5-10-2009

DDASaccident748

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 11/07/2011  Accident number: 748
Accident time: 10:35  Accident Date: 10/05/2009
Where it occurred: AF/1023/08097, MF0086, Bayan Khail Village, Jaji District, Paktya Province  Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)  Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident  Date of main report: 16/06/2009
ID original source: None  Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]  Ground condition: steep slope
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)  Date last modified: 11/07/2011
Date record created:  No of victims: 1  No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:  

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
protective equipment not worn (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-02 DEMINING ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC S-East to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] the De-miner [Demining group] DT-02. The accident occurred at 10:35 hours on 10 May 2009 at minefield number AF/1023/08097/MF0086, located in Bayan Khail village, Jaji district of Paktya province.

SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF/1023/08097/MF 0086 is located in Bayan Khail village Jaji district of Paktya province. From the military point of view the Jaji district was one of the strategic places during the Russian invasion in Afghanistan, as it is located on the border with Pakistan and had been using as a major access way by Mujahedeen therefore, Russian troops heavily laid mines in different parts of this district. The majority of minefields in Jaji district are on the hillsides as it is a mountainous district.

On 10 May 2009 at 10:35 [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] DT-02 was excavating on a detected signal in his clearance lane where he hit the top of an anti-personnel mine by bayonet and it caused the mine going off. The procedure of investigating a pinpointed signal was ignored by this deminer and he was working carelessly. As a result this accident the deminer got several injuries to different parts of body i.e. both hands and thighs. The deminer had only used the jacket of his PPE without skirt. If he would wear the skirt too, his lower limbs would have been protected. Investigation shows that the helmet and visor has been used properly.

As the majority of minefields in Jaji district are located on the hillsides, so the likelihood of mines with changed position exists due to raining hence a comprehensive site operations plan was required to consider all the predictable scenarios during the clearance operations e.g. mines direction changes, mine displacement etc. But this point was missed in the site operations plan.

CONCLUSIONS:
The carelessness of deminer, poor command and control and poor management of the team caused the accident to happen.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
• As outlined in investigation report, [Demining group] operations department is recommended to conduct special revision training for this team and the training package should be shared with the MACCA OPS department prior to start the training.
• The investigation team also recommended for provision of mechanical support to demining teams in Jaji that which needs to be considered.
• Internal QA is to be strengthened and focus on main contributing factors to an accident.
• The management of [Demining group] is requested to respond to MACCA with a management solution that, identify why this accident happened and how they can prevent the recurrence of such accident in the future. We expect to receive [Demining group]’s official response by no later than 24th June 2009.
Victim Report

Victim number: 939  
Name: [Name removed]  
Age:  
Status: deminer  
Compensation: Not made available  
Protection issued: Frontal apron  
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long visor  
Gender: Male  
Fit for work: not known  
Time to hospital: Not made available  

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: severe Hands; severe Legs  
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "the deminer got several injuries to different parts of body i.e. both hands and thighs".

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the task planning was inadequate and that the Victim was not wearing appropriate PPE and not working with appropriate caution, but these errors were not corrected. The failure to plan the Task properly was also a significant Management Control Inadequacy. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators recommended that refresher training was necessary.

The PPE "skirt" mentioned in the report is not explained but is presumed to be an extension to the frontal blast protection commonly used.

The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.