Responsibility for Peacemaking in the Context of Structural Violence

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“They cry Peace, Peace, but there is no peace.” Jeremiah’s complaint resounds loudly in a period in which many of the most intractable social conflicts are products not just of prejudice, malice, or misunderstanding, but also of the normal operations of structurally violent systems. This essay begins by outlining and modifying the theory of structural violence originally presented by Johan Galtung. It goes on to describe several types of conflict-generating systems, including the capitalist economy that produces crime and mass incarceration and the neo-empire that produces terrorism and the “war on terror.” Finally, it inquires into the responsibility of would-be conflict resolvers for system transformation, stressing the need for new forms of conflict resolution theory and practice, and suggesting several processes that might help to satisfy this need.

Structural Violence as a Problem for Peacemakers

In a recent book, I suggested that the field of conflict resolution has experienced three “waves” of praxis, each of which continues to influence thinking and practice among would-be peacemakers. In the first wave, conflict was thought of primarily as a clash of interests that could be managed or resolved through warfare, power-based negotiation, or various forms of alternative dispute resolution. Conflict resolvers of the second wave pictured serious conflict as a product of unsatisfied human needs, arguing that basic needs for identity, belonging, security, and development could be satisfied only by collaborative processes that produced significant changes in intergroup relationships. The third wave of praxis, which is now gaining momentum, sees conflict emanating from violent social systems that, so far from being

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3 Resolving Structural Conflicts: How Violent Systems Can Be Transformed (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2017), 36-44, 53 et seq. The publisher’s permission to use material from the book in this essay is gratefully acknowledged.
“dysfunctional,” produce bitter intergroup strife as a predictable feature of their normal operations. Which forms of peacemaking are appropriate to deal with structural conflicts is a disputed issue, but the peacemaker’s responsibility in such cases seems clear: it is to assist conflicting parties to replace or restructure the violence-producing system.

The theoretical progenitor of the third wave was the Norwegian peace theorist, polymath, and gadfly Johan Galtung. Almost fifty years ago, Galtung published an article in *The Journal of Peace Research* that introduced the idea of structural violence to the conflict studies field. Structural violence, he stated, is force or influence exerted in accordance with patterned social arrangements that prevent people from realizing their human potential and satisfying basic developmental needs.4 Unlike direct violence, which involves one person acting to harm another, it is indirect and may or may not involve people acting deliberately. If I withhold food from you intending to starve you to death, that is direct violence. If the system of food production delivers food only to those who can afford to pay for it, and you starve because you can’t afford the price, that violence is structural. In both cases, “individuals may be killed or mutilated . . . hit or hurt . . . and manipulated by means of stick or carrot strategies.” But, where structural violence takes place, “The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.”5 Of course, this sort of violence need not take a form as dramatic as the physical starvation of one of the system’s “bottom dogs.” Stressing the difference between human potentiality and actuality means that preventing a child from going to school or a woman from working out of the home should also be considered violent, at least where these restrictions are avoidable.

There are three primary reasons for expanding the usual common sense definition of violence to include structural components. The first is that it renders visible forms of destruction which many people in relatively static societies consider natural, hence invisible:

In a static society, personal violence will be registered, whereas structural violence may be seen as about as natural as the air around us. Conversely, in a highly dynamic society, personal violence may be seen as wrong and harmful, but still somehow congruent with the order of things, whereas structural violence becomes apparent because it stands out like an enormous rock in a creek, impeding the free flow, creating all kinds of eddies and turbulences.6

Second, the concept provides a corrective to a common view that the first parties in conflict to resort to direct violence are breakers of the peace, when, as to them, the apparent peace is often already violent. (One thinks of

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6 Ibid., 179.
terrorist attacks in the West, which local residents consider virtually unprovoked breaches of the peace, but which are often done to retaliate for attacks by Western forces in other regions.) Conflict begins with an “avoidable insult to human needs,” not with one’s response to the insult. In fact, a reciprocal causal relationship between direct violence and structural violence exists in which each form tends to provoke or generate the other. Third and finally, “an extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace.” If the absence of direct violence, at least for the time being, can be considered peace in a negative sense, the absence of structural violence and the replacement of abusive or exploitative relationships by valued, mutually rewarding relationships should be considered “positive peace.”

Although Johan Galtung’s detractors joked that the activist scholar had redefined violence to include everything he did not like, his definition of structural violence is coherent enough. His theory makes it clear that the systems which administer and provoke violence can be political and cultural as well as socioeconomic, but it puts considerably more emphasis on the unequal distribution of socioeconomic power than do many other approaches. Under capitalism, he notes, the distribution of resources, including income, education, and medical services, is grossly unequal, with “rank dimensions . . . tied together in the social structure.”

In other words, as Karl Marx had said, society is sharply divided into classes: Marxist criticism of capitalist society emphasizes how power to decide over the surplus from the production process is reserved for the owners of the means of production, who then can buy themselves into top positions on all other rank dimensions because money is highly convertible in a capitalist society – if you have money to convert, that is.

Galtung then goes on to cite, apparently with approval, the liberal critique that “socialist” (i.e., Stalinized) systems also concentrate economic power in a few hands, thus opening the door to structural violence from non-capitalist regimes as well. His dislike of vertically ranked systems clearly extends to those whose advocates declare themselves to be leftists. Even so, his social vision, departing from the generally accepted assumption that the capitalist ‘free market’ is the final stage of socioeconomic development, owes a great deal to Marxist and post-Marxist traditions of critical analysis.

