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Timothy W. Brearly
James Madison University

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The Nature and Etiology of Religious Certitude:
Implications of the EI Framework and Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory

Timothy Wayne Brearly

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY
In
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of
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Abstract

Religious certitude is often associated with conflict between individuals and groups, though the nature of this relationship is still not clear. To further clarify these dynamics, the historical psychology of religion is reviewed and contrasted with current perspectives from social psychology and neuroscience, with an eye towards better understanding the variance within religious expressions and their associated relationships with intergroup conflict. It is hypothesized that religious certainty is related to a difficulty in engaging with contradictory religious perspectives, and that the pull towards certainty is tied to an individual’s unique psychological structure, much of which is developed through the interaction of formative variables over the lifespan.

Utilizing data (N=2331) collected during the Forum BEVI Project, a multi-institution, multi-year project coordinated by the Forum on Education Abroad and the International Beliefs and Values Institute, statistical analyses consisting of ANOVAs, regression analyses, and structural equation modeling are used to explore these ideas. Results suggest that a propensity to identify with religious certitude is predictive of one’s beliefs in a number of other areas. Further, individuals who report distressing early life events associated with unmet developmental needs may tend towards belief certainty. However, structural equation modeling highlights the complexity of this relationship, suggesting the importance of accounting for individual differences. Finally, analyses indicate that the variance in levels of certainty within religious groups is greater than the variance between these groups. It is therefore concluded that accounting for levels of
religious certainty is more helpful than emphasizing particular religious traditions when seeking to understand intergroup conflict.

These findings suggest the value of fostering an agnostic theory of knowledge, and a continuum of belief is proposed to illustrate this concept in relation to religious belief. Towards this end, interventions meant to facilitate intergroup dialogue and understanding while respecting individual theological traditions are highlighted.
It infuriates me to be wrong when I know I’m right.

Molière

In this time of globalization and collision of worldviews, the need for a deeper understanding of religious faith is more pressing than ever. Ideologies and religious systems which seem to contradict one’s own beliefs often are perceived as a personal or cultural attack, which may lead to physical or relational violence against the perceived source of this attack (Silberman, Higgins, & Dweck, 2005; Tan, 2009). One does not have to look far to see examples of conflicts where the battle lines are drawn between those of different religious affiliations. A small sampling of recent examples includes the clashes between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Jews and Muslims in the Middle East, Christians and Muslims in Bosnia and Sudan, Hindus and Muslims in India, and Muslim extremists’ violence towards secularized America and the “Christian West” (Hunsberger, 2005; Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995). While it may be argued that these conflicts also are about politics, ethnicity, or economics in addition to religious faith, the question of why differences in religious faith often create the borders between friend and enemy still remains largely unanswered (Yiftachel, 2006). In other words, it seems that differences in religious belief often are linked to conflict between individuals and groups, but the why of this association still appears unclear.¹

In grappling with this fundamental question of “why,” we examine a wide range of issues in this dissertation including the psychology of religion, the nature of belief certitude, as well as the theoretical associations and empirical correlates that are related to

¹ Content from this dissertation is included as a chapter in Shealy, C.N. (in press) (Ed.), Making Sense of Beliefs and Values, and is published here with the permission of Springer Publishing, New York.
these constructs. We then present findings from a large scale assessment project, which examines the etiology of beliefs and values. Based upon the accompanying theoretical model (Equilintegration or EI Theory) and assessment method (the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory or BEVI), we offer a series of data-based conclusions and recommendations that address the study of religious certitude specifically as well as the nature of belief certitude more broadly. Chief among these is support of agnosticism, along a larger Continuum of Belief, as an intellectually defensible and interpersonally advantageous framework on matters over which definitive conclusions – those that are empirically, independently, and reliably verifiable – seem untenable. Finally, we translate this perspective into applied form by describing educational and psychological interventions that encourage critical reflective thinking about religious or non-religious systems of thought, with a specific focus on cross-conviction dialogues. Through this comprehensive approach – which juxtaposes relevant literature with theory, data, and application – it is our hope that this dissertation may help advance the overarching goal of facilitating greater understanding of why we believe what we believe regarding transcendental matters while offering possibilities for deeper and more constructive engagement with self and others on these fundamental matters that affect us all.

The Nature of Certitude

Certitude has been conceptualized in a number of ways (e.g., Arkin, Oleson, & Carroll, 2009), but for present purposes, is defined as the absence of doubt. This absence of doubt, which may result from a complex interaction among affective, attributional, developmental and contextual processes, seems likewise associated with an inability to
contemplate the potential legitimacy of another’s perspective much less the potential shortcomings of one’s own. The tendency toward certitude requires fidelity to an allied – and often unknown or unacknowledged – epistemological framework with its own set of assumptions. Thus, without digressing too far into philosophical arguments regarding certainty, it may be helpful to highlight the dilemma that is inherent in claiming inviolability regarding one’s own beliefs (Shealy, 2005).

The problem of induction, for instance, challenges the assumption that we can deduce from our past experiences what will be certain in the future. For example, if a hot stove burned my hand in the past, I might be certain it will do so again in the future. However, this inductive logic assumes that the laws of nature are constant and uniform, while simultaneously ignoring the fact that additional variables must be accounted for as well (e.g., the fact that a stove burner may or may not be turned on). As an antidote to such linearity, philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, and psychologists such as Rollo May, have emphasized the subjective, phenomenological, and existential nature of human experience (Towler, 1984). From the standpoint of allied scholarship and practice in psychology, an individual may not necessarily “know” the complete and correct interpretation of reality, as if omnipotent, but should instead grant that multiple perspectives may be valid even if the apprehender regards them as improbable or even impossible (May, 1983; Spinelli, 2005).

On the other hand, even if someone may not be able to know something for certain, it does not necessarily follow that one concurrently may not have a high level of confidence that a particular proposition about the nature of reality is true (Van den Bos, 2011; Vickers, 1988). Some religious scholars have gone so far as to aver that one may
experience legitimate certainty based on the assumption of supernaturally revealed (“a priori”) truth. However, this sort of inductive logic appears sufficient only among those who concur on a particular religious source for their beliefs (Frame, 1987, Shealy, 2005). Though many are unaware of these epistemological nuances, we argue that reflection upon them encourages an informed yet humble approach towards competing perspectives. This line of reasoning has been popularized recently by works tailored to the broader reading public, such as Being Wrong, which essentially maintains that one’s capacity to embrace the possibility of being mistaken is perhaps better viewed of as a sign of cognitive competence than human fallibility (Harford, 2011; Schultz, 2010).

Moreover, it is not just the religious who are subject to such processes, since the expression of certitude, which so often underlies religious belief, may be observed also in the attitudes and assertions of the avowedly “non-religious.” For instance, Richard Dawkins, a prominent atheist, has declared that the end of religious faith could solve many of the world’s most pressing conflicts (2006). In contrast, others have pointed out the “religiousness” of such absolutist claims and their concurrent hostility towards the religious “other” (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Haidt, 2007; Himmelfarb, 2012). Due to the apparent prevalence of these types of claims from a variety of ideological perspectives, some have concluded that the multiplicity of views present in our globalized world have created a “postmodern paradox,” which has made the certainty provided by absolutist worldviews especially attractive (Dunn, 1998; Hogg, 2011; Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). Regardless, whether the content of one’s worldview is religious or non-religious, it seems that both of these perspectives often are held with a
sense of certitude that prompts rejection of or even attacks toward those who hold a conflicting perspective (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

This situation is rendered even more complex when we consider that many people who hold such views often feel justified by a sincerely held belief that they are creating a better world (Silberman et al., 2005). The philosopher and political theorist Isaiah Berlin appears to have had this dynamic in mind when he observed:

If one really believes that [an “Ultimate Solution”] is possible, then surely no cost would be too high a price to pay for that? To make such an omelet, there is surely no limit to the number of eggs that should be broken…If your desire to save mankind is serious, you must harden your heart, and not reckon the cost (as cited in Murphy, 2012, p. SR12).

Essentially, then, claims which are certain regarding transcendental matters exist both within and beyond the bounds of organized religion. Why would this be? On the one hand, expressers of certitude – in a religious and non-religious realm – may experience a high psychological need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010). From this perspective, closure requires an a priori disregard for the multiplicity of other competing claims, with a lack of sensitivity to the inherently ambiguous nature of truth claims in general, due to the security experienced by envelopment within one’s perceived base of factual knowledge. Evidence for this phenomenon is provided by studies which have found that an expression of certitude often is intimately connected with overt assuredness regarding the nature and impact of “truth” in the world (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Hogg, 2005; Van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet, & Maas, 2007). For instance, research illustrates that the degree to which one is able to acknowledge uncertainty predicts the
amount of negative affect (e.g., anger) towards statements which strongly contradict one’s own perspectives, including those of a religious nature (i.e., the higher the degree of certainty, the higher the degree of negative affect) (Van den Bos, Van Ameijde, & Van Gorp, 2006; Van den Bos et al., 2012).

Such findings beg the following questions: Is it possible to coexist peacefully with others who hold beliefs which contradict – sometimes vociferously – one’s own? How can someone hold religious or non-religious beliefs without becoming prejudiced towards those who don’t grant legitimacy to one’s own version of reality (Shealy, 2005)? Such questions are core to the psychological study of religion, as psychologists ultimately are concerned with increasing “people’s understanding of themselves and others...to...improve the condition of individuals, organizations, and society” (American Psychological Association, 2010, p. 2). From an ethical standpoint, the following rationale for such an emphasis by psychology and psychologists – as well as allied scholars and practitioners should be clear: When people are unable to peacefully coexist with those who hold different or contradictory beliefs, they are motivated to attack the “freedom of inquiry and expression,” instead of seeking to increase their understanding of the “other,” which psychologists are expected to promote and preserve (p. 2; Silberman et al., 2005; Tan, 2009; Van den Bos et al., 2006). As Cilliers (2002) maintains, “It is only when [people] have a deep understanding of their own religious traditions and are willing to learn and recognize the richness of other religious traditions that constructive cooperation can take place between groups from different faiths” (p. 58). In this dissertation, then, we contend that one’s ability to tolerate uncertainty – and thus constructively engage those with religious perspectives that are different – is
associated with a particular psychological structure, which has been formed over one’s lifespan via an interaction of multiple formative variables (e.g., demographics, experiences, culture). Moreover, this self structure is expressed through both conscious beliefs and values as well as through the activation of unconscious emotional schemas, which directly affect the holding and expression of one’s religious beliefs – or non-religious beliefs – in relation to others (Shealy, in press).

Psychological Perspectives on Religious Certitude

Building upon this introduction to the construct of certitude, it may be helpful to consider how the psychological study of religion has informed our understanding of the nature of religious belief. In much of the scholarly literature, the term religion refers to “narrow, dogmatic beliefs and obligatory observances” (Wulff, 1996, p. 47). In this sense, religion may be distinguished from more intrinsic forms of religious belief (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Jonas, & Frey, 2006) as well as spirituality, which often refers to the “mysterious realm of transcendent experience” (Wulff, p. 47). For present purposes, unless otherwise noted, the term religion is used in its broadest sense, which encompasses both religion and spirituality. However, in order to have an accurate view of psychology’s historical relationship with religion, while facilitating a more nuanced examination of religious certainty, it may be helpful to overview the major perspectives on religion which have dominated this field of inquiry over the years.

The earliest psychological conceptualizations of religion tended to be critical in nature, often seeing it as a defense against reality (Paragment & Park, 1995). For example, Freud perceived religion to be a form of “wish fulfillment,” which was a
product of infantile longings for a powerful and protective father figure, as well as an amalgamation of rituals which were consistent with the obsessive symptoms of neurosis. Although Freud saw religion as being pragmatically useful in its ability to tame destructive human instincts, he also felt it tended to promote psychological servitude (Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995). Thus, Freud proposed that if people could abandon religion and courageously face the unknowns of their own existence, human civilization would be the better for it. Juxtaposing this perspective with our current focus, one might conclude that Freud believed that religious people needed courageously to accept non-certitude (Wulff, 1996).

In contrast to Freud’s dynamic approach, the early behaviorists linked religious belief to environmentally-mediated phenomena, such as “superstitious” behavior, which sought to impose order and predictability upon events and phenomena which seemed outside of an organism’s control. In other words, they attempted to demonstrate that religious ideation could parsimoniously be explained by naturalistic and behavioral laws. For example, B.F. Skinner conceptualized religion as a product of reinforcement by an individual’s religious priests, creeds, and codes. In a well-known experiment to illustrate such processes, he conditioned pigeons to exhibit superstitious behavior in order to elicit pellets of food (Skinner, 1948). Another behaviorist, George Vetter, compared human religious belief to “superstitious behavior” in animals (such as pigeons and rats), which arises as a response to unpredictable or uncontrollable situations (Vetter, 1958). Along complementary lines, James Leuba demonstrated experimentally that he could produce a mystical experience in subjects through the use of psychedelic drugs. On the basis of this work, he concluded that spiritual experiences were naive illusions that are explained
through physiological processes. It is interesting to note, however, that Leuba also saw this “spiritual urge” as an essential characteristic of human nature. Resisting the exclusivity of traditional religious expressions, he worked to found religious societies which used ceremony, prayer, and confession apart from the worship of a particular god (Leuba, 1925; Leuba, 1950).

Although some behaviorists might have granted that religion could have social benefits, it was seen as far better for “believers” to lead principled and meaningful lives without needing the proverbial crutch of supernatural beliefs (Skinner, 1987). George Vetter (1958) asserted this viewpoint in his work, *Religion and Magic: Their Psychological Nature, Origin, and Function*:

> The priesthoods of whatever stripe can never live down, nor make amends for, their disgraceful role in retarding the development of modern science during the past millennium in Christendom.... Supernaturalism is, in its social functions and consequences, a dangerous opiate. And, what is perhaps even worse, it discourages objective attempts at intelligent social trial-and-error, planning, and even research, and undermines man's faith in his own resources. (p. 515)

Although many were quite critical of religion, other early and non-behavioral psychologists apprehended religion in a more favorable light. For example, in his seminal *Varieties of Religious Experience*, William James (1902) agreed that for some people, religion could be dangerous and a sign of naiveté. However, through his observations of a wide variety of religious persons, he concluded that when religious belief was combined with intellectual rigor (which he referred to as “healthy-minded”
religion), levels of “human excellence” could be achieved which could not be reached in any alternative way.

From an alternative but no less sympathetic standpoint, Carl Jung saw religious experience as being rooted in “archetypes,” which are part of a universal human psyche that he referred to as the “collective unconscious.” Such experiences, and their expression through participation in religious traditions, were central to an individual’s process of individuation and self-realization. According to Jung, modern humans were vulnerable to experiencing conflicts regarding the complexities and seeming contradictions of religious belief, which might lead to a loss of a transcending perspective on life. This conclusion was due largely to his experiences as a clinician, where he observed:

It is safe to say that every one of [my patients over the age of thirty-five] fell ill because he had lost what the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook (Jung, 1933, p. 229).

As such, Jung proposed that religious experiences should be explored and facilitated in order to promote higher levels of human consciousness, which could allow the successful navigation of the individuation process apart from the boundaries of traditional religion. In this way, Jung sought to introduce an inclusive religious system, which would transcend the divisive certitude of traditional religious perspectives. Jung’s theory largely has been ignored by the field of psychology due to its esoteric leanings as well as attendant difficulty with the empirical investigation of its central constructs. However, his views have contributed to a more positive valuation, by psychologists and non-
psychologists, of spiritual/religious experience in human development and functioning (Wulff, 1996).

