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# Putting Up...or Shutting Out? Accommodation of Welfare Chauvinism by Denmark's Social Democrats

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## Abstract

Welfare chauvinism first appeared in academic literature when Norwegian and Danish political parties began framing immigration as a threat to the social democratic system's survival; since then, it has become a cornerstone of populist ideology in Europe. A form of quasi-retrenchment, welfare chauvinism has been advanced in Denmark by the Danish People's Party (DF), which sees immigration as a threat to the welfare state and presents chauvinism as the cure – pursuing one form of retrenchment to “prevent” another. DF's electoral popularity puts the Social Democratic party (S) between a rock and a hard place, torn between the electoral necessities of accommodating chauvinism and maintaining support for the welfare state. In this paper, I argue that indirect retrenchment is too politically costly an option for S to pursue; instead, it will accommodate DF's chauvinism by supporting direct retrenchment. I hypothesize that, via votes in the Danish parliament from 2004 to 2019, S has attempted to make it more difficult to obtain citizenship and residency rights (thus making it more difficult to obtain benefits) and make it easier for these rights, and thus the benefits, to be revoked. My findings broadly, but tentatively, support this claim. I also find that S has supported a third form of direct retrenchment: encouraging repatriation of foreigners to their home countries, which would entail a loss of benefits.

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## Introduction

Welfare chauvinism has become one of the cornerstones of European populist parties' ideologies; in Denmark, it has found its political home with the Danish People's Party (DF), the country's third largest party. The term 'welfare chauvinism' was coined by 1990 by scholars studying the Danish and Norwegian populist parties seeking to restrict who was eligible to receive welfare benefits and promoting the exclusion of immigrants from the social system (Andersen and Bjorklund 1990); since then, it has become a concept applicable to almost all of Europe's populist rightwing parties. The Netherlands' Party for Freedom, France's National Rally (formerly National Front), and Austria's Freedom Party – currently a partner in the governmental coalition – include welfare chauvinism in their policies and platforms (Cornago Bonal and Zollinger 2018). For DF, policies welfare state and immigration meet at the nexus of "welfare chauvinism": support of welfare only for the natives that have contributed to it, and opposition to welfare's extension to anyone else (Careja et al 2017).

DF was one of the first welfare chauvinistic parties in Europe and its rise influenced other populist parties to adopt its rhetoric. Though originally critical of welfare spending, DF reacted to welfare cuts by mainstream parties by becoming supportive of welfare policies. It tried to instigate opposition to immigration and multiculturalism by framing immigrants as threats to the welfare state and has benefitted electorally by doing so (Schumacher ad van Kersbergen 2016). DF frames positively its welfare chauvinism as a patriotic duty. "We are bound by our Danish cultural heritage and our responsibility towards each other as people," its manifesto reads. "For this reason, we wish to strengthen our country's internal and external security." For the party, protecting welfare for Danes necessitates limits on who might become Danish. "Denmark is not an immigrant country and never has been," continues the manifesto. "We will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society" (Dansk Folkeparti 2019).

In analyzing welfare chauvinism, Denmark is an intriguing, and useful, case. In addition to being one of the first countries in which the phenomenon was observed and documented by academic literature, a shift towards chauvinistic exclusionism contradicts the general paradigm of Scandinavian welfare generosity. Van der Waal et al (2013), testing their hypothesis that the three worlds of welfare capitalism – liberal, conservative and social democratic (Scandinavian) –

were likely to derive “three worlds of welfare chauvinism” (164), found that the Scandinavian regime was the least likely to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. The research fit with existing literature. Larsen (2008) found that countries under the social democratic (Scandinavian) regime tended to make fewer distinctions about who was “entitled” to welfare and who was not, compared to countries under the other two regimes. Van Oorschot (2006) found that Europeans viewed immigrants as less deserving of welfare than natives but noted that this finding was least applicable in social-democratic countries. That Denmark has a populist party that espouses welfare chauvinism is not, in itself, surprising; what is more surprising, and worthier of study, is the proliferation of such an attitude across the political spectrum.

DF’s electoral success has strengthened its role as legislative, if not governmental, kingmaker, compounding the influence that the Danish political structure already affords it. Structurally, Denmark’s political system helps welfare chauvinism permeate the political arena. A parliamentary democracy with nine political parties represented in Parliament, it is prone to minority governments that almost always rely upon support from non-government parties in order to pass legislation. DF’s ability to become kingmaker in the legislative process compels mainstream parties to accommodate its anti-immigration platform to a greater degree than a more majoritarian system would (Careja et al 2017). The current coalition government, led by Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen (Venstre) is comprised of Venstre (henceforth referred to as V), the Liberal Alliance (henceforth referred to as LA), and the Conservative People’s Party (KF). It relies upon support from the Danish People’s Party (DF) to pass legislation. The Social Democrats (S), Radical Liberals (RV), Alternative (ALT), and the Red-Green Alliance (EL) are in opposition.

Faced with electorally-popular competition from DF, Danish mainstream parties have been compelled to respond. Willingness to shelter refugees in Denmark is no longer a given for the country’s centrist parties. “They are unwanted in Denmark,” Minister of Immigration and Integration Inger Støjberg, of the center-right Venstre party, said of asylum seekers with criminal records whose applications were rejected. “And they will feel that.” Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, also of Venstre, indicated Denmark’s unwillingness to allow refugees seeking temporary protections to enjoy the permanent benefits of residency and citizenship. “It’s not easy to ask families to go home,” he told listeners at a party event, “but it’s the morally right thing. We should not make refugees immigrants” (Sorensen 2018). Mette Fredericksen, leader of the

center-left Social Democrats, shared similar sentiments. “More have come than we have been able to effectively integrate,” she said of refugees. “We [the Social Democrats] will take control back” (Hamilton 2018).

Mette Frederiksen, leader of the Social Democrats, in an article written for the March 2018 *Financial Times*, argued that Europe’s center-left parties could reestablish their electoral share only by heeding popular concerns. “The rise of populism is rooted in a genuine sense of insecurity,” she argued. “And voters cannot be blamed for reacting when the fruits of globalization are distributed unjustly (2018). The article focuses on the relationship “between markets and people” and makes no explicit reference to migration, but inherent in Frederiksen’s argument is admission of S’s need to adapt to changing voter preferences. One such changing preference involves immigration, and disillusionment with the center-left has caused S’s traditional supporters to defect in favor of DF.