Galtung’s passion for social equality eventually produced a famous exchange of views between the Norwegian polymath and an equally acute and energetic British colleague, Kenneth E. Boulding. In 1977, Boulding produced “Twelve Friendly Quarrels With Johan Galtung,” an essay that, as Galtung pointed out in a reply published a decade later (“Only One Quarrel With Kenneth Boulding”), boils down to a single large disagreement over the necessity of transforming elitist social structures. Essentially accusing

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7 Ibid., 183.
8 Ibid., 171. Galtung does not discuss socialist alternatives to Stalinism, either Trotskyist, Bukharinist, or anarcho-syndicalist, perhaps because of his deep commitment to Gandhian nonviolence and the values of social democracy.
Galtung of being a Marxist without portfolio, Boulding criticized his insistence that violence is deeply related to social inequality and cannot be reduced significantly without eliminating exploitation and repression. On the contrary, Boulding maintained, since violence and poverty (or powerlessness) derive from different sources, equalizing social positions will not necessarily have the potent peacemaking effects predicted by Galtung. His own perspective, which he termed “evolutionary,” suggested that society is developing autonomously, in accordance with entropic laws, in the direction of “human betterment.” The implication (distantly reminiscent of Burke’s objections to the French Revolution) was that deliberate attempts to restructure social institutions are likely to interfere with this natural process. In his reply, Galtung insisted that greater social and political equality is not just one long-term goal, among many. It is a *sine qua non* for the resolution of structural conflicts and the creation of positive peace.

Of course, this exchange left many questions unanswered. A less sweeping critique of Galtung’s approach might have noted that, despite some intriguing speculation about the relationship between structural and direct violence, his essay did not clearly indicate the conditions under which the former is likely to produce the latter, or vice versa. When (if ever) will an unjust or oppressive social system produce violent rebellion? When (if ever) will the spread of personal violence generate violent repression? Adding the social-structural dimension to psychologically based theories such as human needs, relative deprivation, and historical trauma brings the answers to such questions closer, but still leaves a large area indeterminate and subject to influence by multiple variables. For this reason, some analysts (including Galtung himself in later works) have employed psycho-political notions like Paolo Freire’s theory of “conscientization” to explain why passive victims of social injustice sometimes—but far from always—become active resisters or rebels.10

In addition, Galtung offered two important concepts that help explain how one form of violence can be converted into the other: *nested systems* and *cultural violence*. To illustrate nested systems, consider the prison, which one can describe as a violence-generating system based on structural inequality and the non-satisfaction of human needs. Even before going behind bars, most prison inmates-to-be already live in an “iron cage”: a society organized so as to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the poor, people of color, and members of other marginalized groups living in certain communities to get a decent education, hold a remunerative job, feel safe and at peace with others, or enjoy a satisfying family life. We know that poverty and income inequality gestate crime, and that crime gestates prisons.11 Prisons, in turn, recycle prisoners,
sending them impoverished and stigmatized into structurally violent environments that insure that a substantial majority of them will be arrested again within three years.\(^\text{12}\) This situation illustrates the fact that social systems almost never exist in isolation; to use Galtung’s metaphor, they are nested like “Chinese boxes.”\(^\text{13}\) Each system may form part of a larger structure, a tendency that becomes more pronounced as the social world (including structures of domination) becomes more interconnected on a global scale. As a result, the inequalities associated with structural violence appear and are aggravated at all levels from the local to the national, regional, and international.

Within these nested systems, Galtung points out, structural violence and direct violence “crossbreed.” Repressive structures generate rebellion, crime, and self-destructive behaviors such as suicide and substance abuse, while rebellious acts incubate repressive institutions and punitive norms. To illustrate how this crossbreeding occurs, the theorist introduces a third element of the conflict triangle, cultural violence, defined as “those aspects of culture . . . that can be used to justify or legitimate direct or structural violence.”\(^\text{14}\) The cultural products that he considers especially potent in this regard are religion, ideology, language, art, science, and cosmology, although he might also have noted the peculiar importance in today’s world of narrative forms, including the graphic arts (films, videogames, images and stories shared on social media), as well as the subconscious imagery explored by psychoanalysts like Freud, Jung, and Lacan. Like Pierre Bourdieu, who sees “symbolic violence” as authority’s most effective tool, Galtung stresses the extent to which cultural conditioning maintains the oppressive structures that end by provoking and delivering violence:

The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all. Then come the eruptions, the efforts to use direct violence to get out of the structural iron cage . . . and counter-violence to keep the cage intact.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^\text{12}\) U.S. Department of Justice, Special Report: Multistate Criminal History Patterns of Prisoners Released in 30 States (September 2015). http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mschpprts05.pdf


\(^\text{14}\) Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” op. cit. at 291. Of course, cultural violence can also be considered structural, since culture is patterned and institutionalized. See, for example, John R. Hall, “Cultural Meanings and Cultural Structures in Historical Explanation,” History and Theory, 39:3 (Oct., 2000), 331-347.

Other commentators, noting that cultural ideas and practices tend to lag behind changes in the system of production, consider deep-rooted socioeconomic shifts the primary causal factor. But the causes can flow in any direction once the triangle – an integrated violent system – has been established. Moreover, Galtung’s theory points to the fact that the generation and crossbreeding of violent conflict can take place in a wide variety of social systems. The family, school, workplace, religious community, nation, and empire – all can become sites and producers of direct, structural, and cultural violence. This is especially likely to happen under certain conditions, which will be described differently, of course, by those challenging the system and those defending it. What are those conditions? And, what sorts of violent system do they produce?

