

# Contextualizing Migration: An Historical and Political Perspectives of the India-Bangladesh Land Swap Deal of 2015

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## Abstract

The land swap deal between India and Bangladesh was, indeed, a great deal concerning land boundary management in particular and bilateral relations in general. India and Bangladesh share 4096.7 km land boundary; and disputes over this long boundary, namely un-demarcated boundary, adverse possessions and enclaves started from the very beginning which Bangladesh had inherited from Pakistan. However, to resolve the land boundary disputes, the governments of India and Bangladesh signed the Land Boundary Agreement in 1974. Subsequently, Bangladesh had ratified the agreement and carried out its task within a few months. In contrast, the agreement was remained unimplemented by India for 41 years (1974-2015). Eventually, after a lot of bilateral deliberations, India found a way to implement the agreement in 2015. It is remarkable that the resolution of the land boundary conflicts, as well as the territorial readjustments through practical, give and take (i.e. exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions) has created more unified territories both for India and Bangladesh. Against this backdrop, the present article sheds light on the historical and political perspectives of the Indo-Bangladesh land swap deal and, thereby, underscores the key factors behind this final deal. Finally, it discusses the repercussions of migration and the issue of individuals trapped in enclaves. It is the responsibility of both governments to resolve the issue urgently amid the COVID 19 pandemic attack.

**Keywords:** Land swap deal, land boundary disputes, land boundary agreement, India-Bangladesh border, borderland people, enclaves, Indo-Bangladesh relationship



## Introduction

India and Bangladesh are in a close tie, based on geographical vicinity, common natural resources, socio-economic structure as well as shared history and culture. In the first place, Bangladesh and the adjacent states of India (West Bengal, Sikkim, Meghalaya, Tripura, Assam and Mizoram) have developed 'as one economy' from time immemorial, which was ridiculously divided during the partition of 1947, leaving them mutually dependent. For all these reasons, the 'linguistic and cultural affinity and sense of oneness' (Mohammed, 2005, p. 3) between the Indian states mentioned above and Bangladesh continue till today.

However, India and Bangladesh share 4096.7 km land boundary, out of which 180 km is riverine, and 6.1 km was un-demarcated till 2015. The waterways across the 180 km border often with multiple branches have resorted this border to a complex and sensitive one.<sup>[1]</sup> Since rivers change their course frequently, this border, in some locations, is highly floating and volatile. These unpredictable bordering rivers between India and Bangladesh very often, by altering their directions or by corroding land on one side, push the peripheral lands across the border. The Muhuri river, for instance, has created a tiny *char* land by corroding land which has been the bone of contention between India and Bangladesh for so many years.

The land boundary conflicts between India and Bangladesh were indeed inborn which Bangladesh had inherited from Pakistan with root causes in the Award of the Boundary Commission headed by Cyril Radcliffe (1947). Thereupon, disputes arose between India and Pakistan regarding some areas, some of which were the subject of the Bagge Awards of 1950. The rest of the disputes were resolved in the so-called Nehru-Noon Agreement of 1958. For the execution of the Nehru-Noon Agreement, the Constitution Ninth Amendment Act and Acquired Territories (Merger) Act were also adopted by the Indian Government in 1960. Despite that, the West Bengal Legislative Assembly (*Vidhan Sabha*) was firmly opposed to the agreement. The Agreement was also challenged in the court by several writ petitions. Therefore, the Indian government could not initiate the implementation process of the agreement. Eventually, the Supreme Court of India came up with a decision on 29 March 1971 which had cleared the way for the implementation of the agreement. Even so, the agreement could not be implemented evidently because of the ongoing Liberation War of Bangladesh. Subsequently, the unaccomplished Nehru-Noon Agreement was replaced by the Land Boundary Agreement of 1974 (henceforth LBA) between India and Bangladesh. Ironically, this agreement was also hanged for 41 years (1974-2015).

