3-2012

Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership

Pascal Simon

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

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Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership

Cambodia

Geneva, March 2012
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), an international expert organisation legally based in Switzerland as a non-profit foundation, works for the elimination of mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards, such as unsafe munitions stockpiles. The GICHD provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards. In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD’s work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan, coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

This report was written by Pascal Simon, independent consultant.
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# Glossary of Acronyms

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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Accra Agenda for Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACIMA</td>
<td>Australia – Cambodia Integrated Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMAC</td>
<td>Agriculture Development in Mine-Affected Areas of Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIMAD</td>
<td>Australia Integrated Mine Action and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Australian Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUD</td>
<td>Australian Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVI</td>
<td>Australian Volunteers International</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance</td>
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<td>BLDP</td>
<td>Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLS</td>
<td>Baseline Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOT</td>
<td>Build Operation and Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4R</td>
<td>Clearing for Results</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Canadian Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMRR</td>
<td>Community Based Mine Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>CBR</td>
<td>Community Based Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBURR</td>
<td>Community Based UXO Risk Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Commune Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munition</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDCC</td>
<td>Cambodian Demining Coordination Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDCF</td>
<td>Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDMG</td>
<td>Cambodian Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Commune Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRA</td>
<td>Cambodian Demining Regulatory Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Consultative Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGDK</td>
<td>Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDI</td>
<td>Cambodian Initiative for Disability Inclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>Community Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMAA</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMAS</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine Action Standard</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMVIS</td>
<td>Cambodian Mine/ERW Victim Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Cambodian People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Cambodian Red Cross</td>
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<td>CRDB</td>
<td>Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSGMIIMA</td>
<td>Community Strengthening and Gender Mainstreaming in Integrated Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Cambodia Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Disability Action Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIM</td>
<td>Direct Implementation Modality</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>Disabled People Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Democratic Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DU</td>
<td>Demining Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSORN</td>
<td>Economic and Social Re-launch of Northwest Provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnant of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euro</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>Front Uni, National, pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Governing Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDCC</td>
<td>Government – Development partners Coordination Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>GICHID</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMAP</td>
<td>Gender and Mine Action Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>GSI</td>
<td>GeoSpatial International</td>
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<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>The HALO Trust</td>
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<td>HAR</td>
<td>Harmonisation, Alignment and Result</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWDA</td>
<td>International Women Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>KR</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1S</td>
<td>Level 1 Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMAD</td>
<td>Linking Mine Action and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR</td>
<td>Land Release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUMU</td>
<td>Land Use Management Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUPU</td>
<td>Land Use Planning Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAB</td>
<td>Mine Action Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>Mine Action Coordination Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MADWG</td>
<td>Mine Action District Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPU</td>
<td>Mine Action Planning Unit</td>
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<td>MAX</td>
<td>Mine Action Exchange Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Mine Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCTU</td>
<td>Mine Clearance Training Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MDD   Mine Detection Dog
MDG   Millennium Development Goals
MoEF   Ministry of Economy and Finance
MoEYS  Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport
MoH   Ministry of Health
MLMUPC Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction
MoLVT  Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training
MoP   Ministry of Planning
MoSVY  Ministry of Social affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation
MoWA  Ministry of Women Affairs
MUC   Mine/UXO Committee
NDCC  National Disability Coordination Committee
NGO   Non-governmental organisation
NIM   National Implementation Modality
NMAA  National Mine Action Authority
NMAS  National Mine Action Strategy
MSP   Meeting of States Parties
NOG   National Operating Guideline
NPA   Norwegian People’s Aid
NPA-PWD National Plan of Action for People with Disability
NPMEC National Peacekeeping Mine and ERW Centre
NSDP  National Strategic Development Plan
OMOL  One Man One Lane
PBA   Programme Based Approach
PEG   Project Executive Group
PLA   Participatory Learning in Action
PM   Prime Minister
PMAC  Provincial Mine Action Committee
PRK   People’s Republic of Kampuchea
PSC   Provincial Sub Committee on Land Use in Mined Areas
PWD   People With Disabilities
QA   Quality Assurance
QAM   Quality Assurance Monitor
QM   Quality Management
RCAF  Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RGC   Royal Government of Cambodia
SHA   Suspected Hazardous Area
SNC   Supreme National Council
SOC   State of Cambodia
SOP   Standard Operating Procedure
STA   Senior Technical Advisor
TA   Technical Assistance / Technical Advisor
TAB   Technical Advisory Board
TADS  Technical Assistance to Demining Service
TF   Trust Fund
TW   Technical Working Group
UN   United Nations
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission for Cambodia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDHA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSYG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Veteran International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cambodia’s mine and ERW problem is a result of the long period of civil and regional conflicts that affected the country from the late 60s until 1998. Due to these conflicts, Cambodia is now one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world, with more than 63,000 mine/ERW victims recorded since 1979.

The first efforts to address Cambodia’s massive mine/ERW contamination came from the UN Advance Mission for Cambodia (UNAMIC), which contracted the HALO Trust in 1991-1992 to survey 700 km² of land in Battambang province ahead of the probable repatriation of 360,000 Cambodian refugees based in Thailand. In March 1992, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), deployed in February of that year, took over UNAMIC's mission and functions, including assisting mine clearance and mine awareness activities. So in July 1992, UNTAC set up the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU) and started to teach Cambodian nationals to identify, locate and destroy landmines, and to mark minefields.

Meanwhile, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was also created in 1992, with a mandate to conduct mine clearance and mine risk education, including by coordination with international NGO operators such as Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), HALO, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), all of which started mine clearance operations in the northwest of the country that same year. After UNTAC’s withdrawal in August 1993, UNDP and UNOPS started to provide technical and financial support to CMAC through a UN Trust Fund for Demining in Cambodia.

By the time it formally adopted its first national strategic plan in 1995, CMAC had become an efficient, autonomous organisation whose coordination role encouraged healthy competition between operators and a high level of cooperation between all organisations involved in mine action. Nevertheless, despite the high degree of national ownership of the mine action programme, CMAC’s management model—the organisation played the role of both a mine action centre and a mine action authority—proved to be too ’bulky’ and unmanageable. Unsurprisingly, in 1999, several allegations of corruption, mismanagement and nepotism surfaced. As a result, a large number of CMAC managers and staff were demoted, moved to other positions or simply resigned. In addition, donor confidence was dramatically affected and most donors halted or diminished their financial support, waiting for the organisation’s reform.

The 1999 crisis forced the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to seek means of regaining the confidence of donors. This was done by engaging in a very structured and robust reform of CMAC, which significantly enhanced its operational capacity and productivity, and significantly improved the quality of its management. The organization slimmed down the headquarter structure with only three departments and reorganized the operations to gain in flexibility and responsiveness. In addition, the RGC also restructured the institutional framework of the entire mine action sector in Cambodia by creating the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) as an entity completely separate from CMAC.

The establishment of CMAA, as a both a coordinating body for all mine action activities and a regulator on behalf of the RGC, consolidated national ownership by giving the RGC the capacity to lead the mine action programme according to its priorities and strategies, and to regain
donor confidence. However, despite the high level of national ownership, there are still a number of projects supported by different development partners, which are independently managed and implemented, including projects on MRE, demining, and integrated demining and development projects.
INTRODUCTION

In 1953, Cambodia gained independence from France, and Prime Minister Sihanouk ruled for the following 15 years. In March 1970, he was deposed by Lon Nol, who went on to become the President of the new Khmer Republic in 1972. Despite massive support from the United States and a colossal bombing campaign, Phnom Penh fell to the communist Khmer Rouge regime in April 1975, under which an estimated 1.5 million Cambodians died; from execution, starvation or disease.

In December 1978, Vietnam launched a full scale invasion of Cambodia and, on 1 July 1979, took control of Phnom Penh, and installed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

Sihanouk then established the ‘Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif’ (FUNCINPEC) and its armed wing the ‘Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste’ (ANS). The ‘Khmer People's National Liberation Front’ (KPNLF) of Son Sann joined forces with the Khmer Rouge and the ANS, uniting against the Vietnamese occupation. Despite the presence of a large Vietnamese military contingent (140,000) supporting Government forces, insurgent troops could not be defeated. The civil conflict lasted ten years, until Vietnam withdrew its military contingent in 1989. Peace efforts intensified until the Paris Peace Agreement was signed on 23 October 1991.

The Khmer Rouge started to defect to the government in 1996, but despite this, the Government remained unstable due to the political rivalries between the two Prime Ministers. An explosive battle erupted in the streets of Phnom Penh in July 1997, resulting in a large number of casualties and executions. In 1998, Pol Pot died, and the remaining Khmer Rouge leaders defected to the government in December. This indicated the end of more than 30 years of armed conflict in Cambodia.

Cambodia's landmine problem is the result of the long period of civil and regional conflicts mentioned above, that affected the country from the late sixties until the end of 1998.

Cambodia is one of the most heavily contaminated countries in the world: a total of 63,704 victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were recorded between 1979 and June 2010, with 184 casualties recorded in 2010.

Landmine victims represent 80 per cent of the total (50,306) and ERW victims 20 per

---

1 The definitions of terms as 'mines', 'landmines', 'ERW', 'demining', 'humanitarian demining', 'clearance', 'mine action', 'mine action organisation', 'risk education', 'mine victim', 'victim assistance', etc., refer to the definitions proposed by the International Mine Action Standards - IMAS 04.1.Ed. 2, Amendments 1, 2, 3 & 4, 'Glossary of Terms and Definitions'. The term 'landmine' will generally embrace both landmines and ERW except when the distinction is important.
cent (13,398), with 62 per cent of the casualties civilians. The number of victims has decreased over the years, from 4,320 in 1996 to 244 in 2009, however Cambodia still remains one of the most mine/ERW-affected countries in the world.

The national Level One Survey (L1S) was completed in April 2002, and reported that 46 per cent of all Cambodian villages were affected by landmines and/or ERW. Contamination was suspected in all of the 24 provinces and was estimated to affect 4,544 km², or 2.5 per cent of the country landmass. The survey indicated that 20 per cent of all Cambodian villages reported an 'adverse' socio-economic impact, preventing access to housing, agriculture, pasture, water and forest resources.

Most landmine accidents occur in the northwest of Cambodia, where the conflicts were most intense. The most landmine-affected provinces are those located along the Thai–Cambodian border: Battambang, Bantey Meanchey, Pailin, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear. The border area is reportedly heavily mined (known as the 'K5 mine belt'), with an estimate of 2,400 landmines per kilometre along the 1,000 km borderline between the countries, making it of the most heavily contaminated areas in the world.

Landmines, however, are not the only hazard impacting millions of Cambodians. During the Vietnam War, United States war planes dropped 2.75 million bombs over the country, mostly in the central and eastern provinces. The protracted nature of the Cambodian civilian conflict also left millions of ERW scattered through the country.

A large part of those unexploded ordnances (UXO) still represent a lethal threat to neighbouring communities and people foraging in forested areas. Landmine victims used to largely exceed the number of ERW casualties (2,603 versus 730 in 1995), this trend turned around in 2001, and since then, ERW victims consistently surpass the number of landmine victims (133 versus 111 in 2009).

**Figure: Evolution of the number of Landmine and ERW victims until 2009**

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3 See in Annex 4: The map of ERW/Mines accidents locations from January 2005 to June 2010
4 At the exception of 1997.
Despite massive efforts by all the mine action organisations that have been operating in the country for 18 years, Cambodian authorities reported that landmines and ERW continue to negatively affect the country, by:

- Putting pressure on Cambodia’s already fragile healthcare system
- Causing psychological trauma for communities forced to live alongside such a threat
- Blocking access to potentially productive land
- Weakening livelihood options such as raising cattle and foraging in forested areas
- Restricting access to safe drinking water
- Placing emotional and financial hardship on families caring for mine victims
- Preventing access to infrastructures, services and markets
- Diverting funds for clearance from other crucial sectors, such as education and health
- Weakening Cambodia international reputation by contributing to missed opportunities for the country and its citizens in terms of tourism and trade
- Increasing food insecurity

OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME


In November 1991, the UN Advance Mission for Cambodia (UNAMIC) was deployed to maintain the ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment of the UNTAC, and to initiate mine awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was enlarged to include training in mine clearance and the initiation of a mine clearance programme. The first efforts to assess the scope of the landmine problem in Cambodia were conducted by the UNHCR, which had contracted The HALO Trust (HALO) in 1991-1992 to survey 700 km² of land in Battambang province, in prevision of the repatriation of the 360,000 Cambodian refugees based in Thailand. The result of this survey showed the following:

- 112 km² - 'heavily mined'
- 280 km² - 'probably mined'
- 308 km² - 'probably clear of mines'

UNAMIC’s mission and functions were taken over by UNTAC in March 1992. Consequently, one of the four responsibilities of the UNTAC military component consisted in assisting mine clearance and awareness activities. In July 1992, UNTAC set up the mine clearance training unit (MCTU), which started to teach Cambodian nationals to identify, locate and destroy landmines, and to mark minefields. MCTU also promoted mine awareness among the general public.