The Varieties of Violent Systems

From the perspective of those challenging a sociopolitical system they deem oppressive, violence erupts when:

(a) a system marked by a seriously unequal and inequitable distribution of wealth, power, or honor

(b) fails to satisfy the basic needs or legitimate expectations of disadvantaged groups at a time when:

(c) these groups have become strongly convinced of the legitimacy of their basic needs and expectations, and

(d) systemic injustice has become manifest to them despite the ideological and cultural weapons usually employed to justify or disguise it.

From the perspective of the system’s defenders or deniers, on the other hand, violence is likely to erupt when:

(a) groups alienated and embittered by their failure to succeed in society and/or their self-destructive ideas and lifestyles

(b) are manipulated by ambitious leaders to believe that their unrealistic expectations are just and reasonable and that

(c) relevant sociopolitical systems are rigged to favor others and exploit or oppress them, notwithstanding that:

16 An example of this disagreement is the difference of opinion between Marxists and Weberians over the role of religion in the development of European capitalism. Max Weber thought considered the “worldly asceticism” of the early Protestant Reformers, the Calvinists in particular, an essential part of the explanation of why capitalism developed in the West rather than the East. Marxists insist that capitalist relations of production developed in Europe earlier than Weber thought, and that Protestant ethics were more an effect of this transformation than a cause. See Anthony Giddens, “Introduction” to Weber, op. cit., vii et seq.
(d) these systems (which can never be perfect) are generally successful in rewarding meritorious individuals and groups and disfavoring those who lack merit.

These conflicting perspectives draw attention to a number of important, still unanswered questions about the resolution of structural conflicts. The theory of structural violence seems to assume that the existence and character of relevant social systems is a matter of common knowledge. But the system’s role in generating conflict may itself be a major subject of contention between the parties. Although all parties to intense conflicts personalize their enemy to some extent, the rebels tend to be determinist vis a vis the system. That is, they blame an unjust social order, and those representing or profiting it, for failing to satisfy the legitimate needs and expectations of less favored groups. The system’s defenders, on the other hand, tend to attribute such groups’ misfortunes to their failure to meet legitimate standards. That is, they tend to be voluntarist vis a vis disfavored groups. A classic example is their tendency to blame a high rate of unemployment on unemployed people’s personal or collective failings (laziness, indiscipline, unwillingness to stay in school, disrupted families, etc.), rather than seeing it as a product of late capitalist structural features and a cause of personal or cultural problems.

How, indeed, is the conflict-causing system to be identified and defined? The existence and functions of social systems are not self-evident; they are matters of inference to be determined by interpreting events and people’s behavior. The parties to a serious social conflict may therefore agree that its sources are to some degree systemic, but still disagree strongly about the nature and dynamics of the system. Such disagreements (a form of what Oliver Ramsbotham calls “radical disagreement”) are fairly common. To many libertarians, the state is the culprit responsible for much human misery, whereas others tend to focus on the system’s socioeconomic or cultural dimensions. Many left-leaning analysts, when asked what system is responsible for violence in Africa or the Middle East, would immediately respond, “capitalist imperialism,” while many on the right would name “militant Islam” or “tribalized politics.” How should a would-be peacemaker approach radical differences of this sort, which involve conflicting narratives as well as clashes of philosophy and political values?

Before suggesting answers to this question, it may be useful to note the range and major types of systems that tend to produce radical disagreements.

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20 Although protracted conflicts can themselves be analyzed as “dynamical systems,” as Peter T. Coleman does in works like The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to Seemingly Impossible Conflicts.
Legal and political systems define de jure and de facto constitutions that distribute legitimacy, authority, and influence among groups incorporated in a body politic. Socioeconomic systems define modes of production that distribute property, economic roles, and privileges among groups incorporated in an economic market. Cultural systems define modes of discourse and behavioral norms that distribute social roles, status, and access to the means of communication among groups incorporated in a cultural network. A trend noted by social analysts since Hegel is that these systems tend to become increasingly integrated as history takes its course. Disagreements about the causal primacy of this systemic type or that persist, as do arguments about the relationship between social structure and individual agency. Clearly, “nesting” is too simple and straightforward a metaphor to describe complex inter-system relationships. For example, structural integration, which tends toward the creation of a single global System, does not mean the elimination of contradictions; it may actually intensify key contradictions. Even so, an adequate analysis of any social system must take into account its political, cultural, and socioeconomic dimensions and determinants.

Consider, for example, the U.S. legal/political system, one of whose manifestations is the incarceration of about 1.5 million Americans, a higher percentage of the population per capita than any other nation on earth. The essential role of the socioeconomic system in producing this violence can hardly be doubted in light of more than fifty years of research concluding that crime rates (rates of violent crime in particular) rise predictably with increased unemployment, lower income levels, the economic decline of neighborhoods, and growing income and wealth inequality. The authors of the pioneering U.S. Crime Commission report, “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” (1965), put the matter simply: “Warring on poverty, inadequate housing and unemployment, is warring on crime.” A more recent transnational study

(New York: Public Affairs, 2011), the discussion here focuses on the social context of such conflicts.

