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Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 11/07/2011	Accident number: 734
Accident time: 10:40	Accident Date: 15/06/2009
Where it occurred: Bagram Air Field (BAF), Bagram District, Parwan Province	Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)	Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment (?)
Class: Excavation accident	Date of main report: 18/08/2009
ID original source: None	Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)	Ground condition: not recorded
Date record created:	Date last modified: 11/07/2011
No of victims: 1	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate survey (?)
use of pick (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 18th August 2009

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DEMINING ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation was conducted by [Demining group] to find out the causes of demining accident involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] MDD1 team working in Bagram Air Field (BAF). The accident occurred on 15 June 2009 at a minefield/fence inside the BAF, Bagram district of Parwan province.

SUMMARY:

[Demining group] is subcontracted by US-DOD for mine clearance in Bagram Air Field. On 15 June 2009, when the [Demining group] US-DOD related team was working on a BAC task inside the BAF, experienced an uncontrolled detonation. The accident happened when [the Victim] the deminer was excavating a detected signal using a small pick; he found a metal plate and decided to excavate beneath the metal plate, during the excavation drill his excavation tool might touched the mine and caused it to go off.

The task was counted as a BAC task, the deminer [the Victim] was not taking due care and worn the PPE and eye protective glass instead of full face protective visor. The use of lower protection level caused injuries to the deminer's face, but his eyes were remained safe. He has also got some injuries on his hands and arm with broken bones.

CONCLUSIONS:

The main contributing factors to this accident were the assessment of mentioned area as a BAC task and the carelessness of deminer, as he did not take due care during the excavation drill and working without having a full face protective visor. When a sub-surface BAC search is involved, then the full face protective visor with other elements of PPE should be worn (AMAS 22.6.1.b).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

However, the [Demining group] has taken appropriate actions, but as a lessons learned the following points are to be considered by all demining teams:

- Full level of protection should be considered during the clearance operations both in BAC sub-surface clearance and mine clearance activities.
- The de-miners should not hurry up during the operations and be careful while conducting investigation on any detected signals.
- A comprehensive assessment, technical survey and planning for the clearance of each single task should be conducted prior to commencement of clearance operations.

Victim Report

Victim number: 927	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: deminer	Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Frontal apron Goggles	Protection used: Frontal apron; goggles

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: severe Arm; severe Face; severe Hands

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "injuries to the deminer's face, but his eyes were remained safe.. "injuries on his hands and arm with broken bones".

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a *Field Control Inadequacy* because the investigators found that the task had been wrongly assigned by survey and this error was not corrected. Despite the fact the subsurface excavation of mines was taking place, the Victim was permitted not to wear the approved PPE for demining. The secondary cause is listed as *Inadequate equipment* because the use of a pick-axe to excavate a mine delicately is not appropriate. The injuries included broken bones that probably resulted from the deminer being struck by parts of the pick-axe.

The "Inadequate investigation" listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The summary gives little detail and does not list the medical treatment or the corrective measures taken by the demining group. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make Board of Inquiry reports widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over this than those internationals who presume a greater responsibility.