8-23-2007

DDASaccident562

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 08/02/2008  Accident number: 562
Accident time: 10:26  Accident Date: 23/08/2007
Where it occurred: Task No: 6-015, DA  Country: Lebanon
CBU No. 585, Near  Najdh
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)  Secondary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Class: Handling accident
ID original source: None
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: DPICM M77 submunition
Ground condition: bushes/scrub
leaf litter
rocks/stones
trees

Date record created: Date last modified: 08/02/2008
No of victims: 1  No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:  Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: UTM:  Coordinates fixed by:
725,380.3689205

Map east:  Map north:
Map scale:  Map series:
Map edition:  Map sheet:
Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
incomplete detonation (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
no independent investigation available (?)

1
**Accident report**

Limited details of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files and pictures. Their conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has been lost. The substance of the available date is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. This record will be amended if a full accident report is made available later.

**Internal accident data**

[This data is gathered from a detailed Annex to the Internal Accident report. Unfortunately the accident report has not yet been made available.]

**Tasking order**

Date: 14th May 2007

To: [Name removed] TOM [International demining NGO]

From: [Name removed] Chief of Plans, MACC SL

CC: [Name removed] Chief of Operations, MACC SL; [Name removed] LAF Ops Officer

Subject: Parameters for Cluster Strike Survey in Area 6

Location: Area-6

**Requirement:** (Will be amended as required)

It has been recognised that a Survey requirement (Team) is needed to facilitate a more rapid review and on the ground analysis of the actual contamination within the specified Cluster strikes in Area 6.

The Survey team will be directed to identify the centre of the strike where possible, fence the immediate area and take the UTM and distance for bearing. These areas need only at this stage require box of four (4) it will also be necessary to also take photos of the area of concern.

Once these are done on each target area, it will allow subsequent BAC teams to be deployed directly into the threat area making the clearance more efficient and effective.

**Documentation**

[International demining NGO] have documentation that will fulfil the requirement for the survey process, these will be filled in by the Survey Supervisor and presented to the [International demining NGO] TOM for review and then passed on to the Chief of Plans MACC SL.

Both digital and hardcopy is required, these will be entered into IMSMA as additional information.

On a weekly (Friday) basis the [International demining NGO] TOM will receive documentation ie:

- Spreadsheet
- IMSMA maps both imagery and UNIFIL
- DA reports as needed and
- LAF Reports (New targets) these were previously visited by [Other demining groups] EOD teams, I will attach also their findings.
Recommendations that current IMSMA and GIS issued to your organisation be utilised to further enhance information requirements.

**Cancellations**

If any task is deemed that no threat exists or the actual damage was caused by other means, then the Cancellation Process is to be used, as per the NTSG. These are to be filled in by the CLO and submitted to the [International demining NGO] TOM for review and passed to the Chief of Plans MACC SL.

**Cluster Clearance**

No clearance of cluster bombs is to take place unless they constitute an immediate threat to the community.

If cluster bombs are required to be removed/destroyed then a detailed search of the area is to be conducted and records kept detailing the type of munition, the quantity cleared, their location (by UTM).

Only qualified EOD personnel are required to destroy these items, if [International demining NGO] cannot destroy these items the MACC SL Chief of Plans will deploy a qualified EOD team if required.

**Demolitions**

All activities that involve any demolitions is to be per SOP and that these demolitions are to be reported to the MACC SL radio room at least 30mins prior to any action taken.

Any changes to these requirements are to be approved by the UNMACC SL before implementation.

Signed: Chief of Plans UNMACC SL; LAF Ops Officer, MACC SL/NDO

Accepted by organisation: TOM [International demining NGO].

**From Annex A**

[the only part of the report made available]

Task No: 6-015, RECCE 1: DA CBU No. 585
GR: 725,380.3689205
Start date 22/08/07
Nearest hospital: Najdh, 20km and 25 minutes away.
Clearance methodology: Technical Survey
BAC Team: RECCE 1
Last casevac exercise: 22-8-07
Date of last external QA: 22-9-07
Time of accident: 10:26
Location of accident: CBU 585
GR: 725380,3689205

Time of evacuation: 10:35
[Approx CASEVAC time: 34 minutes]

From photo story
[The victim was handling a device when the accident occurred. Another “gagged” device was close by.]

[The M77 partially detonated in the Victim’s hand, but the main charge did not explode. The picture below shows the device afterwards, with the firing pin and ribbon separated.]
[The copper cone of the shaped charge inside the M77 was visible at one end, and the high explosive fill at the other.]

[The Victim’s right hand was injured.]

[Pictures of the site and the prodding tools showed that clearance was being conducted, but there was no indication of any detectors that would have allowed sub-surface clearance.]

[Pictures of another disarmed M77 showed that this was not a non-intrusive survey. Technical Survey is usually intrusive, but the tasking order form the MAC into the order that “No” clearance be conducted - and this was stressed in Bold.]
[Pictures of the Victim's PPE showed an undamaged visor and a short frag-jacket with blood stains.]

[Pictures of the investigators at work showed that they did not wear PPE.]

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**Victim Report**

**Victim number:** 735  
**Name:** [Name removed]  
**Age:**  
**Gender:** Male  
**Status:** supervisory  
**Fit for work:** presumed  
**Compensation:** Not made available  
**Time to hospital:** 34 minutes  
**Protection issued:** Frag jacket, Long visor  
**Protection used:** Frag jacket, Long visor

**Summary of injuries:**  
minor Hand

**COMMENT:** No Medical report was made available.

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**Analysis**

The instructions from the MACC SL were ambiguous and open to interpretation. The instructions stressed that “NO” clearance was to be conducted, but the task was Technical Survey, which generally involves making investigative lanes into a suspect area. This appears to have been done visually.

It is possible to see whether an exposed M77 has armed, and it is routine for many demining groups to “gag” unarmed items so that they cannot “arm”, and then destroy them later.

The M77 involved in this accident did not detonate properly and may have been damaged. If this was visible, it would imply that the Victim made an error by touching it. But if the damage was not visible, the Victim was just extremely lucky.

The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the Victim may have been operating as instructed and the accident occurred due to a device that was damaged and unstable, but not obviously so.

The secondary cause is listed as a “Field Control inadequacy” because the Victim may have been exceeding his brief by the removal of multiple items that did not present an immediate risk to civilians. The removal of some easy to locate devices is sometimes called “cherry-

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6
picking” and frowned upon because there is often a “footprint” from a cluster munition strike – and the removal of devices can erase the footprint and mean that a far wider area has to be cleared later.

The failure of the demining group’s investigators to wear PPE at the site is common, but sets a bad example.

This record will be updated if more information becomes available later.