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## EC-Funded Mine Action in Latin America Volume 2 - Country Reports

Russell Gasser  
*GICHD*

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# EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION IN LATIN AMERICA VOLUME 2 – COUNTRY REPORTS

Russell Gasser | Geneva | July 2008

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The European Union



**The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)** strives for a world free of anti-personnel mines and from the threat of other landmines and explosive remnants of war, and where the suffering and concerns of populations living in affected areas are addressed. The Centre is active in research, provides operational assistance and supports the implementation of the Anti - Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in Latin America, GICHD, Geneva, July 2008

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## ACRONYMS

<b>AICMA</b>	Integrated Mine Action Programme (of the OAS)	<b>IMAS</b>	International Mine Action Standards
<b>APL</b>	Anti-personnel Landmine	<b>IMSMA</b>	Information Management System for Mine Action
<b>APMBC</b>	Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention	<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>AUC</b>	Colombian Paramilitary forces	<b>LRRD</b>	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
<b>AVISCAM</b>	Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields, Peru	<b>LIS</b>	Landmine Impact Survey
<b>AXO</b>	Abandoned Explosive Ordnance	<b>MAC</b>	Mine Action Centre
<b>BAC</b>	Battle Area Clearance	<b>MARMINAS</b>	AOS Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America
<b>CCCM</b>	Colombian Campaign against Landmines	<b>MCA</b>	Multi-Criteria Analysis
<b>CL</b>	Community Liaison	<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>CONVIVIR</b>	Government sponsored rural self-defence groups in Colombia	<b>MOMEF</b>	OAS Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador and Peru
<b>CONTRAMINAS</b>	Peruvian Centre for Action against Anti-personnel Landmines	<b>MRE</b>	Mine Risk Education
<b>CSP</b>	Country Strategy Paper (of the EC)	<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>EC</b>	European Commission, also European Community	<b>NMAA</b>	National Mine Action Authority
<b>ECHO</b>	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department	<b>NSA</b>	Non-State Actor
<b>EOD</b>	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	<b>OAS</b>	Organization of American States
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive Remnants of War	<b>PADCA</b>	Program of Demining Assistance to Central America (of the OAS)
<b>EU</b>	The European Union	<b>PADEP</b>	OAS Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Peru
<b>EU27</b>	The 27 current (2008) members of the EU	<b>PPAICMA</b>	Presidential Programme of Integrated Action against Anti-personnel landmines (of Colombia)
<b>EuropeAid</b>	The EuropeAid Cooperation Office of the European Commission	<b>PPE</b>	Personal Protective Equipment
<b>FARC</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<b>GICHD</b>	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	<b>SALW</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>GINI</b>	The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion named after its inventor, Corrado Gini	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>ICBL</b>	International Campaign to Ban Landmines	<b>UNHCR</b>	UN High Commission for Refugees
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person	<b>UNMAS</b>	United Nations Mine Action Service
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device	<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordnance

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### COLOMBIA

Colombia is the only country in Latin America that has a severe problem of mine and ERW contamination, due to an ongoing conflict that has lasted over 40 years. Mines continue to be used and there are active minefields, many of the mines are of local fabrication. About 60% of municipalities nationwide are affected and there are about 350 civilian casualties annually, with a further 650 combat casualties from mines and IED. The issue of mines and mine action in Colombia is deeply politicised, the government regards the ongoing conflict as a terrorist threat.

Colombia has between 2 and 4 million Internally Displaced Persons due to the conflict. Colombia is a middle income country with a population of about 44 million.

A systematic survey of mine impact has been proposed but not yet implemented; the EC intends to fund such a survey in 2008 but whether this is feasible during active conflict remains to be seen.

Colombia has signed and ratified the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention, has identified mine action as a national priority which is included in national planning, and has funded part of the costs of the national mine action centre. The national health system has provision for assisting mine victims, though there are significant practical obstacles to access at present, including understanding of health rights, and physical access as 97% of mine accidents take place in rural areas. Some mine victims are reported as being unwilling to come forward due to fear of reprisals – either from being seen as part of the forces using mines and injured while mine-laying, or from being seen as attempting to remove mines and therefore a target for those on the other side protecting their minefields. The EC Country Strategy Papers for 2002-6 and 2007-13 both include mine action.

Demining in Colombia is a monopoly of the armed forces, who have been trained in humanitarian demining techniques by programmes coordinated by the Organization of American States, funded by humanitarian donor aid. Substantial resources have been spent in training military deminers who also undertake “Humanitarian demining for humanitarian emergencies” - this does not fall within a standard definition of humanitarian demining as it is mine clearance for populations in zones where combat may be on-going. For security reasons exact locations of mined and cleared areas are usually not released and details of any quality management are not available.

MRE activities in Colombia are fragmented with at least 20 different organisations active. There is still significant unmet need for MRE especially in remote areas and for the millions of displaced persons. Current activities include both the OAS approach of uniformed military personnel giving lectures and the Community Liaison based long-term approach supported by UNICEF and a number of NGOs.

A large number of donors have funded Mine Action in Colombia, the EC is prominent among them with a total of over 4.5 million euros since 2002. This is about 60% of all EC mine action funding for Latin America, which is entirely proportional to the relative scale of the problem but it forms less than 2% of the total EC assistance to development in Colombia which includes very substantial projects in support of displaced persons, and in support of large scale peace-building projects. Two and a half million euros of the EC contribution have been assigned to support the development of national mine action structures and the proposed survey. The total funding for the national mine action centre, including major contributions from the national government, has been about 6 million US dollars (4 million euros at current

exchange rates). The results have been disappointing to date with the national mine action centre still heavily reliant on external advice.

The impact of the new Instruments for Cooperation of the EC has been somewhat negative. EC Delegation staff reported difficulty in finding a mechanism to undertake advance planning of mine action in order to have a strategic plan ready to support any positive moves in the currently blocked peace process. A rapid positive response to breaking the deadlock would be in line with EC policy. The inclusion of mine action in the Country Strategy Papers mitigates any changes to financing. However, even though Colombia has more mine action projects than other countries in Latin America, the staff member responsible reported significant problems of *isolation* – in particular a lack of contact with colleagues working on mine action in other countries of the region, and a lack of training opportunities and supporting documentation.

