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Analyzing the onset and resolution of nonstate conflict in the Middle East & North Africa

Emily A. Barbaro
James Madison University

Analyzing the Onset and Resolution of Nonstate Conflict in the Middle East & North Africa

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FACULTY COMMITTEE: HONORS COLLEGE APPROVAL:

Project Advisor: Keith A. Grant, Ph.D.   Bradley R. Newcomer, Ph.D.,
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science Dean, Honors College

Reader: Manal A. Jamal, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science

Reader: Jonathan W. Keller, Ph.D.
Chair, Department of Political Science

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<u>Acknowledgments</u>

<u>Abstract</u>

By applying structural-functionalist theories of deviance and opposition, this thesis deconstructs nonstate mobilization in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, the quantitative analysis interpreted both group and leader behavior in conflict situations to determine factors that influenced conflict onset and resolution. The quasipoisson regression analysis of group behavior suggested that polity and state capacity were both significant predictors of violent and nonviolent mobilization. The negative binomial regression of regime behavior suggested that civilian casualties were the most significant predictor of a government response to nonstate mobilization. Ultimately, the results suggested that the influence of regime repression on human rights was one of the most salient catalysts for nonstate mobilization in the region.

<u>Introduction</u>

In 1893, at the height of his career, Émile Durkheim published his seminal work *The Division of Labor in Society*. In it, he applied a structural-functionalist mode of thinking to attempt to explain the emergence of anomie and deviant behavior in society. He hypothesized that people in society were linked together by a collective consciousness, which he asserted acted as a unifying force that bonded a group of people together through sets of shared ideas, beliefs, and morals. This collective consciousness served to hold society together and set boundaries for what behavior was acceptable. In this model, crime was necessary to police the margins of the collective consciousness and reinforce the types of morals and beliefs that the society chose to value and abide by. Consequently, Durkheim claimed, crime and other forms of opposition in society were inevitable.

In 1918, a year after Durkheim's death, World War I ended and the former Ottoman territories that would come to comprise the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAP) were divided up by foreign powers with little knowledge of or care for traditional social, political, ethnic, or religious divisions. This significantly altered the formation of organic societies in the region and, Durkheim would argue, created the types of discord within the haphazardly constructed states that was bound to manifest as a profound disruption of the collective consciousness. The imperialist cleavages would only deepen as the region gained strategic significance due to the discovery of vast oil reserves and its geographic placement that made it an ideal route for transporting goods between the Eastern and Western hemispheres. However, because these foreign interests prevailed over local ethnic, religious, and political

customs, the region saw a rise in both violent and nonviolent expressions of factionalism and sectarianism as the realities of living within the constraints of arbitrarily drawn borders set in.

This thesis aims to use Durkheim's structural-functionalist approach to deviance to understand how the development of social and domestic factors in the region has influenced the culture of nonstate opposition and dissent. The MENAP region was chosen because of the significant resources foreign countries have invested in the region since the Cold War and the influence that has had on the development of the region's political culture. Furthermore, its legacy of authoritarianism and its current state of flux following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 present a natural experiment within which to study how different regimes respond to nonstate opposition. Figure 1.1 illustrates a hot spot analysis representing clusters of extreme *polity* scores and confirms that the MENAP region does indeed represent a statistically significant cluster of authoritarian regimes. Thus, by focusing on this region, this thesis can inform important policy decisions as well as offer insights into unresolved issues in the literature concerning the influence of a state's regime type on its experience with nonstate groups.

Figure 1.1: Hot Spot Analysis of Average Polity Score, 1945-2018[a]

Legend[b]

Polity
- Hot Spot - 99% Confidence
- Hot Spot - 95% Confidence
- Hot Spot - 90% Confidence
- Not Significant
- Cold Spot - 90% Confidence
- Cold Spot - 95% Confidence
- Cold Spot - 99% Confidence
- No Data

0 550 1,100 2,200 3,300 4,400 Miles

a.   Source: Polity IV Dataset
b.   Hot spots indicate enduring authoritarian regimes.

The main quantitative analysis will be conducted in two chapters that separately consider the behavior of nonstate groups and the behavior of state leaders in times of domestic crisis. In order to unify the interpretations of the two analysis, the overarching structural-functionalist theory of deviance proposed by Durkheim—and described at the beginning of this section—will be applied to the final conclusion drawn in the last section. Specifically, what has come to be known as the labeling theory of deviance, which posits that behavior can only violate punishable social norms when it can have a collectively agreed upon label applied to it, is used to illustrate how the roles of state and nonstate actors are connected at the initiation and resolution phases of domestic crises. This sheds light on how grievances emerge, how they are acted on, and at what point they are labeled as undesirable by society or by the government. It can also explain why governments choose to interact with some groups and not others, especially when paired with other theories—such as the radical flank effect.

Since this thesis aims to explore the phenomenon of nonstate mobilization at the region-level (as opposed to the state- or group-levels), and since the region contains multitudes of diversity in terms of domestic governance and societal structures, the most appropriate way to conduct a generalizable analysis was to explore instances of civil conflict and opposition from the perspective both of the factors that motivate nonstate groups to mobilize and the factors that motivate leaders and their governments to respond to these challenges. These analyses are presented in separate chapters as two distinct perspectives on the same core issue. The cumulative results of the analyses are meant to inform the factors that motivate opposing sides to engage with each other in order to formulate more efficient policies to mitigate and resolve

conflicts. The thesis is structured to address this issue from multiple perspectives in order to generate the most meaningful results and will thus be composed of three sections that will aim to address the issue of nonstate mobilization from a holistic perspective.

Chapter One explores the extant literature on nonstate groups in the MENAP region to establish a basic understanding of the types of groups that exist, how they gain support, and how their structures influence their engagement with the state. The chapter also highlights some variables that have been found to influence group formation that inform the analyses that are conducted in the next two chapters. Chapter Two aims to understand what motivates groups to mobilize against the state. Using a country-year analysis of trends in event occurrences, the analysis tests the effect of changes in refugee populations, a state's respect for its citizen's human rights, the type of political system present in a state, and the state's capacity to provide services and security to its people on the number of violent and nonviolent events that occur in a country per year. The results of the analysis suggests that regime type and state capacity are the most reliable predictors of nonstate mobilization, with weaker democracies being more vulnerable to violent events while stronger democracies are more prone to nonviolent events.

Chapter Three turns to the question of government response to nonstate mobilization to understand what factors motivate leaders and their governments to respond to nonstate challenges. The research analyzes 'turning points' that represent strategically significant actions by the government to shift the tide of a conflict in their favor. These include cooperative actions (agreements & nonviolent transfers of territory) and coercive actions (mass arrests or arrests of high profile rebel leaders). A country-year analysis was run to determine the effect of executive leadership turnover, regime type, civilian casualties, and changes in foreign investment on the

two dependent variables. The analysis found that civilian casualties were the most reliable predictor of both cooperative and coercive action, while increased leadership turnover only influenced cooperative action and regime type only influenced coercive action. The final section offers concluding thoughts and describes the cumulative significance of the results from Chapter Two and Chapter Three, as well as the implications for leaders and policymakers. It also offers directions for future research and a discussion of the limitations of this study.

By departing from the Durkheimian assumption that society is made of interrelated components whose actions and reactions are interconnected, this thesis aims to present the interrelated nature of opposing actors and how the onset and resolution of a civil conflict is closely tied to several domestic factors within a state. The multidisciplinary approach applied in this analysis hopes to expand on extant analytical methods by accounting for rational behavior when it arises, as well as highlight the human cost that conflict has on civilians in affected areas. It also hopes to shed light on different ways of thinking about and analyzing current trends in the conflict literature in an effort to inform better policy recommendations.

Chapter One

Despite coming to the fore of the collective consciousness after the stunning attacks of September 11th 2001, nonstate groups operating in the Middle East and North Africa had been garnering the attention of both domestic and international leaders since states began to take shape. These groups cited a wide variety of motivations for banding together and chose various methods and organizational structures to suit their goals. For example, the region saw the rise of militant Islamist groups in the wake of the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989 when *mujahideen* (holy warriors) trained by the CIA during the war were emboldened by the prospect of expanding the *jihad* they had just fought in Afghanistan to the rest of the world.[1] Not all groups are religiously motivated, however. Many nonstate groups such as those active in Palestine have political motives relevant to the ongoing conflict the Palestinian territories have been engaging in with Israel since it occupied the state in 1967.[2] Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah (Hamas), which emerged in the late-1980s as an organization aimed at providing social services and political representation to the Palestinian people while countering the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is one example of this type of organization.[3] Additionally, many nonstate groups have formed on the basis of ethnic identities, such as the nonviolent Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, which has mobilized along ethnic lines to advocate for increased rights for the Pashtun people residing in the northwestern provinces of Pakistan.[4]

It is important to note, however, that although violent groups get a lot of attention in both the media and in academic research for the strategies they deploy to achieve their goals, in order

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[1] Bearden, M. (2001). Afghanistan, graveyard of empires. *Foreign Affairs*, p. 27.
[2] Berti, B. (2015). Non-state actors as providers of governance: The Hamas government in Gaza between effective sovereignty, centralized authority, and resistance. *The Middle East Journal*, *69*(1), p. 9.
[3] Berti, "Non-state actors as providers of governance," p. 10.
[4] Yousaf, F. (2019). Pakistan's "Tribal" Pashtuns, Their "Violent" Representation, and the Pashtun *Tahafuz* Movement. *Original Research*. pp. 1-2.

to understand how this complex web of subnational actors influence national behavior it will also be necessary to investigate the influence of nonviolent nonstate groups on state stability. The successful deployment of nonviolent tactics in a region where it has been found that people view violent actions by nonstate groups as the only way to get things done[5] is an interesting phenomenon, indeed. And if the issue of stability is to be addressed in the region, an understanding of how groups such as Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party, the Islamic Action Society, and the Islamic Labor Organization[6] have been able to gain influence will be necessary to understand the larger picture.

Why some groups choose violence

One of the central questions that has plagued researchers who study nonstate groups—and an important consideration for this study to account for—concerns the motivation for some groups to turn to violence while others remain committed to solving problems through peaceful means. One of the most common theories to explain the turn to violent methods by violent groups revolves around rational choice theory and the role it plays in asymmetric conflicts.[7] As it is currently elucidated, the theory posits that nonstate groups use violence as a means to achieve a political end; however, since nonstate groups generally do not have the means to wage a full-scale war against the government of the state with which they are dissatisfied, they are forced to use methods that allow them to attack the state in a more indirect manner.[8]

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[5] Fair, C. C., Malhotra, N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2009). *The roots of militancy: Explaining support for political violence in Pakistan*. Working Paper, Princeton University. p. 4 and Shapiro, J. N., & Fair, C. C. (2010). Understanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan. *International Security*, *34*(3), p. 83.

[6] Asal, V., Schulzke, M., & Pate, A. (2016). Why do some organizations kill while others do not: An examination of Middle Eastern organizations. *Foreign Policy Analysis, 13*(4), p. 830.

[7] Caplan, B. (2006). Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model. *Public Choice, 128,* p. 105.

[8] Crenshaw, M. (2007). The logic of terrorism. *Terrorism in perspective*, *24*, p. 24; Berrebi, C. (2009). The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful? *Social*

The logic behind these types of attacks is that since they tend to be both unpredictable and destructive, the state will face domestic pressure to give in to policy changes to mitigate costs from possible future attacks.[9] This method of conflict has proven to be very effective for nonstate groups in the Middle East, as it allows them to avoid protracted civil war-like conflicts with states—which could be very costly and detrimental to the weaker group in the long run—while still helping the group achieve its goals. Studies such as Pape (2003) have supported this theory by illustrating the efficacy of suicide bombing attacks at achieving a nonstate group's policy goals in civil war settings.[10] Therefore, this strategy serves both to improve the group's legitimacy and credibility in the state in which it is operating.[11] Additionally, by creating fear in the populace through the use of sporadic violence, nonstate groups are also able to maintain a degree of control over the population in the state in which they are active which ultimately helps to expand their influence over the government in the target country.[12]

Thus, considering the ease with which violent groups are able to exert and maintain influence over both the people and the government, why do some groups choose to remain nonviolent? And how are they able to achieve success without being able to exert the same coercive methods as violent groups? Although the body of literature that seeks to answer these questions remains small, many interesting trends have already begun to emerge from the extant research. For example, Abrahms (2006) highlighted many of the areas where much of the "rational choice" research on violence fell short and how those results painted a very different

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Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together, p. 193; and Anderton, C. H., & Carter, J. R. (2005). On rational choice theory and the study of terrorism. *Defense and Peace Economics*, *16*(4), p. 275.

[9] Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. *International security*, *31*(1), p. 49.

[10] Pape, R. A. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review, 97*(3), p. 351.

[11] Kydd & Walter, "The strategies of terrorism," p. 51.

[12] Kydd & Walter, "The strategies of terrorism," p. 50.

picture about the efficacy of violent strategies.[13] Abrahms conceded that state strength did influence the efficacy of violence as a means to achieve political goals; however, he pointed out that extant research largely ignored that most had the capacity to respond to sporadic violence perpetrated by nonstate groups for long enough to prevent weak groups from waging consistent (and, therefore, significantly destructive) attacks.[14] Moreover, after analyzing actions taken by twenty-eight groups that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department, Abrahms found that when nonstate groups employed violent tactics against civilians it significantly decreased their chances of achieving government concessions—regardless of what their policy objectives were.[15]

In addition, according to Chenoweth & Stephan (2008) nonviolent methods tend to be inherently more favorable for attrition for two main reasons. The first being that nonviolent groups tend to be viewed as more legitimate both in the domestic and international arenas, which aids them in garnering more widespread participation.[16] Second, whereas terrorist and other violent nonstate groups are viewed as having more extremist views that necessitate harsh government responses, nonviolent groups are viewed as more moderate, which makes them a more appealing prospect for negotiations and concessions.[17] In sum, nonviolence has been found to be effective due to its ability to engender both widespread support in both the domestic and international arena, as well as for its high success rate in achieving concessions through negotiations with the state government.

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[13] Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. *International Security*, *31*(2), p. 43.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2008). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. *International security*, *33*(1) pp. 8-9.
[17] Chenoweth & Stephan, "Why civil resistance works," p. 9.

These arguments have also stood up to quantitative scrutiny, with studies finding that factors like democratic government and its associated characteristics—such as independent judiciaries, lack of corruption, and the rule of law—were positively correlated to state stability.[18] However, other researchers have found the autocratic regimes are better equipped to ensure the stability of their states due to the repressive mechanisms at their disposal that allow them to suppress dissent before it can evolve into violent opposition.[19] Conjointly, analyzing the states capability to maintain relatively stable conditions during conflict has also proven to be enlightenighting. For example, crisis duration,[20] number of opposing actors,[21] and conflict incidence[22] have all been found to influence state stability.

Nonstate groups and the people

Nonstate mobilization is not unique to the MENAP region. Expressing discontent with the state has been the natural antithesis to the consolidation of power characteristic of the Westphalian system. In the Middle East, many groups have emerged in so-called 'ungoverned spaces'—spaces outside of the authority of the central government either as a result of state incapacity, war, or historical opposition to outside rule—to provide political representation, social services, and safety to the people they have charged themselves with representing.[23] For example, militant nonstate groups have gained significant support in Pakistan for their ability to

[18] DeRouen, K., & Goldfinch, S. (2012). What makes a state stable and peaceful? Good governance, legitimacy and legal-rationality matter even more for low-income countries. *Civil Wars, 14*(4), pp. 509-512.

[19] Peksen, D., & Lounsbery, M. (2012). Beyond the target state: Foreign military intervention and neighboring state stability. *International Interactions, 38*(3), p. 366.

[20] Mishali-Ram, M. (2009). Powerful actors make a difference: Theorizing power attributes of nonstate actors. *International Journal of Peace Studies, 14*(2), p. 67.

[21] Mishali-Ram, "Powerful actors make a difference," p. 68.

[22] Rudolfsen, I. (2017). State capacity, inequality and inter-group violence in sub-Saharan Africa: 1989–2011. *Civil Wars, 19*(2), p. 135.

[23] Baylouny, A. M. (2010). Authority outside the State, Non-State Actors and New Institutions in the Middle East. p. 137.

affect change in a country whose political system struggles with poor government-civilian relationship and rampant corruption amongst government officials.[24] Moreover, by offering social services and aid to the people (most notably in the wake of the devastating 2010 floods), Pakistan's nonstate groups have been able to further delegitimize the government and grow support for their militant agendas.[25]

The strategy of using humanitarian aid as a means of gaining favor with the people by violent nonstate groups is a common strategy that is not unique to groups in Pakistan. In fact, it has been recorded as having been successfully deployed by groups in Syria,[26] Lebanon,[27] and Palestine[28] as well. In addition to providing relief and bureaucratic services, these violent nonstate groups can also gain favor with the people by offering them security, as was seen in Palestine,[29] Lebanon,[30] and Afghanistan.[31] Highlighting the function that these groups play in the respective countries adds important context to the analysis of the influence of nonstate groups on the stability of the Middle East, as it illustrates the fact that most groups could not survive by solely attacking the government. Indeed, they require the broader support of the people to

[24] Constable, P (2011). Playing with Fire. Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. Loc. 65 and Shapiro & Fair, "Understanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan," p. 83.

[25] Shapiro & Fair, "Understanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan," p. 92 & Constable, "Playing with Fire," Loc. 216.

[26] Podder, S. (2014). Mainstreaming the non-state in bottom-up state-building: Linkages between rebel governance and post-conflict legitimacy. *Conflict, Security & Development, 14*(2), p. 236.

