3-17-2008

DDASaccident783

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database

AID

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.libjmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd

Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons

Recommended Citation

https://commons.libjmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/982

This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 19/07/2011  Accident number: 783
Accident time: 09:32  Accident Date: 17/03/2008
Where it occurred: AF/0308/01637,
                   MF0180, Qalai Ahmad
                   Khan Village, Bagram
                   District, Parwan
                   Province

Primary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)
Secondary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)

Class: Other  Date of main report: None
ID original source: (4)  Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]  Ground condition: not recorded
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)  Date last modified: 19/07/2011
No of victims: 1  No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:  Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded  Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:  Map north:
Map scale:  Map series:
Map edition:  Map sheet:
Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate area marking (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT INVOLVING [Demining group] DT# 02

INTRODUCTION:

An investigation team was convened by Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] the acting section leader of [Demining group] DT # 02. The accident occurred at 09:32 hours on 17 March 2008 at task # AF/0308/01637/MF0180 located in Qalai Ahmad Khan Village, Bagram District of Parwan Province.

SUMMARY:

MF# AF/0308/01637/MF0180 is part of a contaminated area which was recorded by LIS as SHA#3 of impacted community # 1222. The area is contaminated with AP mines by Russian forces for security of aircraft ammunition store located at the area during the year 1984.

On 17 March 2008, at 09:32 am, a demining accident happened on [the Victim] a deminer of [Demining group] DT#2 who was appointed as acting section leader of section-02.

According to claim of team, while the acting section leader was checking a lane cleared by one of team party and wanted to fix the location of a marking stone suddenly the stone fell down to un-cleared area and hit top of a mine/UXO causing it to explode.

The acting section leader was dressed with PPE, but his visor was up, and as a result the victim acting section leader got injuries on his eye, leg, parts of his body.

After applying first aid at the site the victim was shifted to Bagram Airbase Egyptian Hospital. The victim was admitted to the hospital at about 10:00 am and as his wounds were not much serious, he was discharged from the hospital next day of the accident.

CONCLUSIONS:

A. The accident point which was shown to investigation team is located at the vicinity of safety margin of two meters wide clearance lane. During clearance of the lane the relevant party has not found any hazardous component and also there is no any visible hazardous item around the cleared lane.

B. The investigation team did not find any sign of uncontrolled detonation or any debris of the exploded item caused the accident in and around the crater of the explosion; this reveals that this crater has not been created by explosion of any hazardous device.

C. The scenario stated by the team did not seem to be true; as If the stone has fallen from left hand of the victim, left side of his leg/body had to be injured, but the wounds of the victim are in front of his body and also his accompanying person has not received any injuries.
Victim Report

Victim number: 969
Name: [Name removed]
Age: 
Gender: Male
Status: supervisory
Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not made available
Time to hospital: Not made available
Protection issued: Frontal apron
Protection used: Frontal apron

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Body; minor Eye; minor Leg
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . acting section leader got injuries on his eye, leg, parts of his body".

Analysis

The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as Management Control Inadequacy because the Victim was a Field supervisor and the investigators found that the details surrounding the accident were fabricated. The group’s management bears responsibility for controlling its field supervisors and ensuring that accidents are reported honestly so that lessons to avoid repetition can be derived from them. The Lessons Learned summary does not include recommendations for the demining group’s management to change, and so lacks any Lessons Learned - which is an unusual omission.

The device in this accident is recorded as an AP blast mine because it was likely to have been a pressure operated device and the injuries are similar to AP blast injuries.

The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.