

5-6-2009

DDASaccident760

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 15/07/2011	Accident number: 760
Accident time: 11:55	Accident Date: 06/05/2009
Where it occurred: AF/0308/01635/[Demining group]-MF 027, Jan Qadam, Qala-e-Ahmad Khan Village, Bagram district	Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)	Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment (?)
Class: Excavation accident	Date of main report: 14/06/2009
ID original source: None	Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast	Ground condition: not recorded
Date record created:	Date last modified: 15/07/2011
No of victims: 1	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
use of shovel (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting

being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 14th June 2009

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-03 DEMINING ACCIDENT

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by the AMAC Central region to investigate the de-mining accident involving [the Victim] the De-miner of [Demining group] DT-03. The accident occurred at 11:55 hours on 06 May 2009 at minefield number AF/0308/01635/[Demining group]-MF 027, located in Jan Qadam area of Qala-e-Ahmad Khan village, Bagram district of province.

SUMMARY:

Minefield # AF/0308/01635/[Demining group]-MF027 is an anti-personnel contaminated site around Bagram Airbase. A mine belt was established by Russian forces in order to secure the Airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. [Demining group] has been sub-contracted by coalition forces to clear certain tasks around Bagram Airbase. MF # 027 is one of the contracted tasks to be cleared by [Demining group]. On 06th of May 2009 around 11:55 hrs [the Victim] the deminer of DT-03 was busy in excavation of a detected signal, his excavation tool touched a PMN2 mine and caused it to explode. As a result the deminer got some injuries on his neck.

According to the investigation report and as seems from the pictures of scene, the deminer was working with a big shovel. On 19th of April 09 one of the MACCA operations assistant found the team using big shovel and raised a non-conformity report, but the team leader and then the operations officer of [Demining group] did not accept the non-conformity report. However the problem was showed to be solved during the re-audit visits, but in reality it had not been solved and consequently the accident occurred.

CONCLUSIONS:

Obvious negligence of [Demining group] team from adherence to SOP and inattention of their operations department with regard to the use of non standard tools caused the accident to occur.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The [Demining group] operations department should take necessary action in order to stop using big shovels during the excavation.

MACCA expectation from [Demining group] management is to come up with a management solution to this problem and present their plan of action, for preventing recurrence of such accidents in the future, to the MACCA Chief of Operations by no later than 22nd of June 2009.

Victim Report

Victim number: 948	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: deminer	Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Frontal apron Long visor	Protection used: Not recorded

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: minor Neck

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . some injuries on his neck".

Analysis

The primary and cause of this accident is listed as a *Management Control Inadequacy* because the international demining group's Operations Manager refused to stop using a tool that the National Mine Action Authority maintained was dangerous, and seems to have compounded this error by trying to pretend otherwise. The secondary cause is listed as *Inadequate equipment* because the tool was not fit for purpose. [It is possible to expose a mine cautiously with a large shovel (see the excavation analysis in the GICHD Manual Demining Study) but only if it is used in the right way during area excavation, not metal-detector signal investigation.]

Neck injury is unusual, but so is using a shovel to expose a metal-detector reading. The investigators failed to record the PPE in use, which should have included (in Afghanistan at this time) a visor and frontal body protection that overlapped with the visor, so making neck injury hard to explain.

The "Inadequate investigation" listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report: the summary provided does not list the PPE used, injuries or MEDEVAC details, and so is inadequate. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make Board of Inquiry reports widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over this than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.