However, MCTU activities were undermined by the absence of a general strategy that would have prepared for the continuation of mine action activities after the organisation's departure. In addition, no arrangements were made to develop the

---

6 The United Nations Security Council Resolution 728 was adopted 8/1/1992. After recalling resolutions 668 (1990), 717 (1991) and 718 (1991), the Council welcomed the implementation by all parties of the agreement in Paris on October 23, 1991, but expressed concern at the existence of landmines in Cambodia. The Council noted the establishment of a mine-awareness programme by a report of the Secretary-General in Resolution 717, and that the agreements allow the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia to assist in the process of demining and to undertake training programmes. It also requested the Supreme National Council of Cambodia to co-operate with the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia with its expanded mandate of demining and training the local population, and again called upon all parties to observe the ceasefire.

7 A majority of the Cambodian refugees intended to resettle in Battambang province as well as in other mine-affected areas in the northwest of the country.

8 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, August 2009.

technical and management skills necessary to run a large mine action programme.10

The Supreme National Council (SNC) decided to create the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in June 1992. The Governing Council of the organisation, composed of representatives from the SNC Presidency and from the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), met for the first time in November of the same year. Aware of the eventual UNTAC withdrawal, different practical solutions were found to make the deminers trained by MCTU operational. Handicap International Belgium (HIB), for example, temporarily employed MCTU graduates to field the country’s first deminers.

Other demining operators such as HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) also started mine clearance operations in the northwest of the country. The French semi-official agency COFRAS-CIDEV started demining in 1993 in Siem Reap, and other organisations, such as the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and World Vision (WV), got involved in mine risk education (MRE). Organisations such as HI, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Veteran International (VI) supported the provision of rehabilitation services to mine victims and people with disabilities.

After UNTAC withdrew in August 1993, UNDP began providing technical support to CMAC, a UN trust fund for Demining in Cambodia. The UN Security Council (UNSC) requested the use of its resources to assist CMAC. The first UNDP/UNOPS project for financial and technical assistance began at the end of 1993 (‘Assistance to Demining Programmes - CMB/93/A07’).

CMAC became an autonomous public institution in 1995, with the mandate to conduct mine clearance and MRE operations; that year, the organisation developed its first strategic plan.11 In late 1996, CMAC took responsibility for accrediting new mine action agencies and started to request ‘independent’ mine action operators to submit their workplans to reinforce coordination.12

In 1997, the general perception about the organisation was very positive; CMAC’s coordination role was strongly established and the relationship with other mine action organisations was based on trust and mutual respect.14 Competition between ‘independent’ operators and CMAC was considered healthy and a high degree of

13 ‘CMAC enjoyed international confidence and funding from many donor countries for its operations and had become one of the world’s most successful mine action programme by 1997’, UNDP, Mine Action project CMB98006, Terminal Evaluation Mission 2001, Dalton M., Bou Puthy, Ayrine Uk, David Edwards.
14 Eaton et al, Cambodia, 1998
cooperation and unity among the different organisations was reported.

1998-2000: A TURNING POINT – “WHAT DOES KILL YOU MAKES YOU STRONG”\textsuperscript{15}

Rather than separating the regulation, coordination and implementation roles, CMAC became the largest mine action operator in Cambodia, playing the role of a mine action centre, with the organisation’s governing council acting as a mine action authority. In addition, CMAC represented Cambodia in the international mine action fora.

At the beginning of 1999, several disturbing issues surfaced and were widely reported in the media. It first appeared that CMAC had to bribe officials from the Ministry of Economy and Finances to receive the Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) financial contribution to the programme. It also emerged that CMAC was unable to account for large areas of land supposedly cleared: a May 1999 internal memorandum concluded that 'CMAC did not know with any clarity, completeness or accuracy in which minefields it conducted operations in 1998'. Instead of clearing land for the poor, some of the cleared land was 'sold' for profit rather than handed over to provincial authorities.

Following these corruption and mismanagement allegations, an audit conducted by KPMG concluded that 'the performance of the financial, management and operational activities was seriously deficient'. In the audit report, the human resources department was accused of 'nepotism within CMAC', pointing to an extensive list of the relatives of CMAC managers who had been appointed within the organisation.

Under donor pressure, CMAC Director General Sam Sotha was removed from his position in August and was replaced by General Khem Sophoan. A large number of CMAC managers and staff had been demoted, moved to other positions or had simply resigned. The UNDP Programme Coordinator also quit his position. Donor confidence was dramatically affected and most halted or slowed down their financial support and disbursements, waiting for the organisation to undergo a deep reform process. Many donors also chose to stop channelling their funding through the UNDP trust fund.

The limited availability of funds meant that, by late 1999, CMAC was in a critical situation. The establishment of a 'regulatory body' attached to the CMAC Governing Council was proposed, to create a regulatory function outside the CMAC headquarters, in order to conform to the national legislation for the time being. Then, in early September 2000, the RGC announced the creation of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA). The new structure appeared to be precisely in line

\textsuperscript{15} A good understanding of the CMAC 'scandal' and the reasons that caused it is essential to fully apprehend the history of the program in Cambodia and appreciate the reforms implemented during the decade that followed. A timeline of the mine action programme and a more detailed description of the problems encountered by the organisation during this crucial period is in \textit{Annex 6} together with sources and references.
with the best recognised international practices of separating the regulator from the service providers; as recommended by the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)\textsuperscript{16}. However, the decision to set up this new agency had not been discussed with the donors, and the appointment of Sam Sotha as Secretary General of the new structure was received with disappointment by development partners and mine action experts.

CMAC sustained problems, and difficult relations with donors prompted the RGC to hold a national symposium on mine action in mid-November 2000. The objective of the meeting was to dissipate mistrust and enhance national and international partnerships under the principles of greater national ownership and leadership. The meeting provided an opportunity for the RGC to clarify the role of the newly established CMAA as well as the future of CMAC. The symposium contributed to the restoration of confidence between the RGC and the donor community, which did not wish to see CMAC totally collapsing. Many donors resumed their support to a downsized CMAC. The organisation reduced the headquarters to only three departments, and reorganised operations to be more flexible and responsive. A new field structure was adopted, with six regional demining units and one training centre.

\textbf{2001-2012: TOWARD INCREASED NATIONAL OWNERSHIP, LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING}

A streamlined and reformed CMAC remarkably survived this turbulent period, and emerged as a better managed and more productive organisation than before the crisis. A new, clearer mine action programme structure was in place, leading to increased efficiency and productivity of mine action activities, and in particular, for clearance operations.

The results of the crisis were generally considered beneficial for Cambodia: the RGC took a more firm lead in conducting the programme, resulting in increased ownership and leadership in the sector. The modes of assistance to the CMAC and to the sector in general had been reviewed, resulting in a smaller but more adapted technical assistance component (see paragraph 3.2. on technical assistance).

With the cessation of armed hostilities in the country, and following the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) ratification, national authorities recognised the need to shift from an emergency approach to a longer term development perspective. Consequently, this generated a more precise mapping of the threat, which was essential for planning

\textsuperscript{16} Following the CMAA setting up, CMAC mandate was amended with a new Royal Decree. The 1999 national legislation against landmines remained however unchanged. In a comment dated 12/4/2010 following a capacity assessment conducted in the CMAA, the organisation announced that ‘the CMAA shared the findings on this aspect and has a firm commitment to define a clear mandate. CMAA will commission a review of the entire legal framework for mine action and will propose requisite legislation and amendments to realise the above commitment’
purposes, and for measuring mine action performance.

Canada and the RGC decided to launch a 'Level 1 Survey' (L1S) project, to be implemented by GeoSpatial International (GSI), in cooperation with CMAC. The objective was to document the full scope and impact of the landmine and ERW problem.

Directly funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the project began in mid-2000 and finished in April 2002. Survey teams visited the 13,910 Cambodian villages, and reported that 6,416 of them (46.1 per cent) were affected by landmines and/or ERW. The survey also found that 4,544 km² of land was suspected to be affected. The RGC considered the L1S suspected hazardous areas (SHA) to present the first national overview of the extent and location of Cambodia’s mine and ERW contamination. The survey was certified by the UN certification committee, and was overseen by an external quality assurance monitor (QAM).

Since completion of the project in 2002, and with subsequent experience gained by operators, the L1S results are no longer considered accurate, and the RGC and CMAA decided to implement a baseline survey (BLS) to provide more detailed information on the exact extent of the remaining contamination in Cambodia (see paragraph 2.3.7. on Survey and Area Reduction Policy).

Despite symbolising Cambodian ownership in the mine action sector, the CMAA’s early years were difficult, as donors provided only modest support to the organisation, partly because of their distrust of the Secretary-General. In addition, the RGC never met its annual funding commitment to the new agency. As a result, essential functions were not adequately executed, such as:

- overall coordination and control
- strategic planning
- information management
- quality management

A joint evaluation conducted in 2004 for the donor working group on mine action

17 Except three of them
18 See in Annex 4: Map of the L1S hazards
20 The L1S follows the principles of the standard landmines impact survey (LIS) methodology developed by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) The purpose of the L1S was mostly to document the negative impact of landmines and ERW contamination on affected communities and not to determine with precision the size of those hazards neither to define the shape of the SHA (polygons)
21 'The CMAA was established to provide holistic national leadership to the sector and to symbolize Cambodia ownership of the problem that had up until then been largely managed by international community'. Article 5 extension request
22 Paterson and Vanna, 2004
concluded that the CMAA was 'weak and ineffective'. The report confirmed the lack of confidence in the organisation’s Secretary-General and, as result, CMAA work was largely ignored. Another study on capacity development noted that CMAA performances had been lacking in enthusiasm.

Of a mine action centre’s responsibilities, coordination is one of the easiest and cheapest, but nonetheless, the CMAA did not deliver satisfactory results in this function.

For example, the CMAA took over the organisation of monthly coordination meetings that had been previously hosted by the governing council, and which involved all stakeholders and even donors. However, meetings were not regularly organised, were called with minimal notice, and provided little opportunity for open discussion. The view expressed by the operators was that these coordination meetings were for the most part, worthless. Coordination meetings with donors through the Mine Action Advisory Board (MAAB), replacing the former CMAC Steering Committee, also took place infrequently.

However, despite existing difficulties, and thanks to external assistance from several donors and development organisations, the CMAA gradually became more operational and produced a national mine action strategy, and, in August 2003, finalised a five-year mine action plan. The Land Use Planning Units (LUPU) system was preserved and even enlarged to new provinces (see paragraph 2.2. on planning).

In parallel, with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000, international attention increasingly focused on the importance of both aid volume and effectiveness. In December 2004, the RGC issued a formal declaration on 'development cooperation partnerships to enhance aid-effectiveness' and the mine action sector adopted the coordination and harmonisation mechanisms developed by the RGC; the Cambodian Rehabilitation Development Board (CRDB) and the Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC).

In October 2008, a new Royal Decree was issued, and Sam Sotha was replaced as CMAA Secretary General and Ambassador in charge of landmine issues a few weeks later, by Chum Bun Rong.

