

9-23-2007

DDASaccident776

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 19/07/2011	Accident number: 776
Accident time: 07:40	Accident Date: 23/09/2007
Where it occurred: AF/1203/12832/001, Samandaw Village, Ishkamish District, Takhar Province	Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)	Secondary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Class: Excavation accident	Date of main report: None
ID original source: (27)	Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]	
Mine/device: Grenade Fuze	Ground condition: not recorded
Date record created:	Date last modified: 19/07/2011
No of victims: 1	No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:	Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded	Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:	Map north:
Map scale:	Map series:
Map edition:	Map sheet:
Map name:	

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON 23 SEPTEMBER 2007

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Northeast (Kundoz) to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group] DT-05. The accident occurred on 23 September 2007 at 07:40 hours at task # AF/1203/12832/001 located in Samandaw village, Ishkamish district of Takhar province.

SUMMARY:

The mentioned minefield is part of an area which was contaminated by PMN/PMN2 mines during the conflict period of Northern Alliance and the Taliban. On 23 September 2007 while [Demining group] DT#5 was working in this MF as usual, [the Victim] one of the deminers detected a signal at 7:40 hrs and started excavation on it. While removing the excavated soil, an explosion happened and as a result he lost two fingers of right hand. The victim deminer had worn his PPE and visor which saved him receiving harms to vital part of his body like chest, abdomen and face. After applying first aid by the team's medic the casualty was evacuated to hospital for further treatments.

CONCLUSIONS

The following points were found by investigation team:

- The deminer was working carelessly as his hand tool touched the fuse of a grenade, because the accident occurred while he was removing the soft excavated soil; it reveals that during the excavation he has not found the fuse (the fuse has missed), which subsequently exploded by touching the hand tool.
- The team had received two digital cameras from [Demining group] headquarter but none of these cameras were available at the field. According to the Assistant Team Leader (Acting Team Leader) one of these cameras was with the team leader and the other was with team admin who both were on leave.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following points are to be considered:

- Refresher training with focusing on excavation and prodding is recommended for the team and the training is to be fully controlled and monitored by the relevant AMAC.
- The command group shall pay full attention to all parties and advise them to work according to approved SOP.
- Digital camera must always be available with the team, and the team's field equipment must be handed over to the replacement whenever any of the command group members is going on leave.
- Increase the frequency of internal QA visits by [Demining group] relevant field office is recommended to make sure the teams are working according to approved standard.

Victim Report

Victim number: 962	Name: [Name removed]
Age:	Gender: Male
Status: deminer	Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not made available	Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Frontal apron Long visor	Protection used: Frontal apron; Long visor

Summary of injuries:

AMPUTATION/LOSS: Fingers

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . he lost two fingers of right hand".

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as *Inadequate training* because the investigators recommend that training in safe excavation techniques was required. The secondary cause is listed as a *Field Control Inadequacy* because the investigators recommended more frequent QA checks to ensure that the deminers were working appropriately.

The "Inadequate investigation" listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.