In this paper, I argue that that some forms of retrenchment will be too electorally costly for S to pursue; instead, it will seek to retrench directly, explicitly restricting immigrants’ access to the social benefits provided by Denmark’s welfare system. I argue that S, via its voting in the Folketing (Danish Parliament), will retrench in two ways: by restricting immigrants’ access to the citizenship and residency rights upon which the conferment of welfare benefits depends and by making it easier for these rights, and thus the benefits, to be revoked. I draw on the framework developed by Careja et al (2017) that distinguishes between indirect and direct welfare chauvinism. Indirect welfare chauvinism, which retrenches welfare generally but disproportionately affects foreigners’ access to benefits, is costlier for S than direct retrenchment, which explicitly excludes foreigners from receiving benefits. Accommodating welfare chauvinism and maintaining support for the welfare state are both electoral necessities for S – the former because it allows the party to retain the voters likely to defect to DF, and the latter because it allows the party to retain the voters likely to defect to other leftist parties if S compromises its support for robust welfare policies. To respond to both pressures, I argue that S pursues two specific courses of action. First, it will seek to limit foreigners’ access to the citizenship and residency rights necessary for obtaining benefits. Second, it will seek to make it easier to revoke those rights, thus revoking the right to access the benefits.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I lay out the theoretical framework of welfare chauvinism and of my argument. Second, I review the literature on welfare chauvinism, with

emphasis on how it relates to the Danish case, and outline what this paper contributes to the topic's study. Third, I will provide an overview of the "state of play" in Denmark's political arena, providing three case studies of unsuccessful proposals that attest to political parties' voting behavior on proposed welfare retrenchment. Finally, I present and discuss my results and evaluate my hypothesis. Tables outlining each vote analyzed, with brief content summaries, can be found in the appendix.

## **Theoretical Framework**

Direct and indirect chauvinism are both forms of welfare retrenchment and are ostensibly, and sometimes expressly, aimed at limiting foreigners' access to welfare benefits. Different forms of chauvinism, however, have implications that a political party – especially a center-left party that seeks and claims to defend the welfare state – must consider. Direct chauvinism is levied directly and exclusively against immigrants and involves the group being explicitly excluded from benefits. Indirect chauvinism has a broad target group, but disproportionately affects immigrants, and occurs when welfare is retrenched and when welfare is made conditional upon recipients' adherence to certain criteria. Indirect chauvinism thus retrenches welfare in general, though foreigners are often the most affected; for example, because foreigners tend to have more children than natives, a policy reducing child benefit would disproportionately impact immigrants as a group. Likewise, a policy making child benefit conditional upon parents' working hours would negatively impact immigrants, who tend to participate in the labor force at a lower rate than natives (Careja et al 2017).

When welfare chauvinist parties increase their electoral share, mainstream parties may respond in three ways. They can accommodate welfare chauvinism by adopting the policies and language of the populist parties, thereby including welfare chauvinism in their own ideologies and policies. They can attack welfare chauvinism by directly opposing it and supporting policies that recognize equality, rejecting exclusionism in favor of universalism. They can ignore welfare chauvinism and carry on with existing platforms, not accounting for the welfare chauvinist parties. In general, the decision to respond via accommodation or attack is influenced by mainstream parties' expectation that welfare chauvinism will have electoral consequences. Mainstream right-wing parties tend to become more supportive of welfare and less supportive of multiculturalism when populist parties exhibit welfare chauvinism, while mainstream left-wing

parties tend to maintain their already high support for welfare and become less supportive of multiculturalism. This was evidenced after 1998, when DF's participation in national elections caused a shift against multiculturalism and towards welfare support among all Danish political parties except RV, thus resulting in generally, albeit limited, accommodating responses (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016).

Although Danish mainstream political parties accommodate DF's welfare chauvinism out of political and electoral necessity, they approach welfare and retrenchment in different ways. In Denmark, support for the welfare state exists across all parties; no party seeks to radically retrench the welfare state, although stance on retrenchment tends to be partisan. Leftist parties tend to advocate generous and universal welfare systems and expanding immigrants' rights so that they may partake of welfare benefits. Rightwing parties in welfare states, on the other hand, are likely to support closing the welfare system to foreigners (Koopmans et al 2012). Welfare retrenchment, especially in countries like Denmark where the welfare state is popular, is a politically unpopular measure. Parties that retrench thus must engage in blame avoidance to mediate the electoral impacts of retrenchment. One blame avoidance strategy involves grouping welfare recipients into "deserving" and "undeserving" categories and framing retrenchment as a necessary measure to reduce the burden that the "undeserving" place on the system (Ermark and Schoop 2017). The Danish case reflects these blame avoidance strategies; while the Danish People's Party perceives a threat to the welfare state from all foreigners' access to its benefits, other Danish parties qualify their welfare chauvinism. The Social Democrats have emphasized immigrants' integration potential, introducing a social element to the discussion surrounding who deserves what in Denmark. Venstre's concerns are more market-related, and the party seeks to reserve benefits for workers whose contributions to the system will, at least in the long term, balance out the benefits they receive. Two types of welfare chauvinism are thus distinguishable: the neoliberal, market-based chauvinism, and the socially-focused, solidarity-based chauvinism, employed by the right and left wing respectively (Jorgensen and Thomsen 2016: 331).

That populist parties promote welfare chauvinism, and that mainstream parties accommodate it for electoral reasons, has been established. What is less clear is how parties retrench when anti-immigrant chauvinism and welfare state maintenance (or expansion) when both concerns are equally electorally pressing. Indirect welfare chauvinism retrenches the welfare state for all of its users, including natives; and is likely to entail electoral consequences

for a center-left party like S that is keen to be seen as a defender – and even expander – of the welfare state. My research sheds light on *how* welfare-supportive political parties respond to welfare chauvinism and fills an important gap in the existing literature.

## **Literature Review: the Political Salience of Migration**

As Freeman (1986) notes, national welfare systems are necessarily closed systems; that is, they provide benefits to members (citizens) and exclude non-members (non-citizens) from those benefits. In order for a welfare state to function, citizens must share a sense of solidarity; that is, they must recognize their common membership and identify this membership as the necessary condition for sharing social benefits. By its nature, this process implies the existence of non-members, who are excluded from sharing in the welfare state's benefits. The fact that welfare states are generally ethnically homogeneous and correspond to nation-state boundaries makes it difficult for foreigners to integrate and be seen as members on equal footing with natives (Grodem 2016). This exacerbates the challenge that migration poses to welfare states as it erodes the social consensus – the solidarity condition – upon which welfare states depend. Welfare chauvinism is impacted both by these social concerns and by more material fiscal concerns. Hansen, Schultz-Nielsen and Tranaes (2015) find that the fiscal impact of migration to Denmark is significantly impacted by the country from which immigrants come. While migration from Western countries has a significant positive fiscal impact, the fiscal impact of migration from non-Western countries is heavily negative. While Western migration generates a surplus, non-Western migration causes a deficit. This can be explained by non-Western immigrants' relationship with the labor market: they tend to participate in the workforce less and retire early. Denmark's ability to strengthen the welfare state's fiscal foundations through immigration is thus dependent upon the type of immigration Denmark receives.