Like Freud, Erik Erikson (1950, 1962) saw correlations between one’s religious convictions and early developmental experiences and needs. However, instead of perceiving this linkage as evidence for the problematic substitution of religion for unmet infantile needs, he saw religion as potentially aligning with the most basic yearnings of the self. More specifically, the religious inclination was a manifestation of deep human needs to experience a sense of “trust” that life ultimately is benevolent. Erikson also believed that religion could facilitate wisdom, which was a focus of his final stage of human development – ego integrity versus despair – and relevant to one’s ability to accept the inevitability of his or her own death. Like other theorists, Erickson warned that religious belief could be associated with abuse and exploitation; however, he perceived religious experience to be an integral component of mature human development, arguing that healthy adults recognized and nurtured their spiritual inclinations (Kiesling, 2008; Wulff, 1996).

From the perspective of humanistic psychology, Erich Fromm conceptualized the impulse toward religion as an attempt to resolve the existential anxiety which derives from humanity’s experienced separation from other creatures due to our unique capacity for self-awareness. Moreover, he defined “religion” as any system of thought or action that was shared by a group, provided an object of devotion, and fostered an orientation toward meaning-making. He also separated religions into two broad types: humanistic (god as an example of the ideal person; focused on self-realization; loving; joyful) and authoritarian (god possesses all of the ideal yet unachievable human qualities; people are
limited in their power; guilt is a primary experiential state) (Awad & Clark, 2009; Fromm, 1950). Fromm’s ideas have received some empirical support, including a study which found that religious commitment was associated with increased levels of personal growth when the death of a close friend was attributed to a loving god (Park & Cohen, 1993). In some ways, Fromm’s division of religion into authoritarian and humanistic types parallels the difference between religious convictions characterized by a sense of certitude versus those that are held in the context of a personally empowering quest for spiritual meaning-making.

Another important conceptualization of religion from a humanistic standpoint was that of Abraham Maslow (1964), who distinguished between religious people who had experienced a “peak experience” and those who either had not or had become defended against such a state. For Maslow, a “peak experience” was a period of intense feelings of wholeness and fusion with the world in which one feels fully alive and becomes aware of absolute values such as truth, justice, and beauty. According to Maslow, religious people who had not experienced a “peak experience” were looking to a religious system which was meant to preserve the “peak experience” of someone in the past, with the lamentable consequence of preventing present-day followers from actually encountering such an experience for themselves. More specifically,

What happens to many people…is that they simply concretize all of the symbols, all of the words, all of the statues, all of the ceremonies, and by a process of functional autonomy make them, rather than the original revelation, into the sacred…In [this] idolatry the essential meaning gets so lost in concretizations that these finally become hostile to the original mystical experiences, to mystics, and
to prophets in general, that is, to the very people that we might call from our present point of view the truly religious people. (Maslow, 1964, pp. 24-25)

One substantive critique of Maslow was that his views were based in part on the traits of figures that he saw as historical exemplars of self-actualization (such as Martin Luther King and Jesus) without empirical data to support his hypotheses (Wulff, 1996). Nonetheless, Maslow’s basic propositions have received considerable interest by psychologists and non-psychologists. For present purposes, it may be hypothesized that someone who experiences a high degree of certainty in their religious convictions would have less capacity or inclination for the transcendent “peak experiences” that Maslow described.

From another vantage point, aligned with the theoretical postulates and applied interventions of the psychodynamic school, attachment and object relations theorists often maintain that the ways we interact with our experience of god are associated intimately with our historical experiences as well as the ways in which we interact with others. In other words, if one’s approach to the divine is shaped by an attitude characterized by certitude, then this same attitude may well characterize their encounters with the “other” (e.g., resulting in less capacity or inclination towards understanding and the ability to experience and express a full range of emotions within interpersonal relationships). One exemplar of this perspective was Donald Winnicott (1953, 1971) who saw religion not as a universal neurosis ala Freud, but rather as a relationship with the divine that is tied to an individual’s internalized structure for relationships. Therefore, one’s relationship with god could either be beneficial or detrimental depending on the level of object relations maturity through which such relationships were experienced and
expressed. This hypothesis is still being explored, with at least one study concluding that there is a strong correlation between the quality and maturity of a person’s relationship with god and the maturity of their relations with others (Hall, 2007).

Attachment theorists also have hypothesized that religious commitments to god may be a form of attachment relationship. Examples of such putative phenomena include seeking closeness to god in prayer and rituals, using god as a safe haven during times of distress, and using god as a secure base for exploring the environment. Furthermore, it has been suggested that individuals with secure attachments form relationships with a loving and caring god, while individuals with insecure attachments are more likely to perceive god as distant – or to avoid forming a relationship with god at all. Evidence for such processes has been found in cultures where parenting style correlates with the overriding cultural conceptualization of god (Rohner, 1986). Along similar lines, Granqvist (2007) found that experiences with insensitive parents (e.g., rejecting and/or role-reversing) were associated with sudden religious changes during life situations of emotional turmoil. Likewise, Davis (2009) found a correlation between attachment anxiety and avoidance vis-à-vis one’s experience and perception of god.

Along similar lines, other scholars have found evidence that some may use their relationship with god as a compensation for previous insecure attachments. For instance, Kirkpatrick and Shaver (1990) found that people who grew up in relatively nonreligious families, and reported avoidant attachments with their caregiver, were more likely to be religious as adults (when compared to other attachment styles). Also, regardless of the religiosity of their parents, those categorized as avoidant experienced the highest rates of sudden religious conversions among the various attachment styles. Regardless of
whether one is reenacting or compensating for an attachment experience, such studies seem to support the hypothesis that one’s religious experience may be correlated with attachment style, life experiences vis-à-vis caregivers, and the basic human needs that attachment relations are designed to meet (e.g., Shealy, Bhuyan, & Sternberger, 2012).

At first glance, it might seem that a securely attached adult would be certain of their relationship with god, whether affiliating or disaffiliating. In deference to Erikson (1950), however, it is important to remember that secure attachment is characterized more by the experience of trust in others and the larger world than is insecure attachment. This observation suggests that a more securely attached individual might be more capable of tolerating a lack of certainty, which may emerge in a variety of spheres (e.g., Spaeth, Schwartz, Nayar, & Ma, in press). For example, interpersonally, such individuals would arguably be able to tolerate the inherent uncertainties that characterize intimate relationships because they default to a trusting attitude towards the “other” (regardless of whether that “other” is perceived as a physical or a spiritual being). In contrast, an insecurely attached person might be more inclined to adopt a perspective – and seek to experience physical and/or spiritual relationships – grounded in certainty. In some ways, through such relational “foreclosure,” they might succeed in freeing themselves from the uncertainty of trusting in the reality of one’s spiritual experience by “faith and not by sight” (e.g., as articulated by the Christian apostle Paul in his second letter to the Corinthian church). On the other hand, as Mikulincer and Shaver (2001) found, when one’s secure attachment schema is activated by the subliminal presentation of words that exemplify it (e.g., love, support), there is a tendency to exhibit increased tolerance for
out-groups, even when the perspectives of such groups challenge one’s own belief
system.

Historically speaking, Gordon Allport was one of the most prominent and
enduring thinkers regarding the conceptualization and psychological study of religion. At
the core of his approach was the construct of the “mature religious sentiment,” which he
described as a well differentiated and complex faith which is relatively independent of its
origins in childhood needs, and consistently directive of a person’s ethical standards, even
though it is held with some level of uncertainty or doubt. According to Allport (1969),
such a framework “never seems satisfied unless it is dealing with matters central to all
existence” (p. 78) and faces this profound calling “without absolute certainty...[as] the
mature religious sentiment is ordinarily fashioned in the workshop of doubt” (p. 83). A
person who holds this “mature religious sentiment” sees his or her faith as a working
hypothesis which gives a basis for values and infuses one’s life with energy (Wulff,
1996), a perspective that perhaps is consistent with the Biblical declaration that “faith is
an assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1).
From this perspective, faith is seen as an end in itself, in contrast with expressions of
religious belief that are used instrumentally to attain other psychological, political, or
social ends (Flere et al., 2008). Allport labeled this first type of religious belief
“intrinsic,” hypothesizing that it was associated with positive psychological outcomes
(Pargament & Park., 1995). Allport regarded the second type of religious belief
“extrinsic” or “immature religiosity,” which seemed to accommodate psychological needs
for security and comfort and/or to legitimate one’s particular political or group identity
(Awad & Clark, 2009).
In addition to congruence with other theorists noted above, echoes of attachment theory resonate here, in that religion is understood again as a means to pursue existential comfort and security. According to Allport (1969), extrinsic religion can address these psychological needs by defining one’s particular religious group identity against other groups through an attitude characterized by certainty. Intrinsic religion, on the other hand, sees religious belief as a value unto itself – an appreciation of one’s subjective experience of god rather than an investment in ensuring that others validate that subjective experience. Rather than seeking to alleviate the existential anxiety which comes from a lack of certainty, intrinsic religion revels in the experience of faith itself. This extrinsic / intrinsic dichotomy parallels the previous proposal that while certitude may be associated with interreligious conflict, faith results in self-aware and humble conviction, which is capable, even desirous, of dialoging with those who hold differing religious beliefs and values (Awad & Park, 2009; Pargament & Park, 1995; Wulff, 1996).

Religious Certitude and Prejudice

Consistent with this central proposition regarding intrinsic versus extrinsic religiosity, it also was Allport’s (1969) hypothesis that extrinsic religiousness was the source of prejudicial and authoritarian attitudes, which historically have been associated with religion. Although many studies have found a correlation between religion and prejudice in the past, this apparent connection has proven to be complex. For instance, along with non-religious persons, highly committed religious persons also have been found in some studies to be among the least prejudiced groups in society (e.g., Ford, Brignall, VanValey, & Macaluso, 2009; Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974; Kirkpatrick, 1993;
Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002). Allport’s dichotomy offers plausible illumination regarding this potentially confusing relationship between religion and prejudice. For instance, studies have indicated that intrinsic religiosity is associated with less prejudice towards gays, lesbians, and ethnic minorities than extrinsic religiosity. So, it seems possible both to be highly committed from a religious perspective but also highly intrinsic, and thus less prejudiced towards others. On the other hand, it may be that highly intrinsic religious persons may simply be more motivated to hide their prejudice (Awad & Hall-Clark, 2009).

Although a number of conceptual and psychometric problems with Allport’s intrinsic/extrinsic categorization have been illuminated (such as its ambiguity and presupposition of particular religious commitments), his framing of the complex differences in how people experience and express their religious beliefs continues to influence our understanding of these phenomena (Wulff, 1996). In any case, regarding the relationship between religious belief and prejudice, definitive conclusions remain elusive, mainly because it appears that the type of religious engagement people experience (e.g., intrinsic versus extrinsic) may mediate the degree of prejudice that is experienced. Such complexity is compounded further by the fact that religious commitments may range from very strong, to very weak, to non-existent (see Edmunds, Federico, & Mays, in press). Hopefully, the below investigation of such processes vis-à-vis belief certitude will provide a helpful frame for differentiating between religious expressions which impede – or facilitate – authentic intergroup communication and understanding regarding matters of religion.
Religious Quest versus Religious Fundamentalism

Although Allport (1969) saw intrinsic and extrinsic religious inclinations in dichotomous terms, they have not been shown to be well correlated in this way. In fact, some research has supported the possibility that spiritual, psychological, and social motivations do not necessarily contradict one another (Pargament & Park, 1995). In an attempt to address these complex interactions, Daniel Batson (1976) added a third orientation, “quest,” which includes constructs such as doubt, complexity, and openness to perspective change. Reminiscent of the previously mentioned ideas of Immanuel Kant and Rollo May, the quest orientation has been described as “honestly facing existential questions in all their complexity, while at the same time resisting clear-cut pat answers” (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993, p. 166). Thus, those with a “quest” orientation perceive that they may not know the absolute truth regarding spiritual matters; however, they also maintain that asking questions and searching for answers are important aspects in the process of believing. Previous studies have correlated a “quest” orientation with self-acceptance, open-mindedness, flexibility, helpfulness, and responsiveness towards others, while also being inversely correlated with prejudice (Batson et al.; Hunsberger, 1995, 2005). However, such conclusions have been questioned on grounds similar to the intrinsic / extrinsic orientations. For instance, one study found that while the quest scale might be partially valid in Christian settings, it may not be for Muslims (Flere, Edwards, & Klanjsek, 2008). Another study concluded that the prevalence of a quest orientation declines with age (Wulff, 1996). Regardless, it is not difficult to apprehend the similarities between this orientation and the hypothesis that a relatively open and
inquisitive inclination to grapple with one’s own religious commitments would be associated with a resistance toward the certainty that “final answers” provide.

As a point of contrast to the quest framework, an orientation toward religious fundamentalism also has been proposed to explain processes of certitude. From this perspective, fundamentalists of various faiths typically are distinguished by the following deeply held beliefs; 1) one’s particular religious perspectives are the only inerrant truth; 2) such truth is opposed by evil forces which must be fought; 3) such beliefs must be followed today the way they were perceived to be followed in the past; and finally 4) those who endorse and follow such beliefs have a special relationship with one or more deities (e.g., see Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; McFarland, 1989; Shealy, 2005). In fact, Altemeyer and Hunsberger have found a strong negative correlation between these two orientations. Although someone with a quest orientation may share many of the same doctrinal perspectives as a religious fundamentalist, he or she arguably would differ in the level of certitude with which these perspectives are held. In short, the quest orientation – with its focus on doubt, complexity, and openness to a change – is representative of a less “certain” holding of one’s faith. Religious fundamentalism, on the other hand, is aligned highly with certitude regarding the inerrant truth of at least some of its religious teachings as well as resistance towards any change in the way that this “truth” is understood or followed (Tan, 2009).

Some studies have pointed to religious fundamentalism as the religious manifestation of Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001). Among other levels of analysis, this perspective is interesting in terms of the interface between religion and governance
(e.g., how some oppressive Central American regimes encourage Christian missionaries to evangelize in their countries). Such findings are consistent with data demonstrating that people are less likely to question the government after an experience of religious conversion (Pargament & Park, 1995). Of course, such scholarship has strong historical roots. For example, and consistent with Freud and Skinner, Karl Marx saw religion as an “opiate of the masses,” which militated against social unrest. Along similar lines, Niccolò Machiavelli emblematically suggested that leaders should maintain the religious structure of their country in order to keep the people “well conducted” (Silberman et al., 2005). As suggested previously, a religious perspective of certitude generally would be associated with resistance to political changes within authoritarian-leaning regimes, along with their theological concomitants, as well as the inevitable cognitive and emotional disequilibrium that these changes would foster. Although we have highlighted two perspectives of religious “quest” and religious “fundamentalism,” it should be noted that these are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive. In other words, overlaps and variations in the two extremes also exist. For example, a believer may hold fundamentalist attitudes in relation to certain doctrines, while remaining open to learning about new or alternative perspectives regarding other doctrines (Tan, 2009).

