4-13-1992

DDASaccident292

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 06/04/2006
Accident number: 292
Accident time: not recorded
Accident Date: 13/04/1992
Country: Kuwait
Where it occurred: not made available
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Secondary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
Date of main report: [No date recorded]
ID original source: KMOD 56/SER 46
Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K15
Organisation: [Name removed]
Ground condition: sandy
Mine/device: PMN AP blast
Date record created: 19/02/2004
Date last modified: 19/02/2004
No of victims: 1
No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:
Latitude:
Alt. coord. system:
Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:
Map north:
Map scale: not recorded
Map series:
Map edition:
Map sheet:
Map name:

Accident Notes

no independent investigation available (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
incomplete detonation (?)
inadequate investigation (?)

Accident report

The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in Kuwait at the time of the accident.

The demining group were a commercial company with a time penalty on their work. International staff were paid very well. The group worked in three-man teams with a two-man drill.
To save time, breach lanes were reduced in width to 50cms. A Ghurkha deminer, walking in the ‘reduced width’ lane activated a PMN (either a Chinese Type 58 copy of the PMN or an Iraqi copy). It seems that the TNT in the mine had cracked up causing a partial detonation.

The victim suffered minor lacerations to the thighs and genitals and minor fractures to some of the small bones in his foot. He made a full recovery. The victim was treated in Kuwait and returned to work.

One witness believed that better PPE crotch pieces would have reduced the victim’s injury. One source recorded that the victim was “saved” by his body armour and helmet. After this accident the breach lane width was restored to a full meter minimum.

Victim Report

Victim number: 368
Name: [Name removed]

Age:
Gender: Male

Status: deminer
Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available
Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket
Helmet
Short visor
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, Short visor

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES
minor Foot
minor Genitals
minor Legs

COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the clearance of the area where the accident occurred had been inadequate, and the failings of the clearance team were not corrected.

It is not clear whether the narrow width of the lane made the accident more likely to occur, but the fact that management reversed their decision to have narrow lanes implies that they may have thought so.

There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.