decided that it would be best to just use the abstract/universal total score variable as a single predictor in the zero-inflated negative binomial regression equation since confirmation of this hypothesis would in turn confirm the other hypothesis posed in this study.

**Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression Results**

A zero-inflated negative binomial regression was conducted to determine whether terrorist organizations’ total abstract/universal scores significantly impacted fatality rates. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.023 - .119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract/Universal Total</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>45.73</td>
<td>.001***</td>
<td>.114 - .124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: z(1, 37,268) = .119, N = 37,268
Note: *** Correlation coefficient is statistically significant (p < .001)

As shown in Table 3, a significant regression equation was found (z(1, 37,268) = 45.73, p < .001). Fatality rates from terror attacks were equal to 0.71 + .119 (abstract/universal total). Meaning that fatality rates increased by .119 for every one unit increase in the total abstract/universal score.

**Discussion**

This study examined if the typologies of terrorist organizations impact their behavior in terms of lethality in the individual terrorist attacks they commit. The above analyses indicate that terrorist organizations that rank higher in terms of their abstract/universal characteristics produced higher fatality rates per individual attacks than those organizations that rank higher in terms of limited/political characteristics. Such findings do make sense when considering the contrasts in the central motivators and end goals of these two typologies. Organizations with a higher degree of abstract/universal characteristics tend to view the world as a zero-sum game – where their goals can only be obtained if those who oppose them do not achieve theirs. In this way, the goals of such organizations become paramount to their existence, and anyone or anything that stands in their way is eligible for elimination. These groups tend to be motivated by transcendental factors which they see in terms of moral absolutes. It is these factors which they feel brings righteousness to their cause and reduces the death destruction that result for their actions to be of little moral relevance. From this perspective, there is no need to place parameters or limitations on fatality rates, as long as such killings stay in alignment with advancing the organization’s cause forward.

Contrastingly, organizations with a high degree of limited/political characteristics often desire goals that are bounded by political and sociological factors that are both strategic and restrained in their scope. Such organizations deal less in moral absolutes and more in tactical advantageous. For these groups, terrorism is one method among many, which they can use to increase their political leverage and force those in power to capitulate to their demands. In this way, the amount of death and destruct that they render onto society must be
carefully factored into their larger agenda so that a delicate balance may be struck. Such organizations, ideally, hope to create so much havoc within their society that it becomes more beneficial for those in government to seek concessions rather than to continue to fight with them. However, they must keep in mind that if too many people die as a result of their actions than the government’s will to seek conciliation with them may be superseded by its need for retribution – disavowing any political leverage they may have obtained.

**Conclusion**

The findings from this study suggest that terrorist organizations that exhibit a greater degree of *abstract/universal* characteristics produce more fatalities in individual terrorist attacks than those with more *limited/political* characteristics. These findings indicate that there are fundamental differences among terrorist organizations based on the specific typology of the organization. This is an essential idea for policymakers to understand in their effort to develop effective policies aimed at counteracting terrorism since what may be an effective strategy against one organization may not necessarily work against another. Therefore, in any endeavor to create counterterrorism policies, terrorist organizations must first be assessed by their unique characteristics, and specific policies should be constructed in a manner that tailors to these characteristics. To assist in this effort, future research is needed so a more in-depth analysis of the distinct characteristics of various terrorist organizations can be made and more definitive typologies of these organizations developed. Moreover, future research should investigate how social, political, and economic factors within a terrorist organization’s host country influence its typology. Special consideration should be made as to how factors such as a nation’s style of governance, social, political, and economic stability, and rule of law relate to the typologies of terrorist organizations.

**References**


Appendices

Appendix A: Criteria Used to Assess Terrorist Organization on Limited/Political Characteristics:

1. **Clearly defined limited political goals and/or affiliations**

The political goals of the organization are clearly defined and limited in their scope and the terrorist operations carried out by the organization serve as a strategic method for achieving these goals. There should be a distinct pathway through which the organization hopes to achieve these goals. Largely, political ambitions should be aligned with a desire to try and maintain some of the elements of the political system which they desire of reform, rather than wishing to completely discard and replace the established system.

2. **History of compromise or mitigation in tactics**

There should be some points in the history of the organization where they have compromised or have attempted to compromise with the institutions to which the majority of their aggression is focused. This could take the form of such things as a cease-fire, peace negotiations, and/or the establishment of an officially recognized political party with an active role in the nation’s legislative process.

3. **Strong sense of nationalism**
The organization has a clearly defined national identity, and for the most part, the organizations goals, ambitions, and tactics are restricted to their country of origin.

4. *A sense of communicating the organizations cause through attacks*

Some elements of the terrorist operations carried out by the organization seem to be intended towards trying to make their grievances known to the world and to position those they oppose as being the true oppressor.

5. *Centralization of the organization*

The organization has a concrete clearly defined structure and exists in a distinct physical and/or geographical manner. There are clearly established parameters and boundaries to obtain membership to the organization.

**Appendix B:** Criteria Used to Assess Terrorist Organization on Abstract/Universal Characteristics:

1. *Unlimited and abstract goals and aspirations*

   The goals and ambitions of the organization are very complex and unlimited in their scope. The true end points of the organizations goals are somewhat ambiguous because these goals are driven more by ideology than by political strategic thinking. The organization has expressed a desire to unite many countries around the world to their cause.

2. *High level of international involvement*

   The organization is operating in multiple countries at the same time.

3. *Clearly defined moral and/or social demands*

   The organization imposes a high level of social and ethical expectations among their members and/or the civilian population they come into contact with. Violations of these expectations are met with severe consequences.

4. *Religious or supernatural belief in the organization’s cause*

   The organization has a clear affiliation with a religion and/or believes supernatural or abstract forces are driving their movement forward.

5. *Unwavering Ideological Purity*

   The organization is not willing to compromise their ideological beliefs to achieve at least part of their goals, even during times where it might seem pragmatic for them to do so.
Author’s Biographies

**Michael Alaimo** is a lecturer at Niagara University’s Leadership and Policy program. Dr. Alaimo’s research utilizes a geographic information system and structural equation modeling to evaluate the effects of social environmental conditions on terrorist activities. Dr. Alaimo’s research interests also include policing strategies (e.g., community policing, problem oriented policing, and zero-tolerance policing).

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