International Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia

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International Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia

An Honors College Project Presented to
the Faculty of the Undergraduate
College of Arts and Letters
James Madison University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

by Mia Linh Fisher
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the requirements for the Honors College.

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# Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations 4  
Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina 6  
Map of Cambodia 7  
Acknowledgements 8  
Abstract 9  
Introduction 10  

## Chapter 1 History and Theory 13  
   Defining Peacebuilding 13  
   Types of Peacebuilding 14  
   The Legal Foundation for Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations 16  
   Post-Cold War and Contemporary Peace Operations 16  
   Challenges of Early Operations & Limitations to Peacebuilding 17  
   The Evolution of Peacebuilding & Changes on the Ground 23  
   The Future of Peacebuilding 29  

## Chapter 2 Methodology 30  
   Why Case Studies 30  
   Research Objectives & Questions 31  
   Dependent Variable: Sustainable Peace 32  
   Independent Variables & Hypotheses 35  
   Case Selection 47  

## Chapter 3 Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina 51  
   The Fall of the Former Yugoslavia & Outbreak of War 51  
   The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 52  
   Conflict Prevention & the UN Protection Force 54  
   Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina 58  
   The Dayton Peace Accords and Ethnic Fractionalization 58  
   The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 60  
   Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Bosnia 61  
   Socioeconomic Conditions & Economic Reconstruction 65  
   Local Ownership & Peacebuilding on the Ground in Bosnia 68  
   Women, Peace & Security in Bosnia 71  
   Local Legitimacy in Bosnia 76  
   Bosnia in its Current State 77  

## Chapter 4 Peacebuilding in Cambodia 79  
   The Cambodian Civil War & Genocide Under the Khmer Rouge 79  
   The Fall of the Khmer Rouge & Vietnamese Intervention 81  
   Peacebuilding in Cambodia 82
The 1991 Paris Agreements
The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia
Socioeconomic Conditions & Economic Reconstruction in Cambodia
Local Ownership & Peacebuilding on the Ground in Cambodia
Women, Peace & Security in Cambodia
Local Legitimacy in Cambodia
Cambodia in its Current State

Chapter 5 Comparative Analysis and Policy Implications 104
Sustainable Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia 104
Variable 1: Power-Sharing 105
Variable 2: Transitional Justice Mechanisms 108
Variable 3: Socioeconomic Conditions 109
Variable 4: Local Ownership 111
Variable 5: Women’s Participation 115
Variable 6: Local Legitimacy 118
Other Factors 120
Limitations of Study 121

Conclusion 122

Bibliography 125
**List of Abbreviations**

AFBiH  Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ANS   National Army of Independent Kampuchea
ARBiH Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLDP  Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
BSA   Bosnian Serb Army
CIVPOL Civilian Police
CGDK  Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CP    Conflict Prevention
CNRP  Cambodia National Rescue Party
CPAF  Cambodian People’s Armed Forces
CPP   Cambodian People’s Party
CSO   Civil Society Organization
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID  United Kingdom’s Department of International Development
DPA   Dayton Peace Accords
DPKO  UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECCC  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
EU    European Union
EUFOR Althea European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
FDI   Foreign Direct Investment
FBIH  Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FUNCINPEC National Union Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
HDZ   Croatian Democratic Union
HVO   Croatian Defense Council
IC    International Community
ICCC  International Criminal Court
ICORC International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IEP   Institute for Economics & Peace
IFOR  Implementation Force
IGO   Intergovernmental Organization
IMF   International Monetary Fund
IO    International Organization
JNA   Yugoslav People’s Army
KPNLAF Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front
LCS   League of Communists of Serbia
LDP   Liberal Democratic Party
MMWG  Mixed Military Working Group
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Organization/Program</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NADK</td>
<td>National Army of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NUCP</td>
<td>National Unity of Cambodia Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commission for Human Rights</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PARP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process</td>
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<td>PBA</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Architecture</td>
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<td>PBC</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<td>PBSO</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Support Office</td>
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<td>PDK</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute of Oslo</td>
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<td>PRK</td>
<td>People’s Republic of Kampuchea</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>RoE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serb Democratic Party</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>Supreme National Council</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>State of Cambodia</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TPO</td>
<td>Transcultural Psychosocial Organization</td>
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<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>UN Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>UN Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNPA</td>
<td>UN Protected Areas</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRS</td>
<td>Army of the Republika Srpska</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSS</td>
<td>Victim Support Section Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESU</td>
<td>Witness and Experts Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WfP</td>
<td>Women for Prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace, and Security</td>
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Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Map 1 No. 3729 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS (March 2007) Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Cartographic Section.
Map of Cambodia

Map 2 No. 3860 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS (January 2007) Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Cartographic Section.
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Abstract

The end of the Cold War brought many changes to the international system, including a rise in intrastate armed conflict and violence against civilians. Consequently, the international community performed increasingly complex and multidimensional peace support operations, and peacebuilding advanced onto the international agenda during the 1990s. Despite the increased attention on peacebuilding in recent decades, most operations have been relatively unsuccessful, and local and international actors continue to struggle with how to implement effective policies to rebuild post-conflict states. The purpose of this research paper is to examine how the international community contributes to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts and to better understand when the international community has been most successful at building peace through qualitative case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia. I determine that there is not a clear model of how to build sustainable peace, but that local ownership and local legitimacy during the peacebuilding process are key factors that affect a country’s trajectory after conflict.
Introduction

After the Cold War, many policymakers and scholars believed that the changes in the international system would result in a more peaceful and democratic society and that the new balance of power would give the United States a unique window of opportunity to shape the global order. However, intrastate armed conflict, or violence within states, dramatically increased throughout the 1990s and has continued to be a source of instability for the international community (IC) today. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRI0) estimated that 49 intrastate armed conflicts, 1 12 of which were civil wars, 2 occurred in 2016 (UCDP and PRIO 2016). The growth in intrastate conflict and violence against civilians has had numerous consequences on a state, regional and international level. This has led the IC—which includes intergovernmental organizations, donor governments, non-governmental organizations, and individuals—to turn their attention to the concept of peacebuilding, or “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict” (The United Nations 2016c).

Although Johan Galtung first proposed the concept in 1975, peacebuilding has been a relatively new phenomenon in international relations. The definition and scope of peacebuilding has expanded over time, and contemporary peacebuilding is now seen as more integrated and multi-faceted than in the past. While there is no single definition of peacebuilding, it includes a variety of activities ranging from conflict prevention, political and economic reconstruction, peacekeeping, transitional justice, and more. In addition, the number of peace operations has increased significantly. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported

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1 At least 25 battle-related deaths per year
2 At least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year
that the IC was responsible for 52 peace support operations in 2011 alone (SIRPI 2013). Despite the increase in peace support operations, they have been relatively unsuccessful, albeit a few exceptions, and local and international actors continue to struggle with how to implement effective policies to rebuild post-conflict states.

The purpose of this research paper is to examine how the IC contributes to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts through qualitative case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina (herein Bosnia) and Cambodia. When is the IC most successful at peacebuilding? What limitations does the IC face during peace operations, and how can the international community overcome these challenges? This paper will explore when the IC has been most successful at peacebuilding and explain how the limits of the IC’s peacebuilding operations affect a country’s chances at and trajectory towards sustainable peace. It will not seek to provide a definitive answer on how to achieve sustainable peace but rather gain broader insights into what can make international peacebuilding efforts most successful. Finally, it will address ways in which the IC can overcome current challenges and provide future research and policy implications.

I have chosen to divide this paper into five chapters. The first chapter will explore the historical and theoretical framework of international peacebuilding. It will examine the evolution of peace operations, traditional and contemporary differences, and prior literature on the effectiveness and limitations of peacebuilding. The second chapter will outline the methodology, operationalize the dependent variable and six independent variables, and explain the case selection. For the purposes of this research paper, the dependent variable will be sustainable peace, and the six independent variables will be power-sharing, transitional justice mechanisms, socioeconomic conditions, local ownership, women’s participation, and local legitimacy. The third and fourth chapters will present the case studies, Bosnia and Cambodia, and the post-
conflict peacebuilding efforts. The fifth and final chapter will compare the two case studies, address the role of each variable in relation to sustainable peace, and evaluate the six hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I determine that there is not a clear model of how to build sustainable peace, but that socioeconomic conditions, local ownership, women’s participation, and local legitimacy during the peacebuilding process are important factors that affect a country’s trajectory after conflict. I argue that local ownership and local legitimacy are especially significant in creating sustainable peace.

Clearly, the topic of post-conflict peacebuilding is incredibly important. Civil war and armed conflict are major sources of state, regional, and international instability and have devastating effects on communities and people. The IC should be well-equipped to handle these current and future conflicts, yet there are enormous gaps and inconsistencies in academic literature and policy on the most effective ways to promote peace. It is my hope that this study can provide a more comprehensive understanding of how different factors have affected the peacebuilding trajectories and outcomes in Bosnia and Cambodia and, ultimately, shed valuable insight into the future of peacebuilding.
Chapter 1 History and Theory

Defining Peacebuilding

Johan Galtung first coined the term, peacebuilding, in 1975 and defined it as any mechanisms that address the root causes of armed conflict (The United Nations 2016c). However, the concept of peacebuilding did not particularly gain traction or emerge on the IC’s agenda until 1992 with the publication of former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s report, An Agenda for Peace. In his report, Boutros-Ghali provided a broad framework for peacebuilding, in which he emphasized the need for the UN to take a leading role in providing security and promoting peace in countries plagued by conflict (Williams and Bailey 2016). He broadly defined post-conflict peacebuilding as “any action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). At this time, peacebuilding primarily focused on enforcing peace agreements or settlements, building political institutions, and establishing rule of law (Williams and Bailey 2016).

Since 1992, there have been various academic and UN reports that have expanded the definition and scope of peacebuilding. The Brahimi Report in 2000 broadened the definition of peacebuilding to include “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000, 3). This expanded peacebuilding mandates and shifted the ideal outcome from negative peace, or simply avoiding conflict, to providing the conditions and foundations for durable and sustainable peace. The Brahimi Report was one step by the UN to address some of the problems that peacebuilders faced throughout the interventions in the 1990s.
The current definition of peacebuilding set forth by the 2007 UN Secretary-General Policy Committee and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is more holistic and includes:

“A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development…must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives” (The United Nations 2016c).

This definition incorporates a wider range of activities such as: conflict prevention (CP) and early warning monitoring; security sector reform (SSR); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); political development; economic reconstruction and recovery; reconciliation and transitional justice; and peacekeeping (Barnett et al 2007; The United Nations 2016c). The Protection of Civilians (POC) has also become an integral part of peacebuilding, and many of the mandates of peacekeeping or peace support operations now include POC language.

**Types of Peacebuilding**

The most commonly known and widely accepted type of peacebuilding is liberal peacebuilding. Liberal peacebuilding has been the dominant approach of the IC in post-conflict societies since the early 1990s. It emphasizes building state capacity and institutions as well as establishing a market economy in post-conflict states. It seeks to enforce ceasefires or settlements, establish rule of law, and build political and economic institutions. Special attention is paid to advancing political and civil rights for all citizens. This approach to peacebuilding has worthy, long-term goals of establishing democracy and a market economy, but it has often resulted in unintended effects in the short-term because it encourages reforms from the top-down, and reforms are often imposed by international actors.
The unintended effects of liberal peacebuilding have led some scholars to put forth other types of peacebuilding. Kristoffer Lidén (2009) offers two more categories of peacebuilding: social and multicultural. He defines social peacebuilding as “the culturally adapted provision of material resources, security, political influence and education without political conditions except for inclusion and non-violence” (Lidén 2009, 621). This type attempts to engage with local actors and do what is best for them. The primary goals are ensuring economic and social rights as well as addressing previous grievances in society. Social peacebuilding is more contentious because the IC is still divided over the extent to which governments and the IC should protect economic and social rights (Lidén 2009). This type of peacebuilding is still gaining support and requires political will from the internal population and IC if it is to be effective.

Another option is multicultural peacebuilding, which Lidén (2009) defines as: “the identities and life-forms that compose the cultural geography of a host society by accommodating and fully adapting to local cultures and moralities” (622). Multicultural peacebuilding emphasizes “local conceptions of peace and justice” and seeks to adapt to local cultures, beliefs and practices of a given country (Lidén 2009, 622). It highlights the importance of working with local actors and giving them a seat at the table when it comes to making decisions. It is less common for peace operations to use this approach because the UN and donor states, who are often the ones funding these projects, want a say in the decisions being made. Multicultural peacebuilding is very controversial because some worry that it could result in the rejection of universal human rights (Lidén 2009).

Lidén concludes that social peacebuilding is the best option in post-conflict states because it:

“…is most consistent with the general objective of building a just and self-sustainable peace. It allows for both the continuation of the normative commitment of liberal
cosmopolitanism to the promotion of human rights, and the communitarian commitment to political autonomy and pluralism” (Lidén 2009, 631).

It is difficult to categorize any major peace operation as adopting social or multicultural peacebuilding because the tendency is still to follow the liberal peacebuilding approach. Smaller non-governmental organizations (NGO) may show signs of social and multicultural peacebuilding on local levels, but research on these types of peacebuilding is limited.

**The Legal Foundation for Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations**

The UN serves as the leader in international peacekeeping and peace support operations. The UN Charter provides the legal foundation for international peace operations because it calls on the UN to maintain international peace and security. However, the UN Charter does not explicitly mention peacekeeping. The UN Security Council has, instead, interpreted Chapters VI, VII, and VIII to justify peacekeeping operations. Chapter VI (“Pacific Settlement of Disputes”) provides guidelines to peaceful settlements of disputes after conflict. Chapter VII (“Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”), which is invoked more often, gives the UN a framework on the use of force and intervention. Chapter VIII (“Regional Arrangements”) permits regional organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the African Union (AU) to resolve disputes. UN Security Council mandates also form the legal basis for peace operations on the ground.

**Post-Cold War and Contemporary Peace Operations**

The 1958 UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), which mandated the observance of the Armistice Demarcation Line between Israel and Lebanon, was perhaps the first modern international peacekeeping operation. UNOGIL’s mandate was very limited because it only sought to uphold the ceasefire line and document violations to the agreement. UN operations have since evolved from these “traditional observer missions” to “multidimensional
enterprises” in response to the changing nature of conflicts and failure of early operations (The United Nations 2016c). Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report was a large step in advancing the UN’s role in the peacebuilding process and served as a catalyst to more multidimensional operations during the 1990s and early 2000s. The UN currently has 16 open peacekeeping missions and remains the leader in international peace operations. 3

Other regional organizations such as NATO and AU have also remained at the forefront of international peace operations. NATO has frequently worked alongside the UN to carry out Peace Support Operations (PSO) in states like Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. NATO defines PSOs as:

“multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other specified conditions. They include Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian relief” (NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1, 0202)

NATO can be particularly useful for demanding military interventions because the alliance is more willing to use force, and member-states are granted greater strategic control over the operation. The AU has also attempted to engage in more comprehensive peacebuilding in response to historical African colonialism and past peacekeeping failures in Africa. The AU is critical to peace and stability operations in African countries, as seen in AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the largest peacekeeping operation of 2018.

Challenges of Early Operations & Limitations to Peacebuilding

Early PSOs suffered from many failures, and policymakers and practitioners found themselves largely unprepared due to the complexity of the conflicts. The UN lacked a clear

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3 At time of writing, based on January 2018 data from the United Nations
strategy and was poorly equipped to deal with the problems that post-conflict states faced. On the ground, peacebuilders suffered from inadequate resources, a lack of institutional capacity, and peacebuilding mechanisms (Williams and Bailey 2016). Communication and coordination between top-level UN officials, practitioners on the ground, and local counterparts was extremely poor, and “bureaucratic turf battles” were common (Williams and Bailey 2016). The following section will explain the failures of the early missions and limitations that the IC continues to face in post-conflict states.

The “Top-Down” versus “Bottom-Up” Approach to Peacebuilding

One of the biggest challenges during early peace operations was the lack of local input in the decision-making process. Until recent years, the dominant narrative was that “peacebuilding is done for the local population, not with them” (Barnett 2016, 23). This mindset encouraged a top-down approach and resulted in international actors implementing policies at the national rather than local level. The lack of local input in the decision-making process had several consequences and greatly decreased the chances of sustainable peace. The failures and effects of the top-down strategy can be seen in many states like Bosnia, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The top-down strategy has also created resentment against the IC and a lack of legitimacy for the IC and mission itself. While the host or transitional government of the state may consent for the UN, donor states, and NGOs to operate within its borders, the general population may not want them there (Barnett 2016). By excluding the local population from decisions, the IC is further fueling a divide in the community they are trying to serve (Autesserre 2014). The top-down model also tends to be “universalist, mechanistic, and reductionist,” meaning that the same universal solutions are applied rather than detailed and thoughtful country-specific responses.
Instead of delving deep into the complexity of the conflicts, the issues are frequently boiled down and simplified into monotonous and programmed peacebuilding language (Chandler 2016). Furthermore, international actors often come into countries with significantly more resources and, thus, feel that they have the knowledge, expertise and skills to solve all of a country’s problems (Autesserre 2014; Chandler 2016). Context and meaningful engagement with the host society is limited.

**Upsetting the Peace: Spoilers**

Many civil wars and armed conflicts end in peace agreements or settlements, but it is rare that all parties agree to the terms or that everyone was included in the process. This process can create spoilers, or “groups and tactics that actively seek to hinder, delay, or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of motives” (Newman and Richmond 2006, 102). Spoilers can be internal or external actors of the state and take the form of governments, diasporas, multinational corporations (MNCs), and transnational networks (Newman and Richmond 2006; Kastrati 2014). They arise due to asymmetry during the peace process, and they vary in their interests, means and goals (Newman and Richmond 2006). In general, spoilers want to undermine the peace process because they benefit from conflict and violence.

There are three types of spoilers: limited, greedy and total spoilers. Limited spoilers have very specific goals and are more open to negotiations while total spoilers are non-negotiable and desire total power (Kastrati 2014). Greedy spoilers lie somewhere in the middle (Kastrati 2014). Spoilers can be successful in upsetting the peace process such as in Rwanda or Angola, but their success depends on the context of the previous conflict (Newman and Richmond 2006). National governments and the IC have struggled with how to effectively deal with spoilers but currently
use three overarching methods: allowing spoilers to join the peace process; engaging with spoilers using carrots and sticks; and using coercion or the threat of force (Kastrati 2014). The type of spoiler and context of the conflict determines the success of these methods.

*Lack of Coordination*

Lack of coordination has been and continues to be a challenge in international peacebuilding. Most international actors now generally agree that a more comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, rather than merely establishing democracy and a market economy, is a step in the right direction to building sustainable peace. However, this does not mean that a single definition of peacebuilding exists or that there is consensus over its means. Organizations still have different definitions and mandates, and this has created challenges in coordinating actors on the ground.

In each country, individual organizations when grouped together undertake a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and a wide variety of peacebuilding activities. On an individual basis, the scope of the mandate varies depending on the actor. Some peacebuilding mandates remain broader while others are narrower and focus on a specific part of peacebuilding like CP, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, crisis management, or reconstruction (Barnett et al 2007). Even at the UN, there are differences—for example, the UNDP focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding and improvement of socioeconomic conditions while the UN Department of Political Affairs focuses on stabilization and political development (Barnett et al 2007).

While many actors can ensure that several activities are being undertaken to promote peace, it is quite possible that policies will go against one another. Each actor has a different “theory of action” or idea of how to best help the host community (Ricigliano 2003). The perfect
example of this is in El Salvador where the financial requirements imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during recovery undermined the peace agreement created under the auspices of the UN (de Soto and del Castillo 2016). In this case, the UN and IMF were both carrying out their individual mandates and doing what they thought was best to promote peace, but the division of labor and lack of coordination between the two organizations undermined sustainable peace.

Measurements of Success

The gap in coordination and differences in mandates also make measuring the success of peacebuilding very challenging. It is likely that each individual organization or agency has a different view of success depending on its mandates and goals (Sherman 2009). For example, the World Bank might define success as a certain threshold of poverty reduction compared to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) who might view it as disarmament and removal of weapons from post-conflict states. While differences do exist, recent literature has highlighted four overarching standards—civil war recurrence (security standard), legitimate regimes (political standard), economic recovery (economic standard), and root causes (social standard)—that scholars and policymakers use in determining the success of international peacebuilding (Call 2008).

Generally, scholars that rely on the security standard have found higher success rates for PSOs, averaging 61-77 percent, compared to those who use political standards, which average at a 31 percent success rate (Collier et al 2006; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Call 2008). Social standards have the lowest rates of success at 22 percent (Paris 2004; Call 2008). Although Jake Sherman (2009) notes that “measurement is becoming an important part of planning, implementation, and learning at the UN,” there are still questions about how to operationalize
and measure the success of peace operations (212). The lack of global assessment measurements will continue to create challenges for policymakers and practitioners on the ground.