The hang-up of the LBA had been the source of escalating tension between India and Bangladesh for all the years. Though the governments of these two countries frequently described their relations as of great companionship, in reality, the lack of confidence in each other has been manifested at least in the case of border management. Schendel (2005, p. 297) remarked: 'Even though heads of government, in public statements, could grow lyrical about the warm relations and eternal friendship between their country and its neighbours, realities at the border told a very different story. The borderland fluctuated between tension and outright confrontation, and interstate relations at the border have always been marked by strain, suspicion and suspense. It is to be noted that, the adverse possessions had been flashpoints between India and Bangladesh intensifying the tensions along the border (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], Government of India 2015, p. 16). Eventually, after a lot of bilateral deliberations, vis-à-vis political confrontations at national levels in both countries the governments of India and Bangladesh found a way to implement the LBA in 2015.

## India-Pakistan Land Boundary Disputes, 1947-71

Borrowing from Benedict Anderson's (2006) idea, as he writes in *Imagined Communities*, it could be surmised that the emergence of the India-Pakistan border in 1947 was though de-colonial the border was colonially determined, and the outstanding disputes over this border were rooted into the award of the Boundary Commission. However, in the process of partition in 1947, the then Governor-General of India, Mountbatten's formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity. It was a huge task and was assigned to the Boundary Commission, headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe.<sup>[9]</sup> It is pertinent to note that the Radcliffe Commission determined the boundary only based on old district maps without any field survey. Moreover, the guide maps at Radcliffe's hand were 'imperfect and out-of-date' and never situated in the greater, stable geographic contest (Rashid, 2002). Thus, in the end, his award pleased no one entirely. Therefore, the premiers of both East and West Bengal immediately issued a joint statement envisaging readjustments of the boundary (Spate, 1948).

Consequently, the determination of the land boundary ran into many difficulties right from the beginning. In this regard, in reply to a question in the *Lok Sabha* (House of the People) on 9 December 1958, the then Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru said,

When the internal administrative boundaries also become international frontiers, it makes a difference. One side of a river is sometimes described as the other side. Maps are attached to the description, but they do not tally. Sometimes a river is named, and there is doubt as to which river is mean (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting [MIB], 1964, p. 285).

It is beyond doubt that in the tripartite (Congress, League and the British rulers) politics of the partition, Jinnah's 'two nations theory' had tentatively won the match. But the sub-continental historiography attests that 'despite achieving his dream' Jinnah himself was not pleased with what he had achieved as Pakistan. When the award was made public, Jinnah commented in a radio broadcast:

It is an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse award. It may be wrong, unjust and perverse; and it may not be judicial but a political award, but we have agreed to abide by it, and it is binding upon us (as quoted in Schendel, 2005, p. 88).

History attests that if common interests and traits are divided into two by nations or states, their commonness creates more competition if not conflict. A similar thing happened to the two parts of Bengal after the partition of 1947. The two governments have forcefully inscribed the unnatural borderline into the landscape. Jones (2011) argued that, perhaps, because of the linguistic, cultural and historical connections between Bangladesh (erstwhile East Bengal) and the West Bengal, the political border has been substantially strengthened and securitised. Besides, two different nationalisms on two sides of the border were discursively defined by the state elites. In doing so, state elites have been in the continuous

practice of making 'self' and 'other' across the India-Bangladesh border. However, in institutionalizing the entirely new land boundary, the governments had adopted some new tools of territorial control, such as border guarding, customs and passport-visa system, and homogenizing the borderland population by ethnic cleansing or removing the minorities from the borderlands. As a whole, both India and Pakistan employed precisely the same strategy (Schendel, 2005). Thus, in the initial stage, the land boundary between India and then East Pakistan was institutionalized through communal violence which victimised those who were fallen on the wrong side of the border and suddenly got the status of 'religious minority'. Subsequently, there were violent expulsions of Hindus from the East Pakistan borderland and Muslims from the Indian borderland.

