

4-19-2007

# DDASaccident490

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database  
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# DDAS Accident Report

## Accident details

<b>Report date:</b> 21/01/2008	<b>Accident number:</b> 490
<b>Accident time:</b> 10:45	<b>Accident Date:</b> 19/04/2007
<b>Where it occurred:</b> Goor Dara Road, Khuajaohar District, Takhar province	<b>Country:</b> Afghanistan
<b>Primary cause:</b> Inadequate survey (?)	<b>Secondary cause:</b> Inadequate equipment (?)
<b>Class:</b> Missed-mine accident	<b>Date of main report:</b> 29/05/2007
<b>ID original source:</b> OPS/03101-37	<b>Name of source:</b> UNMACA
<b>Organisation:</b> [Name removed]	
<b>Mine/device:</b> YM-1 AP blast	<b>Ground condition:</b> dry/dusty soft
<b>Date record created:</b>	<b>Date last modified:</b> 21/01/2008
<b>No of victims:</b> 0	<b>No of documents:</b> 2

## Map details

<b>Longitude:</b>	<b>Latitude:</b>
<b>Alt. coord. system:</b> WGS 84	<b>Coordinates fixed by:</b> GPS
<b>Map east:</b> E 69.39645	<b>Map north:</b> N 36.8991
<b>Map scale:</b>	<b>Map series:</b>
<b>Map edition:</b>	<b>Map sheet:</b>
<b>Map name:</b>	

## Accident Notes

inadequate survey (?)  
mechanical follow-up (?)  
mechanical detonation (?)  
non injurious accident (?)

## Accident report

The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial.

## **Cover letter**

File: OPS/03101-37

Date: 29 May, 2007

To: See Distribution List

From: Chief of Operations UNMACA, Kabul

Subject: Investigation Reports & Lessons Learned from the Demining Accident Happened on [International demining NGO] Loader at Goor-Dara village, Khwaia-Ghar district of Takhar province on 19 April 2007

Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned from Demining Accident that has happened on [International demining NGO] Loader (MDU # 09) at Goor-Dara village, Khwaja Ghar district of Takhar province on 19 April 2007.

Best regards, Distribution List

Complete Investigation Report to [International demining NGO]

Lessons Learned to: [Other demining organizations in-country]

## **LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY**

DEMINING ACCIDENT HAPPENED AT [International demining NGO] LOADER AT GOOR-DARA ROAD, HAMWARSAI DISTRICT OF KHWAJA-GHAR DISTRICT ON 19th APRIL 2007

### **INTRODUCTION**

On 19 April 2007, a YM-1 antipersonnel mine has exploded on loader of [International demining NGO] (MDU # 9) while the machine was operating on MF # AF1212/12579/H1475/HQ1585/SHA — 4.

### **SUMMARY**

A. On 19 April 2007, while the [International demining NGO] loader (MDU # 9) was excavating the ground by using Gill bucket and then the soil inspecting for Antitank mines and UXO but an antipersonnel YM-1 mine has passed through the grids of the Gill bucket and missed from inspection. While the Loader has been levelling the loose dragged soil, in reverse position the front left was tyre driven on the mine and exploded it.

The accident did not have any casualty but small damage on the rubber of the tyre.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

B. The investigation concluded that the accident has happened because of the following reasons:

a) Lack of precise information about the minefield; however the request from local people indicates the presence of Antipersonnel mines on both sides of the road but the technical survey has only confirmed that area as Antitank contaminated. The Gill system has been used as the team supposed the area as Antitank contaminated area as he has not more investigate about the area from local people.

b) Team Leader failed to properly read the local request and ask and investigate them more about the existence of antipersonnel mine in this area.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

C. The following are recommended by the Investigation Team:

a) The [International demining NGO] general survey teams are recommended to make sure the collected report is as much precise as possible.

b) The Star Basket system is recommended to be used for the rest of the task.

c) Before commencement of clearance operations, the team leader of clearance team is required to do a reconnaissance of the whole task and obtain update information from locals.

d) As confidence measure, the cleared portion of the task should be re-investigated to ensure that no antipersonnel or small devices have left behind.

Signed: Chief of Operations UNMACA

#### **Internal Memo**

To: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul

From: Chief of Quality Management, UNMACA Kabul

Date: 17 May 2007

Subject: Demining Accident Investigation Report [International demining NGO] in Goor Dara road of Khuajaohar district of Takhar province.

With reference to demining incident investigation report of AMAC Kunduz, dated: May 14, 07. The investigation report was reviewed and the necessary correction was brought in.

We support the recommendation of the investigation officer and would like to add the following points on it as seems necessary to be reflected in such cases.

Before commencing/during demining operations all the team leaders are recommended to collect more information about the tasks under their operation, in order to make sure that there is nothing left from the assessment team and it will help him to update their operation plan to meet the requirements.

In case of this minefield the star basket system should be used for the clearance of remaining part of the task and as confidence measure the cleared portion should be reassessed to ensure that no YM-I mine or small UXO have been left behind.

#### **From IMSMA report**

Investigation Report of Mine/UXO Accident/Incident within the Ground of Demining.

Task No. AF-1212-12579 H1475/ HQ — 1585 — SHA – 4: Survey Date - 16/11/06

Mechanical Team 9 using the “Mechanical Gill System” detonated a mine under a tyre at 10:45 on April 19, 2007. Operator was using loader for Excavation of Road by Gill System.