Whether immigration is evaluated as a net positive or net negative, socially or financially, for Denmark does not necessarily determine whether the Danish welfare state includes or excludes immigrants. Two hypotheses attempt to explain the relationship between welfare availability and immigration. The dualization hypothesis holds that welfare generosity correlates negatively with foreigners' access to welfare benefits for two reasons. First, generous welfare systems may serve as “magnets” for migration as foreigners are attracted to the promise of social benefits. The higher the number of foreigners seeking benefits in a welfare state, the

higher the budgetary strain. Second, immigration threatens societal ethnic homogeneity, which undermines the social trust upon which the success of welfare states relies. In other words, while the average Dane is likely to support welfare benefits for other, more disadvantaged Danes, s/he is far less likely to support such benefits for foreigners, with whom s/he lacks “trust.” The generosity hypothesis holds that welfare generosity correlates positively with foreigners’ access to benefits. The decommodifying policies inherent to the structure of most generous welfare states decrease economic competition and protect workers’ rights, thereby reducing the possibilities of foreigners being seen as a threat. Furthermore, generous welfare systems tend to adhere to egalitarian principles and non-discriminatory ideologies that mediate the tendency to identify foreigners as “the other.” Such principles are applied practically through the non-establishment of screening mechanisms, which would identify certain people as “the other” via legal means (checking of ID documents, implementation of mandatory reporting/notification obligations, etc.). Romer (2017) finds that, in general, the generosity hypothesis is more parsimonious, though she notes that Denmark’s restriction of immigrants’ rights is a minor exception to the norm.

Jorgensen and Meret (2012) argue that Danish politics have afforded relatively little attention to irregular migration because it is a “marginal phenomenon.” The applicability of this finding post-2012 seems to be contradicted by the rhetoric and policies from Denmark’s major political parties, but the authors’ identification of the mechanisms Denmark uses to control migration remains salient. Danish solutions to irregular migration center upon control mechanisms aimed at restricting migrants’ access to the country and return policies aimed at repatriating the migrants that have gained entry. In addition to implementing measures that directly inhibit asylum seekers’ access to asylum, Denmark has implemented policies of “indirect deterrence” aimed at persuading foreigners not to enter the country in the first place. This is usually accomplished by implementing excessive conditionality for access to citizenship, residence rights and social benefits, thereby reducing the likelihood of foreigners qualifying to receive them (Esmark and Schoop 2017). Some of these measures correspond to direct retrenchment; these are the types of measures I predict will be supported legislatively by S.

## **Danish Welfare: In the Trenches?**



Three attempted proposals constituting welfare retrenchment warrant attention as they indicate S and DF's hierarchy of preferences on welfare retrenchment. The first proposal involved tax reform, analysis of which is useful for two reasons. First, tax cuts are a form of welfare retrenchment that governments perceive as less electorally risky than more blatant forms of welfare retrenchment. This implies that parties which propose and support tax reform are relatively insulated from electoral consequence for doing so – or, at least, they perceive that they are. Second, tax cuts tend to have a partisan dimension in Denmark. While leftwing governments tend to create more forms of taxation to provide the welfare state with additional sources of income, rightwing governments tend to retrench the welfare state by decreasing its income flow via tax cuts (Klitgard and Elmelund-Praestaecker 2014). Therefore, if S's rightwing shift influenced it to support general welfare retrenchment to a greater degree than it did in the past, it is likely that this would be evidenced in its stance on tax reform. In 2018, V concluded an agreement with DF to increase restrictions on the residence conditions under which citizens would receive unemployment benefits. The initial version of the proposal required people to have lived in Denmark for 7 of the past 8 years, but trade unions and left-wing parties, including S, expressed concern over the proposal, noting that it would exclude Danish citizens who had worked abroad from receiving benefits (Gadd 2018). In the final version of the bill, exceptions were made for Danish citizens working for companies overseas and workers who had lived in EU countries. Residence requirements were changed to 7 out of the past 12 years, but despite the changes, S, EL, ALT, RV and SF opposed the bill, which ultimately passed with support from DF, V, LA and KF (Folketinget 2019). It was estimated that that 80% of individuals affected by this proposal will be from non-EU countries, which employment minister Troels Lund Poulsen (V) said “[has] always been the intention” (Gadd 2018). Despite the bill's potential adverse consequences for Danish workers, DF supported the bill. Its support can be explained in part by the bill's consequences for immigrants and in part by the party's hostility to foreign labor. While it is proven electorally popular for S to accommodate welfare chauvinism by supporting policy that excludes foreigners, S did not support the proposal. This indicates that its support for the welfare state in general has not changed, though its stance towards extension of welfare benefits to foreigners has. The consequences for Danish workers outweighed the consequences for foreigners in S's calculation, but not in DF's calculation.

The second proposal centered upon the long-contested issue of tax cuts. In early 2018, the V-led government scrapped plans to cut taxes when it failed to garner enough support from other parties. S refused to support the proposal on the basis of its “lack of welfare” (The Local Denmark 2017). DF predicated its support for the proposal on the government’s willingness to revoke refugees’ residence rights; V would not accommodate the request and DF refused to support the bill. The government plans to introduce new tax cuts targeting low-earning workers, which DF has promised to support (Levring and Rigillo 2018). S responded by introducing its own tax plan, which it promises to implement if it forms a government after 2019 general elections. The plan includes, among other things, caps on salaries for executives, extension of employee bonuses, a doubling of inheritance tax, and a 10 percent increase on the tax ceiling for capital gains (Levring 2018). Despite the potential negative implications for Danes, including the blue-collar workers that comprise much of DF’s voting base, the party was prepared to support the proposal if the consequences for foreigners were sufficiently negative. S not only opposed the proposal on the basis of these potential adverse effects, but released its own proposal in an attempt to attest to its welfare “credentials.” As with the retirement proposal, for S, the potential consequences for Danes outweighed the political utility of accommodating welfare chauvinism. For DF, the opposite was true.

The third proposal related to Denmark’s retirement age. In 2011, the V government, with support from DF and RV, passed a bill reforming the country’s early retirement scheme, a reform that would eventually raise the retirement age to 69. S and SF, supported by some labor unions, opposed the effort, arguing that it would have negative consequences for blue-collar workers whose work was mentally and physically exhausting. Despite the passing of the bill at the time, the part of the agreement that intermittently raised the retirement age to 67.5 was shelved in 2017 due to opposition from DF and S. The proposal was part of a market-related reform, aimed at combatting the lack of available workers in Denmark by increasing the number of years Danes spent working. S’s behavior is indicative of its traditional opposition to such reforms. DF’s support for the bill indicates the party’s lack of consistency on welfare retrenchment and underscores the difficulty in predicting DF’s preferences on such legislation. Voting behavior on this issue would appear to fit with existing literature. While support for the Danish welfare state remains high across political parties, S and the center-right parties diverge significantly. S, in general, favors expansion of the welfare state, advocating higher taxation to

finance higher public spending. While V and its bloc do not consistently advocate retrenchment, it is significantly less likely to seek expansion of the welfare state and is more likely to propose market-focused reforms. Focus on such reforms, however, declined from 1970-2003, due partly to the popularity of the welfare state among citizens and the unpopularity of retrenchment among political parties. S tends to oppose welfare retrenchment and market-focused reforms regardless of whether it is part of the government or opposition (Nygard 2006).