There is limited room for manoeuvre for the EC in planning any further mine action in Colombia. There are restrictions on scope of activities, due to (i) the ongoing conflict, (ii) severe problems with personal security in some areas, (iii) the monopoly on mine clearance by the military, and (iv) the already substantial support for national capacity building from both the national government and donors. MRE and VA appear to be the only two suitable areas for future funding.

The report identifies the EC contribution as:

- *Relevant*, given the constraints.
- Somewhat weak so far on *effectiveness and efficiency* due to the limited success of the substantial capacity building effort for the national mine action centre. This is the only major project sufficiently advanced to evaluate at this stage. Improved effectiveness and efficiency are anticipated for the other major projects.
- Having a disappointing *impact*. This is due to (i) the significant constraints which apply in Colombia due to the conflict, (ii) the results of the *fragmentation and isolation* of mine action implementation by the EC, and (iii) other factors such as the extremely high level of politicisation of mine action in Colombia.
- Having good *sustainability*, based on substantial national funding for mine action and the potential for Victim Assistance through the national health service.
- The report ends with recommendations, of which the most important are to decrease *isolation* by improved communication between EC staff and to consider further limited support for mine risk education and victim assistance only – further “train and equip” programmes for deminers cannot be recommended.

## PERU

Peru has two separate mine and other ERW contamination problems inside its territory, and is also affected by the border minefields laid by Chile on the Chilean side of the border. Peru is a large (slightly larger than Angola) lower-middle income country with a population of about 29 million.

Peru has been a state party to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention since 1998 and has in place national structures for mine action, including a national mine action plan and a national coordination organisation CONTRAMINAS, which is overseen by six government ministries. The Organization of American States has a parallel structure with close links to the military demining staff and coordination links to CONTRAMINAS. There has not been a national impact survey, nor a survey of victims of mine accidents.

One of the mine problems is contamination on the Peru-Ecuador border due to the brief but intense border war in 1995. This is a remote mountainous region, that is difficult to access, and part of which is uninhabited. Clearance is undertaken by the military forces of both



countries as part of a joint project organised through the Organization of American States (OAS). The overall strategic goal of the project is to reinforce the peace process between the two countries.

The other mine problem is due to the protective mining of electric pylons (high voltage transmission line towers) and some other key infrastructure from 1989 onwards, during the internal armed conflict with the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru armed revolutionary movements. About 1,700 towers were mined. Clearance is the responsibility of special police units, and – unusually for Latin America - is being financed by the privatised electricity companies.

The military clearance in the Ecuador border area has proceeded very slowly and at high cost. The results are reported as very positive in terms of peace building but the mine clearance has cost overall around 200 US dollars per square metre and is far behind schedule.

The police clearance teams, on the other hand, have worked very quickly and at low cost, but without sufficient training, equipment or supervision. The result has been a large number of casualties (about 80) and the need to repeat clearance up to three times. The Peruvian victims association AVISCAM was formed by former police deminers injured during clearance operations.

Currently there are roughly 10 civilian casualties each year, the overwhelming majority from ERW associated with the pylons; the border minefield has little impact. The EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for 2002-2006 and 2007-2013 include the border demining, and the latter one also includes demining in a broader context.

The EC has supported the Peru-Ecuador border clearance with 1 million euros, donated through the OAS in 2006. While the impact on peace consolidation has been more than satisfactory, the cost efficiency of the OAS structures (which charge over 50% for “supervision and administration”) and of the overall demining process (which cleared only 197 mines out of a projected total of 1,500) are open to question.

There are no other mine action projects supported by the EC in Peru, so the effects of *fragmentation* of EC mine action resources, and *isolation* of EC staff working with mine action, are clear. EC staff cannot afford the time and resources to become experts in mine action for a single project – this is evidenced by minor errors in the CSP. Improved information resources, improved access to technical expertise, and improved communications within the EC between staff in different countries with limited numbers of mine action projects - in order to share experiences - are urgently needed.

Evaluation criteria:

- *Relevance* was considered as good as the project addressed both peace building and mine clearance. The lost opportunity to work with the police demining programme could be considered as reducing the overall relevance of the programme.
- *Effectiveness*: In terms of the peace process the programme outcome was highly effective. In terms of demining it was ineffective.
- *Efficiency*: It is difficult to quantify efficiency of support to consolidating the peace process, especially in the absence of clear and objectively verifiable programme goals. The efficiency of the demining programme was extremely low, even taking into account the very difficult terrain.
- *Impact*: The same remarks as efficiency apply.
- *Sustainability*: Once again this is mixed. There are some very good and sustainable results in the peace process. The demining is heavily dependent on donor aid and completely unsustainable.

The report ends with recommendations. The most important are:

- to take measures to reduce the isolation of EC staff dealing with mine action and to increase the use of technical expertise;
- to consider long term support for police deminers as a permanent national capacity to deal with residual threat, and
- to not consider further support for the border clearance. If, for political reasons, and in support of the peace process, further border demining is contemplated, then it should be supported by a very much more rigorous contractual regime including technical evaluation, use of EC procedures such as Project Cycle Management, a significant reduction in overhead costs, and payment on the basis of demining work in the contract being completed.

# 1. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO COLOMBIA

## INTRODUCTION

This report provides the findings from a field visit to Colombia in support of a broader regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Latin America, the focus of which is on policy, strategy, and programming. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are appended as Annex A of the overall report.

This Colombia component of the regional evaluation is based on the findings of a mission by Russell Gasser<sup>1</sup> to Bogota in December 2007, further interviews by e-mail and phone, coupled with a review of documents.

