6-28-2005

DDASaccident772

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 19/07/2011
Accident time: 12:50
Where it occurred: Not recorded, see detailed map reference
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)
Class: Demolition accident
ID original source: None
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Fuze

Accident number: 772
Accident Date: 28/06/2005
Country: Sri Lanka
Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?)
Date of main report: 28/06/2005
Name of source: Demining group
Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
demolition site (explosives)

Date record created: 19/07/2011
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

No of victims: 1
No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:
Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: IIMASA
Coordinates fixed by: GPS
Map east: 024.05.72 E
Map north: 037.29.69 N
Map scale: Trincomallee
Map series: ABMP
Map edition: 01
Map sheet: 28
Map name: 1:50000

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
no independent investigation available (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is an IMSMA “tick-box” record. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

IMSMA record extracts
Place of accident: field [GPS recorded]

Cause of accident: "Without knowing the deminer was burning the device which caused the detonation."

Accident description:

“On the 28th of June 2005 [Demining group] QRT did a bulk demolition before going on stand-down. Most of the ammunition went to high order but 3 grenades went to low order and was destroyed by a second demolition.

After the team had located all metal scrap and rests from the destroyed ammunition by raking the whole demolition area and checking inside the broken sandbags that was used as protection during the demolition, they started to clean the area from the broken sandbags and vegetation. The team started to burn all the collected sandbags and vegetation.

In one of the sandbags apparently one fuse was stuck after the demolition and was not discovered by the deminers when they checked the area after non exploded devices. The fuse probably went off by the heat from the fire and injured a deminer in his left arm and in his back with small metal pieces.

The deminer was wearing his protective vest and visor but had his back turned towards the fire when the fuse exploded.

Device: Fuze, unknown.

Victim wore Protective equipment.

Victim Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim number:</th>
<th>958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name: [Name removed]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status: deminer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation: Not made available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection issued: Frontal apron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection used: Frontal apron; Long visor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to hospital: 30 minutes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: severe Arm; severe Back

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. Fragmentation injuries, presumed to require surgical removal, so "severe".

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as Unavoidable because it is likely that the Victim was working as directed, to approved SOPs, when the accident occurred. The secondary cause is listed as Victim Inattention because it is possible that the Victim did not search through the debris properly and so missed the fuze.
When burning demolition debris that may include explosive devices, it is obvious that safety distances should be maintained. With no report other than the notoriously inadequate IMSMA form, it is not clear whether the demining group drew any conclusions from the accident. They may have changed their working methods, which appear to have been questionable.

IMSMA accident records have always been over-simplified and entirely “Inadequate” for use in determining causes and so deriving any useful lessons from the events. The UN supported MAC in Sri Lanka has generally failed to conduct independent investigations and has failed (despite requests) to make any available records available to the DDAS, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. The Demining group involved in this accident is thanked for its transparency in making their record available.