24 Paterson and Vanna, 2004. Participants to those meetings reported that they constituted a 'one way communication' from the CMAA Secretary-General rather than an opportunity for open discussions
25 The meetings were called the 'Cambodian Demining Coordination Committee' (CDCC)
26 Paterson and Vanna, 2004
27 Royal Decree 1008/1133 dated 20/10/2008. The inter-ministerial character of the authority has been modified and the new CMAA was mostly composed of CMAA technicians. The Prime Minister remains the Chair and Minister Prak Sokhon becomes Vice-President instead of Minister Sok An
28 The removal was presented as a normal rotation of personnel. See 'Demining Head loses two posts in reshuffle', Phnom Penh Post, 30/12/2008. However, it is believed that the reshuffle was rather linked to the sensitive border
The UNDP projects ‘Assistance to Mine Action in Cambodia’ (2001-2005) and ‘Clearing for Results 2006-2010’ (C4R) assisted CMAA to achieve a number of critical advances in national planning, prioritisation and mine action regulation. An evaluation of the C4R project in 2009 concluded that:

- the project had been pivotal in consolidating the institutional and operational functioning of the CMAA
- considerable progress in the targeting and application of mine action assets and with the systematisation of surveys and land release approaches had been made
- quality assurance and socio-economic impact improved
- CMAA possessed the fundamental political authority and technical competences to manage its mandate more ably and maturely

Recently, the CMAA successfully prepared the Cambodian MBT Article 5 Extension Request and a ten-year extension has been granted to give Cambodia a new deadline (December 2019), to comply with the treaty Article 5 obligation to clear all anti-personnel mines. To guide mine action operations during these ten years, Cambodia developed a new Mine Action Strategy 2010-2019 (NMAS), which includes landmine and ERW clearance, and MRE and victim assistance activities. The strategy was developed under the leadership of the CMAA in a consultative and inclusive process with all stakeholders.

It is estimated that, with the current level of support, and if operational productivity continues to increase, the landmine and ERW threat will be reduced to a negligible level in the next ten years, and its impact on affected communities will be minimal. In the long term, police and military capacity should be developed to address this residual threat.

To demonstrate increased ownership in the sector, Cambodia and the CMAA organised for the 11th Meeting of States Parties (MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty to take place in Phnom Penh from 28 November to 2 December 2011. A side event was held as part of the Phnom Penh MSP, to present the significant achievements of the mine action sector in Cambodia in the previous fifteen years, including the solid policy and institutional

issues with Thailand. Visited in his office at the Council of Ministers, M. Sam Sotha declared that he had now new responsibilities and had ‘erased all his computers and brain hard disks concerning mine action’, interview with Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 31/8/2010
30 The national mine action strategy indicates that, during the next ten years, Cambodia plans to release approximately 470 km² of the estimated 648 km² of land considered contaminated by APM. Those figures do not take into account the ATM and ERW contamination
framework. The seminar also underlined the remaining challenges, including:

- the importance of improving government/donor coordination,
- a greater alignment between development partners and the RGC through stronger emphasis and adherence to the partnership principles

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32 'Addressing the landmine contamination on the framework of international obligations (Article 5) and Millennium Development Goals (CMDG9)', Seminar Proceedings, 29/11/2011, Phnom Penh, Draft Minutes
CURRENT STATUS OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

POLICY DIALOGUE AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

Cambodia has long been synonymous with the issue of landmines, both in terms of impact, and the energy and innovation of the government and the international community in addressing the problem.

Mine action has always been highly positioned in the RGC agenda. The RGC actively supported CMAC operations and strengthened its leadership over the sector with the establishment of the CMAA in 2000. Cambodia has also been very active in the international fora and structures against landmines. The RGC is committed to conclude Cambodia’s mine action story as soon as possible and in a positive way, and has tried to establish itself as a model for effective and sustained management of widespread landmine contamination.

The policy dialogue with development partners used to take place during annual consultative groups' meetings, but recently the RGC turned this process into the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF). The first CDCF meeting was held in Phnom Penh in June 2007, with the government taking the lead and the ownership of the process. The RGC has also developed a Government - Development Partner Coordination Committee (GDCC) that supports the technical working groups under the umbrella of the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board at the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CRDB/CDC).33

Today, the structure of the mine action sector is clearly defined34. The CMAA is responsible for the coordination, monitoring and regulation of all mine action activities, and for the formulation of strategies and plans to achieve the priorities identified by the RGC development policies. The CMAA has now established a number of policies, standards and guidelines for the management of the mine action programme, and as such is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the national mine action strategy.

Since 2004, a technical working group on mine action has brought the government and development partners together to discuss policy issues, with the aim of improving coordination, promoting alignment and harmonisation. Its mandate is to ensure the government's leadership in coordinating all RGC, development partners and NGO activities and resources, and to promote aid effectiveness according to the Cambodian

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33 See Annex 7: The national aid effectiveness agenda in Cambodia
34 National Mine Action Strategy
Declaration on Enhancing Aid Effectiveness and the Government Harmonisation, Alignment and Results (HAR) action plan.

The application of the HAR action plan and of relevant joint monitoring indicators by all stakeholders is crucial to the successful implementation of the mine action programme and strategy. It requires that all development partners coordinate and align their contributions and design their projects and programmes in support of sectorial strategic goals and annual work plans. One of the most significant challenges to promote aid effectiveness in the mine action sector relates to information management; all implementing partners have to report the results of their activities to CMAA. Information on external assistance should be made available via the Cambodian Official Development Assistance database, and the CMAA.

The Cambodian mine action sector is moving towards a programme-based approach,35 as a way of managing the sector based on the principles of coordinated support. Programme-based approaches share the following features:

- leadership by the host country or organisation
- a single comprehensive programme and budget framework
- a formalised process for donor coordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement
- efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and implementation, financial management, monitoring and evaluation

The technical working group on mine action is currently finalising the review of new partnership principles36 that were signed in April 2011, by the RGC and seven development partners (Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, Ireland, UK and the UN), to reinforce partnerships and collaborations between the RGC and development partners in the mine action sector.

In December 2011, the CMAA organised a one day training by the Geneva based 'Gender and Mine Action Programme' (GMAP) and identified the main components of a future 2012 gender action plan37. In October 2011, the CMAA organised a workshop on gender and mine action to assess the progress and the needs. The UN gender guidelines were circulated on this occasion.

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35 See OECD Glossary: [www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac). The PAB is basically a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) that deals with a thematic of a cross-cutting issue (as mine action or gender) rather than with traditional development 'sectors' as education or health. Donors can support and implement programme-based approaches in many different ways and across a range of aid modalities including budget support, sector budget support, project support, pooled arrangements and trust funds. There are currently 19 TWG in Cambodia, including the technical working group on mine action.

36 ‘Partnership Principles for the Implementation of the NMAS 2010-2019 as a single framework for mine action related assistance’, the document should be discussed during the next TWG-MA meeting.

37 Email from UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/2011.
STRATEGIC AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS

Cambodia ratified the Mine Ban Treaty\(^\text{38}\) in July 1999, and it entered into force on 1 January 2000. In May 1999, Cambodia adopted a national legislation banning anti-personnel (AP) mines\(^\text{39}\), and started to produce its annual transparency reports according to Article 7 of the MBT. Cambodia destroyed its stockpiles of AP mines before the deadline of December 2004, in conformity with Article 4 of the convention. Cambodia is also a state party to the Amended Protocol II on Landmines of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but not to the CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Cambodia has also not yet signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

Mine action is clearly articulated and prioritised in national development plans and poverty-alleviation policies.

Consistent with the international aid effectiveness agenda, the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010 reaffirms the RGC ownership and leadership of the development process. The NSDP is the single, overarching document containing the RGC's priority goals and strategies to reduce poverty and achieve the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (CMDG). The NSDP clearly underlines the humanitarian and security significance of mine action and reaffirms the importance of mine clearance for 'land distribution and the security of poor farming households in remote areas'. The plan indicates that demining and risk education activities will be continued to reduce the number of casualties\(^\text{40}\).

The NSDP has been formulated using the comprehensive 'rectangular strategy'\(^\text{41}\) of the RGC. The strategy confirms that mine action will remain a government priority during the new legislature that started in 2008. The strategy recognised that progress in mine clearance was illustrated by a sharp drop in mine and ERW casualties; from 800 cases in 2003 to 315 cases in 2007. It also specified that mine action resulted in the expansion of road networks and agricultural land; the strategy closely linked mine clearance to the 'principles of equitable distribution of cleared land to landless farmers'.

In 2003, the RGC adapted the eight universally agreed MDGs to better suit the realities of the country. Recognising that one major constraint to development is the continued

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\(^{38}\) 'Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997', also called the 'Ottawa Convention'.


\(^{40}\) The National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2009-2013 has reset the target of the two indicators. The number of annual mine/ERW victims should decrease by 10% every year; from the 2008 baseline (271 victims), the figure should decrease to 243 in 2009, 212 in 2010, 191 in 2011, 172 in 2012 and 155 in 2013. The 2998 baseline total cumulative cleared areas was 47,650 ha; annual figures should increase by 2% to 52,918ha in 2009, 58,292 ha in 2010, 63,772 ha in 2011, 69,363 ha in 2012 and 75,065 ha in 2013.

\(^{41}\) Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency Phase II', First Cabinet Meeting of the 4th Legislature of the National Assembly, September 2008.
contamination of landmines and ERW, the RGC added demining, UXO and victim assistance to the list, to be the ninth major development goal.

ARTICLE 5 EXTENSION REQUEST AND NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY

Due to the high level of contamination, Cambodia requested and secured a ten-year extension of the Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline. It is believed that sustained funding combined with maximising land release methodologies will assist Cambodia to comply with its international obligations. According to latest estimations, around 650 km² could remain mine-affected and will need to be addressed in the future.

Based on the current productivity levels, Cambodia estimates that demining operations undertaken during the next ten years by the three humanitarian operators combined can achieve 470 km² and will require approximately USD 330 million of support. The strategy to reach this objective is articulated in the national mine action strategy 2010-2019 successfully developed by the CMAA with all stakeholders and partners.

The NMAS has been developed for a ten-year period (2010-2019), covering the ten-year Article 5 Extension request period, and two cycles of the NSDP (2009-2013 and 2014-2018). The strategy aims to reach a situation where Cambodia is ‘free from the impact of mines and ERW’ and to ensure ‘that women, men and children live safely and development can take place in a safe environment’.

An essential component of the strategy begins with the implementation of a baseline survey, to define the remaining contamination through a new land classification system. The findings of this will complement the MAPU system and enhance planning and prioritisation, to see clearance assets deployed where the greatest needs are.

PLANNING CAPACITIES

Cambodia gradually developed one of the most efficient and sophisticated mine action planning mechanisms in the world. While clearance operations primarily responded to humanitarian and emergency imperatives in the first years of the programme, the necessity to integrate socio-economic considerations in the planning system emerged around 1996 and 1997.

CMAC started to acknowledge that it could not be responsible for the allocation of demined land to beneficiaries, but must hand over safe land to local authorities. CMAC concluded that it had to develop a stronger coordination with local authorities, development agencies and other entities, before deciding which land had to be cleared.

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42 Article 5 Extension Request.
43 See in Annex 8: The main measures of the national mine action strategic plan.
and for what purpose. It became gradually recognised that demining operators should not decide alone which land is to be cleared. Demining is costly and time-consuming, and guarantees should exist to ensure that cleared land is effectively used for development purposes and by their intended beneficiaries\(^44\).

Such a move had even become more urgent when stories about land grabbing and demined lands being confiscated by civilian or military officials started to emerge. CMAC decided to address the problem during a two day workshop in Battambang in June 1998. During this meeting, military and police officers, provincial and local authorities, UN agencies and development NGOs decided to develop together a new planning system that would guarantee that cleared lands would be handed over to the intended beneficiaries and would be protected from grabbing. The system was called *land use planning unit* (LUPU)\(^45\).

With European Commission support, HI Belgium and Australian Volunteers International (AVI) provided training and capacity development to the system that was gradually enlarged to Bantey Meanchey\(^46\), Preah Vihear, Pailin and Oddar Meanchey.