## BACKGROUND

Colombia is the fifth largest country in Latin America<sup>2</sup> (29<sup>th</sup> largest in the world). With an area of about 1 million sq km it is slightly larger than Egypt and 23% of the total size of the EU27. The population is estimated at 44 million. The Human Development Index<sup>3</sup> places Colombia at 75<sup>th</sup> in world rank order, a similar level to its neighbours Peru and Ecuador. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index<sup>4</sup> places Colombia in 68<sup>th</sup> rank order, slightly ahead of its neighbours. While Colombia is a middle income country, very close to the global average per capita (purchasing power corrected), there are striking differences between rich and poor; the country's Gini coefficient<sup>5</sup> (disparity of income) is over 0.50. About 15% of the population lives in extreme poverty and a further 30% in poverty. There is a very substantial gulf between rural and urban populations in all the indices of health, wealth and welfare.

Colombia has a very severe problem with internally displaced persons due to the continuing armed conflict in the country. The number of displaced persons was reported in 2007 to be second in magnitude of any country, after Sudan. Colombian Government figures suggest that in recent years about 200,000 persons per year have been displaced and the total is about 2 million. Independent estimates<sup>6</sup> put the annual rate higher and the total about 4 million.

Colombia is ethnically diverse. Geographically, it is made up of two major physical regions: the Andes mountains, with large valleys in the west; and the broad lowlands, which extend over almost two-thirds of the country in the east and form part of the Amazon rainforest. The population is concentrated in the valleys and basins of the mountain region, while the lowlands are sparsely inhabited.

The issue of mines and mine action in Colombia is deeply politicised as is the language used to describe the situation; words must be chosen with care. The terms "armed conflict" and "internal conflict" are not accepted by many on the government side, who have preferred "guerilla violence," "insurgency" and more recently "terrorist threat." United Nations (UN) agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) generally use the term "armed conflict" which will be used in this report.

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1 Russell Gasser is an independent consultant working for Humanitarian Technology Consulting Limited.

2 Some sources state: fourth largest.

3 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

4 [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2007](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007)

5 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html> Worldwide, Gini coefficients range from 0.23 in Sweden to 0.71 in Namibia.

6 <http://www.internal-displacement.org>

Figure 1 – Relief map of Colombia from Wikipedia



## ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION

Colombia has very widespread contamination with mines (both manufactured and improvised mines), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and some other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)<sup>7</sup>. As the dominant mine problem is due to ongoing active conflict and mines are still being emplaced, the “residual problem” will not be reported separately from the origin and extent.

There are essentially two different mine problems: a relatively small number of mines laid by government forces as protective barriers around military bases, most of which are marked and fenced, and numerous mines laid by non-state actors (NSAs) as part of the continuing armed conflict.

<sup>7</sup> ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO) as well as mines. Improvised mines are a sub-set of IEDs which are victim operated, IEDs can also be command detonated (this definition is based on the MBT definition of mines being victim operated).

## BARRIER MINEFIELDS AROUND MILITARY BASES

The total figure originally reported in 1997 was about 20,000 mines in 34 mined areas around current and former military bases. By 2007, after only small amounts of clearance, and some land released through technical survey, the figure was adjusted downwards to 3,280 government mines in 18 minefields covering 209,622 sq m (21 hectares).<sup>8</sup> Most of these areas are reported as being marked and many fenced. The Colombian army has made a start on removing the barrier mines around bases in zones that are completely controlled by the government. The land to be cleared around two of the bases will reportedly be sold by the army for civilian use.<sup>9</sup>

## ACTIVE AND ABANDONED MINED AREAS IN CONFLICT ZONES

The conflict between the Government and armed revolutionary movements has been active for over 40 years and is still on-going. Right-wing paramilitary forces have also played an important role and in some of the most mine-affected regions the local population is trapped between opposing armed factions and also suffers the risk of mine accidents. Mines are used for conventional military purposes and also to control and terrorise the population and lock them in to inaccessible locations.

On the government side of the conflict are the armed forces of Colombia, which have received very substantial support from the USA<sup>10</sup>. The principal non-state parties to the combat are the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army). Formerly, during the 1990s, there were also legally constituted CONVIVIR self-defense and intelligence gathering groups, and until recently there were also paramilitaries regarded as having close links to the army, the United Self-defense Forces of Colombia, AUC. This loose federation of regional paramilitary groups is now illegal and was officially demobilized from late 2003 to 2006, though there are credible reports that some paramilitary members are continuing to use armed violence including the use of mines. This is disputed by other sources. FARC, ELN and AUC are currently classified by many countries including the USA, and the EC, as *terrorist organisations*. Use of mines by the FARC has increased since the year 2000<sup>11</sup>. The FARC have consistently maintained a position that mines are a legitimate defensive weapon which are not used near civilian populations.

Mines are also used by the illegal narcotics trade, to protect transport routes, drug processing factories and plantations. There is evidence of links between some of the drug cartels and various armed factions.

Two characteristics of Colombia's mine problem are unique in Latin America: it is extremely widespread throughout the country, and the use of mines has continued and even increased in the last ten years. All of Colombia's 31 mainland provinces are currently considered to be affected by mines and UXO – but the degree of impact varies enormously. Contamination is widespread with 669 municipalities out of a total of 1,098 (60%) reporting at least one suspected hazardous area (SHA) or mine/IED related incident, and the OAS states that “40% of the national territory” is affected.<sup>12</sup> Ninety-seven percent of reported mine affected locations are in rural areas.

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8 Figures as reported in Landmine Monitor.

9 This raises the issue of humanitarian aid being used to train and equip military deminers who then clear land which is sold and the income retained by the army. In the highly politicized context in Colombia this could set a precedent of the EC being perceived as funding the army (albeit indirectly) which could have significant political consequences for other EC projects such as the “LABORATORIOS DE PAZ”

10 In the last six years this has typically been about 600 million USA dollars per year support for the police and army, in training, equipment and advisors. See <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm>

11 <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/colombia0707/3.htm>


12 OAS “National Mine Action Profile - Colombia” available on [www.aicma.oas.org](http://www.aicma.oas.org)

The conflict remains very fluid and communities which until recently were little affected can find themselves in a “hot” conflict zone quite suddenly. Equally, some zones move from intense active combat to relative calm.


