6-25-2003

DDASaccident514

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 27/01/2008
Accident time: Not made available
Where it occurred: Not made available
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: None
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: BLU-97 submunition
Date record created: 27/01/2008
No of victims: 2

Accident Date: 26/06/2003
Country: Iraq
Secondary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)
Name of source: [Name removed]
Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 27/01/2008
No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude: Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not made available Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:
Map scale:
Map edition:
Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate survey (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate training (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)

Accident report

Details of this accident have been withheld by the demining NGO that employed the Victim. A spreadsheet including the Victim’s name and very brief details of the accident was made available in 2007. Some details can be inferred from the information released. For example, it is reasonable to presume that the Victims were repositioning markers inside the area known to be cleared/safe.
This entry will be expanded if access to the report of the investigation is made available in future.

The spreadsheet data is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

“Date and country. [Name removed]: fatal
[Name removed]: fatal
BLU 97 detonated when two members of staff moving to reposition minefield markers, suspected stepped on partially buried BLU-97.”

[From interview with demining group staff, it is known that the task was a BLU-97 strike area and not a minefield.]

**Victim Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim number: 672</th>
<th>Name: [Name removed]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status: deminer</td>
<td>Fit for work: DECEASED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation: Not made available</td>
<td>Time to hospital: Not made available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection issued: Not recorded</td>
<td>Protection used: Not made available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of injuries:**
FATAL
COMMENT: Multiple injury: No medical report was made available.

**Victim Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim number: 673</th>
<th>Name: [Name removed]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status: deminer</td>
<td>Fit for work: DECEASED</td>
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</table>

**Summary of injuries:**
FATAL
COMMENT: Multiple injury: No medical report was made available.
Analysis

This incident is classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because it seems that the device that detonated was inside the area cleared. If it was not, then this would become yet another “Survey accident” (the demining group had several in Iraq at this time). The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the victims went to place markers in an area that was believed to be safe but which was not. Those responsible for the work should have kept an accurate record of the safe area. It seems that the field controllers may also have allowed safety distances to be ignored. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the management of the demining group declined to make the accident details available. Although this is sometimes done to protect the Victims, in this case the Victims’ names were among the limited detail made available. It is possible that the managers have chosen to avoid transparency because they are afraid that the circumstances of the accident would reflect badly on their organisation.

It is known that the Victims had been recently moved from the North of Iraq to conduct submunition clearance and it is possible that they did not fully understand the threat posed by the BLU-97 and its potential sensitivity to any movement, including the placement of markers close by.