[27] DeVore, M. R., & Stähli, A. B. (2015). Explaining Hezbollah's effectiveness: Internal and external determinants of the rise of violent non-state actors. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *27*(2), p. 332.

[28] Grynkewich, A. G. (2008). Welfare as warfare: How violent non-state groups use social services to attack the state. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, *31*(4), p. 350.

[29] Berti, B., & Gutiérrez, B. (2016). Rebel-to-political and back? hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion, politics, and governance. *Democratization, 23*(6), p. 1060.

[30] Hazbun, W. (2016). Assembling security in a 'weak state': the contentious politics of plural governance in Lebanon since 2005. *Third World Quarterly*, *37*(6), p. 1058.

[31] Schetter, C., Glassner, R., & Karokhail, M. (2007). Beyond warlordism: the local security architecture in Afghanistan. *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2*, p. 142.

achieve their goals and one way to garner that support is through illuminating the ways in which the government has failed the people by filling in those gaps.

Similarly, nonviolent groups also attempt to gain favor with the people by offering them necessary services that the government may have been struggling to provide. As was mentioned above, when this strategy is deployed by nonviolent groups it tends to help them gain widespread support from both the local and international communities, as their views are seen to be more moderate and their goals more worthy of concession.[32] It is also important to note that the areas in which violent and nonviolent groups operate tend to overlap. Therefore, there can be areas where violent and nonviolent groups both provide services to the people while having vastly different reasons for doing so. Violent groups, for example, may provide services to the people as a means to coerce them, while nonviolent groups may do so as a means to provide mutual aid to an underserved population.[33] Nonviolent groups have also been known to provide supplemental services to areas that are neglected by both violent groups and the government.[34] These can include forming political parties or other politically-motivated activism or advocacy groups, groups that seek to promote ethnic and cultural preservation, and religious groups that offer aid and support to marginalized and disaster-stricken groups.[35]

Although nonstate groups—whether violent or nonviolent—serve to satisfy some of the same functions for the people, it is important to understand the different motivations that drive the behaviors that nonstate actors exhibit in attempting to garner the support of the people, as it can help to explain why violent groups can gain such widespread support relative to nonviolent

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[32] Chenoweth & Stephan, "Why civil resistance works," p. 9.
[33] Baylouny, A. M. (2010). Authority outside the State, Non-State Actors and New Institutions in the Middle East. p. 137.
[34] Baylouny, "Authority outside the State," p. 137.
[35] Asal, Schulzke, & Pate, "Why do some organizations kill while others do not" p. 813.

groups. In addition, it also suggests that nonviolent groups have the potential to gain widespread

success if the factors that influence support for violent groups—such as poverty,[36] material

deprivation,[37] and repression[38]—are mitigated. In the next section, the relationship between

nonstate groups and the state will be explored further with the aim of illustrating how vital these

groups are to the political ecosystem of the Middle East, for better or for worse.

Nonstate groups and the state

Especially of interest to this thesis is the relationship that nonstate groups have to the

state (in terms of how the state responds to actions taken by groups), and how these relationships

influence the stability of the region as a whole. When exploring the relationship nonstate groups

have to the state, it is important to understand how these groups form not only to serve their own

interests but to fill a void left by the state. Although this point has already been touched on in this

literature review, it is important to emphasize that the MENAP region has always functioned in

ways that are reflective both of its peoples' conception of administrative subdivisions, as well as

in ways that have been hindered or benefitted by foreign intervention. With this in mind, in order

to understand why nonstate groups proliferate, it is important to remember the societal role many

of them play as providers of security, services, and governance in areas of reduced governmental

authority. It is also important to consider the factors that have allowed these ungoverned spaces

to emerge and the role that has played in setting the current landscape in the region.

The previous sections of this literature review have attempted to shed light on how both

violent and nonviolent nonstate groups function both in the context of their relations with the

target state's government, as well as with its people. Similarities in approaches have also been

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[36] Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American political science review*, *97*(1), p. 88.

[37] Agnew, R. (2010). A general strain theory of terrorism. *Theoretical Criminology*, *14*(2), p. 132.

[38] Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative politics*, *13*(4), p. 384.

explored, such as the strategic deployment of humanitarian aid as either a means of coercion or as a means of addressing an area where government response is otherwise lacking. Furthermore, since many violent and nonviolent groups tend to occupy similar roles in the political ecosystem of the Middle East, establishing a better understanding of where in the group formation process the two types of groups divert could aid in minimizing (and possibly eradicating) the continuing influence of violent nonstate groups on the stability of the Middle East.

This question is especially relevant for foreign policymakers who have a long history of attempting to implement policies in the region that have seemingly backfired in the long run. This thesis aims to show how the historically decentralized nature necessitates the existence of nonstate groups in the region, but that with an understanding of how these groups are formed, how they recruit, and how they interact with the state, the people and each other, the U.S. can begin to implement policies that are able to affect change in the region in a more comprehensive manner. A common notion about the Middle East shared by most Westerners is that the region is homogenous and that "one-size-fits-all" policies can be applied to the region; however, the existence of all these competing groups illustrates that the decentralized nature of the region is something that requires special attention and care by policymakers if they truly intend on realizing their vision for progress in the Middle East.

<u>Chapter Two</u>

In the 2000s, a dormant insurgent group reemerged in the Balochistan province of Pakistan. The Baloch people had had a long tumultuous history with various governing powers that had exercised authority over the mountainous western region west of the Indus River since the age of British colonial rule up through Pakistan's current federalist system of governmental administration.[39] Accounts vary on when the current iteration of the group known as the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) reemerged,[40] but scholars agree that the coup of 1999 and the radical political shift that followed served as important catalysts in exacerbating existing Baloch grievances while simultaneously sparking new ones.[41]

There were several unique factors that reemerged in the early 2000s that led to the mobilization of the BLF. The first of these was the significant shift towards authoritarianism Following the 1999 coup that facilitated the ascension of Pervez Musharraf to the office of president, which was fundamentally incompatible with the leftist ideology of the new BLF movement.[42] Moreover, the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2003 increased the already large share of Afghan refugees in the western tribal regions of Pakistan, which already had a long history of accepting temporary laborers from the across the relatively Porous Afghanistan border; however, the areas were ill-equipped to sustain the permanent settlement of the Afghan refugees, which lead to an increase in ethnic and separatist attacks.[43] Additionally, the early 2000s saw the intensified exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources, most notably through a

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[39] Bansal, A. (2008). Factors leading to insurgency in Balochistan. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19*(2), p. 184.
[40] Some (like the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation) place the origin of the group at 2000, while others, like Bansal (2008) claim the group emerged in or around 2003.
[41] Khan, A. (2009). Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan, Pakistan: The Militarized State and Continuing Economic Deprivation. *Asian Survey, 49*(6), p. 1078.
[42] Bansal, "Factors leading to insurgency in Balochistan," p. 185.
[43] Borthakur, A. (2017). Afghan Refugees: The Impact on Pakistan. *Asian Affairs, 48*(3), p. 498.

bilateral agreement between Pakistan and China to build a port in Gwadar that would have limited the Baloch people's ability to sustain their economy based on fishing.[44] Although the plans were ultimately abandoned, a new bilateral agreement between China and Pakistan to build an economic correction to connect Eastern China to the Indian Ocean by way of Gwadar, which the BLF sees as another government strategy to subvert the territorial autonomy of the province.

These novel issues that emerged alongside the rise of the Musharraf regime exacerbated existing issues that underpinned the grievances of previous iterations of the Balochi nationalist movement. The most pressing of which was the socioeconomic marginalization of the residents of Balochistan by the federal government. Despite being the one of the largest and most resource rich areas in the country, it was also the poorest, least educated, and least developed of any other Pakistani province.[45] In addition, despite the number of major infrastructure projects that have taken place in the geographically strategic region to facilitate access to natural resources and transnational trade routes, the Baloch people have been left out of the planning process and have seen little of the economic benefit of these projects that were meant to ameliorate some of the worst developmental conditions in south Asia.[46] This issue was especially contentious due to the disproportionate level resource extraction in the region with the benefits not seen by its people. These issues can all be traced back to the lack of representation of Baloch people in the Pakistani bureaucracy, which remains one of the most enduring grievances cited by the BLF.[47] Despite hailing from the largest province in the country, they were disproportionately underrepresented in the military, the federal government, and other political positions.

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[44] Khan, "Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan," p. 1079.
[45] Khan, "Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Balochistan," p. 1074.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Bansal, "Factors leading to insurgency in Balochistan," p. 185.

Although this anecdote only represents one out of a multitude of possible cases of nonstate group mobilization, it highlights some variables that previous research has identified as common catalysts for nonstate mobilization and helps to introduce the main research question this chapter seeks to answer; namely: which domestic factors can best predict a rise in the number of nonstate groups that choose to engage in deviant behavior? This issue will form the basis of this chapter's analysis, which will analyze country-year event trends to understand how domestic factors influence the expression of opposition and dissent by both armed and peaceful nonstate groups. The chapter will proceed as follows: The first section will supplement the extant literature presented in Chapter One with specific research that will support the theoretical framework, which will be presented in section two. Section three will describe the research design for the empirical analysis. Section four will describe the results of that analysis, and the final section will include a discussion of implications of the results.

Literature

The analysis in this chapter will largely be guided by the labeling theory of crime and delinquency that emerged from the neo-Marxist school of thought. This school of thought conceived of delinquency as a byproduct of society and the collective identity it engendered in its members. Labeling theory, which emerged from the social structural school of thought revolutionized by Émile Durkeim and forms the basis of this thesis's understanding of the motivation of groups to mobilize, posits that deviant behavior is the product of the negative label imposed on it by society and is largely informed by the power structures that exist within societies to suppress opposition.[48] Because of the theory's power to explain how governments

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[48] Moore, M., & Morris, M. B. (2011). Political Science Theories of Crime and Delinquency. *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 21*, p. 290.

(especially authoritarian ones) relate to their citizens, some political science scholars have adopted it to explain the emergence of conflicts in society.[49] Likewise, this thesis had adopted this theory to guide the research presented here in order to help explain both the emergence of nonstate groups as well as the differential government response to the opposition these groups present.

In addition to understanding how societies make sense of criminal behavior through labeling theory, this chapter will also be guided by the theory of the radical flank effect. This theory, which was pioneered by Herbert Haines in 1984, is used to describe the influence of radical members of an organization on that organization's more moderate members, especially as it relates to a group's tactics and goals.[50] Social science researchers have also used the theory to understand why violent and nonviolent groups emerge in similar contexts—especially when they are attempting to achieve the same goals.[51] Most importantly, the radical flank effect can also determine how governments interact with groups through positive and negative mechanisms that serve to condition how deviant behavior will be treated by the authoritative power. Positive radical flank mechanisms emerge when radical and moderate groups coexist in the same context. These situations tend to benefit nonviolent movements, which are seen as less radical and therefore more worthy of governmental concessions than their more radical counterparts.[52] Conversely, negative radical mechanisms emerge when the nonstate field is dominated by radical

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[49] See, example, Shoemaker, D. J. (2005). *Theories of delinquency: An examination of explanations of delinquent behavior.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

[50] See, for example, Schock, K., & Demetriou, C. (2019). Nonviolent and Violent Trajectories in Social Movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, H. Kriesi, & H. J. McCammon (Eds.) *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (2nd Ed. pp. 338-353). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. and Tompkins, E. (2015). A quantitative reevaluation of radical flank effects within nonviolent campaigns. *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change, 38*, p. 103-135.

[51] Tompkins, "A quantitative reevaluation of radical flank effects within nonviolent campaigns," p. 108.

[52] Schock & Demetriou, "Nonviolent and Violent Trajectories in Social Movements," p. 347.

groups whose goals and strategies are too incompatible with those of the government. This typically results in the repression of all opposition and makes it difficult for future campaigns to be successful.[53] The influence of this effect illustrates how some forms of deviance can come to be rewarded while others can come to bear even more social stigma. This carries significant influence for how a state's domestic opposition is formed, how active it is, and how successful it can ultimately hope to be.

Organizational structure is also influenced by the goals of a campaign, although these structures are defined differently depending on the strategies of the group (in terms of whether they use violence or not). Schlichte (2009) outlined three mechanisms that prompted the emergence of armed nonstate groups with an emphasis on the domestic factors that triggered these mechanisms.[54] According to Schlichte, the *ad hoc mechanism* of group formation occurs when certain members of neo-patrimonial populations feel that they are being excluded by patron-client networks, causing violent rebellion.[55] The *mechanism of repression* is activated when a group of people experience governmental repression, leading their political opposition to evolve into armed action. Armed groups that come into being through the *mechanism of repression* carry the important distinction of being led by politicians as opposed to military personnel and typically begin as nonviolent oppositions that *become* violent as a result of their repression.[56] Finally, the *spin-off mechanism* is witnessed when a group initially under government control goes rogue and seeks to achieve their own agendas.[57]

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[53] Schock & Demetriou, "Nonviolent and Violent Trajectories in Social Movements," p. 347.
[54] Schlichte, K. (2009). With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups. *Contemporary Security Policy, 30*(2), p. 246.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Schlichte, "With the State against the State?" p. 246.
[57] Ibid.

Since nonviolent groups tend to coalesce around a desire for societal change, the most popular metrics of organizational structure tend to be anchored in the size of the social movement. In order to standardize and quantify this metric, many researchers have typically followed the dichotomous framework set forth by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) that categorizes campaigns based on the breadth of their goals.[58] On the one hand, there are *maximalist* campaigns, which are defined by their "demand for a radical reshaping of the existing political order," and include three major catalysts: demands for regime change, anti-occupation movements, and self-determination campaigns.[59] Conversely, *reformist* campaigns encompass movements aimed at affecting drastic policy changes but do not otherwise attempt to alter the status quo.[60] *Reformist* campaigns include those that advocate for worker's rights, women's rights, environmental protection policies, and other such issues that generally can be resolved without a dramatic restructuring of the (geo)political landscape. *Maximalist* and *reformist* campaigns are also generally distinguished by the level of involvement the campaign is able to achieve, with *maximalist* campaigns being characterized by those that can exceed 1,000 participants.[61] Developing and abiding by such a framework is especially useful when comparing violent and nonviolent groups as it allows for the selection of enduring nonviolent nonstate (i.e. *maximalist*) groups for a more accurate comparison to enduring violent nonstate groups.

These theories and categorizations each help to describe what this chapter hopes to illustrate through this analysis: that opposition and resistance are socially conditioned and that condition affects how a group organizes and mobilizes. Through this framework, the notion that

[58] Chenoweth, E., & Lewis, O. (2013). Unpacking nonviolent campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. *Journal of Peace Research, 50*(3), p. 419.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.

the MENAP represents a socially monolithic entity will further be challenged by illustrating how a state's domestic factors influence how its citizens view the government and each other. This will provide an explanation for variation at the group- and state-levels for variations in country-year event trends that will ultimately inform how the results of the quantitative analysis should be interpreted.

Theoretical Framework

Transnational migration has long interested conflict scholars for its ability to predict conflict diffusion. The idea that refugees provided a causal mechanism for this diffusion was first described by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), who proposed that the clustered patterns of conflict witnessed in certain regions could be explained by the constant transnational flow of refugees moving between warring countries.[62] The authors' propositions that fluctuations in a state's refugee population—either as a result of the refugee population's direct engagement in hostilities against the host government or as a result of violence directed at them—could increase the chance of conflict onset in countries that hosted a large share of refugees from neighboring countries found empirical support as a mechanism of conflict diffusion.[63] Studies have also confirmed empirical links between flows of forcibly displaced populations and international conflict between sending and receiving states, as receiving states attempt to stem the flow of additional refugees across their borders.[64]

At the time Salehyan and Gleditsch published their study, they noted the perils that refugees escaping conflict faced and acknowledged that not all refugees had violent intentions

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[62] Salehyan, I., & Gleditsch, K.S. (2006). Refugees and the Spread of Civil War. *International Organization, 60*(2), p. 338.
[63] Salehyan & Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," p. 360.
[64] Salehyan, I. (2008). The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science, 52*(4), p. 798.

when traveling to host countries.[65] In addition, they cautioned against implementing harsh and restrictive immigration policies to minimize the threat of violence, citing the counterproductive nature of forcing innocent bystanders to continue to live in a context where viable opportunities quickly become engulfed by the opposing sides of a conflict.[66] From this more sympathetic strand of conflict literature, studies have emerged that have acknowledged the trend between refugee flows and conflict onset described by Salehyan and Gleditsch and attempted to clarify the causal mechanism that appears to be at play. Some studies have focused on the directionality of violence and have emphasized the disproportionality of violence perpetrated *against* refugees as opposed to violence perpetrated *by* refugees.[67] In particular, studies have found that leaders who use refugee populations as political scapegoats are more likely to invite harm to be committed against their refugee populations.[68]

Similarly, another study aimed at providing nuance to Salehyan and Gleditsch's results found that, more often, refugees engaged in conflict with nonstate actors as opposed to state actors.[69] The results of this study were also predicated on a state's capacity to mitigate the impact of refugee flows on the host country's society, with their results indicating that weaker states were less capable of preventing nonstate groups from engaging refugees in conflict.[70] The sum of the results presented on refugees thus suggests that population changes do, in fact, inspire nonstate groups to mobilize. However, they also seem to indicate that measuring this

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[65] Salehyan & Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," p. 339.
[66] Salehyan & Gleditsch, "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War," p. 361.
[67] Savun, B., & Gineste, C. (2019). From protection to persecution: Threat environment and refugee scapegoating. *Journal of Peace Research, 56*(1), pp. 88.
[68] Savun & Gineste, "From protection to persecution," p. 98.
[69] Böhmelt, T., Bove, V., & Gleditsch, K.S. (2018). Blame the victims? Refugees, state capacity, and non-state actor violence. *Journal of Peace Research, 56*(1), p. 74.
[70] Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch, "Blame the victims?" p. 84.

mobilization at the 'event' level as opposed to the 'conflict' level would be more prudent in light of the studies indicating that refugees are more often victims of violence that may not be recorded as organized conflict.