Many of the mines used by armed non-state actors are improvised or manufactured in remote small scale “factories” from available materials, and the distinction between mines and IEDs is not always clear. Also, the Colombian military continues to use Claymore mines on the basis that these do not contravene the APMBC when used in command-detonated mode, though the Landmine Monitor state that proof of conversion to command detonation only has not been given.

In many areas, mines are located in still active minefields guarded by armed forces. The author heard that there are areas controlled by the army in the daytime and by armed non-state actors at night. The US Council on Foreign Relations stated: “Colombia’s government has little control of any territory outside the country’s major cities.” Passing on information about the location of mines, even for the purposes of MRE, is a very delicate issue and informing any representative of the government, including the mine action programme, could be enough to cause fatal reprisals in some areas. This will be discussed in more detail later in the report.

**Figure 2 – FARC: armed actions in the times of President Pastrana (1999-2002) and the first term of President Uribe (2003-2006). From Wikipedia. The unaffected areas in the east are largely rainforest with few inhabitants.**



**Figure 3 – Map showing where military demining has taken place in Colombia from 1990 to 2007. Red diamonds show military demining sites (not humanitarian demining sites). This gives a good idea of the extent of mine contamination in the country. From Programa Presidencial Para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal.**



## REPORTED CASUALTIES

Casualty data in Colombia comes from a number of sources, none of which is complete. Press reports, based on communiqués from the army are one common source but cannot be regarded as independent.

The Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, CCCM, and the government mine action programme, PPAICMA, have taken the position in recent years that Colombia has more mine casualties than any other country. This is based on aggregating military combat and police casualties from active duty, with civilian casualties. Such an approach is open to question, as is the standpoint of using military combat casualties to imply mine impact to the civilian population. It would be particularly unfortunate if this reporting by Colombia were to trigger a retroactive re-assessment by other countries, and the adjustment of their casualty data upwards to include armed forces mine casualties during combat (for example Vietnam or Yemen would be able to increase their total casualties very substantially.) Some non-civilian casualties, such as local police officers in vehicles travelling on normal business, should probably be included but combat casualties have been excluded from the overall figure by other countries and there appears to be no case to Colombia to be an exception despite the reasonable desire of the national authorities to draw attention to the problem.

It is likely that this approach reflects the deep politicisation of mine action in Colombia, on the government side there is little official distinction between civilian casualties and casualties among the armed forces engaged in combat to defend the country against a perceived terrorist threat.

Detailed analysis of the real impact of mines on the civilian population in Colombia is difficult and will remain so until a systematic survey is conducted. At present a survey is not possible – the conflict remains active and the situation is fluid, and there would be extreme risk to both the surveyors, and anyone who provided them with information, in many areas. Despite the very large number of displaced people in Colombia, and the known relationship between IDPs and an increase in mine casualties in a number of other countries, there appears to be no attempt to relate these two factors in Colombia.

By any measure, Colombia has a very severe mine problem. Colombia is one of a small number of countries which has hundreds of civilian casualties from mines and ERW each year (see table below).

**Table 1 – Civilian casualties in the three countries with largest number of reported civilian mine victims 2006. Data from Landmine Monitor.**

Country	Dead		Injured		Total
Afghanistan	90	12%	655	88%	745
Cambodia	66	15%	382	85%	448
Colombia	57	18%	257	82%	314

**Table 2 – Civilian mine and UXO casualties in Colombia, according to data from Landmine Monitor. Blanks in the table indicate no published data.**

Year	Killed	Injured	Total	Caused by mines and improvised mines	Caused by UXO
2006	57	257	314	250	64
2005			338	313	25
2004			239		
2003			195		
2002			271		
1900 - 2001			Approx 500		

As is the case in many countries, most mine accidents take place in remote locations and there is widespread agreement that casualty figures are under-reported. In Colombia there also appear to be strong incentives in some areas to not report mine accidents: there are reliable reports of abduction of mine victims on the basis that forces opposed to the armed factions using the mines assume victims were injured either while fabricating and placing mines, or that forces using the mines assume the victim was injured while attempting to remove mines. The ICRC reported this risk in 2004<sup>13</sup> and UNICEF staff confirmed that it is still prevalent.

<sup>13</sup> ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2004, page 35.



## HISTORY OF MINE ACTION

Colombia signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 1997, and later ratified it in 2000. It is frequently asserted that there is “no known use of mines by the Colombian Armed Forces since the ban was signed”, however a United Nations report released in February 2003 contains a serious allegation of use of antipersonnel landmines by the Colombian Army. The Colombian government has indicated only command-detonated Claymore mines, permissible under the APMBC, were used.<sup>14</sup>

Colombia is a former producer of antipersonnel landmines but ceased production in 1999. Production of a directional fragmentation munition (Claymore-type) continues and Colombia has not reported measures taken to prevent the use of this device as an AP mine by attaching victim-operated fuzing systems.

In 1997, Law 418 established the obligation of the state to care for victims of armed political or ideological conflict within the existing health care system. In 1992, the President’s Office created a fund to guarantee 8 million Colombia pesos (approximately US\$4,000 in 2008) to victims of violence. However, these laws include some time limits for requesting assistance, and there is widespread ignorance of their provisions and the right to claim assistance in rural areas. This is currently being addressed in a number of advocacy projects.

The Government identified mine action as a priority in 2001, and included it in the 2002-2006 Development Plan, in the Project Bank of the National Planning Department, and in the 2004 Investment Project of the Administrative Department of the President of the Republic.

In 2001 the government established a commission (CINAMA) to coordinate mine action, and the key component of this, the government’s Antipersonnel Mine Observatory<sup>15</sup> became operational. The Commission includes representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Relations, National Defence, Health, and Interior, as well as from the National Planning Department. It is organised with an Executive Secretary under the Presidential Program for the Promotion, Respect and Guarantee of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law and is the responsibility of the Vice President. The Commission is also composed of two technical subcommittees, the Intersectorial Committee for the Prevention and Care of Victims and the Intersectorial Committee for Marking, Mapping, and Demining. The general direction, coordination, execution and monitoring of activities related to mine action is carried out by the Observatory, under the supervision of the Vice President; the Observatory has the role of a standard national mine action centre including maintaining the database on IMSMA. However, despite the formal position, demining is firmly in the control of the army and not the Observatory.

