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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 07/07/2011	Accident number: 715
Accident time: 15:30	Accident Date: 25/07/2007
Where it occurred: CBU 771, Nr Majdal Selim, Demining group HQ, Kudmouse, Tyre	Country: Lebanon
Primary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)	Secondary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident	Date of main report: 01/08/2007
ID original source: 012/2007	Name of source: UN MACC SL
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: Submunitions and explosive	Ground condition: not recorded
Date record created:	Date last modified: 07/07/2011
No of victims: 0	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inconsistent statements (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
non injurious accident (?)

Accident report

The report of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files. Its conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has been lost. The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files are held on record. Text in [] is editorial.

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 012/07, FOR ARMOR GROUP ([Demining Group]) INCIDENT AT [Demining Group] HEADQUARTERS, KADMOUSE 25th July 2007

1. BACKGROUND

Date: 25th July 2007

Time of Incident: 1530hrs approx.

Location: [Demining Group], HQ, Kadmouse, Tyre, Lebanon

Task: N/A

UTM of Task: N/A

Task Start / Finish Date: N/A

Organisation Involved: [Demining group]

Unit: N/A

Supervisor: N/A

Reported by: [Name removed], Ops Officer, [Demining group]

Reported to: [Name removed], Ops Officer, MACC SL

Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1545hrs approx.

Organisation POC: [Name removed], Ops Officer, [Demining Group].

Investigation Date/Time: 25th July and 8th August 07.

Investigation Location: [Demining group], HQ,

Investigation Team: Lt [Name removed], LAF/LMAC Ops Officer, [Name removed], MACC SL C of QA.

ERW Type: TNT bulk explosive (approx. 5-8kgs+)

Accreditation Details: N/A

2. DETAILS OF INCIDENT

On the 25th Jul 07 at approximately 1545hrs [Demining Group] reported to the MACC that they had located an amount of bulk explosive, 5-8kgs, at their HQ in Kudmose, Tyre. The explosive was located after a driver discarded a cigarette into tree/bushes adjacent to the [Demining Group] HQ office entrance. See photos at Annex B. A fire was initiated by the discarded cigarette, once the fire was extinguished an amount of explosive was then identified and located. This totalled approx. 5-7kg in weight.

[Name removed], [Demining Group] Ops Officer reported the incident to [Name removed], MACC Ops Officer and [Name removed], MACC SL C of QA.

At approx. 1630hrs on the 25th July 2007, the MACC SL investigation team, comprising Lt [Name removed], LAF Ops Officer and [Name removed], along with [Name removed], departed for [Demining Group] HQ. After arriving at the [Demining Group] office the MACC SL investigation team was briefed by [Name removed] and examined the explosives and the area where the items were located.

Evidence

The area of the fire and the location of the explosives are adjacent to the right side of the [Demining Group] HQ building in a garden area. The area forms part of a garden and lawn

area. A tree indicated the fire location and there were large and small portion of the explosive still remaining on the surface area totalling approx. 5-7kgs.

Interview with [Demining Group] [Name removed]

See Annex D for a summary of the statements taken from all [Demining Group] team four (4) searchers on the 30th Jul 2007. [Annex D was not made available.] In attendance was [Name removed], [Demining Group] Ops Manager, Capt [Name removed] and [Name removed] C of QA. In summary there was some confusion amongst the searchers as to what type of clearance occurred on this specific area. Indications from the searchers of what clearance was conducted at this area of the site are: no clearance to sub-surface clearance occurred in this area. At the request of [Name removed] all personnel [Demining Group] team 4, [Name removed, demining group supervisor] and the BOI deployed to the site for a final assessment to confirm what occurred.

During this site visit all searchers were interviewed separately at the area in question. All searchers confirmed that the area was cleared in approx. 30-90 minutes, this included site marking and sub surface search of the area. In addition that [demining group supervisor] was in a hurry to leave the site and they had been told to search the area very quickly. This was confirmed by a review of the daily work sheets. See Annex D for full details of the daily work sheets. [Annexes were not made available.]

Interview with [demining group supervisor]

[Demining group supervisor] was interviewed on the 30/31 Jul 2007. During the interview on the 30th Jul 07, it was confirmed by [demining group supervisor] that area had been cleared sub surface by [Demining Group] team 4 and that he could not explain why they had missed the two items. A follow up interview was conducted on the 31st Jul, additional personnel, [demining group supervisor] and Lt Col [demining group supervisor], LAF, LMAC were in attendance. During this interview [demining group supervisor] confirmed that although the area was sub surface searched, the procedure and clearance method were not in accordance with [Demining Group] SOPs and further he was in a hurry to vacate the site as he had worked in this area for 6 months or more. He also confirmed he spent no more than 1-3 hours clearing this portion of the site.