Religious Certitude and Religious Orthodoxy

As with most psychological constructs that bear on the interaction of religiosity and other attitudinal phenomena, such as prejudice, correlational trends are complex, but discernible. For example, Kirkpatrick (1993) found that religious fundamentalism was associated with five different forms of prejudice, while Christian orthodoxy either was
inversely related or unrelated to each of these same scales. For this reason, some researchers have looked to Christian orthodoxy (the degree to which someone has internalized traditional Christian tenants) as a useful measure for differentiating the effects of Right Wing Authoritarianism and/or religious fundamentalism from actual religious beliefs (Ford et al., 2009; Hunsberger, 1989; Laythe et al., 2001; Laythe et al., 2002). Christian orthodoxy has in fact been shown to correlate with less prejudicial attitudes in a number of analyses. For instance, one study confirmed that religious fundamentalism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism predicted negative attitudes toward homosexual people. However, the same study found that Christian orthodoxy predicted positive attitudes towards members of this group (Eunike, 2009; Ford et al., 2009). These findings seem to support a central tenet, that prejudice may be related to authoritarian attitudes of certitude, rather than the doctrinal content of one’s religious belief.

Furthermore, recent work on religious fundamentalism suggests that it too may vary in terms of intensity (i.e., on a continuum from high fundamentalism to low fundamentalism), with associations to related cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes. For instance, although an individual otherwise inclined toward fundamentalism may not approve of a certain behavior (i.e. homosexual sex), he or she may still express positive feelings towards gay people if able and willing – affectively and cognitively – to “separate the sinner from the sin” (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).

**Religious Certitude and Identity Closure**

Other research has attempted to differentiate religious persons by building on Marcia’s (1966) emphasis on exploration and commitment vis-à-vis identity
development. In particular, Kiesling (2008) suggested that spiritual identity could be understood through the dimensions of “role salience” (the importance of spirituality to one’s sense of identity) and “role flexibility” (the extent to which one has considered changes in his or her spiritual identity). In this study, the “foreclosed” group was comprised of individuals who expressed a high commitment to their faith, but without much exploration of other options. For these people, spiritual change consisted of deepening their current faith. Such individuals showed few signs of reflection or doubt, and tended to emphasize their relationship with god as their primary religious motivation.

The second, “moratorium” group reported high levels of religious exploration, but had not arrived at a place of commitment. These individuals often reported challenging experiences which were associated with serious questions and doubts. They saw themselves as arbiters of truth as opposed to authorities, and typically came from families that did not participate in religious practices. The final “achieved” group had navigated a period of religious exploration that had culminated in personal religious commitments. Such individuals were able to describe their spiritual identity clearly and specifically, emphasizing an enhanced capacity to relate with others, which they attributed to their religious experiences and commitments. Such individuals also were highly reflective about their religious ideation in the past, and expected to remain so in regards to their faith in the future. However, they had experienced attenuation of their previous religious crisis, and now understood themselves as being more settled and spiritually at ease (Kiesling, 2008). Thus, among other implications, if high fundamentalism is associated with prejudice, one potential antidote may be the cultivation and valuation of an ongoing open and reflective religious framework as a person develops, rather than seeking to
“foreclose” religious identity via the inculcation of unshakable certitude (e.g., Spaeth et al., in press; Tan, 2009).

It should be emphasized that a belief in spiritually revealed truths or inspired texts may well occur for individuals who otherwise lack a sense of certitude regarding these truths or texts. As studies of Christian orthodoxy have illustrated, one may hold traditional religious beliefs in a fundamentalist/authoritarian manner, characterized by a form of certitude which is associated with prejudice and intergroup conflict. However, one also may hold these traditional beliefs in an open/reflective manner, characterized by an appreciation of the apparent elusiveness of absolute certainty in regards to any truth claim (whether it be “religious” or “scientific”). Furthermore, these reflective beliefs seem to be associated with greater interest in, and acceptance of, those who hold different perspectives. In short, consistent with such scholarship, the fact that James, Leuba, Maslow, Jung, Erikson, and many other thinkers grant that a faith journey and faith commitments have the potential to facilitate generative purposes at individual, group, and societal levels makes a case against throwing the proverbial “baby” of religious belief out with the “bathwater” of certitude.

Religious Certitude and Neuroscience

As a final consideration along these lines, recent perspectives rooted in neuroscience have added an entirely new level of analysis to the study of religious certitude. For example, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) have provided evidence that non-conscious processes, rather than conscious beliefs, mediate much of our behavior, religious and not. In other words, deep emotional responses in the brain, rather than
abstract religious principles alone, may more parsimoniously explain why people behave as they do towards others (e.g., Haidt, 2007; Newberg & Waldman, 2006). Such findings lend support to the central contention here that it is necessary, but by no means sufficient, to understand the content of religious belief. Of potentially greater importance, particularly in relation to understanding the dynamics of inter-belief conflict, is the certainty with which beliefs are held as well as why such beliefs have been internalized with such certainty in the first place. In other words, to understand why some individuals are more inclined to experience and express certitude in regards to their religious beliefs, we may need to account for formative variables (e.g., life history, demographics) that are associated with the likelihood of certitude, or the lack thereof, as well as allied affective, biological, and cognitive processes that may mediate or at least co-vary with the relative degree of religious certitude that an individual expresses (Shealy, 2005). By accounting for such complexity in real time, taking into consideration individual differences among us, we may better be able to “make sense” of the messy complexity that culminates in a relative degree of religious or non-religious certitude.

Examining Religious Certitude through the EI Model and BEVI Method

Accounting for the origins of religious certitude – through an interdisciplinary, measurable, and nuanced understanding of the etiological factors associated with religiousness – has been called for in the scholarly literature (e.g., Bloom, 2007; Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995; Pargament & Park, 1995). By utilizing such an approach, it may become feasible to parse cause and effect vis-à-vis religious certainty, and reliably apply such understanding to the individual case. Consistent with such a call,
but eschewing any definitive claims, an overview of the three main components of the present approach – Equilintegration (EI) Theory, the EI Self, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI) – may be helpful at this juncture (see chapters 2, 3, and 4 in Shealy, in press, for a full explication). Essentially, Equilintegration (EI) Theory seeks to explain “the processes by which beliefs, values, and ‘worldviews’ are acquired and maintained, why their alteration is typically resisted, and how and under what circumstances their modification occurs” (Shealy, 2004, p. 1075). Derivative of EI Theory (Shealy, 2004), the Equilintegration or EI Self (see Appendix A) explains the integrative and synergistic processes by which beliefs and values are acquired, maintained, and transformed as well as how they may be linked to the formative variables, core needs, and adaptive potential of the self (Shealy, in press). Informed by scholarship in a range of key areas (e.g., “needs-based” research and theory; developmental psychopathology; social cognition; affect regulation; psychotherapy processes and outcomes; theories and models of “self”), the EI Self seeks to illustrate how the interaction between core human needs (e.g., for attachment, affiliation) and formative variables (e.g., caregiver, culture) often leads to particular kinds of beliefs and values about self, others, and the world at large, that are internalized over the course of development and across the life span.

Concomitant with EI Theory and the EI Self, the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI) is a comprehensive analytic tool in development since the early 1990s that examines how and why we come to see ourselves, others, and the larger world as we do (e.g., how life experiences, culture, and context affect our beliefs, values, and worldview) as well as the influence of such processes on multiple aspects of human
functioning (e.g., learning processes, relationships, personal growth, the pursuit of life goals). For example, the BEVI assesses processes such as: basic openness; the tendency to (or not to) stereotype in particular ways; self- and emotional awareness; preferred strategies for making sense of why “other” people and cultures “do what they do;” global engagement (e.g., receptivity to different cultures, religions, and social practices); and worldview shift (e.g., the degree to which beliefs and values change as a result of specific experiences). BEVI results are translated into reports at the individual, group, and organizational levels and used in a variety of contexts for applied and research purposes (e.g., to track and examine changes in worldviews over time) (e.g., Shealy, 2005; Shealy, Bhuyan, & Sternberger, 2012; for more information about the BEVI, including a description of scales, see chapter 4 in Shealy, in press).

**Research Questions and Results**

This study is exploratory in that we are attempting to understand the relationship between formative variables (e.g., life history, demographics), mediators (various scales on the BEVI), and outcomes (e.g., self-reported religious or non-religious affiliation) in a manner that is consistent with other analytic work with this measure. Analyses were developed on the basis of a large dataset (N = 2331) collected during 2011 - 2012 from the Forum BEVI Project, a multi-institution, multi-year project coordinated by the Forum on Education Abroad ([www.forumea.org](http://www.forumea.org)) and the International Beliefs and Values Institute ([www.ibavi.org](http://www.ibavi.org)). Participants primarily included undergraduate students (96.7%), although a small sample of graduate students (3.3%) also was included, all of whom were recruited through a range of learning experiences (e.g., study abroad,
residential learning communities, general education courses with a focus on transformative / multicultural learning). The sample ranged between the ages of 17 and 62, with an average age of 19; 3.9% fell into the age range of 26 to 62, with another .9 % falling into the range of 12 to 17, and the majority falling between the ages of 18 and 25. Although the majority of participants reported as U.S. citizens (93.3%), non-U.S. citizens also were included in the sample (6.7%) resulting in representation from 38 different countries of origin. Of the sample, 79.1 percent reported as Caucasian with 20.9 percent as non-Caucasian (6.6 percent Black or African American; .9 percent American Indian or Alaskan Native; 7.4 percent Asian or Pacific Islander; 2.9 percent Hispanic / Latino; 3 percent Other). Finally, from the standpoint of gender, 40.8 percent of the sample was female, with 59.2 percent male. All participants were required to provide informed consent as determined by multiple Institutional Review Boards processes, and participation was entirely voluntary. Participants were not required to complete the BEVI, and could elect to discontinue participation at any time. Analyses were conducted via SPSS and MPLUS, and consist of ANOVAs, regression analyses, and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). More information on the Forum BEVI Project is available in chapter 4 (Shealy, in press) and at www.ibavi.org/content/featured-projects. Our data analyses for this exploratory study will focus on addressing five interrelated questions: 1) how does the BEVI operationalize religious certitude; 2) who is most likely, from a demographic standpoint, to score highly on the BEVI’s measurement of this construct; 3) how does the BEVI’s measurement of religious certitude relate to other BEVI scales; 4) what variance in religious certitude exists both within and between religious groups; and
5) to what extent do specific formative variables (e.g., family history) predict religious certitude.

**Question 1: How does the BEVI operationalize religious certitude?**

On the BEVI, the Socioreligious Traditionalism scale likely is related to “religious certitude” as discussed above, as it consists of items indicating strong, traditional religious beliefs, a relatively unquestioning stance vis-à-vis one’s faith, assuredness regarding God’s tangible role in this life and the hereafter, and a fundamentalist sensibility regarding sociocultural issues. Sample items include:

- *God’s word is good enough for me.*
- *I am a religious person.*
- *Sometimes bad things happen because it’s God’s will.*
- *Homosexuality goes against God’s design.*
- *I know that evil people go to hell when they die.*

Therefore, it is our hypothesis that high scores on this scale will be related to this common form of religious certitude. Such perspective should be delineated from certainty regarding transcendent or spiritual inclinations more generally, since this scale is not a criterion-based measurement of the “religious certitude” construct. Rather, given its Likert-type structure (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree), this scale is hypothesized to vary according to the content of one’s religious belief as well as the certainty with which one holds such beliefs. In short, for present purposes, the higher the degree of “Socioreligious Traditionalism,” the greater the degree of “religious certitude.”
Question 2: Who is most likely to evidence a greater degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism on the BEVI?

As Table 1 illustrates, for this sample at least, regression analyses suggest that there are a number of significant differences on the BEVI regarding who is most, and least, likely to score highly on Socioreligious Traditionalism. Of particular note, at an initial level of analysis (i.e., other variables also differentiate these groups), individuals who report that they are Republican, Christian, or Islamic all are significantly more likely to endorse a high degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism whereas individuals who report that they are atheists and agnostics are significantly less likely to endorse a high degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism. Such characteristics, combined with the correlation matrix...

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2 Other marital status refers to marital status other than "Divorced," "Married," "Single," and "Widowed."

Paying college education by oneself refers to the source of college education payment (1=paying college education by oneself; 0=someone rather than oneself paying for college education). Years of foreign languages learning prior to college or university indicates the years the participant spent on learning foreign languages before attending the college. Speak French simply indicates that the respondent speaks French as a foreign language; likewise, to answer how many days of a week the respondent reads a news magazine, or uses an online social network during study abroad, the respondent simply provides an estimation of days or hours respectively spent per week. To ascertain interest in international education or study abroad, the dependent variable is a student’s level of interest. The question is as follows: "On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being ‘extremely low’ and 7 being ‘extremely high,’ please indicate your level of personal interest in international education or study abroad experiences." The independent variables are demographic and experiential variables. Several of the independent variables are dummy variables: gender (0 = male, 1 = female); "parents paying for international experience" (0 = parents do not pay, 1 = parents pay); "university provides orientation for international experience" (0 = university does not provide, 1 = university provides); “plan to travel abroad” (0 = no plan to travel abroad, 1 = plan to travel abroad); “plan to take an internationally focused course” (0 = no plan to take a course, 1 = plan to take a course); and, “speak a foreign language other than English” (0 = does not speak a foreign language, 1 = speaks a foreign language). Another independent variable, the “highest academic degree intended to achieve” is coded from 1 = associate degree, 2 = bachelor’s, 3 = master’s, 4 = specialist (e.g., Ed.S), 5 = professional (e.g., law), 6 = doctoral degree. Also, participants are asked about the number of foreign countries they have previously visited (e.g., respondents indicate the actual number of countries they have visited). Background variables include “mother’s education” and “family income.” “Mother's education” indicates the highest academic degree of a respondent's mother, which ranges from 0 = some high school or less to 8 = doctoral degree. "Family income" is an ordinal variable that reflects the average annual income of a student's parents/guardians regardless if the student receives financial support from them. Income ranges from 1 to 10, 1 = < $10,000 to 10 = > $175,000.
findings presented next, provide insight into what this particular factor of Socioreligious
Traditionalism is measuring on the BEVI.

Table 1

*Background characteristics of individuals who score more highly on Socioreligious
Traditionalism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.069</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other marital status</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation is Republican</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious orientation is Atheism</td>
<td>-0.303</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious orientation is Agnosticism</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious orientation is Christianity</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious orientation is Islam</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal interest in international activities</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying college education by oneself</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of foreign languages learning prior to college or university</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak French as a foreign language</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days of a week read a weekly news magazine</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours per week using an online social network during study abroad</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>109.379***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R-square</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 3: How is religious certitude on the BEVI related to other belief / value structures?

As indicated above, one of the more complex but salient dimensions of religious certitude is how it is, or is not, related to other aspects of how people experience self, others, and the larger world. For example, as previously mentioned, there is a distinction between religious fundamentalism and religious orthodoxy, with those scoring high on the later construct tending to exhibit less prejudice and intolerance than those who express high levels of religious fundamentalism. Given these previous findings, what might Socioreligious Traditionalism on the BEVI illustrate about the relationship of its particular form of religious certitude to other belief / value constructs and processes? As Table 2 illustrates, correlation matrix findings from the BEVI show the following relationships between Socioreligious Traditionalism and other BEVI scales.³

³ These data represent interfactor correlations among BEVI scales. More information about the BEVI, including EFA parameters as well as correlation matrix data, is available at http://www.thebevi.com/aboutbevi.php.
Table 2

Correlation matrix findings of Socioreligious Traditionalism and other BEVI scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale 15. Socioreligious Traditionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale 15. Socioreligious Traditionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociocultural Openness (-.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Resonance (-.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Closedness (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Traditionalism (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs Closure (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Structure (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Closure (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Attunement (-.20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How do we interpret these findings? Essentially, those individuals who score highly on Socioreligious Traditionalism also tend to be:

- much less likely to be interested in and open to cultures and cultural practices that are different from their own (Sociocultural Openness);
- much less likely to be concerned about environmental processes such as climate change or the degradation of natural resources (Ecological Resonance);
- more likely to deny basic thoughts, feelings, and needs that are common or typical for most human beings (Basic Closedness);
- more likely to express traditional and conservative beliefs about who men and women are and should be (Gender Traditionalism);
• more likely to indicate that basic needs were not met in a good enough way during their upbringing (Needs Closure);

• more likely to report that they have few doubts or regrets and are seldom caught off guard (Hard Structure);

• more likely to express confusion or “stuckness” regarding who they are or where they are going in their life (Identity Diffusion); and,

• less likely to have access, and/or be responsive, to their affect or the affect of others (Emotional Attunement).