A national mine action plan has been developed and regularly updated. According to Law 848 of November 2003 and Decree No. 3787 of December 2003, the Anti-Personnel Landmine Observatory was assigned the amount of 2,500 million Colombian pesos, about US \$1 million, of national funding.

The Colombian Campaign Against Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM) has been active in promoting the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention and in mine action in the country since 1996 and currently has representatives in 22 of the 31 mine affected provinces.

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<sup>14</sup> Reported in Landmine Monitor 2003.

<sup>15</sup> This is the usual translation from “Observatorio de Minas AP” but “APL Monitoring Office” would be better.

In May 2001 the Colombian Government asked the United Nation Mine Action Service (UNMAS) for an exploratory mission. This led to the inclusion of Colombia in the UNMAS portfolio of LOIS (Level One Impact Survey) in the 2001-2005 UN mine strategy. The need for a systematic evaluation of mine impact in Colombia was recognised by the Vice-President's Office in 2001.<sup>16</sup> The need for a survey has been re-emphasised many times since, including by the EC. The Survey Action Centre has carried out a Preliminary Opinion Collection but concluded that a full Landmine Impact Survey in accordance with international protocols is not feasible. The EC intends to finance some survey activities later this year (2008). Survey work is made difficult by the active combat in some mine affected areas; there are also very significant concerns that attempting to identify the location of active mined areas could lead to reprisals not only against the survey teams but also against any local people who they speak to.

The organisation Geneva Call has been involved in working with non-state actors in Colombia since 2003 to try to bring about the end of the use of AP landmines by these groups. There has been no breakthrough, but agreement on some limited demining and improved marking of some mined areas was achieved. The EC funded part of the Geneva Call initiative.

The Organisation of American States humanitarian demining coordination programme became actively involved in Colombia in 2005 - the focus of the OAS programme is training and equipping military personnel as humanitarian deminers. The OAS-AICMA is a coordination, standards and management structure which relies on multilateral donations, similar to the role of UNDP in some other countries, however it is based on a military model and only trains armed forces, or occasionally special police or civil protection units, to demine. The training is usually by US military personnel.


In 2007 the Observatory was superseded - its mandate remained essentially the same but its status was upgraded and it is now known as the Presidential Programme for Integrated Action against AP Landmines, PPAICMA. It is still located within the office of the Vice President.

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<sup>16</sup> Reported in Landmine Monitor 2001.

## NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRUCTURES

Figure 4 – A diagram of the mine action structures in Colombia, from the OAS AICMA website



## MINE CLEARANCE

Demining in Colombia is a monopoly of the armed forces, who have been trained in humanitarian demining techniques by programmes coordinated by the OAS, funded by humanitarian donor aid. Reports vary, but it seems that 40 humanitarian deminers were initially trained and a further 40 have since been added to the total. Some reports state the total is now 140 humanitarian deminers. Substantial resources have also been spent in training military deminers who also undertake “Humanitarian demining for humanitarian emergencies,” although it is unlikely that this would fall within a standard definition of humanitarian demining as it is mine clearance for populations in zones where combat may be

on-going. For security reasons exact locations of mined and cleared areas are usually not released and details of any quality management are not available. This type of demining, undertaken by serving military personnel as humanitarian assistance to the local population in a conflict zone, appears to be the most common. For example, the 2003 national action plan allocated nearly 80% of mine action resources to this clearance, USA\$11 million for 2003 to 2006. According to Colombia's April 2003 MBT Article 7 report, the Army's "Grupo Martes" had cleared 1,054 minefields in the past two years. It also trained 877 demining experts at the Military Engineers School in 2002, and another 177 between January and March 2003. According to media reports, the Army also has 450 mine detection dogs from the Canine Training School in Bucaramanga; during the first nine months of 2002, the dogs reportedly discovered 480 minefields, permitting the destruction of approximately 5,000 mines.<sup>17</sup> These activities appear to have only limited coordination with the national mine action centre, Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines PPAICMA. However, they do represent a very substantial national capacity.

The total mined area which could be cleared according to verifiable humanitarian clearance at present is comprised of former defensive mine rows around military bases in areas that are firmly under government control. This is reported as about 21 hectares. With a currently reported capacity of 80 exclusively humanitarian deminers there appears to be no reason that these areas cannot be cleared very quickly (typical manual clearance rates world wide are about one to two hectares per deminer per year)<sup>18</sup>. However, clearance rates in Colombia have been very much lower than this, a total of less than 0.6 hectares was reported as cleared to humanitarian standards in 2006 and less than half a hectare in 2005.<sup>19</sup>

## MINE RISK EDUCATION

MRE activities in Colombia are fragmented and variable, and currently increasing. There is still significant unmet need for MRE especially in remote areas and for the millions of displaced persons. Current activities include both the OAS approach of uniformed military personnel giving lectures and the Community Liaison based long-term approach supported by UNICEF and a number of NGOs. Coordination is by the PPAICMA (former Mines Observatory) who are still building capacity and experience; the programme currently seeks input from experienced organisations like UNICEF as it learns. Until 2007 there was an emphasis by the Observatory on high profile media actions as a way to communicate MRE messages, and nationwide publicity was achieved by top music stars being recruited to the campaign. In the last year a move towards a more community-based approach has started.

There is a strong presence in Community Liaison by the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines (CCCM) who have representatives in 22 departments.

Both the CCCM and UNICEF, as well as the Catholic church's Pastoral Social<sup>20</sup> (roughly equivalent to CARITAS) have chosen a long-term Community Liaison approach and all three strongly emphasised the potential risk in some zones to local people who participate in MRE activities, or especially anyone who provides information about the mine threat in their communities. A long period of building confidence and learning about the realities of the situation from the point of view of local people, is advocated by these organisations.