Hypothesis 1a: As the number of refugees increases in a country,
the number of violent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.

Hypothesis 1b: As the number of refugees increases in a country,
the number of nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.

Especially relevant to the region's recent history is the influence of human rights abuses on nonstate group formation and activity. Indeed, Stammers (1999) implored researchers to recognize the significance of the link between human rights abuses and the impetus of a population to act.[71] By using existing theories about human rights discourses, Stammers suggests that since the Enlightenment era, social movements have demonstrated the ability to challenge the status quo by challenging the power structures surrounding the presiding regime.[72] Rickford (2019) also illustrates the unifying force of human rights discourses in his essay detailing the history of the support of the Palestinian people's struggle for freedom and liberation by Black activists. He posits that Black activists shifted their support away from Zionists—who they believed were similarly situated to them prior to the conclusion of the Second World War—after they began employing the same colonial strategies against the indigenous Palestinians that Black activists had been protesting.[73] The increased levels of globalization and solidarity evidenced by

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[71] Stammers, N. (1999). Social movements and the social construction of human rights. *Human Rights Quarterly, 21*(4)*, p. 980.
[72] Stammers, "Social movements and the social construction of human rights," p. 989.
[73] Rickford, R. (2019). "To Build a New World": Black American Internationalism and Palestine Solidarity. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 48*(4), p. 52.

Stammers and Rickford offer creedence to extant hypotheses that maximalist campaigns—such as those that revolve around abuses of human rights—require broad bases of support to succeed.

The effects of human rights abuses were also potent during the Arab Spring uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, as well. Although many factors contributed to the spread of the revolutionary fervor throughout the region, most scholars agree that desires for basic human rights and democratic governance ultimately played the biggest role in sustaining the protests and fueling their spread.[74] As Nuruzzaman (2013) asserts, repression of human rights was an especially vital tool for the authoritarian regimes in the MENAP region, which claimed strong rulers were necessary for maintaining social and political stability in a post-colonial environment.[75] Empirical evidence of repression as a motivating factor for mass resistance was also found by Chenoweth and Stephan (2008), whose study supported the connection between repression and civil resistance.[76] Although theoretical links exist between repression and violent group formation, the empirical evidence for a correlation between the two is less established for violent groups than it is for nonviolent groups.[77] One theoretical explanation for this observation, proposed by several researchers, suggests that weak states that do not have a monopoly on the use of force to silence dissent will experience the rise of more violent nonstate groups.[78] Thus, consistent human rights abuses by a country's regime would be expected to be met with high levels of nonviolent resistance.

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[74] Nuruzzaman, M. (2013). Human Security and the Arab Spring. *Strategic Analysis, 37*(1), p. 58.

[75] Nuruzzaman, "Human Security and the Arab Spring," p. 58.

[76] Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2008). Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security, 33*(1), p. 41.

[77] Schlichte, "With the State against the State?" p. 246.

[78] Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review, 97*(1), p. 85.

H2a: As human rights abuses increase in a country,
violent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.

H2b: As human rights abuses increase in a country,
nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.

Although several studies have found that a state's regime influenced the emergence of nonstate groups, the regime type itself has consistently been found to have a differing influence on a group's decision to utilize violent means. Despite some disagreement,[79] the consensus was that democracies generally witnessed the emergence of more violent groups than autocracies.[80] Possible explanations for this phenomenon include the barriers democracies face to harshly repress violent groups as well as their relative willingness to negotiate with them.[81] Other research cited the participatory nature or democracies along with other key features of the system—such as rule of law, free and fair elections, and accountability—as possible explanations for the lack of correlation between democracies and violent challenges to state authority.[82] Others offered middle-ground explanations for the relationship between regime type and emergence of violent groups by suggesting that it was not necessarily democracies but anocracies that were victimized by nonstate violence (regimes that were somewhere in between democracy and autocracy).[83] This explanation used an anocratic regime's ineptitude with both democratic constraints (e.g. competing political factions) and autocratic features (e.g. violent repression) to account for its inability to suppress violent groups.

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[79] Savun, B., & Philips, B. J. (2009). Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53*(6)*,* p. 887.

[80] Eubank, W., & Weinberg, L. (2001). Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 13*(1), p. 161.

[81] Agnew, R. (2010). A general strain theory of terrorism. *Theoretical Criminology, 14*(2), p. 144.

[82] Savun & Phillips, "Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism," p. 881.

[83] Fearon & Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," p. 85.

However, the debate from security scholars seemed to be largely ignorant of the duality of violence. That is to say, for a violent campaign to have emerged a nonviolent campaign did not. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) addressed this discrepancy in their groundbreaking comparative study of the emergence of different types of social movements, which led them to discover that most nonviolent movements tended to emerge in countries with enduring authoritarian regimes whereas most violent movements emerged in weaker, more democratic countries.[84] Their study was one of the first to compare violent and nonviolent resistance movements and offered valuable insights into why violence and nonviolence tended to be deployed in different 'environments.' However, this does not match the pattern we see in the MENAP, which emphasizes the need for a region-specific analysis of nonstate group behavior. Moreover, because the states in the Middle East generally provide for large segments of the population through social welfare programs, most grievances tend to be with the exclusionary neo-patrimonial system as opposed to other aspects of authoritarian regimes.[85]

H3a: As a state's polity score increases, it will experience
more violent events initiated by nonstate groups in that country.

H3b: As a state's polity score decreases, it will experience
more nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups in that country.

A final factor that influences the behavior of both violent and nonviolent groups is state capacity. State capacity refers to a state's ability to both provide services to its citizens while also exercising a monopoly over the legitimate use of force as a means to maintain public safety. It is often used as a measure to distinguish "weak" states from "strong" ones. As with the research presented on regime type, studies analyzing state capacity found that nonviolent movements

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[84] Chenoweth & Lewis, "Unpacking nonviolent campaigns," p. 421.
[85] Goldstone, J. A. (2011). Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern Autocracies. *Foreign Affairs, 90*(3), pp. 9-10.

tended to emerge in strong states that could repress them (because they were able to mobilize enough of the population to successfully challenge the regime),[86] whereas violent movements emerged in weak states that were unable to suppress a challenge to their authority.[87] Studies of state capacity have also expanded beyond governmental ability to respond to security challenges and have begun to account for other matters of government incapability that affect the broader population, as well. From this perspective, states with low capacities are often viewed as unable to effectively provide services, govern, or provide security to their people. Although there are many cases where service provision through voluntary action is deployed in benign ways (as evidenced in the discussion of responses to displaced people in Jordan), it has also been well documented that violent groups can use such methods to manipulate public opinion and highlight the shortcomings of the government.[88] In addition, if a government is unable to function effectively or if parts of the country are consistently ignored, it is more likely that the state will witness the emergence of groups seeking to fill that void.[89]

An especially poignant example of a nonstate group exploiting 'weak' states through the provision of services and governance could be seen with the rapid ascension to power of the Islamic State organization (ISIS). The organization was able to establish itself and thrive in parts of northern Iraq and eastern Syria as a result of weakened governments and wars in both countries.[90] The organization was also able to garner support from the residents of the territory it

[86] Chenoweth & Lewis, "Unpacking nonviolent campaigns," p. 421.
[87] Fearon & Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," p. 85.
[88] Fine, G. A., Linick, S. A., & Barr, A. C. (2019). *Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress*, p. 42; Constable, P. (2011). *Playing with Fire: Pakistan at War with Itself.* New York: Random House, Loc. 213; and Grynkewich, A. G. (2008). Welfare as warfare: How violent non-state groups use social services to attack the state. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31*(4), p. 350.
[89] Brandt, M. (2017). *Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict.* New York: Oxford University Press, Loc. 3214-3227.
[90] Tamimi, A. (2015). The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence. *Perspectives on Terrorism, 9*(4), p. 119.

conquered by providing governance and other services to people in areas that had been beyond government purview as a result of years of compounding domestic factors. By establishing committees to oversee basic social services such as electricity supply, waste disposal, health spending, and education, ISIS was able to establish itself as a more capable provider of governance to the people under its jurisdiction than the internationally recognized governments in the countries it held territory in.[91] However, despite having lost its last territorial claim in March 2019, the organization was able to continue exploiting the poor security situations in both Iraq and Syria in ways that led the Inspector General for the American Combined Joint Task Force on Operation Inherent Resolve (the name given U.S. military operation against ISIS in Iraq and Syria) to draw attention to the group's continued ability to exploit the diminished capacities of the states in which it was operating.[92]

Similarly, the situation that prompted the onset in 2014 of (and subsequently fueled) the Libyan Civil War was the exponential rise of independent militias seeking to establish themselves as security providers in the wake of the country's Arab Spring revolution in 2011, which resulted in the assassination of its embattled leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and the overthrow of his regime.[93] Indeed, General Khalifa Haftar,[94] whose Libyan National Army waged an assault against the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord, established his claim to power on the basis of his ability to unite local militias against the threat ISIS posed to the country

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[91] Tamimi, "The Evolution in Islamic State Administration," p. 123.

[92] Fine, Linick, & Barr, *Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress*, p. 8.

[93] Jeursen, T., & van der Borgh, C. (2014). Security Provision after Regime Change: Local Militias and Political Entities in Post-Qaddafi Tripoli. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 8*(2-3), p. 179.

[94] General Khalifa Haftar has lived an interesting and controversial life prior to his involvement in the Libyan Civil War. The *Financial Times* provides an informative profile of how those experiences got him to where he is today: https://www.ft.com/content/65cbac26-5d04-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a and the *New Yorker* wrote an insightful piece on the role he played in the events that shaped Libya since Muammar Qaddafi was assissinated in 2011: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/23/unravelling

between 2011 and 2014.[95] He positioned himself as the ultimate security provider, able to bring peace and stability to a country that was neither in favor of the authoritarianism they had just abandoned, nor the democracy that had been imposed on them by the United Nations.[96] In light of these examples it is thus hypothesized that if a state cannot protect itself from attacks, nor operate efficiently and effectively, it should experience more activity from nonstate groups than more capable states.

H4a: As a state's capacity decreases, violent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.

H4a: As a state's capacity increases, nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.

Research Design

The goal of this chapter is to understand the circumstances under which nonstate group activity is most prevalent. Specifically, this research aims to understand how domestic factors influence group behavior by conducting a country-year analysis of 22 countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia from 1997 to 2018 (Table 2.1). The parameters of the MENAP region were primarily set by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) with the exception of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are rightfully coded as being part of South Asia. However, the decision to include them was made based on their geopolitical relevance to the greater MENAP region and to increase the sample size of events.

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[95] Fasanotti, F. S. (2019). **With Haftar attacking Tripoli, the US needs to re-engage on Libya.** Retrieved from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/25/with-haftar-attacking-tripoli-the-us-needs-to-re-engage-on-libya/
[96] The Economist (2019). **A Western-backed deal to salvage Libya is falling apart.** Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/11/18/a-western-backed-deal-to-salvage-libya-is-falling-apart & Trew, B. (2019). **'There Will Be Bloodshed if He Comes Here.'** Retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/08/libya-serraj-unity-government-civil-war/

The temporal scope of the study is also dictated by the ACLED data, which extends back to 1997 in North Africa and up to 2016 in most of the Middle East, as shown in Table 2.1.[97] The ACLED dataset was chosen primarily due to its currency (data for this study ended in early September 2019), as well as for its thoroughness in tracking both violent and nonviolent events across most of the globe. Observations in the dataset are based on news reports of events and each event is coded to include data on the type of event, the type of actor who perpetrated and was affected by the action, and the location of the event, making it very useful for analyzing changes to group behavior.

Table 2.1: List of Countries and Available ACLED Data Years

Country	Years	Country	Years
Afghanistan	2017 – 2019	Morocco	1997 – 2019
Algeria	1997 – 2019	Oman	2016 – 2019
Bahrain	2016 – 2019	Pakistan	2010 – 2019
Egypt	1997 – 2019	Qatar	2017 & 2019
Iran	2016 – 2019	Saudi Arabia	2015 – 2019
Iraq	2016 – 2019	Sudan	1997 – 2019
Israel	2016 – 2019	Syria	2017 – 2019
Jordan	2016 – 2019	Tunisia	1997 – 2019
Kuwait	2016 – 2019	Turkey	2016 – 2019
Lebanon	2016 – 2019	United Arab Emirates	2017 – 2019
Libya	1997 – 2019	Yemen	2015 – 2019

Source: ACLED

Dependent Variable

As observations in the ACLED data are predicated on the occurrence of an event, the dependent variable in this section will be *number of events.* According to the ACLED, an event "involves a designated actor … [and] occurs at a specific named location … on a specific day."[98] The ACLED codes for six different types of events: battles; explosions and remote violence;

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[97] Although the ACLED dataset logs data for Palestine, unfortunately other data sources largely did not. This caused the Palestinian cases to be dropped from the regression model when it was run due to its missing values, effectively removing it from the sample. As such, it is not being counted as part of the sample here.

[98] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. (2019). Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Code book, p. 6. Available from ACLED website: https://www.acleddata.com/resources/general-guides/

violence against civilians; protests, riots; and strategic developments.[99] The aim of this chapter is to determine what prompts deviant behavior in a society generally; however, since the research discussed in the previous section firmly established that violent and nonviolent groups were motivated by different factors and arose in different contexts, the codes were split into two dummy variables to differentiate violent events (battles, explosions and remote violence, violence against civilians, and riots) from nonviolent events (protests).

The resulting variables accounted for violent or nonviolent events perpetrated only by nonstate actors in the region and time period of interest. Government actions were excluded in this chapter in order to ensure that the analysis was accounting only for the change in nonstate group behavior and the variables that could possibly predict it. In addition, the strategic development event coding was excluded from this analysis because it encompassed both violent and nonviolent subevents that were more characteristics of turning points in a conflict than of increased or decreased nonstate group mobilization generally. Strategic developments and government actions will both be explored in more depth in the following chapter.

Explanatory Variables

The analysis will test four independent variables based on the hypotheses presented above. These will include *refugees*, *human rights*, *polity,* and *state capacity*. Data for the *refugees* variable was drawn from the World Development Indicators' (WDI) yearly count of the

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[99] **Battles** are defined as, "a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location"; **Explosions and Remote Violence** are are defined as, "one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to respond"; **Violence Against Civilians** is defined as, "violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants"; **Protests** are defined as, "a public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them"; **Riots** are defined as, "violent events where demonstrators or mobs engage in disruptive acts, including but not limited to rock throwing, property destruction, etc."; and **Strategic Developments** are defined as, "contextually important information regarding the activities of violent groups that is not itself recorded as political violence, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics within and across states." For more complete definitions and examples, please see the ACLED Codebook.

total number of refugees and asylees per country of asylum. The data were combined with the WDI's yearly population data for the sample countries to create a standardized variable of percent of the population that were refugees in order to better analyze whether their presence significantly influenced the dependent variable, *number of events*.

The *human rights* variable was derived from the ACLED data by creating a country-year variable of the total number of government-initiated instances of violence against civilians to track trends in repressive behavior by the government. The *polity* measure comes from the PolityIV dataset, which tracks yearly changes in a state's political system on a scale ranging from negative ten (perfect autocracy) to ten (perfect democracy). Although it is standard practice to include a squared term of the *polity* variable when conducting an analysis of the highly autocratic MENAP region, when the variable was included in this study it did not change the results in any significant manner and was thus excluded to ensure the results were clear and concise.

Finally, the *state capacity* variable was drawn from the Fragile State Index (FSI), which indexes a variety of factors within countries on a yearly basis to estimate a total state fragility score. Individual variables are scored on a scale from one to ten, and the sum of the variables are then combined to create a total state fragility score (which, in this case, is being called *state capacity*), which amounts to 120 points. Twelve individual indicators are measured on a scale of one to ten, where lower values indicate higher degrees of stability and higher values indicate higher risks of violence, instability, and state collapse. Two of these indices (*security* and *uneven development*) are used as control variables in the analyses and their collective values were subtracted from the total FSI score to ensure their measurement validity. It is important to note

that since the FSI tracks state fragility as opposed to state capacity, larger values indicate worse conditions within a state.

Control Variables

Previous studies have also identified several additional variables that have been found to be related to increased group activity. These include *population, ongoing conflict, legitimacy of security apparatus, uneven development,* and *regime durability.*[100] *Population*, as mentioned above, is drawn from yearly WDI data and logged to account for the large spread of the data. Larger *populations* were expected to be correlated with both *violent* and *nonviolent events.* The *ongoing conflict* was coded as dummy variables and drawn from records of ongoing civil wars and popular uprisings that occurred within a country during the scope of the analysis. It is predicted that an *ongoing conflict* would increase the likelihood of both *violent* and *nonviolent events.*

Variables for *legitimacy of security apparatus* and *uneven development* were measured using FSI data which indexed each variable and produced a measure from one to ten, with lower values indicating higher fragility. Less *security* and less *development* were anticipated to be correlated to *violent events,* while more *security* and less *developments* were expected to predict *nonviolent events.* Finally, *regime durability* was measured using PolityIV data and indicates the strength of a regime by measuring the length of time (in number of years) since the last regime change, as defined by a three-point change in a state's *polity* score in a period of three years or less. It is assumed that less *durable* regimes will experience more *violent events*, while more

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[100] Fearon & Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," p. 84 and Chenoweth, E., & Ulfelder, J. (2015). Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings? *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2)*, p. 316.

durable regimes will experience more *nonviolent events.* Table 2.2 lists the descriptive statistics of the covariates present in the models presented in this chapter.

