9-9-2007

DDASaccident788

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 22/07/2011
Accident time: 11:30
Accident number: 788
Accident Date: 09/09/2007

Where it occurred: AF/2801/28745, MF040, Dragon Valley Village, Centre District, Bamyan Province
Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Victim inattention (?)
Secondary cause: Management/control inadequacy (?)

Class: Other
ID original source: (28)
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)
Ground condition: rocks/stones

Date record created: Date last modified: 22/07/2011
ID original source: (28)
Name of source: UNMACCA

No of victims: 1
No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude:
Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded
Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:
Map north:
Map scale:
Map series:
Map edition:
Map sheet:
Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [Demining group] ON SEPTEMBER 09, 2007

INTRODUCTION
An investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) to investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a section leader from [Demining group] DT- 07. The accident occurred on 09 September 2007 at 11:30 hours in task # AF/2801/28745/MF040 located in Dragon Valley village, centre district of Bamyan province.

SUMMARY
The mentioned minefield is located on the top of a hill which was a fighting area between Mujahiddin and the government and mines were planted. Also the area was once again mined during the period of Taliban and the Northern alliance.

[Demining group] DT-07 started clearance of the area on 16.06.2007. On September 09, 2007 at 1130 hrs an accident happened on [the Victim] section leader of Section No.01 of the mentioned team while he was looking for stones to mark the cleared area. The accident happened on a portion of unclear area while he touched a stone. As a result of the accident he lost his left hand from the wrist and his right hand thumb. Also his right eye injured and he got a slight injury on his chest too. He received first aid by team medic in the site and was carried to Bamiyan civil hospital for further treatments. Then he was evacuated to Noor hospital in Kabul.

CONCLUSIONS
The following points were found by investigation team:

- The section leader had ignored the safety procedure by touching a stone in the unclear area, and as the stone might had been a booby trap, it had exploded and caused the amputation of his hand.
- The section leader had not worn his PPE and visor which is a direct safety breach.
- Poor command and control was a contributory factor for the happening of the accident, because the team leader of the mentioned team was on leave and the assistant team leader failed to avoid the section leader not to enter to unclear area.
- The breaching of rule and standard by a member of command group could be a sign of motivation for other deminers not to work according to approved rules and regulations.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The following points are to be considered:

- All deminers, section leaders, Assistant team leader and the team leader must use their PPE and the visor all the time while they are in the minefield.
- Retraining of team command group is strongly recommended as they are responsible to maintain the approved standards and safety procedures.
- [Demining group] management is advised to take appropriate actions for the improvement of team command and control related activities. Because the section leader himself who is responsible to control the deminers breached the safety procedure and no one stopped him.
• The team leader and Assistant team leader must strictly control the section leaders and deminers activities to make sure they are following the approved rules and regulations.

• [Demining group] relevant field office is recommended to reinforce the internal QA visits of their demining teams, especially the teams working in remote provinces.

Victim Report

Victim number: 977
Name: [Name removed]

Age:             Gender:  Male

Status: supervisory

Compensation: Not made available  Fit for work: not known

Protection issued: Frontal apron
Long visor

Protection used: None

Time to hospital: Not made available

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Chest; severe Eye
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Hand; Finger

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "As a result of the accident he lost his left hand from the wrist and his right hand thumb. Also his right eye injured and he got a slight injury on his chest too".

Analysis

This accident is classed as Other despite the fact that the Victim may have been handling the mine at the time because the investigators did not state that he was. It is possible that the Victim was leaning out of the cleared lane to pick up a visible mine when the accident occurred.

The primary cause of this accident is listed as Victim inattention because it seems that the Victim was leaning into the uncleared area to pick up a stone (to be used for marking) when he detonated a mine with his hand. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the victim was a field supervisor who was acting improperly and not wearing PPE when the accident occurred, and it is the group’s management who are responsible for the selection, training and control of their field supervisors.

The use of stones for area marking in Afghanistan is normal, but lifting them from the uncleared area implies that enough prepared (painted) stones were not available, which would have been a Field control failing.

The "Inadequate investigation" listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.