### **Indira-Mujib Initiatives about the Land Boundary Disputes, 1971-75**

The unsettled border between India and erstwhile East Pakistan became the border between India and Bangladesh. Thus, Bangladesh inherited all the disputes (with India) from Pakistan namely undemarcated land boundary, adverse possessions and enclaves. It is on-topic that a warm relation was built between Bangladesh and India at the outset owing to the generous support from both the government and the people of India towards its Liberation War in 1971. At the government level, the tune of the bilateral relations was set by the two great leaders –Indian Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh Prime Minister, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Remarkably, Indira Gandhi had played a unique role in drawing the attention of the world leaders to the Pakistan army's onslaught and, thereby, the human tragedy over the then East Pakistan. She had also conveyed worldwide the message of the Bangladesh people's determined struggle for freedom. It is widely held that if one single person other than Bangladeshi had the most significant contribution to the liberation of Bangladesh, it was indisputably Indira Gandhi.

The gratitude of Bangladesh might have been materialised in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace (referred to as Friendship Treaty), signed on 19 March 1972. The treaty was signed in Dhaka during the visit of Indira Gandhi to Bangladesh during 17-19 March 1972. This ever first visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Bangladesh, as well as the ever first visit to Bangladesh by any Head of Government, took place just after three months of the liberation of Bangladesh. Subsequently, the outstanding land boundary issues between these two countries warranted the attention of both governments.

The most arresting part of the Bengal border (Indo-Pakistan border 1947-71 and after that India-Bangladesh border) is that it runs through densely populated agrarian areas and that the borderland people of both countries cultivate lands till the zero line. But during the Pakistan period, tensions and conflicts prevailed in the India-East Pakistan border which had devastated the lives and livelihoods of the borderland people. Against this backdrop, the governments of Bangladesh and India were prompted to

normalise the life and livelihood of the borderland people. Consequently, cross-border trade and economic linkages among the borderland people were restored under the Trade Agreement of 1972.<sup>[3]</sup>

Later, Agreements such as Land Boundary Agreement, 1974, Joint India-Bangladesh Guidelines for Border Authorities, 1975 were critical in shaping the independence of two borders. Though the India-Bangladesh borderlands at the beginning were to be that of interdependent borderlands<sup>[4]</sup>, the border security forces of India and Bangladesh maintained relations of mutual understanding and cooperation, and nothing happened in the border of 'a serious nature' (*The Bangladesh Observer*, 25 April 1975). Nevertheless, a few border incidents of a minor nature have occurred, but the rapid understanding was reached by coordination and combined effort. Against this backdrop, the need was felt for further vigilance and action to wipe out the illegal flow of arms, ammunition and explosives, movement of extremists, smuggling and similar border crimes.

However, it was realised in the Border Guidelines that no separate action by anyone government would produce the desired result unless there are ample understanding and coordination between the border guarding agencies of the two countries. These guidelines were comprehensive do's and don'ts for the Border Security Forces of India (BSF) and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) with provisions for urgent flag meetings for dealing with isolated infringements (Mohammed 2005). No matter how, the guidelines seemed very pragmatic, humanistic, and dynamic.

### **The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Military Rule in Bangladesh: LBA was Pushed to the Backburner**

The political landscape in Bangladesh was drastically changed after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15 August 1975. Subsequently, a military regime started for quite a long period (1975-1990), and there was a total and complete change' in the political scenario of Bangladesh during this period (Bhasin, 1996). It is widely held that the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was part of a long-term plan of the pro-Pakistan elements to make Bangladesh a pro-Islamic and anti-Indian country. Consequently, while attempts were made by the regimes during 1975-1996<sup>[5]</sup> to resolve some of the outstanding problems, the atmosphere of negotiations mostly tended to be conflictual. Sobhan (2011) argued that the assassin's bullets transformed what promised to be an amicable relationship into an essentially adversarial one. However, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Friendship Treaty came to be viewed negatively and was found to be counter-productive in the altered political situation of Bangladesh. It was 'allowed to be atrophied and eventually did die unceremoniously at the end of its term in 1997' (Rashid, 2002, p. 26). Apparently, in response to this, LBA was embroiled in India. Under these circumstances, India's project for erecting a border fence in the 1980s led both countries to rhetoric. It was also held by many that during the military rule, Bangladesh became a 'security concern'

for India. For all these reasons, the mobilisation of border guarding forces on both sides of the border and cross-border firing became a common phenomenon during this time.