Overall then, the more likely it is that one experiences certitude regarding the beliefs represented by the Socioreligious Traditionalism scale on the BEVI, the less likely it is that this same individual, on average, will be open to or interested in different cultures, environmental issues, and other important aspects of self, such as how and why we and others function as we do.

**Question 4: What variance in religious certitude exists both within and between religious groups?**

This complex question is perhaps one of the most important to answer if we are to understand the explanatory value of grouping people by their particular religious or non-religious demographic category (Christian, atheist, agnostic, etc.). For example, as the previously reviewed data suggest (e.g., regarding the differences between self-identified Fundamentalist Christians and Orthodox Christians), groups that self-identify with the same overarching category (in this case Christian) appear at times to differ tremendously from one another in terms of their basic experience of self, other, and the larger world.
By extension then, could it be that some individuals who self-report as Christian might have more in common with individuals who do not identify as Christian? For example, might it be possible that some atheists and Christians actually share more in common than they do with agnostics, who presumably are open to the possibilities of either category, and thus are less likely to express certitude regarding transcendental matters?

Although preliminary and necessitating further investigation, several BEVI analyses offer intriguing findings along these lines. Consider Table 3, which addresses beliefs regarding the economics of social welfare as well as Table 4, which deals with basic openness toward or interest in cultures that are different from one’s own.

Table 3

*Comparisons among Atheists, Agnostics, and Christians on the following BEVI item regarding the rich and poor: "There is too big a gap between the rich and the poor in our country"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square Error</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>17.891</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.556</td>
<td>4.275</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>19951.125</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>19951.125</td>
<td>33369.71</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Orientation</td>
<td>17.891</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.556</td>
<td>4.275</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnosticism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>1358.984</td>
<td></td>
<td>2273</td>
<td>0.598</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21328</td>
<td></td>
<td>2281</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>1376.875</td>
<td></td>
<td>2280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* $R^2=0.013$ (Adjusted $R^2=0.010$)
What may we observe about such findings? Due to their relatively large sample size, let’s focus on atheism, Christianity, and agnosticism. First, although mean differences among groups are not large, atheists and Christians from this sample appear to believe similarly on both of these items regarding social welfare and cultural understanding. Second, agnostics are significantly more likely to agree that there is too big a gap between the rich and poor in our country, and that we should try to understand cultures that are different from our own. Such findings are interesting at a number of levels, including the seemingly salient fact that a central tenet of Christianity is that the
plight of the poor should be prominent in the thinking of Christians (Singer, 2009). It should be emphasized that all three of these groups for this sample – of university level students – are inclined to agree with both statements. Also, some of the variance in the rich/poor item might also be related to the moral attributions one makes about the existence of a large rich/poor gap (e.g. some might argue that it is not the size of the gap that is immoral, but rather the lack of care for the poor that is morally reprehensible). That said, such findings are surprising nonetheless, and worthy of further consideration. Most notably, the intriguing if not ironic finding that agnostics are more likely to endorse both beliefs, particularly regarding the issue of rich and poor, raises the question of whether this group may be more inclined toward a basic tenet of Christianity than are self-reported Christians. Likewise, the finding that atheists and Christians are similar in their level of openness towards the “other” (i.e., both groups are less open than agnostics) might be surprising, particularly in light of Dawkins’ (2006) assertion that atheism is the solution to many of the world’s most pressing conflicts (e.g., we’d be better off and less conflictual if we’d but abandon religion), his negative beliefs about Christianity, and his skeptical views of agnosticism.

Additional context from this perspective may be helpful at this point, since Dawkins (2006) has much to say about agnostics, dividing them into two types. “Temporary Agnosticism in Practice” (TAP) is defined as “legitimate fence-sitting where there really is a definite answer, one way or another, but we so far lack the evidence to reach it” (p. 47). In contrast, “Permanent Agnosticism in Principle” (PAP) “is appropriate for questions that can never be answered, no matter how much evidence we gather, because the very idea of evidence is not applicable” such as whether “you see red
as I do.” That is because, “Maybe your red is my green, or something completely different from any color that I can imagine…philosophers cite this question as one that can never be answered” (p. 47). Dawkins appears to be arguing that the only legitimate form of agnosticism vis-à-vis a belief in God is the TAP form. Thus, from his perspective, “even if God’s existence is never proved or disproved with certainty one way or the other, available evidence and reasoning may yield an estimate of probability far from 50 per cent” (p. 50). Here is not the place for a full exploration of why Dawkins would express such certitude regarding his own presentation of “available evidence” – much less his own “reasoning” – except to say that many scholars from across the interdisciplinary spectrum question absolutist rational atheism of the very form promoted by Dawkins, by noting its unacknowledged assumptions, privileged methodologies, underlying epistemologies, and internal contradictions (e.g., Eagleton, 2006; Keller, 2008; Nagel, 1997; Plantinga, 1993). Setting such ongoing debate aside, suffice it to say that abundant evidence suggests we all should exercise due skepticism of our own reasoning, as it appears subject to many empirically demonstrable biasing factors (e.g., Aronson, 2012; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). From such a perspective, certitude about the indisputably false status of religious beliefs is no more defensible than certitude about the indisputably true nature of such beliefs. As Shealy (2005) observes, “believing something to be ‘the real truth’ – even vehemently – has no more power to make it so than nonbelief has the power to make it not so” (p. 84). Moreover, pertinent to fervent believers in religion and non-religion,

…the fact that we all possess beliefs and values is not sufficient to confer legitimacy upon them; that is to say, beliefs and values are not necessarily true,
right, or better simply because they are held to be so…To insist otherwise is like asserting that English is superior to French simply because you speak the former, as do your parents, children, and most everyone else you know. Although the absurdity of such logic (the non-logic) should be painfully apparent to us all, our history as a species indicates it is not. Instead, what we too often seem to ‘know for sure’ – with a steely confidence that belies the fanatic in us all – is a tautology that our beliefs and values are right by virtue of the fact that they are ours (p. 102).

In short, despite all of the emphasis on the putative differences between Christians and atheists (Dawkins, 2006), such differences are not clearly found in the above examples, thus creating important questions regarding the utility and validity of perceiving entire groups of people (e.g., Christians or atheists) either as ineluctably different or similar in their beliefs and values. Moreover, from the standpoint of religious certitude, it would appear that individuals who theoretically would appear to be least inclined toward certitude – agnostics – also are more inclined to believe that that is too large of a gap between the rich and poor, and that there is value in understanding cultures that are different from their own. These findings are consistent with the correlation matrix data presented above, which suggest that individuals high in Socioreligious Traditionalism – our proxy for religious certitude – are less likely to express a sense of interest in or openness to issues and groups that are different from one’s own (e.g. Sociocultural Openness, r=-.62).
Question 5: Are specific formative variables associated with a higher degree of religious certitude as expressed via Socioreligious Traditionalism?

Finally, as we conclude our analyses, an even more basic question may be asked, which has to do with the etiological and mediational factors that are associated with a relative degree of openness in general, and certitude in particular. More specifically, what life experiences appear to be associated with a relative degree of socioreligiously traditional certitude or lack thereof? On the one hand, mild to moderate evidence from the BEVI suggests that individuals who report a greater degree of Negative Life Events tend to be more likely to report a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism. Such a conclusion is based in part upon correlation matrix data presented above which indicated a significant (.0001) and positive (.31) correlation between Socioreligious Traditionalism and Needs Closure, a scale that measures the degree to which individuals report distressing life experiences associated with core needs not being met.

Despite such findings, the non-linear nature of such causal processes should be emphasized, as illustrated by the following Structural Equation Models (SEM), which demonstrate that the mediators of Socioreligious Traditionalism and Christian identity are complex and worthy of further study. Consider Figure 1, which examines the relationship between Positive Family Relations (the degree to which individuals report a happy upbringing and positive relations with their caregivers), Identity Diffusion (the degree to which individuals report feeling stuck, confused, or lost in terms of who they
are and whether they have agency to move forward in life), and the outcome variable of Christianity (i.e., those who self-report as Christian).\(^4\)

Note: \(X^2=1964.837, \text{df}=124, p=0.0000, \text{RMSEA}=0.080, \text{CF1}=0.906.\)

Figure 1. Structural equation model illustrating the relationship between Positive Family Relations, Identity Diffusion, and identification as Christian.

What do such findings suggest? Essentially, individuals who report that they experienced Positive Family Relations – and report Caucasian ethnic status, a higher family income, 

\(^4\) From an interpretive standpoint, Positive Family Relations is a CFA derived factor comprised of items regarding how positively an individual reports their upbringing and family environment were (e.g., a positive value indicates a greater degree of positive life events). Ethnicity is a dummy measured variable; value "0" indicates the respondent is a minority, and "1" means the respondent is a Caucasian. Disability also is a dummy variable; "0" indicates the person is not eligible to services for students with disabilities, and 1 means otherwise. Family income is measured by a series of numbers indicating the respondent's annual family income. It ranges from "1" (Less than $10,000) to "10"($175,000 or more). Both father's education and mother's education are ordinal measured variables. They range from "0" (Some high school or less) to "8" (Doctoral degree). Finally, we used WLSMV (weighted least squares, robust standard errors, and mean and variance adjusted chi square test statistic) as the estimator for all the structural equation models because the variables have an ordinal or dummy measure.
and no disability diagnosis – are less likely to report that they are confused, stuck, or lost in their own life. At the same time, individuals who are high in Identity Diffusion also are less likely to report that they are Christian. These findings are interesting at several levels, but perhaps mostly because they suggest that Positive Family Relations may in fact be associated with a propensity to self-report as Christian when one does not feel a sense of being lost or confused about one’s own identity or life. In other words, Positive Family Relations may be associated with a higher degree of clarity about one’s own self and life purpose, which may – for families which are inclined toward a Christian orientation – be further associated with such status. But do such findings apply only to Christians in general or also more specifically to those Christians who are high on Socioreligious Traditionalism? Figure 2 offers an intriguing look at such complexity.
Figure 2. Structural equation model illustrating the relationship between Positive Family Relations, Socioreligious Traditionalism, and identification as Christian.

What does this model suggest? Essentially, it appears that Positive Family Relations may indeed be associated with a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism, which in any case, is strongly associated with the tendency to self-report as Christian. Interestingly, from the standpoint of formative variables, it also should be noted that the higher the degree of education the mother is reported to have, the lower the degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism individuals tend to report, which is an interesting variable worthy of further study (e.g., why would mother’s education, but not father’s, be associated with a lower degree of religious certitude as expressed via Socioreligious Traditionalism?).
Concluding Perspectives on Religious Certitude

The above findings suggest five concluding points. First, in exploring certitude generally, and religious certitude in particular, it is important to operationalize our definitions. As with all macro-level constructs – such as love, intelligence, or certitude – from the standpoint of measurement and research, an item level of analysis should be a first point of inquiry. Much confusion occurs in the scholarly literature due to the fact that different item constellations are used to define similar constructs; therefore, it is important that researchers carefully consider the content of the items used in order to properly contextualize the applicability of their conclusions. Future research investigating the correlations between Socioreligious Traditionalism on the BEVI and other existing measures of religion/spirituality and certitude might help to better elucidate these dynamics and consolidate existing findings. Hopefully, the above sample items will provide a clear understanding of how religious certitude is operationalized on the BEVI, which may facilitate further such research.

Second, psychological constructs may be understood better by researching who is, and is not, likely to embody them. In the current analysis, we learn, for example, that Christian Republicans are more likely to score high on Socioreligious Traditionalism, which would perhaps be expected, and offers important information regarding the meaning and validity of the construct. Along these same lines, however, and perhaps more telling, individuals who self-report as Islamic, also demonstrate heightened scores on Socioreligious Traditionalism, suggesting that this construct may capture psychological processes vis-à-vis religion beyond those of a Christian population.
Third, a tendency toward socioreligious certitude appears predictive of a wide range of self structures. As the above correlation matrix data illustrate, if one knows something about an individual’s beliefs along the lines of Socioreligious Traditionalism, it is possible to derive empirically-informed hypotheses regarding how these same individuals are likely to regard other cultures or be disposed toward environmental issues as well as how inclined they may be to acknowledge basic thoughts and feelings in self or other. Such awareness also suggests that it is important to regard the “self” as a complex and interdependent whole that is greater than the sum of its discrete parts, including but not limited to one’s religious faith or lack thereof (see chapters 2 and 3 in Shealy, in press).

Fourth, within group differences may be greater than between group differences, which suggests the need to eschew stereotypes about religious and non-religious people. On the one hand, the above data do suggest that people who are high on Socioreligious Traditionalism may also be less open to other cultures, less concerned about the environment, and so forth. However, that tentative conclusion is very different from concluding either that all Christians are high on Socioreligious Traditionalism, or that all atheists are more open to other cultures than all Christians. Although this point may seem evident, scholarly and popular discourse (e.g., painting all Christians or all atheists with the same brush) suggests that such affectively laden labels are highly subject to stereotyping if not prejudice, which Aronson (2012) astutely defines as “a hostile or negative attitude toward a distinguishable group on the basis of generalizations derived from faulty or incomplete information” (p. 299). From that perspective, popular scholars such as Dawkins (2006) would appear prejudicial against at least two groups – Christians
and agnostics – and prejudicial towards another – atheists – by erroneously ignoring both
the differences within all of these groups, and overstating the differences between them.
A more sophisticated understanding of the variables that are associated with particular
self-referencing categories is likely to go beyond a descriptive level of analysis (e.g.,
whether one calls oneself an atheist, Christian, or agnostic), instead seeking to understand
to what degree, and under what circumstances, such self-reporting labels apply. In short,
questions of how and why we believe as we do are at least as, if not more, important than
questions of what we believe if we truly are to apprehend the complex and interacting
factors that culminate in “certitude” of whatever stripe.

Fifth, the relative degree of religious or non-religious certitude an individual
expresses may be highly determined, but in a complex, interacting, and non-linear
manner. On the one hand, individuals who are higher on Socioreligious Traditionalism
are more likely to report a strong commitment to a religious tradition (e.g., Christianity).
Moreover, unhappy life experiences associated with a lack of needs closure also are
associated with a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism. However, as the above
SEM results suggest, unhappy life experience are neither necessary nor sufficient
antecedents to the development of religious certitude, since a subset of Christians, who
also report Positive Family Relations, are inclined to be higher in Socioreligious
Traditionalism. Thus, a high degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism may occur in
families that are experienced as positive or negative, although such status may be more
likely with backgrounds that are of the latter (more negative) variety. At the same time,
the tendency to self-report as Christian does not appear to be associated either with a
negative life history or a confused or lost sense of self. In short, although a lack of needs
closure related to early life events tends to be associated with a greater degree of religious
certainty vis-à-vis socioreligious traditionalism, such reported experiences are neither
necessary nor sufficient in terms of predicting this belief constellation. Thus, in
attempting to understand the etiology of certitude, we must account for complex
interactions among a range of formative variables, keeping individual differences
forefront, and thereby avoiding a “one size fits all” mentality.