**Insufficient Resources**

Insufficient resources are another major challenge of peacebuilding. Civil war and armed conflict have devastating costs such as “human casualties, displacement, economic costs, increased crime, and costs to education and environment” (DeRouen 2015a). After war, infrastructure and resources are damaged, and much of the labor force has been either killed or displaced. States suffer from inflation, have large debts, and unemployment is high. Public health and sanitation also remains poor (DeRouen 2015a). In addition, many recent post-conflict states suffered from weak state capacity and economic development prior to the conflict (de Soto and del Castillo 2016). The lack of resources within the country makes economic reconstruction and recovery very challenging. States do not have the capacity to rebuild alone and require help from the IC through aid and other forms of assistance.

There are many actors that engage in economic reconstruction including the IMF, World Bank, donor states, NGOs, MNCs, and private philanthropists. All actors play valuable roles in economic reconstruction, recovery and development, and they can have beneficial effects for the economy and population. However, these organizations also suffer from a lack of resources and funding. According to the United Nations, UN peacekeeping operations accounted for less than .05 percent of total military expenditures in the world in 2013 (The United Nations 2016a). The PBF, which is primarily responsible for raising financial resources, has only given approximately $623 million from 2006 to 2015 (The United Nations 2016c). This number is small compared to what is needed for the UN to effectively help rebuild post-conflict states. The United States has also decreased the amount of aid given to individual states in the past few years. Similarly,
smaller peacebuilding organizations do not have the monetary resources needed to deal with the scope of reconstruction that is needed after conflict.

**Peacebuilding Reform at the United Nations**

In addition to the aforementioned challenges, the IC also failed to prevent violent conflicts, most notably in Somalia and Rwanda. The challenges of these early operations gave rise to academic research and political discourse on effective peacebuilding. Today, the literature on intrastate conflict and peacebuilding is particularly robust. The literature produced in the past two decades has found that effective peacebuilding is integrated and multidimensional and that it requires the cooperation of all actors. Researchers have focused on many aspects of peacebuilding including the role of peace agreements and negotiated settlements, engagement of local actors in decision-making processes, effects of women’s participation, and need for reconciliation, to name a few.

IOs have also attempted to undertake substantive changes to PSOs and decision-making apparatuses in response to the growing literature on peacebuilding. In 2005, calls for bureaucratic reform at the UN sparked a renewed focus on peacebuilding. The 2005 Outcome Document, produced at the UN World Summit, called for the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). These inter-agencies were formed to provide a better framework for international peacebuilding and to more effectively coordinate groups on the ground with those at the New York or Geneva Headquarters (Williams and Bailey 2016).

**The Evolution of Peacebuilding & Changes on the Ground**

The following section will briefly explain some of the key changes to peacebuilding on the ground and provide background into modern peace operations.
Inclusion of Local Actors

It is now recognized that a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding is much more effective in creating lasting peace, and the IC has attempted to engage and empower local actors in the decision-making process (Barnett 2016; Chandler 2016; Williams and Bailey 2016). The UN General Assembly met with several NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) throughout 2005 when the Outcome Document was being drafted, and they discussed how the UN can more effectively and efficiently work with local counterparts (Williams and Bailey 2016).

NGOs have been relatively more effective than large intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations or World Bank in the implementation of the “local” model of peacebuilding (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). NGOs tend to be smaller in size and less bureaucratic, meaning practitioners on the ground do not have to follow the same standardized procedures and are granted more autonomy. This allows NGOs to better immerse themselves among the population, giving them access to different information than IGOs (Autesserre 2014). As a result, practitioners’ priorities are shaped by local actors rather than implemented from above. International Alert, a UK-based peacebuilding NGO, and Friends for Peace, a NGO in Nepal, are two examples of organizations that have successfully implemented bottom-up reforms (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). Both organizations work to bring multiple actors together in the decision-making process. While the “local” turn in peacebuilding has taken shape in much of the peacebuilding literature, there are still many limitations to implementation on the ground, which will be discussed further in Chapter 2.

The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

The inclusion of women has also become an integral and effective part of peacebuilding. In an effort to better understand peacebuilding, feminist scholars—as well as non-feminist
ones—have examined the role of women in relation to the security and peace of nations. Researchers have consistently found that women bear disproportional burdens during armed conflict and that the security of women is inextricably linked to the security of the state (Hudson et al 2008; Verveer 2015; Hudson and Leidl 2015). Women and men experience war and armed conflict differently, and thus, women compromise a critical role in the peace and security agenda.

The importance of women in the peace process was solidified with the adoption of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) in 2000 after more than a decade of women’s groups lobbying the UN. UNSCR 1325 called for “equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,” and sparked the creation of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, which brought together women’s NGOs and advocates to monitor and advance the WPS agenda (The United Nations Security Council 2000; Otto and Heathcote 2014). UNSCR 1325 was a breakthrough moment for the IC because it challenged longstanding assumptions of how the IC looks at peace and security and advocated for women’s participation in the peacebuilding process and for protections against gender-based violence (Tryggestad 2009). This resolution played a critical role in the global feminist movement because it defined women “not as merely passive recipients of aid or justice but also as agents integral to peace, stability, and security” (Hudson and Leidl 2015, 20).

In 2005, the PBA attempted to add substantive measures to increase women’s participation in peacebuilding and became the first advisory body to include gender in its founding documents (Tryggestad 2016). The Secretary-General also called on each state to adopt
a National Action Plan on WPS in 2005 and published a report on “Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding,” which laid out a Seven-Point Action Plan on how to better include women in the post-conflict peace process, in 2010 (Tryggestad 2016). The US State Department under former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton produced a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, mentioning women and girls 133 times, and its first National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security in 2010 and 2011, respectively (Hudson and Leidl 2015). The WPS agenda has since grown and now encompasses several resolutions including:

- **UNSCR 1820 (2008)**, which established sexual violence as a weapon of war;
- **UNSCR 1888 (2009)**, which formed the position of Special Representative on Sexual Violence During Armed Conflict and mandated peacekeepers protect civilians from sexual violence;
- **UNSCR 1889 (2009)**, which created indicators to measure progress on WPS;
- **UNSCR 1960 (2010)**, which made it mandatory to provide information on parties suspected of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- **UNSCR 2106 (2013)**, which reaffirmed UNSCR 1820 through continued monitoring mechanisms;
- **UNSCR 2122 (2013)**, which called for greater women’s participation in conflict resolution and recovery; and
- **UNSCR 2242 (2015)**, which called upon member states to reaffirm their commitment to the WPS agenda and provide additional resources for implementation (United Nations 2016d).

Women are important in the peacebuilding process for many reasons. Women are often the target of gender-based violence during and after conflict, and sexual violence can be used as a weapon of war as in the cases of Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, and Guatemala. Women also tend to suffer from greater cultural and structural inequalities beyond wartime (Otto and Heathcote 2014). In addition, women make up a large percentage of the informal spaces during conflict and are more likely to focus on different aspects of the peacebuilding process like education or transitional justice (Moosa et al 2013). Clearly, women have different perspectives and experiences to offer; excluding them during the peace process leaves them feeling like
marginalized members of the community after conflict. It is important for the IC to ensure that women feel like valuable contributors to society.

Reconciliation and Transitional Justice

In recent decades, literature on the need for transitional justice and reconciliation in peacebuilding has increased significantly. Reconciliation and transitional justice are now seen as important and effective aspects to peacebuilding in countries with long-standing conflict. This can be attributed to the changing dynamics of war itself. Modern warfare is much more likely to involve regular citizens compared to just combatants (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010). We now find that wars do not just take place on a battlefield but among citizens in rural villages and urban cities. It is also increasingly difficult to distinguish between citizens and combatants. This makes peacebuilding more challenging because it now requires states to rebuild and reconstruct the social fabric between members and groups in society (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010). Transitional justice mechanisms are a few ways that can provide a divided society the foundation to rebuilding this social trust.

Transitional justice can be defined as any means to “reveal the truth about human rights violations, hold perpetrators accountable, vindicate the dignity of the victims, and—potentially—contribute to reconciliation, in order to provide justice” (Buckley-Zistel 2016a, 17-18). Reconciliation is considered a “profound process of dialogue between conflicting parties, leading to the recognition of the ‘other’, and respect for his or her differences, interests and values” (International Year for Reconciliation 1998). Reconciliation is the end goal, and it seeks to unite communities after conflict, restore justice to those who suffered from human rights abuses and address past grievances (Amstutz 2013a). Reconciliation can be achieved through transitional
justice mechanisms such as: trials, truth commissions, restitution, reparation, non-legal measures, public apologies, and institutional reform (Mani 2005; Amstutz 2013a).

There are two main types of transitional justice: retributive and restorative. Retributive justice is the prevailing method in which “offenders [are] held accountable for their wrongdoing through prosecution and punishment” (Amstutz 2013a, 118). Trials and tribunals are the most common form of retributive justice. Tribunals can be international, hybrid or national, but all focus on prosecuting and punishing perpetrators for crimes committed during armed conflict. The IC plays an important role in establishing tribunals because the host country often lacks the legal capacity to prosecute individuals. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are two examples of international tribunals; the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and Gacaca Courts are examples of a hybrid and national tribunal, respectively.

In contrast, restorative justice seeks “the restoration of communal bonds through social and political reconciliation” (Amstutz 2013a, 122). Restorative justice “encourages individuals, groups, and institutions to admit culpability, express repentance, and authenticate remorse through acts of reparation and restitution” (Amstutz 2013a, 122). Truth commissions are one example of restorative justice. Susanne Buckley Zistel (2016b) defines them as:

“Temporary establishments that, through a multitude of individual testimonies, undercover the crimes of violent regimes or conflicts and expose patterns of repression and discrimination, such as the persecution of politically, ethnically or radically marginalized groups” (141).

In other words, truth commissions bring together members of all sides in an open dialogue and make efforts to address past grievances that have been passed down from generations. They have emerged to reconcile deep social cleavages in society (Lerche 2000). They attempt to end the
cycle of fear, hatred and violence that exists within a society (Lerche 2000). Truth commissions have been used most famously in South Africa following Apartheid.

**The Future of Peacebuilding**

The IC has made significant progress since early missions, but it is clear that challenges still remain. The robust body of literature has not yielded many successful examples of peacebuilding in practice, and the IC continues to struggle with how to effectively build peace in conflict-plagued communities. UCDP and PRIO estimated that 31 intrastate armed conflicts, four of which were civil wars, occurred in 2010 alone (UCDP and PRIO 2010). It is important that the IC is well-equipped to handle these current and future conflicts. Civil war and armed conflict are major sources of state, regional, and international instability, and both have devastating effects on communities and people. Thus, the concept of peacebuilding and how the IC can be more successful at it warrants further studying. The next chapter will explain in more depth how peacebuilding will be studied in this paper.
Chapter 2 Methodology

Why Case Studies

A qualitative study comparing two cases, Bosnia and Cambodia, will be used to explain the successes and limitations of international post-conflict peacebuilding. Peacebuilding encompasses a variety of activities, so a qualitative study allows the researcher to provide in-depth research into these activities, which cannot always occur in quantitative studies. It gives the researcher a better opportunity to conduct exploratory research and investigate new ideas or concepts (Gerring 2004). The researcher will also be able to offer a more holistic perspective and focus on the inter-relationships and causal mechanisms between variables using the qualitative method (Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005).

Qualitative studies are particularly suited for peacebuilding research because many of the variables or concepts remain abstract, such as peace, human rights or democracy. This enables the researcher to “achieve high levels of conceptual validity” and a “detailed consideration of contextual factors” (George and Bennett 2005, 19). It avoids the possibility of oversimplifying variables, which is important in this study because the variables examined are difficult to quantify into numerical values; the variables must also be considered in relation to each other and in the greater context of international peacebuilding. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005) explain: “Whereas statistical studies run the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ by lumping together dissimilar cases to get a larger sample, case studies allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases” (19).

While I believe that a qualitative and comparative approach is the most beneficial for this research project, it is also imperative to discuss the shortcomings. The most significant challenge to qualitative, comparative research is in regard to which cases the researcher chooses to
examine. Comparative studies often only focus on two or three cases, which allows for in-depth understanding. However, this makes it more difficult to apply results generally to a broader number of cases and could lead to the possibility of inaccurate analysis of causal mechanisms (Gerring 2004; George and Bennett 2005). Expressed by Jason Seawright and John Gerring (2008), “in case studies of this sort, the chosen case is asked to perform a heroic role: to stand for (represent) a population of cases that is often much larger than the case itself” (294).

In the field of international post-conflict peacebuilding, the “universe” of case studies is particularly robust as there are many countries that have suffered from civil war or armed conflict and that have been subject to large international peace operations. SIPRI reported that there were 52 peace operations in 2011 alone (SIPRI 2013). This means the researcher must be strategic when choosing case studies, but this poses the risk of selection bias (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2008). Selection bias is often unintentional and occurs when researchers choose cases that may not be representative of the entire population. Researchers may choose cases for a variety of reasons such as convenience, personal interest, or ideas of how to make an argument, and this could lead to biased conclusions. Although the researcher needs to be careful of selection bias, it has been found that choosing cases at random is also unwise. Randomization would lead to unbiased studies, but it would likely not lead to any informative contributions because of sample size (Gerring 2007; Seawright and Gerring 2008).

**Research Objectives & Questions**

While there are limitations that need to be considered, qualitative research is best suited for the objectives of this research project because the peacebuilding process is comprised of numerous activities and can vary greatly depending on the country. This research paper will primarily be “disciplined configurative” and “heuristic” in nature. Using disciplined
configurative and heuristic research will allow the researcher to contribute to the already large body of literature on peacebuilding by examining if certain generalized theories or if other new theories better explain the success and failures of achieving sustainable peace. In the disciplined configurative method, the researcher “begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case” (George and Bennett 2005, 181). This type of research can “serve heuristic purposes by highlighting the ‘need for new [theories] in neglected areas’” (Eckstein 1975, 99; George and Bennett 2005, 75). My research will also be heuristic as it will seek to highlight other theories or causal mechanisms that could better explain relationships between variables. This research typology will allow me to examine if certain variables are more important to sustainable peace and the reasons why this could be the case.

The main research questions that are being proposed in this paper are: *When is the international community most successful at international peacebuilding? What limitations does the IC face during peace operations? How can the international community overcome these challenges to build sustainable peace in countries that have suffered from civil war and armed conflict?* The intentions of this paper are not to provide a definitive answer of how to achieve sustainable peace but to gain broader insights into what can make peace operations more successful and effective in providing the foundation for sustainable peace. It is my final hope to be able to present ways in which the IC can overcome current challenges and provide future policy implications for the IC.

**Dependent Variable: Sustainable Peace**

One of the biggest challenges of peacebuilding research is how to define successful peacebuilding. What constitutes a success? What should be considered a failure? Most researchers agree that in order to measure the success of peacebuilding, we need to measure
whether or not a state has achieved “peace.” But, how do we measure something so broad and subjective like peace? What is peace anyway? As researchers, it is important to have a clear understanding of what we mean by peace before beginning our research. In order to better understand past research studies and look more closely at how I will define peace, it will be important to briefly highlight and understand different types of peace.

**Negative Peace vs. Positive Peace**

The two main overarching types of peace are negative peace and positive peace. *Negative peace* refers to the absence of war or sustained fighting between groups and is often achieved through a ceasefire or peace agreement (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Historically, this type of peace, operationalized by war recurrence, has been used in conflict and peace literature. A more recent measure of negative peace has been the IEP’s Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 countries on their relative levels of peacefulness. Negative peace is much easier to measure compared to positive peace. However, it is clear that, in practical terms, the absence of war is not entirely indicative of “peace.” Contemporary civil wars are increasingly difficult to solve, and the line between war and peace is much harder to delineate.

*Positive peace* refers to peace that seeks to eliminate violence and injustice within a society by addressing the root causes of conflict. Positive peace is much more difficult to measure but has been used more in contemporary peacebuilding literature. The IEP defines positive peace as “the presence of the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies” and has created its own methodology called the Positive Peace Index (IEP 2016). The Positive Peace Index ranks 163 countries based on eight domains: “well-functioning government, sound business environment, acceptance of the rights of others, good relations with

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4 War recurrence is a measure of whether a country has relapsed into conflict after war over a certain time span.
neighbors, free flow of information, high levels of human capital, low levels of corruption, and equitable distribution of resources” (IEP 2016, 81).

While the Positive Peace Index is one way to quantitatively measure positive peace, there is no universal measurement, and researchers operationalize positive peace differently. For example, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2006) use sustainable peace as a measurement for successful peacebuilding and focus on the “degree of hostility of the factions,” “extent of local capacities remaining after the war,” and “amount of international assistance” (4). Other researchers have used the term, durable peace, which Michael Lund defines as “a high level of reciprocity and cooperation…based on shared values, goals, and institutions (e.g. democratic political systems and rule of law), economic interdependence, and a sense of international community” (USIP 2008, 9).

Sustainable Peace

In this research paper, I will define successful peacebuilding as sustainable peace. Contemporary peacebuilding is much too broad to only look at war recurrence, and it is likely that most people do not view peace as merely the absence of war. Successful peacebuilding would ideally provide a clear foundation and path for sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. For the purpose of this study, sustainable peace will be defined as the restoration of physical security, well-functioning political institutions, equal economic opportunities, protection of human rights, and a sense of community and respect among groups. The restoration of physical security primarily looks at whether a state is still at war and is important because it legitimizes...
the peace process. Well-functioning political institutions refers to whether a state can effectively govern its constituents. Equal economic opportunities and protection of human rights indicate if all citizens have the same rights and access to opportunities. Lastly, a sense of community and respect among groups refers to whether a country can overcome differences and cooperate with one another.

It should be noted that sustainable peace is not something that will be reached in a short time span and that it should be considered in the long-term. To achieve sustainable peace, the IC and host government would ideally address the root causes of the previous conflict. This ensures that opposing groups do not hold continued grievances against one another. Second, the IC would provide the host government with a strong foundation for good governance. The host government would have the necessary institutions, resources, and political climate to address domestic challenges and resolve potential conflicts without significant international help. I argue that neither Bosnia nor Cambodia have been particularly successful in achieving sustainable peace for different reasons, but this will be discussed further in the case selection section of this chapter. Although some aspects of the peacebuilding process could be labeled as successes, both countries struggle with one or more components of sustainable peace.

**Independent Variables & Hypotheses**

This research paper will examine six independent variables: Power-Sharing, Transitional Justice Mechanisms, Socioeconomic Conditions, Local Ownership, Women’s Participation, and Local Legitimacy. I have selected these variables based on the definition of “sustainable peace,” explained previously, and based on what I view as the most important aspects to building sustainable peace according to prior literature. These variables can shed valuable insight into post-conflict peacebuilding and the successes and failures of international peace operations.
After conflict, political settlements through the form of peace agreements have been used to end war and are important components of the peacebuilding process. There has been a lot of research on peace agreements, but literature has found that peace agreements with power-sharing provisions are more likely to lead to durable peace and can be particularly useful in divided communities (DeRouen 2015b). The four types of power-sharing are political, territorial, military, and economic. These types can be defined as follows:

- **Political Power-Sharing**: “stipulate that a new executive, legislative, and civil service can be established so that factions share power”
- **Territorial Power-Sharing**: “gives the rebel group autonomy to control local politics in a specific region or mandates a federal state where subunits have power relative to the central government”
- **Military Power-Sharing**: “allows both parties’ troops in a new joint defense force and/or the appointment of rebels to high military ranks”
- **Economic Power-Sharing**: “seeks a more balanced distribution of economic resources via redistributive policies” (Mattes and Savun 2009, 741; DeRouen 2015b, 134)

Political power-sharing has been found to be most common in settlements after civil war, but all emphasize the need of previous factions to work together (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; DeRouen 2015b). Power-sharing is one way that political leaders and the IC can address potential spoilers, which were discussed in Chapter 1. The success of these agreements depends on the “nature of the war’s conclusion” and can be difficult to implement due to low state capacity (DeRouen 2015b). Sometimes, power-sharing agreements still result in fighting as in the cases of Rwanda, Lebanon, Timor-Leste, and Iraq (DeRouen 2015b).

Power-sharing also relates to Arend Lijphart’s phenomenon of consociationalism, which emphasizes the importance of executive power-sharing, proportionality, autonomy, and veto-rights (Lijphart 1997). Consociationalism is a form of power-sharing that seeks to protect the group rights of parties and has notably been used in Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Macedonia.
Political scientists like John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary are strong supporters of consociationalism and believe that agreements with consociationalism can be crucial in divided post-conflict societies. Some opponents of consociationalism argue that it further institutionalizes and entrenches existing social cleavages (Brancati 2009). Donald L. Horowitz (2014) states that consociationalism can result in political deadlock and “immobilism.”