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17 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2003.

18 Data from A study of manual mine clearance, book 5, published by GICHD, available from <http://www.gichd.ch>

19 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2007.

20 The Pastoral Social is probably the only humanitarian organization present in all areas of the country. It maintains a strictly neutral position and declines to associate itself with either government or non-state actor positions. The church is widely respected by all groups in the armed conflict.

A partial list of MRE actors in Colombia includes:

UNICEF; OAS programmes; the government's Antipersonnel Mine Observatory and now Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines; UNHCR; Colombian Red Cross; the Governor's Bureaus (Gobernancias) of the departments of Antioquia, Santander, Cauca, and Bolívar; the Health Sector Directorate; Government Secretariat; the Education Secretariat; Mayoralties in selected municipalities; NGOs such as Corporación Paz y Democracia, CCCM, FUNDEMOS; and the social services organisation of the Catholic Church: Pastoral Social.

There are real risks of different messages, methods and strategies resulting in confusion rather than behaviour change, especially where programmes overlap. Increasing the coordination and possibly the regulation of MRE is an urgent task, but one that is currently very difficult to achieve for two reasons. First, the PPAICMA is still gaining experience. Secondly, organisations that maintain a strictly neutral position in the conflict cannot be seen to be too closely involved with initiatives of the Presidential Programme – the influential Pastoral Social of the Catholic church, perhaps the only social organisation with true coverage throughout all parts of Colombia, declines on principle to participate in programmes funded through PPAICMA in order to preserve its strictly neutral status. The EC has recently initiated a substantial MRE programme with co-funding of 2 million euros.

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Colombia is unique amongst the most seriously mine affected countries in having a national health care system with a mandate and possibly enough resources to treat mine victims, and also in offering victims state compensation (up to US\$ 4,000 at 2008 exchange rates). There remain some serious problems in health care delivery - both in terms of emergency trauma care and also in rehabilitation. Facilities are based in large towns and cities and 97% of mine accidents occur in the countryside, often in remote areas. Transporting mine victims after an accident can be extremely difficult and require immediate payments well beyond the means of a substantial part of the rural population.

There is still a lack of a census of mine victims and survivors at national level and the Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines has expressed an interest in completing a census as soon as possible in order to have a better understanding of the situation. How this could be achieved is not clear.

The OAS programme has taken the same approach in Colombia as in other countries by focussing on supplying prostheses or wheelchairs, plus rehabilitation to a limited number of identified mine survivors. The Centre for Integral rehabilitation in Colombia, CIREC, has been active in this field for at least ten years and its "Semillas de Esperanza" (Seeds of Hope) programme<sup>21</sup> has received international recognition from the ICRC and others. For the few mine victims able to get to the capital, and who receive assistance through this programme, the support and services are of a high quality.

## FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

It is difficult to arrive at an exact figure for overall contributions to mine action in Colombia. The principal causes are:

- (i) A relatively large number of donors supporting projects<sup>22</sup> - which include some small mine action components of larger projects, and there is no single

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21 For more information see the Semillas de Esperanza website at <http://cirec.org/>

22 An example is the CIREC rehabilitation programme "Seeds of Hope" According to the website <http://cirec.org> "In the development of this program, CIREC has benefited from the support of organizations like USAID, IOM (International Migration Organization), LSN (Landmine Survivors Network), Star of Hope, UNICEF and the governments of Canada and Sweden."


source of information. The majority of governments have provided indirect support through international organizations. For example, in 2003, Switzerland, together with the EU, supported activities by the Geneva Call to engage Colombian non-state actors.

- (ii) Inconsistent reporting, including some confusion between planned programme size and the actual funding received. Both the OAS and the National Mine Action Plan have requested substantially more funding than was actually delivered.
- (iii) No estimates available for some projects which have been funded, or for the costs of health system treatment for mine victims.
- (iv) The probable use of military personnel trained as humanitarian deminers on other unspecified tasks (this appears to be the only explanation for 80 deminers clearing a total of 0.6 hectares in a year).

A detailed table of funding as reported in Landmine Monitor, and the EC co-funded projects is in Annex 3 to this report.

A summary chart is shown below. The Landmine Monitor summary has usually listed the funding by year of its announcement, whereas the EC lists by year of start of project. For consistency in this regard the year of the LM summary is used for the chart. For exact details of EC funding please see Annex 4.

**Figure 5 –Mine Action funding in Colombia 2002-6**



The Colombian government spent a total of \$3.3 million on mine action in 2002 according to reporting by the Resource Mobilization Contact Group of States Parties. This is the only available figure for any government funding for 2002 but appears to very much higher than the funding for subsequent years so may have been calculated in a different way or be an error.

Colombia's Article 7 Report of April 2003 provides the country's *estimates* of needed funding for mine action for the four-year period from 2003-2006. As of April 2003, the estimated necessary funding for the period 2003-2006 totaled US\$13.8 million, including \$2.4 million for 2003. Funding obtained as of mid-2003 for 2003-2006 totaled about \$5 million.

The budget is broken down into five areas according to the national plan. "Humanitarian demining for humanitarian emergencies" by the army in combat zones<sup>23</sup> accounts for nearly 80 percent of the total budget, with approximately \$1.6 million allocated for 2003 and \$11 million for the period from 2003-2006. The next highest expenditure is "the National Action Plan" with \$550,000 allocated for 2003 and \$1.6 million for 2003-2006. "Prevention of landmine accidents" is budgeted at \$200,000 for 2003 and \$900,000 for 2003-2006. "Mine action information management" is allocated \$33,000 in 2003 and \$267,000 for 2003-2006. Finally, there is "international cooperation management" with \$16,000 allocated for 2003 and \$60,000 for 2003-2006.

The Article 7 report provides information on the sources of funding for 2003-2006. According to the report, the Colombian government and four donors together provided \$1.2 million for 2003, 50% of the stated requirements. The main funds came from the country's national budget, which allocated approximately \$882,000 for 2003 and \$4.9 million for 2003-2006.