Despite its rightward shift, it is not surprising that S refuses to support welfare retrenchment. Arndt (2013) demonstrates that the S-led government of 1993-2001 was electorally punished by voters for its role in welfare retrenchment. The party's traditional working-class voter base, disillusioned with S because of its liberal immigration policy and its backsliding on social democracy as evidenced by its willingness to retrench, moved increasingly to the Danish People's Party. This finding fits within a larger paradigm of voter reaction to welfare retrenchment. Schumacher et al (2012) found that, in general, welfare retrenchment leads to negative electoral consequences for the parties that implement and support it. The consequences are especially severe for center-left, welfare-supportive parties, as voters perceive a sort of betrayal that decreases their willingness to vote for the party. Parties that are perceived to be more welfare-critical are electorally punished as a result of their role in retrenchment, but not to the degree that welfare-supportive parties are. Thus, the electoral consequences of welfare retrenchment are different for political parties based on voters' perceptions of their stances on welfare, and leftist governments suffer the most.

Currently, S has electoral incentives for accommodating welfare chauvinism. Should it receive a mandate to form a government after the 2019 general election, it will have political incentives as well. Welfare retrenchment may well help S leave the opposition, form a government and pass laws that fit with its welfare expansionary platform, but what S is *not* able to do is accommodate DF's indirect welfare chauvinism. If S acquiesces to such retrenchment of the welfare state – even if the ostensible target is Denmark's foreign-born population – its credentials as the political establishment's foremost defender of the welfare state will come into question at precisely the moment it is arguably being redeemed. As Arndt (2013) established, voters are willing to electorally punish S for instigating welfare retrenchment, even if doing so results in the election of a party that also favors retrenchment. This was evidence in the 2011 election, when voters spurned the center-left administration of Helle Thorning-Schmidt due to

the indirect retrenchment it implemented. While some of its retrenchment had a clear bias against foreigners, retrenchment rolled back benefits for citizens in general, which proved unpopular (Jorgensen and Thomsen 2016: 331).

## **Center-Left and Far-Right: Conflict or Convergence?**

As the ideological differences between Denmark's leftwing parties have increased, the potential for the bloc to work together has decreased. Traditionally, before the Parliament's summer break, Denmark's red (left-wing) bloc and blue (right-wing) bloc release statements noting shared goals and evaluating the general political arena. In 2018, the practice clearly showed disunity among the red bloc, as the RV, ALT and SF refused to endorse the statement written by S. Instead, they released their own, criticizing Frederiksen's party for its role in passing anti-immigrant legislation (Barrett 2018a). Less than a week later, Frederiksen announced that, should S win Denmark's next general election, it would seek to form a minority government without support from alternative leftist parties, breaking a 25-year cooperation agreement among parties in the blue bloc. The reason, Frederiksen said, is the "blurring of lines" between the mainstream left and right-wing, especially on immigration, an issue on which the positions of S and SF are no longer compatible (Barret 2018b).

Nedergaard (2017) argues that three factors explain the Social Democratic leadership's turn towards accommodation of welfare chauvinism. The first is informed by the Scandinavian welfare state's "closed" condition as articulated by Freeman. S, which perceives and promotes itself as the welfare state's foremost political defender, has come to see large-scale migration from developing nations as a threat to the existence of the welfare state. In this view, restriction of welfare for immigrants is necessary to prevent welfare retrenchment on a larger scale. The second involves the party's reckoning with its past. In the 1980s, S-led governments liberalized migration policy, which ultimately became unpopular with electorates. This second factor follows from the first, as S could no longer viably tout its pro-welfare credentials as voters blamed it for allowing the large-scale migration that necessarily leads to welfare retrenchment. The third factor is the loss of S's traditional voting base, as working-class voters have increasingly defected to DF and V. S has thus been deprived of a reliable voting base; most likely unable to win support of high-earners because of its opposition to tax cuts and support of high public spending, S must win back its traditional working-class base to survive. The shift to the right led by Frederiksen, has spared S from the electorally bleak fate that has befallen much

of Europe's center left, but such a departure from the party's traditional ideology will necessitate a sharp break from its liberal allies. Whether this is a choice S is willing to make will only be made clear in the next election.

Ideologically, S and DF intersect in a way uncharacteristic of the center-left and far-right. Their parties' platforms converge in four critical areas: concern over the rollback of workers' rights; income inequality; unregulated neoliberal policies resulting from globalization; and the challenges of integrating refugees and migrants into a closed system. Both would, on the surface, appear to oppose welfare retrenchment for natives. Both oppose lowering taxes on top earners and raising the age at which citizens may retire and qualify for state pensions; both support higher public spending to support the welfare state. A key difference between S and DF is the scope of their respective program's focus. S, despite its opposition to neoliberal market policies, acknowledges the integration of the Danish economy into the European and global economies, and thus its program attacks globalism's adverse effects without opposing globalism per se. DF, on the other hand, opposes globalism on principle (Helbak and Krogsbaek 2018). Though the difference in scope affects the parties' abilities to implement coherent policy – a task S is more likely to accomplish than DF – it does not translate into a fundamentally different stance on the welfare state; indeed, on paper, the two parties' platforms seem compatible.

S's shift to the right has thus far failed to deliver electoral consequences. An opinion poll in August gauged S's popularity to be 26% - the same as its popularity immediately before the 2015 general election (The Local Denmark 2018). Therefore, despite the change in the party's direction has not translated to a change in support. With general elections in June 2019, however, S finds itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, if it continues accommodating DF's welfare chauvinism, it risks alienating its liberal voters and its traditional allies. This is likely to be a particularly difficult option if DF promotes indirect retrenchment, which would impact native Danes as well as immigrants. Accommodating welfare chauvinism in such conditions would almost certainly lead to electoral consequences. On the other hand, if S reverts to its previous immigration and multiculturalism policies, it risks being punished electorally.

## **Methodology**

I hypothesize that electoral pressures will compel S to accommodate welfare chauvinism, but that it will not retrench directly because doing so is electorally costly; instead, it will retrench

directly. To evaluate this claim, I analyze bills voted upon by the Danish parliament (Folketing) that concern immigrants' access to Danish citizenship, residency and/or benefits proposed by the competent ministries<sup>1</sup> since the inauguration of the Anders Fogh Rasmussen cabinet in 2004, as these are the earliest legislative records kept systematically by the Folketing online. This analysis includes only those bills that were voted on by the Folketing; it does not include bills in committee at the time of writing or bills that were shelved in committee. More regulatory bills – for example, those that transpose European directives into national law – and those that impose minor structural changes on administrations and agencies (i.e. those that change rules for appointing members of immigration advisory boards) are not included in this analysis. Laws relating to temporary tourist visas, extraordinary acts granting citizenship to persons of domestic importance, and other bills irrelevant to the purpose of this paper are not analyzed. The full list of analyzed bills, with summaries of content, can be found in the appendix. Comprehensive overviews of the bills may be found, in Danish, on the Folketing website.