### **Triggering off the LBA by Sheikh Hasina**

The relations between India and Bangladesh began to improve when Awami League came to power in 1996 for the first time since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Notably, a significant policy shift underwent in Bangladesh on the India issue during the tenure of Sheikh Hasina's government. In reciprocity, India also changed its position as far as the bilateral relationship is concerned. In this changed political scenario, during Indian Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda's visit to Bangladesh on 6-7 January 1997, both governments decided to form Joint Working Groups to discuss border-related issues. Subsequently, the work of settling the land boundary disputes had started after the formation of the Joint Boundary Working Groups (JBWG) in June 2001. The mandate of JBWG was to evolve a comprehensive package proposal to resolve the outstanding land boundary disputes (MEA, 2015).

The ice of the LBA started melting during Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina's visit to New Delhi on 10-13 January 2010. A wide range of issues was featured in the summit, and several accords were signed which as a whole, provided a mutually beneficial and productive relationship. Both countries agreed to comprehensively address all the land boundary conflicts keeping in view the spirit of the LBA and the Indian government was seemingly willing to 'travel the extra mile by taking some non-reciprocal steps in various fields (Karim, 2010). India-Bangladesh Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP) and the signing of border strip maps led the surveyors of India and Bangladesh to prepare the border strip maps, based on the ground realities.<sup>[6]</sup> However, through the signing of strip maps, the long-standing border conflict between India and Bangladesh eventually came to an end on the ground.

### **Manmohan Sing's Visit to Bangladesh and the Protocol of 2011**

It was the first bilateral summit held in Dhaka since the historic first summit meeting between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1972. Several other Prime Ministers of India since then had visited Dhaka but not for a bilateral summit (Sobhan 2011). Interestingly, because of Mamata Banerjee's withdrawal, no agreement was concluded in the Dhaka summit saving the Protocol to the LBA. However, the focus of the protocol was to complete the demarcation of the land boundary in light of the LBA. In a true sense, the protocol was the details of the execution of the LBA on the ground and, therefore, it was a significant development in the way of implementation of the LBA. The most significant event that took place at the summit was a declaration for facilitating 24-hour unfettered access to the Tin Bigha corridor for Bangladesh. It is memorable that India had opened the Tin Bigha corridor for Bangladesh for the first time on 26 June 1992, following the second 'Lease in Perpetuity' (signed on 26 March 1992). Initially, the

corridor was remained open for six hours in the daytime only (in alternative hours). In 1996, the opening time was extended for unconstrained 12 hours from 6.30 am to 6.30 pm. Finally, the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh declared in the Dhaka summit that Bangladesh would get 24-hour unfettered access to the Tin Bigha corridor which was instantly executed on 8 September 2011 (*The Daily Star*, 9 September 2011).

### **Narendra Modi's Regional Vision and BJP's U-turn about the LBA**

It was widely held that a feeling of alienation and a degree of discontent had set in India's relations with the neighbours during the last years of the Manmohan Singh regime. Even where the government wanted to barge, like in the case of Bangladesh, it was constrained by coalition politics (Muni, 2015). However, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) had a surprisingly good start in this regard by pursuing 'both bilateral and regional tracks with equal vigour' (Sidhu and Godbole, 2015). The strong push toward reviving bilateral ties was evident in Modi's first foreign visit to Bhutan and then to Nepal and his Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj to Bangladesh within the first 100 days in office. In the general debate of the 69<sup>th</sup> session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Narendra Modi remarked, 'A nation's destiny is linked to its neighbourhood. That is why my government has placed the highest priority on advancing friendship and cooperation with its neighbours (as quoted in Chaturvedy, 2014).

#### *'Neighbourhood First' Foreign Policy and 'Cooperative Federalism'*

The experts of India-Bangladesh relations argue that the implementation of the long-delayed LBA became possible in 2015 mainly because of Narendra Modi's 'neighbourhood first' foreign policy. It is pertinent to note that BJP used to oppose the LBA throughout history until Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India. It was Modi's 'neighbourhood first' foreign policy which had changed the mindset of BJP and its government towards the LBA. It is of note that Modi was relatively much stronger than any other Prime Ministers of India in recent memory. His growing position and his 'personality cult' (Aiyar, 2018) coupled with the 'neighbourhood first' foreign policy and 'cooperative federalism' paradigm in policy-making and policy implementation has brought massive success in operationalizing the long-pending LBA.