An evaluation of the LUPU conducted in 2003 reported that the process was positively evaluated by most of the senior PSC members who 'feel that it is clearly a government structure that plays a useful role in preventing land disputes, in identifying suitable beneficiaries to receive land and in bringing together demining operators and development agencies'\(^47\). However, the LUPU system could not be considered as a quick fix solution for all problems: by nature, LUPUs addressed large mine clearance tasks only and could not be used as a planning tool for small tasks.

As the process takes several months, the system is also not ideal for emergency tasks. Other systems had to be used to plan for those small and/or emergency tasks, such as

\(^{44}\) As seen in the previous chapter, the system arrived too late to protect CMAC from 'contract demining' and land grabbing scandals. It is somehow bad luck for CMAC as the EC TA project addressing the problem should have started in 1997 but was postponed to 1998 due to the July 2007 factional fighting. In addition, while the Battambang workshop took place in June 1998, the system could only be set up in 1999 due to the July 1998 elections and the subsequent establishment of a new government.

\(^{45}\) The system was first established in Battambang in 1999 and was designed to be transparent, participative, decentralised and community-based. The process involves mine-affected villages, communes and districts authorities, mine action operators and development agencies operating in the target areas. Through that mechanism, mine action can effectively support commune and provincial development plans. The process aims at gradually developing a list of demining tasks at commune and district level, in cooperation with all stakeholders, and having this workplan officially endorsed at the provincial level. The objectives of the system were: to ensure effective, suitable and fair land use, land management and allocation of land in mined areas, to ensure the demining process is clearly planned, fair and transparent and engages the full participation of local authorities, to reduce land conflicts through effective land management and well-planned demining agendas, to coordinate and facilitate all processes related to solving land disputes.

\(^{46}\) The system in Banteay Meanchey had first been called 'Land Use Management Unit' (LUMU) and was slightly different than in Battambang. The LUMU would later been aligned on the Battambang system.

the CMAC community-based mine risk reduction or the community mine marking teams.

Another workshop organised in Battambang in December 2002 concluded that the LUPU initiative virtually eliminated the theft of demined land. This can be considered as a remarkable outcome considering the immense difficulties that were encountered in the past. In his closing speech, a government representative requested to:

- preserve and protect the system
- homogenise the operating procedures of the existing LUPUs
- find an institutional connection at the national level

Not everybody was convinced at that time that the LUPU system should have been taken over by the CMAA. The setting up of the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC), with its indisputable responsibilities on the national cadastre and the social concessions system (potentially including cleared lands), could have been an opportunity to immediately try integrating mine action planning in local and provincial development plans.

It is likely that such a move would have been audacious, but the MLMUPC was probably not so keen to endorse such new responsibility at that time. Consequently, the CMAA soon started working on the Sub-decree N°70/ANK/BK, officially adopted by the RGC in October 2004. The CMAA issued guidelines on socio-economic management of mine clearance operations in February 2005, and the guidelines were revised in November 2006. The policy guideline describes the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in the socio-economic management process of mine clearance operations. The operational guideline details all activities to be implemented during the planning process.

Basically, the new Sub-decree transforms the former LUPUs into mine action planning units (MAPU) and the former PSC into provincial mine action committees (PMAC). This mechanism is quite similar to the former LUPU system, and tries to build on it. The MAPU conducts field investigations to:

- identify mined areas to be cleared
- monitor clearance activities and post clearance land use

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48 ‘LUPUs stop demined land theft’, Phnom Penh Post, 6/12/2002. It was also documented that LUPU teams contributed to resolve land related disputes.
50 Article 5 Extension Request. The Sub-Decree preserves the 'bottom-up planning process that allows local communities to participate in the process of identifying suspect mined areas and to contribute to clearance prioritisation leading to development of Provincial clearance plans'.
The process starts with commune meetings where each village chief presents the village 'wish-list' of priority-clearance sites to the commune. Village chiefs, community-based mine risk reduction (CBMRR), members of village development committee (VDC), development agencies and commune chiefs participate in the commune meeting facilitated by MAPU\textsuperscript{51}.

Mine action district working groups (MADWG) are established by the provincial governors in the districts where demining services are required. The composition of MADWG includes members from district line offices and from stakeholders involved in demining activities. Once minefield investigations of all proposed sites have been completed, the results of the commune meetings and the minefield investigations are presented during a district workshop, and each demining site is rated by the participants using criteria developed by the PMAC in accordance to the operational guidelines. Each minefield is categorised as 'high', 'medium' or 'low risk'.

Based upon the available number of demining assets, workshop participants determine which sites come first for clearance, with high risk sites first on the list. Once the tasks lists are finalised at the district level, they are presented to the PMAC for final approval. The PMAC can add some of its own priorities to the final list. The MAPU then prepares a list of all approved tasks with the location and name of the operator. It becomes the responsibility of each operator to prepare its own plan for each site. Demining operators’ annual clearance plans are then kept by the MAPU; completed minefields and clearance progress are then forwarded to CMAA for inclusion in the database. CMAA reports that the ‘success of the prioritisation processes is clearly demonstrated in the post-clearance land use monitored by the CMAA’\textsuperscript{52}.

In 2007 and 2008, 61 per cent of clearance tasks targeted agriculture and resettlement, while roads represented 28 per cent, and other purposes, such as schools, pagodas, health centres, dykes and risk reduction purposes represented 11 per cent.

The mid-term evaluation of the project 'clearing for results' conducted in 2008\textsuperscript{53} recognised that the MAPU process was conceptually sound, and that progress was made in its implementation. The review team concluded that the CMAA should be more involved in priority-setting and in the allocation of demining assets at the national level. However, it also highlighted MAPU system’s lack of flexibility as an issue. For example, once a plan was officially adopted, operators had to implement it, and were not allowed to carry out area reduction or cancellation. As a result, demining units were not always deployed according to high priorities.

\textsuperscript{51} Idem.
\textsuperscript{52} Article 5 Extension Request.
For this reason, the review team also made several suggestions to correct these problems, including the adoption of an area reduction policy, which has in fact been adopted. MAPUs are currently operational in eight provinces, and the RGC plans to establish seven additional MAPU in the east and northeast of the country54.

**DEMINING CAPACITIES**

The Cambodian mine action sector achieved remarkable results from 1992 to 2009, thanks to a combination of all operators’ demining activities, with efforts from all stakeholders in the sector. In mid-2010, there was an estimated 5,000 staff employed by the four demining operators (CMAC, RCAF, HALO and MAG).

The demining capacity of the three humanitarian civilian mine clearance operators was consistently assessed and considered very positive during the last period of the programme, and their performance on the ground was described as good and improving55.

The increase of productivity of the demining operators in the last ten years has also been impressive. The CMAA Database reported that a total of 595.5 km² was cleared by the four demining operators between 1992 and July 201056. However, it must be noted that although RCAF does report to CMAA, CMAA does not carry out quality management. Since RCAF reporting does not follow usual systems (eg IMAS, IMSMA, etc.), CMAA simply records the information provided, but does not check or review it, making the quality of its reporting quite poor. In addition, RCAF reports their clearance numbers without any map references. This means that more than 200 km² of clearance done by RCAF the CMAA database can only report in numbers not their locations.

These issues notwithstanding, the three humanitarian demining operators57 (CMAC, MAG and HT) cleared altogether 385 km². The demining progress report for the three organisations is as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CMAC</th>
<th>MAG</th>
<th>HT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M²</td>
<td>292,386,859</td>
<td>30,465,883</td>
<td>62,090,924</td>
<td>384,943,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54 CMAA has aligned the mine action planning system with subnational development and investment programmes, especially the Commune Investment Programmes (CIP). New MAPU will be developed in seven new provinces in the east of the country, to focus on BAC and ERW.


57 So far, only one RCAF demining platoon is accredited by the CMAA. The mandate and working methods of the RCAF demining operations are not similar to those of the three other humanitarian demining operators.
Since the beginning of the programme in 1992, a total of 884,000 anti-personnel mines and more than 20,000 anti-vehicle mines have been found and destroyed, and nearly two million UXO have been destroyed. Large amounts of suspected land has been released for productive use, including:

- for the safe resettlement of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP)
- to facilitate social and physical infrastructure reconstruction and other development activities\(^{58}\)

Productivity of demining operations has also strongly increased since the beginning of the programme, as 132.5 km\(^2\) was cleared by all operators between 1992 and 2000, and a total of 462.8 km\(^2\) was reported to have been cleared between 2001 and July 2010. For the three humanitarian demining operators, the figure increased from 96.2 km\(^2\) (1992-2000) to 288.7 km\(^2\) (2001-July 2010).

CMAC

Since its establishment, CMAC has grown into a large organisation which, by mid-1998, employed nearly 3,000 staff. The current number of staff is 2,300, 95 per cent of whom are deployed in the field. The four core functions of the organisation are MRE, information, clearance and training. The largest component of the staff remains employed in the demining platoons.

CMAC continues to innovate in introducing new demining tools and new approaches and methodologies to increase the productivity of the organisation and deal efficiently with the threat. The organisation demining toolbox includes, among others:

- demining platoons
- mine detection dogs (MDD)
- demining machines
- brush cutters
- EOD teams
- battle area clearance (BAC) teams
- technical survey teams
- CBMRR teams

CMAC clearance capacity is mainly deployed to support humanitarian and development priorities, as determined by the MAPU, and to respond to risk-reduction requests from highly-affected communities\(^{59}\).

\(^{58}\) See Annex 4: Map of cleared areas in Cambodia.

During the 18 years of operation, extensive capacities have been developed within the organisation to allow CMAC take full ownership as a national demining organisation. Since its inception, CMAC reports to have cleared more than 292 km² and destroyed nearly 450,000 landmines and more than 1.5 million UXO.

THE HALO TRUST
HALO started working in Cambodia in 1991, when it was contracted by UNHCR to undertake a rapid survey to facilitate the safe repatriation of Cambodian refugees from Thailand. HALO began formal mine clearance operations in 1992 and has concentrated on the northwest provinces. HALO’s objectives are to return land to poor communities for farming and settlement and to reduce casualties caused by mines/UXO. The organisation concentrated mainly on demining, and prides itself on the safety and the efficiency of its clearance operations.

HALO introduced a number of innovations intended to boost productivity, such as the 'one man-one lane' (OMOL) drill for clearance. In 2003, the organisation developed a dedicated EOD team and a MRE team. Following CMAC crisis, the organisation’s operational capacity increased from 561 staff in 1999 to 900 in 2001. Its current capacity is 1,161 national staff and four international staff.

MINE ADVISORY GROUP (MAG)
MAG started working in Cambodia in 1992 and has carried out humanitarian mine action operations in landmine- and ERW-affected communities since then, with a focus on clearance, community liaison and MRE.

MAG has built partnerships with development organisations to systematically integrate humanitarian mine action with development activities, especially in support of rural development. MAG currently works in the provinces of Battambang, Bantey Meanchey, Kampong Cham, Pailin and Stung Treng, with a capacity of approximately 250 national and five international staff. MAG’s strategic objective in Cambodia is to mitigate the effects that remnants of conflict have on livelihoods, health, and economic and social development, which will in turn promote poverty alleviation.

MAG has developed innovative approaches, with the introduction of both the community liaison concept, which has been widely used. The organisation has also promoted the hiring of women and amputees to work as deminers.

60 Vanna, Aid effectiveness, April 2010.
61 Since 2008, MAG reported a decrease of 30 to 40% of funding that has forced the organisation to reduce the number of staff from 500 in 2009 to 250 today; interview with Jamie Franklin, Phnom Penh, 25/8/2010.
THE ROYAL CAMBODIA ARMED FORCES

The RCAF engineering brigades have been involved in demining for many years. The RGC has defined the roles of the RCAF in mine action as:

- urgent demining in support of government priority projects, and
- demining in support of UN Peacekeeping Operations\(^62\)

RCAF demining capacity is about 1,300 personnel; they have received equipment and training from China, France, Japan and the United States. RCAF is a national institution with significant assets in the country, and is reported to have cleared 210.5 km\(^2\) between 1993 and July 2010. This represents more than 50 per cent of the three other civilian operators’ achievements.