Each bill is assigned either a plus (+) or minus (-) sign indicating its implications for foreigners in Denmark. Those bills marked with a plus (+) have made it easier for foreigners to gain access to the country's social benefits via either eased access to residency and citizenship or eased direct access to benefits. Those bills marked with a minus (-) have made it more difficult for foreigners to gain access to these benefits via either restricted access to residency and citizenship or restricted direct access to benefits. This is not a subjective evaluation of whether the bills are “good” or “bad”; it indicates only whether they have positive or negative implications for foreigners' access to social benefits in Denmark.

I identify five forms of welfare retrenchment implemented by Danish ministries in the area of immigrant rights and affairs: Revocation, Financial Obligation, Denial of Access, Social

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<sup>1</sup> The Danish ministry which handles refugee, immigration and integration affairs has been abolished, reestablished and renamed multiple times, although for the period analyzed here it has always existed in some form. The Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, established in the cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V) existed until 2011, when it was abolished by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S). Competences for immigration policy were transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration from 2011-2013; the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and Integration from 2013-2014; and the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations until the end of the government's mandate. In 2015 a different government led by Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V) was elected. From 28 June 2015 to 28 November 2016, the government was comprised only of ministers from V. During this period, the ministry that introduced legislation on immigration affairs was the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing. Following the reestablishment of a three-party (V, LA, KF) cabinet in late 2016, the ministry that introduced relevant legislation was the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, under the same minister. Competence for housing policy was relocated to another ministry.

Obligation, and Repatriation Incentive. Revocation refers to authorities' rights to deprive an individual of rights to residence, citizenship, and/or benefit that the citizen would have enjoyed prior to the passing of the law. Financial obligation refers to the increase in or introduction of cost for programs that previously were free or less costly; in other words, the transfer of burden of payment from state to individual user. Denial of Access characterizes a law that aims to restrict the number of people able to access, or exclude members of a certain group from accessing, residence, citizenship and/or. Social obligation refers to the obligation of an individual seeking residence, citizenship and/or benefits to prove adherence to a socially-constructed criteria, i.e. the obligation of a refugee to prove respect for "Danish values" or attest to their social integration potential. Social obligation may be construed as a form of denial of access, but because a distinction must be made between normative laws and restrictions (i.e. increase in waiting periods) and socially-constructed obligations, two categories must be used. Repatriation incentive, while not a way to deny foreigners access to social benefits per se, nonetheless aims to decrease access of foreigners to residence and/or citizenship. For the purposes of this research, it is evaluated as +/- (neutral), as it neither directly restricts nor expands foreigners' access to social rights in Denmark.

## Results

These results are derived from the larger dataset found in the appendix. The left column indicates the type of restriction in the bill. The middle column denotes the number of bills that included this type of restriction and the right column indicates how S voted. The number of markings in the right column do not always correspond to the number in the middle column because some votes included more than one type of restriction. The number of restrictions do not correspond to the total number both for this reason and because some of the bills voted upon were positive and thus included no restrictions.

2018-2019

Restriction Type	#	S vote
Revocation	2	+, +
Financial Obligation	2	+, /
Denial of Access	3	+, +, +

Social Obligation	1	/
Repatriation Incentive		

#### 2017-2018

Revocation	3	+, +, +
Financial Obligation	1	+
Denial of Access	12	/ (2), - (2), + (8)
Social Obligation		
Repatriation Incentive	1	+

#### 2016-2017

Revocation	1	+
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access	9	+ (8), - (1)
Social Obligation		
Repatriation Incentive	1	+

#### 2015-2016

Revocation		
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access	7	-, + (7)
Social Obligation	3	-, +, +
Repatriation Incentive		

#### 2014-2015: Government of Rasmussen

Revocation		
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access	1	-
Social Obligation	1	-
Repatriation Incentive		

#### 2014-2015: Government of Thorning-Schmidt

Revocation	1	-
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Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access		
Social Obligation		
Repatriation Incentive		

2013-2014

Revocation		
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access		
Social Obligation		
Repatriation Incentive	2	+, +

2012-2013

Revocation	1	+
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access		
Social Obligation		
Repatriation Incentive	1	+

2011-2012

All positive laws; no restrictions.

2010-2011: no laws.

2010-2011: Government of Lokke Rasmussen

Revocation	2	+, -
Financial Obligation	1	-
Denial of Access	2	-, -
Social Obligation		
Repatriation Incentive	1	-

2009-2010

Revocation	1	-
Financial Obligation		

Denial of Access	1	+
Social Obligation	2	+, +
Repatriation Incentive	1	+

2008-2009

Revocation	1	+
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access	2	+, -
Social Obligation		
Repatriation Incentive		

2007-2008

All positive laws; no restrictions.

2006-2007

Revocation		
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access	1	+
Social Obligation	1	-
Repatriation Incentive	1	-

2005-2006

Revocation	1	+
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access	1	+
Social Obligation	2	-, /
Repatriation Incentive		

2004-2005

Revocation		
Financial Obligation		
Denial of Access	1	+
Social Obligation	2	+, +

Repatriation Incentive		
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The increase in the number of immigration-related bills voted upon by the Folketing corresponds with the increase of asylum seekers received by Denmark during the migration “crisis” in Europe. Obviously, an increase in the total number of bills increases the likelihood of S to vote a certain way, thus it is not useful to calculate the percentage change of S’s support, opposition and abstentions. The use of percentages to analyze S’s voting behavior during each time period is not unproblematic due to the small number of bills, but while the percentages should not be considered in isolation, they are useful for portraying S’s voting behavior. In the 2018-2019 period, S abstained on 2 of 8 bills with restrictions (25%) and opposed none (0%). In the 2017-2018 period, S abstained on 2 of 17 bills (12%) and opposed 2 (12%). In the 2016-2017 period, S opposed 1 of 11 bills (9%). In the 2015-2016 period, S opposed 2 of 10 bills (20%). In the 2014-2015 period for which a V-led government was in power, S opposed both bills (100%). In the 2014-2015 period for which an S-led government was in power, S opposed the only bill (100%). In the 2013-2014 and 2012-2013 periods, S opposed no bills. In the 2010-2011 period, S opposed 5 of 6 bills (83%). In the 2009-2010 period, S opposed 1 of 5 bills (20%). In the 2008-2009 period, S opposed 1 of 3 bills (33%). In the 2006-2007 period, S opposed 2 of 3 bills (67%). In the 2005-2006 period, S opposed 1 (25%) and abstained on 1 (25%) of 4 bills. In the 2004-2005 period, S opposed no bills (0%).

