7-8-2009

DDASaccident752

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 14/07/2011  Accident number: 752
Accident time: 09:19  Accident Date: 08/07/2009
Where it occurred: AF/1506/13176, H-5157, Pusht-e- Band Village, Khoram Saharbagh District, Samangan Province  Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)  Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment (?)
Class: Excavation accident  Date of main report: 11/08/2009
ID original source: None  Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]  Ground condition: hidden root mat steep slope
Mine/device: PMN AP blast  Date record created: 14/07/2011
No of victims: 1  No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:  Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded  Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:  Map north:
Map scale:  Map series:
Map edition:  Map sheet:
Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
vegetation clearance problem (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 11th August 2009

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] MU-16 DEMINING ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by AMAC North to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] MU-16. The accident occurred at 0919hrs on 08 July 2009 at minefield number AF/1506/13176/H- 5157, located in Pusht-e-Band (Burma) village, Khoram & Saharbagh district of Samangan Province.

SUMMARY:

Minefield # AF/1506/13176/H- 5157 is located on a hill about 500 metres away from the village of Burma, which was front line between belligerent groups during internal war. From the military point of view this area was important for both sides of the conflict factions; therefore, the AP mines were laid there in 1991 by Sayed Kayan militia to stop the attacks of their opposition. Four accidents occurred on animal from 1996 to 1998. However, the area is mined but it is partially cultivated by villagers.

On 1st July 2009 MU-16 of [Demining group] started clearance operation on mentioned task. On 08 July 2009 at 0919hrs while [the Victim] was investigating a signal in his clearance lane, he found two bullets. He re-checked the spot and found the same signal, this process repeated for three times. Finally he found a root stump in the excavation trench with a thickness of around 2.5 cm and started to remove it, because it was blocking further excavation there. However the deminer had proper tool in his toolkit to cut such obstacles, but he tried to cut it with his scraper. After a few chops of the root stump with a scraper, a PMN mine was initiated and caused the accident. As it seems from the investigation report, the root was located on the pressure palate of mine, so it went off because of applying pressure on it. Fortunately as the deminer was fully dressed with PPE, he got some non-critical injuries. The visor was scratched by accident so he got some injuries on his face, but none of the injuries were severe.

CONCLUSIONS:

The accident occurred because of carelessness of deminer, as he wanted to remove the root stump for further investigation of a detected signal, but used the scraper instead of secateurs available in his toolkit. The command group did not pay attention to see and stop him from such action.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

However, the [Demining group] has taken disciplinary actions against the command group, but as a lessons learned the following points are to be considered by all demining teams:

- The command group should strictly control the de-miners during the operations and stop them when practicing in contrary to the organization SOP.
• The de-miners should not hurry up during the excavation, be careful and seek
guidance from their command group when facing such obstacles during the
operations.

• Demining organizations should make sure that their team deminers know the
approved safe working procedures and if needed refresher training is to be
conducted.

Victim Report

Victim number: 942
Age: [Name removed]
Status: deminer
Compensation: Not made available
Protection issued: Frontal apron
Long visor

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male
Fit for work: presumed
Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long visor worn raised

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Face
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "non-critical injuries. . . he got some
injuries on his face . . . none of the injuries were severe.

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the victim
was working with the wrong tool and with his visor raised and these errors were not corrected.
The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate equipment because the tool and visor were not
fit for purpose, which is a significant Management Control Inadequacy.

The "scraper" was used to chop, so probably refers to the mattock excavation tool favoured
by this demining group (with which there have been many accidents).

The investigators report that the accidentally scratched visor led to facial injuries – so
presumably it was not possible to see through, and so worn raised.

The "Inadequate investigation" listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report: the summary provided does not list the injuries, MEDEVAC details, or the corrective
measures taken, and so is inadequate. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make Board
of Inquiry reports widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It
is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over this than those
internationals who presume greater responsibility.