Interview with [Name removed], UN MACC SL Ops

[Name removed] confirmed that he had visited the site on a number of occasions and that during these visit discussion, with [demining group supervisor] had occurred regarding the clearance of the site, and the need to clear this particular area of the site. The area in question had not been cleared as had been directed by [Name removed]. During a final operational visit which was requested by [demining group supervisor] the need to clear this area to fade was again stressed and the area was then programmed for clearance.

Background

CBU 771 is located within a mixture of residential houses and agriculture land, the land being farmed for wheat. The CBU is located near Majdal Selim.

[Demining Group] commenced BAC operations at CBU 771 on 5th Feb 07 and between this date and the 20th Mar 07, surface and sub surface clearance was conducted. The task was internal suspend from the 6th Feb until the 13th Mar 07 when it was restarted and again thought completed on the 20th Mar 07. However due to additional information on the extend of the strike area, additional clearance was required at the site and this commenced 13th Jun 07 and was completed on the 22nd Jun 07. See daily work sheets for details at Annex B. [Not made available].

3. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

2 July:

1300: [Name removed] reported to the MACC SL two items were located on CBU 771 during an [Demining Group] completions visit.

1430: Site visit by investigation team

1530: Investigation team departs site.

7 July: [Demining Group] internal investigation received at the MACC SL, see Annex A.

27th Jul: Additional information regarding the incident was received by MACC SL regarding the clearance of the area where the items were located.

30th Jul: 0700-1500: [Demining Group] BAC Team 4 was interviewed regarding the site clearance, including Team Supervisor at [Demining Group] HQ. This was followed by a site visit to the CBU location.

31st Jul: 1030-1300: Follow up interview with PM [Demining Group] and Team 4 Supervisor at [Demining Group] HQ.

4. CONCLUSIONS

On 2nd Jul the [Demining Group] completed team reported that two items (M77 and M42) had been located in a sub surface cleared area during a final [Demining Group] completions visit before handing the site to the MACC. The items were located during the harvesting of a wheat crop by the local land owner.

The area was clearly recorded as being cleared sub surface.

The items were located on the surface.

The area was not cleared sub-surface in accordance with the [Demining Group] SOPs or the NTSGs.

The incident is therefore, considered as **Preventable**.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER ACTIONS

The MACC SL investigation team agrees with the [Demining Group] internal investigation report 'Para a' of the recommendations only and further recommends the following additional requirements are implemented with effect receipt this report:

a. [Name removed] "Operational Accreditation" to conduct BAC operations in South Lebanon is suspended, with immediate effect. In addition, due to the serious nature of the incident it is also recommended that [Demining Group] consider taking appropriate disciplinary action against [Name removed].

Operational Accreditation to conduct BAC for [Demining group supervisor] in South Lebanon is suspended until an appropriate level of revision and re-training in clearance requirements has been completed. This is to included appropriate command and control requirements and the correct methods of conducting BAC clearance operations, in accordance with [Demining Group] SOPs and the NTSGs

b. [Demining Group] BAC Team 4, "Operational Accreditation, to conduct BAC operations in South Lebanon is suspended, with immediate effect.

Operational Accreditation to conduct BAC for [Demining Group] BAC Team 4 in South Lebanon is suspended until an appropriate level of revision and re-training in clearance requirements has been completed.

c. The area in question is to be re-cleared using the appropriate sub-surface clearance procedures, in accordance with [Demining Group] SOPs and the NTSGs, until fade or the MACC Ops Officer confirms not additional clearance is required in this site.

d. There is a further aspect to this incident in that not only did it happen but it was recorded in [Demining Group] daily worksheets without any internal comment such that the entire site was about to be presented for completion. This is considered as significant as the incident itself and that it is a reflection of poor internal management procedures and quality control. MACC SL expects [Demining Group] to take all necessary action to resolve this problem to avoid further similar problems in the future.

Signed: [Three names removed] UN MACC SL

1st Aug 2007

Enclosures: [Not made available]

1. Annex A [Demining Group] Internal Investigation Report
2. Annex B [Demining Group] Completion Reports
3. Annex C [Demining Group] Team 4 witness Statements
4. Annex D [Demining Group] Daily Work Sheets
5. Annex E Site Photographs

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a *Management control Inadequacy* because the investigators suspended accreditation from the demining groups involved because they had not ensured that their field managers acted in accordance with SOPs. An area was recorded as subsurface cleared and was not even visually searched. The record was made by the Field supervisor (accreditation also suspended), so the secondary cause is listed as a *Field control inadequacy*.

The *Inadequate investigation* listed under Notes refers to the fact that the record appears to conflate two separate incidents in a way that is entirely confused. This is surprising because the outcome (suspension of working accreditation) was unusual and may have been subject to appeal, so the reasons for the action should have been carefully recorded.