1-6-1992

DDASaccident282

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 18/05/2006
Accident number: 282
Accident time: not recorded
Accident Date: 06/01/1992
Country: Kuwait
Where it occurred: not made available
Primary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)
Secondary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)
Class: Other
Date of main report: [No date recorded]
ID original source: KMOD 43/SER 30
Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K6
Organisation: Name removed
Ground condition: demolition site (explosives)
Mine/device: Ordnance
Date record created: 19/02/2004
Date last modified: 19/02/2004
No of victims: 1
No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:
Latitude:
Alt. coord. system:
Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:
Map north:
Map scale: not recorded
Map series:
Map edition:
Map sheet:

Accident Notes

no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
safety distances ignored (?)

Accident report

The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in Kuwait at the time of the accident.

Information came from staff of a British demining company that had BAC teams unloading serviceable ammunition at a designated Kuwait Ministry of Defence ammunition Depot. The
group were making field storage stacks in accordance with the principles of UK Ammunition storage regulations. Unfortunately, all organisations, including National Army teams from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Egypt, were also unloading at the same depot. There was no overall control of this and each organisation “did its own thing”. The entire dump contained an estimated 15000 tons of ammunition.

The British company’s storage area was designed to minimise the propagation of a fire should an event occur. However, other organisations saw the large gaps in the ammo stacks and filled them, in some cases with loose propellant and BM21 rockets (facing in every direction).

Despite protests by the demining company to KMOD, nothing was done to stop or correct the dangerous situation.

A small fire started in an unknown area (rumour had it that a pipe-smoker knocking out his pipe started the fire) and rapidly spread to the field storage sites where its spread was accelerated by BM21 rockets and other projectiles “going ballistic”. Six local trucks hired to the British demining company, were destroyed.

The demining company staff present retreated to within an Explosive Storage Site (protective walls etc). They withdrew from the site when it was safe to do so and were evacuated without injury. Many Thai TCNs (Third Country Nationals) were missing for the night but were found safe in the morning. They had dug themselves into the sand for self preservation and survived unscathed.

One casualty was a subcontractor of the British commercial company. This was a Palestinian who was an “owner/driver” and went back to try to get his truck out. The ex-pats trying to organise an orderly withdrawal saw him and his truck “vaporised”. Two KMOD soldiers and another individual were also reported to have been killed. (Only the driver is recorded in this database because he was an indirect employee of the British demining company: the status of the others is unknown.)

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**Victim Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim number: 358</th>
<th>Name: Name removed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status: driver</td>
<td>Fit for work: DECEASED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation: not made available</td>
<td>Time to hospital: not recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection issued: None</td>
<td>Protection used: none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of injuries:**

FATAL

**COMMENT**

Victim was seen "vaporised".

No medical report was made available.

**Analysis**

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because the dangers at the site were known and no action was taken to make the area safe.

There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.