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Covariates

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Total Events	208	938	1952	0	15,997
-Violent Events	208	590	1598	0	15,423
-Nonviolent Events	208	319	844	0	5,346
Refugees	185	2.03	7.65	0	49.71
Human Rights	208	18.16	43.00	0	328
Polity	182	-2	4.69	-10	7
State Capacity	137	70.15	14.13	34	95.40
Population	185	16.95	1.07	14.17	19.17
Durability	182	20.95	22.68	0	92
Ongoing Conflict	208	0.48	0.50	0	1
Security	137	7.37	1.78	2.30	10
Uneven Development	137	6.58	1.32	2.80	9.60

Design

As this study is chiefly concerned with counts of events, a quasipoisson regression analysis was used to generate the results. This method was chosen due to the difference between the dependent variable's mean and variance, which failed to satisfy a key assumption for a regular Poisson regression. The modification of the analysis allowed for a correction in the standard errors which ensured they would not be heavily influenced by this disparity. In order to account for the varying time frames of available data, the analyses were all offset by the logarithm of the year for which the events were being recorded to normalize the results based on the number of yearly observations available.[101] Finally, three different analyses were conducted to better understand changes in event types over time. The first analysis was run using a count of the total number of events that occurred, then two subsequent analyses were done filtering for

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[101] More information on offsetting the results of a generalized linear model can be found here:
https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/11182/when-to-use-an-offset-in-a-poisson-regression?noredirect=1&lq=1

violent and nonviolent events, respectively. It is important to note that this study is primarily interested in determining factors that influence event occurrences as a whole, and thus the results of the first regression are meant to be the most authoritative; the results from the violent and nonviolent event regression are only meant to offer additional context to the results to better understand the types of events that are happening in the region.

Results

Although the results from the analyses presented in this section generally matched previous findings from studies discussed earlier in this chapter, there are interesting instances where they differ. Table 2.3 displays the results for the analysis of *violent events* that occurred in the MENAP from 1997 to 2019. Interestingly, the model showed that *refugees* and *violent events* were negatively correlated to each other, meaning that as the *refugee population* increases, *violent events* will decrease (Model 0, Table 2.3). This goes against most of the conventional thinking about the relationship between *refugees* and *conflict* including that of this thesis, which suggests that hypothesis 1a be rejected. Conversely, there was evidence to support the assumption of a positive correlation between *human rights abuses* and *violent events*. Thus, hypothesis 2a, which posited that an increase in *human rights abuses* would lead to more *violent events*, is accepted.

Polity was also found to be positively correlated to *violent events*, suggesting that *democratic-leaning* regimes were more susceptible to violent nonstate mobilization than their *authoritarian* counterparts. It is also important to take the significance of this value in the context of the mean *polity* value of the region being researched which, at -2 (and as illustrated in Figure 1.1), is far lower than values observed elsewhere. This could imply that less stable democracies or unstable anocracies are accounting for this trend, but the evidence does offer support for

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hypothesis 3a, which hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between *polity* and *violent events*. Finally, *state capacity* appeared to have the most predictive value of the explanatory variables (Models 0 & 4, Table 2.3). This supports hypothesis 4a and suggests that high *state fragility* is linked to an increase in *violent events*.

Table 2.3: Quasipoisson Regression of Total Number of Violent Events per Country-Year, 1997-2018

	Model 1 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 2 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 3 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 4 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 5 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)
Refugees	-0.011 (0.047)*	-0.059 (0.036)			
Human Rights	0.003 (0.002)		0.003 (0.001)*		
Polity	0.075 (0.032)*			0.011 (0.030)	
State Capacity	0.060 (0.024)*				-0.056 (0.021)**
Population	-0.013 (0.124)	0.150 (0.088)	0.243 (0.092)**	0.158 (0.115)	0.193 (0.088)*
Durability	0.036 (0.007)***	0.038 (0.003)***	0.025 (0.006)***	0.038 (0.006)***	0.032 (0.003)***
Ongoing Conflict	-0.771 (0.255)**	-0.882 (0.230)***	-0.977 (0.246)***	-0.754 (0.276)**	-0.873 (0.228)***
Security	0.926 (0.200)***	1.566 (0.118)***	1.385 (0.129)***	1.494 (0.132)***	1.149 (0.174)***
Uneven Development	-0.292 (0.124)*	-0.229 (0.095)*	-0.222 (0.100)*	-0.178 (0.118)	-0.382 (0.117)**
Intercept	-11.468 (2.182)***	-15.386 (1.805)***	-15.423 (1.860)***	-15.414 (2.170)***	-15.927 (1.869)***
Observations	187	187	187	187	187
Countries	23	23	23	23	23

note: *$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < 0.001$

As control variables, *durability, conflict,* and *development* were all very reliable predictors of conflict; however, they did not act as expected. The *durability* variable suggests that more entrenched leaders will elicit more violent nonstate mobilization, which contradicted the results of Model 3 (Table 2.3). It was also interesting that *conflict* was negatively correlated to the dependent variable when previous research would suggest that conflict provides less costly opportunities for violent groups to achieve gains from the government. Finally, because the *uneven development* variable was drawn from the Fragile State Index, the negative correlation to *violent events* suggests that **less** *uneven development* (i.e. more equitable development) leads to

more violent events since lower FSI values indicate better outcomes. Otherwise, the values for

population and *security apparatus* acted generally as expected.

**Table 2.4: Quasipoisson Regression of Total Number of
Nonviolent Events per Country-Year, 1997-2018**

	Model 1 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 2 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 3 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 4 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 5 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)
Refugees	0.025 (0.039)	0.027 (0.040)			
Human Rights	0.006 (0.003)		0.000 (0.003)		
Polity	0.092 (0.030)**			0.082 (0.024)***	
State Capacity	-0.054 (0.028)				-0.055 (0.023)*
Population	1.109 (0.150)***	1.191 (0.127)***	1.171 (0.126)***	0.968 (0.116)***	1.233 (0.119)***
Durability	0.002 (0.010)	0.000 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.010)	0.004 (0.008)
Ongoing Conflict	0.325 (0.401)	0.209 (0.367)	0.219 (0.385)	0.505 (0.338)	0.263 (0.350)
Security	0.553 (0.246)*	0.543 (0.162)**	0.544 (0.160)***	0.286 (0.161)	0.841 (0.202)***
Uneven Development	-0.273 (0.148)	-0.469 (0.128)***	-0.482 (0.125)***	-0.395 (0.119)**	-0.330 (0.133)*
Intercept	-20.442 (2.640)***	-24.290 (2.414)***	-23.910 (2.326)***	-18.880 (2.179)***	-24.267 (2.065)***
Observations	188	188	188	188	188
Countries	23	23	23	23	23

note: *$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < 0.001$

Nonviolent events proved to be far less predictable than *violent events*. Neither trends in

refugee populations nor in *human rights abuses* were found to be significant predictors of

nonviolent events, thus hypotheses 1b and 2b are both rejected. *Polity* was found to be positively

correlated to the dependent variable; however, hypothesis 3b posited that *polity* would be

negatively correlated to *nonviolent events*. Thus this hypothesis is also rejected (although the

strong tilt of *events* towards *democratic-leaning* regimes will be revisited in the next chapter).

Hypothesis 4b, which posited that *nonviolent events* would occur more frequently in states with

increased *state capacity* is supported by the result of Model 4 (Table 2.4), which indicates a

negative relationship between the *fragile states* index and *nonviolent events*.

The controls for this analysis performed largely as expected with the same exception of the *uneven development* variable, which was again negatively correlated to the dependent variable. It should be noted that the persistent significance of the *population* variable is something that has been noted by various scholars of nonviolent conflict—most notably Chenoweth and Orion (2013)—as a marker of a nonviolent movement's ability to reach the 1,000 participant threshold that is typically used to distinguish maximalist campaigns from reformist campaigns.[102] Finally, the *security apparatus* variable, which was the only other consistently significant predictor of *nonviolent events*, performed largely as expected.

Discussion

This chapter aimed to understand nonstate group behavior through an analysis of the yearly trends in the *number of events* perpetrated by nonstate groups a country in endured. Departing from sociocultural theories of deviance, as well as theories of group motivation and organization present in both the social movement literature and the conflict literature, a conceptual framework aimed at using anthropological theories of societal norms and expectations to understand how different groups react to changes in their environment was devised to better understand what prompted changes in nonstate mobilization from year to year. The analysis revealed that *human rights abuses* were strong predictors of *violent events* while *state capacity* predicted both *violent* and *nonviolent events*.

There were several results from the analyses presented above that warranted further discussion and recommendations for future research. The most potent and analogous of these were the findings related to the trend between *refugees* and *violent events* (Model 0, Table 2.3). The model suggested that a decrease in a state's share of its *refugee population* would lead to a

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[102] Chenoweth & Orion, "Unpacking nonviolent campaigns," p. 419.

subsequent increase in *violent events*. This prompts several questions deserving of future research about the relationship between *refugee populations* and *violent events*, especially at the substate level. As the research cited in the previous section established, nonstate violence would increase with refugee population in weak states that were not capable of effectively mitigating the effects sudden population changes,[103] however, such a relationship would be less common in a state that was able to mitigate such changes. This suggests that more work needs to be done to truly determine the influence of population changes on (violent) nonstate mobilization, as it appears that *state capacity* is not singularly responsible for the relationships observed in previous studies.

Another interesting trend which will be explored in more depth in the next chapter was the relationship between *polity* and *nonstate events*. It was hypothesized that *democratic regimes* would be more vulnerable to *violent events*, while *authoritarian regimes* would be more susceptible to *nonviolent mobilization*. Neither of these assumptions were supported by the data, however, the analyses did suggest that *democratic-leaning regimes* would be more susceptible to *nonstate events* overall than their *authoritarian* counterparts. As was briefly mentioned in the previous section, this could possibly be a result of the strong authoritarian tradition in the region influencing how states become targeted by nonstate actors.

It is also important to note, however, that the influence of *regime type* on the prevalence of nonstate groups within a state remains a contentious issue amongst scholars of conflict due to the lack of definitive evidence to suggest a specific regime type is targeted more frequently than others. This issue will be explored in more depth in the next chapter, which will explore how

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[103] Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch, "Blame the victims?" p. 85.

theories of political survival inform the actions leaders take against nonstate groups. Special

attention will be paid to whether leaders of democratric regimes engage with groups differently

than autocratic leaders as a result of the different constraints each faces.

Table 2.5: Nonviolent and Violent Events per Country, 2015-2019

Country	Nonviolent Events[1]	Violent Events[1]	Polity[2]	State Capacity[3]	Security[3]	Uneven Development[3]	Human Rights[3]
Syria	4,008	61,221	-9	111.45	9.85	7.65	9.95
Yemen	1,927	33,212	0	112.42	9.90	8.17	9.79
Afghanistan	998	22,960	-1	105.81	10.00	7.65	8.05
Iraq	1,964	19,143	6	102.24	9.23	7.00	8.40
Saudi Arabia	206	5,172	-10	70.61	6.10	4.80	9.13
Pakistan	17,515	4,213	7	96.48	8.80	6.20	7.70
Turkey	5,115	4,182	-4	81.11	8.00	5.47	7.87
Libya	696	3,148	0	94.37	9.30	5.40	9.20
Sudan	1,607	2,546	-4	109.09	8.70	7.60	9.43
Egypt	584	1,754	-4	88.98	8.17	5.80	9.90
Tunisia	2,436	978	7	72.12	8.00	4.93	6.20
Israel	615	808	6	77.98	6.60	6.50	7.20
Bahrain	1,146	675	-10	64.36	6.60	4.40	8.77
Lebanon	730	614	6	86.67	8.40	5.43	7.28
Algeria	2,568	415	2	76.00	6.90	6.30	6.50
Iran	4,735	327	-7	84.36	7.20	5.50	9.20
Morocco	1,060	116	-4	73.97	5.50	5.83	6.50
Jordan	370	84	-3	77.12	5.54	5.23	7.65
Kuwait	30	2	-7	55.86	3.90	4.00	7.60
United Arab Emirates	2	2	-8	41.46	3.25	2.95	7.75
Qatar	3	1	-10	48.06	2.30	4.60	6.20
Oman	8	0	-8	51.25	3.90	4.40	7.60

1. Source: ACLED
2. Source: PolityIV. Note: negative values indicate autocratic regimes and positive values indicate democratic regimes.
3. Source: FSI. Note: since FSI scores are cumulative, higher values on indicators always indicate negative circumstances.
Note: Polity and FSI values are averages for the four year period from 2015-2019.

The relationships witnessed in the various results reported below also presented other

interesting findings, each with unique implications for how nonstate groups in the MENAP are

understood to act and react to changing conditions within a state. One such implication relates to

the reduced number of nonviolent events seen in states with higher rates of human rights abuses.

It is possible that this relationship was influenced by the various ways in which states responded

to challenges to their human rights records by nonstate groups, which in turn, could have influenced the types of nonstate campaigns that emerged (i.e. violent versus nonviolent). For example, Iran is notorious for its harsh repression of dissidents, and its FSI score of 9.2 for human rights and Polity score of -7 (Table 2.5) confirm the regime has the means to oppress its citizenry if need be. Yet, between 2015 and 2019, 94% of the events that occurred in the country were nonviolent. Similarly, in Bahrain—which has a Polity score of -10 and an FSI human rights score of 8.8—63% percent of the events that occurred between 2015 and 2019 were nonviolent.

Conversely, in Tunisia and Algeria—two countries with positive polity scores and FSI human rights scores around six—71% and 86% of the total events in the country were nonviolent, respectively. Thus, it seems that despite strong theoretical support for the unifying force of human rights issues, there have to be certain factors at play for people to mobilize and for that mobilization to be successful. Understanding what those factors are could prove to be very valuable for people living in oppressive conditions to understand how they can organize in a high-security environment.

Finally, it is important to note the limitations imposed on the analysis by the available data. Although datasets exist that catalog specific campaigns (e.g. NAVCO or FORGE), specific conflicts (e.g. COW), or specific events (e.g. ICEWS or ACLED), it is difficult to find a single data source that combines all of these elements to answer the question at hand. Furthermore, the results from this analysis indicate that a MENA-specific study of both violent and nonviolent movements is ripe for investigation with its many challenges to conventionational wisdom, especially in a post-Arab Spring context. More complete data that assimilates the three factors mentioned above and adds temporal depth to preexisting data could exponentially improve

research on the emergence and behavior of nonstate groups, which could produce invaluable positive externalities such as effective governance, improved security, and increased forms of democratic participation. Indeed, generalizing the results of quantitative analyses to disparate nonstate groups cannot provide a singular solution to countering them. However, the importance of developing a framework within which group behavior can be understood cannot be underestimated; for the consequences of the actions taken against the state are rarely confined solely to those challenging its authority.

<u>**Chapter Three**</u>

On 17 December 2011, Muhammad Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old fruit vendor, set himself on fire outside the municipal offices of the seat of the Tunisian governorate of Sidi Bouzid as an act of protest against the mistreatment of the lower class by those in power. This dramatic event transpired hours after his produce was seized and he was publicly humiliated by a local policewoman and ultimately sparked a wave of revolutions that would sweep the region.[104] The country's ruler at the time, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, had long sought to silence dissent and opposition and thus was not sure what to do when the protests that Bouazizi's act sparked began to gain traction.[105] He initially responded by offering small concessions to appease the protesters' demands for better employment. However, Tunisians that had lived under Ben Ali's system for over twenty years saw little more than empty promises in the propositions their president was making and instead demanded radical structural change.[106]

As the days wore on and the protests continued to gain momentum, Ben Ali saw that his political survival rested on containing the protests, which prompted him to order his security forces and his army to suppress them. However, at that critical point in the protests, the military instead stood down and refused to fire on civilians, signaling that their allegiance was no longer with the President.[107] Tunisia is now viewed as the only success story of the so-called "Arab Spring" it provoked because on 13 January 2011, Ben Ali gambled his prospects of political survival on his perception of the strength of his security apparatus, causing him to suffer an

[104] Gelvin, J. (2015). *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs To Know* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 27.
[105] El-Khawas, M. A. (2012). Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution: Causes and Impact. *Mediterranean Quarterly, 23*(4), p. 2.
[106] Al Jazeera. (2015). **Tunisian Revolution**. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2015/12/tunisian-revolution-151215102459580.html
[107] Gelvin, "The Arab Uprisings," p. 48.

incredibly costly political loss. By deploying his military, he sent a signal to protesters that the status quo would be maintained by any means necessary without considering the costs he had accrued both in his responses to protesters in recent weeks as well as his response to opposition over his twenty-four-year tenure.

The focus of this chapter will be on analyzing how costs, such as those incurred by Ben Ali in those fateful few weeks in 2011, shape a leader's reaction to challenges by nonstate groups. While understanding how domestic factors influence nonstate group activity can be beneficial, it only partially explains group behavior. A more robust understanding of group behavior must also take into account the role that governments and their leaders play in shaping group behavior through the signals they exchange with each other. Thus, this chapter will focus on how government interactions with nonstate groups can alter group behavior by attempting to change the course of a conflict.