However, much of the reported clearance has been combined survey and clearance of roads in support to rehabilitation projects. It was noted that higher productivity is normal for such tasks, as most of the considered areas are actually not contaminated\(^63\).

Because of its specific mandate and command and control structure, RCAF does not plan its work through CMAA and the MAPU system, and is not fully under the direction of the CMAA. RCAF activities have not been subject to CMAA quality assurance, so some other mine action organisations or development partners express concern that the areas cleared by RCAF units may not be truly safe for civilian use. One RCAF demining platoon was accredited in 2010; CMAA plans to accredit additional units in the future.

As indicated in the mine action strategy, the RGC foresees that RCAF may be an important contributor in the long term solution to the residual contamination, once the current programme structure with the civilian demining agencies will have disappeared. It remains to be seen how the CMAA and RCAF will strengthen their operational coordination and reporting system in the future.

OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) AND PRIVATE COMPANIES

NGOs, such as Handicap International (HI) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have been directly involved since the beginning of demining operations in the country. HI was used in 1992 as an employment mechanism for deminers trained by the MCTU, before handing those demining platoons over to CMAC.

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\(^{62}\) RCAF has deployed deminers to the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan and the Ministry of Defence maintains a National Peacekeeping Mine and ERW Centre (NPMEC). Five NPMEC teams are accredited by CMAA and their clearance operations are subject to quality assurance by CMAA. Their operational achievements are recorded in the CMAA database.

NPA started clearance projects in Battambang and Bantey Meanchey in support of the Cambodian refugees’ repatriation operations carried out by UNHCR, and the resettlement projects managed by the organisation. NPA handed this demining capacity over to CMAC, and concentrated on providing technical assistance to CMAC.

The French organisation COFRAS/CIDEV developed demining activities in the Siem Reap province, before their activities were integrated in CMAC DU6. Private companies also entered the demining sector in Cambodia. Chirgwin Services Group was contracted with Australian funds to clear land around an orphanage. UXB International was contracted by the US State Department to monitor the US funded activities carried out by CMAC DU3 in Pailin. Two local companies, MUA and Technical Assistance to Demining Service (TADS) won contracts for survey and clearance services in support of road rehabilitation projects funded by ADB.

It is also worthwhile mentioning that some development agencies integrated development and clearance activities aimed at improving livelihood conditions for local communities living in or near landmines/ERW contaminated areas.\textsuperscript{64}

VILLAGE DEMINING

In Cambodia, access to safe land that is suitable for cultivation has been, and continues to be, a widespread problem. Therefore, poor villagers developed what is called ‘village demining’ activities. Mine clearance was undertaken by many people in Cambodia’s rural areas, and the phenomenon was considered very significant but also very controversial in the mine action community.

It was demonstrated that village mine clearance activities were usually 'rational activities driven by livelihood needs'.\textsuperscript{65} Village deminers recognise that what they do is a dangerous activity but they also affirm that they do not have the choice, as landmines block access to food and other essential resources.

Some mine action professionals have made proposals to make use of village deminers, or to provide technical support or equipment to them. These proposals were generally rejected because of concerns in term of safety, risk, responsibility and liability. It was however widely recognised that the level of assistance provided by the sector remained considerably low compared with the need.

It is not possible to precisely assess the village demining activities outputs. However, information obtained from CMAC and reported by the 1999 Landmine Monitor Report indicates that village deminers had cleared an estimated nearly 80 per cent of the surfaces cleared by professional operators. Figures reported in 2000 were lower, at 45

\textsuperscript{64} See Annex 9: Description of some integrated development / clearance projects.
\textsuperscript{65} Bottomley R., ‘Crossing the Divide – Landmines, Villagers and Organizations’, PRIØ Report 1/2003
per cent, but indicate without any doubt that village mine clearance activities were happening on a large scale throughout Cambodia, prior to and despite the arrival of professional mine action organisations.66

SURVEY AND AREA REDUCTION POLICY
Several surveys were implemented and carried out by different organisations in Cambodia, to try to identify suspect or confirmed contaminated areas. However, no single consistent uniform set of procedures have been followed over time by the different operators. As a result, data was collected in different ways, areas were classified in different categories, and surveys were designed for different purposes. As a result, the CMAA national database now contains six different types of survey reports.67

It is considered that some categories of these reports do not precisely describe the current location and extent of Cambodia’s contamination; in particular the L1S reports and this survey had been designed to measure the impact on affected communities rather than accurately map mined areas. As a result, the national database operated by CMAA in cooperation with NPA, CMAC, HT, MAG and CMVIS contains conflicting information:

- overlapping areas
- conflicting classifications
- poor definition of area boundaries

Also, many areas that are effectively still contaminated have been missed. The lack of uniformed procedures, and the problem caused by this situation on the operational planning has been recognised by all operators and the government.

Because of the L1S limitations and the existence of conflicting information, the CMAA and the three humanitarian demining operators decided to carry out a more focused and detailed survey, to identify and define the exact extent of the remaining mined and suspected areas.

The baseline survey started in August 2009 and was carried out by CMAC, HALO and MAG in 122 districts. The operation began in the 21 most mine-affected districts that represent 93 per cent of mine accidents that happened between 2004 and 2008, and are considered to represent the most important priority for demining operators.

The information collected by the baseline survey is to supersede all previously-recorded suspected hazardous areas; it will therefore provide a fresh and up-to-date picture of the contamination. This is especially important because. This information belongs to

66 Bottomley, 2003
67 Article 5 extension request
CMAA and will be shared with MAPU, commune councils and village chiefs, and will document future demining operations as regards planning and prioritisation. In fact, only areas covered by the baseline survey will be accepted for survey and clearance operations based on the MAPU prioritising and selection process, so MAPU will gradually update the baseline survey information with completion tasks and released land.

**NATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT**

Since 1992, mine clearance operators, guided by their own standard operating procedures, have been using various clearance and survey methods to release suspect mined areas. Before the CMAA was set up, there was no formal external quality assurance being carried out on demining operators working in country.

After the creation of the CMAA in 2000, the development of national mine action standards became a priority for the new regulatory agency; however, with limited funding and support, the CMAA took a long time to develop a quality assurance capacity. A MAG technical advisor had been deployed with the CMAA in 2002 and in 2003, to assist with the drafting of the standards based on the IMAS. With the support of EC and UNDP, the technical advisor developed a first set of five standards by mid-2003. Those standards were finally approved in August 2005 and issued in January 2006.

In 2006, UNDP contracted the private company BACTEC to act as a quality 'agent', to assist CMAA in establishing a quality assurance department, monitoring teams and accreditation procedures, as well as to assist with the development of Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS). BACTEC provided assistance to CMAA from 2006 to 2009, and assisted in developing nine new standards. The approval procedure is long and rigid; each standard takes approximately one year to be approved before being submitted to the Prime Minister and issued through the promulgation of a formal decree. So far, 13 CMAS have been approved, with the most recent being the baseline survey and mine and UXO hazard marking. There are still 11 draft standards waiting to be approved; they are currently being reviewed by the operators before being translated to the Khmer language.

With BACTEC support, the CMAA deployed its two first quality assurance teams in early 2008; there are now six quality assurance teams in operation. The responsibility of the teams is to monitor compliance to CMAC by demining operators. The teams operate from their provincial base and, at current capacity, this results in one quality assurance monitoring visit per clearance site per month. Their capacity is probably overstretched, given the geographic spread of operators, and it was recommended to increase their

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68 Gomer L. et al
number to at least ten teams.

The MTE C4R reported that they had the opportunity to visit the provincial base, which was considered very professional, with well-trained staff. The monitoring process was reportedly diligent, and the understanding of safety requirements by the team was of an acceptable standard.

CMAA does not provide quality assurance coverage to the mine action operations implemented by RCAF. So far, only one RCAF platoon has been accredited by CMAA, and it is believed that RCAF does not operate according to IMAS and CMAS. From January to July 2010, the CMAA database reported substantial outputs cleared by RCAF (25 km²) and none of these areas have been subject to quality assurance by the CMAA. Although the CMAA has been given the mandate to monitor all mine action activities in the country, the authority of the agency has not been exercised over the military.

**MINE RISK EDUCATION (MRE)**

Mine risk education (MRE) has been implemented in Cambodia since 1993, with the aim of encouraging people to adopt mine/UXO risk avoidance behaviours, to prevent landmines and UXO accidents. As Cambodia has progressed along the 'conflict – post conflict – reconstruction and development' continuum, both the direct and indirect causes for mine/ERW injury have changed and risk education techniques have been adapted accordingly.

At the end of the nineties, a key priority for rural communities was access to land and, as a result, 'informal' demining became widespread and a frequent cause of mine injury. More recently, it was reported that informal demining and deliberate tampering, while continuing in some areas, are more localised and less prevalent. While intentional handling of UXO, especially among adolescent males, is still reported as an issue, involuntary contact through routine livelihood activities is still one of the main reasons for accidents. Indirect causes of accidents are increasingly recognised as a result of livelihood issues, and there is a general consensus that lack of awareness is no longer a major determinant of injuries.

Therefore, MRE developed its capacity to interact with mine-affected communities through the provision of mine action responses, victim assistance and community development programmes, as well disseminating mine risk education messages that promote safe behaviour to populations at risk.

Since 2000, mine risk education is coordinated by the MRE unit of the CMAA, and implemented through both government and non-government service providers. The following organisations have been active in MRE since the start of the mine action

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69 Evaluation of the Mine Risk Education Program in the Kingdom of Cambodia, CMAA, October 2008.
programme:

- CMAC
- the Cambodian Red Cross
- CARE
- HALO Trust
- Handicap International Belgium
- MAG
- World Vision
- Spirit of Soccer
- National Police
- the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports

CRC has been active since the early eighties; UNICEF started to support MRE activities in 1994 and provided a total of USD 7,667,000 to the sector so far. A mine risk education strategic plan was developed in 2006 by the CMAA.

In 2010, MRE is fully integrated in the NMAS, and remains an important component of the programme to reduce the incidence of casualties.

**VICTIM ASSISTANCE**

Victim surveillance is part of the victim assistance component of the mine action sector and represents a crucial source of information for planning purposes. The Cambodian Mine/ERW victim information system (CMVIS) was developed by the Cambodian Red Cross in 1994, with the support of Handicap International. CMVIS trained and deployed a nationwide surveillance network of CRC volunteers to collect and report detailed information related to mine casualties and mine/ERW incidents. The information is subsequently disseminated to all stakeholders, and provides a rapid update of casualty trends to facilitate the planning of clearance activities. CMVIS had been located and operated at the CRC before to be handed over to CMAA at the end of 2009. Government (80 per cent) and UNICEF (20 per cent) funding has been provided to continue the activity.

The CMAA was initially mandated to coordinate and monitor assistance to landmines and UXO victims in Cambodia. However, responsibility for victim assistance was then delegated by sub-decree in 2001 to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth

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70 Around 1,000 police officers are engaged at national, provincial, district and commune level and were trained by CMAC on ERW identification including Risk Education and to become resource persons for field operational staff; National Mine Action Strategy.

71 Plong Chhaya confirmed UNICEF supported the MoEYS (USD 2,740,000), CMAC (USD 2,657,000), CMAA (USD 170,000) and CMVIS (USD 2,100,000).

72 See Annex 10: List of the organisations working in MRE in Cambodia.
Rehabilitation (MoSVY) and the Disability Action Council (DAC), which was reaffirmed by a second sub-decree in 2005. MoSVY is the key ministry responsible for disability and rehabilitation issues in Cambodia. Coordination of the sector is made through the National Disability Coordination Committee (NDCC), which also encompasses landmines victims' assistance. The NDCC is chaired by the Minister of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation and the DAC operates as the secretariat of the committee. The MoSVY is responsible for disability issues in general, favouring a mainstreamed approach to victim assistance that is coherent with the Cartagena Action Plan provisions related to victim assistance.

