3-13-2001

DDASaccident408

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 06/04/2004  Accident number: 408
Accident time: 14:05  Accident Date: 13/03/2001
Where it occurred: 3.5 km NE of Tisorina camp  Country: Eritrea
Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?)  Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident (survey)  Date of main report: 18/03/2001
ID original source: BJC  Name of source: UNMEE MACC
Organisation: Name removed  Ground condition: hard
Mine/device: AT (unrecorded)  route/path
Date record created: 06/04/2004  Date last modified: 06/04/2004
No of victims: 3  No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:  Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: UTM  Coordinates fixed by: GPS
Map east: 0522487E  Map north: 1620013N
Map scale: H Coy Route Trace  Map series:
Map edition: 4  Map sheet:
Map name: 1: 100,000

Accident Notes

mechanical detonation (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
**Accident report**

An IMSMA report on this accident was made available in 2004. Its cursory content is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

The organisation involved was the UNMEE MACC itself and the accident occurred when a “LAV III” vehicle was “trafficking” a route. The incident occurred “3.5 k, North East of Tsorena Camp in Eritrea on a dirt track”. The accident occurred on a “hardpan road through [a] valley on [the] North side of existing wadi.”

“The route was being recce (again). The Nyala MPV was leading and was approx 50-100m ahead at the time of the strike.”

In another place it is recorded that “The route was considered a proven route. It had been trafficked at least five times prior to the strike…. The route had been proven by the Nyala and trafficked by Bisons”.

A LAV III following the Nyala struck the mine with the right rear intermediate wheel. Force of explosion destroyed both intermediate tyres. Three pers were in the LAV III and no injuries were sustained.”

The mine involved was a “suspected blast Anti-Tank” mine, probably a TM-46 or TM-57 but the report made no confirmation of its identity. The “mine appeared to have been buried approximately two feet deep”. The accident “occurred on the inside of a curve in the road”.

“Initially it was unclear whether or not this was a UXO or a mine strike.”

“The ground is very hard and it appeared that the road surface had been built up (approx 6”) off the existing surface.

The crater holes was recorded as having an approximate depth of 0.75m, a diameter of 1.75m and was recorded as “vertical”.

The IMSMA report recorded that three persons were involved but that there were no casualties. However, under paragraph “E: Effects”, is written:

“E1. Pers Injuries. Minor concussion and emotional injuries. There were three people on board the LAV III – driver, crew comd and gunner. Two were MOC 031 and the third was an Inf Lieutenant. It should be noted that all three pers were wearing the TICCS headsets and none of the crew suffered burst ear drums.”

“E3. Veh Casualties. LAV III c/s 40B (was being operated as c/s 41) lost the right rear intermediate wheel compl. Right rear and forward intermediate tyres were destroyed. There is apparent damage to the hull of the vehicle.”

Following the accident “the ERS Section Comd cleared the area and extraction route for approx 300m using the Minelab detector. The area was marked using red spray paint and suspicious locations with mine tents. The Nyala MPV was used to recover the LAV III veh cas to a safe area.

A Technical Advisor at the MACC made it clear that he believed this mine had been placed to target the recce patrol, which was using MPVs because they knew this might happen.

**Victim Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim number: 535</th>
<th>Name: Name removed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status: driver</td>
<td>Fit for work: yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation: not made available</td>
<td>Time to hospital: not recorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection issued: ear-protectors</td>
<td>Protection used: ear-protectors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of injuries:
COMMENT
No detailed record was made: shock or concussion.

Victim Report
Victim number: 536  Name: Name removed
Age:  Gender: Male
Status: other  Fit for work: yes
Compensation: not made available  Time to hospital: not recorded
Protection issued: ear-protectors  Protection used: ear-protectors

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT
No detailed record was made: shock or concussion.

Victim Report
Victim number: 537  Name: Name removed
Age:  Gender: Male
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes
Compensation: not made available  Time to hospital: not recorded
Protection issued: ear-protectors  Protection used: ear-protectors

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT
No detailed record was made: shock or concussion.

Analysis
This accident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident (survey)” because the patrol of Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) was undertaking a “recce”, or survey.

The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the route was considered “proven” because vehicles had passed along it before. The uneventful passage of a vehicle along a route does not equate to clearance in Humanitarian Demining.

The secondary cause of the accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because it seems that the MACC was deliberately using MPVs as primary clearance tools. It is recognised that the security situation in the theatre and the assets available may have made this desirable, but the end result cannot be considered to be clearance to IMAS standards.
It is possible that the mine had been recently placed on the road to prevent safe passage by one of the combatants groups in the region. When this occurs, it is not clear that Humanitarian Demining to IMAS standards can ever be achieved.

The failure of the MACC to record the physical/medical details of the vehicle’s occupants in any detail was a missed opportunity to add to information about the effectiveness of MPV armouring systems. For example, it is not clear whether or not the occupants were strapped into their seats, or whether “concussions” refers to the after-effects of blows to the heads or to the after-effects of shock-wave transfer.

In discussion with MACC staff, this accident had clearly been considered an “incident” that did not require the usual accident enquiry.