**Agnosticism and the Continuum of Belief**

We began this dissertation by observing that one’s tendency toward certitude
regarding religious matters appears to be among the chief causes of conflict between
individuals and groups. That is likely because if and when individuals are “sure” of their
beliefs and values, they are less able to tolerate the possibility that they may be wrong, or
not completely right, thus mitigating against empathic engagement with another’s
perspective (Shealy, 2005). In our view, the data that we have presented here affirm and
deepen this perspective, by illustrating that we know relatively little about someone based
on their endorsement of a general term to describe who they are, such as Christian or
atheist. This observation emerges from the finding that, from the standpoint of the BEVI,
religious designations may encompass more differences than similarities among
adherents in regards to how they interact with self, other, and the larger world. For
example, some Christians ironically may share more in common from a self-structure
perspective (e.g., their capacity and inclination to experience and express affect) with
their atheist peers than with those who tend to experience less religious certainty, such as
many agnostics. This vexing conclusion likely represents an especially exasperating
reality for a subgroup of individuals who self-identify as Christians, since from this perspective they may have less in common with their brethren than those who do not self-identify as Christian. In other words, a lack of certainty in one’s belief regarding transcendental matters (whether that belief be most akin to Christianity, agnosticism, atheism, or any other label) seems more predictive of one’s ability to interact openly with those who hold other perspectives than any particular religious/non-religious group affiliation. Thus, although preliminary and subject to further study, it may be that self-identified Christians and other believers in a specific religious system who hold their faith without a sense of absolute certainty (e.g., which could perhaps be referred to as “Agnostic Christians,” “Agnostic Hindus,” etc.) might in fact be quite open in relation to other members of their religious group. Along the same lines, atheists who avowedly are non-agnostic (which could perhaps be referred to as “Fundamentalist Atheists”) may have much in common – from a certitude perspective – with “Fundamentalist Christians” who also are avowedly non-agnostic. Thus and again, it behooves us to be careful about concluding anything regarding the basic psychological structure of individuals who reportedly adhere to a specific religious or non-religious affiliation without knowing much more about their formative variables and larger belief / value structures, since the differences within such groups may be much larger than the differences between them.

Overall, then, what may we conclude from such an analysis? From our perspective, an agnostic approach which lacks certainty regarding transcendental issues may represent the most intellectually defensible framework on matters over which scientifically definitive conclusions – those that are empirically, independently, and reliably verifiable – appear untenable, while offering an aspirational framework that
militates against shrill diatribes and destructive behaviors toward individuals and groups who “believe” differently. As Shealy (in press) observes in relation to belief, religious and otherwise, via the “Continuum of Belief,”

one may be *sympathetically noncommitted* (i.e., inclined to believe but ultimately noncommittal) or *skeptically noncommitted* (i.e., inclined to disbelieve but ultimately noncommittal). From the standpoint of the Continuum of Belief, then, “agnostic” encompasses any of the “noncommitted” designations, which is consistent with the scope and intent of the term, “agnostic,” meaning “without” (‘a’) “knowledge” (‘gnosis’).

Thus, to declare oneself agnostic is to concede the inability to assert unequivocally the certainty of knowledge.

By way of illustration, consider “Figure 3” from the “Continuum of Belief” as it relates directly to our discussion (see chapter 2 in Shealy, in press).

![Figure 3. Continuum of Belief.](image)

From the standpoint of the EI Model and BEVI method,

beliefs typically exist in a synergistic relationship to one another in that a belief stated in one direction typically is matched by one or more counterpart beliefs that exist in relative degrees of opposition to it. Moreover, each belief may be
designated as 1) solo or paired (i.e., indicating whether an opposite match has
been demonstrated statistically); 2) predictive at the high, medium, or low level
(i.e., essentially indicative of correlative strength in the positive or negative
direction); and 3) predictive of a match or non-match (i.e., whether two beliefs,
and two or more individuals holding them, are likely to be “compatible –
matched” or “incompatible – non-matched” – in terms of worldview) (Shealy, in
press).

So, one may hold a belief (including, but not limited to religious) with relative degrees of
agnostic commitment up until the state of certitude. As noted above, this point is
revealing in relation to the putative dichotomy between atheism and Christianity because
the labels of “Christian” or “atheist” offer little by way of explicating where someone
actually may fall within these self-reported designations. Since within group differences
often are greater than between group differences vis-à-vis beliefs and values, it is very
important to ascertain where individuals and groups actually reside along the Continuum
of Belief.” Revelatory of individual differences among us, and by way of explication,
consider [Figure 3] in relation to Huan, Eleanor, and Ana. Recall that the two
beliefs of [Figure 3] are strongly and negatively correlated (i.e., paired, but highly
incompatible and highly predictive of a non-match between two different
believers). Let’s say Huan strongly agrees with the belief, God’s word is good
eough for me. Statistically speaking, Huan therefore is highly likely to disagree
strongly with the belief, Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than
good. Likewise, now consider “Eleanor,” who represents the mirror opposite of
Huan, strongly disagreeing that God’s word is good enough for me and strongly
agreeing that *Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good*. On the Continuum of Belief, if other item pairings follow this same pattern, which is statistically predicted, both Huan and Eleanor likely fall under “Committed Certitude” on opposite ends of the Continuum of Belief. Now consider a third example from “Ana,” who disagrees that *God’s word is good enough for me* AND disagrees that *Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good*. Where would Ana fall along the Continuum of Belief? Probably not under “Committed Certitude,” and more likely under “Noncommited Equivocation.” Consistent with BEVI data presented later (e.g., correlation matrix and SEM), the fact that Ana appears to hold complexity in this way – disagreeing that “God’s word is good enough” BUT also disagreeing that “religion does more harm than good,” suggests that she is grappling with fundamental questions regarding her own beliefs vis-à-vis religion and spirituality, and remains open to a range of possible truths (Shealy, in press).

Among other implications of the above scenario, it is important to understand that both a strong atheist commitment and strong religious commitment – that of Eleanor and Huan respectively – are expressions of belief. To be clear, then, “atheism is not non-belief” (Shealy, in press). Some atheists may contend, for example, that a belief in God is false, but from the standpoint of the larger definition of belief provided here, such a

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5 Of course, all manner of variation may occur along this continuum when we juxtapose beliefs at an item level of analysis. Consider “Luis,” for example, who agrees quite strongly that *God’s word is good enough for me* AND agrees somewhat less strongly that *Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good*. Perhaps on further qualitative inquiry regarding how Luis justifies his seemingly contradictory position, he might express his belief that “God’s word” contains some real truths which have stood the test of time, but that difficulties and abuses of interpretation and application have led to situations where religions sometimes seem to do more harm than good. Where would Luis fall along the Continuum of Belief? He seemingly would fall at Committed Investment on one side (*Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good*) and Noncommitted Sympathy on the other end side (*God’s word is good enough for me*) of the Continuum of Belief for these paired items.
contention is still a belief that there is no God. For the foreseeable future then, just as proof for the existence of God or some other transcendent reality seems improbable (e.g., empirically, unequivocally), so also does proof for the non-existence of such an entity or phenomenon. In short, it is our sense that agnosticism most closely approximates the apparent reality that in fact, it is extremely unlikely that the existence or non-existence of God will be proven in a way that would be empirically and unequivocally valid for all human beings who grapple with this fundamental question. We therefore endorse alignment with agnosticism, broadly defined, as Agnostic Christians, Agnostic Muslims, Agnostic Atheists, Agnostic Agnostics, and so forth.

In the final analysis, there are at least two advantages of such a stance. First, through an attitude of agnosticism writ large, we have the best chance of achieving openness toward the potential truth or goodness contained in a given worldview, while simultaneously not eliminating the possibility of learning from other worldviews that may, on the face of it, seem irreconcilable with our own. Second, this agnostic stance hedges also against the perilous human tendency toward certitude, by granting that the beliefs and values we acquire largely are due to deterministic formative variables and extant contingencies of which we may have little awareness (e.g., Aronson, 2012; Shealy, 2005). By resisting the foreclosed security provided by certitude, we might live more honestly in terms of the complexities we face (i.e., not knowing for sure, ‘one way or the other’), while simultaneously recognizing that human perceptions inevitably are inclined toward error – thus abiding in accord with Saint Augustine’s timeless adage, “I error, therefore I am.” In short, experiencing and expressing a spirit of agnosticism along the Continuum of Belief may be the least divisive and most conducive approach to interfaith
dialogue, since it declares neither that the other’s beliefs certainly are wrong nor that one’s own beliefs certainly are right.

Thus far, it has been implied but should be explicit that our support for an agnostic perspective is based in an agnostic theory of knowledge, which subsequently leads to a commitment to agnosticism in our beliefs (i.e., we should recognize that the validity of all knowledge claims rely on a priori assumptions). Moreover, it is our sense—although subject to further inquiry—that “absolute certitude” of a religious variety probably is more akin to a fundamentalist, rather than an orthodox, worldview in most cases. This perspective is supported by the evidence, discussed above, regarding the relative degree of non-prejudicial beliefs espoused by the latter group of religious adherents (i.e., Christian orthodoxy, when separated from Fundamentalism, seems to neutralize and in some cases reverse religion’s lamentable association with prejudice). Finally, we must neither ignore nor devalue the associations between religious belief and positive statuses at a range of levels (e.g., emotional well-being). In fact, strong convictions regarding religious doctrines that value engagement and appreciation of an individual’s experiential self may lead to more positive outcomes related to psychology’s goal of preserving individual “freedom of inquiry and expression,” broadly defined (American Psychological Association, 2010, p. 2; Silberman et al., 2005; Tan, 2009; Van den Bos et al., 2006). Further, it also is possible that high levels of certitude may actually promote a “believer’s” relationship with others, at least within a similar sphere of belief, as the above SEM data imply.

So, while religious certitude seems related to intergroup conflict and violence when it propositions against respect for an individual’s internal experience and
autonomy, such an outcome is not necessarily inevitable. Some less severe forms of religious belief may motivate a believer to avoid shrill diatribes and demonstrate constructive (rather than destructive) behaviors towards people of a different faith. For example, it is possible for a Christian who strongly believes in the doctrinal impetus to “love your neighbor as yourself” also to be more fervent in this regard than an agnostic who feels less certitude in his or her obligations and affinities toward fellow human beings. Perhaps it is the case, then, that high levels of non-absolute certitude – when coexisting with an agnostic theory of knowledge – may best be expressed through the term investment as indicated in the Continuum of Belief. This term delineates such inclinations from absolutistic certitude, and allows room for the valuing of each human’s authentic experiential self, which an absolutistic certitude may see as corrupting of or antithetical to its “truth.”

In the end, our preference for an agnostic stance vis-à-vis transcendental matters is bolstered by the fundamental point that it appears possible to be invested in one’s beliefs while still retaining a non-rejecting and non-prejudicial stance toward those who believe differently. Certainly, from the standpoint of the BEVI, profiles are not uncommon in which people are very high, or very low, on Socioreligious Traditionalism – a common expression of high or low religious certainty – and still evidence openness or closedness to other ways of experiencing self, others, and the larger world. The existence of these “outliers” is one of the central reasons why it is important not to overgeneralize from religious or non-religious beliefs. Even though such beliefs are among the most powerful (i.e., highly predictive of other worldviews on the BEVI), it still is common to have all manner of variation at the individual, or even group, level in terms of differences
and similarities in worldview, a point which should be recognized when assessing and interacting with people of different religious or non-religious sensibilities.

**Real World Implications and Applications: Toward Cross-Cultural Religious Education**

In light of the above theory and data, how do we address such complexity – the promotion of agnostic openness and investment in religious/non-religious meaning making, as opposed to certitude – in the real world? Overall, we recommend educational and psychological interventions that encourage critical reflective thinking about the religious or non-religious systems of thought to which each of us is exposed. As noted above, from our perspective, commitment both to religious (e.g., major religions of the world) and non-religious (e.g., atheism) systems of thought are forms of faith, to the degree that their adherents profess a belief in the fundamental but non-provable tenets that underlie them. In other words, both a fundamentalist Muslim and a fundamentalist atheist are expressing their “faith,” since in both cases it appears that the system of belief to which they adhere cannot be proved in any definitive and unequivocal manner.

Keeping with our emphasis on an agnostic theory of knowledge, as opposed to certitude of whatever stripe, this stance is not meant to discredit or privilege any particular perspective but rather to equip ourselves with the skills for reflecting at a meta-level on why we believe what we believe, in order to facilitate growth, dialogue, and understanding over time. The aim of interventions that align with these goals is to discourage any form of religious or non-religious certitude (which appears to lead to prejudice and conflict among individuals and groups), while simultaneously fostering a culture of open-mindedness, curiosity, and exploration across the variety of perspectives.
regarding transcendental matters (Tan, 2009, 2010). Practically, our aim would be to encourage people to “reflect critically on the committed perspective into which they have been nurtured,” with the goal of expanding their ability to take on personally authentic convictions (Thiessen, 1993, p. 255). For example, adapting suggestions by McLaughlin (1984, p. 81), an educator, leader, clinician, or parent might consider fostering an environment which supports the following processes and attitudes:

- encourage people to ask questions, and also be willing to respond to questions honestly and in a way that respects each person’s cognitive and emotional development;
- help people reflect on what parts of their perspectives are a matter of faith rather than universally agreed upon absolutes;
- encourage attitudes of empathic patience and understanding in relation to religious and non-religious disagreement;
- propose that morality is not exclusively dependent upon religious belief;
- be cognizant of the affective, emotional, and dispositional aspects related to the development of conviction in tandem with the cognitive aspects of that development;
- respect each individual’s experience by encouraging the pursuit of their developing convictions, while encouraging reflection on any facets which may not allow space for respecting the convictions of others.

Interventions that seek to foster this type of environment generally benefit from utilizing a dialogical approach that aims to balance both openness and rootedness (Tan, 2010). Consider one such example, as illustrated by the “Muslim Tolerance and
Appreciation for Multiculturalism” program, which has been implemented at the Muhammidayh University of Surakarta, Indonesia (Tan, 2011). This initiative aims to “develop arguments for multicultural Islam based on theological, philosophical and Islamic jurisprudential precepts, using these to legitimate the concept of multicultural Islam, and to promote religious tolerance towards the multicultural society” (Baidhawy, 2007, pp. 22-23). Especially noteworthy, this program is grounded in Islamic teachings that are held firmly by many Muslims. These beliefs include tawhid (the unity of the Godhead), which emphasizes the need to maintain the unity of humankind as brothers and sisters based on God as the primary source of all humankind; ummah (living together), which teaches that all human beings regardless of religion may co-exist peacefully; and rahmah (love), which refers to a spirit of love and care in human interaction based on the attributes of “God the Merciful and the Benevolent.” Typically, programs such as these have been advanced within and across communities of religious believers. However, we see every reason for those who adhere to an atheistic worldview to participate as full and equal partners in similar sorts of cross-conviction dialogues, which might be divided into three overlapping and mutually reinforcing levels – preliminary dialogue, practical dialogue, and critical dialogue – which we describe next.

First, preliminary dialogue refers to basic inter-religious engagement through symbolic acts of interest and support towards another religion. Examples include visiting a place of worship of another faith, or attending an exhibition showcasing religious artifacts from different faiths. Here, any encounter with believers of another faith is spontaneous and sporadic. This first step does not require direct interaction among adherents of different faiths and is the easiest to achieve, but is limited in its capacity for
building bridges or affecting worldviews. To include atheists within such a paradigm, we might suggest that religiously convicted people of whatever faith consider attending various atheistic venues, such as “freethinkers” (see www.nobeliefs.com/) or an “American Atheists” (see www.atheists.org/) event. Likewise, atheists might consider respectful engagement with peoples who profess religious leanings within their various venues.