Accident/Incident Location

**History of the Minefield:** This task is a road which is diverted from Khwaja Ghar- Talucian main road in Ham war say village leading to Goor Darah village. Due to the [International

demining NGO] GS team report the length of this road is 1030m contaminated by AT YM-II mines were laid by North Alliance during the conflict with Taliban. This task is covered in LIS HQ No 1585 SHA No 4. The General survey of this task had been done by [International demining NGO] GS team in 16/11/06. A Minefield H/2948 has been cleared in the same SHA before commencing this task and an incident had happened with the same MDU on 10/03/07 in mentioned task (H/2948) which caused damage to the tire of loader. The area of the task is 10300 sqm and 5770 sqm has already been cleared by MDU-09, one YM-II AT mine has been discovered by the team during the operation up to date. The depth for MDU clearance in this task is identified 30 cm from the original surface of the ground. According to our findings from the local people during investigation of this incident, it was proved that both side of the road have been contaminated by APM laid by same party. Additionally a villager named Nasir Ahmad who provided us with information was the victim of mine from the same SHA, but the [International demining NGO] team leader didn't have the information regarding AP mines in both side of the road.

[The accident site is shown below.]



Description of the accident/ incident:

The mentioned incident has happened when the MDU-09 was levelling the loose/ excavated soil after the clearance process. The loader was excavating the ground by its bucket then by its gill system the soil was inspecting for AT mines and large UXO. During the inspection process an AP mine type YM-I was passed through the grids of bucket, and missed to be inspected. While the loader was levelling and dragging the loosed soil in reverse position its front left side tire stepped on the mine and was exploded. It haven't caused any serious damages to the machine only the robber portion of tire got some damages, fortunately didn't cause casualty as well. As soon as the accident had happened the team's operation was ceased, and the movement of the machine was stopped to avoid further accidents/ incidents and to conduct the investigation. The report was relayed to [International demining NGO] Operation section and to the AMAC Kunduz by [International demining NGO] Operation officer.

Site conditions: The ground was described as flat and open. The soil was soft and dry. The weather was clear and mild. There was no vegetation.



Depth of the mine from the hillside 1m.

Team Operation outlook: The last refresher course had been in Feb 2007. The Team had been at the site since 11/04/2007. They worked from 06:40 to 13:40. The team has two breaks, 09:00 – 09:30 and 11:45 – 12:00. The last leave period was 20/03/2007 — 31/03/2007.

Conclusion:

Accident/incident happened due to lack of information about the MF.

Recommendations

The [International demining NGO] GS teams are recommended to acquire and collect the exact and precise information regarding the task and devices, and report it correctly and precisely.

The MDU-09 team leader is strongly recommended to conduct the reconnaissance of the task prior to the commencement of operation and shall keep the contact with local people and up date his information, because during the investigation we caught the information regarding the task from the locals, as they confirmed the presence of APM in both side of the road. Additionally when we checked the task folder documents we found a local demining request shows the AP mines in both sides of the road but the deminers didn't have information about it.

The star basket system with MDU should be used for the rest of the task: as the APMs and small UXO to be inspected thoroughly which are not able dropping through the grids of this system while in the Gill system it has the possibility of dropping due to the wider holes.

The [International demining NGO] Operation section is required to authorize the team leader in the task to make decision about getting information and how to clear the task and shall remain initiative.

Attachments: [Held on file.]

Note:

The late cause of the report was that [International demining NGO] had removed their Volvo 5 machine from the accident site and some changes had come in the accident site so we were waited for the site pictures of the accident as the accident had happened on Thursday 19 April, 2007 and the [International demining NGO] teams were leaving on 21 April so the site investigation was done on 21 April but the pictures we received from [International demining NGO] on May 01, 2007.

## **STATEMENTS**

### **Statement and Witness Report 1: Team Leader**

Date:21/04/07

Q1: Please explain that when the incident was occurred, during incident where were you and what was the cause of the incident.

On 10: 45 date 19/ 04/ 07 the incident was occurred I was standing and controlling the operator by binocular from 300m distance, in my opinion the cause of the incident was the miss information of the GS team.

Q2: As it seems that you have started the work in this task effective 5/ 03/ 07 for 46 days during this period don't you acquire complete information regarding the task and types of mine from the local residence. Why?

As you know better that I am a team leader of MDU and I am working based to the GS report the gathering and acquiring of information isn't my responsibility.

Q3: As it is proved that the both side of the road has APM and you showed the area safe and were walking in both side of the road weren't it dangerous for you and for your team's personal?

Before the incident happened we believed the area as an ATM and we were functional as gill system now that the incident was happened we will change our system of work to Star Basket before we marked the both side of the road by white stones and now as you saw we put the red and white stones on the sides of the road.

Q4: To avoid such incidents/ Incident in the future what recommendation/ suggestion do you have to be applied?

As the Afghanistan is a war-ruined country so the different kind of incident/ incident may occur, any way the exact and precise information regarding the task has its own worth.

### **Statement and Witness Report 2: MDU No 9 Operator**

Date:21/ 04/ 07

Q1: In what Task No were you working when the incident was happened and what did you did after incident?

I was working in Task No H/ 1475; the incident was happened on 10: 45 after the incident I stopped the operation based on my team leader order.

Q2: Did you know about the APM laid down in this task prior to incident?

No I didn't have information regarding the AMP in the task.

Q3: Please explain the damages to the MDU through the incident.

The MDU or Volvo 5 one Tyre has got damages.

Q4: Please explain the shortage or mistake which lead to incident and who were the responsible for this incident.

In my opinion the only mistake of the GS team was that they did not gather the exact information.

## **Analysis**

The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate survey” because the investigators found that the survey had failed to identify an obvious threat that was already on record as being present at the site.

The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the same International demining NGO that conducted the survey then deployed an inappropriate machine to work at the area. It is only luck that prevented personnel stepping on missed mines.

The National Authority should have required that the area already sifted with the Gill machine be processed again with the smaller grid. However, given that no machine reliably locates all small AP mines, another system should have been required (and would have in most countries).