Departing from the assumption that the goal of most nonstate groups is to challenge state authority or legitimacy either directly or indirectly, this chapter explores the impact government reactions to such challenges have on conflict outcomes. This assumption will be tested through an analysis of a selection of subevent categories derived from the *strategic developments* variable from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED). This variable "captures contextually important information regarding the activities of violent groups that is not itself recorded as political violence, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics within and across states."[108] Of the six subevent types[109] the *strategic developments* variable codes for, only three will be used to create measures of a state's *cooperative* versus

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[108] ACLED Codebook p. 14.
[109] These include 'Agreement', 'Arrests', 'Change to group/activity', 'Disrupted weapons use', 'Headquarters or base established', 'Looting/property destruction', 'Non-violent transfer of territory', and 'Other'.

coercive behavior vis-a-vis nonstate challengers.[110] Furthermore, for both clarity and to reflect the nature of what this manipulated variable is measuring, it will henceforth be referred to as *government actions* as opposed to *strategic developments*. This variable will lay the groundwork for the main question this chapter seeks to answer: how do a leader's or government's actions influence group behavior throughout the course of a conflict? The chapter will address this question in four sections. The first section provides brief descriptions of a selection of the existing literature on the concepts of audience costs and political survival. The second section establishes a theoretical framework within which to empirically test how these theories can be applied to asymmetric conflicts. Next, the third section will be an overview of the quantitative research design. And finally, the fourth section will provide results with a discussion of their implications for understanding conflict situations.

Literature

A theme that emerged from the analysis in the previous chapter revolved around how government behavior influenced the occurrence of nonstate events. However, what remains unclear is how a government's actions during the course of a conflict can influence outcomes. Although understanding how domestic factors influence the grievances people develop, such studies only account for half of the factors that influence conflict onset and resolution. In order to account for this disparity, it is thus also important to understand how leaders react to domestic challenges to their authority and how these reactions shape the security environment of their countries. The issue of political psychology on governance is well researched in the field of political science and has branched off into other fields over the past several decades.[111]

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[110] Further discussion of the manipulation of this variable can be found in the Research Design section.

[111] See, for example, Chiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E. (2004). International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still *Ex Post* Inefficient? *American Journal of Political Science, 48*(3), pp. 604-619; Bueno de Mesquita, B.,

Especially of interest to this study, however, is the theory of political survival - which attempts to understand a political leader's behavior through their desire to remain in office. This theory informs a large body of the conflict literature, as it offers explanations for why leader's act the way they do in times of crisis.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) significantly contributed to the study of political survival when they introduced their selectorate theory as a means to predict how leaders attain and maintain political power.[112] The theory derives from the central postulate that leaders are primarily interested in remaining in power in order to accomplish their policy goals.[113] In order to remain in power, the leader must keep the 'selectorate'—the groups of people tasked with electing officials—appeased. The size of the selectorate will depend on the regime type, with democratic rulers having to satisfy larger portions of the population than autocratic ones. Importantly, selectorates are theorized to be 'bought off' differently depending on regime type, as well. For example, the larger selectorates present in democracies are appeased through the disbursement of public goods funded by tax dollars, whereas smaller selectorates present in autocracies are given private, high-value goods to purchase their appeasement. This has especially costly implications during times of conflict when a democratic leader is faced with the

Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2004). Testing Novel Implications of the Selectorate Theory of War. *World Politics, 56*, pp. 363-388; Filson, D., & Werner, S. (2007). Sensitivity to Costs of Fighting versus Sensitivity to Losing the Conflict: Implications for War Onset Duration, and Outcomes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51*(5), pp. 691-714; Peceny, M., & Butler, C. K. (2004). The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes. *International Politics, 41*, pp. 565–581.
[112] Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, "Testing novel implications from the selectorate theory of war," p. 364.
[113] Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2010). Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance. *American Journal of Political Science, 54*(4), p. 936.

decision of reducing the proportion of public goods disbursed to the selectorate to fund a war effort.[114]

Further attempts to formalize the understanding of conflict escalation as it relates to the wartime decision making of political leaders were made by Fearon (1994), who presented his theory of audience costs; a term used to describe the penalties a leader incurs in the eyes of their constituents for escalating an international crisis and than ultimately backing down.[115] According to Fearon, a leader begins to incur audience costs when they initially decide to escalate a conflict, which typically occurs when a lack of information sharing between leaders makes war the only viable option.[116] Fearon's study showed that democracies were more prone to generating audience costs than autocracies and were thus less likely to escalate crises into wars.[117] However, when democracies did escalate conflicts, they were less likely to back down due to the negative impact a loss in battle would have on leadership favorability.[118] Other studies have expanded the theory of audience costs to apply to intrastate conflicts to better understand how political leaders react to nonstate challenges.[119] Prorok (2016) study, which focused on the specific behavior of leaders in intrastate conflicts, determined that leaders deemed responsible for a conflict were far more likely to experience extreme repercussions and were less likely to make concessions to end a conflict.[120] This was attributed to leaders' aversion to being punished for participating in

[114] Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, "Testing novel implications from the selectorate theory of war," p. 365.

[115] Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review, 88*(3), p. 577.

[116] Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences," p. 586.

[117] Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences," p. 585.

[118] Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences," p. 585.

[119] Prorok, A. K. (2016). Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes. *American Journal of Political Science, 60*(1), pp. 70.

[120] Prorok, "Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes," p. 82.

conflicts and thus offered explanations for why civil conflicts with no end in sight were more difficult to resolve.

Subsequent studies have also expanded on the concept of audience costs to show that the dichotomous characterization between democratic and autocratic leaders neglect to fully capture the nuances found in different subtypes of regimes found within each characterization. For example, Weeks (2008) deconstructed the theory to illustrate how audience costs can emerge in the international arena when a leader is no longer viewed as legitimate or when other branches of the government that wield significant amounts of power (like the military) decide to turn on a head of state, as was seen in the Tunisian example presented at the beginning of this chapter.[121] Through an analysis of Militarized Interstate Disputes that filtered for ten regime types,[122] Weeks found that autocratic regimes can be as vulnerable to audience costs if they are unable to control how their role in the crisis is perceived both domestically and internationally.[123] Nevertheless, conceptualizing state behavior as a reflection of a leader's decisions, as opposed to as a result of the regime type in power, offered invaluable insight into the study of decision-making in conflict situations.

The analytical portion of this chapter will continue the work of Weeks (2008) and Prorok (2016) by analyzing how leaders react to domestic nonstate challenges in the heavily autocratic MENAP region. This framework will produce results that specifically describe how leaders in this region respond to domestic threats, which presents two significant implications for conflict research. First, although the theories presented above are meant to address how leaders react to

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[121] Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization*, *62*, pp. 40-44.
[122] Based on categorizations made by Geddes (2003) in Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
[123] Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs," p. 59.

interstate crises that escalate to conflicts, the reality is (as Prorok points out[124]) the most common type of conflicts since World War II have been *intra*state conflicts.[125] Second, it is important to acknowledge that despite the control they are able to exercise, autocrats are still susceptible to domestic threats, as evidenced by the ouster of Ben Ali. Thus, expanding theories of political survival should be considered of paramount importance for generating updated knowledge to match the changing nature of conflict. The following section will detail the theoretical basis for the independent variables that will be tested in this analysis.

Theoretical Framework

The concept of political survival has been expanded in many ways since Michael Doyle repopularized Immanuel Kant's groundbreaking theory in a series of essays in the 1980s. An especially salient branch of this research has developed out of the literature concerned with understanding the phenomenon of democratic peace, which observes that democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies due to the costs both countries would incur domestically for such action. These costs, described as audience costs, suggest that democratic leaders might be more susceptible to removal from office than their autocratic counterparts during times of crisis or conflict and would thus be more risk averse. First elucidated by Fearon (1994), this theory underscored the influence of regime characteristics and political psychology on conflict outcomes.[126]

Some researchers have begun to apply theories of political survival to democratic peace theory to better understand how leader characteristics can influence wartime decision making.

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[124] Prorok, "Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes," p. 70.

[125] Pettersson, T., & Wallensteen, P. (2015). Armed conflicts, 1946–2014. *Journal of Peace Research, 52*(4), p. 537.

[126] Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), p. 577.

London, Palmer, and Regan (2004) analyzed this question by exploring the influence of political orientation in parliamentary democracies to understand how conflict impacts a leaders' vulnerability to removal from office.[127] Their study indicated that left-leaning parliamentary democracies were more likely to see militarized interstate disputes escalate than right-leaning parliamentary democracies—possibly as a result of the pressure that arises from the various coalitions that form and the number of constraints on a leader's power in this type of governance system.[128] Debs and Goemans (2010) used a model that accounted for a broader array of regime types to understand how a leader's propensity to engage in conflict affected their chances of political survival.[129] Their analysis, which examined how certain regime types within the democratic-authoritarian dichotomization produced different kinds of leaders, found that leaders could be driven by the desire for political survival to demand unreasonable concessions in an effort to appear dominant, making peace increasingly difficult to attain due to the incompatibility of the goals of the opponents.[130]

Other studies have also shown that despite the unwillingness of democracies to engage in conflict for fear of its repercussions, they are far more likely to be the targets in international crises than leaders in other regimes.[131] Gelpi and Greico (2001) proposed that this disparity could arise from the vulnerability of inexperienced leaders that have just been elected to political office.[132] Furthermore, their analysis found that inexperienced leaders were more likely to make

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[127] London, T. R., Palmer, G., & Regan, P. M. (2004). What's Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies. *International Interactions, 30*(1), p. 1.
[128] London, Palmer, & Regan, "What's Stopping You?" p. 16.
[129] Debs, A., & Geomans, H. E. (2010). Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War. *American Political Science Review, 104*(3), p. 430.
[130] Debs & Goemans, "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War," p. 442.
[131] Gelpi, C., & Grieco, J. M. (2001). Attracting Trouble: Democracy, Leadership Tenure, and the Targeting of Militarized Challenges, 1918-1992. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45*(6), p. 814.
[132] Gelpi & Grieco, "Attracting Trouble," p. 795.

concessions during times of crisis than experienced leaders. Another study conducted by Wolford (2012) sought to understand how frequent changes in political leadership influenced crisis bargaining and outcomes.[133] His analysis determined that the ability of opposing leaders to commit to an agreement could be fundamentally altered by the possibility of a turnover in leadership in the near future that could lead to the election of a leader with different policy goals. [134] These studies showed the inherent vulnerability of democracies to crises despite their aversion to initiating them and carried significant implications for when and how regimes became targets of crises and how that influenced the ultimate outcome.

Especially relevant to this thesis and the research question at hand is the branch of research on political survival as it relates to civil crisis bargaining. Applying this theory to civil wars, Uzonyi and Wells (2016) argued that longer tenured leaders had more difficulty getting rebel groups to commit to an agreement due to that leader's lack of credibility, which they attribute to a leader's previous actions while in power.[135] Their empirical analysis supported their argument, which suggested that in addition to other exogenous factors related to civil war duration such as third party intervention and the characteristics of the opposing groups, autocratic leaders with few checks on their power are far less likely to resolve conflicts with groups that fear the possibility of punishment for rebelling against the state after an agreement has been finalized.[136] Alternatively, Prorok (2018) analyzed the issue of civil war duration from the perspective of leader culpability and the influence these views had on responsible and thus

[133] Wolford, S. (2012). Incumbents, successors, and crisis bargaining: Leadership turnover as a commitment problem. *Journal of Peace Research, 49*(4), p. 517.
[134] Wolford, "Incumbents, successors, and crisis bargaining," p. 526.
[135] Uzoni, G., & Wells, M. (2016). Domestic institutions, leader tenure and the duration of civil war. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 33*(3), p. 295.
[136] Uzonyi & Wells, "Domestic institutions, leader tenure and the duration of civil war," p. 307.

vulnerable leaders to draw out a civil conflict in the hopes of achieving a victory with time.[137]

Her study found support for her assumption that culpable leaders remained engaged in civil wars longer than leaders viewed as less culpable for the conflict.[138] The cumulative sum of the literature presented in this section has suggested that the way governments and leaders choose to respond to crises is impacted by several factors, but that a leader's fear of repercussions is incredibly salient in determining conflict outcomes. Thus, it is assumed that the rate of leadership turnover will have a significant influence on whether, and to what extent, a government chooses to engage nonstate challengers.

Hypothesis 1a: As rates of leadership turnover increase in a country, so will instances of cooperative government action.

Hypothesis 1b: As rates of leadership turnover decrease in a country, instances of coercive government will increase.

Another enduring question in the conflict literature—which goes beyond a leader's desire for political survival and harkens back to more traditional international relations studies—is about how different regimes react to challenges to their authority. In the previous chapter, the vulnerability of different regime types to nonstate group activity was analyzed in order to understand which type of regimes experienced larger proportions of nonstate group activity. However, in this chapter the nature of a leader's response to a nonstate group based on the leader's regime type will be analyzed. This topic has long been a point of contention in the literature due to the lack of definitive evidence for which types of regimes are more likely to respond to nonstate group mobilization. Amongst the scholars who believe that democracies are more likely to engage with nonstate groups, assertions are usually supported by evidence

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[137] Prorok, A. K. (2018). Led Astray: Leaders and the Duration of Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62*(6), p. 1180.
[138] Prorok, "Led Astray," p. 1197.

suggesting that democracies are more accountable to the people, making their need to reconcile with substate entities more prescient.[139] Moreover, the bureaucratic systems that are integral to democratic regimes (i.e. legislative, judicial, executive, etc.) are also thought to offer more avenues for such regimes to address nonstate group grievances democratically.[140] However, there is also evidence which suggests that democracies are more susceptible to coercion due to lower opportunity costs associated with public participation in democracies.[141]

It is also important to note that the relationship between democracies and violent expression could partially be explained by the lack of similar channels of expression in authoritarian regimes, while other studies have found that the repressive nature of authoritarian regimes allows them to insulate themselves from attack because they are better equipped to respond to nonstate challenges by bending the rule of law to their will.[142] Some researchers have suggested that people harbor more grievances under authoritarian regimes, making them more likely to mobilize against the ruler.[143] Moreover, other studies have established an empirical link between levels of repression and domestic terrorist incidents, which suggests that in the absence of nonviolent means of expression, people will turn to more extreme measures to express their dissatisfaction with the regime.[144]

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[139] See, for example, Eubank, W., & Weinberg, L. (1994). Does democracy encourage terrorism? *Terrorism and Political Violence, 6*(4), p. 443; however, this has been found to be influenced by the age of the democracy, as well. See: Eyerman, J. (1992). Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems? *International Interactions, 24*(2), p. 166.

[140] San-Akca, B. (2014). Democracy and Vulnerability: An Exploitation Theory of Democracies by Terrorists. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58*(7), p. 1302.

[141] See, for example, Chenoweth, E. (2010). Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity. *Journal of Politics, 72*(1), p. 26; and Pape, R. A. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review, 97*(3), p. 351.

[142] See, for example, Wilson, M. C., & Piazza, J. A. (2013). Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks. *American Journal of Political Science, 57*(4), p. 953.

[143] Aksoy, D., Carter, D. B., & Wright, J. (2012). Terrorism In Dictatorships. *The Journal of Politics, 74*(3), p. 811.

[144] Piazza, J. A. (2017). Repression and Terrorism: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis of Types of Repression and Domestic Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence, 29*(1), p. 114.

The debate in the literature over the responses different regime types express towards nonstate groups is, in some ways, reflective of the volatility of regimes to domestic factors. For example, the historically authoritarian regime in Algeria has been taking steps to engage with peaceful protesters who are demanding democratic reforms in the country, which include a complete restructuring of the current government.[145] Although the protesters have consistently rebuffed the government's attempts to ameliorate the situation, the government has indeed attempted to implement some reforms despite the implications that would have for the existing government. The atypical pivot of the country's historically authoritarian regime towards a more democratic means of engagement with protesters underscores the uncertainty that remains in determining how regime type influences the reaction a government will have to nonstate challengers. Conversely, Pakistan, which has long been coded as a strong democracy by the Polity Project, has struggled to engage democratically with the various separatist groups vying for autonomy from the central government's control.[146] Moreover, despite experiencing an increase in its polity score from 2017 to 2018, its Prime Minister has been criticized for using increasingly authoritarian tactics to suppress opposition groups and journalistic freedom, enough to warrant condemnation from the international journalism watchdog, the Committee to Protect Journalists.[147] However, because of the influence democratic mechanisms would have on both a leader's ability to engage nonstate challengers as well as on their political survival (by virtue of

[145] Serrano, F. (2019). **After 8 Months on the Streets, Protesters in Algeria Aren't Giving Up.** Retrieved from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/03/after-eight-months-on-the-streets-protesters-in-algeria-arent-giving-up/

[146] Marshal, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2011). Polity IV Project [Dataset]. Center for Systemic Peace: Polity IV Project, Vienna, VA.

[147] Marshal, Jaggers, & Gurr, "The Polity Project [Dataset]"; & Committee to Protect Journalists. (2018). **Acts of Intimidation: In Pakistan, journalists' fear and censorship grow even as fatal violence declines**. Retrieved from: https://cpj.org/reports/2018/09/acts-of-intimidation-pakistan-journalists-fear-censorship-violence-military.php

selectorate theory), it is believed that more democratic regimes will engage with nonstate groups more frequently.

Hypothesis 2a: Democratic (and democratic-leaning) countries will engage in cooperative actions with nonstate groups more frequently than autocratic countries.

Hypothesis 2b: Autocratic (and autocratic-leaning) countries will engage in coercive actions with nonstate groups more frequently than democratic countries.