Although research has found that power-sharing can be useful in divided communities, there is no standard, and success remains largely dependent on the nature of the state and its past conflict. While I believe that power-sharing could be useful in the short-term, I argue that it should not be based on ethno-religious lines. I believe that this would further entrench past divisions and create problems in the long-term for post-conflict societies. The following hypothesis corresponds to the IV, Power-Sharing.

**H1: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if peace agreements do not include power-sharing based on ethno-religious lines.**

*Variable 2: Transitional Justice Mechanisms*

Average citizens are much more likely to be involved in war now than in the past, and this makes peacebuilding more challenging in post-conflict states. The IC is not just faced with the task of rebuilding the physical infrastructure and institutions but also the social fabric of the state. This has led scholars and policymakers to view transitional justice and reconciliation of higher importance in post-conflict societies. Tribunals and truth commissions are the most popular and well-known type of transitional justice mechanisms, but there are also many others such as reparations, public apologies, commemorations, restitution, etc. (Mani 2005; Amstutz 2013a). For the purpose of this paper, the primary focus will be on the use of, or lack thereof, retributive justice through tribunals and restorative justice through truth commissions.
Each type of transitional justice mechanism has its merits and its drawbacks. The main mechanism of retributive justice is tribunals. Tribunals are beneficial because they serve as a deterrent for future perpetrators due to the fear of being prosecuted and punished for certain crimes. In this aspect, they set social norms of what is acceptable and what is not as well as provide the foundation for rule of law. Tribunals are also beneficial for victims as they provide a public space to acknowledge crimes committed during war, and they can validate stories of abuses. They also establish a government’s commitment to protections of human rights and acceptance of international law (Amstutz 2013b). On the other hand, tribunals are also largely symbolic because it is impossible to prosecute all perpetrators that committed crimes and human rights abuses during war if the conflict was large in scale, like in the case of Rwanda. Not International tribunals also ignore elements of culture and social justice, and they can be impositional and seen as a Western model. They create judgment and do not always lead to justice. Lastly, tribunals tend to solely focus on perpetrators, leaving victims feeling marginalized.

Comparatively, there are many types of restorative justice mechanisms. The most well-known type is truth commissions. Truth commissions can be beneficial because they seek to address the root causes of conflict and attempt to rebuild the social fabric of the state. They are more likely to engage with many local actors compared to tribunals. They can be especially useful if civil war or armed conflict was large in scale and if it affected most of the population. Research has also found that truth commissions can have positive effects for women. Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2016b) found that gender-based truth commissions not only spark conversations on sexual violence of women during war but also on broader topics such as women’s rights and gender justice. They provide “a wider social perspective on the crimes committed…[situating]
atrocities in the prevailing political, social and economic structures of a society and [revealing] patterns as well as developments over time and space” (Buckley-Zistel 2016b).

While truth commissions are an attempt to address the root causes of conflict, the main criticism of truth commissions is that they favor perpetrators over victims and continue to fuel the “us vs. them” mentality (Lerche 2000; Mani 2005). In many instances, truth commissions provide impunity to perpetrators of human rights violations, and this can devalue victims and their stories (Mani 2005). Other restorative justice mechanisms include: educational measures, reparations, public apologies, or commemorations. All of these mechanisms seek to uncover the truth of what happened during conflict and rebuild the social fabric of the state.

It is clear that retributive and restorative justice mechanisms each have their merits, which is why I argue that both should be used together. Each offer different but necessary components to peacebuilding and could have a net positive effect if used strategically. For example, in states with large-scale conflict, tribunals could serve to hold top-level perpetrators accountable, while truth commissions could focus on rebuilding relations between ordinary citizens. Other restorative justice mechanisms could also fill the gaps that tribunals fail to address and provide a sense of agency to survivors. This research paper will examine if both types of transitional justice mechanisms were used, how successful they were, and the relationship between the two of them (if applicable). If both types were not used, I will examine the reasons why this was the case. The following hypothesis corresponds to the variable, Transitional Justice Mechanisms.

**H2: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if retributive and restorative justice mechanisms are used.**
Variable 3: Socioeconomic Conditions

Economic reconstruction and recovery are critical components to post-conflict peacebuilding for many reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that war has disastrous economic costs for a society, and post-conflict states suffer from insufficient resources to rebuild their communities. The second reason is that economic inequalities and grievances are main causes of conflict. Literature has shown that economic inequality and relative deprivation are two of the main causes of conflict and that poverty is highly correlated to large-scale war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). In addition, economic inequality, as operationalized by the Gini coefficient, when coupled with ethnic fractionalization, is more likely to lead to war (DeRouen 2015a). Thus, it is important that all citizens have equal economic opportunities in the post-conflict state. The third reason is prior research has found that economic development is a key factor to building sustainable peace in post-conflict states (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

According to the 2017 Global Peace Index report published by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP):

“The economic impact of war was $1.04 trillion. Peacebuilding expenditure is estimated to be approximately $10 billion, or less than one per cent of the cost of war. The report also estimates that the likely return on increases in peacebuilding funding, noting that the return on investment can be up to 16 times the cost of the intervention, highlighting a major opportunity for future investment” (IEP 2017, 3).

The IC is in a unique position to address the economic root causes of conflict during the peacebuilding process and provide the foundation for equal economic opportunities among all citizens. The IMF and World Bank are perhaps the most well-equipped out of all IOs to deal with the scope of economic reconstruction and recovery due to their resources, but they also face challenges. Their foreign assistance and economic aid can negatively impact post-conflict states
if policies are not carefully thought out before implementation (Turner and Pugh 2006). The international community often uses a one-size-fits-all approach when giving foreign aid, which has been modeled by liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalism seeks implement free markets and capitalist economies in developing countries; value is placed on the creation of conditions for a market economy with high foreign direct investment (FDI) instead of improvement of local economic conditions (Turner and Pugh 2006). While this may be the most beneficial approach in the long-term, the short-term effects can be disastrous in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

Some researchers have found that the World Bank and IMF do not pay specific attention to micro-economic policies, such as unemployment and labor protections, and the ways in which these economic reforms impact everyday citizens after conflict (Turner and Pugh 2006). Most post-conflict economic reforms often only benefit metropolitan areas, and this can widen the already existing gap between urban and rural communities (Paris 1997). This could potentially worsen inequality and economic grievances between opposing groups. Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo (2016) concur by arguing that large IOs, like the IMF and World Bank, focus on implementing the most economically efficient policies and do not consider the political impacts of doing so—often of which are most disadvantageous to rural, agricultural populations. These policies continue the cycle of inequality and can create resentment among groups within the country but also against international actors and liberalism in general.

In this research paper, the researcher will examine if socioeconomic conditions have improved among all citizens in the post-conflict state. The researcher will pay special attention to pre-war, inter-war, and post-war socioeconomic conditions between groups and look at if IOs
have taken actions to address inequalities that have arisen at given points in time. The following hypothesis corresponds to the IV, Socioeconomic Conditions.

**H3: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if socioeconomic conditions have improved among all citizens in the post-conflict state compared to the pre-war state.**

**Variable 4: Local Ownership**

Recent literature on international post-conflict peacebuilding has found that local ownership through the inclusion of local actors will better facilitate the process towards sustainable peace. The “local” approach seeks to engage with local communities and organizations and is more people-centered. Although the consensus is for bottom-up peacebuilding rather than top-down, local ownership and inclusion of local actors remains a challenge for the IC, and there is a significant gap between theory and practice. The IC continues to implement “top-down” reforms, such as in Iraq or Afghanistan, which create resentment and a lack of legitimacy towards the IC and its missions (Autesserre 2014; Barnett 2016; Chandler 2016).

The challenges in implementing bottom-up peacebuilding stem from many factors, including a lack of consensus on what local peacebuilding is and from practices at the international level and on the ground (Autesserre 2014; DeRouen 2015b; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). Hanna Leonardsson and Gustav Rudd (2015) believe that one reason for the gap in local peacebuilding on the ground is because each international actor has a different idea of what local peacebuilding is and should be. For example, the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) believe in “building on already existing local formal and informal institutions, and supporting systems that strengthen civil society and link traditional authorities with local governance structures” (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015, 830). Other organizations like the World Bank argue for creating strong partnerships
with local development NGOs (Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). The differences in opinion on what constitutes local peacebuilding makes it difficult to categorize what the priorities for the country should be as well as what is successful and what is not.

The international community and practitioners on the ground also contribute to the top-down approach to peacebuilding in many ways. On the international level, value tends to be placed on stability and containment of conflict (DeRouen 2015b; Cahill-Ripley 2016). While this has changed somewhat in recent years, peace operations still lean towards rebuilding the state’s primary function—to provide security—which includes “maintaining cease-fires and group disarmament, the creation of secure borders, ‘renationalization’ of the use of force, and prevention of violence within the society” (DeRouen 2015b, 150). These processes do not particularly include or empower local actors in decision-making and often ignore long-standing grievances and root problems of the conflict. Basic everyday needs of the local population are often neglected (Cahill-Ripley 2016). Literature has also found that the IC only engages with a few elite local actors rather than multiple actors with the most need (Parent 2016).

On the ground, practitioners also suffer from specific habits, practices and narratives that continue to fuel the top-down narrative (Autesserre 2014). Practitioners and humanitarian workers will often spend time in numerous countries throughout their careers; they have thematic peacebuilding expertise but lack in-depth knowledge on local practices, culture and history of the country they are working in at the time (Autesserre 2014). It is rare that practitioners remain in a specific country for a long enough time to establish the relationships and trust with local counterparts needed to build sustainable peace. In many instances, international procedures actually prohibit practitioners from staying in a certain country for too long (Autesserre 2014).
Furthermore, autonomy on the ground is still constrained because peacebuilders must follow certain security, recruitment, and visibility procedures (Autesserre 2014).

In general, international procedures and practices still facilitate a top-down approach to peacebuilding. A lack of consensus on what constitutes local peacebuilding coupled with a lack of coordination between these actors has resulted in unsuccessful peace operations. The IC must continue to strive for better coordination and consensus on peacebuilding if the “local” model is to be effectively implemented and if meaningful inclusion is to occur throughout the peace process. The following hypothesis will build on prior literature and test how deep the “local” model reaches in each post-conflict society. The following hypothesis corresponds to the IV, Local Ownership.

**H4: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if local ownership is high, meaning that the international community actively engages local actors from all ethnic groups and all levels of society.**

**Variable 5: Women’s Participation**

The inclusion of women in the peace process is fundamental to post-conflict peacebuilding. Researchers have consistently found that women bear disproportional burdens during armed conflict and that the security of women is inextricably linked to the security of the state (Hudson et al 2008; Otto and Heathcote 2014; Verveer 2015; Hudson and Leidl 2015). The adoption of UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent resolutions have solidified the importance of women in the peace process. Today, many peacebuilding strategy reports, such as Burundi and Sierra Leone, as well as peacebuilding mandates include WPS language (Tryggestad 2009; Tryggestad 2016).

Women’s involvement in the peace process has been most notable in the cases of Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines (Chang et al 2015; Verveer 2015).
example, in Northern Ireland, women created a new political party called the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC). NIWC was integral in the formation and passing of the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Act, an Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland, and the Good Friday Agreement (Chang et al 2015; Verveer 2015). NIWC also focused on non-traditional issues to address everyday concerns like education, victims’ rights, and inclusion (Chang et al 2015).

While UNSCR 1325 has provided the foundation for the inclusion of women, the WPS agenda has not been without its challenges. In practice, women’s political participation in the peace process remains low. According to an article published in Foreign Policy, Melanne Verveer (2015) cites that “in the last two decades, women constituted a mere 4 percent of all signatories and less than 9 percent of negotiators in official peace processes.” Women still remain marginalized and do not feel like valuable contributors to society. In some cases, like Liberia, societal norms in post-conflict states can restrict full implementation and contribute to the “women as victims” narrative (Moosa et al 2013). The language of UNSCR 1325 can also lead to limitations:

“[UNSCR 1325] gives the impression that women represent a uniform group with the same set of needs and participation aspirations…This writes out women’s diversity both across and within communities” (Otto and Heathcote 2014, 25).

UNSCR 1325 tends to group women together as one and does not consider the diversity or differences in experiences between women. Finally, the lack of mechanisms to operationalize the implementation and effects of WPS contributes to the low levels of women’s participation.

It is clear that women play a critical role in building peace and that the IC must continue to provide women with the agency to positively contribute in post-conflict settings. In this research paper, I will argue that peacebuilding will be more successful if women’s participation
is high and if they do not face limited opportunities and high levels of social exclusion from their communities. H5 goes beyond the idea that women need to be included in the peace process and examines the conditions that can make women’s participation challenging. It is important to note that I will assume that if women do not face limited opportunities and high levels of social exclusion, then they will be more present in the public sphere—and the peace process—as they will have lower barriers of entry and higher levels of agency. The following hypothesis corresponds to the IV, Women’s Participation.

**H5: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if women’s participation during the peace process is high and if women do not face limited opportunities and high levels of social exclusion in their host societies.**

*Variable 6: Local Legitimacy*

It is important that the IC and peace operation is seen as legitimate by host populations. Legitimacy can be defined as “a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule or the rule-making institution and not by coercive authority” (Frank 1990, 26). Legitimacy is important because the IC undertakes crucial reforms that affect citizens’ everyday lives and seeks to rebuild the social contract of the state. They need support from local host populations in order to be successful. There are multiple sources of local legitimacy, but scholars have found that local ownership, equal resource distribution, and inclusion of multiple actors can positively increase legitimacy. If the reforms carried out by IC are not seen as legitimate, then creating sustainable peace will be more difficult because the IC will have to rely on more force or coercion to convince citizens that reforms are in the best interest of the state.

It is obvious that gaining legitimacy is not an easy task. The IC continues to struggle with how to “win the hearts and minds” of host populations, and the IC’s inability to do so has resulted in numerous consequences such as war recurrence, insurgency, political gridlock, etc.
Lack of local ownership, unequal distribution of resources, use of force, and inconsistent policies are a few examples of factors that can create low levels of legitimacy. Michael Hecther (2013) argue that the IC, or foreign governments, will be more legitimate if they equally distribute public goods. James Gow and Christopher Dandeker (1995) found that lack of neutrality can affect legitimacy, citing the example of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Croatia:

“…support for UNPROFOR from Bosnian and Croat quarters has been eroded by its failure fully to execute parts of its mandate, for example, deterring Serbian attacks on ‘safe areas’. However, if it engages more actively in deterring such attacks, it damages its relationship with Serbian political and military leaders, as well as their populations” (173).

This is problematic because one action might win local support from one side but lose support from another. In an attempt to remain “neutral,” peacekeepers and practitioners on the ground frequently find themselves trying to balance between how to effectively engage with host populations.

It is also important to note that the peace operation needs to be seen as legitimate by the rest of the IC, but this study will not seek to examine this aspect of legitimacy. This research paper will primarily look at how the host population views the IC. The following hypothesis corresponds to the IV, Local Legitimacy.

**H6: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if the peace operation and international community have strong local legitimacy from the host population.**

**Case Selection**

As mentioned previously, the “universe” of cases for peacebuilding is robust. There are many countries that have suffered from civil war or armed conflict and that have been the centers of multidimensional peace operations. In this study, I have chosen to explore and analyze international post-conflict peacebuilding in two countries, Bosnia and Cambodia, for several reasons. First, Bosnia represents the classic “post-Cold War case,” meaning that it was one of the
first post-communist states to collapse and that it had an ethnic identity component to the conflict. Cambodia, in contrast, serves as the “most different” case. Second, Bosnia and Cambodia have regional differences and cultural variations. By examining cases with differences in region, culture, and conflict, I will be able to see if the IC did, in fact, implement country-specific peacebuilding reforms. These differences can also present information about the scope of past theories and provide valuable information about the successes and failures of international peacebuilding efforts. Furthermore, Bosnia and Cambodia have both suffered from genocide and armed conflict within their states, and they have dealt with pressures and intervention from regional actors and the IC. Both operations are considered to be in the post-Cold War era, and a host of IOs and peacekeepers entered both countries to help rebuild and prevent a relapse into conflict after the signing of peace agreements.

Bosnia and Cambodia are also interesting because they have been subject to similar peacebuilding initiatives, but both have struggled with one or more aspects of sustainable peace and have somewhat diverged in how they have been successful and how they have failed. For example, Bosnia has particularly struggled in regard to its political institutions; deadlock between opposing political parties is frequent. In addition, mistrust between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs continues to affect everyday life, highlighting the inability of the IC to rebuild the social fabric of the state during the peacebuilding process. This has been exacerbated more recently by the rise of populism and nationalism throughout Bosnia and surrounding countries. In contrast, the biggest challenge of sustainable peace in Cambodia has been its protection of human rights and equal economic opportunities. The Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, has been in power since 1998; he is described by many as authoritarian and has consolidated power around him by appointing loyalists and expunging dissidents. Economic inequality in Cambodia
has also worsened over time as an impact of globalization although economic growth more generally has been extremely successful. The following chapters will delve into these case studies and the policy implications of the post-conflict peacebuilding process.

Chapter 3 will examine international peacebuilding in Bosnia. Bosnia is a small country in the Balkan region of Eastern Europe that gained independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. It has a population of approximately 3.861 million people and is ethnically diverse with populations of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats (Central Intelligence Agency 2017a). Serbian nationalists, with the support of Serbia, fought for territory and committed ethnic cleansing campaigns against Bosniak Muslims in an effort to create a larger, more powerful Serbian state. After internal failed attempts to end the ethnic cleansing, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened and began a bombing campaign against the Serbs. After Milosevic capitulated, the US led peace talks known as the Dayton Accords, which were signed in 1995.

Chapter 4 will explore international peacebuilding in Cambodia. Cambodia is a much more populated country in Southeast Asia and is home to approximately 15.9 million, the majority of who identify as Khmer or descendants from the Angkor Empire (Central Intelligence Agency 2017b). Over 1.5 million Cambodians died under the reign of the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot from 1975 to 1979 (Central Intelligence Agency 2017b). In 1978, the Vietnamese government invaded Cambodia, ending the reign of the Khmer Rouge, but the intervention sparked a civil war that lasted until 1991. The UN established a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992, and a hybrid tribunal called the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was created with the help of the UN in 2003. The peace process in Cambodia has been slow and is a lesser known example of post-conflict
peacebuilding compared to Bosnia. Cambodia is seen by some scholars and policymakers as a success in international peacebuilding (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).

Chapter 5 will analyze post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in both states. It will explore when the IC has been most successful at peacebuilding and explain how the limits of the IC’s peacebuilding operations have affected a country’s trajectory towards sustainable peace. This research paper will not seek to provide a definitive answer on how to achieve sustainable peace but rather gain broader insights into what can make peacebuilding most successful. It is my final hope that I will be able to provide policy recommendations on how the IC can overcome challenges to more successfully build sustainable peace.
Chapter 3 Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina (herein Bosnia) is a small country in the Balkan region of Eastern Europe with a population of 3.86 million people (Central Intelligence Agency 2017a). It is diverse and has three primary ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Bosnia was formerly a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until it broke up in 1991. In 1992, Bosnians voted for independence in a referendum, but war broke out soon after. During the war, Serbian nationalists in Bosnia, with the support of the Serbian Armed Forces, fought for territory and committed mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing campaigns that killed over 100,000 people (Baker 2015c; Central Intelligence Agency 2017a). The outcome was international intervention via the United Nations Protection Force and the peace agreement known as the Dayton Peace Accords. While the Dayton Peace Accords were a step towards peace and remain intact today, Bosnia still remains a fragile state with high levels of ethnic tension. Bosnia has been viewed as a “testing-ground” for contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding and serves as a useful model in identifying successes and challenges in international post-conflict peacebuilding due to the wide array of IOs that have operated and continue to operate there.

The Fall of the Former Yugoslavia & Outbreak of War

The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Bosnia. It was led by Josip Broz Tito, a communist revolutionary, who served as the President of Yugoslavia from 1953 to 1980. Tito was a charismatic leader who was popular both domestically and internationally; he kept the six republics unified, defused political unrest, and advanced Bosnia economically and culturally

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7 Bosniaks refers to the ethnic group of Bosnian Muslims. Although Bosniaks are spread throughout the Balkan region, they are concentrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
during his presidency (Burg and Shoup 1999a; Baker 2015a). Although some argue that he was a repressive dictator, others will say that Tito transformed Bosnia into a new model of tolerance and secularism in Eastern Europe (Burg and Shoup 1999a). When Tito died in 1980, there was a lack of strong political leadership to take his place, and people began to question the future of Yugoslavia. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was in disarray, and the government was still struggling to rebuild the economy from the 1973 oil crisis (Burg and Shoup 1999a). Ethnic hypernationalism ensued and calls for independence spread throughout the six republics.

