1-19-2009

DDASaccident727

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 08/07/2011  Accident number: 727
Accident time: 10:15  Accident Date: 19/01/2009
Where it occurred: AF/0718/08510, MF017, Nargaci Village, Chamkani District, Paktiya Province
Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)  Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment (?)
Class: Excavation accident  Date of main report: 18/02/2009
ID original source: None  Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]  Ground condition: not recorded
Mine/device: PMN AP blast  Date last modified: 08/07/2011
Date record created:
No of victims: 1  No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:  Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded  Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:  Map north:
Map scale:  Map series:
Map edition:  Map sheet:
Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
use of pick (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 18th Feb 2009

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT - 05 DEMINING ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by AMAC Gardiz to investigate the de-mining accident involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] DT-05. The accident occurred at 10:15 hours on 19 January 2008 [sic] at minefield number AF/0718/08510/MF017, located in Nargaci village, Chamkani district of Paktiya province.

SUMMARY:

Minefield # AF/0718/08510/MF017 is an anti-personnel contaminated area comprised of a mine belts located on Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The area was mined by Russian backed government to protect the Chamkani district HQ of Paktya province from the attacks of their opposition (Mujahedeen). This minefield is located on the south side around 600m away from Chamkani district HQ, and in a close vicinity i.e. around 300m to the village.

During the period of operations [Demining group] DT-05 cleared 19670m2 area and found/destroyed 32 AP mines and 10 SAA of ERW.

On 19 January 2009 at 10:15 10 hours while [the Victim] was busy in excavating a detected signal, the explosion occurred due to PMN mine and caused the accident. Unfortunately as he was not fully dressed with PPE, therefore, he has got severe injuries on his face and lost his both eyes and some minor injuries on his hand and leg. According to the investigation report, it seems that he was working with pick instead of standard excavation tool and started excavation directly from the centre of the signal.

CONCLUSIONS:

Poor supervision, carelessness of de-miner and use of wrong tools were contributing factors to this accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following points are to be considered:

- The command group should strictly control the team members to work in accordance with set procedures and use standard tools during prodding and excavation.
- Full PPE must be worn correctly during operations on a hazard area. There is no exception to the involved personnel.
- The de-miner should pinpoint the signal properly, mark the point with care and attention and then start excavation according to the procedure.
- The team should undergo refresher training with focus on prodding and excavation drill and team supervision.
This is the second accident of the same team with the scenarios in the similar minefield; therefore, it is highly recommended that the internal QA to be strengthened and also frequent external QA visits to be conducted on the teams working there.

[Demining group] management is to take appropriate action to improve the command and control ability of the team command group.

Victim Report

Victim number: 919
Name: [Name removed]
Age: 
Gender: Male
Status: deminer
Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not made available
Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Frontal apron
Protection used: None
Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Hand; minor Leg; severe Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eyes both
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "severe injuries on his face and lost his both eyes and some minor injuries on his hand and leg".

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the Victim was working with the wrong tool and without wearing PPE and his errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that there was not enough internal QA and that the management need to improve the "command and control ability of the team command group".

The "Inadequate investigation" listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.