DDASaccident793

Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID

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DDAS Accident Report

Accident details

Report date: 22/07/2011
Accident number: 793
Accident time: 09:50
Accident Date: 01/11/2007
Where it occurred: AF0308/01637, MF173, Qalai Ahmad Jan Village, Bagram District, Parwan Province
Country: Afghanistan
Primary cause: Field control inadequacy (?)
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Other
ID original source: (34)
Name of source: UNMACCA
Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast
Ground condition: not recorded
Date record created: Date last modified: 22/07/2011
No of victims: 1
No of documents: 1

Map details

Longitude: Latitude:
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:
Map east: Map north:
Map scale: Map series:
Map edition: Map sheet:
Map name:

Accident Notes

inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)

Accident report

The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.

The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
LESSONS LEARNT SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED TO [Demining group] DEMINING TEAM # 2

INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team composed of Mr. [Name removed] the QMA and [Name removed] Team Leader of QMIT-21 was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Centre to investigate the demining accident occurred on [the Victim] deminer of [Demining group] DT-2 at Qalai Ahmad Jan village, Bagram district of Parwan province. The mentioned demining accident occurred at 09:50 hours on 01 November 2007 in Minefield # AF0308/01637/MF173. As a result of this accident, the deminer lost his left leg, right foot fracture and some other superficial injuries to other parts of his body.

SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF0308/01637/MF173 is part of a contaminated area which was recorded by LIS as SHA#3 of impacted community # 1222. The area was contaminated with AP mines by Russian forces for security of aircraft ammunition store located at the area during the year 1984. According to request of Qalai Ahmad Jan village residents the clearance of this MF was started on 04/10/2007. On 01 November 2007 at 09:50 am an accident happened on [the Victim] deminer of section # 2 of the mentioned team. The victim deminer was walking around and wanted to cross the boundary of the MF using unclear area that suddenly he stepped on an AP mine and caused it to explode. The accident happened during rest time of the team and the deminer was without PPE, so as a result of the accident he lost his left leg, sustained right foot ankle joint fracture and some other minor injuries to other part of his body. After applying first aid the victim deminer was evacuated to Bagram airbase Egyptians hospital.

CONCLUSIONS:
The following points were found by investigation team:

- The deminer ignored the red stones and entered into the unclear area, after proceeding about 4m stepped on an AP mine and caused it to explode.
- The accident point has about 500m distance from the deminer working lane, and it means that the deminer had walked long distance to enter into the unsafe area without being avoided by command group of the team.
- The portable latrine of the team was near the work site and there was no need for the deminer to go elsewhere for defecation/urination.
- One PMN and one PMN 2 mine and some UXO are visible on the ground next to the accident point which shows that the area where the deminer was walking is extremely dangerous.
- There is much possibility that the victim deminer wanted to take the two mines which were on the ground and before getting to those mines he became victim of an other mine which was under ground.
- All the above mentioned facts reveal that there was poor command and control in the team/section.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:

- Arranging refresher training session is recommended for the team and the training should focus mostly on safety precautions in the field.
• Team command group should strictly control the activity of deminers and do not allow them to ignore safety standard or act contrary to it.

• In vain walking into the danger area is considered direct safety breach and should be avoided by team members, and command group is to control properly the movement of their staff in the field.

• [Demining group] management is to take appropriate action to improve the command and control ability of the team command group to maintain safety precautions during the demining operation.

Victim Report

Victim number: 983  
Name: [Name removed]

Age:  
Gender: Male

Status: deminer  
Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available  
Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued:  
Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:

INJURIES: minor Body; severe Foot

AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg

COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "... the deminer lost his left leg, right foot fracture and some other superficial injuries to other parts of his body".

Analysis

The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim walked through the cleared area without PPE and entered the uncleared area (probably to collect visible mines) and his errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators identified a need for training and because it is probable that the Victim acted without fully understanding the risk he was taking. Failure to provide effective training was a significant Management Control Inadequacy.

The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.