Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership | Sudan

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

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Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership

Sudan

Geneva, March 2012
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This report was written by Åsa Massleberg, Advisor, Strategy, Transition and Development, GICHD.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author greatly appreciates the many individuals who were willing to share their vast experience and knowledge of the transition and capacity development process of the Sudan mine action programme. Interviews were conducted with key informants in Juba and Khartoum in May and June 2011. Meetings were also organised with other key informants in the months after the field trips, either face-to-face or via Skype.¹

The author would like to give a special thanks to Stephen Pritchard and Adina Dinca, both of UNMAS, for their much appreciated assistance in preparing the missions to Juba and Khartoum respectively, and for helping out with arranging meetings.

Lastly, the author is grateful to all the respondents who took the time to review the draft document and to share very valuable and constructive feedback.

¹ A full list of interviewed individuals is presented in Annex 1.
# Glossary of Acronyms

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>Association for Aid and Relief Japan</td>
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<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>Anti tank</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Anti-personnel</td>
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<td>CL</td>
<td>Community Liaison</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CTA</td>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Dangerous Area</td>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPDO</td>
<td>Friends of Peace and Development Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
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<td>HMA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Mine Action</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<td>JASMAR</td>
<td>Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme</td>
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<td>MF</td>
<td>Minefield</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
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<td>MTI</td>
<td>Mine Tech International</td>
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<td>MYWP</td>
<td>Multi-Year Work Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
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<td>NMAA</td>
<td>National Mine Action Authority</td>
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<td>NMAC</td>
<td>National Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<td>NRMAO</td>
<td>Northern region Mine Action Office</td>
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<td>NTSG</td>
<td>National Technical Standards and Guidelines</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLAVS</td>
<td>Operation Landmine Action and Victim Assistance</td>
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<td>OSIL</td>
<td>Operation Save Innocent Lives</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SSDC</td>
<td>South Sudan Demining Commission</td>
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<td>SHA</td>
<td>Suspected Hazardous Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<td>TPO</td>
<td>Transition Planning Officer</td>
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<td>T5</td>
<td>Transition Plan 5</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNMACC</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>UNMAO</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Office</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteer</td>
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<td>VA</td>
<td>Victim Assistance</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report gives an overview of the capacity development/transition process of the Sudan mine action programme (MAP), from its establishment in 2003 till 2011.

Sudan’s landmine/ERW contamination stems from World War II, the first civil war (1955-1972) and the second civil war (1983 – 2004). The Government of Sudan’s (GoS) Sudan Armed Forces, the SPLA/M and other non-state actors used landmines/ERW throughout these conflicts, the last of which ended with the signing of the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1590 was adopted in March 2005, providing the legal foundation to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to establish the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO) was established to support the UNMIS and to coordinate all mine action activities. The mission plan explicitly stated capacity development as a key focus area of the UN mine action programmes. Sudan’s National Mine Action Authority was established through Presidential Decree No. 299 in December 2005.²

The 2006 Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework determines the role of UNMAS to be that of coordinating mine action activities in collaboration with the national authorities. UNMAS had the dual role of coordinating the UNMAO and supporting the UNMIS. In addition to these responsibilities, UNMAS was also in charge of administering and supervising contracting procedures for tasks, and for coordinating the demining assets of the troop-contributing countries.³ UNDP, which was the lead agency for capacity development in the UNMAO structure, started its capacity development activities in early 2004 and ended in August 2011. In its role as lead agency for MRE within the UNMAO framework, UNICEF coordinated and provided technical support, developed training and promoted best practices.

The formal transition planning process started with a transition workshop in Nairobi in 2008, bringing UNMAO agencies and representatives from SSDA and NMAC together. Another five transition workshops were organised by June 2011.

Over that time, the slow progress of capacity development/transition efforts in southern Sudan has been in sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. One key reason for this discrepancy may be traced to the fact that the general level of capacity is considerably higher in the north compared to the south, explained in part by higher levels of education, more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly, considerably lower impacts of the war on all levels of society. As of mid-2011, UNMAO had taken the

³ Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Kenya and Egypt are troop contributing countries that provided demining contingents to UNMIS
lead in all major elements of operations, including accreditation, tasking, quality assurance and quality control. The weakest area in SSDA’s operations department remains in tasking operators through the issuing of clear, concise and accurate task dossiers.

NMAC’s operations department on the other hand became increasingly involved in prioritisation processes, and took full responsibility of tasking procedures from 1 April 2011, with technical assistance from UNMAO.

As per the CPA, an internationally monitored referendum took place on 9 January 2011, with 98.83 per cent voting for secession. The independence of South Sudan, declared on 9 July 2011, effectively terminated the interim arrangements, agreed to by the NCP and the SPLA/M through the signing of the CPA. Following the end of the UNMIS mandate in July 2011, the UNMAO concluded its activities in Sudan. At the request of the GoS, UNMAS continued providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC. Following the independence of South Sudan, the UNSCR 1996 of 8 July 2011 defines the mandate of the UN as supporting the republic of South Sudan in mine action activities, and in building the capacities of the SSDA. This new mandate resulted in the mine action office changing its name from UNMAO to the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre in September 2011.

The report’s main findings regarding the transition to national ownership in Sudan are summarised as follows:

Overall findings

- The MAP has been praised for its impressive clearance outputs, but criticised for its weak implementation of capacity development activities. We recommend that capacity development roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined in relevant ToR and job descriptions and staff should be required to report on these activities. This would help clarify who is responsible for what and it would avoid the risk of capacity development being marginalised and viewed as an area that is not included in “getting the job done”.

- The MAP suffered from a lack of communication and cooperation between different UN agencies within UNMAO. We recommend the UN inter-agency policy be reviewed, and that, for any collaborations among UN agencies, the agencies involved agree upon a memorandum of understanding which clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the different agencies in that specific context. We also recommend that capacity development roles and responsibilities are included in the ToR for all relevant personnel, which will require agreement on these ToR by senior staff. The different roles and responsibilities should be complementary and clear to all stakeholders involved.

- There were many examples of individuals benefiting from capacity development efforts only to leave shortly after training, resulting in a lack of continuity and
missed opportunities for the national mine action authorities to reap the benefits from capacity development activities.

- Dedication, commitment and intention to learn is key for successful capacity development and transition. The extent and rate of progress is in the hands of the impacted states – external agencies can only assist and support.
- Transparency and information sharing are key aspects of capacity development. Examples of good information sharing and transparency illustrate strengthened trust, whereas a lack of these points to the opposite.

Specific findings and lessons learnt: NMAC
- Transition should have been made a priority at an earlier stage.
- The transition plan clarified the transition process, and the transition matrix was an excellent tool for focussing on the activities that had to be carried out, which element of the transition plan each corresponded to, the status of the activity, the individuals responsible, and the deadline for completion.
- Transition processes should aim to adapt to national procedures, rather than transferring the “UN way” of doing things.
- The capacity level of NMAC’s various departments strengthened considerably when UNMAO staff collocated at the NMAC premises in early 2010.

Specific findings and lessons learnt: SSDA
- Recruitment procedures need to be made more transparent and rigorous to ensure that individuals are recruited based on their competencies, experience and skills, and not on the basis of tribal or political affiliation.
- There is no clear separation between the Authority and the MAC at the SSDA. SSDA is responsible both for broad policy decisions and for overseeing mine action on a day-to-day basis at the operational level. To clarify SSDA’s mandate, we recommend that the operational and authority levels be separated.
- To avoid key stakeholders “disassociating” themselves from transition plans, and to make the most of the momentum from workshops, we recommend that future transition plans are drafted and distributed as soon after the workshops as possible.
- On-the-job training needs to be included in work plans and stipulated in relevant UNMACC staff’s ToRs.
- The collaboration between NPA and UNMAO has been excellent, with UNMAO playing an instrumental role in securing donor funding for NPA’s capacity development project. This particular collaboration represents a best-practice, and we recommend that it be continued, and where appropriate, replicated in other countries.
- Organisational structures, systems, processes and resources required for the implementation of SSDA’s mandate, function and the delivery of services need to be strengthened considerably for SSDA to assume its responsibilities.
We recommend that the development of SSDA’s capacity is integrated with the national capacity development process and aligned with national development priorities and policies.
INTRODUCTION

REPORT LAYOUT

This report gives an overview of the capacity development/transition process of the Sudan mine action programme (MAP), from its establishment in 2003 till 2011. It starts by outlining a brief overview of key development indicators for northern and southern Sudan⁴, before moving on to present the background to landmine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, and how it was initially assessed.

A brief overview of the landmine and ERW contamination and casualty situation since June 2011 is followed by an outline of the historical background on the Sudan MAP, presenting key events and developments, and the normative framework. The report then outlines the main United Nations (UN) agencies involved in the process, and their key responsibilities.

The “transition to national ownership” chapter presents the transition planning process, outlining key events, presenting the transition workshops and plan. The report then focuses on the capacity development and transition process of northern Sudan. The various departments of the national mine action centre (NMAC) are presented, highlighting the main capacity development activities and key challenges.

The same is done with southern Sudan, before presenting findings and lessons learnt to conclude the report. General findings related to the overall Sudan MAP are first presented, followed by findings and lessons learnt related specifically to northern Sudan, and then southern Sudan. Recommendations are provided in conjunction with some of the findings when deemed relevant, and a time-line for the Sudan MAP is provided in Annex 2.

This report does not cover the Darfur programme, as there are no National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) structures in that region.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS⁵

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in 2010, 46.5 per cent of northern Sudan’s population was living below the poverty line, and the figure in southern Sudan was 50.6 per cent. To compare, South Sudan is not faring much worse.

⁴ This case study reviews the Mine Action Programme of Sudan, when Sudan was a unified country, comprising the northern region and the semi-autonomous region of southern Sudan. As a result of the January 2011 referendum, South Sudan declared its independence on 9 July 2011. This case study mainly focuses on activities pre-independence and therefore uses the term “southern Sudan” when describing the southern region of Sudan. The term “South Sudan” is used when describing any events post-9 July 2011.

⁵ Sources: UNDP Sudan, 2011; Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation; World Development Indicators
than its northern neighbour, if their respective populations and GDP are taken into account; Sudan has 30.1 million people and a GDP of 49 billion US dollars while South Sudan has 8.26 million people and a GDP of 13 billion US dollars.

Other key development indicators on health and education provide a more sobering picture however. In 2010, 48 per cent of the children in southern Sudan were malnourished, while in northern Sudan the figure was 31.8 per cent. Similarly, infant mortality rates were much higher in southern Sudan than in northern Sudan, with the former experiencing 131 deaths per 1,000 live births and the latter 71 deaths per 1,000 live births. In terms of education, the gross primary enrolment ration in southern Sudan was only 48 per cent, compared to 71.1 per cent in northern Sudan. The adult literacy rate stood at 37 per cent in southern Sudan and 78 per cent in northern Sudan. On one hand, these indicators provide a clear picture of the development challenges faced by northern and southern Sudan, and on the other, of the differences between the two regions.

As will be demonstrated in this report, these differences are reflected in the discrepancies between capacity levels between Sudan and South Sudan.

**BACKGROUND TO SUDAN’S LANDMINE/ERW CONTAMINATION**

Since Sudan’s independence in 1965, the country has only seen peace for a total of 11 years. Autonomy for the southern Sudan region was agreed through the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, putting an end to the first civil war (1955-1972). The agreement aimed to address concerns of the southern Sudan liberation movement. Despite relative calm over the next decade, tensions between southern Sudan and the central government in Khartoum remained. In 1983, lead by Dr. John Garang, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebelled against the central government in Khartoum, initiating the second civil war (1983 – 2004). The signing of the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004 paved the way for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, putting an end to Africa’s longest war.6

The Government of Sudan’s (GoS) military, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the SPLA/M and other non-state actors used landmines/ERW throughout the civil wars. Landmine contamination can also be traced to World War II, when landmines were laid along the northern border with Libya. The second civil war was essentially a guerrilla conflict, with the GoS holding a few garrison towns, including Juba, Malakal and Wau, and surrounding outposts, while SPLA controlled much of the countryside in the south. The guerrilla warfare continued throughout the second civil war, with SAF and SPLA controlling various towns and areas of land, resulting in roads and communities along the frontlines becoming severely contaminated with landmines/ERW.

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6 While the CPA was signed in January 2005, the permanent ceasefire was signed in 2004. [http://www.un.org/chinese/ha/issue/sudan/docs/cpa-3.pdf](http://www.un.org/chinese/ha/issue/sudan/docs/cpa-3.pdf)
Anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) landmines were used by both sides in a wide range of areas, including key roads, towns, rural communities, around water sources and across arable land. AT mines were mainly used on roads by SPLA/M to restrict the movements of GoS forces and to limit access to the towns. GoS used AP mines defensively to protect its garrison towns and to prohibit movement of SPLA/M forces. Upon the signing of the CPA, Sudan emerged as a country contaminated by landmines and ERW, making an impact on transport, socio-economic development rehabilitation and reconstruction, and hindering the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees to their home communities.

**LANDMINE IMPACT SURVEY IN SUDAN**

At the request of the UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS) and the GoS, the Survey Action Centre (SAC) initiated its activities in Sudan, with an advanced survey mission to South Kordofan in 2003, in order to provide an initial understanding of the extent of landmine contamination. At this point, landmines were perceived as a major problem in Sudan. Infrastructure was poor or nonexistent, which, combined with the insecurity that remained in many areas, resulted in little or no reliable available data as to the actual levels of contamination. The Danish Church Aid (DCA) and the Sudan Landmine and Information Response Initiative (SLIRI) were the major operators at the time. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG), serving as SAC’s partner, implemented the first pilot Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in 2006, in the Eastern Equatoria State.

Through the implementation of surveys in 15 states, the LIS identified a total of 296 impacted communities in Sudan. Out of these communities, eight per cent were categorised as high-impact, 29 per cent as medium-impact, and 63 per cent as low-impact. The LIS established that the landmine problem was predominantly concentrated in five of the 25 states located in the southern, central and eastern parts of Sudan: Central Equatoria, Southern Kordofan, Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile and Kassala. Also, all of the 25 communities were categorised as high-impact, and 71 of the 85 categorised as medium-impact were located in these five states.

Upon completion of the survey of each area, the LIS results were shared on the Sudan Mine Action Programme website, permitting further surveys and verification of the findings to be carried out. Between the completion of the first LIS in 2006 and 2009, UNMAO tasked operators to implement technical surveys in 241 of the 605 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) identified by the LIS. Simultaneously, the implementing partners also conducted a so-called “retrofit” - a verification of all dangerous areas recorded in the national database since 2002.

---

LANDMINE AND ERW CONTAMINATION IN SUDAN

UNMAO’s monthly report from June 2011\(^8\) lists the following statistics in relation to “closed hazards”\(^9\):

- 6,366 dangerous areas
- 188 minefields
- 331 SHAs

The following “open hazards” were reported:

- 719 dangerous areas
- 118 minefields
- 274 SHAs

A regional breakdown shows that 575 out of the total 719 open dangerous areas were in southern Sudan, 42 in the western region (Darfur), and the rest in the northern region. As for the open minefields, 57 out of 118 were located in southern Sudan, with the rest in the northern region. Out of the total 274 open SHAs, 180 were located in southern Sudan, with the rest in the northern region.

It is important to note that more landmines were laid in both southern Sudan and northern Sudan in mid-2011. Volatile security situations in a number of states in southern Sudan, particularly Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity, has meant that access has been restricted, and, as a result, the actual level of contamination of some areas remains unknown.

LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN NORTHERN SUDAN

The UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) recorded a total of 1,651 landmine/ERW casualties in northern Sudan (493 killed; 1,158 injured) between 1964 and the end of 2010. Of all casualties, 1,477 or 89 per cent were male. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor\(^10\) reported 67 landmine/ERW casualties in northern Sudan in 2010. Of the casualties, 88 per cent were male (59), and half of all casualties for which the age was known were children, mostly boys.

12 per cent (eight) of all casualties in 2010 were female casualties: five of these were girls. The 67 casualties reported in 2010 was an increase from 40 in 2009.

Improvements in Sudan’s data collection system and more available data, with a new Reference:

\(^9\) “Closed hazards” refer to tasks that have been completed, and “open hazards” refer to tasks that have not been completed
national casualty database launched in September 2010, may have contributed to the increase in reported casualties. Casualties were recorded in six states for the 2010 data, of which three were in the Darfur region. Over half of all casualties recorded in 2010 (33) were in the state of Kassala.

LANDMINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor\(^\text{11}\) notes that a total of 4,283 casualties (1,226 killed; 3,057 injured) were recorded by UNMAO in southern Sudan for the period ranging from 1964 to December 2010. Of the total number of casualties, 3,076 or 72 per cent were male and 583 or 14 per cent were female; the sex was unknown for 624 casualties.

However, the absence of a comprehensive casualty survey, combined with very poor health facilities and inaccessible areas, have resulted in a widespread belief that there is serious underreporting, and that the actual casualty number is considerably higher. During the same timeframe, UNMAO reported a total of 64 casualties from cluster munitions in southern Sudan, all of which occurred prior to 2010.

The Monitor further points out that 2010 saw 82 new landmine/ERW casualties. Children made up the majority of all casualties (43) and 57 per cent of civilian casualties, with boys being the single largest casualty group (36). There were a total of 17 female casualties: seven girls, six women, and four of unknown age. Casualties were identified in all three regions of southern Sudan and in seven of its ten states. The greatest number of casualties occurred in the state of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, followed by Upper Nile state, both of which border northern Sudan. The 82 casualties identified in 2010 are more than double the 38 casualties recorded in 2009. A number of factors can explain this increase, including rise in the movement of people, as large groups of returnees came back to southern Sudan to vote in the January 2011 referendum, and an increased level of violence, particularly in the border areas with northern Sudan.

OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

PRE-CPA ERA

With the support of the European Commission and Landmine Action, the Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) was established in 2001 as a cross-line project to initiate information gathering and develop a mine action plan. The signing of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement in 2002 resulted in the GoS and the SPLA/M cooperating in mine action as early as 2002. This collaboration was notable in that it created a space for dialogue between the conflicting parties, while preparing the grounds for peace-building, even in the middle of ongoing conflict. The Ceasefire Agreement established an international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the ceasefire, and opened the door for mine action activities to begin in Southern Kordofan.

At the request for assistance in mine action by the GoS and the UN in Sudan, the UNMAS established an emergency mine action programme, the “Information Management and Coordination for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan” in early 2002. The objective of this programme was to:

- work within the confines of the pre-peace/ongoing conflict environment
- develop standards, establish and document operational capacity and professionalism of national NGOs
- promote and assist the development of a national mine action planning and coordination body that would be able to plan and cope with increased mine action activities following any peace settlement

With no solid peace agreement in place however, most donors were reluctant to allocate funds for mine action operations in Sudan, which resulted in few national and international organisations implementing mine action operations. Most of the early activities were limited to the Nuba Mountain region (current Kordofan State), where international actors monitored a cease fire agreement, as well as in Rumbek, the previous capital of southern Sudan (located in the current state of Lakes).

The early engagement of UNMAS in emergency mine action assistance in Sudan was influenced by the UN mine action policy (A/53/496/Annex II) and was in accordance with a General Assembly Resolution on Emergency Assistance to the Sudan (A/RES/56/112, OP.14). The details of the UN emergency mine action project were agreed upon in a memorandum of understanding between the GoS, SPLM and the UN in

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September 2002.\textsuperscript{15} The memorandum of understanding was significant in a number of ways:\textsuperscript{16}

- it was the first “state-wide” document that the main conflicting parties (GoS and SPLA/M) signed
- it prepared the ground for pre-CPA peace negotiations
- it was instrumental for the inclusion of important mine action aspects in the subsequent CPA\textsuperscript{17}

As an operation partner of the JMC, the Danish Church Aid (DCA) implemented the first cross-border demining activities in the Nuba Mountains in 2002. These first clearance activities were unique, in the sense that the clearance team was composed of equal numbers of deminers from each side of the two main conflicting parties, northern and southern Sudan. The national organisations, JASMAR from northern Sudan, and Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) from southern Sudan, initiated an operational partnership, with direct supervision by the DCA.

Upon completion of the training and IMAS accreditation, the team’s first task was to clear the main road leading to the project’s training camp. After the success of this initial pilot project, the demining programme grew in size, and more civilians from both sides enrolled in the basic demining course. These first clearance activities, composed of deminers from both sides, built confidence between the two main conflicting parties, and represented a concrete and tangible outcome of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement.

Subsequently, the national mine action office - based in Khartoum, and the new Sudan mine action directorate based in Nairobi, were established in 2003, with the objective of carrying out emergency clearance operations of landmines and ERW.

In 2004, the GoS, SPLM and the UN signed the first versions of \textit{the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework} and \textit{the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework}. These documents stated that mine action in Sudan would have a “one country approach”. In the run up to the signing of the CPA, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) began operations in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in southern Sudan in February 2004, conducting route surveys on priority routes for reconstruction. The commercial company Mechem, under contract with United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), also began survey and clearance of routes in March 2004. The Norwegian

\textsuperscript{15} Memorandum of understanding between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the United Nations regarding the UN’s mine action support to Sudan, http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/MOU.pdf

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Chris Clark, (former UNMAS Programme Manager in Sudan 2001 – 2002) in Geneva 30 may 2011

\textsuperscript{17} This is in line with the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action’s Mine Action Guidelines for Ceasefire and Peace Agreements, http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/MAguidelinesper cent20ceasefire.pdf
People’s Aid (NPA), an organisation that had been active in southern Sudan since 1986, expanded its humanitarian programme to include mine action in 2004.

As a response to the June 2004 signature of the declaration in Nairobi, in which six protocols were signed between the GoS and the SPLM/A, and following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1547\(^{18}\) in June 2004, the United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was established. The UNAMIS was essentially a political mission, dedicated to facilitating contact between the conflicting parties, and to preparing for the expected peace support operation, following the signing of the CPA, but did not explicitly mandate any mine action activities.

**THE CPA**

The second civil war between SAF and the SPLA ended with the signing of the CPA\(^ {19}\) between the GoS and the SPLA/M in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 2005. The signing was the result of more than two and a half years of negotiations between the SPLA/M and the ruling National Congress Party (NRC). The CPA provided for an initial pre-interim period of six months, followed by an interim period of six years. The interim arrangement set out that the single state of Sudan should be ruled by the Government of National Unity, and the semi-autonomous government of southern Sudan (GOSS). This interim arrangement is often referred to as the “one state two system approach”.

In annex 1 on “Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities and Appendices”, the CPA includes a specific paragraph on safeguarding “...against the menace and hazards posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance”. This paragraph is divided into six subparagraphs, presenting issues related to the prohibition and clearance of landmines, as well as the establishment of demining authorities in northern and southern Sudan respectively. Paragraph 8.6.5 of the CPA states that “the UN Support Mission, in conjunction with UNMAO, will assist the Parties’ demining efforts by providing technical advice and coordination...” Paragraph 8.6.6 states that the parties shall establish by D-day (signing of the CPA) + 30 days two demining authorities (northern and southern) that shall work together and coordinate their demining activities and work jointly in close cooperation with UNMAO.

Key milestones during the interim period include the 2009 democratic elections, and the January 2011 referendum. The signing of the CPA, and the subsequent influx of donor money, mainly through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) Assessed Budget\(^ {20}\), resulted in a significant expansion of mine action operations in Sudan. From its

\(^{20}\) The assessed budget of UN DPKO missions are determined by UN Security Council Resolutions and are to cover the costs of core peacekeeping functions, but do not cover all the costs within peacekeeping mandates. In Sudan, the UN assessed budget was used for mine action activities in support of the UNMIS peacekeeping forces and humanitarian
inception in 2003, the Sudan MAP grew to be the world’s second largest mine action programme (after Afghanistan), with an annual budget of USD 70 million in 2011.\(^{21,22}\)

**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY**

Acting upon Article 58 (1) of the Interim Constitution of 2005, and Chapter VI of the CPA, and following Sudan’s decree ratifying *the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction* (in short, the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)), Sudan’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established through *Presidential Decree No. 299* in December 2005.\(^{23}\)

Officially launched in March 2006, the NMAA comprised a national mine action committee, a general secretariat (headed by the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, the Government of National Unity (GONU), a national mine action centre (NMAC), and a southern Sudan regional mine action centre (RMAC). The decree set out the structure of the authority, and the structures, authorities and responsibilities of the NMAC located in Khartoum and the RMAC based in Juba. The national mine action committee was an inter-ministerial body, with representatives from civil society, SAF, SPLA and GoSS. The committee exercised its responsibilities through the deputy Minister of Humanitarian Affairs - the committee’s secretary general. The presidential decree further stipulated that financial resources should be allocated by the government, and that the Ministries of Humanitarian Affairs, Finance and Defence, along with other designated parties, should take necessary measures to implement the decree. With technical and advisory support from UNDP, mine action activities were included in the national budgets from 2006.

The RMAC changed its name to the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) through GoSS’s *Presidential Decree No. 45* in June 2006.\(^{24}\) The president of southern Sudan, General Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed the appointment of a chair person, a deputy chairperson and three executive members. The decree mandated the SSDA to formulate and implement plans for clearance activities, and it urged it to cooperate and collaborate with relevant national and international institutions that had expertise in the field, while working closely with the SPLA and the SAF.

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\(^{22}\) Annex 3 provides a summary of total VTF and assessed budget contributions to the Sudan MAP from 2003 - 2010


\(^{24}\) GoSS Presidential Decree No. 45/2006, 27 June 2006, [http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPAcent20Monitor/Annexes/Annexper cent2044per cent20GoSSper cent20Commissioners.pdf](http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/CPAcent20Monitor/Annexes/Annexper cent2044per cent20GoSSper cent20Commissioners.pdf)
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

THE SUDAN NATIONAL MINE ACTION AND STRATEGIC AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Initially developed and endorsed in 2004, the updated National Mine Action Strategic Framework 2006 – 2011 was prepared by a joint action team from the GoS and the UNMIS, and was endorsed by Presidential Decree No 283 in August 2006. The strategic framework presented the vision, mission, 11 strategic goals and 12 key mine action priorities for Sudan. Importantly, four out of the eleven strategic goals related directly to the transition and capacity development process:

1. Goal 4: to strengthen and expand the existing national capacities, to ensure physical, psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of mine/ERW victims and survivors.
2. Goal 5: to strengthen and expand the existing national mine action institutional framework, to be able to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor all aspects of mine action.
3. Goal 6: to develop and implement a transitional plan, to facilitate the transition of mine action management from the UN to national authorities.
4. Goal 7: to strengthen and expand the existing national operations capacities in mine action surveys, mine/ERW clearance, MRE and victim assistance.

The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework of June 2006 recalled that the CPA stipulated that Sudan should remain united during the transitional period until the 2011 referendum for the citizens of southern Sudan. This “one country approach” was based on CPA’s “one country, two systems approach”, essentially meaning unified national coordination, planning and implementation across the country. The establishment of a NMAA was seen as essential for Sudan to be able to fulfil its obligations under the APMBC, and to carry out all tasks at a national level, while recognising north-south differences, as set out in the CPA. The mine action policy framework presented 11 key principles, of which two were directly relevant to the capacity development/transition process:

1. Principle 3: to enhance the Sudanese leadership and ownership, through developing their skills, expertise, and abilities to plan, implement and monitor all aspects of mine action in the Sudan within the framework of the NMAA
2. Principle 6: all mine action projects must have a strong local/national mine action capacity building element.

The policy framework also set out the roles of key national and international actors,

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such as the NMAC, UNMIS, UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF and national and international civil society organisations and the private sector.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Sudan signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction on 4 December 1997. Subsequent to the convention’s ratification in October 2003, the Convention entered into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. Sudan has regularly submitted its annual transparency report as required by Article 7, and the latest report for 2010 was submitted in April 2011.

In compliance with Article 4, Sudan destroyed all stockpiled anti-personnel landmines before the deadline of April 2008. According to Article 5 of the Convention, Sudan should clear all known mined areas by the end of March 2014, or else apply for an extension. Sudan completed its stockpile destruction obligations in March 2008, complying with its treaty deadline of 1 April 2008. Sudan also signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons in April 1981, but has not ratified it. Sudan signed The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in March 2007, and it was ratified in April 2009. Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).

The SPLM/A signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action in 2001. Building on this initial commitment, South Sudan expressed a keen interest to succeed to the APMBC shortly after its independence, and became the 158th state party to the convention on 11 November 2011. At the time of writing, it was still unclear how the clearance deadlines of Article 4 and 5 will be determined.

THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION BILL
Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Bill by Presidential Decree No. 51 in March 2010. The act comprises 29 articles that are divided into four chapters:

1. Preliminary provisions.
2. National committee, national centre and regional centre, the formation of the national committee.
3. Financial provisions and financial resources.
4. General provisions, prohibit the use of anti-personnel mines.

UN FRAMEWORKS AND PLANS

The UN document Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy of June 2005, highlights various issues in relation to assistance to mine-affected states and national ownership in its “common positions” section. Paragraph 16 notes: “To ensure the most effective and appropriate response to the landmine threat, United Nations mine action activities promote national ownership, institution-building and capacity development, and are contingent on adherence to the core requirements of the IMAS...” Paragraph 18 highlights that “in certain exceptional circumstances, it may be appropriate for the United Nations to assume some or all of the responsibilities, normally undertaken by a national mine action authority”. Paragraph 63 further notes that in programmes managed by the UN, the UN “Coordinates development of a plan, in collaboration with national and UN partners, establishing the milestones to be reached before management of the programmes is transferred to national authorities”. Paragraph 64 is dedicated entirely to the transition process:

“Where the United Nations has been managing a programme on behalf of a national or local authority, the United Nations encourages or assists the government to develop a plan to transfer responsibility for the programme to the national authorities, based on the attainment of agreed milestones as part of a single and integrated strategy. The transfer process will normally be implemented as a phased activity, as capacity is developed within the national and local structures. The process will culminate when appropriate capabilities exist within these structures, and the formal handover of remaining responsibilities will be completed...”

The United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for 2006 - 2010 outlines the strategic objectives and indicators for UN mine action, and is informed by Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy. It promotes achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and full adherence to and compliance with relevant treaties and other international instruments, in particular the APMBC, the convention on conventional weapons and relevant human rights instruments. The strategy stated the following in its situation analysis: “National ownership of mine action programmes has proven critical to long-term success”. The strategy's objective number four was to: “Assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries”. The strategy presented two activities and two indicators of achievement for this specific objective.

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29 Mine Action and Effective Coordination: the United Nations Inter-Agency Policy, June 2005,
31 Ibid. p. 12
32 Ibid. The major activities are to:
   a) Provide capacity development support to enable national mine action institutions to manage, coordinate, and implement an appropriate response to the current landmine/ERW problem
THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK FOR SUDAN (UNDAF)

The UNDAF 2009 – 2012 set out to provide a framework for how the UN could respond to Sudan’s national priorities and needs in an effective, systematic and coherent way. The overarching goal of the UNDAF was consolidating peace and stability, with four interrelated areas of cooperation:

1. Peace building.
2. Governance and rule of law.
3. Livelihoods and productive sectors.
4. Basic services.

Mine action fell under the peace-building area, and UNDAF anticipated the following output: “Strengthened national institutions’ capacity to prioritize, coordinate and manage all aspects of mine action at central and state levels, including implementation of national and international obligations under the Ottawa Conventions (UNMAO, UNDP).” The UNDAF further established the target of the NMAA and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission, taking full responsibility of mine action by 2011, with domestic mine action laws in place.

SUDAN MINE ACTION SECTOR MULTI YEAR PLANS

Sudan’s mine action sector, comprising national authorities, the UN and NGOs, agreed in 2008 that they would together develop a multi-year plan, covering all the components of mine action, through sector-wide consultations.

The 2006-2011 Multi year Plan that was endorsed by the SSDA, the NMAC and UNMAO, was the first plan of such kind to be developed for the mine action sector in Sudan. The purpose of the plan was to demonstrate the commitments of all the Sudanese mine action sector partners to implement mine action activities in accordance with the national strategic framework, and towards meeting national and international obligations. The 2006-2011 Multi Year Plan was aligned with all relevant national documents, as well as with the UNDAF. The process of developing the plan was based on consultations with partners on their strategies and capacities. In line with the transition plan, the 2006-2011 plan envisaged that all management responsibilities would be transferred from the UN to the national mine action authorities by 2011. The plan presents the sector response to capacity development, with a focus on two main

b) Assist national authorities to identify appropriate national institutions and develop capacities that can meet long term mine action requirements

areas:

1. Planning, coordinating and monitoring.
2. Quality management.

The main objectives of the plan were to:

- clarify the gaps in terms of capacities and resources against the defined and shared targets
- make easier the tracking of resources against activities
- provide more transparency vis-à-vis donors and stakeholders
- help partners realign their strategies and activities to the common goals
- improved coordination of tasks

NRMAO staff pointed out that the process of developing the plan and the plan itself was significant in creating a stronger sense of ownership among NMAC staff members.

The 2006-2011 plan was followed by the 2010-2014 Multi Year Work Plan\(^{35}\), which, as with the first plan, was based on consultations with all actors in the Sudanese mine action sector, with UNMAO working closely with their national counterparts. The stated purpose of the multi-year work plan is to provide a unified planning document to assist with resource mobilisation and planning, within the mine action sector in Sudan.

While the first multi-year plan combined north and south together, apart from in the “mine and ERW survey and clearance” section, which was divided between the north, the south and Darfur, the multi-year work plan has two distinct sections – one for the north and one for the south. The plan includes specific sections for north and south respectively, and states how on-the-job training would be the most effective solution to address the SSDA’s need to increase practical understanding of the mine action management processes.

It is clear that the plan has been a useful document for resource mobilisation, and for planning purposes for the Sudanese mine action programme as a whole. While a number of NMAC staff highlighted the value of the document, no SSDA staff members made any reference to it during meetings for this case study. As to whether or not the process of developing the plans resulted in strengthened national capacity, NRMAO staff has pointed out that had the involvement of NMAC been greater, the process’ contribution to NMAC’s capacity development would have been more notable.

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\(^{35}\) Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Work Plan 2010-2014,
THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1590 was adopted in March 2005, providing the legal foundation to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to establish the UNMIS. UNMIS was mandated by UNSCR 1590 to support the CPA in a number of ways, and consisted of 10,000 military personnel and up to 750 civilian police personnel.

Article IV of the UNSCR 1590 stipulated that the UNMIS’s mandate would be the following: “To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination”. The UNSCR 1590 explicitly recognised the sovereignty of Sudan. The Sudan Unified Mission Plan stated that, in its aim to support the Sudanese people in establishing a peaceful and democratic Sudan, the overall programme of the UN in Sudan must have “sustainability as its key objective; allowing for a gradual shift from international assistance to Sudanese self-reliance, and progress that is carried forward by the people and institutions of Sudan”.

The Sudan Unified Mission Plan (the mission plan) stipulated that UNMIS was to oversee the work of UNMAS and UNDP, as well as other mine action actors. It further stated that “all mine action activities will be integrated into a common United Nations mine action program, coordinated by the UNMAS”. The UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) was established with headquarters in Khartoum, and three regional offices in Kadugli (with sub-offices in Kassala and Damazin), Juba (with sub-offices in Yei, Wau and Malakal) and El Fashir (with sub-offices in El Genina and Nyala).

The mission plan presented three key areas that the UN mine action programme should focus on:

1. Surveying potentially contaminated areas countrywide, clearing high and medium priority mine and ERW contaminated areas; rehabilitating the most serious mine victims, and raising awareness of the mine and ERW situation through MRE.
2. Clearing priority roads to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian police components of the mission.
3. Developing national capacity through support to the national mine action authorities and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both the north and the south.

It is important to note in particular point number three, and that the mission plan

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37 UNSCR 1590, ibid
explicitly stated capacity development as a key focus area of the UN mine action programmes.

The mission plan further presented three distinct phases of the mine action programme. While not presenting any timelines for these phases, the mission plan outlined the following key activities, for each phase:

1. Route verification, limited clearance, emergency survey/marking, quality assurance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), battle area clearance (BAC), targeted MRE, emergency VA and capacity building, address treaty obligations and conduct community assessment of the impact of landmines and ERW.

2. Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), route clearance, clearance of high/medium impact areas, quality assurance, national MRE, national VA, capacity building, including implementation of transition plan, and establishing a fully operational national mine action coordination and implementation capacity.

3. Complete the transitional plan, develop operational national mine action coordination and implementation capacity, and make Sudan mine-impact free.

**MAINTREAMING GENDER CONSIDERATIONS IN UNMIS**

The UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security\(^\text{39}\) calls for gender mainstreaming\(^\text{40}\) of all peacekeeping operations. In response to this, a DPKO gender advisor participated in the inter-agency assessment missions conducted prior to the finalisation of the mandate for the UNMIS. In light of this, UNSCR 1590 established the UNMIS reaffirmed the calls of UNSCR 1325, and included a specific section on gender, and explicitly stated that “gender perspectives are to be integrated effectively in all components of the mission...The mission will aim for its policies, programs and activities to comply with international standards on gender equality, and will promote gender equality and equity both internally (inside the mission) and externally (for the Government of National Unity, Government of Southern Sudan, UN agencies and civil society)”\(^\text{39}\) . The mission plan further emphasised the need to ensure that the discharge of the UNMIS mandate was in accordance with international standards, and the UNSCR 1325, which makes an explicit reference to mine action, “Emphasising the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls”\(^\text{39}\).


\(^{40}\) Gender mainstreaming refers to “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality” (report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997(A/52/3) 18 September 1997)
The DPKO’s Under-secretary General’s General Policy Statement on Gender Mainstreaming\textsuperscript{41} of March 2005 provided an operational framework for implementing gender mainstreaming mandates in DPKO’s work. The policy statement requires that all peacekeeping functional units design guidelines to facilitate gender mainstreaming. In response to this, UNMAS developed the Gender Guidelines for Mine Action, in 2005, with an updated version published in 2010. The guidelines present advice on how to mainstream gender in the main areas of mine action, highlighting concrete examples from affected countries. The extent to which a gender perspective was truly integrated into the mine action component of the UNMIS is questionable, and it is evident that the gender guidelines for mine action programmes have not been implemented. Many of the informants interviewed for this study were not even aware of the guidelines, indicating that they have not been disseminated in any meaningful way.

HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

UNMAS
The UN Inter-agency Policy specifies that UNMAS - a division of the DPKO – is the focal point for mine action in the UN system. The policy further sets out that in specific peacekeeping, complex emergency and rapid response settings, UNMAS can establish and manage mine action coordination centres (MACCs). In relation to capacity development, UNMAS is mandated to coordinate the planning for the transfer of programme management responsibilities to national authorities, and, in cooperation with other UN mine action team members, to advise governments on the development of mine action institutions and legislation as well as to assist in developing capacity and institution building plans.

The 2006 Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework determines the role of UNMAS to be that of coordinating mine action activities in collaboration with the national authorities. As mentioned above, the Sudan Unified Mission Plan stipulated that UNMAS should coordinate all mine action activities, integrated into a common United Nations mine action programme. UNMAS have had the dual role of coordinating the UNMAO and supporting the UNMIS. In addition to these responsibilities, UNMAS was also in charge of administering and supervising contracting procedures for tasks identified by the steering committees, comprised of UNMIS, the UN country team and the Sudanese Government. UNMAS was also responsible for coordinating the demining assets of the troop contributing countries.  

UNDP
UNDP was the lead agency for capacity development in the UNMAO structure, as per the Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-agency Policy document, which stipulates that “The United Nations Development Programme provides comprehensive support to national mine action programmes in the full range of mine action activities, at the request of mine-affected countries”. The UN Inter-Agency Policy explicitly states, that; “UNDP capacity development support aims to assist national and local authorities to: develop laws, policies and national and sectoral strategic plans; deliver all elements of mine action efficiently and to IMAS; establish comprehensive information management systems necessary for the efficient planning and prioritisation of mine action activities and ensure the quality of mine action operations; explore cost-effective alternatives to clearance operations based on humanitarian and socio-economic impact analysis; advocate for the inclusion of mine action in national development plans; and meet their legal obligations under relevant

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42 Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Kenya and Egypt are troop contributing countries that provided demining contingents to UNMIS
UNDP’s capacity development activities in Sudan started in early 2004. The first phase of the project (2004 – 2008) focused on establishing legislative frameworks, developing basic organisational infrastructures, including the set up of head/field offices of NMAC and SSDA, as well as training staff members in basic mine action management. The second phase of the project (2009 – 2011) aimed to provide comprehensive management, technical, material and financial support to the NMAA and the SSDA, to consolidate and strengthen their existing institutional, management and technical capacities to be able to plan, coordinate, monitor, accredit, quality assure, manage information, and implement all other aspects of mine action within the framework of the IMAS and the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs). The UNDP mine action programme and capacity building project was managed at the national level. Under the overall supervision of the UNDP Sudan Country Director, the project was executed under UNDP’s direct implementation modality, in both Khartoum and Juba, and was located within the Crises Prevention and Recovery unit of UNDP.

A UNDP senior technical advisor was based in Khartoum between 2005 and 2010, where he spent time in both the north and the south, overseeing five technical advisors, who worked at different times in southern Sudan between 2006 and 2011. The last UNDP technical advisor, based in Juba, was on a UN volunteer’s contract. The reason for downgrading the position was partly due to funding shortages, and partly due to a broader strategy to recruit and place volunteers in various government departments in order to develop capacity. The UNDP noted that the high turnover of technical advisors in Juba impacted negatively on its ability to effectively provide sustained capacity development support to the SSDA. Stated reasons for the high turnover have involved the challenging working conditions in Juba and difficult working relationships between UNDP and UNMAS personnel.

The 2007 Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project presents the following four recommendations, addressing the requirements for:

1. A realistic long term needs assessment, to provide the basis for:
   a. An appropriate long term strategy for the national mine action programme, which will allow:
   b. Realistic plans for further development of Sudanese mine action capacities and for transferring responsibilities from the UN to national authorities, and finally:
   c. Plans by the international mine action organisations (NGOs as well as the UN agencies) for supporting capacity development.

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44 Ibid, p. 35
45 GICHD, Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action capacity Building and Development Project, October 2007
From August 2011, the UNDP was no longer involved in any capacity development activities for the SSDA or the NMAC. Despite numerous efforts, it was not possible to obtain an official explanation as to why UNDP ceased its capacity development activities. An unofficial explanation pointed to a combination of funding issues and clashes between UNMAS and UNDP staff members in Khartoum and at headquarters. A former UNDP staff member stated that UNDP “had enough of being constantly overruled by the more powerful and resourceful UNMAS”.

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF)

In its role as lead agency for MRE within the UNMAO framework, UNICEF coordinated and provided technical support, developed training and promoted best practices. UNICEF further supported “the MRE advisory group”, composed of a number of expert agencies and individuals who provided guidance to the sector, while identifying ways of improving effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of MRE within the broader mine action community.

In relation to capacity development, the UN Inter-agency Policy states that; “In all its work, UNICEF seeks to build the capacity of its local and international partners to undertake effective mine action projects. Consistent with its main focus of work, UNICEF works to develop effective mechanisms to coordinate MRE projects, such as establishing national MRE working groups, undertakes MRE and associated training activities for practitioners, in addition to providing direct technical assistance to government and other national partners”.

A 2007 evaluation of the Sudan mine action programme however, highlighted that UNMAS “had to hire” its own MRE advisors to provide support, as a result of a perceived “lack of interest” on UNICEF’s part. When UNMAS received funds for MRE, the intent was for the funds to be transferred to UNICEF, to hire regional MRE coordinators for Kadugli and Juba. The evaluation team further argued that internal rules regarding support costs meant that it was not possible for UNICEF to accept the funds to hire the two international coordinators. UNMAS then reportedly requested UNOPS to hire them for the programme. A UNICEF staff member provided a different perspective, pointing out that a lack of interest was not an issue, but that the UNMAS negotiated terms and conditions made the transfer of funds to UNICEF impossible. UNICEF further mentioned that UNMAS hired two regional coordinators, despite concerns raised by UNICEF, and that the subsequent arrangement was worked out as a compromise.

UNOPS recruited the two regional MRE coordinators in 2005, and in order to ensure coordination of the MRE programme throughout the country, UNOPS and UNICEF

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46 Ibid, p. 39
agreed that the UNICEF MRE coordinator in Khartoum would coordinate the activities of the two MRE regional coordinators. UNICEF had been providing an MRE coordinator to the UNMAO office in Khartoum since April 2005, but the coordinator reported both to the UNMAO programme manager and the UNICEF chief of child protection. This dual reporting obligation was described as a “confusing arrangement” by the coordinator.

UNICEF had a close collaboration with NMAC’s MRE department in Khartoum, with the coordinator actively involved in developing the MRE element of the transition plan.

At the time of writing, UNICEF supported two international and eight national NGOs financially, to provide MRE activities in southern Sudan. In collaboration with the SSDA, UNICEF also supported the printing of a “teacher’s guide”, which is integrated into the primary educational curriculum. UNICEF has further provided logistical support to the SSDA in the form of vehicles to regional offices and the Juba head office, as well as laptops, a projector, and digital cameras. UNICEF also supports the SSDA through joint field visits to monitor field activities, and through organising special mine awareness campaigns.

INTERNATIONALLY ORGANISED MINE ACTION MANAGER TRAINING COURSES

Many of the middle and senior managers at NMAC and SSDA have participated in one or more of the internationally organised mine action manager training courses provided at Cranfield University (UK), James Madison University (USA) and Amman University (Jordan). Many of the NMAC and SSDA staff members rated the courses and the value created by interacting with colleagues from other mine action programmes, sharing lessons learnt and good practices. A number of international staff however, questioned if these courses really add any value.

Cranfield Mine Action, part of the Centre for International Security and Resilience within Cranfield University, has been providing a range of training courses for national managers in order to develop national capacity to enable the Sudan MAP achieve national ownership in a timely manner. The most recent course, conducted in April 2010, included training on applied quality management, mine action project management, resource mobilisation, and process improvement. Recipients of the training included representatives from NMAC, SSDA, as well as Sudanese national NGOs.

While it is beyond the scope of this study to assess the effectiveness of internationally organised mine action training courses, a number of evaluations have been carried out, including one commissioned by the GICHD in 2007.47

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47 GICHD, Evaluation of UNDP Mine Action Senior and Middle Management Training Courses, February 2007
TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

THE TRANSITION PLANNING PROCESS

In response to the updated 2006 *Mine Action Strategic Framework*’s strategic goal no. 6, to develop and implement a transitional plan in order to facilitate the transition of mine action management from the UN to national authorities, UNMAS - through UNOPS - recruited a transition planning officer in late 2007. The officer’s key responsibilities included developing a transition plan and an exit strategy in consultation with national authorities, and managing “the whole transition process”, from the development of a plan to its implementation, in close cooperation with other stakeholders.

TRANSITION PLANNING WORKSHOPS AND PLANS

The transition planning officer initiated the formal transition planning process, with support from Cranfield University, with a first transition workshop organised in Nairobi in late February 2008. This was behind the timeline set out in the strategic framework, which stipulated that the UNMAO and the NMAA “shall jointly develop and endorse a transitional plan, including clear milestones by December 2006”.

A “transition framework” was developed at the Nairobi workshop, identifying a number of functions and components. The intention was for the framework to be used to map the different actions and capabilities of the NMAC and the SSDA. Additional work on the transition framework was carried out by the transition planning team, based in Khartoum and Juba, through the identification of key elements of national ownership, the identification of a number of core components for each element, and the development of criteria for national ownership for each component.

A second workshop was held in Nairobi in May 2008, at which a monitoring tool to track levels of national ownership was developed, and an agreement on developing transition action plans was made. The third transition workshop in Khartoum in August 2008 took stock of progress made in developing the action plans to support the transition to full national ownership. After this workshop, it was agreed that transition should be approached with the ten core management responsibilities of a mine action programme as a starting point:

1. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action.
2. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities.
3. Accredit mine action organisations, in accordance with the NTSGs, prior to authorisation of mine action activities.
4. Quality manage all mine action activities.

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5. Revise NTSGs according to in-country needs and conditions, that all concerned are obliged to adhere.
6. Maintain the integrity of the IMSMA.
7. Mobilise necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve mine action strategic goals.
8. Coordinate and manage the implementation of MRE to communities at risk on a priority basis.
9. NMAC shall coordinate and manage the implementation of mine victims assistance to ensure physical and psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of landmines/ERW victims and survivors.
10. Ensure that Sudan honours its obligations under the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties.

A fourth transition meeting was held in Juba in November 2008, with the key objective of presenting the transition plan, agreeing its structure and the relationship between transition and capacity development, and discussing its implementation and activities in 2009 and beyond. The importance of monitoring and evaluating capacity development training activities was also agreed upon. The participants further decided that a memorandum of understanding between the UN and the NMAA should be developed, and that the starting point for the implementation of the transition plan should be 1 January 2009.

The fifth transition workshop was held for two days in Khartoum in May 2010. Cranfield University assisted with facilitating the workshop, and representatives from UNMAO, UNOPS, NMAC and SSDA participated.

Participants were divided into two separate groups - NMAC staff members and their UNMAO counterparts in one, and SSDA staff members and their UNMAO counterparts in the other. The two groups first worked separately, reviewing progress made in relation to the level of national ownership in the various elements as set out in the 2008 transition plan, and then got back together for general discussions and reporting. The workshop was essentially structured around the following five areas:

1. “Where were we before?” December 2008 levels of national ownership in the three main areas: clearance, MRE and VA
2. “Where are we now? Current operational plan until June 2011”.
3. Transitioning the ten core management responsibilities.
4. Performance indicators.
5. “Making the multi-year work plan ours”.
The workshop is summarised in a “fifth transition report”. The fifth transition plan presented nine core management responsibilities instead of ten:

1. Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action.
2. Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities.
3. Revise the NTSGs according to in-country needs and conditions to which all concerned are obliged to adhere.
4. Manage the quality of all mine action activities.
5. Accredit mine action organisations in accordance with NTSGs, prior to authorisation of mine action activities.
6. Maintain the integrity of IMSMA.
7. Mobilise necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve mine action strategic goals.
8. Ensure that Sudan honours its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty and other relevant treaties.
9. Plan, coordinate and manage all aspects of support service elements of a mine action programme.

As can be seen, the previous core management responsibilities related to coordination and implementation of MRE activities (previously responsibility No. 8), and to coordinating and managing the implementation of victim assistance were deleted, while the additional responsibility of planning, coordinating and managing support services was added.

The fifth transition plan was divided into the above mentioned nine core management responsibilities of the Sudan MAP. These responsibilities were referred to as “elements”, which were subdivided into components; each of the elements was divided into a common structure, outlined and described; then an end-state for that specific component was presented.

The report presented five levels of national ownership for each component, with level 0 corresponding to no national capacity to carry out responsibilities, and level 4 corresponding to the highest level of national ownership. The reader could also see at which level of national ownership the MAP was set in 2008 (indicated in orange), and which level it was believed the programme had reached in 2010 (indicated in blue).

Following a description of the different levels of national ownership, there was a summary of the situation in June 2010, followed by an outline of activities deemed necessary in order for the NMAC/SSDA to reach the next level of national ownership. Each component ended with an estimate of which level of ownership the NMAC/SSDA

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would reach one year later (June 2011).

**THE TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: NORTHERN SUDAN**

Following the third transition workshop in 2008, the first transition matrix was jointly developed by the northern region mine action office (NRMAO), the UNDP and NMAC. The development of the matrix was seen as necessary, as it was generally believed that the transition plan was too complex, complicated and academic to be practically workable.

The matrix set out specific timelines in relation to what needed to be achieved, and it stipulated the specific responsibilities of the various actors involved, highlighting concrete activities that had to be undertaken in order to reach the goals. It is believed that the development of this transition matrix made the capacity development process less academic and theoretical, concretely highlighting instead what needed to be achieved, by when, how, and who should be responsible. This was an important shift in the capacity development process – from an academic approach to a more practical and pragmatic approach, one that was more easily understood by all stakeholders involved. The shift to a more pragmatic approach strengthened the relationship between NRMAO and NMAC, as NMAC became increasingly involved in quality assurance visits.

Many NMAC respondents indicated that the transition process was unclear to them prior to the May 2010 fifth transition (T5) workshop. It is worth pointing out however, that very few of the NMAC and NRMAO staff that participated in the workshop had been involved in the earlier transition activities of 2008. Some staff members remarked that they doubted transition “would ever happen”. However, all NMAC and NRMAO respondents pointed out that the workshop was a “great success”, remarking how the workshop resulted in a “much clearer” picture of the activities that were necessary for the transition to national ownership to successfully take place. Staff members further underlined that the workshop strengthened the relationship and level of trust between NMAC and NRMAO, providing a strong foundation for closer collaboration between the two organisations. It is evident that the T5 represented a key event in the transition/capacity development process.

Subsequent to the T5 transition plan, a matrix of transitional activities was developed jointly by NMAC and NRMAO staff. The matrix presented the various pillars, activities, what elements of the transition plan the activities corresponded to, the individual(s) responsible, and deadlines. The matrix was an essential document, as it made more concrete the transition plan, clearly presenting the activities which were needed for each area, and importantly, indicating who was responsible for which activity, by when. It essentially answered the questions: Why, What, Who, When?
CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE NMAC

Mine Risk Education Department

The MRE department was consulted in the drafting process of the transition plan, and staff members remarked that capacity development was only really initiated as a structured process with the T5 transition plan. Respondents from the MRE department pointed out that high staff turnover represented an initial challenge for the department up to 2009, and that this negatively impacted on its capacity level.

From mid-2010, the MRE department has had close collaboration with NRMAO, with one NMAC MRE staff member working at the NRMAO office. Key capacity development activities carried out until late 2010 included joint NRMAO – NMAC teacher training activities and field trips, “learning by doing” through in-house training, participation at international meetings, and attending international training courses.

Both NMAC and NRMAO staff members remarked that the January 2011 collocation of NRMAO at NMAC improved NMAC’s general skills tremendously, mainly as a result of:

- on-the-job training
- strengthened coordination
- improved information sharing
- day-to-day discussions and interactions

NMAC successfully chairs the MRE working group on a monthly basis at the NMAC premises, highlighted as a key achievement. A multi-year work plan was developed jointly by NMAC, NRMAO and UNICEF, with the intention of serving as a planning document post-June 2011. NMAC co-tasked all MRE activities in collaboration with NRMAO, and an NMAC signature on all tasking documents was made obligatory.

The T5 transition plan set out five different elements for the MRE department, some with corresponding subcomponents, nine in total. The level of national ownership was fairly balanced among the nine components, with most of them seeing national ownership at level two or three. Key activities included training in the following areas:

- external reporting responsibilities
- survey and needs assessment methodologies
- data analysis techniques
- prioritisation processes
- proposal writing
- planning capacity

While the MRE capacity at NMAC in Khartoum is generally regarded as strong, with two MRE associates and one head of department, staff members pointed out that there are
no MRE capacities in the sub-offices, due to a lack of qualified staff members. Recognising this, NMAC head office identified a number of activities aimed at strengthening capacity at the sub-offices, where NMAC staff usually travel on a more frequent basis. However, issues such as a lack of fuel and functional vehicles regularly represent key challenges to this. Limited commitment from relevant ministries involved in MRE was also underlined as a key constraint. Other significant challenges related to fundraising, and the sustainability of activities.

While NMAC’s MRE department expressed a keen interest in mainstreaming gender considerations, and showed a fairly high level of awareness of gender aspects related to MRE, the staff were not aware of UN’s *Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes*.\(^5^0\) It appears that these guidelines have not been disseminated in any of NMAC’s departments.

**Victim Assistance Department**

The victim assistance (VA) programme was established at the NMAC headquarters in 2007, through funding from the human security trust fund. NRMAO and NMAC have worked in parallel since its initiation. NMAC works closely with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Social Security, which is the ministry officially in charge of VA and broader disability issues in Sudan. NRMAO and NMAC were instrumental in advising on the VA part of the national strategic framework in 2007.

NMAC, in close collaboration with NRMAO, established the VA working group, which consists of 18 NGOs. This working group meets once a month. As of mid-2011, there were three VA staff members at NMAC, but no capacity at the subregional level. A grant from CIDA provided the bulk of the funding from 2008 to June 2011.

A key aspect of capacity development activities has been on-the-job training, carried out by the collocated NRMAO VA expert. Needs assessment activities concluded that training was needed in the following areas: Technical writing with a focus on planning, resource mobilisation, monitoring and evaluation and reporting. Since these areas were of relevance to other NMAC departments, joint training sessions were organised with a number of departments. A key area of attention in the capacity development process has been on the information management cycle, focusing on data collection, storage, quality assurance and analysis.

Key achievements of the VA department include:

- successfully organising workshops related to the *Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities* (CRPD) at state level

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• developing and using a questionnaire to evaluate and monitor outcomes of VA projects at the beneficiary level (presently elaborating a M&E system)
• drafting and disseminating annual and quarterly VA reports
• a VA victim registration form has been developed and the database has been developed, verified and is working
• victim data has successfully been entered into the database, which is currently in use
• data has been collected from NGOs and rehabilitations centres, with the aim of centralising all VA data in a database
• being fully in charge of reporting obligations under Article 7 of the APMBC

It is important to note that responsibilities related to VA activities will eventually be taken over by the Ministry of Social Welfare, incorporating victim assistance into the broader disability programme. This is in line with paragraph 13 of Article IV of the Cartagena Action Plan, which stipulates that “victim assistance should be integrated into broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks related to disability, health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction, while placing particular emphasis on ensuring that mine victims have access to specialised services when needed and can access on an equal basis services available to the wider population”.

Support Department
As mentioned above, participants at the T5 workshop recognised that support services were not reflected in the transition plan, resulting in the inclusion of one additional key management component - “support services”. It was agreed that support services should include administration, logistics, finance, resource mobilisation, IT and external relations. Element 9 of the transition plan set out that “NMAC shall plan, coordinate and manage all aspects of support service elements of a mine action programme in northern Sudan”.

Key activities to develop capacity in NMAC’s logistics department included:

• training the logistics officer in rules and regulations of donors in relation to procurement, asset and fleet management
• establish logistical systems (database, stock taking, asset management, fuel monitoring, request systems and internal auditing systems)
• attaching the NMAC logistics officer to the UNMAO logistics department

In addition to these activities, the development initiative (TDI) seconded a consultant to NMAC’s logistics department through the NRMAO. Upon the establishment of the logistics department and the arrival of the TDI consultant, the set-up of a vehicle management system and asset tracking were made key priorities. Issues related to effective and efficient fleet management were highlighted by staff members working in the logistics department as critical challenges. In particular, concerns were raised
related to NMAC’s capacity to cope with a large number of additional vehicles upon the closure of UNMAO in June 2011, as well as the lack of funds to insure them.

In relation to the administration component of support services, the following activities were carried out in order to strengthen capacity and to prepare for national ownership:

- reviewing NMAC’s organisational chart, and all staff members’ ToRs
- conducting on-the-job training in administration
- Human Resources auditing and reporting (NRMAO staff worked closely with NMAC staff in these areas)

Key activities deemed necessary for strengthening the finance element of support services included NRMAO advising on relevant procedures to meet international audit requirements. Building trust among international donors in order to ensure sustained funding was mentioned as an important task for NMAC.

**Information Management Department**

The sixth element of the core management responsibilities as stated in the transition plan relates to Information Management: “Maintain the integrity of Information Management System Mine Action (IMSMA)”. The Information Management (IM) element was mainstreamed into the clearance, MRE and VA pillars of the transition plan. The T5 report states that IMSMA was one of the “most disputed” topics during the T5 workshop. The T5 report also highlights that “…IMSMA is the only category where everyone agreed there is a real problem”. One of the key explanations for this was that the capacity development process had been initiated late in the IMSMA department. In light of these challenges, participants at the T5 workshop agreed that NMAC’s IMSMA department should be more closely integrated into the NRMAO’s IMSMA activities, and it was believed that the merging of NMAC and NRMAO during the next demining season would significantly strengthen NMAC’s level of capacity in the area. NRMAO’s IMSMA technical advisor highlighted one key recommendation during the T5 workshop: The IM national staff from NRMAO should be transferred to the mine action authorities during the transition period.

Staff members in the IMSMA department pointed out that it was not very clear what the capacity development and transition goals were in 2008. On-the-job training activities were initiated in 2009 however, and the capacity development and transition goals became clearer in 2010. Since March 2011, the main focus of the on-the-job training within the department has been on the “IMSMA package”. A NRMAO IMSMA expatriate staff member acted as an advisor to the NMAC IMSMA department. A considerable part of the on-the-job training was carried out through an experienced Sudanese NRMAO IMSMA staff member, working closely with NMAC. This strategy was proven to be highly successful, as cultural and linguistic aspects made the collaboration effective, resulting in strengthened capacity.
Despite improvements however, the NRMAO and NMAC IMSMA staff members expressed that “more time is needed for confidence building”. On-the-job training focused, among other things, on the “customisation” of IMSMA to the future needs of the country, if necessary; “training the trainer” activities were also carried out, to ensure that NMAC’s IMSMA department has the ability to train newly recruited IMSMA staff members as well as other NMAC staff members in IMSMA.

IM and IMSMA were pointed out to be “very much integrated into operations”, with IMSMA staff members working closely with the operations and MRE departments. The NRMAO technical advisor, pointed out that the capacity development work was “very time-consuming”, and that it often was challenging to find the right balance of “doing training and running the show”. The technical advisor further mentioned that it would be premature for all UN support to be terminated with the closure of UNMAO in June 2011, highlighting a need for continued external support in relation to guidance, technical assistance and monitoring of progress.

The availability of sex and age disaggregated accident data is a precondition for enabling the identification and awareness of the distinct exposure to risks that women, girls, boys and men commonly face due to their gender specific roles and responsibilities. This information can in turn allow for MRE activities to be more effectively tailored and targeted. As a state party to the APMBC, Sudan has committed to collect and analyse all data in a sex and age disaggregated manner by the Cartagena Action Plan’s action point number 25.51 The information management department displayed a high level of awareness of the importance of storing and presenting data in a sex and age disaggregated manner whenever relevant, and accident data was presented in this way by default.

**Operations Department**

As of June 2011, NMAC’s operations department comprised a total of eight staff members, including three from the NRMAO, collocated in its office. The department highlighted the goals of full ownership and Sudan meeting its APMBC Article 5 clearance obligations at the 2010 T5 workshop. It was noted that although transition to national ownership would mean that the UN would play a supporting rather than implementing role, continued UN presence at the NMAC, providing technical assistance and resource mobilisation would be critical for the continued capacity development of NMAC.

In order to structure the capacity development activities, the operations department developed a plan of action, outlining timelines, milestones and indicating which individuals were responsible for what activities.

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Key focus areas of capacity development at the operations department included:

1. **Prioritisation**
   - NMAC co-chaired the prioritisation process for the 2010 – 2011 season
   - All three sub-offices took the lead in the prioritisation process at the sub-office level for the 2010-2011 work plan

2. **Tasking**
   - NMAC increased its involvement in tasking procedures from 1 January 2011, through directly tasking implementing agencies
   - The NMAC operations office took full responsibility of tasking procedures from 1 April 2011, with technical assistance from NRMAO

3. **National technical standards and guidelines (NTSGs)**
   - NTSGs were reviewed and adapted to country specific requirements in October 2010, and were published on the Sudan MAP website

4. **Accreditation**
   - Indicators, outlining to what percentage NMAC should be involved in accreditation and quality assurance activities were agreed upon, and an “accreditation schedule” was completed and shared with sub-offices

Three NRMAO operations staff members were collocated with the NMAC operations department in January 2011. From January on, NMAC’s operations officer worked very closely with NRMAO’s regional operations coordinator, gradually taking on more responsibilities. Capacity development aspects were included in the NRMAO regional operations coordinator’s ToR, but was not a key focus of his work, as he mainly supported the activities of UNMIS.

NMAC operation’s staff recalled that it was only when the collocation of NRMAO with NMAC took place that the “real transition” started, underlying the need for continuing technical assistance, and that the exchange of experience is key. Planning and contracting were highlighted as areas in need of continued capacity development through practical experience and on-the-job training.

It is worth noting that NMAC and NRMAO were collocated from the very beginning of the establishment of the Kassala sub-office in 2006. The successful collocation at the sub-regional level influenced the push for the collocation of NRMAO with NMAC at headquarters level in Khartoum. The NMAC Kassala sub-office was “running on its own” from early 2011, with one expatriate staff member providing technical assistance when needed. The NRMAO Damazin sub-office was located within the UNMIS base. NMAC quality assurance officers spent two days per week at the NRMAO office, benefiting
from on-the job training and technical assistance.

Key operational challenges for a post-transition NMAC were pointed out to include tasking, monitoring and quality assurance and control. It was further mentioned that the NMAC budget, as of June 2011, only covered office and some of the salary costs, and no operational activities related to tasking, monitoring and quality assurance and control. A 2012 grant that has been issued to NMAC will reportedly cover these gaps. The salary discrepancy between UNMAO and NMAC national staff was highlighted as a key challenge in absorbing staff with relevant technical skills and qualifications into NMAC.

One example clearly illustrates this discrepancy: A UNMAO national operations quality assurance (QA) assistant, level 3, receives a monthly salary, all inclusive of about 2,900 Sudanese Pounds, while the equivalent position at NMAC receives a monthly salary of SDG 1,000. Not only was it difficult to absorb UNMAO staff members with relevant experience and knowledge, but the salary discrepancy also resulted in difficulties in retaining them; “it is impossible to retain trained staff at NMAC”.

In terms of the extent of the contamination, the operations department pointed out it has an up-to-date and accurate understanding of it, and that a strategic plan is in place to implement its mine clearance obligations under Article 5 by 2014.

As regards the residual contamination, NMAC noted that the plan is for the SAF to deal with it. Discussions between NMAC, NRMAO and MAG resulted in an agreement on NMAC establishing a mine action hotline number 1912 (free of charge, similar to 999), from 1 January 2012. Community members can call the hotline number whenever they come across any landmine/ERW contamination. The hotline phone number is based at the NMAC, and will cover all of Sudan, it is funded by MAG and managed by NMAC. It can be dialled from all mobile networks operating in Sudan and is free of charge. Every call will be received and registered by NMAC, and calls reporting a mine, an item of unexploded ordnance, or any suspicious object, as well as reports of mine related accidents, will be passed to the field offices that will take appropriate actions to identify the threat and task relevant assets to eliminate it.

With regards to national clearance capacities, the JIDUs (part of the Joint Integrated Units (JIU)) were created as a result of the signing of the CPA and include deminers from southern and northern Sudan. These deminers were initially seconded from the army but then came under the supervision of the High Commission for Mine Action (a group of ministries led by the Humanitarian Affairs Commission). They were trained at the Nairobi training centre as humanitarian deminers and equipped with the necessary equipment. The JIDUs were closely integrated into NMAC from 2009 onwards.

The JIDU were given a desk accreditation as an integrated mine clearance team (IMCT)

\[52\] Information can be found on NMAC’s website: [http://su-mac.org/index.php/sample-sites-2](http://su-mac.org/index.php/sample-sites-2)
by UNMAO in 2010, followed by an operational accreditation and a test field, funded by the British Embassy in Khartoum. As a result of the accreditation, there has been an increased interest among previous donors to continue the support they had previously provided and help create a sustainable humanitarian demining capacity capable of conducting independent mine clearance operations that comply with IMAS.

The JIDUs were provided by the CPA and, as such, ceased to exist on 9 July 2011. They were renamed the National Demining Units (NDUs) after July 2011, and they continue carrying out humanitarian demining, coordinated by the Humanitarian Affairs Ministry as and when funds are available.

**The Way Ahead**

Following the end of the UNMIS mandate as per UNSCR 1997 in July 2011, the UNMAO concluded its activities in Sudan. At the request of the GoS, UNMAS continued providing assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC.

Following the termination of UNMIS and the closure of UNMAO, the main activity of UNMAS in Sudan (UNMAS-S) is to continue assisting the NMAC in the implementation of mine action activities in the country, to promote the humanitarian and developmental goals of the government.

The current areas of assistance are inline with the Sudan Mine Action Programme Multi-Year Work Plan and the transition plan. NMAC and the Humanitarian Affairs Commission have identified, through the transition planning process initiated in 2008 that the main competencies where the NMAC would like continued UN support are:

- operations and quality assurance
- IMSMA
- MRE
- resource mobilisation

Support will continue, based on a regular monitoring and evaluation system agreed upon with NMAC.

**INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN NORTHERN SUDAN**

**The Danish Church Aid**

As previously mentioned, DCA was the first international operator involved in clearance in Sudan in 2002, from the very beginning working in close partnership with national...
organisations JASMAR (the Sudanese association for combating landmines) and Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL). The first ever cross-border demining training course, organised by DCA, was attended by JASMAR and OSIL.

JASMAR and OSIL were DCA’s implementing clearance partners until 2005, when significant financial and organisational challenges resulted in DCA taking over all clearance teams from the two national organisations. DCA pointed out that JASMAR and OSIL were struggling to establish themselves as fully independent NGOs, and that OSIL in particular was very poorly funded. While the national organisations may have had a good level of technical capacity in terms of clearance, DCA highlighted that they lacked capacity in other areas that are essential for an organisation to operate independently, such as finance and logistics.

Both JASMAR and OSIL had MRE teams working directly with the DCA since 2003 up to 2011. These teams were working closely with DCA’s multi-task teams, providing community liaison (CL) and MRE support during clearance operations.

In addition to the above activities, DCA provided capacity development support to JASMAR, in the form of logistical, finance and English language training. DCA also provided vehicles and IT equipment, as well as financial contributions to JASMAR. DCA staff pointed out that JASMAR had increasingly developed into a self-sustained NGO, and that improvements in the running of the organisation were very evident.

**Association for Aid and Relief, Japan**

The Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR) started its activities in Sudan in 2006, and has had a partnership agreement from the very beginning with the Sudanese organisation Friends of Peace and Development Organisation (FPDO). AAR and FPDO initially focused their activities on developing MRE material. AAR opened a sub-office in Kadugli, South Kordofan in 2007, and started developing MRE sessions. AAR shared this office with the FPDO from the very beginning, and FPDO delivered MRE on an independent basis.

AAR has highlighted that it focused its capacity development activities with the FPDO in the following areas:

- MRE training
- IT skills
- administrative related work

AAR also conducted workshops and gave trainings to other national NGOs, with a specific focus on material development. AAR provided training to a staff member at the NMAC MRE department, through regular on-the-job training in MRE development,
three days per week.

In terms of FPDO’s general level of capacity, AAR has pointed out that it is “quite good”, and the main capacity challenges are reported to be in the administrative and financial areas.

**Mines Advisory Group**

While not having had any formal capacity development activities with NMAC, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) did focus on strengthening the capacity of its clearance teams, with the long term view of “handing them over” to its national partner organisation JASMAR. Leaders of the various clearance teams underwent training to be certified at EOD level 3, and MAG also conducted an EOD level 2 training course in Khartoum in August 2011. There were 23 staff members from JASMAR/MAG, the NDU and the NMAC who became certified at EOD level 2. Medical training was also provided to seven medics, qualifying them to provide emergency medical support for Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) operations.

MAG signed a memorandum of understanding with the NDU in May 2010, following from which five deminers were seconded to MAG to be trained and accredited as a multi-task team. The team was trained in manual clearance, BAC, and technical and non-technical survey. Soon after, a second team was seconded to MAG to be trained in the operation and maintenance of a Bozena IV mechanical asset and mechanical preparation techniques. The team has since also been trained and accredited in the use of mechanical assets. Based on the successes of MAG’s partnership with the NDUs,

MAG has also run CL and MRE projects with JASMAR, as well as providing training and support for its programme staff. JASMAR seconded CL staff to MAG to benefit from the expertise provided by MAG’s technical team, and MAG benefitted greatly from JASMAR’s extensive experience delivering MRE projects in the region. In May 2011, the national community liaison manager and MAG/JASMAR MRE trainer were sent on a programme learning and exchange visit to Lebanon, where they shared constraints, achievements and lessons learned with both MAG’s Lebanese programme, and the Lebanese NMAA.
TRANSITION AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: SOUTHERN SUDAN

THE SSDA
The Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) is responsible for:

- broad strategic policy decisions
- responsibilities that are usually associated with a NMAA
- for overseeing mine action at the operational level
- for managing day-to-day mine action activities, a role commonly associated with a mine action centre (MAC)

IMAS 02.10, the Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme\(^{54}\) clearly describes the responsibilities of these different authorities, and recommends a clear division of the two. SSDA has three sub-regional offices, located in Malakal in Upper Nile State, Yei in Central Equatoria State, and in Wau in Western Bhar El- Ghazal. Most respondents noted that the capacity is very low in these sub-offices, and it was pointed out that they are severely under-resourced in terms of staff and equipment.

TRANSITION TEAM
Following the news that UNDP would cease its mine action activities, UNMAS initiated the idea of creating a transition team in 2010. The principal aim was to implement the transition plan and to carry out capacity development activities with SSDA. The transition team, as of June 2011 was made up of representatives from three different organisations: UNMAS, NPA and UNDP.

As from mid-2010, two staff members from the UNMAO team were directly involved in capacity development: one UNDP UN volunteer (UNV) who was permanently located at the SSDA premises, and one UNMAS technical advisor, who spent considerable time working with SSDA’s senior management team. Together with the NPA capacity development team (consisting of two expatriate staff and two national staff), these staff members represented the “transition team”. Key responsibilities and activities were agreed upon by the transition team members. It was further decided which key external partners the various transition team members were “responsible for”, and each transition team member was assigned a SSDA counterpart.

THE T5 WORKSHOP
The slow progress of capacity development/transition efforts in southern Sudan is in

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sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. This can be explained by a number of factors, including lower levels of education among the population, poorer infrastructure and greater impacts of the conflict at all levels of society.

While the T5 workshop, held in Khartoum in May 2010, was hailed a “success” by most UNMAO and NMAC representatives, a distinctively different perspective was given by SSDA staff members and other southern Sudanese participants. Recognising the “one country approach” stated in the CPA and other key documents, the reasons for organising the T5 workshop in Khartoum, bringing southern and northern stakeholders together, are understandable. It is, however, evident that the format of the T5 workshop resulted in problems. Numerous southern Sudanese T5 participants were highly critical of the workshop, and of the fact that it was organised in Khartoum.

One senior SSDA staff member referred to the T5 workshop as a politically driven “window dressing” activity - adding little real value to SSDA’s capacity development and transition process. Another senior SSDA staff member highlighted that T5 was a “success” for the north, but a “disaster” for the south. One senior UNMAS staff member who worked at the UNMAO head office at the time pointed out that the combination of new senior staff members at UNMAO in Juba, limited resources, and the politically driven motives linked with the “one country approach”, resulted in the decision to conduct the T5 workshop jointly in Khartoum. Recognising the shortcomings of this decision, however, the same staff member also confessed that “in hindsight, it was a mistake to have north and south together”. When asked about the accuracy of the levels of national ownership agreed upon in Khartoum, this same staff member remarked that they “didn’t want to wash the dirty laundry in public”, presumably referring to the fact that the low level of capacity at the SSDA was overlooked.

THE T5 TRANSITION PLAN

There was a lot of criticism on the T5 transition plan. Firstly, many pointed the great delay in its completion, and that it was not made available to the SSDA (nor the NMAC) until February 2011, despite the workshop taking place in May 2010. One senior SSDA staff member argued that the transition plan was “mainly an UNMAO document”, with very little consultation from SSDA staff members besides the chairperson. According to him, the chairperson was the only one “who was allowed to talk” during the T5 workshop, resulting in the subsequent transition plan being based on “assumptions” – not accurately reflecting the reality in southern Sudan.

Another senior SSDA staff member pointed out that “how the transition plan stipulates the capacity development and transition process does not happen on the ground”. A senior UNMAO staff member working in Juba at the time pointed out that about a dozen SSDA staff members attended the T5 workshop, and that a meeting was organised shortly after returning to Juba, in order to confirm what had been decided in...
Khartoum. At this meeting, it turned out that SSDA staff did not agree with much that had been decided at the T5, resulting in an additional four meetings. The UNMAO staff member highlighted that these four meetings resulted in an “as close to agreed language as we could get”. It was further underlined that the considerable delay in drafting and distributing the T5 transition plan lead to SSDA “buying out”, to a large extent disassociating themselves from what had been agreed.

Another key criticism raised by many was the lack of indicators for the different levels of national ownership, at times resulting in highly subjective interpretations of what the different levels mean.

Likewise, expatriate representatives who were involved in the capacity development process believe the plan had serious limitations. For instance, one individual argued that the transition plan essentially was a “political document”, while explicitly pointing out the problems related to lack of indicators. Echoing criticism from SSDA staff members, a number of expatriates pointed out that the transition plan was not realistic, and that it was difficult to use in a practical way. The T5 transition plan and the corresponding process have been criticised by some individuals as being “too academic” and “too theoretical” – not “tailored to the reality” of the Sudan mine action programme.

Information obtained from respondents involved in the transition process clearly indicates that the T5 transition plan was not actively implemented in southern Sudan. None of the individuals interviewed during the research mentioned they had actually used the transition plan. One SSDA staff member argued that the lack of implementation of the transition plan was the result of “a lack of cooperation between the SSDA and UNMAO”.

THE SIXTH TRANSITION WORKSHOP

As per clause 2.555 of the CPA, an internationally monitored referendum, organised jointly by the GoS and the SPLA/M provided the women and men of southern Sudan with the opportunity to either confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the CPA or to vote for secession. The referendum took place as scheduled on 9 January 2011, and the results that were published on 7 February 2011 showed that an overwhelming majority (98.83 per cent) voted in favour of secession. The vote for secession and the subsequent independence of southern Sudan, declared on 9 July 2011, effectively terminates the interim arrangements, agreed to by the NCP and the SPLA/M through the signing of the CPA.

The sixth transition workshop (T6) was held in Juba in June 2011. Following the outcome

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55 “At the end of the six year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organised jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession”.

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of the referendum in southern Sudan, the workshop focused exclusively on the transition process in southern Sudan. NMAC and UNMAO representatives were therefore not present. The workshop was organised by UNMAO’s technical advisor, with GICHD assisting with facilitation. The workshop brought together representatives from GoSS, the UN, NGO partners and other stakeholders. The aim of the workshop was to:

- review the progress made since the 2010 T5 workshop
- take stock of current levels of national ownership, compared to those identified in the T5 transition plan
- identify key activities necessary to move to the next level of national ownership

Workshop participants were divided into three groups, tasked to discuss three different “sections”:

- clearance
- MRE/VA
- support

Review discussions during the T6 revealed that SSDA’s levels of national ownership, as agreed upon during the T5 workshop, far from accurately reflected the reality on the ground. One key reason for this discrepancy could be traced to the fact that the general level of capacity is considerably higher in the north compared to the south, explained in part by higher levels of education, more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly, considerably lower impacts of the war on all levels of society. The high levels of national ownership agreed on during the T5 could therefore have been a result of representatives from southern Sudan feeling intimidated in comparison with their northern counterparts. With new UNMAO staff members in the south, it was hard for them to accurately verify the levels indicated, since they were new to the context themselves. A number of individuals have highlighted these as plausible explanations as to why such exaggerated levels of national ownership were accepted.

Recognising the shortcomings of the T5 workshop and of the subsequent plan, it was clearly emphasised from the very start that the T6 workshop should aim to result in agreed levels of well thought through national ownership, and accurately reflect the reality on the ground. Discussions during the T6 workshop made it clear that numerous aspects of the transition plan had not been fully understood by many of the SSDA staff members. Also, the lack of SMART\(^{56}\) indicators for the different levels of national ownership (level 0 “lowest” to level 4 “highest”) resulted in varying and highly subjective interpretations of the different levels.

While most levels of national ownership corresponding to the different elements of the

\(^{56}\text{SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound.}\)
transition plan were actually put back one or two levels, at least the T6 workshop resulted in a more realistic picture, reflecting the actual level of national ownership within the SSDA. Understandably however, the fact that many elements saw the levels of national ownership being brought back one, and sometimes even two steps, meant that many SSDA staff members were discouraged, since many felt they had made efforts and could see visible improvements in some areas. It was therefore important to point out that the “modification” of some levels should not be interpreted as a static situation at the SSDA, but rather as a result of a misleading starting point.

CORE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF SSDA

MRE and VA Department
SSDA’s MRE/VA department is fairly small, with three staff members, including the director. Generally speaking, SSDA’s capacity to carry out its MRE responsibilities is very low. The T6 transition plan includes a total of eleven components. The T6 workshop determined that the level of national ownership corresponds to level 0 in two out of the eleven components, level 1 in seven out of the 11 components, level 2 in two cases.

The SSDA has no capacity to task MRE activities or to conduct needs assessments and analysis to support the MRE programme. One of the key achievements of the MRE department appears to be that it organises the MRE working group on a monthly basis and has been hosting it at the SSDA premises since May 2010. UNMAO reported that, in collaboration with UNICEF, it developed a matrix stipulating MRE activities, and that this was used as a basis for the MRE work plan. It is unclear however, to what extent this activity matrix has been useful and implemented by the department.

Key challenges that were pointed out referred to the generally low level of competency and skills of the staff members, as well as a lack of ability to communicate within the department and with key stakeholders in a professional manner. The extent to which on-the-job training activities have been carried out appears to be very low, with fairly limited interactions with UNICEF and UNMAO.

The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MoGCSW) is the Ministry responsible for disability issues in South Sudan, and VA falls under this broader responsibility. SSDA’s present role and responsibility in VA is mainly related to information sharing activities. Together with the MoGCSW, the SSDA co-chairs the monthly VA/disability working group meetings at the physical rehabilitation centre in Juba.

Support Services Department
The transition team focused its capacity development efforts in the support section on institutional capacity development, aimed at clarifying the SSDA structure; which staff
members have which positions, and their specific roles and responsibilities. The transition team clarified the organogram in 2010, and terms of reference (ToR) were developed for each of the eight departments, and for all the different staff positions.

As of June 2011, the SSDA had a total of 96 staff members on its payroll. The T6 workshop made it obvious that the roles and responsibilities of many SSDA staff members were unclear, and that, in too many cases there is confusion as to which departments and in particular, staff members are responsible for which activities. It therefore appears that the time and energy invested in developing and clarifying the roles and responsibilities among different departments and staff members have resulted in very limited, or no, visible improvements on the ground.

Capacity assessment questionnaires were also developed by the transition team in 2010-2011, with the aim of establishing the level of capacity of the different staff members and to clarify where the capacity gaps were the greatest.

With the objective of strengthening the administrative and financial procedures within the SSDA, a total of 52 forms were developed in collaboration with the SSDA director of administration and finance. As a direct response to very poor attendance levels of SSDA staff members, a monthly attendance sheet was one of the many human resources (HR) forms that were developed, in the hope that this form should serve as a basis for the issuing of salaries. The extent to which this form has been implemented however, seems to be fairly limited. On-the-job training on how to complete these forms was provided to relevant staff members in the Juba office and in the sub-regional offices of Yei, Wau and Malakal.

There appears to have been very little collaboration between UNMAO and SSDA in relation to resource mobilisation activities. The SSDA programme director, who in theory should be responsible for fundraising activities at the SSDA, informed she has not collaborated at all with UNMAO’s programme officer who is involved in resource mobilisation. The resource mobilisation capabilities within the SSDA appear to be at best, very low and at worst, nonexistent.

**Information Management Department**

Component 6.1 of the transition plan relates to information management, and describes it as: “effective data entry and verification, collation, management and secure storage of mine action data”. As in the north, IMSMA is the system that is used to enter, manage and store mine action data in South Sudan. The transition plan stipulates the end state for component 6.1 as: “Using IMSMA, mine action data is managed and used in an efficient and effective manner”.

Participants at the T6 workshop agreed that, in order to reflect the reality, SSDA’s level
of national ownership in information management should be brought back from level 2; “SSDA is managing and using mine action data, yet not done in an efficient or effective manner, and further improvements need to be made”, to level 1; “SSDA’s capacity to manage and use mine action data is being developed”.

The rationale for setting the level of national ownership to correspond to level 2 in May 2010 is hard to understand, as level 2 depends on a parallel IMSMA being up and running. SSDA has all necessary hardware for utilising IMSMA effectively, but a lack of regular supply of electricity has meant that as of September 2011, no parallel IMSMA was established at the SSDA. As of October 2011, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) was therefore still fully responsible for managing all mine action data in southern Sudan, with most external stakeholders going directly to UNMACC for information and/or maps.

As in the operations department, NPA has been a key partner in the capacity development work of the information management department, providing IT and IMSMA courses and ongoing on-the-job training. NPA’s regional information management advisor is based in the NPA office located in the SSDA compound. When NPA started its capacity development project in mid-2010, a hardware/resources needs assessment of SSDA’s IMSMA department was carried out. As a response to the findings, NPA assisted in purchasing necessary equipment. A needs assessment looking into competencies and skills was carried out on an ad hoc basis. NPA informed that its activities have mainly responded to UNMAO’s capacity development suggestions. NPA started its information management training activities more or less “from scratch”, focusing on basic computer literacy, and familiarised the staff members with the most commonly used IMSMA forms, such as survey and completion forms, and the corresponding process of how to complete them. NPA and UNMAO’s IMSMA department have been collaborating in their capacity development efforts, planning and making decisions together.

The main weaknesses of SSDA’s IMSMA department were highlighted to include lack of practical experience in using IMSMA and analysing data. Main strengths highlighted by NPA include the willingness and eagerness to learn and a high level of commitment. Until a parallel IMSMA has been installed at the SSDA, NPA will focus its capacity development activities on training the IMSMA staff members in quality assurance and data entry, using a “dummy IMSMA”. The aim is to familiarise the staff members with the process of report entry and quality assurance, as a preparation for the “real” IMSMA.

In terms of the level of capacity in the various areas of information management, it has been pointed out that data entry is the area where the SSDA is the most advanced, whereas there is still need for training in reporting, mainly due to lack of opportunities to practice. The important analysis part of information management has not even been
touched upon. One of the main problems appears to be the lack of practical opportunities to actually use IMSMA, apart from data entry activities at UNMAO. As argued by NPA: “The guys have had no opportunity to show anyone how good they are”.

Operations Department
The capacity level of SSDA’s operations department is weak in many areas. As of mid-2011, UNMAO was taking the lead in all major elements of operations, including accreditation, tasking, quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). A number of cases illustrate a keen interest and a high level of motivation among some SSDA QA officers in learning new skills and taking on more responsibilities. However, SSDA’s operations department’s ability to effectively, efficiently and professionally manage all the operational aspects of the mine action programme remains very limited. The weakest area in SSDA’s operations department is in tasking operators through the issuing of clear, concise and accurate task dossiers.

As of June 2011, SSDA had no capacity to task and manage mine action activities. The T6 transition plan stipulates that this capacity would be developed throughout 2011 and 2012, mainly through an increased involvement of relevant SSDA staff members in tasking procedures. The transition plan further sets out that SSDA’s operations department should be trained in task dossier development. The plan also stipulates that “SSDA will create and manage tasks by at least 50 per cent by September 2012”. Whether this is a realistic goal remains to be seen.

As to the quality management of operations activities, a QA system has been developed and introduced by the UNMAO, and SSDA QA officers collaborate with UNMAO to conduct QA activities. There are examples of excellent collaboration between SSDA QA officers and UNMAO operational staff, both in Juba and in Yei. The success of these collaborations appears to be rooted in motivated individuals, largely dependent on high levels of commitment and interest from both sides, resulting in effective on-the-job training. It is clear that these success stories reflect high levels of individual commitment, motivation and interest, rather than a high level of institutional capacity.

Key actors have recognised that that an in-depth knowledge of mine action is a necessary precondition for the SSDA to effectively carry out accreditation and quality management activities in compliance with the NTSGs. The T6 stipulates that this will be achieved through an integrated field-based training programme, along with on-the-job placements with UNMAO and implementing partners. The key areas this on-the-job training focuses on include:

- general mine action assessment
- technical survey
Joint reconnaissance activities with the aim of supporting the development of an implementation plan that fully responds to task dossiers is currently underway, and will continue with the goal of SSDA, leading joint reconnaissance exercises with technical assistance of the transition team by June 2012.

Upon the request from the UNMAO technical advisor and chief of operations, the commercial company Mine Tech International (MTI) offered four weeks’ “integrated mine action” training to five SSDA QA officers in March 2011. The course covered the following areas:

- overview – MRE
- field visits – integrated mine clearance
- planning
- asset deployment
- threat assessment

According to MTI, the SSDA staff members’ performance during the course was very mixed, with a varying degree of commitment. Three out of the five participants passed the course. The fact that this training came out of a request from UNMAO suggests there is good collaboration between different actors in southern Sudan, indicating that there is a commitment to collaborate in developing the capacity of the SSDA.

Commercial company G4S has also been involved in on-the-job training, through field placement of SSDA QA officers in G4S operations for an extended period of time.

**Residual Capacity**

As of mid-2011, there was no concrete plan in place for how to deal with residual contamination, specifying what capacities would be necessary and who would be responsible. Recognising that new minefields are still being discovered, and that new landmines are being laid in a number of volatile states including Unity and Upper Nile, it is understandable that the focus is still on how to deal with the known contamination in the most effective and efficient manner.

Respondents from both SSDA and UNMNAO have highlighted that the most effective and logical ways of dealing with a future residual threat would be through police and/or SPLA EOD teams. There have already been discussions between the UN, SSDA and SPLA...
in relation to plans for SPLA to deal with residual contamination. It was highlighted that one option could be to have an international commercial company training the SPLA.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

NPA started its operations in southern Sudan in 1986, with a focus on food security, health care, development of local communities, as well as training programmes for the local population. NPA established its mine action programme in Yei, South Sudan in March 2004, carrying out clearance and survey activities.\(^{57}\)

NPA is the NGO that has been most heavily involved in capacity development activities with the SSDA in southern Sudan, and it also has a long history of close support to the SPLM. NPA started its capacity development project with SSDA in mid-2010, after being approached by UNDP’s technical advisor at the time. UNMAS played an important role in helping NPA secure Canadian funding for the capacity development project, with senior UNMAS staff liaising with the Canadian donor, emphasising the need for additional capacity development efforts.

This example illustrates the good collaboration between key actors in the capacity development process in South Sudan. UNDP requested NPA to assist in training SSDA QA and operations officers, training IM staff and implementing the IMSMA, IT support, and providing advice to the SSDA management staff members on a daily basis. NPA MA and UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding, and two NPA staff members started working in the capacity development project in 2010, setting up a container in the SSDA compound, in order to encourage a close working relationship with SSDA staff members. NPA initially started with one expatriate capacity development advisor, one expatriate IM staff member, and three national staff members. In collaboration with UNMAO, NPA was mandated to implement the following training activities for relevant SSDA staff members:

- manual demining training course, including explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training course level 1
- EOD training courses level two and three
- relevant quality assurance and operations courses
- “on-the-job” training during quality assurance visits with UNMAO
- IT and IMSMA training to SSDA IM staff members

NPA’s second phase of capacity development activities with the SSDA runs from 2011 to 2013, with the long term objective that SSDA has a functional and sustainable mine

\(^{57}\) NPA, Mine Action Portfolio 2010 – 2011
action authority/mine action centre that coordinates all mine action activities and stakeholders in South Sudan. From 2011, NPA has coordinated all capacity development activities closely with UNMAO and the transition team, with the aim of “corresponding directly to crucial institutional functions of the national mine action authority as identified in the Transition Plan and as part of the collaborative efforts of the Transition Team”. During the second phase, NPA is focusing its activities in the following areas:

- institutional capacity building: NPA to provide logistics, finance and administration courses in accordance with IMAS and requirements from GoSS and UNDP in implementing Element 9 of the transition plan
- quality assurance and operations management: NPA to provide on-the-job training and field attachments in accordance with IMAS and NTSGs, in close collaboration with UNMAO, commercial mine action companies and mine action NGOs
- IM and IMSMA: NPA to provide information management training to all SSDA field offices
- NPA to incorporate gender, sexual exploitation and anti-corruption in its training activities. Training to be conducted by a national partner organisation
- land release: NPA, in collaboration with the GICHD, to provide a selected number of SSDA staff members with knowledge on how land release methodology can be implemented in South Sudan

Mines Advisory Group
MAG has been operational in southern Sudan since 2004. While MAG has not been involved in direct capacity development/transition activities with the SSDA, the organisation has supported its national partner organisation Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) since 1998, with the aim of strengthening the national mine action capacity.

Since 2009, MAG has, in collaboration with CHF, implemented a 3-year project that aims to develop the capacity of OSIL. The project aims to develop OSIL’s capacity at three different levels – mine action, livelihoods and organisational development. OSIL has been involved in mine action since it started operating in South Sudan, and has, over the last few years had an operational focus on MRE/CL activities. MAG’s capacity development activities in this project included the following activities:

- expand OSIL’s level of capacity in CL activities, through training and “handing over” a fully trained national community liaison manager (NCLM) and CL team
- develop OSIL’s technical expertise through training and “handing over” a fully trained national technical field manager (NTFM), a manual demining team and a mechanical team

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58 NPA, Information Document; NPA’s support to the capacity development of Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority, March 2011
Since March 2010, MAG also implemented a second project, focusing exclusively on capacity development.

MAG organised a level 3 EOD course in Juba in July 2010. A total of 38 participants attended the course, with 18 participants successfully completing it. One of the key objectives was for the course to directly contribute towards building the country’s national capacity to coordinate, implement and monitor mine action activities.

Danish Demining Group
The Danish Demining Group (DDG) started its activities in southern Sudan shortly after the signing of the CPA in 2005, and has since the beginning focused on MRE, low-tech EOD, BAC and stockpile destruction. In line with DDG’s global development, a new programme focusing on armed violence reduction (AVR) activities started in 2009. Since the second half of 2011, the organisation has intensified the community focus of its mine action activities, using a “village-by-village approach”, thereby increasing the number of community based tasking and prioritisation.

As with MAG, DDG has not been directly involved in developing the capacity of the SSDA. However, the organisation organised a level 3 EOD course jointly with NPA in early 2011. Around 20 southern Sudanese representatives from southern Sudanese NGOs, SSDA and UNMAO participated in the course. All four SSDA representatives who participated passed.

In mid-2010, DDG’s donors started demanding a more explicit capacity building component in DDG’s activities. As a response to this, DDG looked into possibilities of initiating capacity development activities with SSDA, and was more or less told by UNMAO and NPA that “they had that covered”.

Rather than starting capacity development activities directly with SSDA, DDG reached out to the national NGO Operation Landmine Action and Victim Assistance (OLAVS), and initiated a capacity development collaboration.

OLAVS is a renewed organisation of the Sudan Landmine Response (SLR), a national organisation that used to work closely with Halo Trust, until allegations of corruption led to the break-up of the partnership. Key activities include the training of one EOD and one MRE team (mainly through on-the-job training).

At the time of writing, the MRE team was accredited, and the EOD team was awaiting accreditation. DDG believes that these activities have been quite successful, judging by the accreditation of the MRE team. What has been more challenging however, has been the attempt to develop the OLAV’s institutional capacity. The main reasons for this were pointed out to be a general disorganisation, a low level of ownership, and a low level of capacity.
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action

As highlighted previously, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) was one of the first operators involved in the surveying and clearance of roads in southern Sudan, contracted by the World Food Programme (WFP). FSD entered into a partnership agreement with national organisation Sudan Integrated Mine Action (SIMAS) already in 2004. Funding was secured in 2006, to enable capacity development activities of SIMAS.

FSD ceased its operational activities in late 2007, and focused exclusively on providing technical advice and capacity development assistance to SIMAS, through the presence of international advisors, in programming and finance. This lead to strengthened capacity in operational areas, resulting in UNMAO accreditation of a SIMAS clearance team in 2007, after which SIMAS carried out clearance operations independently. As of mid-2011, SIMAS had one mine clearance team, one EOD team and two MRE teams. Following the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, SIMAS changed its name to South Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service.

The GICHD

The GICHD organised a workshop on international humanitarian law for SSDA in Juba in April 2011. The workshop was convened to address the content of the APMBC, the CCM and the CCW. Some 15 SSDA staff members participated in the workshop, including the director and deputy director, the operations manager and the legal advisor.

In late 2010, the GICHD was requested by the SSDA, UNMAO and NPA to provide land release training, which it carried out in April 2011. The training was conducted in cooperation with UNMAO and NPA, who also provided instructors for the training. The four-day training covered the key areas of the land release process, and was attended by about 15 SSDA staff members from various departments. The GICHD’s information management section has provided continuous IMSMA support to the SSDA.

GICHD also assisted with the facilitation of the three-day sixth transition workshop, held in Juba in June 2011.

POST-INDEPENDENCE: WAY AHEAD

The 2011 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) is an outcome of the collaboration between a number of actors. The key aim of the plan is to guide government and donor spending in South Sudan.

The SSDA, with assistance from UNMAO and UNDP technical advisors, was part of the security working group in the drafting of the plan. A total of 17 institutions were involved, and one individual who was involved in the entire drafting process, pointed
out that the SSDA representatives were among the top three in terms of quality of input, reliability and participation. The SSDP drafting process provided the SSDA with a good opportunity to strengthen the visibility of mine action, and to clarify mine action’s importance in South Sudan’s development. Mine action falls under the conflict prevention and security pillar, which sets out to “free the country from the impact of landmines and ERW”. The document indicates that national authorities will “conduct and coordinate mine action activities to support the safety of the citizens and the socio-economic development of the country”. Planned outcomes include:

- the release of 1,306 hazardous areas for resettlement, agriculture, grazing and road construction
- the reduction of mine action accidents through mine risk education activities
- the provision of physical rehabilitation services, psychological support and socio-economic reintegration of mine victims

The SSDP articulates sectoral capacity development requirements, and is accompanied by a *Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy*[^59] which sets out to provide a strategic framework for organising capacity development efforts in support of GoSS’ state building objectives.

The UNSCR 1996 of 8 July 2011 defines the mandate of the UN in supporting the republic of South Sudan in mine action activities, and in building the capacities of the SSDA. The resolution authorises the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to perform the following tasks; “Supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in conducting demining activities within available resources and strengthening the capacity of the republic of South Sudan Demining Authority to conduct mine action in accordance with International Mine Action Standards”[^60]. This new mandate resulted in the mine action office changing its name from UNMAO to the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) on 1 September 2011.

FINDINGS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE SUDAN MAP

OVERALL FINDINGS

SUDAN’S CHALLENGING CONTEXT AND THE MULTIPLE RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNMAO

The Sudan MAP has been praised for its impressive clearance outputs and for enabling the transportation of humanitarian assistance on verified, safe roads rather than by air, saving millions of dollars. The opening of key routes also facilitated the safe resettlement of IDP and refugee returnees. A 2008 evaluation of EC – funded mine action programmes in Africa concluded that,

“... in spite of the vastness of the country, the decrepit infrastructure, and the modest level of knowledge concerning the scope and nature of the explosives contamination, UNMA Service (UN and its partners) have done an excellent job in establishing mine action operations and coordinating these through UNMAO”. 61

The MAP has also been recognised for its significant contributions to peace building, particularly in the early days. It is generally recognized that the Sudan MAP has had to operate in a challenging, highly political context, in combination with having to deal with poor infrastructure with limited access to many areas due to volatile security situations, flooding, no roads or a combination of all. Many UNMAO staff have pointed out that the focus has been on “getting the job done”, essentially meaning carrying out as much clearance as possible, in support of the UNMIS, as well as carrying out the responsibility of coordinating all operators.

A 2007 external evaluation of the Sudan mine action programme concluded that the biggest weakness in the programme was capacity development. Likewise, 2010 multi-donor evaluation 62 of support to conflict prevention and peace building activities in Southern Sudan underlined the following:

“Where criticism seems warranted, it is in the role of UNMAO in developing a transitional strategy to hand over mandate and responsibilities to the Southern Sudan Demining Commission and national authorities after 2011. ...overall management of the sector by UNMAO has been generally highly regarded. But efforts to coordinate with

GoSS and the SSDC as well as the other commissions were less successful and have not generated the expected results.”

It is clear that capacity development, despite being included in all key documents that make up the normative framework for the capacity development/transition process of the Sudan mine action programme, was not viewed as a priority when focusing on “getting the job done”. The Sudan MAP was faced with considerable pressure to open key routes allowing humanitarian aid to be transported by road rather than by air. In this context, priority was not put on developing the capacity of the national counterparts. In addition, capacity development responsibilities were not included in any of the UNMAO staff’s ToR in the first few years. Even in June 2011, most UNMAO staff had no capacity development provisions in their ToR. Consequently, the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities for capacity development activities resulted in few personnel “volunteering” to make the extra effort to involve relevant personnel of the NMAC and the SSDA in their work. One evaluation of UNDP’s capacity development project has also highlighted doubts as to whether UNMAS personnel have the necessary skills and aptitudes to train and mentor national counterparts. With pressure from the UNMIS and a busy schedule accrediting, tasking, coordinating and quality assuring operators, capacity development activities were sidelined from the beginning of the programme. Some respondents have pointed out that they believe a stronger focus on capacity development would have “slowed down productivity”.

Recommendation: If UNMAS personnel are expected to be involved in capacity development activities, this needs to be taken into consideration during the recruitment and selection processes to ensure the selected personnel have relevant skills. Capacity development roles and responsibilities should be explicitly defined in relevant ToR and job descriptions and staff should be required to report on these activities. This would help clarify who is responsible for what and it would avoid the risk of capacity development being marginalised as an objective and viewed as an area that is not included in “getting the job done”. This way, capacity development would not be an option that can be ignored, but a requirement, just like any other responsibility.

COMPETITION AMONG UN AGENCIES

A number of individuals – national as well as international, in both northern and southern Sudan – highlighted problems related to “UN internal fighting”. Many SSDA personnel seemed puzzled by the bad relationship between UNMAS and UNDP, and were surprised at the visible tensions and open confrontations among some personnel. In particular, people highlighted tensions between a previous UNMAS programme manager and a UNDP CTA as a problem. Some pointed out that these clashes were mainly “personality driven,” whereas others suspect that they were “trickle down
effects” of tensions between UNDP and UNMAS at HQ level.

That broader tensions existed in the recent past between UNDP and UNMAS HQ is no secret, and many UN staff in Sudan believe these affected the relationship between these agencies at field level. One respondent pointed out that a key aspect of UNDP’s and UNICEF’s way of working was that they “put the government in the front and took a step back.” The same respondent also pointed out that in the UNMAO set-up, however, the UNMAS dominance meant that the UN took a leading role and the government took a step back. In their view, this was “contradicting the CPA,” which clearly sets out that the UN should be supporting the government. It is worth noting, however, that a number of individuals reported that the relationship between UNMAS and UNDP at HQ level has improved dramatically since mid-2011, something many put down to changes in senior staff.

It is apparent that UN internal conflicts made collaboration within UNMAO difficult; something pointed out by representatives from SSDA, NMAC, UN agencies and national and international NGOs. UNICEF and UNDP personnel stated that they felt sidelined and undermined by the many UNMAS personnel, arguing that the dominance of UNMAS personnel within the UNMAO instilled a military-like culture in the organisation. This, at times, prevented UNMAO from establishing good working relationships with the national mine action authorities, civil society, development organisations, government ministries, and the broader humanitarian community.

The fact that UNDP and UNICEF personnel refer to UNMAS as being UNMAO indicates to what extent UNMAS was perceived to dominate UNMAO. One senior UNMAS staff member described the UNDP – UNMAS relationship as “UNDP is from Venus and UNMAS is from Mars” – referring to UNMAS often being perceived as the more “martial, militant and harsher” UN agency, while UNDP is the “softer, more feminine” agency. It appears that UNDP and UNMAS often looked at the same issue but saw different things, coming up with different, often opposing strategies and plans for solving those issues. Some respondents pointed out that a “lack of division of labour” constituted one key source of conflict between UN agencies.

Another issue relates to a lack of clarity in how the UN inter-agency policy assigns responsibilities to the various UN agencies. As mentioned earlier, this policy designates UNDP as the lead agency to support capacity development activities. Conversely, UNMAS is mandated to coordinate the planning of the transfer of programme management responsibilities to national authorities and, in cooperation with other UN mine action team agencies, to advise governments on the development of mine action institutions and legislation and to assist in developing capacity and institution building plans.
It seems these policy statements have contributed to conflicts and confusion between the two agencies. UNDP as an institution has expertise in creating an enabling environment through the development of necessary legal, policy and regulatory frameworks, which are critical to enabling NMAAs to carry out their mandated functions. The role of UNMAS in providing complementary technical know-how and expertise at an operations level and through concrete on-the-job training is an equally essential component of the transition and capacity development package.

Despite these issues, UNMAO successfully managed to develop a number of important planning documents such as the multi-year work plans and the transition plans. It is also important to note that, without the strong mandate of UNMAO through UNMIS and the UNSCR 1590, mine action would probably not have received the attention it did immediately after the CPA. Thanks to considerable funding from the assessed budget and other mechanisms, clearance operations were quickly organised and implemented.

**Recommendation:** To ensure the UN agencies’ comparative advantages and areas of expertise complement each other in unambiguous ways, we recommend the UN inter-agency policy be reviewed. In addition to the UN inter-agency policy, we recommend that, for any collaborations among UN agencies, the agencies involved agree upon a memorandum of understanding which clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of the different agencies in that specific context. Finally, we recommend that capacity development roles and responsibilities are included in the ToR for all relevant personnel, which will require agreement on these ToR by senior staff. The different roles and responsibilities should be complementary and clear to all stakeholders involved.

**HIGH UN SALARIES: CHALLENGES IN ABSORBING AND RETAINING COMPETENT STAFF**

While the issue of salary discrepancies between the UN and governmental agencies is not unique to the mine action sector, numerous respondents argued that the high salaries paid to Sudanese UNMAO personnel led to difficulties in absorbing them into the NMAC and the SSDA. Many highlighted that salary discrepancies represent a key obstacle for national authorities to recruiting the most qualified and competent individuals. Also mentioned was that some national personnel prefer working with UN agencies and international NGOs because of the greater professional opportunities that are perceived to exist with those agencies.

**Recommendation:** A 2007 evaluation of the Sudan MAP also highlighted the issue of high UNMAO salaries as a key challenge in absorbing national staff working with UNMAO into the SSDA and NMAC.\(^65\) That report recommended that UNMAS and UNOPS consider this issue when first designing and starting up a new programme. It further advised UNMAS/UNOPS to consider having the government entity hire the

\(^65\) Evaluation of the mine action programme in Sudan, *ibid*
national staff directly, with the UN providing funds to increase the salaries of these individuals by entering into a contract with the NMAA. Apparently, this has been done in some countries to avoid the problem of absorbing national staff from UN agencies into the NMAA.

STAFF RETENTION
Many respondents stated that the high turnover of national and expatriate personnel represented a key challenge to capacity development. There are many examples of individuals benefiting from capacity development efforts only to leave shortly after training, resulting in a lack of continuity and missed opportunities for the national mine action authorities to reap the benefits from capacity development activities. This also points to the challenge of developing institutional capabilities rather than individual capacities, which is less sustainable. Many respondents highlighted how the sudden departure of one senior SSDA staff member affected the Authority, as her competency, knowledge and experience were greatly missed by fellow SSDA colleagues and external partners. This particular staff member moved to another government ministry so the GoSS continued benefiting from her competencies and skills, but it was a big loss for SSDA. As for NMAC, high staff turnover was to a large extent the result of some staff being secondees from the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Many of these had to leave NMAC on short notice due to internal MoD arrangements.

DEDICATION, COMMITMENT AND INTENTION TO LEARN IS KEY FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION
At the risk of stating the obvious, a certain level of dedication, commitment and willingness to share and to learn is a necessary precondition for any capacity development effort. Without this, millions of USD can be spent with little progress sustained. Numerous examples highlight how high levels of commitment and motivation have resulted in strengthened capacity. Conversely, other examples illustrate how a lack of commitment and motivation has seriously hampered capacity development. The extent and rate of progress is essentially in the hands of Sudanese authorities – external agencies can only assist and support.

TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION SHARING
Transparency and information sharing are key aspects of capacity development. Examples of good information sharing and transparency illustrate strengthened trust, whereas a lack of these points to the opposite.

SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT: NMAC
Transition should have been made a priority at an earlier stage
Many respondents argued that a key problem with the transition/capacity development process was that it should have been given more resources and recognition at an earlier stage: “The UN should have been serious about transition earlier”. A number of NMAC staff pointed out that, prior to the T5 workshop, the relationship between NRMAO and NMAC used to be “quite bad”, with poor information sharing and a lack of transparency. Some NMAC staff also highlighted that they used to be under the impression that NRMAO “was not so keen in helping out and in developing the capacity”.

T5 transition workshop/plan
As previously mentioned, the T5 workshop and the subsequent transition report were highly regarded by many who worked with NMAC and UNMAO in June 2011. The workshop clarified the transition process and what needed to be done, and the resulting transition plan served as a basis for updating and refining the transition matrix, specifying activities, timelines, roles and responsibilities. They also pointed out that the workshop increased confidence within NMAC in how to plan and to reach specific goals. The workshop also strengthened the trust between NMAC and NRMAO, as NMAC staff felt that UNMAO was committed to helping them develop their capacities. Clearly, the T5 workshop and the transition plan were important in initiating a more concrete transition process.

The transition matrix
While the transition workshops and plans were important aspects of the capacity development and transition process, the development of the transition matrices were key in clarifying how to achieve the goals set out in transition plans. The matrices stipulated the activities that had to be carried out, which element of the transition plan each corresponded to, the status of the activity (planned, ongoing or completed), the individuals responsible, and the deadline for completion. Transition plans are of little concrete value without clearly defining such points. While transition plans have served as guiding documents, it was the matrices that stipulated how to achieve what, how, by whom and by when. The development of the matrices is therefore a key lesson learnt, and we recommend that transition plans should always be accompanied by concrete implementation plans.

Collocation
The collocation of NRMAO with NMAC in early 2011 strengthened capacity development/transition activities and represented a turning point in the process at NMAC. Many NRMAO and NMAC personnel stated it was the collocation that truly kicked off the capacity development process, making transition more “real.” Collocation signalled to NMAC that NRMAO “was serious about transition” and it was willing to assist. It is clear that collocation facilitated the following:
  - building trust between NMAC and NRMAO
  - coordination
  - collaboration
  - information sharing
A number of challenges had to be overcome for collocation to happen. Willingness and commitment by UNMAO and NMAC directors were preconditions. Many respondents said the capacity of the NMAC would have been considerably higher had collocation taken place at an earlier stage. Senior NMAC and UNMAO personnel underlined that the delay of the collocation was a lesson learnt; it should have happened in 2010.

Information sharing and transparency
In terms of financial transparency, information sharing led to greater trust between the NMAC director and senior management in UNMAO. One senior UNMAS staff member underlined that taking the time to sit down with the NMAC director, go through the finances and the UNMAO budget, and explaining each budget line improved their relationship considerably. Enhancing trust is essential for any capacity development process.

Adapt to national procedures, rather than transferring the “UN way” of doing things
It appears there was a tendency to simply transfer the “UN way” of doing things to certain areas of responsibilities of the NMAC. While there are international standards which need to be followed for, say, the technical areas of accreditation and quality assurance, many of NMAC’s responsibilities need to comply with the “government way” of doing things. For example, one area highlighted as particularly relevant was that of procurement. NMAC’s procurement is managed through the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, and a number of respondents pointed out that the focus on “UN ways of doing” procurement would not result in a sustainable structure since UN procedures are often incompatible with the GoS’ procedures. The failure to adapt to the government procedures that guide many areas of NMAC’s activities resulted in challenges for the GoS in assuming ownership of the MAP. One respondent also pointed out that the transition plan was made by assessing the situation through “UN lenses” and failed to recognise how the NMAC operates.

SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNT: SSDA

Commitment and motivation are key
Many respondents viewed the main challenge to capacity development as the lack of commitment and motivation among some SSDA personnel. Basic work ethics such as attendance, showing-up for arranged meetings and completing assigned tasks were highlighted as issues that hamper any meaningful capacity development activities. Many have indicated particular problems at the middle-management level. There is a widespread belief that some of the main donors are losing confidence in the SSDA and want to see evidence of improvement in line with the money invested. Commitment
and political buy-in are preconditions for success in capacity development. The extent and rate of progress is essentially in the hands of South Sudanese authorities; NPA, UN agencies, GICHD, etc. can only support.

Many respondents stated that some senior UNMAO personnel displayed no commitment to capacity development. In fact, some (both from the UNMAS and from SSDA) argued that capacity development was “actively discouraged” by UNMAO management for a number of years, resulting in tension between SSDA and UNMAO. Most respondents highlighted that the mid-2010 change of UNMAO management, which was a conscious decision from UNMAS HQ, resulted in dramatic improvements in relations between SSDA and UNMAO, with a strengthened focus on capacity development.

**Recommendation:** A rigorous performance based system needs to be formally established, with regular (at least annual) assessments of all personnel. This would contribute to improved organisational performance. All ToR and job descriptions should be reviewed to ensure these accurately reflect the requirements and responsibilities of the organisation. A code of conduct should be created and circulated to all personnel. For these measures to be effective, there needs to be buy in and support from SSDA’s senior management.

**The influence of nepotism, tribalism and political appointments on the effectiveness and professionalism of SSDA**

Many stated that nepotism and tribalism reduce the effectiveness of the SSDA. There is a widespread view that several SSDA personnel have been appointed because of family and tribal ties or for connections within the SPLA, and not because they have the necessary skills and experience. Another issue is the SSDA’s political appointees, as there is a risk of politicisation of SSDA’s activities. This obviously has consequences on any capacity development activities as the “right people” are not necessarily in the “right positions”. It appears that SSDA’s ability to select employees based on merit is limited.

**Recommendation:** Recruitment procedures need to be made more transparent and rigorous to ensure that individuals are recruited based on their competencies, experience and skills. It is important that SSDA has a combination of sector-specific skills and expertise as well as core functional skills such as basic public financial management.

**No separation between the Authority and the mine action centre**

One challenge for the SSDA is that there is no clear separation between the Authority and the MAC. As highlighted previously, the SSDA is responsible both for broad policy decisions and for overseeing mine action on a day-to-day basis at the operational level. Many respondents argued that multiple problems stem from the lack of separation between the Authority and the MAC, including confusion related to the SSDA mandate and the politicisation activities. NPA was one organisation that advocated for a
separation between the Authority and the MAC. NPA has shared concrete suggestions to the SSDA, clearly illustrating how the two areas can be separated in a straightforward manner.

As well, the importance of separating the authority and the MAC was highlighted in two other evaluations.\textsuperscript{66} IMAS 02.10\textsuperscript{67} presents clear advice on how this can be achieved.

**Recommendation:** To clarify SSDA’s mandate, we recommend that the operational and authority levels be separated.

**Transition plan**
It is clear that the experience from the T5 workshop and the subsequent preparation of the transition plan in southern Sudan was in sharp contrast to that of northern Sudan. A key problem was that the pre-T6 transition plans were unrealistic, portraying levels of national ownership that did not reflect the reality. Most respondents said the transition plan was not a useful document. Other key flaws included:

- no concrete, SMART action points
- no indicators of the different degrees of national ownership of the transition plan

Many stated the delay in drafting and distributing of the transition as another problem. This led some SSDA personnel to disassociate themselves from what previously had been agreed, with momentum lost. In combination with the above problems, the lack of a realistic work plan and matrix accompanying it meant there has been little practical implementation of the transition plan. Subsequently, the June 2011 T6 workshop was significant because frank and honest discussions took place about the actual degrees of national ownership, leading to a more realistic transition plan. In addition, the T6 transition plan was distributed within a few days of the T6 workshop.

**Recommendation:** To avoid key stakeholders “disassociating” themselves from transition plans, and to make the most of the momentum from workshops, we recommend that future transition plans are drafted and distributed as soon after the workshops as possible.

A concrete capacity development work plan and a “matrix of transitional activities”, similar to that developed at NMAC, are necessary complements to the transition plan. These clarify the capacity development/transition roles and responsibilities, activities, responsible person(s) and deadlines.

**Collocation**
\textsuperscript{66} This was highlighted in the 2008 GICHD evaluation of the UNDP Sudan mine action capacity development project and the 2007 evaluation of the mine action programme in Sudan
\textsuperscript{67} IMAS 02.10, *Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme*, First edition, 1 August, 2007
Despite talk of collocation, no UNMAS personnel were permanently located with the SSDA as of late 2011. The NMAC example clearly demonstrates that collocation can have positive results, speeding the capacity development process considerably. Challenges related to collocation do exist; a lack of a regular supply of electricity was highlighted as one. However, commitment from senior managers on both sides of the partnership would result in dealing with challenges in a proactive and pragmatic manner.

**Recommendation:** We recommend that UNMACC learn from the positive experience at NMAC. While recognising that northern Sudan provided a very different context to that of South Sudan, lessons can still be learnt, particularly in relation to how to overcome challenges.

**On-the-job training**
While some on-the-job training has taken place, particularly with SSDA quality assurance and IMSMA officers, where close working relationships between UNMACC and SSDA have been established, it is clear that much more could have been done.

**Recommendation:** On-the-job training needs to be included in a work plan and stipulated in relevant UNMACC staff ToRs.

**Collaboration between the UN and NPA**
As stated above, NPA has been a key actor in the capacity development efforts ever since UNDP requested its assistance in 2010. The collaboration between NPA and UNMAO has been excellent, with UNMAO playing an instrumental role in securing donor funding for NPA’s capacity development project.

This provides a positive example of good team spirit between different actors who recognise each other’s advantages and strengths, with UN agencies proactively engaging with NGOs. This particular collaboration represents a best-practice, and we recommend that it be continued, and where appropriate, replicated in other countries.

**Organisational capacity development**
Despite efforts from various organisations involved in capacity development, it appears that SSDA’s capacity has seen very limited improvements. Although an organigram, job descriptions and set of ToRs have been developed, along with a number of process documents, SSDA’s organisational structures remain weak. Many SSDA personnel have attended middle and senior management courses in Jordan and the U.S. over the years, but it is difficult to detect the benefit of these courses on SSDA.

**Recommendation:** Organisational structures, systems, processes and resources required for the implementation of SSDA’s mandate, function and the delivery of services need to be strengthened considerably for SSDA to assume its responsibilities. Also, organisational structures and procedures should be further formalised and
clarified to ensure SSDA’s performance is not dependent on individuals, but on solid standard operating procedures.

**Ensure a Holistic and Strategic Approach to Capacity Development**

As the world’s newest country, South Sudan now receives considerable state building support from a range of international actors. The SSDP is an important document, presenting South Sudan’s development priorities through 2013. The SSDA and UNMAO did an excellent job in ensuring the inclusion of mine action within the plan’s security pillar. Capacity development has been made a national development priority under the responsibility of the GoSS, and the medium-term capacity development strategy serves as a guiding document in this regard.

**Recommendation:** Ensure that the development of South Sudan’s Mine Action Authority’s capacity is integrated with the national capacity development process and aligned with national development priorities and policies. We recommend that SSDA’s capacity development partners use the momentum of the development of the SSDP and work with other national and international stakeholders to ensure their efforts are informed by an ongoing dialogue. While there are specific skill-sets and expertise that are unique to mine action, mine action capacity development partners can benefit greatly from the capacity development expertise that is available in other sectors. This would facilitate collaboration and information sharing among partners, while ensuring that capacity development efforts are driven as a national process, aligned with national priorities, processes and plans. Also, as highlighted in the medium-term capacity development strategy, partners need to be attentive to the absorptive capacity of national institutions to apply complex capacity development programmes that represent “international best practice.” Therefore we recommend realism, with a focus on what is needed and manageable from the perspective of South Sudan’s mine action authority.
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## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1

### INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

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<th>Title</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jurkuch Barach, Jurkuch</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
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<td>Abe Enosa</td>
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<td>Mike Rashid, Fulla</td>
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<td>Leonie Barnes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lou Luff</td>
<td>Ex-Chief of Operations</td>
<td>UNMAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Clark</td>
<td>Ex-Programme Manager</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insaf Nizam</td>
<td>Child Protection Specialist (MA)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelly McAulay</td>
<td>Country Programme Manager</td>
<td>MAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Hussein Elobeid</td>
<td>General Manager</td>
<td>JASMAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ANNEX 2

## TIME-LINE: SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>SPLA/M signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Emergency Mine Action Programme established by UNMAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Establishment of a national mine action office in Khartoum and the new Sudan Mine Action Directorate in Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Sudan signed and ratified the APMBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>APMBC entered into force on 1 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>First versions of the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework were signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Signature of the Declaration in Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>UNMIS established by UNSCR 1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Sudan’s NMAA established by Presidential Decree No. 299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Regional mine action centre (RMAC) changed name to Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) by Presidential Decree No. 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>National Mine Action Strategic Framework updated and endorsed by Presidential Decree No. 283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Sudan signed the CRPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>First transition workshop organised in Nairobi in February, as per the 2006 Strategic Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Second transition workshop held in Nairobi in May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Third transition workshop held in Khartoum in August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Fourth transition meeting held in Juba in November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Starting point for implementation of transition plan in January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Sudan ratified the CRPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Fifth transition workshop (T5) held in Khartoum in May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>“Transition team” (UNDP, UNMAS and NPA) created in southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>T5 Transition Plan distributed in February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Law in March, by Presidential Decree No. 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Referendum on unity of Sudan or secession of South Sudan in 7 February, As per clause 2.533 of the CPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>T5 transition workshop held in Juba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>South Sudan became independent on 9 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UNMIS and UNMAO’s mandate expired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>UNSCR 1996 mandated the establishment of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Mine Action Coordination Center, as from 1 September,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>South Sudan acceded to the APMBC on 11 November</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 3

### SUMMARY OF VTF AND ASSESSED BUDGET CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 2003 - 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>INCOMES</th>
<th>EXPENDITURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PKAB</td>
<td>VTF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.001.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6,077,799</td>
<td>2,147,180</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15,584,359</td>
<td>2,099,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>17,318,342</td>
<td>1,023,658</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24,447,504</td>
<td>4,016,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24,447,504</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10,730,506</td>
<td>4,016,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8,006,051</td>
<td>4,016,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL INCOMES:** 95,964,826

**TOTAL EXPENDITURES:** 203,909,254

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68 Information from UNMAO