Colombia reported that the \$494,906 to be provided through the OAS under the two-year agreement reached in March 2003 will be allocated as follows: \$256,506 for administration and supervision, \$130,000 in prevention education, \$30,000 for training of Colombian personnel, \$30,000 for victim assistance, \$30,000 for logistics, and \$9,400 for other activities. Allocation of well over 50% of the total budget for administration and supervision may appear excessive, but is usual for the OAS demining work in Latin America. However, of the total planned, only \$115,000 was donated by Canada, amounting to 23%.

In 2006, the Observatory was reported to have received a total of \$6 million to carry out its activities to date. Funding had been provided by Canada, Japan, Sweden, the US, the EC, UNDP, IOM and UNICEF.

Overall, donors have not been prepared to fund a large proportion of the requests from Colombia.

The 2006 end of year review of the UN's Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Colombia received only 3 percent (\$157,110) of funds requested through the appeal process in 2006. In October 2006 UNICEF reported a shortfall of 88 percent of required funds for its mine action programs in Colombia. UNICEF reported funding of \$76,071 provided by Germany against \$650,000 required funds for 2006. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that lack of funding resulted in the cancellation of MRE materials and affected medical and physical rehabilitation programs and the "psychological well-being" of mine victims and their families.

The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects included 21 project appeals for Colombia with a total value of \$6,250,431. Information as to how much of this total was funded is not yet available.

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23 As noted elsewhere, this does not conform to usual descriptions of humanitarian demining but is emergency demining for which there appears to be no quality management process nor marking nor reporting.

## EC CONTRIBUTION

Although Colombia has received about 60% of all EC mine action funding for Latin America, mine action remains a very small part of the overall EC support to Colombia, and even a very small part of the relief and development aid. There are a number of high-level cooperation agreements between the EC and EU, and Colombia.<sup>24</sup> The three principal areas of cooperation are: Regional development and peace; Governance, justice, and human rights; and Productivity, competition and commerce. The delegation website lists 78 projects currently running in July 2007 with a total value of over 186 million euros.<sup>25</sup> Mine Action accounts for about 1.5% of the current total with less than 3 million euros. In comparison, support for Colombia's millions of displaced people receives 46 million euros and the "Laboratorios de Paz," usually literally translated as "Peace Laboratories," three large scale initiatives to support civil society peace building<sup>26</sup>, received 92 million euros. This inevitably leads to the same problem of *fragmentation* of dispersed funds, and *isolation* of staff with responsibility for mine action, that has been found in other latin American countries. With such a small percentage of the total aid and development funding project there is no possibility that the delegation in Colombia can have a specialist in mine action on the staff, and the person responsible will have limited time and resources for mine action amongst a large portfolio of other projects. There is a limited amount of time for programme officers to acquire specialised knowledge about mine action and limited support resources. This is part of a more general problem of *fragmentation and isolation* in EC mine action which is discussed in more detail in the regional report. One way to mitigate the isolation would be improved contact between programme officers dealing with mine action in different countries in Latin America. Another mitigation action would be to provide EC programme officers with (a) good quality reference documentation about how to design, negotiate, manage and evaluate mine action projects and (b) expert technical support in the critical phases of contract design and evaluation.

Both deconcentration and the ending of the thematic AP mine action budget line have contributed to increasing this isolation, even though both processes also bring other benefits and are part of the change of orientation and implementation of EC aid and foreign policy on a very large scale. Finding ways to work successfully within the new context is essential.

## EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA

The basis for aid and cooperation is the Country Strategy Paper (CSP), drawn up by the EC delegation in close consultation with the national authorities and civil society.

The CSP 2002-6 includes mines as a part of the impact of the conflict in Colombia. Based on an exploratory mission by UNMAS the CSP focusses on just one action, a mine impact survey, which has not yet been realised. None of the difficulties due to ongoing conflict of undertaking a full LIS to community level are noted in the CSP.

The CSP 2007-13 includes mine action in two areas:

*"1. To achieve a short-term impact on the conflict in Colombia, the EU will first of all provide **assistance to the victims** of violence [...]"*

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24 Full details on the Colombia delegation website

[http://www.delcol.ec.europa.eu/en/eu\\_and\\_colombia/agreements.htm](http://www.delcol.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_colombia/agreements.htm)

25 [http://www.delcol.ec.europa.eu/en/eu\\_and\\_colombia/proyectos.htm](http://www.delcol.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_colombia/proyectos.htm)

26 The CSP 2002-6 states: "[...] specifically, the laboratories should have four basic components:

- Culture of peace and integral rights: education/training, creation/support of civil society networks, etc.
- Productive activities: support to sustainable rural development proposals.
- Social and productive infrastructures: basic infrastructures such as sanitation, schools, etc.
- Institutional strengthening: particularly of local institutions with emphasis in planning and programming, health, etc.



[...] – Operations aimed at educating people against risks, helping victims and clearing mines are to be continued.” (page 24)

“2. *With a view to achieving a medium-term effect on the conflict in Colombia*, the EU will endeavour to **promote peace** at local and national level [...]

[...]

– by working to bring about human security, according to the Colombian government requests and the limitations imposed by the community instruments for development cooperation and for stability.

Possible actions include: building capacity in civil society and the government in the fight against trafficking and the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons, related ammunition, de-pollution of anti-personnel mines and remnants of war;[...]" (page 25)

(All emphases in the original).

The CSP thus clearly establishes the context of mine action as support to victims and peace promotion, and establishes the linkage between mine action and Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation (SALW) and ERW issues. However, the inclusion of mine clearance suggests that (a) the strong monopoly of the army and (b) the impossibility of humanitarian demining before the end of the conflict, are not fully appreciated by the delegation. The CSP also makes reference here to the “limitations imposed by the community instruments for development cooperation and for stability.”