21 See, e.g., my discussion of Anthony Giddens’ perspective in Resolving Structural Conflicts, op.cit. at 12-13, 63-65.
extends the same analysis globally, but puts special emphasis in the correlation of overall economic growth, income inequality, and violent crime:

Both economic growth and income inequality are robust determinants of violent crime rates. Furthermore, even after controlling for country-specific effects (including systematic measurement error), there is clear evidence that violent crime is self-perpetuating. These variables (economic growth, inequality, and past crime rates) worked well for homicides and remarkably well for robbery rates. Their sign and statistical significance survived the addition of other explanatory variables, including measures of crime deterrence, illicit drug activities, demographic characteristics, and cultural traits.  

It is not only crime that increases with the growth of social inequality, but also a wide variety of violent intergroup conflicts, including ethno-national, racial, and religious struggles. As a recent study by Ravi Kanbur for the International Peace Academy puts it, “Theory and evidence support the view that it is the between-group dimension of inequality that is crucial. Given structural cleavages such as caste, religion, ethnicity, race and region, if income disparities align with these splits they exacerbate tension and conflict.” This finding has important implications for the connection of crime with the operations of the cultural system, as we will see in a moment.

Given the relatively clear connections between poverty, inequality, and crime outlined above, one might expect conflict specialists to seek to resolve the conflict between lawbreakers and authorities by helping the parties discover how to eliminate these conditions. The difficulty, however, is that that poverty and inequality have persisted and even deepened (along with “precarity,” the mode of existence one step removed from poverty in which vast numbers of working people currently find themselves), notwithstanding more then eighty years of strenuous effort to mitigate them by creating capitalist welfare states. To some analysts, this persistence suggests that economic misery is systemically generated – a product of globalizing capitalism at its current stage of development. If so, elimination of the problem will very likely require some sort of large-scale system transformation.  

https://archive.org/stream/laworderreconsid00camprich/laworderreconsid00camprich_djvu.txt

26 Pablo Fajnzylber, et al., “What Causes Violent Crime?” European Economic Review 46 (2002), 1323-1357 at 1349. Cf. Elliott Currie, op. cit., at 120: “Countries where there is a wide gap between rich and poor routinely show higher levels of violent crime . . . . Societies with weak ‘safety nets’ for the poor and economically insecure are more likely than others at a comparable level of development to be wracked by violence.”


prospect most analysts view with pleasure or even resigned acceptance. For a number of reasons, including the ideological legacy of the Cold War, the unevenness of economic development, and the dizzying pace of technological change, conflict specialists (among others) tend to avert their gaze from the systemic socioeconomic causes of poverty and crime. Instead, they are likely to conceive of clashes between criminals and authorities as grounded primarily in racial, ethnic, and cultural attitudes. The result is a tendency to classify conflicts between ‘the police’ and ‘the community’ as identity-group struggles rather than as products of the class structure.

This classification (dating back to the Kerner Commission’s 1968 Report on U.S. racial disorders) leads quite naturally to the multiplication of academic studies, intergroup dialogues, and government-funded projects designed to improve police-community relations. These efforts have produced a number of reform programs, some of which have apparently had a favorable impact on police-community relations. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the continuing state of war between authorities and lawbreakers in many communities will continue until the conflict’s systemic socioeconomic causes have also been identified and removed. As Elliott Currie puts it the updated 2013 edition of Crime and Punishment in America:

Today, as in the 1990s, the United States is distinguished by its unusually high levels of poverty, its wide spread of income inequality, and its relatively weak and hesitant provision of social benefits to the vulnerable. The key difference is that these problems have worsened since the first edition [of this book], and that has a great deal to do with why America’s cities remain the most violent in the advanced industrial world.

These words resound with particular force: “America’s cities remain the most violent in the advanced industrial world.” People lacking a systemic framework for interpreting this reality are unable to understand that, where crime and punishment are concerned, the fundamental problem is neither bad criminals nor bad cops., but a social system that has turned large urban areas into war zones. In a war zone, one is not surprised to learn that soldiers frequently abuse their power and brutalize civilians, or that armed civilians consider soldiers their enemy and fair game for retaliation. In most discussions of the crime/punishment syndrome, however, the extent to which all the actors in the drama play roles scripted by the economic structure as well as by cultural attitudes is downplayed or even ignored. Furthermore, those averse to system analysis often reduce the cultural system to a set of racially biased

31 Elliott Currie, op. cit., 223.
thoughts and behaviors rather than seeing racism as part of a discursive structure linking ideas about “us” and “them” to praxes involving the family, work, the nation, and religious or ethical values. The result of this habit of thought is to obscure the links between the cultural and socioeconomic systems.

Clearly, in important respects, the clash between police and communities in many Western nations is also a racial or ethnic identity group struggle. Reliable statistics in the U.S. and U.K. show that a disproportionately high number of people of color are arrested, convicted, and imprisoned for crime and suffer its effects as victims. There is no longer much doubt that police and prosecutors focus particularly intense attention on ethnic and racial ghettos, that racial profiling takes place as a matter of course, and that many criminal laws and institutions are designed to treat people of color more harshly than whites. But, Elliott Currie is surely right to insist that the underlying reality is an overlap between economic deprivation and race. “Being poor in America means being at the bottom of an exceptionally harsh system of inequality; being black greatly increases the chances of being impovdered and, therefore, trapped at the lower end of the social ladder.” Empirical studies show a particularly sharp correlation between extreme poverty and crime, with the result that extremely poor white neighborhoods “suffered more violence than somewhat less poor, but still deprived black communities. And they suffered almost twice the violent crime rates of black neighborhoods characterized by ‘low’ poverty.”