To be mindful that though the foreign policy and international agreements of India are under the prerogative of the central government, the cooperation and support of the border state governments are all-important in the implementation of any agreements with its neighbours like Bangladesh. It is remarkable that because of the non-cooperation from the West Bengal government the LBA was not implemented in 2011. Also, it is because of the lack of consent of the West Bengal government that the Teesta water-sharing treaty once again was not concluded during Narendra Modi's visit to Bangladesh

in 2015 although the stage looked well set for a breakthrough by both India and Bangladesh. Sikri (2015) remarked, 'Modi's Team India approach, which includes the Chief Ministers of state government as part of policy-making and policy implementation structure, has brought in a breath of fresh air, yielding rich dividends in operationalizing the long-pending LBA between India and Bangladesh. PM Modi's new paradigm, his concept of "cooperative federalism" is an essential and dispensable component of his "neighbourhood first" foreign policy.

It is argued that the real benefit of the 'neighbourhood first' foreign policy is, Bangladesh has provided a great strategic opportunity to India from regional perspectives. Bangladesh is now at the frontline of India's counter-terrorism strategy. Moreover, Bangladesh has emerged as a key gateway for India's sub-regional initiatives such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal Initiative (BBIN) showcasing bonds with Bangladesh as proof of Modi's 'neighbourhood first' policy (Kaura, 2018). India's Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar remarked, 'if there is one example where the "neighbourhood first" foreign policy has yielded good result, it is in the case of Bangladesh' (as quoted in Kaura 2018).

### **Dhaka Summit of 2015 and the Land Swap Deal: Impact on Migration**

Back to back summit-level visits by Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to New Delhi in 2010 and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Dhaka in 2011 had laid down the way for the implementation of the LBA. There was an expectation that the LBA and Teesta water sharing would be concluded during Manmohan Singh's visit to Bangladesh. But being hostage to coalition politics in India nothing happened except for signing the Protocol to the LBA. However, Manmohan Singh's government did the most preparatory work about the implementation of the LBA. Under these circumstances, after four years, with Narendra Modi as Prime Minister of India (through the landslide victory in the election of 2014) another summit was set for in Dhaka in June 2015. The year 2014 also witnessed Sheikh Hasina assuming the office of Prime Minister for a consecutive second term in Bangladesh (ever first for any government in Bangladesh). However, it is Hasina's bold leadership<sup>[7]</sup> that steered Bangladesh to stand by India in addressing its security concerns in north-eastern regions. However, in the meantime, Hasina and Modi had two rounds of meetings in New York (September 2014) and Kathmandu (November 2014) on the sidelines of the UNGA and the SAARC summit. In such an atmosphere, Narendra Modi visited Bangladesh 'with a sense of enthusiasm and delight' (*The Daily Star*, 6 June 2015). On his arrival in Dhaka, Modi tweeted, 'Hello Bangladesh. I bring with me the affection & goodwill of the people of India' (as quoted in Karim, 2015).



Eventually, the Instruments of Ratification of the LBA was exchanged in the Dhaka Summit (6-7 June 2015). The Protocol of 2011 and the 'Letters on Modalities for Implementation of the LBA and the Protocol of 2011' were also exchanged between the two governments. It is to be noted that the Protocol of 2011 and the Letters on Modalities constituted an Agreement between India and Bangladesh. Consequently, the LBA was implemented and thus the land swap deal including the exchange of enclaves were eventually made. It is worth mentioning that the resolution of land boundary conflicts and the territorial readjustments with practical give and take (in cases of enclaves and adverse possessions) have created more unified territories both for India and Bangladesh.

Consequently, around 38,000 Indians in Bangladesh and 15,000 Bangladeshis in India are trapped in the vicious catch. (Hosna J. Shewly, March 9, 2016)<sup>[4]</sup>. It has eventually led to an enclave conundrum. The challenges of people trapped under this enclave conundrum are the issues related to their identity, lack of documents, basic educational, administrative and health security. Amid COVID -19 pandemic, the issues of individuals trapped in enclave got highlighted as they could not avail any of the benefits, social security, health security etc.