Also related to both political survival and regime type is the influence the number of civilian casualties a conflict produces has on the likelihood a government engages with nonstate groups. This variable can contribute to decisive actions in several key ways. First, it can foster government engagement with groups if the groups are able to strategically target civilians in a way that puts pressure on the government without costing the group public support.[148] Scholars who have researched groups that use these tactics have reported mixed results when analyzing their effectiveness empirically. Some have found that suicide bombings can be especially effective at helping a group obtain territorial concessions,[149] whereas other researchers have found that strategic violence can decrease a groups chances of governmental concessions because it can prompt target countries to infer group objectives from the short term consequences of their actions as opposed to from the group's actual stated goals.[150] Further, research has shown that killing a group's leader will increase the chances of violence against civilians through their propensity to aggrieve lower-level members of a group as a result of the leadership deficits that result, regardless of the group's strategic aims.[151] One source of agreement amongst these pieces, however, is the ability of nonstate groups to inflate the cost of a conflict for a leader by

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[148] Hultman, L. (2012). Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the Achilles Heel of Democratic Governments. *International Interactions, 38*(2), p. 177.

[149] Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," p. 351.

[150] Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. *International Security*, 31(2), p. 76.

[151] Abrahms, M., & Mierau, J. (2015). Leadership matters: The effects of targeted killings on militant group tactics. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 29(5), p. 842.

strategically targeting civilians. This implies that groups that exploit this strategy more frequently should enjoy the benefit of engaging with a leader and gaining concessions more frequently.

Another interesting dynamic of pressuring the government through civilian casualties is a nonstate group's ability to regulate a nongovernmental organization's ability to provide vital medical aid to populations in need. This branch of coercion has only recently begun to gain traction in the scholarly community with researchers from several disciplines contributing to studies that illustrates both the frequency with which these activities occur as well as the devastating effects they can have.[152] Medical doctors have been at the forefront of bringing attention to the issue by using their positions at prestigious research institutions to elevate the voices of doctors in the field who have attempted to provide care in conflict situations and have experienced the lack of support from international governing bodies when their attempts are blocked first hand. A dominant theme in the literature on the security of medical aid workers rests in the lack of human rights protections for doctors that facilitate their targeting by nonstate groups attempting to alter the outcome of the conflict,[153] with subsequent quantitative studies illustrating the efficacy of this strategy by delineating a connection between increased neonatal mortality rates in conflict situations.[154] Indeed, the challenges of providing medical services in the conflict situations being discussed by medical professionals have deeper roots in issues of weak governments and their inability to adequately provide services to their citizens. Thus, it is

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[152] See, for example, Batniji, R, et al. (2014). Governance and health in the Arab world. *Lancet, 383*, pp. 343–355; and Wise, P. H., & Darmstadt, G. L. (2015). Strategic governance: Addressing neonatal mortality in situations of political instability and weak governance. S*eminars in Perinatology, 39*, pp. 387-392.
[153] Footer, K. H. A. & Rubenstein, L. S. (2013). A human rights approach to health care in conflict. *International Review of the Red Cross, 95*(889), p. 167; and Rubenstein, L. S. (2013). A way forward in protecting health services in conflict: moving beyond the humanitarian paradigm. *International Review of the Red Cross, 95*(890), p. 331.
[154] Wise, & Darmstadt, "Strategic governance," p. 391.

important to be mindful of the ways these situations can be further exploited in conflict situations, often to the detriment of innocent bystanders.

An additional way civilian casualties can spur decisive government actions is when they come at the hands of the state itself. Governments can also be the perpetrators of violence through their repression of protests movements.[155] However, these tactics can prove to pose a serious risk to a leader's political survival as was evidenced by the outcome of the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. Furthermore, studies have found that repression can backfire (known as 'political jiu-jitsu') if the means to communicate violent repression to a wide audience are present, thus precipitating governmental concessions.[156] One study found that economic structures that necessitated foreign dependency (as opposed to self-sufficient resource-based economies) were more likely to experience negative consequences from the violent repression of protesters as well due to such countries inability to withstand foreign economic pressures, which could subject them to the mechanisms of selectorate theory and put the regime in jeopardy.[157] Finally, state-sanctioned violence against protesters can also generate costs to the regime by motivating attacks against it, making these actions incredibly costly to a leader that perpetrates them.[158] Thus, because of the influence of both the internal and external coercive capabilities that follows from an increase in civilian casualties, it is assumed that an increase in civilian casualties should eventually lead to an increase in decisive actions.

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[155] Anisin, A. (2016). Violence begets violence: Why states should not lethally repress popular protest. *The International Journal of Human Rights, 20*(7), p. 893.

[156] Sutton, J., Butcher, C. R., & Svensson, I. (2014). Explaining political jiu-jitsu: Institution-building and the outcomes of regime violence against unarmed protests. *Journal of Peace Research, 51*(5), p. 569.

[157] Girod, D. M., Stewart, M. A., & Walters, M. R. (2018). Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35*(5), p. 515.

[158] Anisin, "Violence begets violence," p. 910.

Hypothesis 3a: As number the number of civilian casualties increases in a country, so should the number of cooperative government actions.

Hypothesis 3b: As number the number of civilian casualties increases in a country, so should the number of coercive government actions.

Finally, the analysis also seeks to analyze whether changes in the amount of foreign aid a country receives leads to subsequent changes in a leader's behavior. Inspired by the revelations about the influence a country's economy has on its willingness to concede to protesters after violently repressing them, this section looks at additional literature that has analyzed how donor countries have attempted to use foreign aid to influence the behavior of recipient countries. Much of the literature on this topic has been devoted to understanding how foreign aid can be deployed an in attempt to prevent conflicts (called 'securitization'),[159] how it can support peace agreements in post-conflict situations,[160] its efficacy at promoting the goals of the donor country, [161] and finally, its influence on the occurrence of terrorist incidents.[162] However, little research seems to focus on whether foreign aid can alter the outcome of an *ongoing* civil war.

Historically, theories conceptualized the world system as one characterized by conflict, but recent research has suggested that economic policy has been used by donor countries more often to help recipient countries.[163] These types of disbursements are typically referred to as 'positive sanctions' and are seen as a strategic tool donor countries can use to influence outcomes in a recipient country.[164] Currently relevant and well-studied examples of 'positive

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[159] Tahir, N. (2017). Does Aid Cause Conflict in Pakistan? *Defence and Peace Economics, 28*(1), p. 112.

[160] Fearon, J. D., Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2009). Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia. *The American Economic Review, 99*(2), p. 291.

[161] Bearce, D. H., & Tirone, D. C. (2010). Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments. *The Journal of Politics, 72*(3), p. 848.

[162] Baldwin, D. A. (1975). The Power of Positive Sanctions. *World Politics, 24*(1), p. 23.

[163] Licht, A. A. (2010). Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54*(1), p. 58.

[164] Licht, "Coming into Money," p. 58.

sanctions' include the links between the disbursement of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and cooperation in the 'War on Terror.'[165] Of the few studies that attempt to explore the effects of foreign aid on civil conflict, results are decidedly mixed. There is some agreement on the positive correlation between civilian killings and aid disbursements from donor countries, although whether these killings are perpetrated largely by rebel groups or the state is disputed.[166] Moreover, the type of aid has been linked to differential outcomes in conflict situations. For example, while military assistance has been found to encourage governments to cease targeting civilians, development aid has been found to perpetuate state-sanctioned civilian killings.[167]

Especially relevant to the research question presented in this chapter were the findings presented in a study exploring aid disbursement patterns to countries where leaders faced an elevated risk of losing power. The study found a significant correlation between aid disbursements and endangered leaders that suggested that foreign aid could be especially useful to newly-elected democratic leaders attempting to build a large coalition, but can eventually become a liability once that coalition is built.[168] Although other studies investigate how aid can or has been used to influence the political survival of recipient leaders, few have considered how 'negative sanctions'[169] can serve to purposefully increase the costs a leader incurs during a conflict in order to encourage a swifter resolution.

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[165] See, for example, Aning, K. (2010). Security, the War on Terror, and Official Development Assistance. *Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3*(1), p. 23 and Azam, J. P., & Delacroix, A. (2006). Aid and the Delegated Fight Against Terrorism. *Review of Development Economics, 10*(2), p. 341.

[166] Jadoon, A. (2018). Persuasion and Predation: The Effects of U.S. Military Aid and International Development Aid on Civilian Killings. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41*(10), p. 796 and Wood, R. M., & Sullivan, C. (2015). Doing harm by doing good? The negative externalities of humanitarian aid provision during civil conflict. *The Journal of Politics, 77*(3), p. 5.

[167] Jadoon, "Persuasion and Predation," p. 796.

[168] Licht, "Coming into Money," p. 80.

[169] According to Baldwin (1975), "negative sanctions are actual or threatened deprivations" relative to a recipient country's baseline expectation at the moment a donor's influence attempt begins (pp. 23-24).

Although little evidence of the success of this tactic exists at the time of writing, recent attempts to employ it have been made by the United Kingdom through a landmark court ruling stating that the country's arms sales to Saudi Arabia—one of the key aggressors in the conflict in Yemen—were unlawful under international law,[170] as well as by the United States through a Congressional resolution to cease aid to Saudi Arabia due to its involvement in the war in Yemen (though the resolution was ultimately vetoed by the President).[171] When examining these examples of what could be considered 'negative sanctions' being deployed in the region, it should follow that the change in behavior the donor countries hoped to trigger would materialize. Thus, the fourth hypothesis posits that changes in the amount of foreign investment a country receives, whether through government aid or foreign direct investment, will influence the number of decisive government actions the country chooses to engage in.

> **Hypothesis 4a:** An increase in the amount of foreign investment a country receives will positively influence the cooperative actions a government engages in.

> **Hypothesis 4b:** An increase in the amount of foreign investment a country receives will positively influence the coercive actions a government engages in.

Research Design

In order to test the hypotheses proposed in the theoretical section, a multivariate regression analysis will be conducted to predict the influence of the variables described above on the occurrence of 'strategic developments.' This is a classification made in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) to signify events during a conflict that are contextually significant but not necessarily overtly violent and that was renamed to 'decisive government

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[170] Landler, M., & Baker, P. (2019). **Trump Vetoes Measure to Force End to U.S. Involvement in Yemen War**, Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/trump-veto-yemen.html

[171] Human Rights Watch. (2019). **UK: Arms Sales to Saudis Suspended After Landmark Ruling**. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/20/uk-arms-sales-saudis-suspended-after-landmark-ruling#

actions' for clarity.[172] However, because the analysis is selecting only three variables codes out of over thirty possible variable codes, the possible sample size was greatly reduced both as a function of there being fewer total observations as well as the observations not being evenly distributed across the region. Although this presents a serious limitation on the extent to which the findings can be generalized that must be acknowledged, it does ensure the measurement validity of the study remains strong due to the selection of only the most relevant observations for the analysis. Figure 3.1 illustrates the available data for the country-year unit of analysis which will be used for this analysis.

Figure 3.1: Years During which Decisive Government Actions were Recorded, by Country

Note: A country may record observations of strategic developments for every year which it has data available; similarly, it may not record any over that period.
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Dataset

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[172] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. (2019). Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Code book, p. 14. Available from ACLED website: https://www.acleddata.com/resources/general-guides/

Dependent Variables

In keeping with the theme of political survival of this chapter, the '*strategic developments*' variable from the ACLED dataset was chosen to test the conflict dynamics between governments and nonstate groups due to its ability to capture contextual actions taken by these actors to alter the direction of the conflict. These contextual events are believed to carry more significance than other events due to their ability to highlight both the successes and failures of the bargaining process and how both sides can use their unique resources and tactics to apply pressure to the other side by increasing the costliness of the conflict. This event classification includes six subevent types: agreements; arrests; change to group or activity; headquarters or base established; looting or property destruction; and nonviolent transfer of territory. To construct the 'decisive government action' variable used in this analysis, the data for *agreements* and *nonviolent transfer of territory* were extracted and combined to form a *cooperative government action* variable, and the data for *arrests* was extracted to make a *coercive government action* variable. The variable was also created to ensure that all actions it described were initiated by the government[173] against nonstate groups.[174] As a result, it is believed that the variable can accurately predict how states respond to nonstate challenges in a domestic context.

The *cooperative government action* variable signifies instances where a government exhibited conciliatory behavior towards nonstate groups by brokering an agreement with them as well as by facilitating peaceful transfers of territory between a nonstate entity and the government. Conversely, the *coercive government action* variable underscores instances when

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[173] Coded as "state forces" in the ACLED data, but described in the codebook as acting on behalf of the state or leader.

[174] This category included rebel groups, political militias, identity militias, rioters, protesters and civilians. It did not include external security forces or sole-state action.

governments take overtly hostile measures to cripple a nonstate group. This is reinforced by the

ACLED codebook, which notes that the *arrests* subcategory is only applied to cases when mass

arrests are conducted or when a particularly significant individual in a group's hierarchy has

been detained. This underscores the strength of the *strategic development/decisive government*

action variable at measuring important occasions of government reaction to nonstate provocation

since the variable focuses on how opposing leaders choose to respond to certain events by either

escalating or resolving a conflict. Figure 3.2 illustrates the total number of government actions

per group type and year for the time period analyzed in this study.

Figure 3.2: Mean Number of Decisive Actions Taken, By Type and Country [a]

a. Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)

Explanatory Variables

Political survival was measured by creating an *Executive Leadership Turnover* variable

that counted the number of years an executive leader was in power before a regime change

occurred (regime change years are coded as 'year 0'). This method was chosen to ensure that countries (such as Bahrain whose leader has been in power since 1971 but only has accompanying ACLED data for the period from 2016-2019) have meaningful observations recorded in the data. This measurement method was important because it allowed the variable to inherently control for regime type through larger observations as well as offer context for situations where a conflict aimed at regime-change erupted. It is also important to note that *executive leadership* was determined based on the person recognized as the one with the most executive power in the country according to its constitution, meaning it was not always a president or a king. Further information on positions and elections used to measure this variable can be found in the appendix.

The *polity* measure comes from the PolityIV dataset, which tracks yearly changes in a state's political system on a scale ranging from negative ten (perfect autocracy) to ten (perfect democracy). Although it is standard practice to include a squared term of the *polity* variable when conducting an analysis of the highly autocratic MENAP region, when the variable was included in this study it did not change the results in any significant manner and was thus excluded to ensure the results were clear and concise.

Data for *civilian casualties* were also drawn from the ACLED dataset to create parity between observations with the dependent variables. In keeping with the aim of this chapter to measure how governments and their leaders react to the rising costs of conflict, the civilian casualties variable measures the total number of civilian casualties per country-year regardless of the event that caused the civilian casualties to occur. This allows the variable to provide context

on the costs a leader may be incurring that could spur them to engage with armed groups. The variable was logged to simplify the model by scaling the observations.

Finally, a variable capturing fluctuations in *foreign investment* into a country was created by averaging the change in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the change in Official Development Assistance (ODA) a country received per year. Both variables originally came from the World Development Index (WDI) and presented the data as a percentage of the country's economy the disbursements represented. Change was calculated for each by subtracting that year's value with the previous year's value for both FDI and ODA. To measure the magnitude of the change in *foreign investment*, the change for both measures were combined before being averaged. This allows for the tracking of change in investment patterns by country on a standardized scale in order to accurately determine the effect such changes have on a leader's actions.

Control Variables

As with the previous chapter, population data from the WDI will be used as a control variable to determine whether the strength of its influence on the dependent variables will persist, as well as to measure for the size of the audience a leader would be accountable to. The variable has been logged to account for the large size of the observations. It is believed that a larger *population* will put more pressure on a government to act in the face of nonstate challenges, thus leading to more *government action*. A *regime durability* was measured using PolityIV data and indicates the strength of a regime by measuring the length of time (in number of years) since the last regime change, as defined by a three-point change in a state's *polity* score in a period of three years or less. This variable provides important context to the *executive leadership change variable* by differentiating between changes in leadership between parties as

opposed to within parties, which would influence political agendas and outlooks within a country. This is especially useful in a region such as the MENAP region with its legacy of enduring authoritarian rulers where a *regime* change could significantly influence the policies a country adopts—especially as it relates to a country's nonstate groups. It is believed that *durable regimes* will engage less frequently in *cooperative action* than unstable regimes.

The total *number of events* that occurred during a country-year is also being included in this model to assess the context in which decisive *government actions* are occurring and how leaders are responding to nonstate group activity. It is believed that changes in the *number of events* should lead to increased decisive *government actions*; however, whether those actions are *cooperative* or *coercive* would depend on other domestic factors. Finally, a variable for *legitimacy of security apparatus* was measured using FSI data which indexed each variable and produced a measure from one to ten, with lower values indicating a higher probability of violence or state collapse. It is hypothesized that the FSI score for *legitimacy of security apparatus* will differentially influence the type of government action that is pursued. Table 3.1 lists the descriptive statistics of the covariates present in the models presented in this chapter.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Covariates

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Cooperation (log)	118	0.53	0.85	0	4.97
Coercion (log)	118	1.62	1.14	0	4.89
Executive Leadership Change	117	8.8	9.8	0	46
Polity	100	-0.96	5.17	-10	7
Civilian Casualties (log)	118	3.67	1.89	0	7.16
Foreign Investment	118	-0.16	1.41	-9.01	3.29
Population (log)	101	17.16	1.16	14.17	19.17
Durability	100	12.93	19.96	0	91
Total Events (log)	118	6.46	1.88	1.10	10.35
Security	94	7.97	1.48	4.2	10

Design

Since the observations of this chapter do not fit the criteria for a quassipoisson analysis, this chapter implemented a negative binomial analysis instead. In order to account for the varying time frames of available data, the analyses were all offset by the logarithm of the country-year[175] for which the events were being recorded to account for the uneven distribution of observations between countries and years.[176] Additionally, due to the small sample sizes for both dependent variables being tested in this chapter, a full-model test with all the independent variables tested together against the dependent variables could not be done without compromising the validity of the results. Thus, to gauge the combined effect of the key independent and control variables on the dependent variable, each set of independent variables (key and control) were tested against the dependent variable in models titled 0a and 0b to account for both the small sample size and the need to understand how variables will interact with each other in the model. The results are presented below in tables 3.2 and 3.3.