These events resulted in the emergence of a new populist leader named Slobodan Milošević. Milošević was elected as the leader of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS) in 1987 and later served as President of Serbia from 1989 until 1997. He was well-known for being anti-capitalist and sought to preserve Yugoslavia as a socialist state with a Serbian identity (Baker 2015c). During his terms as president, he emphasized Serbian nationalist policies, which later led to anti-Serbian sentiments across the Balkans. Milošević, as well as Serbian nationalists that lived in Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, became particularly concerned as nationalism grew because the break-up of the six republics meant that Serbs would be considered a minority ethnic group in each state except Serbia (Baker 2015c). The events during the 1980s culminated with votes for independence in all but Montenegro and Serbia in 1991 and 1992. In 1991, war finally broke out in Croatia in response to territorial claims and ethnic differences.

The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

After the war began in Croatia, many wondered what would happen in Bosnia. Some, including Bosniak President Alija Izetbegović, believed that the culture of tolerance and secularism would prevail and that Bosnia would not be subject to the deep ethnic divisions like
in the surrounding republics (Burg and Shoup 1999b). Others argued that Bosnia was doomed when Yugoslavia fell—in other words, the death of Yugoslavia meant the death of Bosnia. This was because Bosnians had to choose a side, and usually, people chose the side that corresponded to their own ethnic groups (Burg and Shoup 1999b). In addition, Bosnia was in the middle of the conflict geographically, which meant that it was subject to territorial disagreements between groups. The latter proved to be more accurate as war broke out shortly after Bosnians voted for independence in 1992.

On a military front, arms had already begun secretly flowing into Bosnia from Belgrade prior to the vote for independence. Members of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) quickly moved into Bosnia and began training the newly formed Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) and Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). On the opposite side was the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO). Serbian forces first attacked Serb-dominated towns and cities in an attempt to grab territory and later moved on to other areas (Baker 2015c). Towns with large populations of Bosniaks, including Foča, Višegrad, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica, became primary targets for the VRS, BSA and JNA. During the war, Bosnian Serb forces, led by Ratko Mladić, were particularly violent and committed acts of indiscriminate shelling, ethnic cleansing, and systematic rape against women (Burg and Shoup 1999c; Baker 2015c). The ARBiH and HVO also committed some of these crimes but to a lesser extent.

On a diplomatic front, there were three new political parties that emerged in the 1980s to represent each nationalist group: the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), led by Izetbegović; the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), led by Radovan Karadžić; and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which later split into two factions each led by Mate Boban and Stjepan Kljujić (Burg and

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8 The ARBiH represented Bosniaks.
9 The HVO represented Bosnian Croats.
Shoup 1999a; Baker 2015a). The SDA, SDS, and HDZ all gained seats in parliament during the 1990 election and sought to consolidate their power by appointing their own party loyalists to high government positions (Burg and Shoup 1999b). Although discussions occurred between the three parties prior to the onset of the war, they could not reach a consensus as each party only focused on policies that would guarantee the rights and serve in the interests of themselves (Burg and Shoup 1999b). A diplomatic solution became increasingly more complicated when war broke out in Croatia because the SDS had close ties to Milošević, and the HDZ had close ties to Croatian President Franjo Tuđman. However, the SDA and HDZ formed a joint federation as the war progressed.

Conflict Prevention & the UN Protection Force

During the early stages of the war, the IC stood idly by and watched as war broke out in the Balkans. The IC’s decision not to act in the beginning can be attributed to a few reasons. First, the UN, European Community (EC), and United States (US) did not understand the conflict, particularly in Bosnia, and were thus hesitant to engage both militarily and diplomatically. The first attempts at negotiations led by the EC in 1992 failed because the IC viewed the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia as being the same: “a blend of aggression, ethnic assertion, self-determination, and state preservation” (Gow 1997d). The IC believed that the conflict would “work itself out,” and they did not understand that the state would deteriorate so quickly (Burg and Shoup 1999b). Second, the EC, Canada, and US all had distinct ideas about how to handle the Yugoslav conflict. The US wanted to keep Yugoslavia together, whereas Germany wanted to recognize the independence of individual states (Gow 1997d; Cohen and Moens 1999). Third, the UN historically had only sent in troops with the consent of all parties; the idea that peacekeeping forces could be sent in for humanitarian reasons or to prevent conflict
was a recently new phenomenon during the Bosnian War (Johansson 1997; Cohen and Moens 1999). Eva Johansson (1997) explains that: “It was customary to send UN troops into a conflict only after there was a treaty of peace among the contending parties, however fragile the agreement among them might be” (451).

**The UN Protection Force**

In February 1992, the UN finally decided to deploy 15,000 peacekeepers, under Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar, to document violations and deliver aid in a good faith measure as the humanitarian conditions worsened on the ground (Baker 2015c). The mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was limited, with the primary focus on Croatia, but its command center was based in Sarajevo. As fighting intensified in Bosnia, the mission adapted to include Bosnia (Gow 1997a). Many scholars now argue that this set the mission in Bosnia up for failure because Bosnia became seen more as an afterthought or “add-on” to Croatia rather than its own integrated peacekeeping mission (Cohen and Moens 1999).

UNPROFOR is now considered by most as being largely unsuccessful, which was highlighted in the cases of Sarajevo and Srebrenica. In Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, the VRS cut off humanitarian aid by surrounding and blockading the town even though the UN had declared Sarajevo as a “safe zone.” Known as the Siege of Sarajevo, it lasted almost three years and eleven months, and approximately 14,000 people died (Baker 2015c). During the siege, many suffered from starvation, public services collapsed, and crime rates rose to extremely high rates. The inability of peacekeepers to help civilians and deliver humanitarian aid—the prime objective of UNPROFOR—was problematic for the UN mission as it illegitimated what it was supposed to be there to do.

The biggest failure of UNPROFOR was in Srebrenica, a small town in Eastern Bosnia which was declared a UN “safe zone.” Many Bosniak refugees had gathered there during the war
with hopes that they would be protected from Serbian military units. However, in July 1995, the VRS, BSA, and JNA committed the largest massacre during the Bosnian War, and more than 7,000 people, mostly men and boys, died (Rapp 2015). It was in Srebrenica that Serbian forces—under the leadership of Mladić—committed mass atrocities including crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Because of confusion over the proper use of force, UNPROFOR did nothing to deter the attacks and watched as civilians were executed. The massacre at Srebrenica was a huge blow, not just to the reputation of UNPROFOR, but to the reputation of the whole IC.

*Lack of Coordination & Communication at the United Nations*

UNPROFOR suffered from a lack of coordination and communication on the ground. UNPROFOR peacekeepers in Bosnia suffered from a lack of understanding of the mandate’s goals and the changing dynamics of peacekeeping itself. As discussed earlier, the mandate for UNPROFOR was only to deliver humanitarian aid in the beginning but quickly expanded over time to include other activities such as:

“demilitarizing the [UN protected areas] (UNPAs)...providing protection to their inhabitants...[assisting] the return of displaced civilian populations who had been residents of the UNPAs...[monitoring] the withdrawal of the JNA forces from Croatia” (Cohen and Moens 1999, 88).

While the changing nature of the mandate was not bad in and of itself, the lack of coordination and communication between UN Headquarters and UNPROFOR leadership, when these changes occurred, proved to be a major challenge (Rapp 2015). UN peacekeepers easily became confused, especially over the use of force and Rules of Engagement (RoE),\(^\text{10}\) because they were constantly having to reinterpret the mandate. In addition, peacekeepers were continuously

\(^{10}\) RoE are directives that UN peacekeepers and military forces must follow. They vary depending on the mandate of the UN mission.
adapting to new responsibilities and challenges in an already difficult environment (Gow 1997a; Cohens and Moens 1999; Rapp 2015).

The IC also facilitated this narrative of confusion and ambiguity through its resolutions and discussions at UN Headquarters. For example, Resolutions 836 and 844 passed by the UNSC on the use of force in safe zones were so vague and contradictory that UNPROFOR forces did not know how to interpret them (Rapp 2015). The mandate under Resolution 836 suggested that UNPROFOR was allowed to use force for the purposes of “self-defense.” However, when the UN later passed Resolution 844, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali interpreted that “the purpose of safe areas was to protect people, not to defend the territory,” suggesting that UNPROFOR forces should not engage (Rapp 2015, 10). Lenard J. Cohen and Alexander Moens (1999) attribute the IC’s inability to reach political consensus as a key factor to this ambiguity; they suggest:

“Confronted with strong contradictory pressures wanting to stay out of the war on the one hand and wishing to relieve human suffering on the other, members of the UN Security Council decided on a somewhat ambiguous, and ultimately conflicting, mandate for the UN mission” (Cohen and Moens 1999, 89)

This ambiguity also made the task of impartiality on the ground difficult for peacekeepers.

In addition, UNPROFOR suffered from not having enough resources. UNPROFOR Command and the UN Secretary-General reported that they did not nearly have enough troops to fully patrol safe zones or station them in the necessary areas to deter attacks (Rapp 2015). Eva Johansson (1997) reports that when the number of troops finally began to increase in the later stages of the war, it was not effective because regulations on their movement also increased; this meant peacekeepers could not work or associate with civilian populations as much and mostly stayed on their own bases.
**Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The war lasted until 1995 when NATO undertook a massive airstrike campaign against Serb forces (Operation Deliberate Force) following the massacre at Srebrenica. The airstrike campaign and advances on the ground by the ARBiH and HVO pressured Bosnian Serbs to participate in peace talks in Dayton, Ohio. Milošević, who represented Bosnian Serbs, Tuđman, and Izetbegović all attended. US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, EU Special Representative Carl Bildt and Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov led the negotiations, which resulted in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). The UN was largely left out of the process due to the failures of UNPROFOR (Tardy 2015). The DPA established two autonomous zones, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS), and an autonomous town of Brcko. It also created a tripartite presidency to which Izetbegović was elected to lead in 1996.

Following the signing of the DPA, the UN established the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and IOs flocked to Bosnia in an effort to rebuild the country and promote reconciliation. Bosnia quickly became dubbed a “testing-ground” for modern, integrated peacebuilding and continues to be a source of interest for academia. The rest of the chapter will explore some of the successes and failures of peacebuilding components such as the DPA, UNMIBH, and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It will also examine the six independent variables: Power-Sharing, Transitional Justice Mechanisms, Socioeconomic Conditions, Local Ownership, Women’s Participation, and Local Legitimacy.

**The Dayton Peace Accords and Ethnic Fractionalization**

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, commonly referred to as the DPA, was signed in 1995 by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The
primary objectives of the DPA were to end the war and provide the foundation for post-war reconstruction and democracy in Bosnia. Under the DPA, two separate autonomous zones, FBiH and RS, were established, and the Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) was created. The DPA also set the framework for international involvement and allowed NATO forces, called the International Force (IFOR), to remain in the country to oversee the implementation of the agreement (Pickering 2007a). IFOR was later replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and then by the European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) in 2006 due to its success in deterring and preventing conflict (Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014; Keil and Kudlenko 2015). The DPA has successfully prevented Bosnia from relapsing into conflict, but it has not led to serious reconciliation or cooperation between the three primary ethnic groups and other minorities, which is necessary for durable or sustainable peace.

The DPA is based on consociationalism, a form of power-sharing to help facilitate cooperation after ethnic conflict, and can be beneficial in communities where ethnic conflict has been present. However, consociationalism has not been as successful in implementation in Bosnia. The unique legal features of the DPA and political environment of Bosnia have, instead, made it more difficult for actors from opposite ethnic groups to cooperate together; therefore, a multi-ethnic state has not been achieved (Gaeta 1996; Pickering 2007a).

The tripartite presidency is the most notable example of consociationalism. The tripartite presidency was well-intentioned and attempted to protect the group rights of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, but it is also a good example of how consociationalism has negatively impacted the peacebuilding process in Bosnia. The tripartite presidency is a three-member body composed of one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb, all of who serve a 4-year term. The member with the most
votes becomes the Chairperson of the Presidency, but in order to ensure equal participation, they rotate every eight months. Each holds a veto power.

One of the main limitations of the tripartite presidency is that meaningful reforms cannot be undertaken because of political deadlock between the three members. There are no real incentives or mechanisms to promote cooperation and consensus among groups, and they disagree on a “coherent vision for the future of the country,” even to this day (Pickering 2007a; Keil and Kudlenko 2015, 485). Bosniak elites still push for a more centralized state whereas Bosnian Serbs and Croats are more reluctant because they want to keep their own autonomy (Keil and Kudlenko 2015). This lack of cooperation cannot be solely attributed to the DPA but also the unwillingness of local elites to compromise (Keil and Kudlenko 2015). Another limitation of the tripartite presidency is that it makes participation in the political process nearly impossible because they must identify and be recognized as Bosniak, Croat or Serb (Gaeta 1996; Pickering 2007a). Finally, the DPA has not facilitated inter-ethnic cooperation at the local level. Bosnia remains culturally segregated due to entrenched values and views (Pickering 2007a; Chivvis 2010). If Bosnia is to move on and achieve real, sustainable peace, society must reconcile its ethno-political differences.

**The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The law enforcement agencies in Bosnia were highly dysfunctional and corrupt when UNMIBH was deployed. Thus, the DPA also created the UNMIBH via UNSCR 1035 to “assist and monitor Bosnia’s law enforcement agencies” (Tardy 2015, 512). UNMIBH consisted of a UN Civilian Office, International Police Task Force (IPTF), Criminal Justice Advisory Unit, Human Rights Office, and Public Affairs Office (Tardy 2015). UNMIBH was the first post-Cold War operation to include its own police force. More than 2,000 personnel were deployed at its

IPTF was the largest body of UNMIBH, and its responsibilities included: “advising and monitoring law enforcement activities, training law enforcement personnel, and assisting the parties’ law enforcement agencies in ensuring the existence of conditions for free and fair elections” (Tardy 2015, 513). There six core areas of IPTF were “police reform, police restructuring, police/criminal justice system, institution-building and inter-police cooperation, public awareness, and participation in UN peacekeeping” (Tardy 2015, 513). The goal of IPTF was to build the foundation for successful “democratic policing.”

IPTF was somewhat successful on the ground. It reformed and restructured the Bosnian police forces, increased ethnic and gender representation, created new training courses, and established a State Border Service and Special Trafficking Operations Program (Tardy 2015). However, IPTF was often subject to political interference and lacked transparency (Tardy 2015). The quality of IPTF also varied greatly, and local actors held very negative perceptions of IPTF police officers (Tardy 2015). Lastly, Western nations largely focused on NATO’s IFOR and SFOR instead of UNMIBH. UNMIBH’s mandate expired after the US vetoed its renewal in 2002. In 2003, IPTF was replaced by the European Union Police Mission (EUPM).

**Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Bosnia**

Unfortunately, reconciliation in Bosnia has been relatively unsuccessful. Although war has not broken out and ethnic tolerance has somewhat increased since the end of the war, Bosnia remains fragile and divided. Social trust between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats remains low, and political leaders have failed in uniting the state to pass any meaningful reforms. Even Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative for Bosnia, commented that the country was moving
closer towards separation than unity when he stepped down in 2006. The IC, including the UN, donor states, and other NGOs, has continued to actively address the deep ethnic cleavages and crimes committed during the war, but it has faced many challenges along the way.

*The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*

The most widely known transitional justice mechanism implemented by the IC is the ICTY. Located in The Hague, Netherlands, the ICTY was formed by the UN Security Council in 1993 and was the first major international tribunal since the Nuremberg Trials. The ICTY was historic in the field of international humanitarian law by attempting to hold those who committed crimes accountable for their actions during the Yugoslav Wars. According to the UN-ICTY, its primary objective is to:

“try those individuals most responsible for appalling acts such as murder, torture, rape, enslavement, destruction of property and other crimes listed in the Tribunal’s Statue…aims to deter future crimes and render justice to thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia” (UN-ICTY 2017).

The ICTY is a form of retributive justice, and it has indicted 161 individuals since it formed (UN-ICTY 2017).

The ICTY has been met with criticism since its creation, and scholars and policymakers remain divided over the success of it and its effectiveness in reconciling differences between ethnic groups. Originally, proponents believed that the ICTY would help acknowledge the crimes committed during the Yugoslav Wars and provide some sense of closure to victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing and sexual violence. They hoped that it would serve as a foundation for rule of law and democratic values in the Balkan region, eventually providing a sense of sustainable peace to citizens of all ethnic groups (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010). However, the ICTY has largely failed in reconciling deep divisions between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. Some scholars argue that the ICTY provides some sense of “thin reconciliation,” meaning that it
acknowledges the need for physical security and demonstrates that the crimes committed are unacceptable; but, the ICTY does not provide “thick reconciliation,” or the reconstruction and rebuilding of social trust needed in Bosnia (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010). There are many possible reasons that the ICTY has not been as effective in practice including lack of local input, lack of political will, and bias.

Many scholars have criticized the ICTY for not including local opinion, a common pitfall to effective peacebuilding. David A. Hoogenboom and Stephanie Vieille (2010) believe that the ICTY has not led to local reconciliation because of its literal and figurative distance from local Bosnia. Literally, victims and perpetrators are required to travel to The Hague in the Netherlands to testify or stand trial. The judges, administrative staff, and counsel are all located there, away from local Bosnian culture and people. Figuratively, the ICTY is still seen as an international model based on a Western view of justice that favors prosecution and punishment (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010). It ignores elements of culture and does not consider local opinions or perceptions of justice. This problem is further entrenched because finances continue to come from international donors, not Bosnian ones. This means that foreign IOs and governments continue to play a key role in setting the standards and priorities for the ICTY (Baker 2015b).

The ICTY has also been criticized for being too biased, and some have argued that this has substantially hurt chances for reconciliation in Bosnia. The history of the Yugoslav Wars is very divided and differs greatly depending on who is telling the story. Each group interprets events and asserts facts that are convenient to advancing their side; they do not seek to undercover the “truth” of what happened (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010). This is emphasized and perpetuated in the education system because students from each ethnic group use different textbooks which denote very different histories. Because each side tells a different history,
Retributive justice mechanisms are increasingly difficult to implement and are ineffective in practice because ethnic divisions within the country are further entrenched (Hoogenboom and Vieille 2010).

In contrast, Marko Attila Hoare (2010) believes that the ICTY is actually not “biased” enough. He argues that the IC’s decision to refrain from assigning blame to either side has led to a lack of political will in prosecuting individuals. He cites the Nuremberg Trials as a foil to the ICTY, pointing out that the IC was more willing to assign blame. Because the Nuremberg Trials focused mostly on one side of the conflict, the Nazis, compared to the ICTY, which was formed to try those from all sides, the IC had more at stake (Hoare 2010). He argues that the political will was greater during Nuremberg and concludes that this has affected the lower number of high-level indictments in the ICTY (Hoare 2010).

Restorative Justice in Bosnia

There were some discussions about creating a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) in the former Yugoslavia, but one was never formed due to hesitation by local and international actors. Most of the IC wanted to create the ICTY first and believed establishing a TRC would make those who committed crimes hesitant to participate (Dragovic-Soso 2016). Domestic groups also resisted the idea because they were not included in early conversations on the formation of the TRC; they viewed a TRC as an “elitist, lucrative project” (Dragovic-Soso 2016, 305). Bosnian Serbs refused the idea of a TRC because they thought it would result in Bosnian statehood and reaffirm the narrative that Serbs were the prosecutors of genocide and ethnic cleansing (Dragovic-Soso 2016). Despite the unpopularity of a TRC, Jasna Dragovic-Soso (2016) believes that a TRC could have closed the gap between local and international models of justice. She argues that a TRC could have established a more coherent and “authoritative”
narrative of Bosnian history and the Yugoslav conflict and give Bosnians the opportunity to “re-write” their history (Dragovic-Soso 2016).

It is unclear whether a national TRC in Bosnia would have helped the community move on from the past. In an attempt to fill the gap of a TRC, smaller international and local NGOs have focused on initiatives to help rebuild the social fabric, including trauma healing, dialogue, identity-building, and women’s empowerment. These have played a role in reconciliation, but the underlying tensions between ethnic groups are still deeply ingrained into all levels of society. The ICTY and reconciliation process has been relatively unsuccessful in addressing deep social cleavages and rebuilding a sense of common identity in Bosnia.

**Socioeconomic Conditions & Economic Reconstruction**

*Socioeconomic Conditions during the War*

Prior to the onset of the Bosnian War, the former Yugoslavia was considered a socialist state, and the economy was centrally planned. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were widespread, and the private sector was almost non-existent. When war broke out, Bosnia’s economy collapsed. Infrastructure was ruined, social services disintegrated, and the country suffered from extreme levels of poverty (Effron and O’Brien 2004a). Therefore, the IC provided Bosnia with significant amounts of humanitarian aid, such as food and medical supplies, throughout the war (Effron and O’Brien 2004a).