Because of its considerable number of mine victims, Cambodia is included in the VA26 group. In November 2008, the RGC adopted the national plan of action for persons with disabilities, including landmine/ERW survivors (NPA-PWD), which articulates the RGC responses to the needs of all persons with disabilities. In July 2009, the national assembly adopted the law on the protection and the promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities. The law is said to be consistent with the dispositions of the convention on the rights for people with disabilities, which was signed by Cambodia in October 2007.

There are currently 11 rehabilitation centres providing orthopaedic, physiotherapy and rehabilitation services to disabled people in Cambodia. Those facilities are supported by five international organisations:

- ICRC,
- HIB,
- HIF,
- Cambodia Trust, and
- [Other organisations mentioned]

73 The Disability Action Council (DAC) was established in 1997 as a semi-autonomous national coordinating body for the disability sector, with representatives from relevant government ministries, under the leadership of MoSVY, and representatives from NGOs/agencies and individuals promoting the wellbeing of persons with disabilities. By sub-decree, the DAC has recently become an official department of MoSVY.
75 At the Mine Ban Treaty’s First Review Conference, 24 State Parties with the greatest number of survivors formed a group and accepted that they had “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing victim assistance. They were later joined by Jordan and Iraq, which brought their number to 26.
76 The MBT was also a source of inspiration for the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its optional protocol, which marked a major step forward in promoting and protecting the rights of people with disabilities and in ensuring their full and equal participation and inclusion in society. The CRPD can contribute to the implementation of victim assistance by putting it in the context of a broader and more comprehensive legal framework, aimed at protecting and promoting the rights of all people with disabilities.
77 In a clear reference to CRPD, Article 49 of the Cambodian law stipulates that international provisions will prevail in case of contradiction.
78 In Kompong Speu, Phnom Penh, Kompong Chhnang, Sihanoukville, Siem Reap, Takeo, Kompong Cham, Battambang, Kean Kleng (Phnom Penh), Prey Veng and Kratie.
• Veteran International (VI).

The eventual takeover of those rehabilitation facilities by the RGC remains a sensitive issue for the MoSVY. The international organisations and the Ministry have signed an agreement to arrange for the handover to take place at the end of 2010, however, it is likely that the agreement will have to be extended\(^79\). The agreement plans for a gradual increase of the government financial contribution to the structures, and for transforming the local staff to government officers\(^80\). However, the sustainability of some of those rehabilitation facilities is questioned as it is unlikely that the RGC will have the capacity to maintain all the rehabilitation centres in operation.

The Landmine Survivor Assistance Program is funded by AusAID and managed by Australian Red Cross (ARC). The program started in 2007 and was enlarged in 2010 to become the Cambodia Initiative for Disability Inclusion (CIDI).

UNICEF has supported the development of the NPA, the law and the sub-decrees; verification has ensured that national legislation is consistent with the UN CRPD. Since 2006, UNICEF has supported the national community-based rehabilitation (CBR) coordination mechanism project to facilitate the development of CBR activities at national level, and promote effective services provision and social welfare for people with disability in the community.

While services for landmine/ERW survivors have been integrated into the NPA-PWD, mine action stakeholders will continue to support MoSVY and the broader disability assistance community to guarantee the provision of services tailored to the specific needs of the survivors\(^81\) through:

- enhanced data collection,
- advocacy, and
- resource mobilisation efforts.

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\(^79\) ‘Three Years Rehabilitation Plan’, Convention between MoSVY and the five international organisations; the document is in the Khmer language.

\(^80\) MoSVY is currently working with the Council of Ministers to transform the 43 rehabilitation technicians working in the centres in Government staff; this requires a special procedure as the technicians do not comply with government regulations in term of age.

\(^81\) See Annex 11: List of the NGO service providers in the disability / rehabilitation sector.
HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

TYPE AND EXTENT OF SUPPORT

UNITED NATIONS
The mine action programme in Cambodia was initially mandated by the UNAMIC and UNTAC, which trained Cambodian nationals to detect and destroy landmines, through the setting up of training centres. Essentially, all the deminers who started operating in the country in the beginning of the nineties had been trained during the UNTAC period. When CMAC was established in 1992, a large part of the demining capacity was gradually absorbed.

From the end of 1993, UNDP and UNOPS developed several phases of a project known as 'Assistance to Demining Programmes'. The objectives of this project were:

- that donor’s financial contributions would cover CMAC operations, in line with the official mandate of the organisation,
- to channel donor’s in-kind contributions of specialised military personnel to provide technical assistance to CMAC, and
- to support institutional building in areas of leadership, planning, administration and financial management, through UNDP technical advisors

For many donors, the UNDP Trust Fund (TF) has been the primary choice to channel financial resources to CMAC for reasons of simplicity, transparency and accountability. However, the use of the TF may have created a perception within CMAC that the funding would be everlasting. Between 1993 and 2000, it was reported that a total of USD 63 million had been transferred to CMAC through the UNDP/UNOPS Trust Fund, not including the government contribution of 1.76 million to CMAC and CMAA.

From 2001 until 2005, UNDP implemented a Support to Mine Action Programmes in Cambodia project, which aimed at:

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82 Phase I until 1996; Phase II from 1996 to 1998 and Phase III from July 1998 to June 2001. The Phase III of the project was initially planned for a duration of two years to correspond to the last two years of CMAC strategic plan 1996-2000. Due to the crisis, the project was extended until June 2001. At the beginning of the Phase III, UNDP decided to move toward the direct execution and manage the Trust Fund to reduce overhead costs and fasten the transition towards the national execution.

A sign of this concern is given by the 2001 UNDP evaluation, indicating that the ‘trust fund must be seen as long term funding capacity rather than encouraging CMAC to use all financial resources in the year they are allocated’. The reports goes on to recommend that ‘a trust fund mechanism should not be seen as a never-ending source of cash or as a petty cash box’, Dalton et al, 2001.

continuing the provision of financial and technical support to CMAC and the CMAA
• developing national ownership and decision-making

The project continued to channel pool funding to the sector and provide training opportunities through the Mine Action Exchange programme and the senior mine action management course, offered by the James Madison and Cranfield Universities.

Since 2006, UNDP has supported the *Clearing for Results: A partnership for mine action in Cambodia* (C4R) project, with the aim of supporting the RGC’s response to its mine problem by developing the CMAA capacity to lead, coordinate, monitor and regulate the sector, and by funding clearance in support of poverty alleviation and rural development activities.

Between 2006 and 2009, in partnership with CMAC, more than 30 km² were also cleared. The project assisted CMAA to:

• revise the operational guidelines on the socio-economic management of mine clearance operations
• establish a post-clearance land-use monitoring system

CMAA has developed its capacity in the regulation and monitoring of demining and survey activities, by developing Cambodian Mine Action Standards and accreditation mechanisms, and by deploying six quality assistance teams. Between 2006 and 2009, *Clearing for Results* has mobilised some USD 25 million mainly from AusAID, CIDA, Spain, Adopt a Minefield and UNDP core resources.

Recently, Cambodian officials expressed the wish to develop to a more balanced partnership with UNDP, to allow the CMAA to assume a more 'determinative role' in managing the next phase of the C4R project (2011-2015). The direct implementation modality was abandoned in favour of the national implementation modality. Consequently, the chair of the TWG-MA is expected to play a more active role in the management of the project and in the approval of the operational work plan.

The number of UNDP advisors should be reduced from two to one by the end of 2012.

The CMAA wishes to test the organisation's ability to manage key planning and regulatory functions 'in its own right', believing that playing a stronger role in the conduct of the project will reinforce the capacity of the agency to convene donors and

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85 Vanna M, Aid Effectiveness, 2010.
86 The 'Clearing for Results' Phase 2 Project was signed on 25/1/2011; CMAA is the official implementation partner of the project.
87 Email from UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/11.
national actors to push forward the aid-effectiveness agenda. The CMAA proposed to have one single chair of the project executive group, 'ideally the CMAA'.

As the sector is appropriately going into the direction of a programme-based approach, this is a positive development, as the sector becomes more mature and the national execution management modality is considered the norm by UNDP.

In compliance with its mandate in the mine action sector, UNICEF has been active in providing technical and financial assistance to the mine risk education (MRE) sector. UNICEF supported the coordination among the different operators and the development of the community-based mine risk reduction project, and, recently, funded the:

- MRE sector evaluation
- elaboration of the MRE strategy

Traditionally, UNICEF also supports the victim assistance component of mine action programmes, for example:

- financial assistance to ensure the smooth handover of CMVIS from CRC to CMAA
- assistance to provide MoSVY to develop the disability law and issue the application sub-decrees

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The European Commission (EC) has supported several operations in the mine action sector in Cambodia through CMAC, and 'independent' operators, such as HALO Trust, MAG, HIB and CIDEV. In February 1998, the EC launched the Institutional Strengthening of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre project, which, through the provision of technical advisors, aimed at:

- improving the coordination between CMAC and the other demining operators
- providing institutional support and capacity-building to CMAC in the EOD, socio-economic and verification departments of the organisation

Within CMAC, one of the major outputs was the creation of a socio-economic unit that was involved in the setting up of the LUPU prioritisation mechanism and the creation of a regulatory body for the mine action sector (the Cambodian Demining Regulatory Authority - CDRA) within CMAC Governing Council. The CDRA was set up to coordinate, regulate and monitor mine action activities on behalf of the RGC. CDRA responsibilities

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were taken over by CMAA. From January 2002 until June 2003, the EC continued to provide financial and technical assistance to assist the establishment of the CMAA.

The European Commission has also developed the *Economic and Social Re-launch of Northwest Provinces* (ECOSORN). This five-year project ends at the end of 2010 and includes a funding facility for mine action activities to be implemented in the target zone by CMAC.

**THE GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING**

The GICHD provides support to CMAC, the CMAA and other mine action actors in Cambodia in the fields of strategic management, operations, and information management. The minister attached to the Prime Minister and Vice-chair of CMAA, HE Prak Sokhon, is a member of the Council of Foundation and HE Heng Rattana, Director General of CMAC, is a member of the advisory board. HE Sophakmonkol Prum, Deputy Secretary General of CMAA, is a member of the International Mine Action Standards Review Board.

The GICHD has assisted the CMAA to prepare the strategic planning process leading to the adoption of the National Mine Action Strategy. The Centre also assisted the midterm evaluation of the UNDP C4R project in 1998.

In the frame of 'Linking Mine Action and Development' (LMAD), GICHD and Cambodian mine action and development agencies organised a workshop in Siem Reap in June 2007.

The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) has provided some assistance in relation to the preparation of the Cambodian Article 5 Extension Request.

Over the last two years, the GICHD provided assistance to CMAC in:

- developing land release operational methodologies
- efficiently deploying mine detection dogs
- organising a mechanical demining workshop

The CMAA has also requested assistance to receive and install the new generation Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).

**NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

A large number of Non-governmental Organisations have supported CMAC and the mine action programme in Cambodia, through providing technical and financial assistance.
Handicap International

Contracted by UNDP, Handicap International (HI) provided several technical advisors to CMAC headquarters and the three regional demining units in finance, administration and logistics, contributing to the development of CMAC internal procedures. HI supported the creation of the demining unit N°4 in Kompong Thom in 1996 with a grant from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

The organisation has been directly involved in the establishment and the development of the:

- LUPU system
- CMAC CBMRR approach
- setting up of CMVIS with CRC

HI has been very active in the disability sector, and was instrumental in developing and supporting the physiotherapy school training curriculum in Phnom Penh. It has managed several regional rehabilitation centres in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and provided support to the Disability Action Council, to reinforce coordination between MoSVY and the service providers active in the disability sector.

Norwegian People’s Aid

After having handed over the control of demining operations to CMAC in 1994, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) continued to support CMAC, by providing technical assistance and training in areas such as quality control, planning, demining unit management, mine awareness, public relations and operations.

To improve integration of clearance operations in development activities, NPA launched the Resettlement, Community Integration and Rehabilitation project in 1996. NPA has been innovative in supporting new approaches to increase the productivity and the efficiency of CMAC, through contributing to the risk reduction concept and in developing the technical survey model. NPA supported the setting up of a quality management system (ISO 9000) and currently provides technical assistance to the CMAA database. NPA was also instrumental in setting up a functional and working CMAA database; all current staff are trained by NPA and NPA is fully funding the DBU’s running costs.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

During the inception phase of the programme, technical assistance was provided in the frame of UNTAC, and contributing countries seconded military advisors to the MCTU. It is reported that, at one point, 130 military advisors were deployed, most of them

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rotated every six months; too short to be knowledgeable about Cambodia and its culture.\textsuperscript{90}

In addition, the short term of UNTAC mandate (18 months) did not facilitate management training, resource mobilisation strategies, or the development of a national programme. After UNDP set up the trust fund and started the \textit{Assistance to Demining Programmes} projects, an increased number of civilian technical advisors were deployed in CMAC.

The UNDP Phase III project planned to have seven UNDP technical advisors and 61 other positions provided by ten other donors and two UN agencies. In June 1999, a total of at least 78 permanent international technical advisors were recorded as working for the organisation.\textsuperscript{91} It was estimated that the annual cost of the technical assistance provided to the sector was between USD 7.5 million and USD 13 million, representing sometimes the same amount of funding that had been channelled to CMAC operations.

Besides UNDP and UNOPS, major technical assistance providers included Canada, Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, Finland, HI, NPA and Sweden.

The functional and cost-effectiveness analysis of this general capacity development exercise for the period until 2000 remains mixed:\textsuperscript{92}

- Technical assistance initiatives were mostly donor driven. Technical advisors rotated to their government schedule, often for only six months at a time, consulting with CMAC only minimally on proposed replacements or target objectives of the exercise. Short term assignments did not facilitate their eventual adaptation to the Cambodian culture and 'attitude' problems were often reported, creating misunderstandings and frustration about the role of technical assistance.

- Although the number of civilian technical advisors gradually increased, there was a continued and persistent tradition of using military advisors with little development background, who despite having high professional technical skills, lacked somewhat in training and teaching skills. Incidentally, their presence instilled a pervasive military culture in the organisation, preventing CMAC from linking effectively with civil society, development organisations or other ministries. In fact, several attempts were made by TA’s to have CMAC change focus but the CMAC top management insisted on having it this way. This insistence on drill and technical training may have been detrimental to the

\textsuperscript{90} Paterson and Vanna, Study of Capacity Development in Cambodia, 2004  
\textsuperscript{91} Dalton et al., Terminal Evaluation Mission, 2001.  
\textsuperscript{92} Idem.
strengthening of other equally essential management functions such as finance, human resources and planning.

- The initial and traditional capacity-development delivery method was done in a one to one way, with one advisor dedicated to one national counterpart. The system was considered by CMAC management as inefficient to create a sustainable capacity-development environment. Using a roving or horizontal approach would have reached a wider audience and maximised the impact of the intervention. As a result of this system, technical advisors often became directly involved in operational issues instead of supporting national counterparts. In some other cases, they were even asked to do the job instead of being seen as advisors.

- The proliferation of international advisors seconded by a large number of donors and organisations, with sometimes vague or non-adapted terms of reference, did not facilitate the coordination of the different inputs by CMAC and the UNDP coordinator. There was a lack of continuity and coherence between successive technical advisors. Furthermore, they had also developed a large set of manuals and procedures in English that could not be shared with their national colleagues or with middle management. As a result, many could not contribute to the strengthening of the institution.

The crisis that hit CMAC in 1999 and 2000 forced a change of perspective in capacity development delivery methods. The large international technical advisor contingent had been seen by CMAC management as unable to prevent the crisis and ineffective to take corrective measures. On the contrary, the solution seemed to originate in an increased national leadership of the programme and, as a result, the necessity to own and control the process of designing, selecting, managing and monitoring all technical assistance appeared more evident to CMAC.

In the preparation of the next phase of the project, the number of foreign technical advisors was significantly phased down, and their professional skills were more carefully scrutinised. The new project gave the CMAC Director General the capacity to make decisions at all stages in regard to the need to initiate or continue capacity development inputs, including the preparation of terms of reference, monitoring of the progress and coordination of the inputs from the various partners. The old technical advisors structure was abandoned and it was suggested to adopt a more flexible, efficient and streamlined mechanism that would mix the presence of long term civilian expert advisors with other professional development solutions. Examples of this included:

- study tours
- workshops
- seminars
• courses
• training
• short consultancies

It was decided to reinforce the use of existing national services and capacities: consultant companies were contracted to provide management advisory services to CMAC, focusing on internal controls and human resources development. Training needs assessments were carried out, and a staff training and development programme was developed and implemented as part of the integrated working plan.

The crisis created an electroshock for the RGC, CMAC and the donors. The reputation of the organisation was in jeopardy and the donor confidence at the lowest. A large number of management staff was demoted, resigned or moved to other services. To ensure its survival, the organisation had to reform radically, and the CMAC management took control of this process. The crisis facilitated the understanding that the on-going technical assistance system had reached its limits and had to be seriously re-examined. The principle of national execution was reemphasised, and CMAC ownership of its technical assistance re-established. The crisis prompted the RGC to get more involved with CMAC and to reorganise the institutional framework of the mine action sector in Cambodia, by creating the CMAA and reviewing CMAC mandate, freeing it to concentrate on its core functions.

In parallel, issues related to national ownership and leadership of the development agenda and process were highlighted in new cooperation paradigm that was presented by the RGC to development partners during the Consultative Group meeting in May 2000. This new thinking – with the increased importance of the national aid effectiveness agenda – would now substantially influence the way the mine action sector would be managed and the programme operated. As indicated in the mine action strategy, the creation of the CMAA was the product of the new mindset among Cambodian leaders, and the national regulating agency was seen as symbol of an increased national ownership and leadership of the mine action sector.\footnote{The CMAA was established to provide holistic national leadership to the sector and to symbolize Cambodia ownership of the problem that had up until then been largely managed by the international community', Article 5 Extension Request.}

The EC\footnote{The EC capacity development project had to last three years with a budget of EUR 1 million but the duration of the project was later reduced to 18 months as 40% of that budget had been allocated to HI to develop and reinforce the LUPU system.} and the UNDP supported the first steps of the CMAA establishment. The first years of operations were complicated, partly due to a lack of confidence by donors and, consequently, little external assistance had been channelled to the CMAA.

Gradually, more technical and financial assistance was provided to the database by Germany and Canada. United Kingdom assistance was channelled through UNDP, to...
develop socio-economic planning and quality management. In the C4R project, more substantive support was provided to CMAA to develop management capacities, consolidate the authority of the agency and strengthen mine action policies and standards and enhance the prioritisation and planning system. The UNDP capacity development team is composed of a project coordinator, a technical advisor in socio-economics and a technical advisor in quality management. In the C4R phase two, the number of advisors should be reduced to two and then one by 2012. The CMAA capacity development plan was finalised in August 2011.

Despite some above mentioned limitations, the long effort of developing capacity of the Cambodian mine action sector definitely brought positive results.

**FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE**

Cambodia has benefited greatly from significant contributions from the international community to fund mine action activities since 1992. The overwhelming majority of mine action funding has been directed to mine clearance, but significant contributions have also been made to MRE, victim assistance, mine action governance, integrated mine action programmes and research and development. While Cambodia remains a developing country with great pressure on its national budget to address a wide range of different needs, the RGC, in recent years, managed to increase its budget allocation to mine action.

Development Partners contributed to all the components of the mine action programme, plus in-kind donations such as metal detectors, vehicles, information technology (IT) equipment, mine detection dogs (MDD) and demining machines. Total documented contributions are USD 267,836,895 for the period 1993-2009. The three operators (CMAC, HALO Trust and MAG) received financial contributions from donors of at least USD 244,393,635 from 1993-2009.

The RGC provided USD 2,945,136 support to CMAC from 1994 to 2009 and USD 8,902,976 in core support for CMAA, RCAF and the police, from 2003 to 2009. In addition, the MoEF, over the period 2000-2007, provided over USD 38,541,865 to finance demining support for infrastructure reconstruction projects, giving a total estimated RGC contribution of approximately USD 50 million from 1994 to 2009. Other Cambodian contributions, particularly by local authorities and community

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96 Email from the UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/11.
97 Vanna M., Aid Effectiveness, April 2010. Remark, the author could only document contributions from Australia, USA, Canada, Germany, Netherland and Japan during the study.
99 Vanna M. Aid Effectiveness, April 2010. The UNDP also reported that the RGC provided a contribution of approximately USD 3.3 million in 2009 and USD 2.27 million in 2010 to the CMAA, CMAC, NPMEC, Police and Border Committee. An even more contribution is provided by the RCAF in demining operations conducted to support infrastructure construction. (Email from UNDP programme advisor, 8/12/11).
members, gave valuable contributions to the successful execution of the mine action programme over the last 18 years.

**EXISTENCE AND CONTENT OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PLANS**

After 17 years of operations and the provision of massive capacity development and technical assistance for more than ten years, CMAC is happy to declare that the organisation does not need substantial capacity development anymore. CMAC currently benefits from assistance from JICA, which deployed three experts in information management, maintenance of equipment and capacity development of the training centre; NPA, which provided an MDD TA; and Germany, which funded a TA with DU6. This phase of the project will stop in September 2010. The continuation of this activity will depend on an eventual new request for assistance from CMAC.

Regarding CMAA, the assessment is different. The C4R Review (December 2009) noted that CMAA was still in need of capacity development and institutional strengthening. The CMAA is currently in the process of assessing its future capacity development needs. The C4R review reported that the provision of technical assistance via embedded and dedicated personnel – whether full time technical advisors or long term specialist consultants – was the best indicated modality for supporting capacity development within the agency. The review recommended continuing with this modality during the next phase of the project (2011-2015).

The CMAA and UNDP are in the process of assessing the future needs of capacity development in the organisation. Without pre-empting the results of this exercise, the C4R review proposed nevertheless the following recommendations related to capacity development:

- the CMAA database is currently supported by NPA; it is recommended to reinforce that assistance to enhance the capacity of the database to provide comprehensive information services to the government, development partners and mine action organisations
- the CMAA quality assurance teams performances should be evaluated to assess future capacity needs,
- the CMAA socio-economic and planning department should be reinforced through the provision of long term consultants
- South-south cooperation should be further developed

Although it is accurate to declare that the mine and ERW problem will continue for a

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1 Interview of Heng Rattana, Phnom Penh, 27/8/10.
2 A CMAA capacity development plan and strategy has been finalised in August 2011.
long time in Cambodia, it is considered that a large part of this problem – the part that actually affects people’s life – can in fact be resolved in a reasonable period of time.

With appropriate support, it is believed that the National Mine Action Strategy constitutes a realistic and credible road map toward a situation where the landmine and ERW contamination will have a gradually negligible negative impact on Cambodian citizens. According to the strategy, Cambodia aims to be mine/ERW impact free within the next ten years (2019). In order to address the longer term requirements in solving the mine and ERW contamination problem, the RGC will engage key national players (CMAC, RCAF and Police) to ensure that viable and sustainable institutions are in place after 2019.

Taking into account the strategic objectives, the remaining capacity development efforts to be implemented in the Cambodian mine action sector should be appreciated from this medium term perspective. All mine action professionals believed that most of the problem should be solved by 2019 if the programme is correctly funded and well managed. However, the current priority should be to assist Cambodia to sustain ongoing efforts during the next ten years, at a level that will allow the accomplishment of the national mine action strategy objectives.

With the national ownership and leadership of the programme now well affirmed, development partners should remain confident it is possible to achieve concrete and substantive results in the next ten years for the following reasons:

- While it had often been said that mine action in Cambodia would last several hundred years, we have now to recognise that the threat is much more manageable than initially thought, and can be quickly reduced to an acceptable level. Unlike other development problems, the clearance of mine/ERW affected areas solves the problem: it will not come back again.
- The Cambodian mine action programme has undoubtedly been through some challenging periods. The current institutional and operational conditions are however considered to be favourable for the future. It is important that they receive the encouragement and support they need.
- Mine action remains essential for development and poverty reduction; mine action is an investment, not a cost, it creates economic opportunity and reduces health and security cost.
- Support to mine action is a moral imperative towards poverty-stricken Cambodians living in affected areas.

102 This is true for all countries that had protracted conflicts on their territory. Every year, Belgium, UK, France and The Netherlands still find and destroy potentially deadly unexploded ordinances dating from WWI and WWII.
TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

TRANSITION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Today, the structure of the mine action programme is clearly defined and it is reasonable to assert that national ownership by Cambodian authorities of the mine action programme is now firmly established because of and thanks to the following:

- the presence of a large, efficient and competent national mine action organisation as CMAC
- the establishment of the CMAA, acting as a regulator on behalf of the government, and coordinating the assistance made by all partners involved in the programme, especially the essential contributions made by CMAC, HALO and MAG to demining activities
- the setting up of the TWG-MA facilitating policy dialogue, and partnerships between the RGC and development partners

However, this does not mean that there is no room for improvement; in terms of progressing towards a programme-based approach and reinforcing aid effectiveness in the sector, the following issues have been identified:

- There are still a number of projects supported by different development partners which are independently managed and implemented. These include projects on MRE, demining, and integrated demining and development projects. Demining activities funded by the RGC in support of infrastructure projects are not recorded for the mine action sector in the ODA database.
- Some mine action operators do not have complete records of the funding they received. Some development partners do not have complete records of their mine action contributions. The mine action sector does not have a mechanism to record financial and in-kind contributions, and the CMAA Secretariat General does not have a clear mechanism to confirm financial contributions from the MoEF for demining activities.

The formulation of the NMAS has been a constructive process and the strategy is in itself an important asset for enhancing national ownership and the aid effectiveness agenda. However, some gaps remain:

- The absence of complete and accurate records on the extent and nature of the contamination still hampers operational planning and prioritisation.

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103 This feeling was shared by most of the people interviewed during the study.
104 Vanna M., Aid effectiveness, April 2010
105 According to UNDP, there is also little consultation between the CMAA (representing the Cambodian Government) and development partners on programmes and projects planning. This constitutes a difficulty for the CMAA to ensure assistance and support national strategic priorities.
Missing information should be made available by the end of 2012, with the completion of the baseline survey.

- Complete and accurate records of RCAF demining achievements are still not available\textsuperscript{106}.
- The database unit in CMAA needs continued reinforcement, if the data are to be analysed and reported in a timely and useful way.
- The coordination with a number of government agencies and ministries facing mine/UXO contamination problems could be improved. CMAA can provide assistance but lacks a coordination capacity with relevant government bodies (for example, ministries in charge of infrastructure, agriculture and rural development)\textsuperscript{107}.
- Reporting at the output level is reasonably accurate, but little reporting exists at the outcomes level. CMAA still has to develop its monitoring and evaluation system. Some initiatives (such as the UNDP supported Impact Assessment methodology development) are underway to strengthen this function.

The TWG-MA will play a crucial role if the goals and strategic objectives of the NMAS are to be achieved. In particular, the TWG-MA should focus on policy dialogue and partnerships expansion with mine action development partners, as there is no other mechanism to fulfil this role.

NMAS, together with Partnership Principles, the Planning and Prioritisation Guidelines and the Cambodian Mine Action Standards provide a good policy and regulatory framework for the mine action sector, but other sectors are unaware of these policies. Coordination with ministries and other government agencies can be further developed. Mainstreaming mine action within government rehabilitation and socio-economic development plans and strategies remains as critical as ever.

\textsuperscript{106} According to CMAA, RCAF/NPMEC will use the BLS data and provide completion site sketches to the CMAA Database. The old RCAF data cannot be backtracked but they have some clearance polygons to verify.

\textsuperscript{107} On this issue, the composition of the 'first' CMAA looked more appropriate.
LESSONS LEARNT

THE ROLE OF THE UN
The United Nations (UNTAC, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS) have been pivotal in creating the impetus establishing a mine action capacity in Cambodia. Despite the initial lack of vision and preparation often underlined in the documentation and the strong military and organisational mindset, most people questioned during this research expressed the feeling that the UN, alongside other organisations as HI and NPA, should be 'proud' of what had been done in building national capacities to operate and manage a large, complex and comprehensive mine action programme.

THE USE OF THE TRUST FUND
The use of a pool funding facility as the UNDP Trust Fund is recognised to decrease transaction costs and is appreciated by donors for its transparency and simplicity. The application of such a modality is to be encouraged, as the sector is more actively moving into a programme-based approach\(^{108}\). However, at the beginning of the programme, the trust fund may have generated a diffuse feeling among CMAC staff that it was a never-ending source of cash with the negative consequence that efficiency and productivity were not given enough attention\(^{109}\). For various reasons, some donors prefer to earmark and channel directly their contributions to mine action operators. To ensure the requirements of the various donors are accommodated and in order to enlarge the partnerships possibilities, CMAC and other organisations have usefully developed their management and reporting capacities.

THE CRISIS AND CMAC REFORM
The 1999-2000 crisis undoubtedly constituted an electric shock treatment for the RGC, CMAC and the donors. To regain confidence from donors, CMAC had to engage in a very structured and robust reform process that enhanced its operational capacity and productivity and significantly improved the quality of its management. The crisis prompted the RGC to restructure the institutional framework of the mine action sector in Cambodia, by creating the CMAA and reviewing CMAC mandate, allowing to organisation to concentrate on its core functions.

THE CRISIS AND THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The crisis facilitated the understanding that the existing technical assistance system had reached its limits and had to be seriously re-examined. The way capacity development and technical assistance were provided to CMAC and the mine action sector was

\(^{108}\) A PBA does not imply a single funding mechanism.

\(^{109}\) 'The focus to date for CMAC has been on safety, effectiveness and, to some degree, efficiency. From observation, efficiency does not appear to have been given sufficient attention. There has been an inability to analyze the basic data and this highlights the lack of attention to productivity’. Dalton et al 2001. According to UNDP, a way to avoid this is to allocate resources to projects through a competitive process. This should promote transparency, cost-efficiency and results-based management of the resources allocated to the sector.
radically modified. The old technical advisor structure was eliminated and there was a shift from military to civilian technical advisors with development experience. This encouraged Cambodian ownership, the principle of national execution was reemphasised, and CMAC ownership of its technical assistance re-established. Capacity development has been at the heart of the efforts made by the organisation during the post-crisis period and, thanks to those efforts, CMAC can now be described as a stronger, more efficient and better managed mine action organisation.

THE CMAA
Despite being consistent with best internationally recognised practices, the creation of the CMAA as a national agency responsible for regulating and coordinating mine action in Cambodia was not fully understood in 2000. It is now accepted that separating the regulator – acting on behalf of the government – and service providers is a sound, valid and necessary move. The establishment of this agency consolidated the national ownership in giving the RGC the capacity to lead the programme according to its priorities and strategies. There is still room for improvement in the way the agency operates, but progress has been observed. An efficient CMAA will be an asset to achieve the goals and objectives articulated in the national mine action strategy.

THE PBA
The adoption of a programme-based approach (PBA) by the Cambodian mine action sector has given an unquestionable leadership position to the RGC in leading the programme, and is considered crucial in guaranteeing the continued enhancement of operational efficiency in the sector. The application of the Harmonisation, Alignment and Results Action Plan and the relevant joint monitoring indicators by all stakeholders is essential to the successful implementation of the NMAS. The TWG-MA ensures policy dialogue, encourages the development of new partnerships, and harmonises activities and projects to avoid redundancy and resources duplication.

TOWARDS THE END OF THE PROGRAMME
Although not always smooth and easy, the long capacity development exercise has been considered fruitful and decisive in the progresses made by the mine action programme in this country. However, in regards to demining objectives and plans, massive clearance operations are not sustainable. Consideration should be given by development partners to channel an appropriate level of financial and technical resources to ensure that Cambodia complies with international obligations related to landmines to achieve the goals and objectives articulated in the national strategy. To reach such a situation, Cambodia must preserve robust clearance capacity and services among its professional operators, and ensure the strengthening of its prioritisation (MAPA) and quality assurance mechanisms. The long term residual landmines and ERW contamination will be addressed by national operators as RCAF and the police with national resources.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
Progress has been observed in the development the National Plan of Action for People with Disabilities (NPA-PWD), the adoption of the law protecting PWD and some of the relevant subdecrees. Cambodia is actively preparing to ratify the UN Convention on the rights of PWD. However, observers underlined the lack of support to the MoSVY in the implementation of those measures and plans; it was also noted that the handover of the 11 rehabilitation facilities currently operated with the assistance of five international NGOs was threatened by a lack of funding from the RGC.

ADVOCACY
In support to peace and security efforts worldwide and in the region, the national mine action strategy indicates that the RGC will join as soon possible other disarmament instruments, such as the CCW Protocol V related to ERW. In the 'Rectangular Strategy' and the NMAS, Cambodia confirms its willingness to contribute positively to regional integration, peace and security. Cambodia reaffirmed its readiness to closely cooperate with its neighbours, in order to engage as soon as possible in the demarcation and clearance of the border area. As Cambodia is one of the most UXO-affected countries in the world, some development partners recommended Cambodia to sign the Convention on Cluster Munition (CCM), as this may open new resources opportunities for the programme.
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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

Cambodia Political Map
ANNEX 2

Location of the Main Anti-PKR Camps
## ANNEX 3

### Cambodia Key Indicators

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<tr>
<td><strong>World view</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Population, total (millions)</td>
<td>12.76</td>
<td>13.87</td>
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<td>Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)</td>
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<td>6.20</td>
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<td>GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)</td>
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<td>GNI, PPP (current international $) (billions)</td>
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<td><strong>People</strong></td>
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<td>Life expectancy at birth, total (years)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fertility rate, total (births per woman)</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)</td>
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<td>Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)</td>
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<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
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<td>Forest area (sq. km) (thousands)</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>100.1</td>
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<td>Agricultural land (% of land area)</td>
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<td>30.3</td>
<td>30.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved water source (% of population with access)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>..</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
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<td>GDP (current US$) (billions)</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)</td>
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<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP)</td>
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<td>Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)</td>
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<td>Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)</td>
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<td>Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Gross capital formation (% of GDP)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>States and markets</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time required to start a business (days)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% of GDP)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100 people)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, paved (% of total roads)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global links</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (millions)</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$) (millions)</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Timeline of the Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1991</td>
<td>UNAMIC deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>HALO survey in Battambang province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>UNTAC deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1992</td>
<td>Official creation of CMAC by SNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1992</td>
<td>Setting up of the MCTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1992</td>
<td>First meeting of CMAC Governing Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>HIB employs the first MCTU graduates and fields the first deminers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deployment of NPA, HALO, MAG and COFRAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>National elections, First FUNCINPEC / CPP coalition government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>Sihanouk returned as new King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1993</td>
<td>UNTAC withdrawal, First UNDP / UNOPS Assistance to Demining Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1995</td>
<td>A Royal Decree established CMAC as a public institution, Appointment of a new CMAC Director, first CMAC strategic plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1996</td>
<td>First KR defections (Ieng Sary faction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>'Factional fighting' in Phnom Penh, Some FUNCINPEC commanders join the KR along the border with Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1998</td>
<td>Death of Pol Pot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1998</td>
<td>National elections – Second CPP / FUNCINPEC coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia regains its seat at the UN General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1998</td>
<td>Final KR defections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning 1999</td>
<td>First corruption and 'contract demining' allegations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1999</td>
<td>KPMG appointed to audit CMAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1999</td>
<td>Sam Sotha is removed from the CMAC Director position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Cambodia is accepted as a member of ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-2000</td>
<td>Start of the Level 1 Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2000</td>
<td>Creation of the CMAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2000</td>
<td>National Symposium on mine action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Start of the UNDP Assistance to Mine Action project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td>First commune councils elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>Termination of Level 1 Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>CMAA National Mine Action Strategy / Five-Year Mine action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>Creation of the TWG on mine action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Beginning of UNDP C4R phase 1 project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Revision of CMAA Royal Decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>MBT SP grant a 10 years extension to comply with Article 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Adoption of a new 2010-2019 National Mine Action Strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>