Pierre Bourdieu and Johan Galtung explain this by noting that in many societies, direct violence, such as police brutality against minorities, is visible and outrageous, while structural violence seems so ‘natural’ as to be virtually invisible. But, this seems a bit facile. As Galtung’s theory suggests, structural, cultural, and direct violence produce each other. Moreover, the violence attributable to class structure is not really invisible. When people lose their jobs or their homes because of business failures or relocations, when some under-employed people turn to drugs, alcohol, or criminal activities, or when whole neighborhoods or regions are depressed by economic reversals, these

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33 A commonly cited example is the law punishing the sale and possession of crack cocaine more severely than the sale and possession of powdered cocaine. But there is also a vast differential in the enforcement of laws against street crime and “white collar” crime. See D.O. Friedrichs, *Trusted Criminals: White-Collar Crime in Contemporary Society*, 4th Ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, 2009). See also the well-researched senior honors thesis by Joseph P. Martinez, “Unpunished Criminals: The Social Acceptability of White Collar Crimes in America.” (Ypsilanti, MI: Eastern Michigan University, 2014). http://commons.emich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1381&context=honors

34 Elliott Currie, *op. cit.*, 122, 126.

effects are quite visible.

In fact, what disappears from view in such cases is the connection between these violent effects and their systemic causes. The sufferers and their neighbors have learned not to view the business closure or the depressed neighborhood as an avoidable insult to their basic needs produced by a profit-driven system. The messages delivered constantly and in multifarious ways by cultural agencies ranging from the school and church to news shows and television dramas are that business trends (and catastrophes) are as mysterious and uncontrollable as the weather; that the ‘free market’ system is basically beneficent and healthy, although it occasionally needs tweaking; that, in any case, there is no conceivably better alternative system; and that individuals are ultimately morally responsible for their own economic destiny. These networked beliefs serve as a particularly dramatic illustration of the integration of the socioeconomic and deep-cultural systems, which collaborate to shift the attention of both in-groups and protest groups away from systemic defects and toward the personal level of analysis. All parties are invited to participate in the mode of thought and behavior that I have elsewhere termed “partisan moralism” – a propensity to personalize struggles by classifying warring parties either as innocent or culpable, as ‘good guys’ or ‘bad guys.’ “Parties who earn the positive label are thought of as well-intentioned, rational actors defending themselves against unjustified aggression, while those branded wrongdoers are considered malicious or deluded fanatics with a natural bent toward cruelty and violence.”

Partisan moralism is particularly evident in attempts to rally support for efforts by powerful nation-states to impose their will on other states or on dissident groups such as those named as enemies in the so-called “war on terror.” This highly personalized, Manichean form of nationalist ideology distracts attention from another violence-generating system – a globalized structure of production and power that some analysts term neo-imperialism. It may help, to begin with, to distinguish neo-imperialism from globalization per se. Globalization is a multi-faceted, self-engendering process involving the rapid multiplication and proliferation of transnational contacts and relationships of all sorts. It takes place when diverse peoples visit or trade with each other, learn each other’s songs, contract each other’s diseases, or marry each other’s children. Neo-imperialism is globalization promoted, shaped, and ultimately limited by elites driven to expand their own commercial infrastructure and values, modes of research and communication, and basic principles of government, education, and social life. What globalizing elites send abroad, of course, is an ‘export version’ of their home system – a technique first developed by the Romans in order to diffuse the fundamentals of Roman Law throughout their empire. Even so, it is a total system that is exported,

37 Resolving Structural Conflicts, op. cit. 7.
38 See, e.g., George Mousourakis, Roman Law and the Origins of the Civil Law Tradition (New York: Springer, 2015), esp. 84 et seq.
including socioeconomic, political, and cultural structures.

This neo-imperial system, I believe, provides the structural context needed to help us to understand the plague of religious violence and related warfare that has beset the world since the 1980s. After a long period of relative silence, the study of empire, fueled by the perception that the United States has succeeded to the role once played by the old imperial powers, has again become acceptable in some academic and journalistic circles. An early study of the conflict between Muslim jihadists and pro-Western forces named the neo-imperial system “McWorld”: Benjamin Barber’s way of describing the rapid and pervasive spread of American hegemony around the globe after 1945, culminating in the United States’ emergence as the world’s sole military superpower following the Cold War.39 This vast expansion of influence has been perceived by many groups abroad, particularly in volatile, resource-rich regions subject to foreign economic and military intervention, as an invasion that undermines local and regional autonomy, divides and conquers subject peoples, generates massive political corruption, disrupts long-established patterns of social interaction, and exposes local communities to a barrage of imports that challenge traditional religious values and threaten people’s core identities. It therefore generates numerous forms of violence, including rebellion, repression, and inter-imperialist warfare.