*Economic Reconstruction in Bosnia*

Bosnia’s economic reconstruction became an important part of the peacebuilding process following the signing of the DPA. At the first meeting with international donors and local officials, the IC pledged to provide over 5 billion dollars in reconstruction aid to Bosnia to rebuild housing and infrastructure and provide social services (Effron and O’Brien 2004a). The
World Bank served as the leader in Bosnia’s economic reconstruction and sought to transform Bosnia from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The World Bank’s main goals were to reform the tax system, deregulate the economy, restructure SOEs, implement fiscal and monetary policies, and increase private sector development (Effron and O’Brien 2004b). Following the IC’s pledge, poverty levels were reduced significantly, and GDP increased (Effron and O’Brien 2004a).

![GDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991-2016](image)

**Table 1 GDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991-2016 (Current US$) Data Source: World Bank and OECD**

**Government Fragmentation and Aid Dependence**

Although the IC pledged large amounts of aid and support to Bosnia’s reconstruction efforts, there were many challenges when it came to implementation. Bosnia did not have a “unified economic space” due to the fragmented structure of the government under the DPA (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006, 71). The decentralized government structure meant that economic and political powers were shared among groups, and there were no unified institutions that regulated the country’s fiscal policy or public infrastructure (i.e. electricity, gas, utilities)
(Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006). The IC held significant power over the post-conflict environment, so many of the economic reforms did not include local actors (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006). Lastly, there were severe regional disparities regarding wealth. Urban areas were much better off than rural ones, and FBiH had better economic conditions than RS (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006). Within FBiH, Croatian areas were better off because of their ties to Croatia (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006).

![Unemployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991-2017](chart)

*Table 2 Unemployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991-2017. Data Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSAT database.*

The last main challenge to Bosnia’s economic reconstruction has been its aid dependence, which has negatively impacted Bosnia’s economic growth. Bosnia remains largely reliant on outside aid to sustain its economic growth (Effron and O’Brien 2004c; Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006). The low levels of economic growth and stagnation in recent years when aid has decreased, as pictured in Table 1, is evidence of this. Furthermore, Bosnia continues to suffer from high levels of unemployment resulting from corruption and economic stagnation. The country has the highest rate of youth unemployment in the world at 67.5 percent in 2017 (World
Bank 2017). In addition, Bosnian elites continue to benefit financially from the widespread corruption and thus, have no desire to make reforms to the system. Bosnia will need to make serious reforms to its economic system and crack down on political corruption if it is to overcome its economic challenges.

**Local Ownership & Peacebuilding on the Ground in Bosnia**

Peacebuilding in Bosnia has generally been criticized as not including local actors, and most argue that Bosnia serves as a poignant example of the “top-down” approach to peacebuilding (Kriz and Cermak 2014; Dursun-Ozkanca 2010). As billions of dollars of military and economic aid poured in from the IC, local Bosnians struggled to find their footing among the wide array of IOs. The IC controlled most aspects of Bosnia until the late 1990s when policymakers and Bosnians became critical over the lack of local input. In general, local ownership in Bosnia was extremely low.

The main challenge in Bosnia was that each IO had distinct ideas about how to best help local Bosnians, and they did not coordinate peacebuilding activities with each other or local populations (Pickering 2007c; Dursun-Ozkanca 2010). The lack of interagency cooperation resulted in IOs carrying out duplicate activities that were not beneficial to what local populations needed. In addition, the peacebuilding model in post-war Bosnia mostly fostered “horizontal connections and repeated interaction among tiny groups of activists, not ordinary people” (Pickering 2007c, 124). Paula M. Pickering (2007c) describes in her book, *Peacebuilding in the Balkans*, how “international donors have focused on building NGOs that advocate for liberal democratic ideals” (123). By solely focusing on liberal democratic ideals, the IC is not focusing on what local Bosnians consider to be most necessary in their day-to-day lives. The idea that
Bosnia would easily transform into a liberal democratic haven in the Balkans region was unrealistic at the time.

The Bonn Powers

Another challenge to local ownership and inclusion of local actors was the intrusive powers given to the OHR created after the DPA. The IC appointed Carl Bildt as the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and his job was to “facilitate the local parties’ own efforts to establish political and constitutional institutions and to mobilize and coordinate the activities of other organizations and agencies involved in the process” (Caplan 2004, 55). In the beginning, the OHR did not have much power, but this changed after the addition of the Bonn Powers of 1997. The Bonn Powers allowed the OHR to make decisions if local actors could not and remove local politicians from office if they did not follow the DPA (Caplan 2004; Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014). From 1997 to 2006, many of the policies in local Bosnia came out of this office, including citizenship laws and legislation on the national flag, anthem, currency, and even license plates (Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014; Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). It is reported that Wolfgang Petritsch, who served as the High Representative from 1999 to 2002, fired 81 officials and implemented 166 laws or amendments in Bosnia during his term (Caplan 2004). The decisions implemented under the OHR often disregarded local opinions and served in the interest of elites (Kriz and Cermak 2014; Caplan 2004; Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014; Parent 2016).

In the early 2000s, the Bonn Powers became heavily criticized by many local and international actors as not giving ownership to Bosnians. When local Bosnians were asked if they felt included in the political process and if they were asked to provide input into decisions made by their governments or the IC, they responded that elites only consult a select group of people—most of which are not the ones with considerable need (Parent 2016). In the same
survey, they were also asked if they felt that they were able to improve their own day-to-day lives, to which most answered “no” (Parent 2016). Internationally, the World Bank, European Union (EU) and OHR all agreed that the IC’s robust involvement was beginning to be detrimental to peacebuilding and the future of the state because it was creating a “superficial attachment” to peace itself (Keranen 2014; Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). In response to calls for “local ownership,” the IC slowly began to give Bosnia back some of its decision-making power and control over the peacebuilding process (Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). The EU called on the OHR to close in 2007, but it reopened in 2008 due to concerns by local Bosnians.

Academic literature, field research and international reports have concluded that local ownership has increased in recent years but is still in the beginning stages. Zdenek Kriz and Petr Cermak (2014) conducted a field study of 11 local Bosnian municipalities and interviewed local Bosnian peacebuilders and citizens. They found that NGOs are heavily consolidated around urban areas, and the younger generation is much more open to the peacebuilding process compared to past generations (Kriz and Cermak 2014). They also discovered that there is a growing number of local NGOs focusing on peacebuilding and interethnic reconciliation in most of the municipalities that they studied (Kriz and Cermak 2014). Local judiciaries have also begun to investigate war crimes and hold trials against perpetrators, although this process has just started (Kriz and Cermak 2014). While local ownership has increased in the past few years, it has been generally low. The robust peacebuilding mission was mostly led from the top rather from local actors. This had unintended consequences for the peace process and illegitimated the IC’s efforts to rebuild Bosnia.
Women, Peace & Security in Bosnia

The inclusion of women is particularly important in post-conflict Bosnia because of the prevalence of gender-based violence and use of rape as a weapon of war throughout the former Yugoslavia. The following section will explore gender-based violence during the Bosnian War, the role of women in the peace process, and current policies that affect women’s rights in Bosnia.

The Role of Women in the former Yugoslavia

In the former Yugoslavia, communist and socialist ideologies allowed women to step outside the private sphere and make educational and professional advances (Kaufman and Williams 2004). Women composed a large portion of the workforce and fought for more liberal divorce and abortion policies (Simmons 2007). Women in Bosnia also attempted to facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation during the late 1980s as ethnic nationalism rose (Simmons 2007). However, nationalist propaganda, especially in Serbia, redefined the role of women from the modern “workers” to the traditional “mothers,” a narrative that is still emphasized today (Kaufman and Williams 2004; Simmons 2007). The gains that women accumulated under Tito reversed during and after the war (Kaufman and Williams 2004).

Gender-Based Violence in Bosnia

The evidence of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war was well-documented throughout the former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia, Bosnian Serb forces committed gender-based violence and human rights abuses against women, most of whom identified as Bosniak.11 The worst case of sexual violence and rape during the war was in Foča, a small town, home to mostly Bosniaks, located in RS. It was here that Bosnian Serb forces, under the leadership of Dragan

11 Women from other ethnic groups also suffered from gender-based violence but not to the same extent as Bosniaks. Bosnian Croat and Bosniak forces also committed gender-based crimes against women during the war, but it was relatively less compared to Bosnian Serb forces.
Gagović, Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač, and Novislav Đajić, detained and systematically raped women as part of the broader “ethnic cleansing” campaign. Bosnian Serb forces would also impregnate women to victimize and humiliate them (Kaufman and Williams 2004). Unfortunately, Bosnian Serb forces were not the only actors to commit gender-based violence. Peacekeepers were also accused of sexual violence and misconduct against local Bosnian women (Sion 2009; Rosul-Gajić 2016).

Women’s Participation in the Peace Process

The prevalence of gender-based violence created the need for women’s participation in the peacebuilding process, but the IC was slow to include gender issues. In Bosnia, approximately 40 women’s organizations remained active during the war, yet none received a seat at the table during the peace process (Hunt and Posa 2001). In other words, women remained absent during the entirety of the DPA’s formation, and the DPA itself did not mention gender at all. There were no provisions for equal rights or gender-based discrimination (Pupavac 2005; Björkdahl 2012; Byrne and McCulloch 2012).

The number of women elected into parliament also plummeted in the 1996 elections, and women found themselves on the outskirts of the public sphere compared to pre-war Bosnia (Pupavac 2005; Björkdahl 2012). In general, women had lower levels of agency and participation after the war than during the pre-war period (Kaufman and Williams 2004; Pupavac 2005; Björkdahl 2012). This idea of women having less agency has been reaffirmed in literature that says women have unique opportunities to advance their statuses in post-conflict societies but often “have difficulties sustaining their wartime gains in terms of freedom, autonomy, and agency in peacetime” (Björkdahl 2012).
To explain the importance of women during the peace process and the effects of the lack of women’s participation in Bosnia, Valerie M. Hudson often cites the example of when former U.S. President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, and First Lady Hillary Clinton traveled to Bosnia for meetings with local leaders in 1997. While in Bosnia, First Lady Clinton met with women activists while President Clinton, Albright and Berger met with newly elected politicians. Hudson notes that the first lady left her meeting feeling energized and excited about the future prospects of Bosnia while the latter three felt more ominous (Hunt and Posa 2001; Hudson and Leidl 2015). It is examples like these that make it impossible to wonder if the outcomes of the DPA—and peacebuilding process—could have been different if women were included.

UNSCR 1325 and Public Awareness of Women’s Rights

It wasn’t until after the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and pressure from women’s advocacy networks that gender became part of the conversation (Pupavac 2005; Rosul-Gajić 2016). A new sense of activism has grown within Bosnia, and Bosnian women have used UNSCR 1325 as an “instrument to legitimize their demands for effectively incorporating gender perspectives and women’s rights into conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building” (Rosul-Gajić 2016, 149). Public awareness of women’s rights and their role in the peacebuilding process has increased within the political sphere thanks to UNSCR 1325 (Rosul-Gajić 2016).

Under the OHR, the Gender Co-ordination Group, Gender Center of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Gender Center of Republika Srpska were also created (Pupavac 2005; Byrne and McCulloch 2012).12 In addition, the Law on Gender Equality was passed in 2003, and the OHR and OSCE established a Women in Politics program (Pupavac 2005; Byrne

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12 The Gender Co-ordination Group includes representatives from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), and other smaller organizations.
and McCulloch 2012). Electoral rules were also adapted to require 30 percent of electoral lists to include women (Pupavac 2005). In 2010, a National Action Plan to tackle gender-based violence and include more gender-sensitive reforms was created.

Furthermore, NGOs have been relatively successful at providing safe spaces for women and advancing women’s rights in post-conflict Bosnia (Rosul-Gajić 2016). Cynthia Simmons (2007) has found that gender-based NGOs have been two-fold in the peacebuilding process. NGOs that are operated and run by women have been successful in helping other women feel more empowered, and women who seek support from gender-based NGOs have found them to provide a sense of comfort and assistance (Simmons 2007). The rise of “political NGOs” has also been growing in Bosnia and could increase the number of women involved in the public sphere (Simmons 2007).

The Women’s Court for the Former Yugoslavia

One of the most recent developments in the WPS field was perhaps the Women’s Court for the former Yugoslavia that occurred in Sarajevo in 2015. Unlike a regular court system, the Women’s Court for the former Yugoslavia did not have the jurisdiction to legally prosecute individuals for crimes during the war but instead provided women a platform to discuss wartime crimes against them (O’Reilly 2016). It was a 4-day event and featured testimonies on gender-based violence during the war from 36 women who lived in the six republics; women presented to an audience of more than 500 people (O’Reilly 2016). Protests and symbols were also used throughout the conference to commemorate the hardships that women faced during the Bosnian War. The Women’s Court for the former Yugoslavia was a new way to advance the WPS agenda and reconcile the local and international models (O’Reilly 2016).

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13 Political NGOs seek to affect government policy, increase political participation, and raise awareness on key issues.
Future Challenges to the WPS Agenda in Bosnia

While Bosnia’s commitment to the inclusion of women has been positive on paper, it has had limited success in practice. This is because most of the aforementioned gender-based agencies or reforms still come from the outside or IC. Vanessa Pupacav (2005) cites that:

“International organizations were closely involved in drafting the gender equality law at every stage, so much that even its style reflects how the draft provisions spent much of their time being formulated in the English language rather than the language of the country” (5).

Women still lack the agency to fully participate in the political process, and they do not receive strong support from the government or local Bosnians (Rosul-Gajić 2016). In addition, women who suffered from sexual violence during war and who have high levels of trauma are more likely to feel disempowered and less likely to be able to move on from the past (Parent 2016). Fear of retaliation, limited opportunities, and social exclusion have all contributed to low levels of political advocacy among women in Bosnia (Björkdahl 2012).

Lastly, one of the major challenges to the WPS agenda in Bosnia is the prevalence of human trafficking and forced prostitution. After the war, illegal activities, which included the trafficking of persons, increased due to poor economic conditions (Rosul-Gajić 2015). The Bosnian government has been slow to enact anti-trafficking laws. This is problematic because it shows that gender-based violence is still prevalent and that the roots of the problem are deeply ingrained in Bosnian society. The human trafficking problem can make women feel more marginalized and disempowered to participate in the public sphere.

Overall, women’s participation in the peacebuilding process has varied over time, but it has generally remained low. Although inclusion of women has increased on the grassroots NGOs level recently, it has not transformed into higher levels of the state. Women still make up small
percentages of government positions, and international and local actors do not consult women regularly to include them in the process.

**Local Legitimacy in Bosnia**

Local Bosnians generally view IOs like the UN negatively. The low levels of legitimacy and distrust of the IC stem from the UN’s failures during the war and on the IC’s broader views of intervention during conflict (Stewart 2006). As Bosnia deteriorated in the early 1990s, Bosnians, especially Bosniaks, had high expectations that the IC would intervene, prevent conflict, and protect civilians; however, these hopes were not met in practice. Even within the US, the White House and various departments could not come to consensus on US-Bosnia policy (Gow 1997d). The IC’s inability to reach a decision resulted in confusion and ambiguity. In the early days of the conflict, Izetbegović called on the UN to provide peacekeeping forces but was met with resistance, and Bosnians found themselves unable to rely on the IC for support.

The second challenge that the IC faced in establishing legitimacy was on the ground through UNPROFOR and other international agencies. UNPROFOR peacekeepers mostly associated with ARBiH and Bosniak civilians, who believed that the UN was there to help their “side” (Johansson 1997). When Bosniaks discovered that UNPROFOR peacekeepers were supposed to remain impartial, they became upset and distrustful of UN forces. Swedish peacekeepers who were part of UNPROFOR have cited “negative experiences” with Bosniak civilians as the war progressed, which Eva Johansson (1997) attributes to a lack of international legitimacy. In contrast, Serbian civilians viewed UNPROFOR as being biased towards Bosniaks and Croats; they argued that the UN and IC were anti-Serb and viewed Serbia as the aggressor. The IC’s legitimacy and reputation in Bosnia especially dropped after UNPROFOR’s failure to prevent the Srebrenica massacre and the NATO air intervention towards the end of the war.
Local Bosnians viewed UNPROFOR as not intervening enough, and the air campaign against Serb forces as too interventionist and militarily robust (Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014). Furthermore, the outcomes of the DPA significantly reduced international legitimacy by not giving local actors a say in the decisions made (Stewart 2006; Kappler 2013).

In more recent times, external states like Serbia and Russia have impacted negative perceptions of the Western-dominated IC in Bosnia. This is apparent in the discussions of membership into NATO and the EU between local politicians and Bosnians. Some Bosnian politicians view membership into NATO and the EU as a long-term strategic, geopolitical advantage, and they have set Bosnia on the track to joining both (Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014).

To become a member of the NATO alliance, Bosnia has been participating in the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 2006 (Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014). While Bosnia has been undergoing reforms including dissolving the OHR to join these organizations, Serbia and Russia have been able to influence local perceptions about the benefits and drawbacks of these organizations. For example, they can facilitate the narrative that NATO and the EU are too interventionist and draw on the Bosnian intervention as proof (Turčalo and Kapidžić 2014).

In general, Bosnia has had low levels of local legitimacy, which negatively affected IC’s ability to carry out peacebuilding activities effectively and efficiently.

**Bosnia in its Current State**

Clearly, peacebuilding in Bosnia has been met with many challenges. While the IC has achieved preventing Bosnia from relapsing into conflict, it has not been successful in addressing the root causes of the conflict, specifically the underlying ethnic tensions and divisions within the country. It is evident that all three sides continue to hold distinct views of what happened during the war and that cooperation, particularly on the national level, has been limited. The
guilty verdict of Mladic in November 2017 emphasizes how Bosnians remain divided. While Bosniaks were generally relieved with the verdict and felt like justice had finally been served, Serbs claimed that the tribunal was biased (Borger 2017). Some Serbs even continue to describe Mladic as a war hero and deny the atrocities committed against Bosniaks (Borger 2017).

Furthermore, Bosnia suffers from extreme political gridlock and economic stagnation, and political elites have little political will to address many of these problems due to widespread corruption. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that real progress will be made in addressing the everyday needs of Bosnians if there is not serious reconciliation between ethnic groups. Despite Bosnia’s challenges, it remains a potential EU candidate country. It will be important to watch if the accession process and Bosnia’s potential integration into the EU will impact political elites’ desire to make changes to Bosnia’s governance systems.
Chapter 4 Peacebuilding in Cambodia

Cambodia, a country located in Southeast Asia, is home to approximately 15.9 million people, the majority of whom identify as Khmer or descendants from the Angkor Empire (Central Intelligence Agency 2017b). The country has had a tumultuous history of authoritarianism, civil war, genocide, and intervention. Cambodia was historically part of French Indochina but gained independence in 1953 under Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Sihanouk served as Prime Minister and then Head of State until 1970 when he was ousted by a military coup and replaced with the Khmer Rouge in 1975. The reign of the Khmer Rouge—under which over 1.5 million Cambodians died—ended in 1978 following the Vietnamese intervention, but fighting continued until the signing of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, also known as the Paris Agreements, in 1991 (Central Intelligence Agency 2017b). After the signing of the Paris Agreements, the UN established the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) in 1991 and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992. In 2003, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid tribunal, was created to bring justice to the crimes committed by Khmer Rouge officials. Today, the UN and other policymakers have cited Cambodia as a successful example of modern, multidimensional peacebuilding. However, Cambodia continues to face many challenges such as low levels of political freedom, poverty, widespread corruption, and environmental degradation.

The Cambodian Civil War & Genocide Under the Khmer Rouge

Cambodia was originally part of French Indochina, a region that includes what is now present-day Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, but gained independence under Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1953. Although Sihanouk originally received popular support following Cambodia’s independence, he became known as an extremely corrupt and autocratic leader
(Keller 2005). From 1953 to 1970, Cambodia suffered from widespread corruption, poverty, and inequality under his reign (Keller 2005). Sihanouk’s wide unpopularity among Cambodians created domestic unrest and resulted in a military coup, which installed Lon Nol to power, in 1970.

Civil war then plagued the country from 1970 to 1975, and a group called the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), more commonly known as the Khmer Rouge, emerged. At this time, the Second Indochina War, or Vietnam War, also began to spill over into Cambodia, and the US believed that Cambodia was aiding the North Vietnamese. Subsequently, the US began bombing Cambodia along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, which caused many Cambodian deaths and contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge. Lon Nol was overthrown by the Khmer Rouge, and the state was renamed “Democratic Kampuchea” in 1975 (Keller 2005).

The Khmer Rouge was led by Pol Pot and is widely known as being responsible for the Cambodian genocide from 1975 to 1979. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge dramatically altered Cambodian society during this period and wanted to rid the country of “foreign” influences. Pol Pot placed significant emphasis on agriculture, and he sought to collectivize the country, similarly to Maoist China (Chandler et al 2005). During this period, the Khmer Rouge forced all Cambodians who lived in urban cities into the countryside to work in labor camps. Thousands of Cambodians were tortured and executed; many Vietnamese and other minorities were also targeted, killed and buried in mass graves (Human Rights Watch Asia 1995; Chandler et al 2005). Tuol Sleng or Security Prison 21 (S-21), now home to the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, in Phnom Penh became the most notorious execution center (Chandler et al 2005). In addition, the Khmer Rouge and Cambodian government relied on land mines and other improvised
explosive devices (IED) to target civilians; the Cambodian government also used land mines to isolate and target Khmer Rouge soldiers (Human Rights Watch Asia 1995).