Results

The results of the negative binomial analysis present several interesting trends. The first of which was that *executive leadership turnover* was significant only for *cooperative government action* (Model 1, Table 3.3). The positive relationship to the dependent variable suggests that less entrenched rulers are more likely to broker agreements with nonstate groups than their more entrenched counterparts. This supported hypothesis 1a, which posited that lower rates of *executive leadership turnover* would correlate to more *cooperative action*. There was no evidence to suggest that *polity* had any influence on *cooperative government action*, therefore

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[175] Coded as a combination of a country's Correlates of War country code and the observed year.
[176] More information on offsetting the results of a generalized linear model can be found here:
https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/11182/when-to-use-an-offset-in-a-poisson-regression?noredirect=1&lq=1

hypothesis 2a is rejected since regime type does not seem to play a significant role in a government's ability to take decisive action against a nonstate challenger.

Table 3.2: Analysis of Instances of Cooperative Government Actions

	Model 0a Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 0b Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 1 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 2 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 3 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 4 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)
Executive Leadership Change	0.004 (0.009)	-	0.016 (0.007)*			
Polity	-0.008 (0.017)	-		-0.017 (0.015)		
Civilian Casualties	0.246 (0.434)***	-			0.059 (0.093)	
Foreign Investment	-0.012 (0.054)	-				0.014 (0.050)
Population	-	-0.154 (0.065)*	-0.166 (0.063)*	-0.152 (0.064)*	-0.165 (0.067)*	-0.153 (0.065)*
Durability	-	0.013 (0.005)**	0.013 (0.004)**	0.012 (0.005)*	0.013 (0.005)**	0.013 (0.005)**
Events	-	0.130 (0.068)°	0.180 (0.071)*	0.136 (0.069)°	0.110 (0.076)	0.131 (0.069)°
Security	-	0.330 (0.095)***	0.302 (0.094)**	0.333 (0.095)***	0.285 (0.119)*	0.334 (0.096)***
Intercept	-8.016 (0.194)***	-8.025 (1.208)***	-8.062 (1.1845)***	-8.119 (1.208)***	7.573 (1.403)***	-8.074 (1.223)***
Observations	101	94	94	94	94	94

note: $* < .05$ $**p<.01$ $***p<.001$ | ° = one-tailed significance

Additionally, *civilian casualties* were found to be positively correlated with *cooperative government action* (Model 0a, Table 3.2). However, this relationship is only present when tested against the other key independent variables, which suggests a diminished prediction capability as a key mechanism to predict *government action*. The relationship still offers support to hypothesis 3a, which posited that an increase in *civilian casualties* would lead to more *cooperative government action*. There was no evidence to support hypothesis 4a, which posited that an increase in *foreign investment* in a country would lead to an increase in *cooperative government action*.

The control variables generally performed as expected as they related to *cooperative government action*, with the exception of *population*. When used to predict *cooperative government action*, it was hypothesized that a larger *population* would correlate to more *government action* due to the increased pressures from the selectorate and the increased audience

cost a leader would face from not resolving a conflict swiftly. The results from Table 3.2 suggest that smaller populations correlate to more *cooperative government actions*. This could suggest that weak regimes that lack the capability to face nonstate challenges are more likely to coalesce if the selectorate is small and the *security apparatus* is conducive to violence or state collapse. Also of note was the significance of *regime durability* and *security*. which proved to be the most significant predictors of *cooperative government action*, suggesting that *cooperative action* tends to occur in situations where the *number of events* puts pressure on a regime to act, but doing so *cooperatively* poses less of a risk to a ruler's political survival than attempting to subdue an opponent through *coercive action*.

Table 3.3: Analysis of Instances of Coercive Government Actions

	Model 0a Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 0b Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 1 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 2 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 3 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)	Model 4 Coefficient of number of events (robust standard error)
Executive Leadership Change	-0.004 (0.011)	-	0.015 (0.009)			
Polity	-0.016 (0.022)	-		-0.039 (0.018)*		
Civilian Casualties	0.288 (0.056)***	-			0.246 (0.112)*	
Foreign Investment	0.072 (0.071)	-				0.116 (0.061)°
Population	-	0.335 (0.080)***	0.324 (0.079)***	0.340 (0.078)***	0.291 (0.080)***	0.344 (0.079)***
Durability	-	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.018 (0.006)*	-0.009 (0.006)°	-0.008 (0.006)
Events	-	0.394 (0.085)***	0.440 (0.089)***	0.407 (0.083)***	0.312 (0.091)***	0.401 (0.083)***
Security	-	-0.275 (0.117)*	-0.301 (0.118)*	-0.268 (0.115)*	-0.462 (0.143)**	-0.248 (0.117)*
Intercept	-7.019 (0.253)***	-11.924 (1.492)***	-11.958 (1.480)***	-12.131 (1.466)***	-10.051 (1.690)***	-12.330 (1.486)***
Observations	101	94	94	94	94	94

*note: * < .05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 | ° = one-tailed significance*

The results for *coercive government action* showed interesting differences from the results seen in the analysis of *cooperative action* displayed in Table 3.2. Among these was the lack of evidence to support hypothesis 1b, which posited that lower rates of *executive leadership turnover* would correlate to increased *coercive government action* (Model 1, Table 3.3). Another contrast from the first set of results was the inverse relationship between *polity* and *coercive*

government action (Model 2, Table 3.3). This offers support for hypothesis 1b, which posited that *authoritarian* regimes would engage in more *coercive action* than their *democratic* counterparts.

Civilian Casualties were also found to be positively correlated to *coercive government action*, both in the partial model (Model 0a, Table 3.3) and in the full model (Model 3, Table 3.3). This supports hypothesis 3b and suggests that targeting civilians is the most reliable way to elicit a governmental response, although whether that response will be detrimental or beneficial to a group's organizational structure and goals is far less predictable. *Investment change* also indicated some correlation to *coercive government action* when the one-tailed p-value was taken. This offers modest evidence to hypothesis 4b and suggests that increases in *foreign investment* can lead to more productive securitization efforts in the face of threats to state authority.

The control variables in this analysis also performed largely as expected. Most notably, many of the relationships between the control variables and *cooperative government action* were inverted when the dependent variable was changed to *coercive government action*. This was most apparent in the *population* and security variables, which was positive for coercive actions and negative for cooperative actions (Table 3.3). This suggests that states with larger *populations* and stronger *security apparatuses* are more likely to engage in *coercive government action*. The *number of events* a state endures is also consistently positively correlated to *coercive government action*, suggesting that *coercive government action* is sparked by an accumulation of costs incurred by a leader, seemingly as a result of not taking action to restore order (Table 3.3). Finally, *durability* became a far less consistent predictor of government action in this analysis; however, it did indicate an inverse relationship to the dependent variable suggesting that *weaker*

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authoritarian regimes were more likely to engage in *coercive action*, possibly as a way to maintain an image of authority (Model 2, Table 3.3).

Discussion

This chapter sought to determine the extent to which a leader's response to a nonstate challenge influenced conflict outcomes. the results presented in the previous sections provided several avenues for future research, especially for those interested in continuing to contribute to research on both state and nonstate leaders' incentives in conflict situations. Furthermore, expanding the sample of this study beyond the MENAP region could provide future studies with insight into how the 'turning points' measured by the *decisive government actions* variable influence conflict onset and resolution in other regions and how such patterns differ on a global scale.

One interesting trend that merits future research was the difference in the ability of the *leadership turnover* and the *regime durability* variables to predict *decisive government actions*. As is noted in the research design section, the *durability* variable measures the amount of time a regime is in power as defined by a three-point change in a state's *polity* score in a period of three years or less. This differs from the *executive leadership turnover* variable, which measures the actual period of time that a leader is in power and thus more accurately captures the implications of certain events and decisions that characterize a leader's tenure. Table 3.4 illustrates the relationship between different regime characteristics and types of *decisive government actions* to illustrate how these variables function in practice.

When the variables are analyzed descriptively, trends that could further influence conflict outcomes become apparent. For example, more *autocratic* countries (with the exception of Israel) are less likely to engage *cooperatively* with nonstate groups than their *democratic*

counterparts. Furthermore, the region's *democratic* countries (in this case, Pakistan and Lebanon, but again, not Israel) are the only ones that consistently engage *cooperatively* with their nonstate groups, which suggests that either *democratic mechanisms* or threats to political survival motivate democratic leaders to come to a consensus with opposition groups, although by slim margins. Finally, another noteworthy trend is that countries that have experienced conflict at some point since 1997 are also more likely to engage both *cooperatively* and *coercively* with the nonstate groups that challenge them. Taken together, these trends suggest that in times of peace, regime type does influence how governments and leaders engage with nonstate groups—though further research would be needed to determine which specific mechanisms influence this relationship—while conflict necessitates leaders of all persuasions to adapt by displaying a willingness to make concessions.

Table 3.4: Regime Characteristics and Type of Nonstate Group Engagement

Country	Regime Type	Polity (Avg.)	Regime Durability	Total Coercive Action	Total Cooperative Action
Syria*	Autocracy	-9	55	222	184
Yemen*	Anocracy	0	0	49	43
Iraq*	Democracy	6	4	48	19
Sudan*	Anocracy	-4.8	7	89	18
Libya*	Anocracy	0	0	20	15
Afghanistan*	Anocracy	-1	4	25	10
Pakistan	Democracy	7	10	201	9
Algeria*	Anocracy	2	14	29	9
Tunisia	Anocracy	4	4	42	5
Egypt	Anocracy	-3.6	5	213	2
Lebanon	Democracy	6	13	14	2
Israel	Democracy	6	37	14	1
Bahrain	Monarchy	-10	54	11	1
Turkey	Anocracy	-4	2	270	0
Morocco	Monarchy	-4.6	53	29	0
Iran	Autocracy	-7	14	21	0
Saudi Arabia	Monarchy	-10	92	5	0
Jordan	Anocracy	-3	29	2	0
Kuwait	Monarchy	-7	52	2	0
Oman	Monarchy	-8	61	2	0

* - Denotes a country that engaged in a conflict during the survey period

Sources: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, PolityIV Dataset

Two other variables that exercised significant influence worthy of future research over the dependent variables and in this section were *population* and *security*. It was assumed that *cooperation* would occur in states with larger *populations* while *coercion* would occur in states with smaller *populations* since government *cooperation* has generally been viewed as symbolic of rewarding the preferable behavior of modest groups,[177] which are generally those that are nonviolent and operate in a country where the population has the capacity to effectively support the efforts of a successful nonviolent campaign.[178] However, the results of this analysis suggested that larger *populations* were conducive to *coercive government actions* while smaller *populations* were more likely to elicit a *cooperative* response from the government. It is likely that since this analysis is attempting to understand government behavior, these values are representative of the selectorate theory and a leader's perception of the share of the population that will hold them accountable for the actions they choose to take to counter nonstate groups.

The relationship between *security* and *decisive government actions* presents another interesting yet troubling trend. The results indicated that *weak security* was correlated to increased *cooperation* while *strong security* was linked to increased *coercive* responses. This suggests that regimes with strong *security apparatuses* are able to stifle opposition, likely at the expense of their citizen's human rights, which Chapter Two indicated was a significant predictor of unrest. This suggests that *coercive* measures to address dissent and opposition create a self-perpetuating cycle where repressive responses to nonstate mobilization fuel some of the same grievances that motivate nonstate groups to mobilize in the first place. Moreover, the correlation between *weak security* and *cooperation* also suggests that if a state is unable to

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[177] Chenoweth & Stephan, "Why civil resistance works," pp. 8-9.
[178] Thurber, "Social Structures of Revolution," p. 9.

project an air of authority, they will continue to remain the subject of nonstate attacks. This presents issues for state stability that could impact social functions far beyond the scope of the conflict, which presents issues for a state's capacity to function properly and provide services to its citizens. Understanding how these different regime characteristics influence noncombatants and the cycle of conflict in a country is important for understanding how conflicts are sparked and how enduring peace can be achieved.

Although this study is believed to have made valuable contributions to the study of conflict, it did face several limitations. The most significant, which unfortunately hinders even the most impactful studies, was the availability of relevant data. More detailed data on contextual events and 'turning points' in conflicts would have been especially beneficial for making more definitive claims about the relationships between the variables this study analyzed. More congruity between temporal data for countries could have increased the internal validity of the study, as well; although the work of the people who put together the ACLED dataset does not go unappreciated. Finally, an infinite amount of time to parse through the data and test every possible iteration of every possible relationship would have likely been unproductive, but perhaps have provided additional interesting results. Despite these limitations, the study provides new information on how states react to nonstate threats that offer several critical avenues for future conflict research.

Conclusion

This thesis was focused on two central questions: what motivates nonstate groups to instigate a challenge against the state, and what factors influence a state's decision to engage with nonstate groups that challenge their authority? Despite the volume of research that has emerged in the onset and resolution of asymmetric conflict and the surge of terrorism in the wake of the attacks of September 11th, scholars have struggled to ascertain a unifying theory to explain why certain individuals or groups choose to rebel and how that rebellion is perceived and treated by governments it threatens. Unified theories of conflict and terrorism are indeed difficult to discern due to the numerous and multifaceted contexts within which conflicts arise. Deviance theory and the humanist approach generally underscored how groups that chose to adopt different methods tended to emerge from similar contexts and were influenced to rebel against state authority by similar factors. By applying concepts from the structural school of anthropological thought, this thesis attempted to present an alternative perspective to the study of conflict by using the labeling theory of deviance to generate a comprehensive image of the ways in which conflict onset and resolutions are shaped by the actions of the participants.

The first chapter gave an overview of the extant literature on nonstate groups in the MENAP region, with an emphasis on their formation, their motives, their decisions to choose violent over nonviolent methods, and their functional roles in the larger geopolitical landscape of the region. The substance of this chapter served to create an understanding of the breadth of literature and related hypotheses on the emergence, function, organization, methods, and distribution of nonstate groups to inform the specific theories and relationships that were tested in the following chapters. The overarching themes explored in this chapter established the direction for the research questions that were analyzed in the following two chapters.

Departing from theories concerning the radical flank effect in social movements and group organization and goals, and informed by the labeling theory of deviance that underlies the theoretical basis of this thesis, Chapter Two sought to formulate an understanding of nonstate grievances and mobilization through a country-year analysis of event occurrences. The multivariate analysis tested the impact of four factors consistently found to impact nonstate mobilization—*refugees*, *human rights abuses*, *polity*, and *state capacity*—to determine the extent of the effects they had on the number of both *violent* and *nonviolent events* a country experienced in a year. The results indicated that *human rights abuses, polity, and state capacity* all had statistically significant influences on the dependent variable and that, as was expected, the dependent variable was differentially influenced by *violent events* and *nonviolent events*. The results of this analysis provided insights into avenues for future research to reevaluate the impact of refugees on the stability of a state and offered further credence to extant theories that suggest the potency of human rights violations as a catalyst to nonstate group mobilization.

Chapter Three explored the relationship between *cooperative* and *coercive* government behavior in order to understand what factors were most likely to prompt a government response to nonstate mobilization. Similarly based on the labeling theory of deviance that has guided this thesis as well as theories of audience costs and selectorate theory that form the basis of theories of political survival, the research presented in this chapter determined that *polity* and *violence against civilians* were two of the most reliable predictors of government actions against nonstate groups. Additionally, the models suggested that *security apparatuses* also influenced a regime's decision to employ *coercive* versus *cooperative* methods, although the relationship differed depending on which dependent variable was being tested. These results were consistent both

with the results in Chapter Two and the previous research generally. Broadly, the results suggest that anocratic regimes with strong security apparatuses and high human rights abuses by nonstate groups were more likely to elicit coercive behavior from the government, whereas anocratic regimes with high human rights abuses and weak security apparatuses are more likely to cooperate with nonstate groups. This presented interesting implications for the containment of nonstate groups in terms of their perception of the opportunity costs associated both with carrying out attacks against civilians and continuing to mobilize, depending on the political environment in which they are operating.

When considered in concert, the results from chapters two and three underscored the significance of human rights violations as a mobilizing factor for both nonstate groups as well as state actors. Attacks on civilians by both states (Chapter Two) and nonstate groups (Chapter Three) were shown to have significant effects on nonstate mobilization and mitigation. These results underscored the disregard for the value of civilian lives in situations of limited state stability and the cost paid by bystanders and noncombatants to bring about the change sought by nonstate actors. This indicates the need for enhanced mechanisms to sanction actors who violate the autonomy of civilians and noncombatants in ways that perpetuate an environment of increased state fragility. Such mechanisms could also prove valuable in mitigating the influence of such factors on conflict onset and bring about positive changes in state stability that could ultimately reduce the frequency of asymmetric conflict.

