

7-11-2007

DDASaccident745

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 11/07/2011	Accident number: 745
Accident time: 07:40	Accident Date: 11/07/2007
Where it occurred: CBU 203, See map coordinates	Country: Lebanon
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)	Secondary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident	Date of main report: 11/07/2007
ID original source: None	Name of source: UN MACC SL
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: M77 submunition	Ground condition: agricultural (recent) soft
Date record created:	Date last modified: 11/07/2011
No of victims: 0	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: UTM: 707270/3679376	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)

inadequate training (?)

non injurious accident (?)

Accident report

A brief QA report of this incident was made available in 2008. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LAF SAMPLING TEAM INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR [Demining group] BAC
SUBSURFACE CLEARED SITE AT TASK CBU- 203

Date: 11.07.2007

1. BACKGROUND OF TASK

Task Start date: 17 October 2006

Task end date: 21 December 2006

Task: CBU- 203,

Task Dossier 7 - 002

UTM of Task: 707270 3679376

Organisation Involved: [Demining group]

Reported by: [Name removed] &LAF Sampling Team

Reported to: Mr. [Name removed] (Operations Officer MACC SL), Mr. [Name removed] (Chief of QA MACC SL), Lt. [Name removed], Mr. [Name removed] [Demining group] TFM

ERW Type found: US M-77 Submunition

2. DETAILS OF ITEMS FOUND on SubSurface [Demining group] BAC Task

Evidence

Sampling Team located submunition M77 on CBU 203 in cleared and completed area by [Demining group].

Item found in depth 5cm.

Interview with [Name removed] [Demining group] TFM

[Name removed] [Demining group] TFM arrived on site after the item reported to be found in [Demining group] previously cleared task, on his arrival myself as Supervisor ([Name removed]), LAF Sampling Team, TL, LAF Planning Officer, MACC SL Operations Officer and MACC SL Chief of QA section went on location of item M 77 found and [Name removed] [Demining group] TFM agreed that item found was inside the cleared task by [Demining group] subsurface

Photos of Item M77 located in CBU 203



[M77 as found]

[Other photographs showed significant other amounts of metal found during the check. The demining group was clearing with metal-detectors so should have left cleared ground metal-free.]



Reported by: [Name removed] QA Officer, LAF Sampling Team Site Supervisor.

[No record of the corrective action required of the demining group was made available.]

Analysis

The primary and secondary cause of this accident are listed as *Field control inadequacy* because the demining group was clearing using Minelab metal detectors and apparently left significant metal behind, including at least one M77 submunition. The only explanation for so much metal being left is that the search was not conducted appropriately and parts of the Task area were not searched. This is the “Inadequate training” referenced under Notes.

Given the time lapse between the end of the clearance and the QA check (seven months), it is possible that some of the metal was placed after the event. It is also possible that some came from the destruction of devices at the end of the Task (although this should have been collected to prevent its causing trouble during the QA check).

The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full report with some explanation of how the device was missed and what was done to correct the situation.