

9-14-2009

DDASaccident657

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 06/03/2011	Accident number: 657
Accident time: 10:55	Accident Date: 14/09/2009
Where it occurred: MF001, Laghakai village, Kahmard district, Bamyan, Province	Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Victim inattention (?)	Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident	Date of main report: Not recorded
ID original source: OPS, 14/01-25	Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: Fuze	Ground condition: not applicable
Date record created:	Date last modified: 06/03/2011
No of victims: 1	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)

inadequate training (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. This record will be revised as more information becomes available.

The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)

File: OPS, 14/01-25

Date: November 30, 2009

Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] — CBDT-6 DEMINING ACCIDENT

Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] CBDT-6 demining accident occurred on 14 Sep 2009 in Laghakai village, Kohmard district of Barnyan Province.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT6 -DEMINING ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by AMAC Central to investigate demining accident involving [the Victim] the Section Leader of [Demining group] CBDT-06. The accident occurred at 10:55 hours on 14 September 2009 at minefield number AF/1311/28883/MF001, located in Laghakai village Kahmard district of Bamyan province.

SUMMARY:

Minefield # 001 is located at Tapi-e-Surkh Laghakai village which was front line between belligerent groups of the civil war (Taliban and Northern alliance) in 1996. From the military point of view this area was important for both sides of the conflict faction, therefore, was hand to hand between both parties and both sides laid AP mines around their positions to block the attacks of their opposition. Around 7 accidents happened on civilian and 6 on animal there.

On 14 September 2009, a deminer of CBDT-06 was busy in his clearance lane, he detected an unknown device and informed his respective section leader who had 18 year demining experience to check it. The section leader took the device with his left hand from the clearance lane, he started to remove the soil from it, but in this time it was exploded and caused injuries to his left hand fingers. Unprofessional dealing with unknown device caused this accident.

CONCLUSIONS:

The carelessness of section leader caused the accident. It is clearly visible that he has ignored the safety precaution and procedure described in [Demining group] SOPs/AMAS.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following points are to be considered:

- a. Unprofessional dealing with mine/UX0 should be avoided as they will have undesirable consequences behind.
- b. It is the responsibility of everybody working in demining teams to firmly adhere to safety measures.
- c. Refresher training is recommended for the team.
- d. The [Demining group] Operations department is to take more professional steps to build up a strong capacity of command and control mechanism within their teams under a sound quality assurance system.
- e. Feedback on any preventive and constrictive actions taken by [Demining group] is required to be submitted to the MACCA office by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue date of this letter.

Victim Report

Victim number: 840	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: supervisory	Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Not recorded	Protection used: Not recorded

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: severe Hand

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as *Victim Inattention* because it seems that an experienced supervisor held an unknown device in his hand to clean it without considering the consequences. The secondary cause is listed as *Inadequate training* because the investigators recommended that refresher training should be conducted.

The device type (fuse) is inferred from the fact that it was sensitive to disturbance and caused relatively small injuries for an explosive device held in the hand.

The "Inadequate investigation" listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the UN to share it with others is regrettable.