As noted, the small number of relevant bills voted upon by the Folketing makes drawing conclusions difficult. However, S’s relatively permissive attitude towards restrictive bills during the V-led government’s tenure (2015-2019) contrasts with its voting behavior during the S-led government’s tenure (2011-2015), indicating that the loss of the election did indeed result in “lessons learned.” The likelihood of S voting with DF was also significantly higher during the V-led government’s tenure than during the S-led government’s tenure, as the tables in the appendix show. Perhaps a more useful indicator of changes in S’s voting behavior can be found by analyzing what parties S tended to vote with during its tenure as opposition under the first and second Rasmussen cabinets. In the 2018-2019 period, S voted with DF on 5 out of 6 bills and only voted with its former coalition partner RV on 3. In 2017-2018, it voted with DF 10 times and voted with RV 8 times. In 2016-2017, it voted with DF 9 times, including one unusual

instance in which both sides opposed the government, and voted with RV 5 times. In 2015-2016, it voted with DF 9 times and with RV 3 times.

## **Conclusion**

The findings above reflect tentative support for my hypothesis. Voting records also identify another form of direct retrenchment supported by S: encouragement of repatriation of foreigners to their home countries. S has accommodated DF's welfare chauvinism by supporting direct retrenchment in three ways: by making it more difficult for foreigners to acquire the conditions under which they may claim and receive welfare benefits in two ways: a) by making it more difficult for foreigners to meet the residency and citizenship requirements necessary for access to benefits and b) by expanding the conditions under which residency and citizenship rights may be revoked and c) by encouraging repatriation. Though repatriation is more voluntary than exclusion and expulsion, it indicates a desire on the part of the parties that vote for it to extend fewer benefits to fewer foreigners, and thus it constitutes a form of direct retrenchment. Based on these findings, I anticipate that, in the future, S will continue to retrench directly because indirect retrenchment almost certainly entails negative electoral consequences. An upcoming general election, due to be held in June 2019, increases S's prerogatives for pursuing welfare chauvinism accommodation and welfare state support.

This paper analyzed only the bills voted upon by the Folketing that met certain specifications; a more systemic, robust analysis would account for bills that were proposed but not voted on. This would allow for a more thorough analysis of how S and DF react to proposals ostensibly aimed at reducing access to benefits for foreigners but effectively infringe upon native Danes' access to those benefits. It was beyond the scope of this project to analyze such legislation here, but doing so would provide a clearer picture of the two parties' relationship with migration and welfare policy. Because of the small number of bills analyzed, the study suffers from overdetermination; while the findings tentatively support the hypothesis, the hypothesis should be tested further and more systematically.

## Appendix

2018-2019: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).

Ministry of Immigration and Integration.

Minister: Inger Støjberg (V)

Law	Content	+/-	Retrenchment Type	Status	Support	Opposition	Abstentions
L166	Extension of British citizens' rights in event of no-deal Brexit	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>D</b> , <b>V</b> , EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/	/
L152	Legalize expulsion of foreigners who violate laws on criminalization of mental violence; Restrict access to residence permits for foreigners with prison records	-	Revocation  Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , RV, SF, KF	EL, ALT	/
L140	Introduction of cap for family reunifications; further penalty for violation of residency and entry laws; increased leeway for authorities to revoke refugees' residence permits; rephrasing so that refugees' residence permits made temporary	-	Revocation  Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L133	Compel users of au pair scheme to pay for Danish language lessons	-	Financial Obligation	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , EL, SF	<b>V</b> , LA, ALT, RV, KF	/
L81 L80	Raise naturalization fee; allow Minister to set conditions for citizenship ceremonies, upon which conference of citizenship is conditional, including demonstrating respect for Danish values	-	Financial Obligation  Social Obligation	Confirmed	<b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	<b>S</b>
L55B	Restriction of conditions for spousal reunification	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/	/

2017-2018: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).

Ministry of Immigration and Integration.

Minister: Inger Støjberg (V)

L239	Increase residence requirement and introduce employment requirement to earn right to education and cash benefits	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	DF, V, LA, KF	AL, ALT, RV, SF	S
L231	Make spousal reunification conditional upon likelihood of spouse's successful integration; connection requirement replaced by integration requirement with language component; introduction of residence requirement for individuals seeking reunification of spouse, including limits on where residence can be located	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV	SF
L225	Introduction of payment obligations for education for students, foreign workers, and EU citizens	-	Financial Obligation	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L222	Effective grant of citizenship to 1953 adults and 472 children together with parents	+	/	Confirmed	S, V, EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	DF	/
L215	Abolition of au pair scheme on grounds that it facilitates "wage dumping" and undeclared work	-	Denial of Access	Rejected	DF, EL, SF	S, V, LA, RV, KF	ALT
L197	Continue provisions to establish temporary residences for refugees; increase police power to detain refugees to verify identity	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L196	Obliges authorities to inform foreigners about repatriation; strengthen	+/-	Repatriation Incentive	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, SF, KF	EL, ALT, RV	/

	structural factors for repatriation; provide incentives for repatriation						
L189	Changes to wage requirement for foreigners employed in certain types of work, to ensure that such employment does not affect the wages of Danish workers	-	Denial of Access	Rejected	DF, EL	S, V, LA, ALT, RV, KF	SF
L180	Ease ability of authorities to expel foreigners deemed no longer in need of protection	-	Revocation	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	
L156	Introduction of shorter entry bans so that more individuals may be denied entry; establish framework for expulsion of foreigners charged with crimes	-	Denial of Access Revocation	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, RV, SF, KF	EL, ALT	
L145 A	Tightening of regulations guiding asylum seekers' access to housing and labor market	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	AL, ALT, RV, SF	
L141	Ease rules for foreigners seeking secondary employment and volunteer work	+	/	Confirmed	S, V, EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/	DF
L140	Ease access to residence permits for foreigners who worked with international organizations in Denmark	+	/	Confirmed	S, V, EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	DF	/
L120	Reduction of integration allowance to incentivize job-seeking	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	S
L97	Simplify rules for distribution of refugees among municipalities; restricts right of refugees to be rehoused if they move away from	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, RV, KF	EL, ALT, SF	/

	municipality to which they were assigned						
L96	Increase right of authorities to refuse to issue travel documents to foreigners if suspicion of sale/abuse of travel documents	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, RV, SF, KF	EL, ALT	/
L95B	Removal of “special, easy” access to judicial trial in family reunification cases involving children	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	
L94	Ease access to labor market and residence permits for foreigners with “innovative business ideas”	+	/	Confirmed	S, V, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	DF, EL	/
L80	Set quota of 500 for refugees issued with residence permit annually	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, V, LA, KF	DF, EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L46	Restrict access to permanent residence permit for foreigners who have “opposed the clarification of their identity”	-	Revocation	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/

2016-2017: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).  
Ministry of Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Inger Støjberg (V)

L204	Denial of education for adult foreigners in reception centers; provisions for accommodation of unaccompanied minors	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, SF, KF	EL, ALT, RV	/
L188	Increase use of biometrics/fingerprints and personal photographs to verify asylum seekers’ identities	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	S, DF, V, LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L175	Facilitate newcomers’ access to labor market	+	/	Confirmed	S, DF, V, EL, LA,	ALT	/