“Invasion,” in the case of neo-imperialism, is more than a metaphor. The modern era of religious politicization and extremism began with the Iranian Revolution of the 1970s and accelerated in the following decade with U.S. aid to jihadi forces rebelling against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It did not involve attacks against the West, however, until the President George H.W. Bush sent an army to Saudi Arabia and invaded Kuwait in 1991. The stated purpose of the invasion was to expel Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s troops from Kuwait, but Bush’s war was also intended to inaugurate a new era of U.S. neo-imperial activism by overcoming the so-called ‘Vietnam syndrome’ and eliminating Saddam’s Iraq as a major player in Middle Eastern affairs.40 The first communiqué issued by al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden called for the U.S. to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia’s sacred soil, terminate military operations and deadly civil sanctions against Iraq, and end its one-sided support to Israel.41 Little more than a decade later, lured by the promise of oil wealth, regional ‘democratization,’ and the establishment of U.S. control over the region, the second President Bush invaded Iraq proper. Saddam Hussein was deposed and killed, and the region was plunged into sectarian chaos. From the recipients’ perspective, it seemed clear that, stylistic differences aside, the Americans’ neo-imperial ‘mission’ differed hardly at all

40 On March 1, 1991, in the midst of Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), President Bush gave a speech at the Executive Office Building in Washington, D.C. in which he stated, “It’s a proud day for America. And we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19351. On U.S. war aims, see my Reasons to Kill: Why Americans Choose War (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), 139-43.
from that of the Western imperialists who had carved up the Middle East following World War I, and who had dominated most of the non-Western world ever since the eighteenth century.

Military imposition, however, is not an adequate explanation for either the relative success of the neo-imperial project or the current wave of rebellions against it. Although force was clearly used to expand and maintain the system, it is also true that certain groups in the receiving nations welcomed the spread of Western economic activity and cultural products in their lands, at least up to a point. Younger, more urbanized people in particular displayed great interest in Western consumer goods, technologies, and fashions, in greater freedom of expression, travel, and opportunities to study in Europe or America, in gender rights, internet access, and parliamentary democracy, online investment opportunities, pop music, and religious pluralism, not to mention TV satellite dishes, mobile phones, and a whole panoply of American and European lifestyles and politico-cultural values. Yet the desire for these goods and services can be intensely ambivalent and guilt-producing, since they threaten traditional identities, patterns of social order, and belief systems, and often extract a heavy price in the loss of personal dignity and national independence. For decades, to cite just one example, this price has included the wholesale bribery of public officials and business executives in nations incorporated into the neo-imperial system. Intense ambivalence about Western mores may help to explain why the al Qaeda operatives living in Florida prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. targets imbibed alcohol and visited strip bars before going into battle; it was one way to ‘sharpen the contradictions.’

The two faces of neo-imperialism are therefore intimidation and temptation, a combination that has been a potent stimulus to religious rebellions throughout history. One recalls the popular resistance to the French in the Mahgreb, to the British in old China, India, and East Africa, to the Russians in Central Asia, and to the United States in Iraq. Everywhere that secular leadership was unwilling or unable to push back against foreign political and economic domination, religious leaders mobilized mass insurgencies by fusing traditional values and behaviors with modern ideas and organizing techniques. Religious movements not only offered followers the opportunity to purify themselves and defend their traditions, they often provided the only opposition capable of organizing across the lines of class, region, and ethnicity. Moreover, they linked the promise of personal transformation – repentance and spiritual rebirth – to the achievement of social reform. Frequently, they practiced what they preached by organizing social welfare and relief programs that corrupt or callous governments seemed

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42 Barber, op. cit., 17-20, passim. See also Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Picador, 2012), which portrays the process as essentially consumer-driven.


incapable of providing, as well as organizing resistance to imperial claims and impositions. These examples of sacrificial action linked to promises of personal and social transformation appealed to many believers at a time when secular movements that promised radical change had been discredited, and when Western thought no longer inspired movements of cultural revival and national liberation. Given the choice between a pallid, collaborationist secularism and a fiery religious fundamentalism, it is not surprising that many people yearning for change preferred the latter.

This analysis, of course, may be challenged by those who do not believe that “neo-imperialism” accurately describes the current global order or the U.S. role in creating and maintaining it. Similarly, some may object that I have not accurately described the systemic basis for poverty and inequality in the United States and the role of socioeconomic conditions in producing crime and mass incarceration. Those challenges are welcome, so long as they lead to a full discussion of the role played by social systems, as well as individual decisions and attitudes, in generating structural and direct violence. One might say, then, that the first responsibility of a peacemaker, in the context of structural violence, is to facilitate discussions among individuals and groups about the extent to which social systems are generating violence, the nature of those systems, and the most effective ways to transform them.

Systemic Change and the Peacemaker’s Responsibility

For would-be peacemakers, two forms of responsibility in the context of structural violence seem preeminent. The first is their responsibility to help move thinking about mass incarceration, the “war on terror” and other forms of state-supported violence out of the mode of partisan moralism and toward identification and analysis of the social systems that generate them. The second is to develop practical methods of assisting conflicting parties to transform violent systems into systems of peace. The problem, in a nutshell, is how to accomplish a socioeconomic and cultural transformation that is both radical and nonviolent. Inegalitarian structures that fail to satisfy basic human needs generate violent conflict in two ways: directly, as when social classes struggle for economic and political supremacy, and indirectly, as when frustrated people conditioned to think of themselves in national, racial, ethnic, or religious terms hold other identity-groups responsible for their problems and target them for punishment. Conflict resolution requires that ranked socioeconomic structures be altered in order to satisfy the basic needs and vital interests of lower class and lower status groups. But how can this be accomplished without provoking violence by the old regime and its challengers? And, if a nonviolent social transformation is feasible, what roles can specialists in conflict resolution play in the process?