**The Fall of the Khmer Rouge & Vietnamese Intervention**

The Khmer Rouge became more powerful during the 1970s, and neighboring Vietnam became increasingly fearful of its security. As a result, both countries—originally allies—became suspicious of one another’s intentions, and their forces began to fight in skirmishes along the border (Chandler et al 2005). The Khmer Rouge later preemptively attacked Vietnam, and in 1979, Vietnamese forces crossed into Cambodia, ending the genocide and overthrowing the Khmer Rouge (Chandler et al 2005). Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge retreated from the capital of Phnom Penh into Thailand, and Vietnam installed communist leader Hun Sen (Keller 2005). Cambodia was renamed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and later the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989.

Following the installation of Hun Sen, four predominant factions emerged in Cambodia. The factions included the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party, which became what is currently the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led by Hun Sen; the National Union Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), a non-communist party led by Sihanouk; the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPLNF); and the PDK or Khmer Rouge (Chandler et al 2005; Keller 2005). Each faction also had its own respective military: the Cambodian People’s Armed Forces (CPAF), National Army of Independent Kampuchea (ANS), Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), and the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). The four factions remained very divided throughout the 1980s and sought for control over the government. FUNCINPEC, KPLNF and

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14 It is also commonly referred to as the Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neuter, pacifique et coopératif (French).
PDK eventually formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to oppose Hun Sen’s CPP following pressure from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China (Keller 2005; Widyono 2015b).

**Peacebuilding in Cambodia**

While the Vietnamese intervention ended the genocide and removed the Khmer Rouge from power, Cambodia still faced many challenges. Fighting and guerilla warfare between factions continued, and thousands of refugees fled the country into neighboring Thailand. Most Cambodians and international actors did not support Hun Sen and the CPP, which was emphasized in the unwillingness of the IC to recognize the new government at the UN (Keller 2005). In addition, the government struggled to improve the declining economy, which was caused by decreases in aid and support from the Soviet Union and the US-led economic boycott of Cambodia (Chandler et al 2005; Keller 2005). In 1989, Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia after repeated pressure from the IC. The withdrawal of Vietnam sparked the signing of the Paris Agreements and the robust peacekeeping operation known as UNTAC. The rest of the chapter will examine the successes and failures of the Paris Agreements, UNAMIC, UNTAC, and the ECCC. It will also look at how the six independent variables relate to the peacebuilding process in Cambodia.

**The 1991 Paris Agreements**

The UN took a leading role in the Cambodian peace process, and the outcome was the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, or Paris Agreements, which were signed in 1991. The Paris Agreements were comprehensive, incorporating provisions for elections, rule of law, human rights, and refugees and IDPs (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994; Keller 2005). It gave the UN an unprecedented role in the peace
process and created a transitional authority, UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which would oversee Cambodia’s transitional period until elections could occur, as recommended by Sihanouk. This gave UNTAC significant authority over the future of Cambodia during the postwar period.

The Paris Agreements also created the Supreme National Council (SNC), a power-sharing body composed of 12 members—six members from the CGDK and six members from SOC (Keller 2005; Widyono 2015b). The SNC was led by Sihanouk and would advise UNTAC on matters relating to post-conflict Cambodia. Although the SNC played an important role in the Cambodian peace process, the SNC was mostly symbolic in that it signified Cambodian independence and sovereignty; UNTAC held ultimate authority and made binding decisions according to the Paris Agreements if the SNC failed to reach consensus (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994; Widyono 2015a).

Cambodians felt generally positive about the Paris Agreements and the deployment of UNTAC because it indicated the end of the war and “independence” from foreign powers (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994; Mersiades 2005). The main challenge of the Paris Agreements was the unwillingness of the four main parties to cooperate. It is widely accepted among policymakers and scholars that the four factions only signed the Paris Agreements out of “exhaustion” and with pressure from Vietnam and China (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994; Mersiades 2005). The four parties did not agree over the future of the state and still largely desired government control, so the UN signed separate agreements with each faction (Mersiades 2005). This created discrepancies and tension between Cambodian parties and the IC on the ground because each party continued to compete for the advantage; the UN also held little bargaining power over the parties (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994). The Khmer Rouge was the
least satisfied because they felt the Paris Agreements targeted them specifically and that the IC was not neutral; the Khmer Rouge eventually withdrew from the Paris Agreements in June 1992 (Mersiades 2005).

**The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia**

The most significant outcome of the Paris Agreements was the creation of the transitional authority called UNTAC, which was seen, at the time, to be the UN’s most ambitious and complex peace operation. However, the complexity of the operation would mean that there would be a considerable gap in time between the signing of the Paris Agreements and UNTAC deployment (Keller 2005; Widyono 2015a). As a result, the Security Council, with the guidance of Prince Sihanouk, decided to create a smaller contingent known as the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to uphold the ceasefire and prepare for UNTAC (Keller 2005; Mersiades 2005; Widyono 2015a). The UNSC passed Resolution 717 in October 1991 and mandated UNAMIC to:

> “assist the four Cambodian parties to maintain their ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment and deployment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and to initiate mine-awareness training among the civilian population” (UNSCR 717).

At its peak, UNAMIC had 1,090 personnel on the ground in March 1992 (Widyono 2015).

UNAMIC was somewhat successful in achieving its objectives. UNAMIC personnel successfully de-mined several important areas and began rebuilding infrastructure (Widyono 2015a). This enabled UNTAC’s Electoral Planning Unit to deploy early and begin demographic surveys of the region, which contributed to the high voter turnout in the 1993 elections (Widyono 2015a). However, UNAMIC’s authority was “ill-defined,” and the contingent did not receive the “necessary seriousness” by the Security Council that it needed to be successful (Widyonoa 2015, 368). UNAMIC’s small size made it impossible to uphold the ceasefire and oversee all
Cambodian factions. This resulted in a vacuum and violent protests between groups, which UNAMIC forces failed to prevent (Mersiades 2005). In addition, UNAMIC personnel were unable to communicate well with local Cambodians due to language barriers (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994; Widyono 2015a). UNAMIC remained on the ground and oversaw Cambodia for significantly longer than planned because UNTAC was also late in deploying.

The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAC finally deployed in March 1992. More than 2.8 billion dollars in aid went into the peace operation, and approximately 15,000 military troops and 7,000 civilian personnel were deployed (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994). Yasushi Akashi and Lieutenant-General John Sanderson were appointed to serve as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Military Commander, respectively (Widyono 2015b). As mentioned previously, UNTAC was given unprecedented legal authority on the ground to oversee and implement the Paris Agreements. There were seven main components of UNTAC: military, civilian police (CIVPOL), civil administration, human rights, refugee repatriation, rehabilitation, and electoral (Widyono 2015b).

Repatriation of Refugees

UNTAC is largely seen as a success by the IC, especially regarding repatriation of refugees and elections. When UNTAC first deployed, over 370,000 refugees and 200,000 IDPs were living in camps in Thailand (Widyono 2015b). UNTAC was able to coordinate with UNTAC military personnel, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Cambodian Red Cross so that refugees could move back into Cambodia (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994). Most of the refugees and IDPs returned to Cambodia before the elections in 1993 (Keller 2005; Widyono 2015b).
Elections in 1993

The organization of fair elections in Cambodia has been declared UNTAC’s largest success. In the months leading up to the election, the Khmer Rouge threatened and intimidated people into not voting, and attacked provinces like Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, Kompong Speu, and Siem Reap (Akashi 1994). This caused the Security Council to become particularly concerned, and the IC watched carefully as more than “200 international staff as well as 400 UN volunteers who in turn supervised 8,000 polling teams of 56,000 Cambodian personnel” facilitated and supervised the process (Widyono 2015b, 400). Despite the threats made by the Khmer Rouge, more than 20 political parties, including FUNCINPEC (led by Sihanouk’s son, Norodom Ranariddh) and CPP, registered in the elections (Amer 1993). The Khmer Rouge’s political party, the National Unity of Cambodia Party (NUCP), did not register (Amer 1993). The KPNLF registered two parties: the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Amer 1993).

The elections were held from May 23rd to 28th, and approximately 90 percent of Cambodians voted (Akashi 1994). None of the parties received the majority, but FUNCINPEC, followed by the CPP, won the most seats (Amer 1993; Akashi 1994). The CPP originally rejected the outcome of the elections but accepted the results after a coalition government between FUNCINPEC and CPP was formed. At this time, an Interim Joint Administration, or Provisional National Government, was also created to draft a new constitution (Amer 1993). The success of elections in Cambodia is often attributed to Chief Electoral Officer Reginald Austin, who also served in the same position in Namibia (Widyono 2015b). Austin’s experience in Namibia allowed him to more effectively coordinate military and civilian components (Widyono 2015b). Many of the UN staff members had also served in Namibia and had experience
managing elections in transitional states (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994). In addition, UNTAC placed an emphasis on finding volunteers, experts and specialists who were familiar with Cambodian culture, history and language (Akashi 1994; Widyono 2015b).

UNTAC’s Limitations and the Withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the Paris Agreements

While UNTAC successfully carried out elections and repatriation of refugees, it suffered from late deployment, which negatively affected the ability of UN personnel to carry out its objectives. The Secretariat was inadequately prepared for such a complex and large mission like UNTAC and did not have the necessary experience or staff to carry out the operation on the ground. In addition, the UN became more preoccupied with the former Yugoslavia during this period, so the Cambodia mission was given insufficient attention (Widyono 2015b). Bureaucratic procedures and lack of information also slowed down the process (Lee Kim and Metrikas 1997). Thus, several components of UNTAC were ultimately postponed in deployment, creating a power vacuum; when all components were finally deployed at the end of 1992, serious violations to the ceasefire and Paris Agreements had already occurred (Doyle and Suntharalingam 1994; Widyon 2015b). The late deployment of UNAMIC and UNTAC greatly affected the future of the mission.

The mission also failed to meet one of its key objectives: disarmament and demobilization of factions. The Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC) was primarily responsible for the removal of land mines in Cambodia, but it did not have the international financial assistance to adequately remove all land mines and unexploded ordnances (UXO) (Human Rights Watch Asia 1995). The inability of the IC to disarm all factions has also been widely viewed as the result of the withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the Paris Agreements and lack of cooperation between all parties.
The Khmer Rouge’s discontent with the peace process stemmed from several circumstances, which were expressed during multiple Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) meetings (Amer 1993). However, the Khmer Rouge’s major complaints were that UNAMIC failed to prevent violent protests against their delegates and did not provide adequate security for their leaders (Amer 1993; Mersiades 2005). The Khmer Rouge noted at one MMWG meeting that UNAMIC troops were deployed at all parties’ headquarters except for theirs (Amer 1993). Once the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the Paris Agreements, they returned to violence and did not allow UNTAC personnel to access their land for de-mining purposes (Amer 1993). The UN tried diplomatic options but ultimately responded with targeted sanctions against the leaders of the Khmer Rouge; neither diplomacy nor sanctions were effective (Amer 1993). Because the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, other factions also refused, and fighting did not officially cease until 1997. Other commonly noted limitations of UNTAC include variation in staff quality, especially in CIVPOL, absence of a functioning justice system, ineffective communication between UN Headquarters and practitioners on the ground, and unclear mandates (Akashi 1994; Lee Kim and Metrikas 1997; Widyono 2015b). Furthermore, once UNTAC withdrew from Cambodia, Hun Sen and the CPP launched a military coup against FUNCINPEC in 1997; Hun Sen remains in power to this day (Chandler et al 2005).

**Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Cambodia**

*The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia*

The Khmer Rouge committed various crimes and human rights abuses, killing approximately 1.5 million people, from 1975 to 1979 (Central Intelligence Agency 2017b). Although these abuses were widely documented, the IC was slow to encourage the creation of an international tribunal in Cambodia when compared to other states like the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. This is largely because Cambodians had little interest in establishing a war crimes tribunal and favored national unity (Keller 2005). In addition, most citizens and elites had connections or were affiliated with the Khmer Rouge, so they did not believe that forming a tribunal would be productive to moving forward as a country (Keller 2005).

Despite the emphasis on national unity, Cambodian government officials and the UN ultimately decided to establish a tribunal and began negotiations in late 1997 after fighting between parties had finally ceased and calls for the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders developed among Cambodians and the IC. The outcome was the establishment of a hybrid tribunal called the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2003. The ECCC is based in Cambodia and has domestic and international jurisdiction. It is also composed of both Cambodian and UN personnel; for example, in the Extraordinary Chambers, there are three national and two international judges, and in the Appeals Chamber, there are four national and three international judges (Keller 2005). The ECCC is the first major hybrid tribunal and is seen as a compromise between Cambodian officials, who wanted a national tribunal, and the UN, who sought for an international one (Keller 2005).

The ECCC has four major cases. The first, Case 001, prosecuted Kaing Guek Eav (known as Duch), who managed the Tuol Sleng or S-21 prison in Phnom Penh, and the ECCC found him guilty of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Accords (ECCC 2006; Herman 2013). Case 002 charged Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary (deceased), and Ieng Thirith (deceased), but the verdict has not been reached and is expected to be announced sometime in 2018 (ECCC 2018). Information on Case 003 and Case 004 is mostly confidential, since they were only announced in 2009, but the cases are expected to prosecute Meas Muth (Case 003) and Yim Tith, Im Chaem and Ao An (Case 004) (ECCC 2018).
Victims’ Rights and the ECCC

The most notable aspect of the ECCC has been its attempts to increase survivors’ participation throughout the reconciliation process. All too often, tribunals focus exclusively on perpetrators, and victims are left feeling sidelined and disappointed. Instead, the ECCC seeks to facilitate a more “victim-oriented justice” by providing survivors with a sense of agency and empowerment (Killean and Moffett 2017). The main mechanism for their participation has been the granting of “civil party status” during the trials, as outlined in the ECCC’s Internal Rules (Herman 2013). The purpose of civil party status is that “victims can participate in criminal proceedings by supporting the prosecution and…seek collective and moral reparations” (Herman 2013, 464).

The granting of civil party status is based on evidence that has found that trauma survivors’ participation can be therapeutic, but it has had mixed success in practice (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017). In Cambodia, victims have been able to give eyewitness testimonies and provide important contextual information on the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017). Victims’ testimonies have shed new insight into other crimes such as the prevalence of forced marriage under the Khmer Rouge (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017). Most importantly, victims’ testimonies have been able to adequately show the human impact of the crimes committed. The ECCC has allowed victims to tell their stories through “Victim Impact Hearings” and “Statements of Suffering.” During Victim Impact Hearings, two Lead Co-Lawyers present evidence of suffering, while victims are granted the chance to speak uninterrupted during Statements of Suffering (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017).

Despite the benefits of victim participation and testimony, there are also significant drawbacks including re-traumatization, unreliable or false testimony, misrepresentation of
victims’ interests, and inefficient trials (Herman 2013; Ciorciari and Heindel 2017; Killean and Moffett 2017). In the case of re-traumatization, survivors must confront the accused, which may reopen painful wounds and memories and lead to symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017). The effects of re-traumatization were largely exhibited during Cases 001 and 002. There are several noted instances where victims or survivors of loved ones were unable to testify due to emotional distress (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017). The ECCC has since placed greater emphasis on psychological counseling through the creation of a Victims Unit, which was renamed the Victim Support Section Team (VSS) in 2007, and a Witness and Experts Support Unit (WESU) (Herman 2013; Killean and Moffett 2017). While the VSS and WESU were created to assist survivors, they are under-resourced and lack direction due to frequent organizational changes (Herman 2013). Johanna Herman (2013) argues that the VSS could be a great platform to bring in local CSOs and NGOs, but that it has failed in forming a coherent strategy to streamline communication and coordinate activities. Instead, the space has been filled by the Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO), an international NGO that provides mental healthcare and psychosocial support; the TPO and many other NGOs have been instrumental in supporting survivors (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017).

**Other Limitations to the ECCC**

In addition to re-traumatization, the introduction of victims’ participation as civil parties has naturally generated challenges, and there have been multiple amendments to the Internal Rules. Critics have argued that the revisions have lowered the participatory rights of survivors. For example, survivors must now be collectively represented by Lead Co-Lawyers. This is because the number of survivors willing to testify increased so greatly from Case 001 to Case 002. In Case 001, four main groups, representing 90 civil parties, participated in the process,
while in Case 002, the number increased to thousands (Herman 2013). The ECCC found it was nearly impossible, due to time constraints and legal procedures, for everyone to be able to testify and share their accounts (Herman 2013; Killean and Moffett 2017). The Internal Rules now stipulates a time limit on how long parties can speak (Herman 2013). Furthermore, the ECCC has faced criticism from survivors over the implementation of non-judicial measures and reparations programs (Herman 2013; Ciorciari and Heindel 2017). Survivors have been left largely disappointed that they have not received the appropriate reparations, if any at all, that they were promised (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017).

*The Path to National Reconciliation in Cambodia*

While the purpose of the ECCC was to promote national reconciliation in Cambodia, it has struggled to do so on a grassroots level. The government, still ruled by Hun Sen and the CPP, lacks the resources and political will to address the problem. Instead, NGOs have, perhaps, played the most significant role in promoting national reconciliation. Mneesha Gellman (2008) examines the Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID) and finds that they have been successful in facilitating spaces for reconciliation but have not been able to make the structural changes that could occur through a national reconciliation process.

Paternalism and authority-based governance has also made national reconciliation challenging (Gellman 2008). For instance, younger Cambodians and NGOs “face formidable challenges in rewriting Cambodia’s oppressive communication code that continues to limit the creative space for dialogue that is available to civil-society actors” (Gellman 2008, 47). Mneesha Gellman (2008) further argues that increasing public participation, social trust, and conflict resolution capacity would be helpful in promoting national reconciliation and believes that CSOs can provide an important space for dialogue and reconciliation.
Socioeconomic Conditions & Economic Reconstruction in Cambodia

The Economy Under Sihanouk and During the War

Before we examine the economic reconstruction of Cambodia, it is important to briefly understand the socioeconomic conditions prior to and during the war. Cambodia’s economy has historically been centrally planned, and agriculture, particularly rice and rubber, comprised the largest sector (Kirk 1971). The 1960s, under Sihanouk, brought a period of steep economic decline, and rice exports dropped; this contributed to the rise of the Khmer Rouge (Kirk 1971). During the war, socioeconomic conditions were also extremely poor. Many Cambodians suffered from starvation, and the economy was in disarray. Cambodia also had “no central administration, no currency, and no electricity or transportation services” (Than 1992, 271).

Economic Reconstruction in Cambodia

When the Paris Agreements were signed, the economy of Cambodia was left devastated from war, economic sanctions, and cuts in aid. As a result, the economic reconstruction of Cambodia became a priority for the IC, and the IC invested significant monetary and technical resources towards Cambodia’s economic reconstruction. In 1991, the IC signed the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, which outlined Cambodia’s reconstruction process. In 1992, 19 governments pledged approximately $880 million dollars in aid at the Tokyo Conference (Than 1992). The International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), which would be chaired by Japan and oversee the reconstruction process, was also created at this time (Than 1992). Following these events, foreign investment and aid increased substantially, and international NGOs swarmed to Cambodia in an attempt to revive its economy.
Throughout Cambodia’s economic reconstruction, the IC remained committed to building a market economy. The IMF and World Bank served as leaders in Cambodia’s economic reconstruction. The World Bank put forth five priority areas in Cambodia: health, education, agriculture, transport, and public utilities (Than 1992). The IC also worked with the Cambodian government and National Assembly to adopt a national budget, finance laws, and tax collection system, and to modernize Cambodia’s banking system (St. John 1995). The Cambodian government also concentrated on increasing trade with regional partners and eliminating obstacles for FDI (St. John 1995).

Today, Cambodia has seen significant economic growth, which is viewed as being a result of the economic reforms during the 1990s. From 1994 to 2015, Cambodia’s average growth has been 7.6% (World Bank 2017). Poverty levels have also dramatically fallen, primary education rates have increased, and maternal mortality rates have decreased (World Bank 2017).

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Table 3 GDP in Cambodia, 1960-2016 (Current US$). Data Source: World Bank and OECD
The Political Culture of Cambodia

While Cambodia has had significant economic growth, the political culture of Cambodia continues to pose challenges (St. John 1995). Corruption is widespread, and much of the wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few. Elites have much more access to land and natural resources than ordinary citizens (Öjendal and Siyhouc 2015). Naazneen H. Barma (2012) has found that domestic elites have failed to distribute economic rents and foreign aid, instead co-opting the system and creating patronage networks to ensure their holds on power. She argues that “elite predation has replaced outright conflict as the main avenue through which Cambodians experience insecurity and vulnerability in everyday life” (Barma 2012, 282).