					RV, SF, KF		
L174	Increase incentives for voluntary repatriation of foreigners	+/-	Repatriation Incentive	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, SF, KF	EL, ALT, RV	/
L163	Ease family reunification for some professionals affected by the repeal of the 26-year rule	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, RV, KF	EL, ALT, SF	/
L162	Repeal of 26-year rule for family reunification	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, KF	<b>DF</b> , EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L161	Increase in minimum salary necessary for foreign workers to legally stay in Denmark	-	Denial of Access	Rejected	<b>DF</b> , EL	<b>S</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/
L154	Increase restrictions for obtaining residence permit, including increase in residence requirement and requirement for self-sufficiency	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L153	Enactment of “emergency brake” allowing Denmark to reject asylum seekers at border in crisis situations	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L135	Clarification of foreigners’ salary requirements under amounts scheme	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , EL, SF	<b>V</b> , LA, ALT, RV, KF	/
L119	Restrict authorities’ abilities to revoke student residence permits in case of illegal work	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>V</b> , EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	<b>DF</b>	/

2016-2017: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V).  
Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.  
Minister: Inger Støjberg (V)

L82	Ease access to residence permits for highly-qualified workers/PhD candidates	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/	/
L51	Increased monitoring of foreigners with criminal	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , <b>V</b> , LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/

	records; increased penalties for violating notification obligation						
L50	Introduction of obligation of religious figures to commit to compliance with Danish law and take course on Danish law and order prior to being granted residence permit	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V</b> , EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/	/
L49	Compels authorities to expel criminal foreigners unless doing so expressly contradicts Denmark's international obligations (abolition of changes made by former government)	-	Revocation	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V</b> , LA, SF, KF	EL, ALT, RV	/
L48	Introduction of sanctions list naming individuals to be banned entry to Denmark on basis of public order	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V</b> , LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/

2015-2016: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V).  
Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.  
Minister: Inger Støjberg (V)

L191 A	Abolition of 2 year deadline for family reunification in cases involving children	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V</b> , KF, LA	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L191 B	Allow cash-benefit and educational aid recipients who become integration benefit recipients to retain already-earned benefits	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V</b> , EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/	/
L188	Provide benefits to companies that provide foreigners and refugees with practical training and education	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S, V</b> , ALT, RV, KF	<b>DF</b> , EL, LA	/
L169	Cancellation of green card scheme on basis of "wage-dumping"	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S, DF</b> , EL, SF	<b>V</b> , LA, ALT, RV, KF	/

L168	Increase foreign workers' minimum income requirement for residence under amounts scheme	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S, DF,</b> EL, SF	<b>V,</b> LA, ALT, RV, KF	/
L111	Extension of integration benefit to create "incentive to work" and "be integrated"	-	Denial of Access/Social Obligation	Confirmed	<b>DF, V,</b> LA, KF	<b>S,</b> EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L87	Postpone family reunification for persons with temporary protection; abolition of "easy" access to permanent residence permit for refugees; reduction of cash benefit for asylum seekers; allow authorities to search refugees' belongings and confiscate items to help state cover expenses for these refugees; condition selection of quota refugees on those refugees' potential for integration; increase ability of authorities to withdraw residence permits of refugees who visit home country; tightening of requirements for obtaining indefinite residence permit	-	Denial of Access  Social Obligation	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V,</b> LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L62	Allow authorities to stop transportation services between Denmark and other countries in extraordinary cases	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V,</b> LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L60	Require foreigners taking citizenship test to demonstrate knowledge of Danish society, culture and history	-	Social Obligation	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V,</b> LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/

L53A	Require foreigners born/raised in Denmark to apply for nationality	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V</b> , LA, KF	EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
L54B	Allow acquisition of Danish nationality by adult to extend to adult's children	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S, DF, V</b> , EL, LA, ALT, RV, SF, KF	/	/

2014-2015: Cabinet of Lokke-Rasmussen Cabinet (V).  
Ministry of Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations.  
Minister: Inger Støjberg (V)

L2	Replacement of education aid and cash assistance for newly-arrived foreigners with integration allowance	-	Denial of Access/Social Obligation	Confirmed	<b>DF, V</b> , LA, KF	<b>S</b> , EL, ALT, RV, SF	/
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2014-2015: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt Cabinet (S, RV).  
Ministry of Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations.  
Minister: Manu Sareen (RV)

L79	Reinstatement of previous more lenient rules for granting refugees access to state pensions	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , RV, SF, EL	<b>V, DF</b> , LA, KF	/
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Ministry of Justice.  
Minister: Mette Frederiksen (S)

L99	Increase ability of government to revoke residence permits for foreigners who participate in armed conflict abroad	-	Revocation	Confirmed	<b>V, DF, S</b> , RV, SF, LA, KF	EL, UFG	/
L72	Introduction of temporary protection status for individuals fleeing serious conflict in home country	+	/	Confirmed	<b>V, S, DF</b> , RV, LA, KF	SF, EL, UFG	/
L44	Increase right of former citizens to regain citizenship; allow dual citizenship	+	/	Confirmed	<b>V, S</b> , RV, SF, EL, LA, UFG	<b>DF</b> , KF	/

2013-2014: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).  
 Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and Integration.  
 Minister: Anette Vilhelmsen (SF)

L117 A	Increase reintegration assistance for foreigners wishing to return to home country x	+/-	Repatriation Incentive	Confirmed	V, S, DF, RV, SF, EL, LA, KF, UFG	/	/
L117 B	Ease requirements of repatriation assistance so that more people may receive it	+/-	Repatriation Incentive	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL	V, DF, LA, KF	/

Ministry of Justice.  
 Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S)

L186	Increase right of children and young adults to have their residence cases reviewed	+	/	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL, KF	V, DF, LA	/
L162 A	Allow children born to unwed Danes the same rights to citizenship as children born to married Danes	+	/	Confirmed	V, S, DF, RV, SF, EL, LA, KF, UFG	/	/
L162 B	Increase opportunities for non-citizens born and raised in Denmark to access citizenship	+	/	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL, UFG	V, DF, LA, KF	/
L141	Abolition of guidelines for selecting refugees for quota system on basis of integration potential; introduction of system under which refugees are chosen based on their "needs and expectations"	+	/	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL, UFG	V, DF, LA, KF	/

2012-2013: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).  
 Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration.  
 Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S)

L190	Obliges municipalities to provide refugees with individualized integration plans and health assessments	+	/	Confirmed	S, RF, SF, EL, LA	V, DF, KF	/
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Ministry of Justice.  
Minister: Morten Bodskov (S)

L130	Increase right of asylum seekers to work and move outside of asylum center; extend offer of private residence to families with children after waiting period; increase incentives for rejected asylum seekers to voluntarily repatriate	+ +/-	/	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL, LA	V, DF, KF	/
L143	Increase right of authorities to revoke residence permits of individuals who have forced another individual into marriage	-	Revocation	Confirmed	V, S, DF, RV, SF, EL, LA, KF	/	/
L129 A	Increased right of trafficked individuals to temporary residence permits	+	/	Confirmed	V, S, RV, SF, EL, LA, KF	DF	/
L129 B	Increase right of abused spouses and children to stay in Denmark	+	/	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL	V, DF, KF	LA

2011-2012: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).

Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration.

Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S)

L101	Abolish obligation of local governments to provide guidance on repatriation to foreigners; abolishes financial incentives for local governments to do so	+/-	/ (Removal of Repatriation Incentive)	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL, LA	V, DF, KF, SP	/
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Ministry of Justice.  
Minister: Morten Bodskov (S)

L180 A	Allow refugees who have “shown willingness to integrate” access to permanent residence permits in shorter timeframes	+	/	Confirmed	S, RV, SF, EL, LA	V, DF, KF	/
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L180 B	Increase weight of Denmark's international observations in considerations of when foreigners may be deported	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , RV, SF, EL, LA, <b>V</b> (by mistake)	LA, <b>DF</b> , KF	/
L178	Provide foreigners the right to vote in municipal and regional elections after 3 years of residence	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , RV, SF, EL, LA	<b>V</b> , <b>DF</b> , KF	/
L150 A	Increase obligation of authorities to foster integration of children	+	/	Confirmed	<b>V</b> , <b>S</b> , RV, SF, EL, LA, KF	<b>DF</b>	/
L150 B	Increase children's ability to regain lost residence permits	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , RV, SF, EL, LA	<b>V</b> , <b>DF</b> , KF	/
L104	Allow spousal reunification for individuals with lower financial security than previous laws permitted; repeal of point system for spousal reunification	+	/	Confirmed	<b>S</b> , RV, SF, EL, LA	<b>V</b> , <b>DF</b> , KF	/

*2010-2011: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt.  
No laws made.*

2010-2011: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Soren Pind (V)

L212	Compel foreign students to show more documents attesting to self-sufficiency and language requirements	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>V</b> , <b>DF</b> , LA, CF	<b>S</b> , SF, RV, EL	/
L211	Oblige municipalities to inform foreigners of possibilities for repatriation	+/-	Repatriation Incentive	Confirmed	<b>V</b> , <b>DF</b> , KF, LA	<b>S</b> , SF, RV, EL, KD	/
L210	Oblige authorities to expel criminal foreigners unless doing so is expressly forbidden by Denmark's international obligations	-	Revocation	Confirmed	<b>V</b> , <b>S</b> , <b>DF</b> , SF, KF, LA	RV, EL, KD	/

L168	Tighten rules for spousal reunification	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	V, DF, KF	S, SF, RV, EL	/
L66	Introduction of fees for family reunification and study applications	-	Financial Obligation	Confirmed	V, DF, KF, LA	S, SF, RV, EL, UFG	/
L37	Compel unaccompanied minors with residence permit to leave Denmark upon reaching age 18	-	Revocation	Confirmed	V, DF, KF, LA	S, SF, RV, EL, UFG	/

2009-2010: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V)

L188	Increase number of crimes for which foreigners can be expelled; allow authorities to expel asylum seekers who go on vacation in home countries	-	Revocation	Confirmed	V, DF, KF	S, SF, RV, EL	/
L87	Compel spouses seeking reunification in Denmark to take immigration test	-	Social Obligation	Confirmed	V, S, DF, SF, KF, UFG	RV, EL	/
L187	Introduction of compulsory course in Danish society and culture for residence permit-seekers; increase in waiting period for third-country nationals to receive voting rights in Denmark	-	Social Obligation  Denial of Access	Confirmed	V, S, DF, SF, KF	RV, EL	/
L81	Encourages repatriation for foreigners who do not work	+/-	Repatriation Incentive	Confirmed	V, S, DF, SF, KF	RV, EL, LA	/
L64	Allow foreign workers to access labor-related education before access to Danish education is gained	+	/	Confirmed	DF, V, KF, LA	EL	S, SF, RV

2008-2009: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, SF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V)



L174	Increase length of some entry bans; expand range of circumstances under which foreigners may be expelled	-	Denial of Access Revocation	Confirmed	<b>V, S, DF, KF</b>	SF, RV, EL, LA	/
L69	Require foreigners in Denmark on temporary stay conditions to report to police daily	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>V, DF, KF</b>	<b>S, SF, RV, EL, LA, UFG</b>	/

2007-2008: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Birthe Rønn Hornbech (V)

L132	Ease conditions under which skilled foreign workers may move to and work in Denmark	+	/	Confirmed	<b>V, DF, KF, RV, NY</b>	<b>S, SF</b>	EL
L131	Increase authors' access to residence permits	+	/	Confirmed	<b>V, DF, KF, RV, NY, S, SF</b>	/	/

2006-2007: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Rikke Hvilshøj (V)

L218	Conference of financial support in home country upon rejected asylum seekers	+/-	Repatriation Incentive	Confirmed	<b>V, DF, KF</b>	<b>S, RV, SF, EL</b>	/
L198	Increase in waiting periods for persons found to have abused the au pair scheme	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	<b>V, DF, KF, S, RV, SF, EL</b>	/	/
L93	Introduction of integration test as requirement for cash assistance and some residence permits; introduction of immigration test for spouses seeking reunification and religious figures	-	Social Obligation	Confirmed	<b>V, DF, KF</b>	<b>S, RV, SF, EL</b>	/

2005-2006: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).

Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Rikke Hvilshøj (V)

L235	Ease conditions under which Eastern Europeans can work in Denmark, in expectation of Eastern states' accession to the EU	+	/	Confirmed	V, S, KF, RV, SF	DF, EL	/
L180	Include within citizenship test questions about Danish society, history and culture	-	Social Obligation	Confirmed	V, DF, KF	S, RV, SF, EL	/
L128	Creation of "conditional expulsion" to make it easier to expel foreigners convicted of a crime in event that they commit further crimes	-	Revocation	Confirmed	V, S, DF, KF	RV, SF, EL	/
L94	Increased penalties for parents who send their children on "restoration trips" to home country at expense of child's education and integration	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	V, S, DF, KF, RV, SF	EL	/
L93	Introduction of integration contract that must be signed by foreigner with residence permit and municipality issuing that permit	-	Social Obligation	Confirmed	V, DF, KF	RV, SF, EL	S

2004-2005: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Bertel Haarder (V)

L163	Effectively confers citizenship upon 3038 persons and implies that 2064 children may acquire citizenship	+	/	Confirmed	V, S, KF, RV, SF, EL	DF	/
L79A	Increase requirement of refugees in Denmark to partake of Danish education and language learning	-	Social Obligation	Confirmed	V, S, DF, KF	RV, SF, EL	/

L79B	Provide for selection of refugees under quota system on basis of integration into Danish society	-	Social Obligation	Confirmed	V, S, DF, KF	RV, SF, EL	/
L78	Increase penalties for foreigners working illegally; increased penalties for persons found to be facilitating illegal work	-	Denial of Access	Confirmed	V, S, DF, KF	RV, SF, EL	/

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