

11-1-2009

DDASaccident601

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 04/03/2011	Accident number: 601
Accident time: 14:45	Accident Date: 01/11/2009
Where it occurred: Task # AF/0109/00173/11, 1F 0145, Tangi Syedan village, Chahar Asyab district, Kabul Province	Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)	Secondary cause: Other (?)
Class: Handling accident	Date of main report:
ID original source: OPS, 14/01-29	Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: 40mm rifle grenade	Ground condition: not applicable
Date record created:	Date last modified: 04/03/2011
No of victims: 1	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. This record will be revised as more information becomes available.

The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)

File: OPS, 14/01-29

Date: 02 December 2009

Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] 01-18
DEMINE ACCIDENT

Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] DT-18 demining accident occurred on 01 November 2009 in Tangi Syedan village, Chahar Asyab district of Kabul province.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group]- DT-18 DEMINE ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] DT-18. The accident occurred at 02:45 hours, 01 November 2009 in Task # AF/0109/00173/11,1F 0145 located in Tangi Syedan village, Chahar Asyab district of Kabul Province.

SUMMARY:

Task # AF/0109100173/MF 0145 is an anti-personnel mine contaminated area; the mines were planted by Russian troops during 1981-1984 in order to secure their military installation from attacks of the Mujahidin. The clearance operation was started there by [Demining group] DT-18, on 24 August 2009 along with support of MDU-01. So far, the team destroyed totally 32 AP mines and more than 1575 different types of UXO.

500m away to the east side of this task there is an area which is currently using by NATO, ANA, ANP and some security companies as a range practice area. On 28 Oct 2009, [Demining group] DT-18 was informed by military people that they will have range practice as three days in a week during the morning shift, so in coordination with central AMAC it was decided that the team change their operation hours from morning to after noon shift.

On 1st Nov 2009, at 02:45 pm during the rest time, [the Victim] a deminer of mentioned team found an unknown item and tried to touch it. According to the investigation report, the item was a rifle Grenade of 40mm which was exploded as a result of irresponsible action of the victim deminer. As it was the break time of the team and the deminer was without visor and PPE, therefore, he lost his right hand, left eye and sustained jaw and leg fracture.

The exploded item was a new type of UXO and most probably was left from NATO military range practice in already cleared area.

CONCLUSIONS:

Weak supervision of command group who failed to properly control the team members during the break time and irresponsible action of victim deminer who touched unknown object were the contributing factors to this accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following points are to be considered:

A It is the responsibilities of respective IP's operations department to make sure that a proper system of command and control exists in the field.

- B. Prior to start clearance operations, the demining team is to check the cleared area for any potential risk of UXO in such problematic sites.
- C. Revision training should be held to the team in terms of risk assessment and risk mitigation in relation to Mine Action.
- D. The deminers should not touch any unknown item; instead they have to inform the command group for further necessary actions.
- E. If the same concern of range practice by any source close to any demining site exists, then the demining team should immediately inform their concerned organization for further appropriate decision.
- F. Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to be submitted to MACCA operations department by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue date of this letter.

Victim Report

Victim number: 784	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: deminer	Fit for work: no
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Not recorded	Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: severe Head; severe Leg
 AMPUTATION/LOSS: Hand, Eye Left
 COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as *Inadequate training* because the investigators suggest that the deminers need training to deal with the new live ordnance left in a cleared area by NATO forces. The secondary cause is listed as *Other* because the threat was unexpected and in a cleared area, so the Victim may have felt safe to presume that anything left around was harmless.

The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the UN to share it with others is regrettable.