A 2016 Global Witness report entitled “Hostile Takeover: The Corporate Empire of Cambodia’s Ruling Family” came to similar conclusions. The report finds that Hun Sen and his family holds key positions in every sphere and have links to large international corporations such as Apple, Visa, Procter & Gamble, and Honda (Global Witness 2016). It estimates that Hun Sen and his immediate family have a listed capital of more than $200 million US dollars from more than 114 domestic firms (Global Witness 2016). The concentration of wealth by the Hun Sen regime has been exacerbated by corruption at all levels of government. It is important for IOs that continue to operate in Cambodia’s economy to do better at making sure economic reforms benefit ordinary citizens.

Local Ownership & Peacebuilding on the Ground in Cambodia

The IC has been somewhat successful in including local actors in the peacebuilding process. NGOs have played the largest role in Cambodia’s reconstruction process, and UNTAC made concrete efforts to recruit local Cambodians. Particularly, Prince Sihanouk played an important role in providing guidance for UNTAC leadership. However, the main challenge of the
inclusion of local actors during the peacebuilding process has been Cambodia’s reliance on foreign assistance. Cambodia does not have a strong history of civil society and engagement, and most local NGOs and CSOs were only formed in the 1990s (Dosch 2012). This means that local NGOs and CSOs lacked the capacity, resources, and experience to operate effectively in post-conflict Cambodia. Many local NGOs continue to rely on foreign assistance to remain in operation.

One of the benefits of foreign assistance has been that the IC can provide expertise to local staff members. In 68 interviews and group discussions with international and Cambodian NGO volunteers, staff, and scholars, Jörn Dosch (2012) consistently found that:

“[Cambodians] believe that although the expertise and capacity of national Cambodian NGO workers has markedly increased over the past years, for the foreseeable future foreign experts are needed for capacity building and skills transfer, and cannot yet be replaced by local experts or other instruments on a large scale” (1073).

However, Dosch (2012) also found that Cambodian NGOs frequently implement internationally-developed projects, and this leaves out the room for local input. Because the funding comes from outside Cambodia, the IC largely sets the agenda for domestic projects, especially in the area of transitional justice (Dosch 2012).

Moreover, the IC has been noted to only consult a smaller group of elites, who benefit more from international reforms, rather than ordinary citizens. Most of the reforms have been at the national level rather than the local one, and the IC has placed more of an emphasis on establishing democracy and a market economy instead of addressing Cambodians’ everyday needs (Öjendal and Siyhouch 2015). A poignant example of the emphasis on national-level reforms has been noted regarding elections. Local elections in Cambodia were not held until 2002, or 9 years after the first 1993 national elections (Öjendal and Siyhouch 2015).
The IC’s land distribution policies and programs also serve as another example of how local Cambodians were often left out of the peace process. Agriculture is the largest industry in Cambodia, so “land had been considered not only as a means of maintaining one’s own livelihood but also as a way of securing economic growth and national food security” (Lee 2015, 1439). Unfortunately, Cambodia lacked the administrative and legal capacity to redistribute and register land; most rural areas went unregistered, or local elites and military commanders kept the land for themselves (Lee 2015). Local Cambodians did not have knowledge of land distribution policies and the concept of private property was unfamiliar, because they had never encountered it before (Lee 2015). Historically, village chiefs settled territorial disputes, and ordinary citizens felt land registration was “an unnecessary and expensive process and therefore decided not to participate in it” (Lee 2015, 1444). The IC did not understand why ordinary Cambodians refused to participate in the process. In general, local actors’ participation has been highest in the NGO sector but has been low in the political and economic spheres.

**Women, Peace & Security in Cambodia**

Literature has consistently shown that women experience conflict differently than men and that they can offer different perspectives during the peacebuilding process. The case of Cambodia highlights the differences of women’s experiences during war and the need for women’s participation after conflict. The role of women before, during and after the conflict is extremely complex. The sections below will address some of the issues that women faced during and after the conflict.

*Cambodian Women During the War*

To begin, Cambodian women’s experiences were vastly different depending on their socioeconomic status, residency, and ethnicity. While a large portion of Cambodian women fled
to Thailand as refugees, some remained in Cambodia because they did not have the access or resources to leave. Many women who remained in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge experienced gender-based violence and were often subjected to forced marriages with Khmer Rouge soldiers (Ciorciari and Heindel 2017). In contrast, some women chose to fight in the war alongside their male counterparts. The CPK, particularly, had a strong presence of women soldiers, which were led by Pol Pot’s wife, Khieu Ponnary (Frieson and Chan 1998). The differences in women’s experiences during the war emphasize the importance of including them in the peacebuilding process.

**Women in the Peacebuilding Process**

Prior to the war, women in Cambodia were largely seen as wives and mothers. They did not receive the same access to education or work as men and did not participate in the political sphere (Whitworth 2004). However, after the war, women compromised more than 60 percent of the Cambodian population because more men died in combat (McGrew et al 2004; Whitworth 2004). This put women in a unique position, making it possible for them to engage in the peacebuilding process and to have an opportunity to contribute to society in ways they had not been able to previously.

**The Role of NGOs in Increasing Women’s Participation**

NGOs were most successful in advocating for women’s rights and increasing women’s participation in the public sphere (Frieson and Chan 1998; McGrew et al 2004; Whitworth 2004). For example, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and Women for Prosperity (WfP) significantly contributed to women’s political participation through targeted information campaigns, which sought to raise awareness of the 1993 election and bring light to the challenges that Cambodian women faced in their everyday lives (Frieson and Chan 1998;
McGrew et al 2004; Whitworth 2004). UNIFEM also held a National Women’s Summit, which was an attempt to increase women’s political participation and boost voter turnout (Whitworth 2004). Lastly, UNIFEM and WfP played important roles in making sure gender equality was codified into the new constitution and creating the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MWVA) (Whitworth 2004).

In addition to advancing women’s political participation, there were also many international and local NGOs that provided education, health, and family support services for Cambodian women. The Project Against Domestic Violence (PADV) administered educational programs about domestic violence and arranged emergency support and housing for victims (Frieson and Chan 1998). Another well-known, local NGO, Khemara, provided literacy classes, health services, and family support to Cambodian women (Frieson and Chan 1998). Although many of these NGOs predominately served women, some—like Gender and Development (GAD)—brought men into the conversations in an attempt to transform societal views and stereotypes regarding gender. GAD created a Cambodian Men’s Network to bring men and women together to discuss and address issues of gender-based violence (McGrew et al 2004).

The overall effect of women’s participation has been positive, and women’s organizations have been successful in providing new opportunities for women to engage in the public sphere. Women have been able to tackle corruption, promote cross-party cooperation and advocate for nonviolent resolution (McGrew et al 2004). However, many of these organizations were largely dependent on international aid and support programs, which were administrated by organizations like US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Asia Foundation. Cultural stereotypes, hierarchy and patronage still existed throughout Cambodian society and remain prevalent to this day (McGrew et al 2004). Despite the fact that “Cambodian women and
girls continue to face unequal access to education, health care, and economic and political opportunities…they are beginning to demand greater protection under the law and greater participation in political affairs” (McGrew et al 2004, 13).

The Rise of Sexual Assault, Prostitution & HIV/AIDS

The major critique of peacekeeping in Cambodia was the rise of sexual assault, prostitution and HIV/AIDS upon the deployment of UNTAC personnel and the failure of the UN to address these issues. These failures of UNTAC negatively impacted the WPS initiatives in Cambodia. There are many documented instances of UNTAC personnel committing various acts of sexual assault and gender-based violence against Cambodian women (McGrew et al 2004; Whitworth 2004). Furthermore, rates of prostitution increased significantly during the time of UNTAC. Women refugees that returned to Cambodia often found themselves less secure, lacking many of the services they were given while living in refugee camps, and many turned to prostitution to sustain themselves and their families (Whitworth 2004). The rise in prostitution also resulted in an increase of HIV/AIDS among Cambodian women (McGrew et al 2004; Whitworth 2004).

The prevalence of sexual misconduct is largely attributed to structural problems within the UN mission. Women were largely left out of the drafting of the Paris Agreements, and they did not hold any high-level positions in UNTAC. Women in military contingents was also so small that the UN Division for the Advancement of Women categorized the presence of women as zero (UN Division for the Advancement of Women 1995; Whitworth 2004). Furthermore, the UN was also slow to address the problem. When questioned about stories of sexual assault and prostitution, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi held a very “boys will be boys” mentality.
The Prevalence of Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking

While women’s participation in the public sphere has increased and been positive for the peace process, women still face many challenges. Gender-based violence, human trafficking, and domestic abuse continue to pose great problems for women (Williams and Palmer 2016). Men rarely receive punishment for their crimes, and the ECCC has been slow to address charges of gender-based violence, sexual assault, and forced marriage (Williams and Palmer 2016). Furthermore, women have lower rates of literacy, are less educated, and receive lower pay than men (Sokunthea and Hawkins 2016). In an article in The Cambodia Daily, Hang Sokunthea and Hannah Hawkins (2016) find that the construction industry, in which Cambodian women make up 30 percent, is particularly known for its pay gap and failure to train women. Finally, the Cambodian government has not made any formal commitments towards UNSCR 1325 or the WPS agenda.

Local Legitimacy in Cambodia

The legitimacy of the IC during the peace process in Cambodia has been mixed. Local Cambodians have generally seen the IC’s involvement, particularly through UNAMIC and UNTAC operations, as being legitimate. This is because the expectation of UNTAC among local Cambodians was to supervise and facilitate elections, which UNTAC successfully did. Until the 1993 elections, Cambodians had not been able to vote since 1972. Elections served as a major source of legitimacy for the IC. However, the IC did lose legitimacy from local Cambodians when UNTAC did not intervene after the Khmer Rouge turned violent and because of the unequal distribution of resources, such as land (Mersiades 2005; Lee 2015).

Comparatively, the IC was viewed as less legitimate among the four parties’ leadership, particularly the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge had especially negative views of the IC and
UNTAC because they felt the IC favored FUNCINPEC (Mersiades 2005). The lack of legitimacy stemmed from various incidents such as the inability of UNAMIC to prevent violent protests against the Khmer Rouge and failure to provide security to Khmer Rouge delegates (Amer 1993). In addition, the Khmer Rouge criticized the presence of Vietnamese in Cambodia because they interpreted the removal of “foreign forces” (as stipulated in the Paris Agreements) as all Vietnamese, not just military forces (Roberts 1998). The lack of local legitimacy culminated with the withdrawal of the Khmer Rouge from the Paris Agreements.

While there are many reasons that contribute to the differences in legitimacy, the overarching dilemma that the IC faced was that each group—local Cambodians, the CPP, Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, and KPLNF—had different expectations of international actors (Mersiades 2005). Michael Mersiades (2005) argues that the failure of the IC to gain legitimacy from the warring factions contributed to its inability to convince Cambodians that democratic rule and governance is necessary for peace. Today, the IC continues to have mixed support in Cambodia. Cambodia’s economic growth has largely been a result of international-led market reforms, but many argue that only few benefit. Many Cambodians, especially in rural communities, continue to live in poverty. Furthermore, Western ideals of democracy and human rights have failed to take form in Cambodia.

**Cambodia in its Current State**

The IC’s peacebuilding efforts in Cambodia can be considered a partial success. It is clear that the Paris Agreements and UNTAC administered fair and free elections in 1993, allowed refugees and IDPs to return to Cambodia, and largely contributed to Cambodia’s economic growth. However, the IC was unsuccessful in the security sector, and Cambodia continues to face challenges, especially regarding de-mining. Most notably, the IC failed to
convince Cambodians of the importance of democratic rule of law. The 2017 Freedom in the World report by Freedom House categorizes Cambodia as “Not Free,” giving the country a score of 6 of 7 on political rights and 5 of 7 on civil liberties (Freedom House 2017).\footnote{Freedom House is an international NGO that ranks freedom in countries using a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (not free).} Hun Sen is one of the longest-serving Prime Ministers in the world and deeply mistrusts the Western nations (Strangio 2017). He is well-known for cracking down on political dissidents, journalists, and CSOs, including one of the last independent newspapers, The Cambodia Daily (Strangio 2017). Corruption remains widespread throughout the government, and Hun Sen relies on a system of patronage and nepotism to remain in power. In recent years, Hun Sen’s control on power has been challenged by younger Cambodians calling for democratic reforms and the opposition leader, Sam Rainsy, President of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), whose party was recently dissolved. As opposition within Cambodia grows, it will be interesting to see if Cambodians will choose political stability or challenge Hun Sen’s authoritarian rule.
Chapter 5 Comparative Analysis and Policy Implications

Chapters 3 and 4 have shown the complexity of the Bosnian and Cambodian conflicts and demonstrated the many challenges of international peacebuilding. This chapter will summarize the case studies presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and examine key similarities, differences and overall trends. It will also address the role of each variable in relation to sustainable peace, evaluate the six hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, and provide policy implications and future areas of study. The following table summarizes the findings of this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Support for Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power-Sharing</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Limited Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Justice Mechanisms</td>
<td>Retributive Justice (ICTY)</td>
<td>Retributive Justice (ECCC)</td>
<td>Not Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Conditions</td>
<td>Medium Improvement</td>
<td>High Improvement</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Ownership</td>
<td>Low Ownership</td>
<td>Medium Ownership</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Participation</td>
<td>Low Participation</td>
<td>Low Participation</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Legitimacy</td>
<td>Low Legitimacy</td>
<td>High Legitimacy</td>
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Sustainable Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia

As mentioned previously, successful peacebuilding is commonly operationalized as whether or not a community has achieved “peace.” In the past, researchers have used negative peace (also referred to as cold peace), or the absence of war, to measure successful peacebuilding. More contemporary studies have used the variable, positive peace, or peace that seeks to eliminate violence and injustice within a society by addressing the root causes of conflict. This type of peace is much more difficult to measure, but it has higher levels of conceptual validity compared to negative peace because most people view peace as more than just the absence of war.
In this study, the dependent variable is sustainable peace, which I define as the restoration of physical security, well-functioning political institutions, equal economic opportunities, protection of human rights, and a sense of community and respect among groups. To achieve sustainable peace, the IC and host government would ideally address the root causes of the previous conflict. Second, the host government would have the necessary institutions, resources, and political climate to address future, domestic challenges and resolve potential conflicts independently of the IC.

Based on the above definition, I believe that both Bosnia and Cambodia should be considered a partial peacebuilding success based on their levels of peacefulness. Bosnia has not experienced a relapse in conflict since the signing of the DPA, and democracy has somewhat taken shape. However, the state continues to suffer from ethnic tensions, political gridlock, and economic stagnation. In contrast, Cambodia is more politically and socially stable, but its government is viewed by many as authoritarian. Hun Sen, the current Prime Minister, has been in power since 1997, and human rights conditions remains poor. Although the interventions have been successful in some ways, they should not be categorized as full peacebuilding successes because both states struggle with one or more aspects of sustainable peace, which negatively affect the everyday functioning of the state.

**Variable 1: Power-Sharing**

Power-sharing has been particularly popular in communities with ethnic conflict because it emphasizes the need for previous factions to work together and share power. However, literature on power-sharing has been mixed. Some researchers have found that power-sharing protects the group rights of parties and addresses potential spoilers, while others have argued that it institutionalizes and entrenches social cleavages. Hypothesis 1 stated: Peacebuilding is more
likely to be successful if peace agreements do not include power-sharing based on ethno-religious lines.

Based on my findings, support for H1 is limited. Power-sharing was used in both states, but it was based on ethnicity in Bosnia and political party in Cambodia. In both cases, power-sharing has not been successful in providing the foundation for well-functioning political institutions, which is necessary for sustainable peace. Without well-functioning political institutions, leaders cannot properly address future grievances or make necessary reforms to address domestic challenges. While my research supports that peacebuilding will likely face challenges if power-sharing is based on ethnic or religious lines, there is not enough evidence to suggest that power-sharing would be more successful based on political parties.

In Bosnia, the IC hoped that the power-sharing agreement set forth in the DPA would lead to a multi-ethnic democracy, but there is little evidence that the power-sharing structures have facilitated inter-ethnic political cooperation or reconciliation between opposing groups. Rather, power-sharing has further entrenched wartime ethnic cleavages and created political deadlock. The DPA included political and territorial power-sharing, and both were based solely on ethnicity. Today, the make-up of all government institutions continues to be dictated by ethnic quotas, and parties remain founded on ethnic divides. In addition, the country is split into two autonomous zones, FBiH and RS, and communities remain homogenous. Because of these structures, politicians still advance nationalist agendas and only rely on their own ethnic groups to remain in power. This supports the findings of Brancati (2009) and Horowitz (2014), who argue that power-sharing agreements based on past social cleavages further institutionalize these divisions and result in political “immobilism.”
In contrast, Cambodia used power-sharing based on political parties. Power-sharing was primarily political, and the SNC—composed of six members of the CGDK and six members from the SOC—was the main power-sharing body during the peacebuilding process. After the 1993 elections, a coalition government, which included power-sharing, was formed between the FUNCINPEC and CPP. Prince Ranariddh of the FUNCINPEC and Hun Sen of the CPP became Co-Chairmen of the Interim Joint Administration and divided control of the ministries. However, Hun Sen consolidated his power under the Interim Joint Administration, and the power-sharing agreement collapsed following Hun Sen’s 1997 coup. In this case, power-sharing was mostly out of convenience, and it is clear that Hun Sen had no desire to share power with Prince Ranariddh.

Although power-sharing might have been successful in the short-term or in providing a “cold peace,” it has not been successful in facilitating long-term “sustainable peace” and creating well-functioning political institutions with democratic rule of law. In both cases, leaders never showed a real desire to cooperate or share power, and the state did not have the appropriate domestic politics for democracy following the war. I find that power-sharing alone will not lead to cooperation among opposing groups, let alone well-functioning institutions needed to address future grievances and make domestic reforms. This is because power-sharing is often imposed by the IC to get parties to cooperate that otherwise would not. It is necessary for the IC to convince leaders that it is in their best interest to cooperate and provide incentives for them to do so. In other words, elites must have the political will to cooperate if power-sharing is to work in providing the foundation for sustainable peace. Furthermore, power-sharing was based on past wartime cleavages in both instances. In the future, the IC should work with local actors to form political parties based on political ideologies rather than previous wartime divisions or social cleavages. Parties founded on ideological differences could be more beneficial to building
sustainable peace because it would allow for parties’ constituencies to include citizens from opposing groups; this could decrease past social tensions and lead to better functioning political institutions.

**Variable 2: Transitional Justice Mechanisms**

Average citizens are more likely to be involved in contemporary warfare, which makes post-conflict peacebuilding more challenging. The IC is not just faced with rebuilding the institutions and infrastructure but also the social fabric of the state. The concept of transitional justice has, as a result, advanced as part of the international peacebuilding agenda over the past two decades. Despite the general support for transitional justice mechanisms, people disagree over which type will be more successful. The two main types are retributive and restorative. Hypothesis 2 stated: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if retributive and restorative justice mechanisms are used.

Based on my research, H2 is not supported because neither state used both retributive and restorative justice mechanisms. Although there were high-level discussions in Bosnia about creating a truth commission for the former Yugoslavia, one was not created. There were no discussions about creating a truth commission in Cambodia. This reaffirms that retributive justice is more widely accepted and embraced by the IC as a means to promote reconciliation. Restorative justice, in contrast, is a relatively newer concept that is still gaining support. Although the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was seen as largely successful, the IC still has concerns over the success of truth commissions generally and believes that this type of justice can provide impunity to perpetrators. The IC continues to favor prosecution and punishment for crimes. Proponents of restorative justice, in contrast, argue that
truth commissions can be beneficial in promoting reconciliation if conflicts were widespread and affected most of the population.

Despite the lack of support for restorative justice, the cases of retributive justice in Bosnia and Cambodia offer another finding: hybrid tribunals can be more successful in promoting sustainable peace compared to international ones. Both Bosnia and Cambodia established tribunals, the most well-known type of retributive justice, but Bosnia’s was an international tribunal (ICTY) and Cambodia’s was a hybrid one (ECCC). The overall premise of both tribunals—prosecution and punishment—remained the same, but the composition differed. The ICTY was located at The Hague and composed of international administration and judges, while the ECCC was located in Cambodia and composed of both international and domestic personnel and judges. This contributes to sustainable peace because it gives Cambodians more ownership over the transitional justice process and boosts domestic legitimacy for the tribunal. Scholars and policymakers should further study and examine the effectiveness of hybrid tribunals as they have received little attention.

**Variable 3: Socioeconomic Conditions**

Economic reconstruction and recovery has become an important part of post-conflict peacebuilding. War has disastrous economic costs for a society, and post-conflict states suffer from insufficient resources to rebuild their communities. The IC is in a unique position to improve socioeconomic conditions and economic security in post-conflict states. It is important that the IC and host governments ensure that all citizens have equal economic opportunities in the post-conflict state because economic inequalities and grievances have been found to exacerbate tensions between groups. H3 stated: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if
socioeconomic conditions have improved among all citizens in the post-conflict state compared to the pre-war state.

Based on my research, there is evidence to support H3. Socioeconomic conditions in Cambodia, compared to Bosnia, have improved more relative to the pre-war period. In Bosnia, economic reconstruction has not been as successful as the IC hoped, and Bosnia suffers from aid dependence, economic stagnation, and high levels of unemployment. In Cambodia, economic reconstruction has largely been viewed as a success. Cambodia has averaged a 7.6% annual growth rate from 1994 to 2015, poverty levels have fallen dramatically, and average levels of education have increased (World Bank 2017). Cambodia’s improved socioeconomic conditions have improved the economic security of all citizens. My findings suggest that the relative improvement of socioeconomic conditions and economic security have resulted in some degree of political stability. This affects sustainable peace because ordinary citizens are more satisfied with the political order and government leaders. My research supports prior literature that says that improved economic conditions will lead to political stability.

Despite the differences in outcomes of Bosnia and Cambodia, I discovered that the economic reconstruction processes in both states remained very similar, and the IC’s primary goal was on economic liberalization. Bosnia and Cambodia historically had centrally planned economies and suffered from collapsed economies following the war. Both states received significant monetary resources during economic reconstruction, and the IC sought to create the foundation for a market economy. The World Bank and other international donors paid special attention to increasing privatization and FDI in both states. While this has benefited both states in some ways, it has ignored micro-economic policies such as unemployment and labor protections. Today, Bosnia suffers from some of the highest levels of unemployment, and Cambodia is well-
known for having lax labor protections. The high levels of unemployment in Bosnia and lax labor protections in Cambodia are potential sources of political instability. Leaders in Bosnia and Cambodia should address these challenges because they could lead to future tensions and instability.

In addition, my research presents another finding: elites remain better off than ordinary citizens due to high levels of corruption. Elites in Bosnia and Cambodia failed to distribute peacebuilding resources, and a significant amount of wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few. The Hun Sen regime in Cambodia particularly highlights this challenge. As the IC attempts to centralize power in the host state following war, it should be cautious and careful to make sure that resources are still being distributed evenly and fairly among citizens. The gaps in wealth between elites and ordinary citizens could pose challenges to peace and lead to potential instability.

The cases of Bosnia and Cambodia confirm and challenge H3. Overall, I find evidence that relative improvement of socioeconomic conditions can lead to political stability and more sustainable peace. However, I also discover that if socioeconomic conditions do not improve among all citizens, but rather a select group of elites, then this could have negative consequences to sustainable peace because it exacerbates wealth inequality. Overall, the IC must do a better job at ensuring that aid is going to programs that affect ordinary citizens.

**Variable 4: Local Ownership**

A significant portion of recent peacebuilding literature has focused on the inclusion of local actors and importance of local ownership in the peacebuilding process. After many years of imposing top-down reforms in post-conflict states, the IC now recognizes that higher levels of local ownership through the inclusion of multiple local actors is important to building sustainable
peace. By including local actors in decision-making processes, the IC is strengthening the national capacity of the state and empowering civil society, which is necessary for sustainable peace. Hypothesis 4 stated: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if local ownership is high, meaning that the international community actively engages local actors from all ethnic groups and all levels of society.

Based on my research, there is support for H4. Cambodia had relatively higher levels of local ownership than Bosnia, but neither state should be categorized as having high levels. The dominant narrative in both states continued to be liberal peacebuilding, or democratization and market liberalization. This resulted in low levels of ownership and caused challenges to building sustainable peace because it led to lower levels of national capacity, poor civil society, and reliance on the IC. It is important to mention that the “local turn” in peacebuilding was just taking shape during the Bosnian and Cambodian operations, which could possibly explain why local ownership was so low.

In Bosnia, local ownership and the inclusion of local actors was particularly low due to the intensity of the Bosnian operation. The IC was given significant authority over the post-conflict state, especially after the establishment of the Bonn Powers, which allowed the OHR to make decisions when local politicians were unable to come to agreement. Consequently, Bosnian politicians never had to learn how to make decisions without significant international help, and state capacity remains weak. Today, Bosnia continues to lack the ability to resolve conflicts or pass meaningful legislation. Furthermore, the OHR remains open; although the OHR closed for a short period after criticism from the EU, calls by Bosnian citizens, elites, and NGOs resulted in the extension of its mandate. The disappointment of Bosnians when it closed for a brief period shows how reliant Bosnia has become on the IC to address domestic challenges.
In Cambodia, the operation was much less intensive, and the IC was somewhat more successful at including local actors. For example, UNTAC placed an emphasis on hiring Cambodian citizens during the peacebuilding process; over 56,000 Cambodian personnel helped facilitate the 1993 elections (Widyono 2015b). Prince Sihanouk and the SNC also helped inform the IC’s decisions and reminded the IC that local opinions, history and culture mattered. Although Prince Sihanouk and the SNC’s role might have been symbolic, it signified to ordinary citizens that the IC was working with local actors. Lastly, the creation of a hybrid tribunal, the ECCC, demonstrated that local ownership was important to Cambodians. Because the ECCC is a hybrid tribunal, as opposed to an international one, Cambodians have been granted more ownership in the transitional justice process. Despite relatively higher levels of local ownership, the peacebuilding process was still based on democratization and market liberalization.

Clearly, Cambodia had relatively higher levels of local ownership and inclusion of local actors compared to Bosnia. The higher levels of local ownership and inclusion contributed to sustainable peace because it strengthened national capacity and boosted legitimacy for many reforms. However, my findings suggest that neither state had high levels of local ownership because the dominant narrative of Bosnia and Cambodia was liberal peacebuilding. I find that although the histories, conflicts, and cultures of Bosnia and Cambodia varied, the peacebuilding operation remained largely similar. While the goals of democracy and a market economy were well-intentioned and worthy in the long-term, it was problematic in creating sustainable peace because it ignored Bosnia’s and Cambodia’s distinct histories and cultures. Many of the post-conflict reforms were imposed and struggled to gain support from host populations.

My research also demonstrates that the intensity of the operations affected the levels of local ownership and inclusion. While the levels of local ownership and inclusion of local actors
varies in each case, it is not necessarily clear if the IC was intentional in promoting local ownership. As mentioned previously, the intensity of both operations differed, which could explain differences in local ownership. The IC had much more at stake in Bosnia due to its involvement during the war and because Bosnia was one of the first post-Cold War communist states to collapse; in many ways, the IC wanted to fix the mistakes it had made during the war and prove to the world that democracy, not communism, would prevail. The memories of ethnic conflict in Rwanda also caused the IC—particularly the US—to become overly preoccupied with the state. Comparatively, the IC’s main goals in Cambodia were to end the war and force the Vietnamese to withdraw. The IC did not have as much at stake, and thus, the intensity of the operation was lower. Because the Bosnian operation was more intensive, the IC had significant authority over domestic politics, and the state became more reliant and dependent on the IC. The cases of Bosnia and Cambodia suggest that higher intensity operations will lead to lower levels of local ownership.

Both cases also present another finding: the IC regularly fosters connections with smaller elite groups rather than ordinary citizens (Pickering 2007c; Öjendal and Ou 2015; Parent 2016). This is problematic for many reasons. First, it assumes that elites’ views represent those of the average citizen, which is often not the case. It ignores the everyday needs of local citizens and provides the IC with limited perspectives. Second, it creates gaps in services between ordinary citizens and elites. If only a smaller group is consulted, most of the resources will benefit them, and other groups will suffer. This could possibly explain why urban areas tend to be more developed than rural ones in post-conflict states. Third, it provides the opportunity for domestic elites to co-opt the system in their favor. Elites in both Bosnia and Cambodia failed to distribute
peacebuilding resources to the general population. This creates large discrepancies in wealth, which could lead to future problems.

It is clear that my findings support previous literature on the need to include local actors in the peacebuilding process and suggest that higher levels of local ownership and inclusion of local actors will lead to more sustainable peace. However, the cases of Bosnia and Cambodia demonstrate the challenges the IC faces, in practice, when it comes to including local actors. I believe that the IC should focus on developing new indicators and mechanisms to measure local ownership. In addition, the IC should stress the importance of working with local NGOs and developing local organizations’ capacity. Lastly, the IC should propose new forums in post-conflict states that could bring these organizations into the decision-making process. The adoption of quotas, perhaps, could be one way to ensure local actors’ participation.

**Variable 5: Women’s Participation**

Women’s participation has become an important part of the peacebuilding process, and research has found that women’s participation can positively contribute to the security and peace of states. Women experience conflict differently than men and can provide different perspectives. The importance of women in the peacebuilding process has been solidified under the WPS agenda, which is made up of UNSCR 1325 and its seven subsequent resolutions.

Hypothesis 5 stated: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if women’s participation during the peace process is high and if women do not face limited opportunities and high levels of social exclusion in their host societies.

Based on my research, there is some support for H5. Women’s participation was rather weak in both states, and this impacted sustainable peace. Women remained largely absent from the drafting of the DPA and Paris Agreements, made up only a smaller percentage of
peacekeepers, and held very few parliamentary seats. A main reason for the lack of women’s participation was because the WPS agenda did not exist during the Bosnia and Cambodia operations. However, it is important to note that the Bosnian operation served as a catalyst to the WPS agenda because the IC recognized the need for women’s participation during the process.

Based on my research, NGOs played the largest role in facilitating women’s participation during the peacebuilding process and allowed women to address everyday concerns. In Bosnia, NGOs provided safe spaces for women, offered support services, and worked to advance women’s rights. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 also increased the number of political NGOs in Bosnia, which sought to affect government policy towards women and increase women’s political participation. In Cambodia, NGOs contributed to women’s political participation, gender equality, education, domestic violence programs, and family support services. Both cases highlight the integral role of NGOs in implementing the WPS agenda and demonstrate that NGOs provide new opportunities for women to engage in their post-conflict societies.

Despite the importance of NGOs, women’s participation remained low for several reasons. As mentioned above, the WPS agenda did not exist at the time of the Bosnian and Cambodian operations. Thus, the IC was not actively promoting women’s participation during the peacebuilding process in the same ways that it does now. Second, women in Bosnia and Cambodia faced limited opportunities and some degree of social exclusion. Both Bosnia and Cambodia are male-dominated or patriarchal societies, and women are traditionally viewed as belonging in the private sphere. This negatively affects women’s participation in the peacebuilding process as cultural views carry significant weight; women’s participation is not going to be high if cultural views around the role of women do not shift. To successfully
implement the WPS agenda and create women who are active members of society, the IC needs to have broader conversations, with both men and women, about gender.

Finally, the cases of Bosnia and Cambodia demonstrate how IOs can negatively impact women’s participation in post-conflict states. Both states suffered from sexual assault by UN peacekeepers and a rise in prostitution following the deployment of international personnel. This negatively contributed to women’s participation and sustainable peace because it de-legitimized the peacebuilding process and hurt the credibility of the UN and IC. Unfortunately, the UN was slow to address the issues of sexual assault and prostitution in Bosnia and Cambodia, and sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers continues to be a problem for the IC. In examining why this continues to occur, it leads me to another important finding regarding WPS: women’s participation at the international level continues to be low. Women hold very few, if any at all, senior-level positions at the UN and other IOs. Representatives of donor governments are still mostly men, and women compose a small percentage of peacekeeping forces. The underrepresentation of women at the UN and other IOs could have negative consequences including limited perspectives and lower levels of women’s participation in the host state. While current UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has pledged to increase the number of women appointed to senior-level positions, it is imperative that the UN continues to advocate for women’s participation within their own institutions and other IOs if WPS is to truly be successful (Patrick 2017).

My findings suggest that there is some support for H5 and that low levels of women’s participation contributed to sustainable peace. However, it is hard to say definitively how women would have contributed to the peacebuilding process had their participation been higher. In future operations, it is important that the IC continues to work with NGOs to implement the WPS
agenda and advocate for women’s participation within their own institutions. Despite low levels of women’s participation, women in Bosnia and Cambodia have clearly made great strides in advancing women’s rights and advocating for peace within their countries.

**Variable 6: Local Legitimacy**

Local legitimacy is an important factor to successful peacebuilding because the IC undertakes important reforms that affect citizens’ everyday lives. If the reforms carried out by the IC are not viewed as legitimate—being in the best interest of the host population—then creating sustainable peace will be more difficult. This is because it will require more force or coercion to convince the population that the reforms are advancing the common good of the state. The IC and state will also have trouble rebuilding the social contract between the host government and local population. Unfortunately, it is clear in practice that the IC struggles with how to win the “hearts and minds” of local populations. Hypothesis 6 stated: Peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if the peace operation and international community have strong local legitimacy from the host population.

My research supports H6. Levels of local legitimacy varied in Bosnia and Cambodia. In Cambodia, legitimacy of the IC was much higher, and local Cambodians viewed the IC more positively. Similarly, trust between ordinary citizens and the IC was higher in Cambodia than in Bosnia. This positively contributed to sustainable peace because local Cambodians believed that the reforms carried out were in the best interest of the state. One of the main reasons for the higher levels of legitimacy was because the expectations of local Cambodians aligned with the reforms and policies of the IC. For example, local Cambodians’ primary expectation was that the IC would bring elections, and the IC successfully did; this served as a huge source of legitimacy for the IC. In addition, most parties, with the exception of the Khmer Rouge, supported the Paris
Agreements. The cooperation of the three parties and Prince Sihanouk greatly contributed to higher levels of local legitimacy. Finally, because the IC did not participate in the Cambodian conflict and only got involved after the Vietnamese invasion, local Cambodians did not have as much of a reason to view the IC negatively. This contributed to higher levels of legitimacy and trust between the IC and Cambodians. The IC was, as a result, more able to convince ordinary citizens and elites that the proposed reforms would advance the common good.

In comparison, the IC was viewed more negatively in Bosnia. The IC’s goal to create a multi-ethnic democracy did not align with the views of ordinary Bosnians. The need for two separate autonomous zones highlights how elites could not agree with a unified vision for the state and how the expectations of the IC and state did not align. In addition, the IC’s robust involvement in Bosnia prior to the peacebuilding process led to lower levels of legitimacy. The failures of UNPROFOR and the NATO airstrike campaign, in particular, negatively affected the local Bosnians’ perceptions of the IC and led to higher levels of distrust. In general, the IC struggled with convincing the local population and elites that the reforms would benefit all members of the state. Local Bosnians were not confident in the IC’s ability to rebuild the state.

My findings suggest that higher levels of local legitimacy positively contributed to sustainable peace, supporting H6. The higher levels of local legitimacy and trust in Cambodia made it easier for the IC to convince the population that the proposed reforms would advance the common good. It also provided the foundation for more stable governance structures in the long-term because the IC did not have to rely on as much coercion to establish the host government’s authority. I also found that local expectations and the IC’s role prior to the peace operation played a large role in determining the level of legitimacy, although there are certainly many others. H6 is highly related to H4, that stated that higher levels of local inclusion would lead to
more sustainable peace. Cambodians had higher levels of local ownership than Bosnians, so the IC was viewed as more legitimate.

**Other Factors**

**Role of Identity**

The cases of Bosnia and Cambodia also suggest that the role of identity plays an important role during the peacebuilding process. Although identity alone will not lead to conflict, it does affect the peacebuilding process in numerous ways. Many contemporary conflicts have an identity component to them, and this makes peacebuilding more challenging. Clearly, this research paper demonstrates that ethnic identity was much stronger among citizens in Bosnia compared to Cambodia. Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs had distinct cultural, political, linguistic, and historical differences, and they were not as willing to compromise on specific issues. Ethnic identity still remains strong today, and there is little inter-ethnic cooperation among political leaders.

The central question to many of these modern wars then becomes: how can peace ever be achieved in communities with strong identities? In examining ethnic conflict in Africa, Peter Kagwanja and Gerard Hagg (2007) suggest that “the conversion of identity from a political identity back to its roots as a cultural identity” would address this challenge. They argue that the role of identity should be reframed as an asset for peace rather than a hindrance, and that cultural diversity should be emphasized during the peacebuilding process (Kagwanja and Hagg 2007). The AU formally recognized the importance of cultural diversity via the Charter Renaissance of Africa in 2005 in hopes that it would depoliticize ethnicity and promote inter-ethnic coexistence (Kagwanja and Hagg 2007). In thinking about future operations, the UN should consider following the AU’s lead and reframe how it looks at the role of identity.
Limitations of Study

Although my cases present evidence that suggest socioeconomic conditions, local ownership, women’s participation, and local legitimacy affected the peacebuilding process, it is important to discuss the potential shortcomings. Due to time constraints, this study only included two cases, which makes some of the findings of this study difficult to generalize more broadly. If given more time, the researcher should examine other cases to see if results are similar. Another limitation is that many of the concepts, like sustainable peace, remain broadly defined and lack universal measurements. This leaves more room for subjectivity and allows the researcher to decide how he or she will interpret the concepts and cases. The creation of universal measurements to examine the success of peacebuilding operations would help address this problem. Lastly, qualitative studies are difficult for future researchers to replicate. Despite these shortcomings, the findings, especially in regard to local ownership and local legitimacy are consistent with previous literature.
Conclusion

This study has examined post-conflict peacebuilding in two states, Bosnia and Cambodia. The purpose was to explore when the IC was most successful at peacebuilding and what challenges the IC faces during the peacebuilding process. I proposed that six independent variables—power-sharing, transitional justice mechanisms, socioeconomic conditions, local ownership, women’s participation, and local legitimacy—would all affect the dependent variable, sustainable peace. My final hope was to address how the IC can overcome current challenges and more effectively rebuild sustainable peace in post-conflict states.

After analyzing the peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Cambodia, I argue that both states should be considered a partial success based on their levels of peacefulness. Bosnia has not relapsed into conflict since the signing of the DPA, but the state continues to suffer from ethnic tensions, political gridlock, and economic stagnation. Cambodia, in contrast, experiences more political and social stability but is ruled by a largely authoritarian government. The current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, is one of the longest-serving Prime Ministers in the world, and respect for human rights remains poor. Although the interventions have been successful in some ways, they should not be categorized as full peacebuilding successes because both states struggle with one or more aspects of sustainable peace, which negatively affect the everyday functioning of the state.

Based on my research, I found limited support for my hypotheses related to power-sharing and transitional justice mechanisms. I found that power-sharing based on parties rather than ethnic divisions were not more successful in promoting sustainable peace and that power-sharing institutions alone will not lead to cooperation among opposing groups, let alone well-functioning political institutions or democracy. I argue that domestic elites must have the
political will to cooperate if power-sharing is to work and that parties founded on political ideologies rather than previous wartime divisions or social cleavages could be more successful. Regarding transitional justice mechanisms, my study was rather limited because both cases predominantly used retributive justice through the use of tribunals. I find that hybrid tribunals, as opposed to international ones, may be more effective in promoting reconciliation among parties, but scholars and policymakers should further study and examine the effectiveness of hybrid tribunals because they have received little attention.

My findings did suggest that socioeconomic conditions, local ownership, women’s participation, and local legitimacy all affected sustainable peace in Bosnia and Cambodia. I found that improvement of socioeconomic conditions among all citizens relative to the pre-war period could lead to political stability, but also argue that improvement of socioeconomic conditions among select groups could lead to political instability because it exacerbates wealth inequality and grievances. My research also demonstrates that women’s participation is important to the peacebuilding process and that NGOs are important actors when it comes to implementing the WPS agenda, advocating for women’s participation, and addressing women’s everyday concerns. However, I note that the low numbers of women at the top levels of the UN and donor governments have negatively affected women’s participation during the peacebuilding process. It is necessary that these IOs continue to advocate for women’s participation within their own institutions.

Finally, I determine that local ownership and local legitimacy are the two most significant factors that contribute to sustainable peace. My findings demonstrate that higher levels of local ownership through the inclusion of local actors and higher levels of local legitimacy will lead to more sustainable peace, reaffirming previous literature. I argue for the development of new
indicators and mechanisms to measure local ownership and stress the importance of working
with local NGOs after conflict. I also propose new forums and the adoption of quotas as two
ways to ensure local actors’ participation.

It is clear that this research study reaffirms and challenges previous literature on
peacebuilding. I determine that there is not a clear model of how to build sustainable peace, but
that local ownership and local legitimacy during the peacebuilding process are key factors that
affect a country’s trajectory after conflict. As the IC continues to undertake increasingly complex
and multidimensional enterprises around the world, it is my hope that this study has provided a
more comprehensive understanding of post-conflict peacebuilding, the challenges that the IC
faces, and potential measures to better build sustainable peace.
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