Second, **practical dialogue** focuses on cooperation among adherents of different belief traditions with projects that may not be explicitly religious in nature. The objective, as Leganger-Krogstad (2003) maintains, is to make common celebrations and ethical practice possible, understandable, and transparent, thereby motivating participants to discover common values and essential differences, which make harmonious living possible. One goal of such dialogue is to decide upon a project that reflects such shared values, and then, collaborate together in taking action (e.g., working with a local food bank; participating in a Habitat for Humanity building project). This approach emphasizes that common values (e.g., harmonious living) are core not only to various religious creeds, but are shared also by atheist believers, as exemplified by the “secular humanism” movement, which aspires to be a transcending framework for all these perspectives (e.g., www.secularhumanism.org/).

Another example of this type of approach is advocated by an Islamic research center in Britain which explicates how a “civic morality” may be established between Muslims and non-Muslims, based upon shared principles. In practice, this means articulating a kind of civic morality that identifies how to treat others well, including the affirmation of mutual respect, as well as resisting the tendency to discriminate against
others. This approach suggests that Muslims should treat non-Muslim individuals as equal in the domain of social interaction, regardless of religious or doctrinal disagreements. The starting point for building this framework, from the Islamic point of view, is the body of principles outlined in the Qur’an and Islamic traditions, including good neighborliness, charity, hospitality, non-aggression, honoring of commitments, and doing good (HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies, 2009, p. 12). Such a framework is transitional between practical and critical approaches to dialogue, since the latter perspective respects and values commonalities (as the above center constructively aspires), but ultimately focuses deliberately upon the specifics of a religious tradition.

Third, critical dialogue involves deliberately planned encounters in which participants discuss religious issues based on theological similarities and differences. This form of cross-conviction dialogue represents the deepest type of encounter among believers of various stripes, as it challenges participants to delve intensively not only into the content of their respective creeds, but also to explicate fundamental issues of meaning and purpose that are associated with them (i.e., why one believes what one believes). As this form of dialogue represents the “holy grail” (pun intended) of this approach, we explicate it in some detail below. As noted under practical dialogue above, the commonalities we share – across the scope of religious and non-religious communities – are values that are integral to, but also transcend any particular religion, such as love, truth, respect for human dignity, and good works. Therefore, as previously suggested, it seems that one need not abandon strong religious or nonreligious commitments to avoid prejudice and promote harmony.
One common approach for engaging in critical dialogue is found in “inter-faith dialogues,” which are based upon the common understanding that there exists a variety of moral traditions and legitimate moral differences (Runnymede, 2000). In concert with this theme, the overarching goal of these dialogues is to underline ambiguous and/or controversial aspects of a given belief tradition in order to develop religious literacy, interfaith relations, greater self-awareness, and active citizenship (Erricker, 2006; Ipgrave, 2003). Without a direct consideration of the underlying assumptions of various belief traditions – as well as their related commitments, suspicions, and grievances towards other religious and nonreligious traditions – interfaith dialogue exercises remain superficial. Although universal agreement may be reached (e.g., as described under practical dialogue above), deeper encounters regarding ethical, metaphysical, anthropological or theological content likely will remain elusive without an in-depth examination of the most basic convictions of believers across the spectrum (Lindholm, 2004, as cited in Van Doorn-Harder, 2007).

For critical dialogue to be successful, we suggest that religious/non-religious believers seek to set aside any form of certitude that may hinder inter-religious (and nonreligious) understanding. Guided by an attitude of quest (perhaps fostered by the relational connections created via the preliminary and practical dialogues as described above), participants may be capable of coming together to explore alternative perspectives and interpretations for contested issues in and between various faiths (religious and non-religious). Examples include, but are by no means limited to, competing claims or beliefs regarding reason, knowing, truth, contemplation, meaning, causation, purpose, love, care, compassion, ethics, morality, science, death, the afterlife,
God, salvation, religious conversion, and the need – or lack thereof – of a religious sensibility to live and promote a life worth living for self, others, and the larger world. The objective in these dialogues is not to win the argument or even to reach a consensus (although this endpoint is desirable, if possible and legitimate), but to understand and to learn. Furthermore, the discussion should take place within a framework of all parties stating and justifying their views rationally while respecting the rights of others to hold to their views and agree to disagree as necessary.

In preparing participants to reflect critically on another belief system in a productive manner, it is helpful first to foster a degree of understanding and empathy with that system, which may attenuate critical comments that are based upon false stereotypes or prejudices. While it may be salutary for participants to question and even challenge the assumptions of certain religious beliefs and practices, discussants should avoid inflammatory statements or postures in general. In short, participants need to know that freedom of speech requires responsibility and accountability, and should be provided with guidelines regarding how, whom, and what to question in a socially acceptable and constructive manner, while also avoiding “political correctness” (e.g., hypersensitivity; affective flatness; denial of difference; an “everyone is right” sentiment), since such processes ultimately undermine honesty and depth, tend to be superficial and conflict avoidant, and are unlikely in any case to achieve substantive outcomes at an individual or group level. One specific model that may be useful in this regard is the “intergroup dialogue” methodology, which thoughtfully and strategically brings together equal numbers of “opposing” perspectives and/or representatives of “different” facets of an issue (see http://igr.umich.edu/about/institute). Moreover, explanation and discussion of
perspectives articulated earlier in this dissertation (e.g., the difference between fundamentalism and orthodoxy; what the “quest” perspective implies; the meaning and implications of the “Continuum of Belief”) also may provide the terminological heuristics and conceptual scaffolding that are necessary to facilitate such meta-level reflection. Whatever the method or approach, achieving balance between appropriate sensitivity and honest conviction is key to achieving both depth and integrity vis-à-vis processes of critical dialogue. Concretely, participants may be encouraged to reflect upon the nature of different religious and non-religious beliefs (e.g., the content of the belief system), the foundation of such beliefs (e.g., the etiology of such beliefs and why they are promulgated), and the perceptions of the adherents to such beliefs regarding their validity (e.g., why believers contend that their belief system is good or true).

For example, in addition to contemplation regarding the various big picture concepts noted above (e.g., meaning, purpose), participants might bore down further by comparing the various and competing interpretations of ‘jihad’ used by Islamist groups to justify terrorist acts, and by others (Muslims and non-Muslims) who condemn such acts. An exploration of this concept might help participants obtain a more critical and reflective understanding of the varieties of Muslim religious expression. Alternatively, the origins and potential dilemma of the faith-based claim by both Christians and Muslims that their leader (Jesus and Mohammed, respectively) is the primary representative of God, as opposed to any other such figure in the past, present, or future may be a fruitful source of discussion, as can an analogous point of contrast with Hinduism (many gods, but perhaps from one source) or Buddhism (in which the Buddha explicitly disavowed inimitable status, despite such reverence often shown him by
devotees). As a final example, an examination of the fundamental atheist belief that there is no god and no need for god – along with an attendant observation regarding how much destruction has been done in the name of god – can be a useful point of contrast and discussion when facilitated respectfully and constructively. Again, the point of such critical dialogue is not to convince others, although such outcomes may occur, but rather to reflect deeply and honestly not only about what one believes and values, but why such convictions matter in the first place, as well as how an experience of certitude may present a source of comfort and/or conflict for self, others, and the larger world.

Reflecting upon the importance of such critical dialogue from an Islamic perspective, Noor (2003) urges fellow believers to “re-learn the norms and rules of dialogue and communication” (p. 325) in a spirit of intelligence, honesty, and compassion:

Recognizing the multiplicity within ourselves opens the way for us to recognize the multiplicity of the other as well. It would mean that we would be able to look at the West (and the rest) for what it truly is: a complex assembly of actors and agents, interests, beliefs, values, and ideas that may not be completely in harmony with each other. It may also help us realize that in the midst of that confusing and complex heterogeneity that is the other are also values, beliefs, and ideas that are common to ours… We need to remind ourselves continually of the fact that the Western world is far from uniform and that there exists a vast array of Western thinkers, leaders, activists, and citizens who care for Muslims as much as they do for their own. These are our real allies and friends, and we must never abandon or disregard them in our pursuit of justice and equity (p. 327).
The three types of inter-religious dialogues discussed above may be implemented sequentially, progressively, or concurrently, depending on specific needs and objectives. In the end, what seems important is to encourage dialogue in all contexts (i.e., not just formal but also non-formal and informal), while emphasizing authentic relational connections with those who hold differing beliefs and values. If dialogues such as these involve the key stakeholders from all segments of a society – such as schools, religious institutions, social groups, and of course the state and its attendant political structures – outcomes over the long term may be moving and salutary, if not transformative.

**Summary and Conclusion**

At the outset of this dissertation, we proposed that the need for a deeper understanding of religious faith is of great relevance in our increasingly globalized world, as religious systems which seem to contradict one’s own beliefs and values often are perceived as a personal or cultural attack, which may lead to conflict or even violence toward the perceived source of this attack. From this point of departure, we considered certitude, a construct defined as the “absence of doubt,” in adherents of religious and non-religious beliefs, whether they be the fundamentalist versions of various religious faiths or the strident truth claims proposed by some advocates of atheism. We then noted that the tendency toward certitude requires fidelity to an allied epistemological framework with its own set of assumptions, before turning to an overview of various psychological theories and theorists, who have expressed negative (e.g., Freud, Skinner), positive (e.g., Jung, Maslow), and contemporary (e.g., the role of human attachment in relation to religious inclination) perspectives regarding religion and spirituality.
From there, we examined the complexity of religious certitude in relation to prejudice, including the intriguing finding that religious belief in itself may not necessarily be associated with antipathy toward “the other,” but rather depends upon how beliefs subjectively are held by believers (e.g., the difference between fundamentalist and orthodox experiences of religious ideation, with the former group showing higher, and the latter group lower, degrees of prejudice overall). Along these lines, we considered the various forms in which religious ideation may be held by its adherent, with a specific examination of the broader “quest” orientation, which apprehends religious commitment as an ongoing process that is worked out and understood over time, in concert with the evolution of one’s identity (i.e., one may grapple with one’s religious/spiritual perspectives over the course of one’s life). Among other aspects related to the etiology of certitude, we examined those from neuroscience, which offer tantalizing clues regarding the affectively mediated bias that seems tied to a sense of certainty regarding one’s religious or non-religious beliefs.

At this point, we turned our attention to the overarching model and method that represented the investigative core of this dissertation, first by providing a brief overview of Equilintegration (EI) Theory and the EI Self, as well as the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI). Following this overview, we offered a series of data-based findings from a multi-institution assessment of learning project, which resulted in five concluding points. First, in exploring certitude generally, and religious certitude in particular, it is important to operationalize our definitions carefully. Second, psychological constructs may be more deeply understood by researching the characteristics of who is, and is not, likely to embody them. Third, a tendency toward socioreligiously traditional certitude
generally is tied to a wide range of other belief structures (e.g., regarding other cultures as well as the natural world). Fourth, within-group-differences may be greater than between-group-differences when dividing people by religious / non-religious identification, which suggests the need to eschew surface level analyses of religious and non-religious people both in scholarly and lay discourse. Fifth, the relative degree of religious or non-religious certitude an individual expresses may largely be determined by a range of formative variables, but in a complex, interacting, and non-linear manner. On the basis of such findings, and in light of the original goals of this dissertation, we suggest that an agnostic stance along the “Continuum of Belief” may represent the most intellectually defensible framework regarding matters over which scientifically definitive conclusions – those that are empirically, independently, and reliably verifiable – seem untenable, while offering an aspirational framework that mitigates against shrill diatribes and destructive behaviors toward individuals and groups who “believe” differently.

Finally, in rounding out our discussion, we attempted to translate this perspective into applied form by describing educational and psychological interventions that encourage critical and reflective thinking about religious or non-religious systems of thought, with a specific focus on cross-conviction dialogues which may be divided into three overlapping and mutually reinforcing levels: preliminary, practical, and critical. By providing descriptive information and examples of each of these types of cross-conviction dialogues, it is our hope that this dissertation may help advance the overarching goal of facilitating greater openness, reflection, and understanding among the adherents of various belief systems, whether they be religious or non-religious.
In the final analysis, what is recommended most is the cultivation of a culture of humble curiosity and respectful exploration in which individuals may interact with those who hold a different religious or non-religious perspective in an honest, authentic, inquiring, and intellectually responsible manner. Perhaps, if we strive to nurture psyches that are less inclined toward certitude, human beings will be freer to exercise religious faith or non-religious faith on the basis of a richly earned awareness of why one does or does not believe as one does. By bravely accepting that definitive claims seem untenable – particularly regarding matters that appear to transcend the bounds of empirical reasoning – we may best be prepared for open engagement with self, others, and the larger world. Hopefully, such a caring, candid, and committed stance may help us to navigate more authentically the mysteries that are integral to our lived experience together.

This book provides an overview of Allport’s definitions of the two main types of religious belief, the youthful (extrinsic) and mature (intrinsic) religious sentiments. The youthful religious sentiment is characterized by a less-reflective following of religious practices (often learned during one’s youth). This religiosity is motivated by the security or social benefits which the practices may provide and is often associated with prejudice. The mature religious sentiment, on the other hand, is dynamic, complex, and integral to one’s identity. It fosters moral behavior, and is well differentiated from one’s childhood needs. This book also details Allport’s reflections on the intersection of psychotherapy and religion, as well as the nature of faith and doubt.


This article summarized a series of studies that looked at the relationship between Religious Fundamentalism, Religious Quest, Religious Orthodoxy, prejudice, and

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6 In order to facilitate future scholarship and practice in this area, and consider relevant perspectives and approaches in greater detail, an annotated bibliography of selected references is included in this dissertation.
Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Results suggested that while Religious Fundamentalism was positively associated with prejudice, Religious Quest was negatively associated. Further, Religious Orthodoxy tended not to be associated with prejudice. Finally, while Religious Fundamentalism predicted RWA, Religious Quest was inversely related with RWA.


This document summarizes the ethical code developed by the American Psychological Association, meant to guide the ethical decision making of licensed psychologists. In relation to the current paper, this document asserts that psychologists should be concerned with helping people to better understand themselves, others, and society, as well as seek to encourage freedom of expression and inquiry (even in relation to a patient’s religious perspectives).


This book outlines the numerous ways that certainty has been conceptualized in the psychological literature, and argues for the pervasive influence of personal
uncertainty in motivating human behavior, particularly in the modern era. It presents a compelling overview of the research area of certainty writ broadly.


This book is a very popular social psychology text, and has a chapter dedicated specifically to the concept of prejudice. Though a variety of experimental examples, Aronson makes the argument that many of the influences which cause us to feel prejudice toward out-groups occur below the level of conscious awareness. He also discusses how our motivation to hold prejudicial attitudes is often tied to our need to maintain our own self-concept, thus leading towards confirmatory bias in our acquisition of information in our environment (p. 310). Finally, his chapter on social cognition is a helpful explanation of the impacts of stereotypes and categorization in our understanding of others.


This paper provided a helpful review of the multitude of perspectives in the psychological literature on the relationship between prejudice and religiosity. Of particular use were the explanations of the perspectives of Fromm and Allport, as well as the reflections on the potential reasons that intrinsic religiosity is often not
associated with prejudice (i.e. intrinsic believers may be more highly motivated to hide their true perspectives). The results of this particular study suggested that RWA was a significant mediator in the relationship between extrinsic religiosity and prejudice against Middle Eastern people, indicating that an assessment of RWA attitudes may be more useful in predicting prejudice than an understanding of the nature of one's religious beliefs.