Weak *security apparatuses* were found to predict all forms of event occurrences (Chapter Two), as well as the likelihood of a government to engage a nonstate group in *cooperative* action (Table 3.1). This presents interesting insights into the ways in which security structure of a

regime can have a significant influence on the durability of a country's peace, in that strong and repressive apparatuses may prompt nonstate mobilization through their direct targeting of the civilian population, whereas weak and ineffective security apparatus can indirectly harm the civilian population by failing to prevent nonstate attacks aimed at gaining swift governmental concessions. This suggests that state fragility and capacity to mitigate human rights abuses play a role in the onset and resolution of conflict with nonstate actors and underscores the need for research into the ways that non-physical forms of foreign intervention can assist conflict-afflicted countries to address the fundamental issues that cause conflict.

The reciprocal relationship between human rights violations and instability also denotes implications for state fragility that were not explicitly explored in this thesis. Specifically, the relationship between *human rights abuses* and *weak security apparatuses*, as well as the relationship between high *state fragility* and *violent events* presented in Chapter Two, suggest that the environment fostered by the detrimental relationship a weak or repressive security apparatuses can have on human rights can promote circumstances that make nonstate mobilization increasingly likely, especially mobilization of a violent nature (as was evidenced in Table 2.3). Table 4.1 presents rudimentary evidence to support the claim that *state fragility, security apparatuses,* and *violence against civilians* are interconnected in problematic ways.

Table 4.1: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients for *State Fragility, Security Apparatus, and Violence Against Civilians*

Variable	State Fragility	Security Apparatus	Violence Against Civilians
State Fragility [a]	1	.867*	.627*
Security Apparatus [a]	.867*	1	.573*
Violence Against Civilians [b]	.627*	.573*	1

*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
[a] Source: Fragile State Index.
[b] Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset.

As with most studies that seek to explain the natural phenomena through numbers and graphs, the main limitation of this study was the availability of complete and cohesive data. Although the recency of the ACLED data allows for the most current and pressing trends to be analyzed empirically, its novelty comes at a cost when attempting to merge its observations with those from other, less recent, datasets. This was a cost that was thoroughly contemplated and deemed to be worthwhile in order to explore how singular events, as opposed to conflicts generally, could explain a geostrategic landscape. It is hoped that with time the ACLED data for the Middle East will continue to expand its historical scope to better gauge how the effects of specific events—such as the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011—influenced the behavior of state and nonstate actors.

It is also important to note that this study is limited by the geographic scope that it chose to focus on. Although the decision to focus on the Middle East and North Africa was made to understand theoretical concepts in specific contexts, it is important to note that the results do not intend to make claims about the state of global conflict or to further misconceptions about this particular region's predisposition to violence or conflict. Valuable insights can be gained from understanding how conflicts erupt in a region that bears the burden of being the focal point of many nations' foreign policy and diplomatic objectives, but it is important to note that a more comprehensive understanding of conflict would be gained from a study that analyzed global as opposed to regional conflict. Thus, the results of this study must be understood and applied only within the narrow scope upon which they are focused.

Finally, as with any project capped by a deadline, this study was limited by the time that was allotted for its completion. Indeed, with each new paper that was read and each new

additional model that was run, it was believed that this study could be improved in one way or another. Furthermore, in the end stages of this project, I realized that a global focus could have offered more insightful results about the origins of and the responses to nonstate challenges to state authority. However, expanding the project in this manner at such a late stage in the writing process was infeasible. Future research would benefit from further analyzing the patterns uncovered in this analysis in a global context to confirm their strength and directionality of the relationships this research uncovered in a broader context.

Subsequent studies should also adopt an events-based global approach as opposed to a regional one. Establishing that human rights abuses and inadequate security forces fuel conflict in the Middle East and North Africa is important for policymakers seeking to formulate effective foreign policy initiatives; however, the narrow scope of this research limited the generalizability of the results. With intrastate conflicts making up the majority of the conflicts since 1950[179], producing knowledge that can apply to the varied contexts in which conflicts occur will ultimately be more productive than doing so to inform policy decisions.

In addition to researching the effects of human rights abuses on state fragility, further research could benefit from gaining a better understanding of how exactly refugees influence both state capacity and nonstate mobilization. The results of the events-based analysis presented here offered a different perspective on the nature of the causal mechanism than previous studies that focused on the influence of refugees in the more analytically static context of conflict. Although the influence of refugees on conflict diffusion is well defined in the extant literature, such an approach to studying population changes only accounts for the extreme outcome of

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[179] Pettersson & Wallensteen, "Armed conflicts, 1946–2014," p. 537.

migration while failing to acknowledge that such patterns mostly only result in minor instability in a country. The results in Chapter Two present a challenge to the prevailing wisdom of conflict diffusion by suggesting that violent nonstate groups can gain an upper hand both on refugee populations and the state by violently targeting these vulnerable populations. The lack of acknowledgement in the majority of the conflict literature to the violence faced by migrants illustrates an ignorance of the way such experiences shape migrants' decisions on whether to remain in a country or to settle there in the first place (an interpretation that would support the results seen in Table 2.3), as well as the ways such violence could impact both state capacity and the number of events a state experiences. Future research could expand on these observations by determining whether other variables—such as changes in migrant populations, the end of hostilities in a neighboring country, and changes in migrant dispersion patterns—influence the relationship between refugees and nonstate mobilization.

Further avenues for future research stem from the results indicating that government investment in a country experiencing conflict can increase the amount of decisive action a government takes when faced with a nonstate challenge. The results from Chapter Three (Model 3.2) suggest that increased foreign investment in a country could lead to a parallel increase in arrests of high-ranking members of nonstate groups. This relationship, as it is presented in this paper, is promising but tenuous. Although decisive action to resolve conflict may be desirable for the government, the long-term effects would need to be analyzed to better understand the enduring effects of the choices to employ cooperative versus coercive action to subdue a nonstate challenge. Foreign investment can be a powerful tool to support intelligence-sharing programs as well as developmental programs that can alleviate underlying issues that lead to popular unrest.

Thus expanding on the results of how exactly foreign investments can encourage productive and durable conflict resolutions could offer valuable insights into how countries can provide support to their allies in order to approach domestic conflicts in more productive ways, especially in a region that is becoming increasingly wary of foreign intervention after years of failed invasions and civil wars escalating to even deadlier and protracted proxy wars.

One final point which deserves future research is the relationship between state security and human autonomy. As has been discussed already in this section, the strongest relationships across all the models tested in this thesis related to the influence of human rights abuses and security apparatuses on the occurrence of state and nonstate engagement. This seems to suggest that, within this model, conflict amongst these actors occurs when a state's attempts to maintain a monopoly on the use of force infringe on the citizens' sense of personal autonomy. This presents a paradox in which a state's attempts to protect its citizens from threats can evolve into the object of a nonstate group's motivation to challenge a regime. Although the relationship between human rights abuses and state repression was not directly tested, researchers and policymakers could benefit from understanding the security-autonomy nexus when determining whether and how to respond to asymmetric conflicts that arise between nonstate groups and their governments.

Ultimately, future research should focus on how the events that occur in a country can create a climate that is conducive to either conflict or peace. By applying theories that look at society as a whole and attempting to understand the ways that their conceptions of these events are constructed, researchers can produce work that is observant of and attuned to the human impacts, costs, and reactions to conflict. Furthermore, expanding on frameworks that analyze

trends in event occurrences could allow for more meaningful interpretations of the dynamics that emerge in countries that experience instability before, during, and after the conclusion of a conflict. Finally, as has been voiced by other scholars, the most important duty of conflict research is to generate understanding of difficult situations in order to minimize the harm that they produce. It is hoped that this thesis met that standard and highlighted areas where policies could be improved to ensure that every human can expect to live a just, dignified, and prosperous life.

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Appendix

1. Event Type (dummies 1,0)

1. Battles
2. Explosions/Remote Violence
3. Violence Against Civilians
4. Protests
5. Riots
6. Strategic Developments

2. Subevent Type (dummies 1,0)
   1. Armed clash
   2. Government regains territory
   3. Non-state actor overtakes territory
   4. Chemical weapon
   5. Air/drone strike
   6. Suicide bomb
   7. Shelling/artillery/missile attack
   8. Remote explosive/landmine/IED
   9. Grenade
   10. Sexual violence
   11. Attack
   12. Abduction/forced disappearance
   13. Peaceful protest (start here)
   14. Protest with intervention
   15. Excessive force against protesters
   16. Violent demonstration
   17. Mob violence
   18. Agreement
   19. Arrests
   20. Change to group/activity
   21. Disrupted weapons use
   22. Headquarters or base established
   23. Looting/property destruction
   24. Non-violent transfer of territory
   25. Other

3. Inter1/2 (dummies 1,0)
   1. Military
   2. Rebel Groups
   3. Political Militias
   4. Identity Militias
   5. Rioters
   6. Protesters

       7. Civilians

       8. External Forces

5. Region (dummies 1,2,3)

       1. Middle East

       2. North Africa

       3. South Asia

6. Country (unique value 1:23)

       1. Afghanistan 2017 - 2019

       2. Algeria 1997 – 2019

       3. Bahrain 2016 – 2019

       4. Egypt 1997 – 2019

       5. Iran 2016 - 2019

       6. Iraq 2016 – 2019

       7. Israel 2016 – 2019

       8. Jordan 2016 - 2019

       9. Kuwait 2016 – 2019

       10. Lebanon 2016 -2019

       11. Libya 1997 – 2019

       12. Morocco 1997 – 2019

       13. Oman 2016 – 2019

       14. Pakistan 2010 – 2019

       15. Palestine 2016 -2019

       16. Qatar 2017 & 2019

       17. Saudi Arabia 2015 - 2019

       18. Sudan 1997 -2019

       19. Syria 2017 – 2019

       20. Tunisia 1997 – 2019

       21. Turkey 2016 - 2019

       22. UAE 2017- 2019

       23. Yemen 2015 – 2019

7. Conflicts (dummy 1,0)

       1. Afghanistan

          a. Civil War 2001 – Present (Internal)

       2. UAE

          a. Yemeni Civil War 2015 – Present (External)

          b. Sinai Insurgency 2018 – Present (External)

       3. Bahrain

          a. Decisive Storm 2015 – Present (External)

       4. Algeria

a. Algerian Civil War 1991 – 2002 (Internal)(SP)
5. Egypt
    a. Intervention in Libya 2015 – Present (External)
    b. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
6. Iran
    a. Iranian Revolution – 1979 (Internal)(SP)
7. Iraq
    a. War Against ISIS 2015 – Present (External)
8. Israel
    a. Operation Chess (against Hezbollah) 2012 - Present (External)
9. Jordan
    a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
10. Kuwait
    a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
11. Lebanon
    a. Fatah al-Islam Rebellion 2007 (SP)
12. Libya
    a. Libyan-Egyptian War 1977 (SP)
    b. Libyan Civil War 2011 – Present (Internal)
13. Morocco
    a. Western Sahara War 1971 – 1991 (SP)
    b. First Sahrawi Intifada 1999 – 2004 (Internal)
    c. Independence Intifada – 2005 (Internal)
14. Oman
    a. Gulf War 1990 – 1991 (SP)
15. Pakistan
    a. War in North Pakistan 2004 – Present (Internal)
16. Palestine
    a. Operation Protective Edge
17. Qatar
    a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – 2017 (External)
18. Saudi Arabia
    a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
19. Sudan
    a. Lord's Resistance Army Insurgency 1987 – Present (Internal)
    b. War In Darfur 2003 – Present (Internal)
    c. Chadi-Sudan Conflict (External)
20. Syria
    a. Syrian Civil War 2011 – Present (Internal)

21. Tunisia
    a. Bizerte Crisis 1961 – (Internal)(SP)
22. Turkey
    a. American-led Invasion in Iraq 2015 – Present (External)
23. Yemen
    a. Yemeni Civil War 2015 – Present (Internal)

8. Conflict in Neighbor (dummy 1,0)
    1. Afghanistan
        a. War in North Pakistan 2004 – Present (Internal)
    2. UAE
        a. NA
    3. Bahrain
        a. NA
    4. Libya
        a. Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)
        b. Chadian Civil War (2005-2011)
        c. Sudan-South Sudan Border War (2012)
        d. War in Darfur (2003 – Present)
    5. Egypt
        a. Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)
        b. Libyan Civil War (2011 – Present)
    6. Iran
        a. Afghanistan Civil War (2001 – Present)
    7. Iraq
        a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
    8. Israel
        a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
    9. Jordan
        a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
    10. Kuwait
        a. NA
    11. Lebanon
        a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
    12. Libya
        a. First Sahrawi Intifada (1999 – 2004)
        b. Libyan Civil War (2011-Present)
    13. Morocco
        a. Algerian Civil War (1991 – 2002)
    14. Oman

a. NA
15. Pakistan
    a. Afghanistan Civil War (2001 – Present)
16. Palestine
    a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
17. Qatar
    a. NA
18. Saudi Arabia
    a. NA
19. Sudan
    a. Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000)
    b. Central African Republic Bush War (2004-2007)
    c. Chadian Civil War (2005-2011)
    d. Libyan Civil War (2011 – Present)
20. Syria
    a. NA
21. Tunisia
    a. Libyan Civil War (2011 – Present)
22. Turkey
    a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
23. Yemen
    a. NA
9. Leadership Changes -> so it would reset at zero on election year and count up after that
    1. Afghanistan 2017 - 2019 (President)
       a. SP: 2014 – Hamid Karzai -> Ashraf Ghani
    2. Algeria 1997 – 2019 (President)
       a. SP: 1994 - Ali Kafi -> Liamine Zéroual
       b. 1999 - Liamine Zéroual -> Abelaziz Bouteflika
       c. 2019 - Abelaziz Bouteflika -> Abdelkader Bensalah
    3. Bahrain 2016 – 2019 (King)
       a. SP: 1999 - Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa -> Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
    4. Egypt 1997 – 2019 (President)
       a. SP: 1981 Anwar Sadat -> Hosni Mubarak
       b. 2011 – Hosni Mubarak -> Mohammed Morsi
       c. 2012 – Mohammed Morsi -> Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
    5. Iran 2016 - 2019 (Supreme Leader)
       a. SP: 1989 - Ruhollah Khomeini -> Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei
    6. Iraq 2016 – 2019 (President)
       a. SP: 2014 - Jalal Talabani -> Fuad Masum

        b.   2018 – Fuad Masum -> Barham Salih

7. Israel 2016 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
    a. SP: 2009 - Ehud Olmert -> Benjamin Netanyahu
8. Jordan 2016 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
    a. SP: 2016 - Abdullah Ensour -> Hani Mulki
    b. 2018 – Hani Mulki -> Omar Razzaz
9. Kuwait 2016 – 2019 (Emir)
    a. SP: 2006 - Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah -> Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
10. Lebanon 2016 -2019 (President)
    a. SP: 2016 – Michel Sleiman -> Michel Aoun
11. Libya 1997 – 2019 (Chairman of the Presidential Council) (this is why the 'ongoing conflict' variable is important)
    a. SP: 1969 = Muammar Gaddafi
    b. 2011 – Muammar Gaddafi -> Mustafa Abdul Jalil
    c. 2012 - Mustafa Abdul Jalil -> Mohamed Magariaf
    d. 2013 - Mohamed Magariaf -> Nouri Abusahmain
    e. 2016 -> Nouri Abusahmain -> Fayez al-Sarraj
12. Morocco 1997 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
    a. SP: 1994 - Mohammed Karim Lamrani -> Abdellatif Filali
    b. 1998 - Abdellatif Filali -> Abderrahmane Youssoufi
    c. 2002 - Abderrahmane Youssoufi -> Driss Jetou
    d. 2007 - Driss Jettou -> Abbas El Fassi
    e. 2011 - Abbas El Fassi -> Abdelilah Benkirane
    f. 2017 - Abdelilah Benkirane -> Saadeddine Othmani
13. Oman 2016 – 2019 (Sultan)
    a. SP: 1970 - Said bin Taimur -> Qaboos bin Said Al Said (note: Sultan Qaboos had not yet died during the time of the data analysis, thus the transition is not noted)
14. Pakistan 2010 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
    a. SP: 2008 - Muhammad Mian Soomro -> Yousaf Raza Gillani
    b. 2012 - Raja Pervaiz Ashraf -> Mir Hazar Khan Khoso
    c. 2013 - Mir Hazar Khan Khoso -> Nawaz Sharif
    d. 2017 - Shahid Khaqan Abbasi -> Nasirul ul Mulk
    e. 2018 – Nasirul ul Mulk –> Imran Khan
15. Palestine 2016 -2019
    a. NA
16. Qatar 2017 & 2019 (Emir)

a. SP: 2013 - Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani -> Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
17. Saudi Arabia 2015 – 2019 (King)
    a. SP: 2015 - Abdullah bin Abdulaziz -> Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
18. Sudan 1997 -2019 (President)
    a. SP: 1989 - Ahmed al-Mirghani -> Omar al-Bashir
    b. 2019 – Omar al-Bashir –> Sovereignty Council
19. Syria 2017 – 2019 (President)
    a. SP: 2000 – Hafez Assad -> Bashar al-Assad
20. Tunisia 1997 – 2019 (President)
    a. SP: 1987 – Habib Bourguiba -> Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
    b. 2011 - Moncef Marzouki -> Beji Caid Essebsi
    c. 2019 – Beji Caid Essebsi -> Kais Saied
21. Turkey 2016 – 2019 (President)
    a. SP: 2014 - Abdullah Gül -> Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
22. UAE 2017- 2019 (President)
    a. SP: 2004 - Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan -> Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan
23. Yemen 2015 – 2019 (President)
    a. SP: 2012 – Ali Abdullah Salih -> Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi