Sri Lanka: Mine Action in a Deteriorating Environment

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A major mine-action program has been underway in Sri Lanka since 2002, when a cease-fire agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was signed. However, after a seemingly inexorable escalation in violent guerrilla tactics used by the LTTE, open warfare resumed, and in May 2009, the government announced that it had achieved military victory over the LTTE. This article traces the various ways that the increase in conflict affected mine-action activities in Sri Lanka.

The presence of anti-personnel landmines in areas where the displaced would resettle was a major hindrance to rehabilitation efforts," as these devices were utilized extensively by both sides in previous phases of the conflict. The exact number of landmines that had been laid was unknown, but it was estimated to be between 1.5 and 2 million. The issue grew increasingly urgent as people began spontaneously returning to their homes. While neither the government of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE had renounced the use of anti-personnel mines—allowing the possibility of the future use of these weapons in the event of renewed hostilities—donor governments and institutions felt that this stance should not be an impediment to supporting mine action and provided a significant level of funding for mine-action activities.

A variety of agencies, both national and international, began work on mine-action projects under the coordination of Sri Lanka’s National Steering Committee for Mine Action. Clearance of mine-affected areas was one of the main priorities, and a number of international agencies began clearing areas jointly held by the government and LTTE. There was optimism about the possibility of swift mine-clearance progress. Indeed, in the first few years after the cease-fire was signed, the optimism seemed well-placed; for instance, it was noted that clearly defined mined areas—mostly fenced and marked—led to a Level Two Survey being conducted in just six months, a task described as “impossible in any other country.”

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Reduced Operational Effectiveness
Mine action became increasingly hampered by the escalation of conflict, and the deterioration of the situation affected ongoing mine-action activities in a variety of interconnected ways. By 2006, those agencies that were working in LTTE-controlled areas were citing the security situation as a reason for slower-than-expected implementation of mine-cleanup activities. In these areas, the work of mine-action agencies was reportedly disrupted by the recruitment, both voluntary and forced, of staff by “local security forces.”

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by Chris Rush | Geneva Call |
In government-controlled areas, the volatile security situation also affected mine-clearance activities, with operations reportedly being affected by the surge in violence. The Landmine Monitor noted that the operating environment was becoming increasingly ineffective because of tighter controls on the movement of people, equipment, and supplies. The imposition of work permits for expatriate workers reportedly affected the operations of humanitarian agencies. The movement of mine-clearance equipment into LTTE-controlled areas was reportedly problematic even before the escalation in conflict. However, it became even more difficult as the situation deteriorated, and beginning in August 2006, restrictions on the movement of various items, such as fuel, affected the effectiveness of mine-clearance agencies operating in these areas. Of particular concern was the prohibition of the movement of the personal protective equipment utilized by deminers.

While a number of agencies, including Norwegian People’s Aid, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, Danish Demining Group and Mines Advisory Group, were initially operating in LTTE-controlled areas in the north, by 2007 only NPA still had the necessary permission from the government to work there. However, in January 2008, NPA suspended operations, asserting that it had no choice in the matter because its Technical Advisors were not granted permission to re-enter the LTTE-controlled areas after a routine stand-down in their operations. By the end of 2008, NPA ceased its operations in Sri Lanka altogether.

Loss of Mine-action Workers

Perhaps the starkest and most unwelcome illustration of how the deteriorating security environment affected mine action is the violent disappearance and death of mine-action staff. By any standards, Sri Lanka has been a dangerous place for humanitarian actors. Forty-three humanitarian workers have reportedly been murdered in Sri Lanka since the beginning of 2006, while 20 more individuals were reported missing. Five of those murdered, and nine of those that have disappeared, reportedly worked for international mine-action agencies. Most of the incidents occurred when the staff members were off duty or on the way to or from work. These incidents, besides being abhorrent, served to undermine the operational effectiveness of the agencies in question. For instance, after the murder of a DDG staff member in Jaffna in August 2007, the organization suspended its operations for nearly two weeks.

With a few exceptions, affected agencies did not make public comments about the deaths or disappearances of their staff. This reticence has been in stark contrast to incidents that involved the killing or abduction of other humanitarian staff; these humanitarian agencies issued statements condemning attacks, and where relevant, called for the release of staff.

There may be a number of factors behind this different approach. The author was told by a mine-action program manager that an incident involving the abduction of a staff member of his agency did not necessitate a response, as it was considered unlikely that the staff member had been targeted because of his work for the agency, but for other reasons unrelated to his professional life. In other instances, mine-action agencies may have viewed that issuing public statements was not worthwhile, because such measures had proved ineffective in either stopping the killings or leading to the release of those abducted. Furthermore, agencies may have also been concerned that in an increasingly polarized situation, any comment might be construed as critical of one party or another, and would compromise their neutrality.

Shifting Priorities

The increase in conflict led to the emergence of new needs for mine-clearance expertise, particularly in respect to battle-area clearance. In 2008, the Landmine Monitor noted that mine action in Sri Lanka had shifted from being a development- and reconstruction-related activity to being focused largely on responding to immediate unexploded-ordnance and mine-contamination threats.

Some agencies expressed concerns about the prioritization of tasks in this new environment. It was felt that the National Steering Committee for Mine Action had been sidelined, and that decisions about priorities were primarily made by the military. It was reported that there was pressure put on agencies to concentrate their efforts on supporting the clearance of areas to allow for the return of the recently displaced. While positive in itself, one agency felt that the prioritization was driven by political—rather than humanitarian—concerns, as the numbers of displaced people received increased international attention. Furthermore, some expressed skepticism about the quality of clearance that could be carried out within the new imposed time frame.

Withdrawal of Donor Support

Increasing concern about a drift toward renewed conflict led to a review of funding priorities by a number of donors. Some government decisions that it was not appropriate to fund mine clearance at the time when there was a real risk of a resumption of mine use by either, or both, of the involved parties. Geneva Call was informed that the Netherlands had withdrawn funding for this reason, and later, Switzerland followed suit. In a speech made to commemorate the International Day for Mine Awareness 2006, the U.K. Ambassador to Sri Lanka announced that because Sri Lanka was still not a signatory to the AP Mine Ban Convention, no more funds for mine clearance would be made available that year. Furthermore, he stated that unless there was progress toward the ban, funding in the following year would go toward survey activities only. He stated, “This may appear a tough line, but what is the point of financing the lifting of landmines only to see them being put back into the ground when conflict recurs or security demands [use of mines]?"

Forty-three humanitarian workers have reportedly been murdered in Sri Lanka since the beginning of 2006, while 20 more individuals were reported missing.
The approach of linking funding to progress toward an AP mine ban was not unanimously accepted. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which operated humanitarian demining teams in LTTE-controlled areas, expressed that the pressure placed on parties involved in the conflict to make mine-ban commitments amounted to “politicization” of mine-action funding, and that it led to very short-term funding and was problematic for agencies carrying out the work.

During the early years of the cease-fire, there were a number of national and international actors involved in attempts to convince the parties to move toward a ban on the use of AP mines. However, progress was limited, the government linked accession to the AP Mine Ban Convention to reaching an agreement with the LTTE over the “non-use” of landmines, while the LTTE made it clear that they would only consider banning the weapon if significant progress toward peace was made.

As the conflict escalated, the opportunities and prospects for advocacy were reduced. There was increasing hostility to any initiative that seemingly limited the means and methods of warfare. Geneva Call, which had been engaging the LTTE in a ban on landmines with the endorsement of the Sri Lankan government, was no longer able to carefully monitor and assess developments, and respond quickly to changing situations, methods, and achievements, as well as the many challenges it faces.

**Conclusion**

The escalation of conflict in Sri Lanka profoundly affected mine action. Some of the challenges were predictable, though others could not have been foreseen. To ensure that they remain effective, mine-action agencies and donors working in the context of ongoing conflict must be able to carefully monitor and assess developments, and respond quickly and appropriately to new challenges.

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**Development Programme, Mines Advisory Group and Handicap International are conducting mine action in Sri Lanka, with numerous other projects taking place.**

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**Mine-risk Education in Nepal, 2009**

Despite the signing of a 2006 peace agreement by the Nepalese government and the Maoists, Nepal’s mine clearance remains a work in progress due to the after-effects of its decade-long Maoist conflict and the emergence of small, armed groups. Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL) is at the forefront of the country’s mine-risk education efforts. This article examines NCBL’s MRE program objectives, expectations, methods, and achievements, as well as the many challenges it faces.

**by Purna Shova Chitrakar | Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal |**

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**Rush: Sri Lanka: Mine Action in a Deteriorating Environment**

The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the government of Nepal signed a comprehensive peace agreement on 21 November 2006. The tireless efforts of NCBL enabled both parties to agree to incorporate important points on landmines and improvised explosive devices into the CPA. The provision directs the parties to map landmines and other explosive devices within 30 days of the signing of the agreement and destroy such mines and devices within 60 days. Despite this commitment, only 17 out of 53 minefields, and 99 out of more than 285 improvised-explosive-device fields were cleared by mid-2009.