In light of recent increases in ethnic and religious conflict in Indonesia, this paper argues for religious/multicultural education that respects and utilizes existing religious principles, rather than dismissing them in favor of more secular or relativist perspectives. The author argues that division is best addressed, within this context, by emphasizing and promoting the multicultural principles that can be discerned within Islamic theology. Finally, a model for multiculturalist Islam is described through a series of values, implementations, and goals.

This seminal article makes the argument that unconscious processes, developed largely through environmental learning and past behavior, guide the majority of our actions. This perspective challenges the common assumption that our cognitive processes and reasoning are the primary basis of our behavior. Further, many of the judgments or evaluations we make (such as when stereotyping) are activated automatically without engaging our explicit cognitive reasoning. This line of thought challenges the idea that the explicit content of one’s religious or spiritual beliefs would be the primary cause of conflict with others.


Batson, in this book, contends that when Allport’s conceptualizations of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were translated into measurement scales, that some of the components of intrinsic religion were not included. The first missing component is a person’s ability to consider difficult problems which often intersect with
religiosity (such as the nature of evil and ethical responsibility) without reducing their complexity. The second component is a believing person’s ability to maintain a self-critical stance that is willing to doubt. Finally, Batson argues that Allport originally emphasized a sense of incompleteness and tentativeness that motivates one to continue to search for a deeper understanding of religious questions. In order to measure these additional aspects of one’s religiosity, Batson suggests a third religious dimension which he labels “quest,” and provides information on how it might be measured. He then proceeds with an examination of evidence in relation to large scale questions such as the extent to which religion leads to greater freedom for individuals, how religion affects one’s self-interest and prejudicial attitudes/behaviors, as well as the complex relationship between religion and the mental health of its believers.


This article opens by describing how psychology has traditionally neglected the study of religion, as well as the reasons why religion should be a greater area of focus (particularly from a developmental perspective). Blooms reviews recent research which has suggested that some religious ideals seem to be inherently understood by young children. Specifically, beliefs in the separation between mind and body (dualism) as well as attributions regarding a creator behind perceived complexity seem to be cognitive biases which may give rise to religious
thought. Bloom concludes with a call for further research into the contextual and developmental processes which give rise to different forms of religious belief.


Brandt and Reyna argue that the well-established correlation between religious fundamentalism and prejudice towards out-groups is based in the fundamentalist’s need to protect the sense of closure and certainty that “epistemic authority” provides. The authors explicate this point by describing the results of two studies. The first suggested both that the need for closure was related to fundamentalist beliefs, and that it was a partial mediator of the relationship between fundamentalism and negative attitudes towards sexual “value violators.” The second study indicated that some of the facets that make up cognitive closure, specifically closed-mindedness, preference for order, and preference for predictability, were related to fundamentalism. However, neither fundamentalist nor cognitive closure necessarily lead to prejudice, as only closed-mindedness was related to prejudice in this study. Since fundamentalist beliefs can serve a variety of psychological needs, this article suggests that it is less the content of the belief that matters, and more the way that beliefs are held in relation to other competing truth claims.


This book argues against the possible existence of god, and faults religion for many instances of war, prejudice, and interpersonal abuse. For these reasons, Dawkins concludes that allowing people to believe in god is not a harmless decision, but is actually detrimental to human society. In this way, he argues against the ethical legitimacy of agnostic belief, which questions the human capacity for legitimate certainty regarding the meaning of any empirical evidence or any proposed acquisition of absolute truth. Finally, Dawkins contrasts this negative view of religiosity with arguments for the positive societal impact of atheism, as well as its potential to foster a sense of curiosity and wonder that he feels is often lost among religious adherents.


This dissertation research found a correlation between attachment anxiety and avoidance in one’s experience and perception of god. A convenience sample was
utilized consisting of evangelical Protestant Christians from several Christian clinics and three Christian universities. The correlations found were particularly strong among the clinical sample when compared with the non-clinical sample.


This multifaceted work discusses the ways in which individual and group identity have been complicated by the postmodern situation, as it overthrows the institutions and authorities that so often defined identity in the modern age. Dunn ties much of this identity confusion to the variety of perspectives made available through technological innovation, the postmodern emphasis on consumption, and the revolutionary economic changes occurring in our globalized world. This argument supports the contention that the postmodern zeitgeist has facilitated identity insecurity, thus creating a pull towards the safety of absolutist worldviews.


This scathing book review critiques Dawkin’s “The God Delusion,” painting his arguments as theologically and rationally misinformed. Eagleton accuses Dawkins of basing his conclusions on faith more so than on reason, and
challenges the idea that reason, science, and faith cannot co-exist. Though intensive at times (perhaps with the intention of rebuffing Dawkins with the same fervor with which Dawkins wrote “The God Delusion”), the author argues for the beauty of faith from the perspective of someone who believes Christine doctrine. Further, he argues for the similarity between religious certitude and scientific certitude (both of which appear to hold stances that overstate the available evidence), while highlighting the mistake of not differentiating fundamentalist belief from its less extreme counterparts.


Erricker, C. (2006). If you don’t know the difference you are living with, how can you learn to live with it? Taking difference seriously in spiritual and religious education. *International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, 11* (1), 137-150.

This article argues that the current approach to religious education in England, which emphasizes religious pluralism and “moral homogeneity,” is inadequate in addressing the growing challenge of religious extremism. The author argues instead for an approach which grants that world religions have distinct differences, and thus teaches students from the frame of these major religions by
inquiring into the key concepts of their worldview, and understanding how these concepts motivate and affect the behavior of believers. It is hoped that by engaging with different beliefs, that students will be better able to establish their own beliefs, convictions, and ethics.


This study looked at the relationship between various types of religious belief (religious fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism, and Christian orthodoxy) and one’s implicit and explicit attitudes towards homosexuals. In regards to explicit attitudes, religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism each predicted negative attitudes towards homosexuals. Right-wing authoritarianism was also a significant predictor of implicit negative attitudes towards homosexuals. However, Christian orthodoxy (belief in basic tenants of the Christian faith), was related to positive explicit attitudes towards homosexual people. This study suggests the central role of right-wing authoritarianism in religiously-based bias against homosexuals, as well as the potential value of Christian orthodoxy in promoting positive attitudes towards homosexual people among believers.

This study hypothesized that intrinsic religious belief would help people to cope with terrorism, and explored this possibility by looking at self-efficacy and mood in believers and nonbelievers after a terrorist attack. The authors’ sample suggested that intrinsic religiosity was correlated with higher levels of self-efficacy and positive emotions on the day of terrorist attacks. However, when an attack had not recently occurred there was no difference in mood or efficacy found when comparing intrinsic believers with nonbelievers. This article also provided a helpful overview of the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as well as the literature linking extrinsic religiosity with negative or maladaptive coping.


This study investigated the validity of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity constructs across three diverse cultural samples (Bosnian Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, and Slovenian Catholic). Interestingly, the construct of a questing religious orientation was correlated differently with intrinsic religiosity in the
Muslim sample than it was in the two Christian samples suggesting the cultural
dependence of this construct, favoring more pluralistic and postmodern contexts. Specifically, it seems that in cultures where there is less tolerance for “religious
switching,” a questing orientation is negatively associated with an intrinsic
orientation, inferring that questing attitudes may be culturally inadmissible.
Finally, this article provided some preliminary evidence suggesting that the
extrinsic religiosity construct might be subdivided into a two separate components (a religious one and a psychological one).


Through two studies Ford and colleagues investigated the hypothesis that orthodox Christian beliefs discourage feelings of prejudice against others, and lead to self-critical emotions when one acts in a prejudicial manner. The first study provided evidence that orthodox Christian beliefs are correlated with a desire to act without prejudice towards homosexual people as well as African-Americans when controlling for the effects of Right Wing Authoritarianism and political conservatism. In addition, the second study’s results suggested that Christian orthodoxy is not related to attitudes towards homosexual practices. These studies support the contention that it is the merging of socially conservative political beliefs with religious beliefs that best explains the often cited
relationship between religion and prejudice. In fact, these findings suggest that orthodox Christian beliefs might actually protect against prejudice attitudes and behaviors in believers.


This is a book by a Christian presuppositional theologian, who argues that one can start from the assumption that the Christian Bible is true, and thus build certain knowledge from that basis. Since the God described in the Christian Bible is the ultimate source of truth (according to the author), a believer who has a relationship with this God can have certainty. That is, if one receives knowledge from the source of truth, then they can be certain of that knowledge.


In this classic work, Freud argues that religion is an illusion based in one’s unmet childhood needs for protection and love from one’s father. According to Freud, by believing in an all-powerful and benevolent father (god), one is able to address one's underlying fears regarding life. He continues by describing religious belief in the terms of a universal neurosis or psychiatric delusion, which is essentially in conflict with reality. Later in the book, he discusses the conflicts between science
and religion, and ultimately concludes that just because science may not be capable of providing us with a transcendent meaning, that does not mean that we should look for it in the delusion of religion.


In this book, Fromm argues that it is more helpful to understand the ways in which humans believe, rather than to focus on the content of their faith perspectives. He frames this approach by separating religious belief into “humanistic” and “authoritarian” subtypes. He also expands the definition of religion to include atheism, arguing that religion is any framework that helps humans to make meaning in light of their experiences of existential anxiety. Finally, he argues that psychology is not a threat to religion, and that instead psychologists should see religion (in its “humanistic” form) as beneficial to human well-being.


This literature review concluded that the average church member is more ethnically prejudiced than the average attending non-member (because he/she is “nontheologically motivated”). However, church members that are highly active
in the church were found to be as non-prejudicial as attending non-members. Thus, the authors concluded that the holding of a strong value position, that removes one from the society at large, is advantageous in the adoption of a non-prejudicial perspective. Further, the review noted that the more intrinsically religious, nonfundamentalistic, and theologically discriminating a person is, the less prejudiced they tend to be.


In addition to the study itself, this article provided a nice review of the literature on the relationship between religiosity and attachment theory. For instance, religious people may seek closeness to God in prayer and rituals, use God as a safe haven during distress, as well as use God as a secure base for exploring the environment. Some have even theorized that individuals with secure attachments tend to form relationships with a loving and caring God, while individuals with insecure attachments are more likely to perceive God as distant or not form a relationship with God at all. This study looked at adult attachment styles and compared them with various forms of religious phenomenon. The results suggest that experiences with insensitive parents (e.g., rejecting and/or role-reversing) may be associated with sudden religious changes (such as conversions) during life situations of emotional turmoil. Further, disorganized attachment may be
associated with the holding of “New Age” beliefs (e.g., personal contact with the
dead, spiritual possession, nontheistic/paranormal experiences).

Retrieved from http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt07/haidt07_index.html

This article outlines the scientific discoveries that have contributed to our modern
understanding that emotional processes are more predictive of behavior than our
conscious thoughts or beliefs. Haidt’s theory regarding the five foundations of
morality is also reviewed, which suggests that self-identified liberals value only
fairness/reciprocity (a’ la Lawrence Kohlburg) and harm/care for others (a’ la
Carol Gilligan), while self-identified conservatives also value the moral principles
of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. He then goes on to
explain how this may provide some insight into religious belief, and points out the
similarities between the statements of some atheists and fundamentalist believers
in that they both seem to base their perspectives more on belief than on scientific
data.

This article highlights the pervasive attractiveness of certainty from an economic and political perspective, as well as the presence of the assumptions which underlie certainty of any type. The author continues by pointing out the power of certainty to attract followers, and the dangers of being certain at the cost of neglecting evidence and reasonable doubt.


Himmelfarb draws a parallel between the arguments of modern atheists (such as Richard Dawkins) and the challenges to belief that William James addressed during his time at Harvard in the late 19th century. By unpacking some of William James’s perspectives regarding the different types of belief, the author points out that the “terrible simplifiers” (the certain) tend to dominate discourse all too often, polarizing issues in topics as diverse as philosophy, politics, literature, and religion.
The chapter integrates a number of studies to make the argument that a person’s level of self-uncertainty is related to a desire to identify with groups that are able to provide a sense of security by requiring significant ideological commitment for membership. According to the author, these groups allow someone to “depersonalize” and feel secure in a clearly delineated category defined by the group’s identity. Further, group members are arguably motivated to ensure that evaluations of the group are positive (in order to maintain their positive sense of self-esteem) and are often also motivated to ensure that their group is seen as better than other competing groups.


This article makes the argument that religions have unique characteristics that make them particularly well suited for relieving a person’s self-uncertainty. For
instance, religions provide answers for the most basic questions of human existence, such as one’s purpose. They also utilize rituals and ceremonies, and provide moral guidelines that give someone a course for purposeful living. These characteristics of religions are particularly powerful in their ability to provide a sense of security, according to the authors, when they are absolutistic.


This white paper, developed primarily by the Centre for Islamic Studies at Cambridge University, reviews the characteristics of Islam as it is expressed in Britain as well as the political and socio-economic factors which lead to its acceptance or exclusion. The report also reflects on the interaction between Islamic theologies and the pluralist secular zeitgeist which currently pervades the country. The authors ultimately argue that there is great overlap between Islamic beliefs and the “secular” values of equality, respect for the rights of others, and the rejection of discrimination. For this reason, they feel that Muslims can thrive in a procedurally secular environment while remaining true to their beliefs.

This article introduces a short version of the Christian Orthodoxy scale, and describes the strengths and weaknesses of using the short versus the long version. It also provides a review of the psychometrics of the original Christian Orthodoxy scale, as well as its relationship with other constructs (such as Right-Wing Authoritarianism).


This work highlights how the findings on religion’s relationship with prejudice are positive, negative, and even curvilinear (in light of the validity challenges to some of Allport’s measures of religiosity). Newer conceptualizations of religious orientation such as quest and religious fundamentalism focus more on the ways religious beliefs are held rather than the content of the beliefs. The authors see the quest orientation as effectively being the opposite of religious fundamentalism. They also highlight how confronting fundamentalist believers with the consequences of their orientation may lower their prejudice. Finally, the authors call for additional work focused on investigating the complex relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice.

This article provides a helpful summary of intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, and religious fundamentalist orientations as well as some of the ways that religiosity has been related to violence and conflict. Further, the idea of high versus low religious fundamentalism is described, as well as each type of fundamentalism’s possible correlations to more or less complex thought processes. Social Identity Theory is also reviewed, along with its claims that people maintain and enhance self-esteem through downward comparisons with other groups. Finally, the article suggests that even though a person may not approve of a certain behavior (such as homosexual sex), he or she may still express positive feelings towards its participants (homosexual people).


Through empirical examinations of prejudicial attitudes towards religious and non-religious others, Jackson and Hunsberger investigate the contention that
religious groups tend to promote prejudice towards out-groups. Most interestingly, the results of these studies could be interpreted to infer that those who are more religious (i.e. more certain of their belief system) tend to be prejudiced towards people of different religious orientations regardless of the content of their doctrine (e.g. religious fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, intrinsic, extrinsic). Even among atheists, the authors found prejudice towards “believers.” The authors conclude that the dynamics between religious groups parallel those found in other intergroup relations, where one’s fusion with the group enhances self-esteem, thus leading to antagonism towards out-groups which are a threat to one’s bolstered sense of security.


In this seminal work, William James explores religion and spirituality from a variety of different perspectives based on his experiences with various religions expressions. He also discusses his theory of “healthy-minded” religion, contrasting it with dogmatism. Ultimately, he concludes with the hypothesis that a higher power communicates through the human’s subconscious self, and thus makes an impact on physical reality through humans. He argues that belief in a supernatural reality, beyond the reach of physics or biology, respects the human experience in a way that purely empirical scientific perspective (to the exclusion of the supernatural) does not.
In this classic work, Jung describes his theory of archetypes which he argues exist in the human unconscious, and can be seen reflected in religious and spiritual beliefs. He describes religious/spiritual belief as a search for meaning, and sees modern man as searching for a new perspective to fill the space left by the decline of traditional institutionalized religion. His argument is that people need to find a new source of meaning to help them make sense of life, and that this loss of meaning is at the core of many psychological problems.


This book, written by a Manhattan preacher soon after the release of Richard Dawkin’s God Delusion, attempts to present an accessible argument for the reasonableness of the historical Christian faith. It also responds to some of the claims of Dawkin’s and other outspoken Atheists directly, and seeks to address some of the common concerns people often have regarding Christian doctrine and practice (e.g. that it is patriarchal, prejudiced, and/or exclusive).

This study analyzed interviews with 28 “devout believers,” qualitatively assessing the content from the interviews and rating each person’s level of spiritual role salience as well as the flexibility of their beliefs. Inspired by Erikson’s theory of human development (with his claim that healthy adults nurture their spiritual tendencies) and Marcia’s views on identity development, the author suggests several different categories of spiritual belief: foreclosed, moratorium, and achieved. While the first stage is characterized by a lack of exposure to other ways of believing and a general adoption of beliefs present in one’s family or environment, the later stages are characterized by exploring other belief options and making individualized belief commitments through a process of personal reflection.


This study explored the impact of childhood attachment on one’s religious beliefs in adulthood. The findings suggested that those with avoidant attachment styles were most likely (compared to those with more secure attachments) to be religious as adults (if they grew up in a nonreligious family) or to convert to a
new religion suddenly. Based on these findings, the authors concluded that religion might provide a substitute attachment figure (e.g. God) that would be particularly attractive to those whose attachment needs were not met adequately as children.


When the effects of intrinsic religion were controlled for, this study showed that fundamentalism was positively correlated with 5 different scales of prejudice, while Christian Orthodoxy was either negatively or neutrally correlated with all 5 scales. Christian Orthodoxy was also only moderately correlated with fundamentalism in this study, further indicating the differentiation of these two constructs.


This chapter describes the Norwegian public education system’s current approach to religious education, a country which historically divided children into different classrooms based on religious beliefs. In contrast, the current approach seeks to integrate children from different religious perspectives by having them participate in activities that require them to work together and build relationships and understanding. Though religious dialogue is not the goal of these activities, it is often a natural consequence as the children grow to understand other beliefs by building close working relationships with those who hold them. Further, as the children work together, they are in a prime position to observe the similar values that their diverse belief systems share in common.


In this work, Leuba describes several religious expressions but focuses primarily on Christianity, highlighting that drugs provide a similar effect as religious experiences in their ability to enlarge one’s perspective and alter their emotions. He also describes his investigations into the trance like states common in religion,
along with other experiments seeking to experimentally understand intrapersonal religious phenomenon. He concludes with the idea that science is able to provide the mystical experiences that many have found in religion, and uses psychotherapy as an example of the ways that secular practices can meet these human “needs.”


This work provides an outline of Leuba’s views on religion, particularly religions that believe God interacts directly with humans. Leuba also describes the reasons for his belief that the inspiration, meaning, and moral guidance provided by religion can be accessed through a reformed, secular version of “church.” Finally, he provides a framework for the basic beliefs or doctrines that this type of church might hold, as well as the ways in which they might bring healing to those who are struggling with psychological difficulties.


This chapter seeks to provide an argument for why it is important to give people the right to choose their religion or belief system, with an eye towards societies
and political contexts which do not value this right. Further, it explores the challenges that arise in an environment that seeks to honor religious diversity in this way (e.g. what to do when the beliefs of one person conflict with or infringe on the rights of another). This discussion is highly relevant to the topic of religious dialogue, and it points out the importance of not overlooking specific religious claims and doctrines as these are often a source of conflict even when shared values between religions have been identified.


In this classic article, Marcia describes four different developmental pathways that he argues adolescents may take as they seek to develop their ego identity in relation to occupation and ideology: identity achievement, moratorium, foreclosure, or identity diffusion. One unique aspect of this study, in comparison to some developmental theories that rely only on qualitative interviews, is that it integrates objective process tasks and self-report measures. This work was expanded upon by Kiesling, with a particular emphasis on the way in which one holds their religious beliefs.
In this work, Maslow details the unfortunate historical split between science and religion. He argues that while their relationship is often misunderstood, many of the needs, yearnings, quests, and other components of religion can be studied empirically through science. He then goes on to point out what he believes to be unique about the religious beliefs of those who have had a peak experience (where they felt privately and intimately connected to a spiritual reality that convinced them of values such as truth, justice, and beauty). Those who have had this experience are then contrasted with those who, instead of having a peak experience for themselves, have instead used organized or conventional religion in such a way as to defend against or suppress their opportunity to have a peak experience of their own. They do this, Maslow argues, by following the traditions and dogmas of their religion, which are tied to the peak experience of a figure in the past.


This work outlines May’s existential approach to psychology, as well as the philosophical perspectives that form its foundation. For instance, he describes Kierkegaard’s arguments regarding the relational nature of truth, which highlight the apparent contextual nature of ideas or knowledge (and the resultantly tenuous
nature of certainty claims). While May sees the value of other approaches to psychotherapy (e.g. behaviorism, psychodynamic therapy) he ultimately argues that we cannot break a person up into their respective behaviors without missing their true essence or “being,” which is greater than the sum of its parts.


This study found that religious fundamentalism was correlated with a general tendency towards discrimination, with specific discrimination towards women, homosexuals, and communists. Further, when the impact of fundamentalism was controlled for in those who were intrinsically religious, the discriminatory tendencies originally found in this group disappeared. Finally, a questing religious orientation was negatively correlated with all forms of discriminatory attitudes measured. This study highlights the importance of differentiating the content of one’s beliefs from the particular way in which one holds those beliefs when seeking to understand religion’s relationship with discrimination.


McLaughlin discusses the challenge of respecting parent’s rights to raise their children in their own religious perspective, and how this may cause tension with
societies which value pluralism, tolerance, and individual autonomy. The author then reviews some of the common arguments against allowing parents to “indoctrinate” their children, while also providing a counterargument and framework for how parents can provide religious education to their children in a way that respects their autonomy as well as the realities and needs of a pluralistic society.


This article describes a series of studies which examined the effect that priming may have in activating a person’s underlying attachment schema. The results of their five studies suggested that priming a person’s sense of secure attachment (even if their primary attachment style was not secure) removed any out-group bias that may have been present otherwise. The authors hypothesize that the priming of a sense of security activates a secure attachment schema because, regardless of one’s background, a person may be able to (at least subconsciously) recall some instance when they felt secure. However, the authors also found that when secure attachment priming procedures were not used, a person’s baseline level of attachment anxiety was related to their level of negative reactions towards out-groups.

This New York Times editorial briefly reviews the effects of moral and/or ideological certainty in history (e.g. inquisitions, fascism, terrorism) and the temptation for society to seek to combat absolutism by responding in kind, or by limiting liberty or democratic rights. The article resolves with a call to resist the temptation to seek to control absolutism through authoritarianism, arguing instead for the subversive power of doubt.


In this modern philosophy classic, Nagel argues for the value of objective reason and points out the assumptions that often underlie strong subjectivity and relativism. He sees reason as a universal truth, and an essential building block for effective communication and the addressing of societal challenges. In order to make his argument, he points out what he sees as the underlying assumptions of competing claims, whether they be in the fields of ethics, science, or language.


This article provides an overview of the psychological literature on religion and human well-being defined broadly, including social challenges such as prejudice. The authors are sensitive to the multiple constructs used to understand religion, as well as the complex relationships that these constructs have with outcomes. Further, they call for additional research focused on better understanding these dynamics by integrating different branches of thought, rejecting any claims that the question of religion’s effect on human well-being has been answered satisfactorily.


According to this article, the assumption in much psychological literature is that religious belief serves as a defense against reality. This paper seeks to explore and challenge this view by reviewing relevant research regarding religion’s relationship with psychological variables (e.g. anxiety, depression, self-actualization). It provides a helpful overview of the various psychological conceptualizations of religion that have been proposed, including some lesser known delineations of religious beliefs such as “control with God” versus
“control by God.” The lack of secure attachment is also highlighted as a likely indicator of seeing God as authoritarian and feeling “threatened” if one’s religious worldview is questioned. Finally, the authors discuss some interesting perspectives regarding the relationship between authoritarian governments and Christian missionaries, as well as the relationship between religious orientation and militancy. They conclude with a call for future research on the factors which determine the shape of someone’s religious orientation, suggesting the value of collaboration between religious and academic circles.


This philosophical treatise discusses the nature of knowledge and the importance of context as well as the individual thinker in understanding one’s resultant beliefs and justifications. Plantinga addresses competing ideas regarding knowledge (such as those put forth by Descartes, Locke, John Pollock, and those grounded in Bayesian thought), making arguments for why they may or may not be valid in turn. Ultimately, Plantinga argues that a supernatural metaphysics is an essential foundation for a sound epistemology, and that metaphysical naturalism is ultimately unreasonable.

This book seeks to elaborate a series of principles to explain the impact and consequences of parental acceptance or rejection of their children. In particular, the author discusses the impact of child abuse on human development, integrating various perspectives from different types of societies around the globe. He also highlights the common relationship between societal religious beliefs and parenting style. Finally, this text is a primary source for understanding Rohner’s parental acceptance-rejection theory as well as his ideas regarding intervention.


This report provides a broad overview of the various systemic variables that will impact Great Britain’s future (e.g. education, immigration, politics, religion), and describes a vision where diverse interests are evenly represented and discrimination is decreased. As a foundation for this goal the author proposes a framework for the future of Britain, six moral pillars to guide actions, and a series of interventions and strategies by which the proposed changes might come about. Though many of the suggestions focus on the macro-level of intervention, others can occur on a smaller scale. For instance, the authors discuss the potential value
of inter-faith dialogue in helping diverse groups to better respect, understand, and engage one another.


This article discusses the merits of Henrique’s Justification Hypothesis, with a particular eye towards its value in providing a framework to integrate the numerous perspectives and levels of analysis that currently fragment psychology and other social sciences. For instance, the author argues that the Justification Hypothesis provides a lens for understanding how all empirical pursuits are impacted by human subjectivity, as highlighted by the humanistic branch of psychological thought. The pull for humans to justify their own perspectives (or “versions of reality”), often through downwards comparison with competing perspectives, is also elaborated upon through the use of modern day examples. The article ends with the hope that the field will be able to develop a deeper and more integrative understanding of the etiology of harmful human behavior, and the author’s Equilintegration (EI) Theory and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI) are proposed as helpful tools in this quest.


This article highlighted interesting historical and research examples to provide insight on the dynamics between religious belief and conflict. For instance, Marx saw religion as an “opiate of the masses” which kept people from changing their society. Machiavelli suggested that leaders should maintain the religious structure of their country in order to keep the people “well conducted.” Additionally, modern research is reviewed suggesting that people who commit acts of violence or cruelty motivated by their religion usually believe that they are creating a better world. Of particular interest was the perspective that religious groups tend to challenge the social structure of society only until its members in a particular area gain wealth, at which point the group tends to support the status quo. It is thus concluded that ideologies or religious beliefs which seem to contradict a person’s religious meaning system can be perceived as an attack and lead to violent reactions.


In this article, Skinner notes that in some cases pigeons associate their own behaviors with the receiving of food due to a chance repeated pairing of the two together, with the learned association being maintained for a time even when not being reinforced. He infers that this is an explanation of human “superstitious” behaviors as well, providing the example of a gambler who utilizes rituals which are believed to affect gambling outcome.


This article emphasizes the importance of religious literacy in a world that is deeply affected by religious tensions, and delineates several ways that children can be educated towards this end. First, “teaching for commitment” aims to close the learner’s mind to beliefs unlike their own by “catechizing” them into a faith. Alternatively, “teaching about commitment” exposes children to a wide range of religious views while seeking to remain objective, without preference for any
particular perspective. The author argues against this common approach by pointing out that it may not capture the nature of religions as they are experienced by “true believers,” and thus ultimately distance children from actual religious experience. Instead the author offers “teaching from commitment” as an alternative approach which introduces children to a primary set of beliefs, values, and practices which allow them to create a coherent cognitive map to make sense of the world. While this approach may run the risk of indoctrination, this may be prevented when parents encourage their children to reflect on and justify their beliefs, consider alternatives, and make autonomous decisions regarding what they want to believe. The article also provides some examples of what it looks like to teach from commitment in a Muslim context.


This work challenges the common idea that religious education, whether it be in schools, religious meetings, or homes, equates to the indoctrination of children. To the contrary, it is the author’s perspective that education into a particular religious tradition is not necessarily less of an “indoctrination” than educating a child into scientific thinking or liberal ideals. Thiessen ultimately argues that it is possible to provide a child religious education that initiates them into the chosen framework of thought while still “nurturing” them in a way that avoids
indoctrination and thus fulfils the ideals put forth by modern secular education paradigms.


This book details the results of a study of letters written during the 1960’s by people explaining their personal perspectives on faith. Through qualitative analysis, the author divides the perspectives into five categories: conversionism, exemplarism, gnosticism, traditionalism, and theism, highlighting the variety of subjective religious experiences that are subsumed into typical religious categorizations (e.g. Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc.).


This article highlights literature suggesting that people have a heightened need to protect themselves, and their worldview, during situations that make them feel uncertain. Further, it is argued that people often focus on adhering to and supporting cultural norms and values to better tolerate uncertainty in their environment. For example, research has shown that when you ask someone to contemplate their uncertainties (as opposed to not contemplating them) they tend to react more negatively towards someone who has been communicating negative things about their home country. Research has also suggested that students who have been reminded about their personal uncertainties react more negatively toward information that is unfavorable to their “alma mater” university than those who have not had the same reminder. In these cases as well as others highlighted in the article, personal uncertainty appears to be an important moderating variable of defense reactions. This was particularly evident in relation to religious beliefs, leading the authors to conclude that high levels of self-uncertainty can “motivate
people to believe more in orthodox, hierarchical and extreme belief systems.”
Finally, evidence was presented suggesting that high levels of personal
uncertainty in highly religious people may increase anger or negative affect
towards antireligious statements.


In this work Vetter elucidates his theory, reminiscent of Skinner’s pigeon experiment, that religious practices are the result of actions that are associated with ultimately uncontrollable outcomes. As a result, these practices are repeated in order to provide a sense of control. Vetter also describes what he sees as the problematic impact of religion in a diversity of areas such as sex, thinking, choice, learning, society, and ethics.


Coming from the perspectives of formal logic and philosophical theory, this work highlights the changes in formal thought as the philosophical zeitgeist has moved
from logical positivism towards modern notions of subjectivity. A number of mathematical theories of probability are discussed, and the argument is ultimately made that meaningful logical deductions can be arrived at even when one cannot have absolute certainty regarding the truthfulness of a given proposition.


This chapter provides a comprehensive summary of both historical and current psychological conceptualizations of religion, their proponents, as well as the research which supports and/or critiques them. It provides an excellent “big picture” view on the psychology of religion, and is an excellent foundational text for scholars new to the field.

Appendix A. EI Self