The first question demands attention because of the historic association of radical social transformations with intense mass violence. In some situations where the goal was to replace or alter legal and political institutions without overturning the old socioeconomic order, significant change took place without large-scale bloodshed. The nonviolent movement led by Mohandas Gandhi and the Congress Party ousted the British from India, and the campaign led by
Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress overthrew the apartheid system in South Africa, without a revolutionary civil war, but also without reordering those nations’ socioeconomic structures and priorities.\(^{45}\) Other upheavals that aimed at transforming the system of class and property relations as well as the system of governance proved more destructive. In certain instances (the Russian and Chinese revolutions come to mind), significant system changes were, indeed, accomplished, but state and revolutionary violence exacted a high price both in human lives and subsequent political deformation. Of course, this does not mean that leaving an old social regime in place produces peace! The slow collapse of a defunct system (for example, the centuries-long decay of feudalism in Europe) can be even more costly, generating religious upheavals, communal wars, and struggles between secular rulers, as well as horrendous structural violence.

This history must give us pause. It should also lead us to understand that our social thought and peacemaking practice remain uncomfortably constrained by a dichotomous understanding of “reform” and “revolution.” For example, we know that in some cases, significant socioeconomic changes were made relatively rapidly \emph{without} serious violence. One recalls the mass mobilizations led by New Dealers in the United States and social democrats in Europe that legitimized the labor movement and created the welfare/interest group state.\(^{46}\) During the 1930s in the U.S., a series of hard-fought strikes and demonstrations led by far-left organizations posed the threat of a violent mass uprising and enabled those advocating structural reforms to portray themselves as relative moderates. Revolutionary violence was avoided, although many of the tactics employed by the labor movement were either quasi-legal or illegal and were branded violent by the old regime. Such innovations in the U.S. as ‘sit-down strikes’ (i.e., factory occupations) and ‘one-cent sales’ (mass demonstrations to prevent property foreclosures) were borderline tactics that the state decided not to challenge in order to avoid a dangerous conflict escalation. One also recalls that American courts declared much of the original New Deal legislative program unconstitutional before the U.S. Supreme Court finally decided to validate it.

Interestingly, the size and militancy of the mass movement seems to correlate positively with the avoidance of civil violence. When people are politically aroused to demand significant structural change, but also have the organized means to express themselves collectively, nonviolent


transformations can occur. That being said, the extent to which these reform movements actually succeeded in altering the old social system remains a matter of debate. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s enemies branded him a revolutionary tyrant, and the new principles and institutions brought to life by the New Deal were more than cosmetic, but in hindsight, the claim that his administration rescued American capitalism by reforming labor-management relations, strengthening the social “safety net,” and regulating the banking and securities industries seems not at all far-fetched. While the changes implemented by the New Deal and social-democratic movements were in some ways substantial, they did not eliminate old classes or create new ones, permanently reverse relations of class domination/subordination, or transform the system of property relations that reflects and embodies the power of these groupings. This leaves us with a key question that current social science has done little to answer. How can we evaluate the transformative potential of a specific reform program? To do this requires a better understanding of the processes of system change than scholarship now possesses.

A second example of substantial nonviolent socioeconomic change is the rapid and unexpected movement of former Communist systems in the direction of capitalism that has taken place over the past two or three decades in Russia, the former Soviet republics and satellites, China, and Vietnam. In the former U.S.S.R. and its dependencies, as well as in Yugoslavia, the old system virtually collapsed and was replaced by a version of Western-style oligopoly capitalism, while in China and Vietnam, capitalist institutions and markets were permitted to develop under Communist Party control. Major questions concerning these developments remain unanswered. Was violence largely avoided because bureaucratic elites were able to maintain political power or to transform themselves into business elites under the new system? Can the parties now in control of formerly Communist regimes prevent the return of the gross inequalities and related social ills associated with capitalism? Do their activities in the world represent a new model of international behavior, or are they repeating the process of empire building that has so often led to global warfare?

Even with these major issues awaiting exploration, the historical materials suggest that rapid and far-reaching socioeconomic changes can be made without unleashing state and revolutionary violence, at least under certain conditions, and that conflict specialists can play useful roles in facilitating processes of transformation. Taking Crane Brinton’s classic study of violent revolutions, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, as a rough template, one can imagine an “Anatomy of Nonviolent Transformation” that would involve the following stages of development:

1. *The old social system’s functions and basic unfairness become evident, provoking multifarious and contradictory demands for change.*

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Historians such as Brinton discuss the decline of the ancien regime at length, emphasizing the role played by the “transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals” in delegitimizing old authority systems.\textsuperscript{48} Conflict specialists can play a role in this process by focusing attention on the systemic causes of social problems, the forms of structural violence, and the possibilities of helping to create less violent systems. Like the French Encyclopedists, scholars in conflict studies and related fields can produce publications, new course offerings, conferences, and practice projects applying the ‘structural turn’ to specific issues of class and class conflict. The audiences for such presentations can be students, community residents, journalists, or policymakers. In January 2016, for example, several scholar/activists at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution organized a two-day conference at United Nations headquarters in New York to discuss “Poverty, Inequality, and Global Conflict,” and to consider what types of national and international policies might help to solve the problems of system-generated violence. A report of the conference was distributed to a group of ‘opinion-makers’ who could help spread the word that poverty and inequality were systemic causes of violence that needed to be combated by new national and international policies, as well as new community-based programs.\textsuperscript{49}

2. \textit{In a growing atmosphere of crisis, mass movements organize and demand that substantial changes, not yet carefully specified, be made in the old system. They support their demands by resorting to unusual political tactics.}

A further sign that the situation may be ripe for systemic change is the emergence of political movements both to the left and to the right of established elite-dominated parties. This indicates that people are moving toward accepting the need for some sort of social and political reconstruction, although they have not yet agreed on its content. As feelings of disenchantment with the existing socioeconomic order spread, people feel the need for public and private discussions of what has gone wrong with the system and what the possibilities are of changing it. Under these circumstances, conflict resolvers are well positioned to facilitate various forms of public dialogue that may be convened by community groups to help people air their discontents, identify key social structures requiring alteration, and envisage possible methods of altering them.\textsuperscript{50} They can offer to inform political groups formally or informally of the results of relevant academic


\textsuperscript{49} The Conference on Poverty, Inequality, and Global Conflict (January 11-12, 2016) was cosponsored by George Mason University, the UN Academic Impact, and the Chicago-based People Program International. The Conference Report is available from the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at scar.gmu.edu.

research, as well as undertaking *new research* needed to throw further light on systemic problems and possible solutions. Skilled facilitators can also offer to assist such groups to work through their internal differences and/or their differences with competing organizations by using the *problem-solving workshop* methods developed by practitioners like John Burton, Herbert Kelman, and Christopher Mitchell, the *sustained dialogue* approach pioneered by Harold Saunders, Johan Galtung’s *transcend and transform* methods, and other relevant techniques for intergroup analysis and communication.51 These techniques, originally designed to deal with ultra-violent ethno-nationalist conflicts, may be well suited to facilitate discussions reflecting disagreements about the nature of the conflict-generating system.

3. *As ferment spreads, social-constitutional discussions erupt on street corners, in churches, and in workplaces, while economic and social experiments take place in numerous communities.*

People mobilizing for change select new leaders at the local as well as national and international levels. Rather than await the outcome of some final struggle, however, they begin to imagine and implement local solutions to the problems that most concern them. Conflict specialists can play various useful roles in this process, including advising the members of new organizations how to *use tactics that are militant and nonviolent,* and how to employ conflict resolution techniques in dealing with their political adversaries. Moreover, they are well positioned to investigate, evaluate, and publicize the *community-based programs and experimental projects* that have already begun to appear in response to perceptions that the current socioeconomic system is in crisis.

In contemplating further system change, people want to know ‘what works.’ What existing programs already help to get young people in poor neighborhoods off the streets, provide them with useful, well-paid work, and keep them out of the hands of violent gangs?52 How have older people and others declared ‘superfluous’ by the market economy managed to provide services for each other in exchange for ‘time-dollars’: a program now operating in more than 30 U.S. cities?53 What alternative forms of cooperative business and public service enterprise already permit workers and local residents in scores of communities to own their own companies and plan their own economic futures?54 Some activists believe that the spread of these local

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51 See Chapter Two, *supra,* at 46–47.


initiatives and cooperative enterprises is the key to a nonviolent socioeconomic transformation.\textsuperscript{55} Others fear that local movements will be co-opted or repressed as struggle intensifies. Conflict specialists can make a valuable contribution to the discussion by studying and evaluating the evidence for these claims and working to develop programs that they believe are transformative.

4. \textit{Political conflict intensifies at local and national levels, with old elites dividing and political coalitions reorganizing to support competing visions of system change. Specific programs for structural transformation are presented to the public in elections, referenda, and other forms of public decision-making.}

As political conflict escalates and moves toward a possible resolution, conflict specialists could play very important, although virtually unprecedented roles in facilitating agreement on a new social constitution. All the ‘third party’ techniques mentioned earlier can be employed to assist the parties to reach specific agreements on needed changes. Moreover, conflict resolvers skilled in improvising new public decision-making processes could help design political forums to permit open and thoughtful discussion of proposed structural changes.\textsuperscript{56} They could also advise conflicting parties how to deal with two factors that often obstruct nonviolent agreement on new socioeconomic relations: elite groups’ fear of total loss, and all parties’ reluctance to consent to irrevocable changes. Conflict resolvers will understand the need to assure privileged groups that changes agreed upon will not render them non-people, expose them to vengeance, or ignore their basic human needs. They will also work to ensure that any new structural arrangement embodies the ‘principle of reversibility.’ In the same way that citizens can now work to amend a political constitution, the parties to class conflicts need to be assured that restructured socioeconomic systems can also be re-altered to reflect changes in the popular will.

This brings our discussion full circle. The work of peaceful system transformation must involve public education on a large scale. Strenuous new efforts are required to help our fellow citizens and fellow humans worldwide, at a time of increasing insecurity and frustration, to move beyond partisan moralism to a new appreciation of their own responsibility and the system’s responsibility for avoidable violence. The bad news is that, where violent conflict is concerned, no party to the conflict and few bystanders are guiltless. As the Rolling Stones sing (in “Sympathy for the Devil”), “I shouted out/Who killed the Kennedys?/When after all/It was you and me.”\textsuperscript{57} The good news is

\textsuperscript{55} The project is described at http://democracycollaborative.org/content/next-system-project and thenextsystem.org.


that no party is solely responsible for violence sponsored or provoked by an oppressive social structure. And the best news is that, once people decide to transform such a structure, they can help each other to do so. Each of these steps – acknowledging responsibility for violence, perceiving that a system is also responsible for it, and deciding to change that system through collective effort – challenges peacemakers to overcome serious (but not insuperable) political and psychological obstacles to public understanding of such issues. That, I believe, is their particular professional and ethical responsibility.