The historical and political exchanges and agreements do explain the prevailing enclave of immigration in both countries. However, the onset of the COVID 19 pandemic conveys the urgent need to resolve the crises of human life, ensuring the health security of each individual.

## **Conclusion**

The foresightedness of Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had led India and Bangladesh to sign the LBA which provided meticulous guidelines for an early and amicable resolution to the outstanding land boundary issues. Both governments as well as people, in general, were delighted about the agreement. But the political landscape in Bangladesh was drastically changed after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. During the period between 1975-1996 'Bangladesh's approach was derived, in part, from the nature of its adversarial domestic politics where confrontation with India was seen as a point of differentiation with the political forces who were seen as 'Pro-Indian' (Sobhan, 2011). This incursion of India-Bangladesh relation into the fault lines of domestic politics had made the resolution of outstanding problems with India difficult. Because of the failure to negotiate such agreements for fear of being accused of selling out the country to India, few problems were satisfactorily resolved over the years. However, a significant policy shift was undergone in both Bangladesh and India regarding the bilateral relationship during Sheikh Hasina's regimes in Bangladesh.

Also, India's policy towards Bangladesh in 2015 was motivated by some regional perspectives as far as India is concerned. On the other hand, Bangladesh is central to India's 'Act East policy. All these prompted

Narendra Modi's Government to resolve the long-pending land boundary disputes with Bangladesh. The fine-tuning between the bold leadership of Sheikh Hasina and Narendra Modi contributed the most to the historic land swap deal between India and Bangladesh in 2015. The issue of a vicious enclave of individuals must be resolved urgently as the COVID -19 pandemic has raised serious issues regarding health security. Both countries must implement policies and strategically streamline the issues across borders.

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📄 <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/india-and-bangladesh-swap-territory-citizens-landmark-enclave-exchange>

📄 Fifty-four of the rivers of Bangladesh, including the major ones, out of a total of over 230, flown in from India, i.e they either originate in India and/or flow within India before entering into Bangladesh. Bangladesh is thus the lower riparian for all these rivers (Mohammed, 2005, p. 3).

📄 For many reasons, the Boundary Commission was not in a position to ensure righteousness in its work. Firstly, Radcliffe, being a British as well as a first-comer to India, neither was well-known to the geography and history of the so vast and diverse land which he had divided nor he knew the conditions on the ground. Secondly, he did it so hastily within a short span of 34 days (from the day of his arrival to India on 8 July to 13 August 1947). Thirdly, as the chairman of both Bengal and Punjab boundary commissions Radcliffe was under the double burden and had no free time for scrutiny. Fourthly, the members of the Boundary Commission (two Hindu judges and two Muslim judges) 'on all material points' divided two and two, 'leaving Cyril Radcliffe the invidious task of making the actual decisions' (Spate, 1948).

📄 The Trade Agreement provided that in order to meet the day to day requirements of the people living within a sixteen-kilometre belt of the border, border trade shall be allowed in specified commodities.

📄 In the *interdependent borderlands*, the societies on both sides of the border are symbolically linked leading to a considerable flow of economic and human resources across the border (see for details Martinez, 1994).

📄 Though democracy was restored in Bangladesh in 1991 the first BNP Government (1991-1996), as viewed by many scholars, was also of anti-Indian spirit.

📄 A strip map is a simple un-scaled drawing of a route including critical points along the border. It usually incorporates distances, roadside features and town facilities on a simple flip-over style map. However, a total of 628 strip maps were drawn for 2,262 km border with West Bengal, 93 strip maps for 264 km border with Assam, 20 strip maps for 320 km border with Mizoram, 269 strip maps for 874 km border with Tripura and 139 strip maps for 436 km border with Meghalaya.

📄 A bold leader is someone who is courageous. They are prepared to go against the tide of popular thinking. They often see problems and challenges as opportunities. They are committed to their vision. They are bold enough to see their vision, work towards it, shape it and gather others to it (see for details Keep Thinking Big [KTB], n.d., retrieved from <https://keepthinkingbig.com/bold>)

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