#### Limitations imposed by the new Instruments

In meetings, the delegation staff expressed the need to have in place a planned response to any movement in the currently blocked peace process. The ability to respond quickly and positively to any opportunity to move to a peaceful resolution of over 40 years’ conflict was perceived as a strategic priority. However, the delegation staff considered that the new Instruments offered no obvious mechanism to support this type of “preparedness planning.” Even in peace building this is not an issue strictly limited to demining, and there are parallel issues (noted by the delegations in Peru and Nicaragua) regarding their ability to support reconstruction shortly after unforeseen natural disasters, through the new Instruments

### CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS

There are currently several thematic areas of activity in mine action in Colombia:

(i) capacity building of the national mine action structures of the Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines PPAICMA, including the national IMSMA system, (ii) training army humanitarian deminers, and limited amounts of demining around military bases, (iii) mine risk education undertaken by a large number of organisations in a variety of different approaches (iv) victim assistance, through advocacy to ensure victims know their rights and the support available through the national health system and also by offering extensive support to the rehabilitation and reintegration of a small number of victims.

The EC’s principal project has been 2.5 million euro support for capacity building the national mine action structures. A full list of all current EC funded mine action projects is included in Annex 4 to this report.

### ANALYSIS

Given the very large scale of the overall contamination in the country, and the available financial resources of a medium sized nation in the middle-income group of countries, there is

a good case for establishing a long term national *humanitarian* demining capacity and management structures.<sup>27</sup> Questions arise regarding:

- (a) How the current exclusive use of military personnel for humanitarian demining relates to the strategy of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The potential role of NGOs or commercial clearance companies remains unexplored. If the current military monopoly on mine clearance is to be maintained then the scope for action by the EC may be severely curtailed.
- (b) The use of humanitarian funding to train and equip serving military personnel who are re-assigned onto tasks other than humanitarian demining (as defined by IMAS) has also not been discussed. This was reported by other organisations, who want to be strictly neutral in order to undertake humanitarian or development work, as being a problem.
- (c) Linkage of military planning and implementation structures to the EC established project cycle management methods, which are mandated for development projects.
- (d) Timing - any purely humanitarian capacity established long before a peace agreement or military victory will be unused until the end of conflict is achieved in a large enough area to occupy the capacity. This raises issues of efficiency, and also the redeployment of humanitarian deminers funded by donor aid to other military duties including combat demining while they are waiting for the emergence of large scale humanitarian demining objectives during a peace process. See item (b) above.

There is also a larger issue of alignment which, according to the three main independent actors interviewed (UNICEF, CCCM, Pastoral Social) has serious implications. The PPAICMA does not share this view, and as a government organisation is aligned with the government view that the problem of armed conflict is due to *terrorists* or *insurgents* who are not legitimate. Essentially, the EC works with the Colombian government and its institutions, in this case the Presidential Programme. In the cities this is not contentious – the conflict is far away and has little impact on the cities. However, the three respondents who work in the countryside presented a unanimous view that this results in the EC being perceived as aligning itself with one side to the conflict. One consequence is that any information given to MRE programmes (or a future landmine impact survey) is perceived as giving information to the government who might then pass it to the army who will use it for military planning. The support for building national mine action structures is apparently perceived in some zones as direct support to the government, and to be seen to support this can be risky. This reflects the very strong need for people in the countryside to be strictly neutral to avoid repressive actions from one side or the other – it is not necessarily because people are opposed to the government, but they are living in combat zones and cannot be seen to favour one side or the other. The difference in perspective in interviews between organisations working in the countryside and those in the city was striking – the gap appears to be very wide.

Further support to building the humanitarian demining capacity of the army would be seen by many as deeply prejudicial. It is reported that the army already has hundreds of combat deminers and any deminer training could be perceived as supporting this fighting capability.

## CONCLUSIONS

Colombia has a severe impact from landmines, and significant impact from other ERW. It is unique in this regard in Latin America. It is also unusual worldwide in that there is continued active use of AP and AT landmines.

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<sup>27</sup> See the section on Resilience-Impact analysis in the 2005 Global Evaluation for the detailed explanation of how this judgment is reached.

The inclusion of military combat casualties in official statistics for mine victims in Colombia is a departure from standard practice which is not justified.

The ongoing conflict and considerable danger to anyone who is considered as “involved” with mine use or clearance makes mine action such as MRE and especially survey, extremely difficult. Providing information about mine locations for the purposes of MRE can lead to reprisals.

The national mine action structures in Colombia are still at the stage of gaining experience and expertise. Given a total investment of about 6 million dollars plus considerable support from the GICHD (IMSMA and MRE support) over a period of several years, this is a disappointing outcome. It should have been possible to have a good quality system already fully functional for the resources used.

The 2.5 million euros that the EC is providing to support the national mine action structures is perceived by key independent field actors as firmly aligning the EC with the government of Colombia. This is in conflict with the desire for strict neutrality by these organisations who insist that such an alignment creates difficulties for establishing MRE capabilities, and will impact negatively on data gathering for the proposed survey activities. However, the Commission has no real choice other than supporting the PPAICMA as the coordination body for mine action and especially for MRE, the EC is essentially a “government-level” structure which works with national governments.

Mine clearance in Colombia is an exclusive monopoly of the military. Serving military personnel have been trained and equipped as “humanitarian deminers” by humanitarian donor aid administered through the OAS. The main task of these personnel is apparently “emergency humanitarian demining” which is *not* humanitarian demining according to agreed international standards. There is no way of knowing if these humanitarian deminers are also deployed for combat demining. The interface between humanitarian aid and military run programmes is far from easy in terms of Project Cycle Management, LRRD and in the overall acceptable use of humanitarian funds. The OAS programme has offered particularly poor value for money with well over 50% of costs designated for administration and supervision.

One impact of deconcentration and the new Instruments has been to increase the isolation of EC programme coordinators (or project officers) isolated and without sufficient training and reference resources. There is also a particular issue in Colombia of the lack of a clear mechanism within the new Instruments for putting in place plans for future action, in order to be ready to move quickly should the current deadlock in the peace process be broken (or the Colombian government achieve an unqualified military victory). Mine action is not the only area which was identified as facing this issue. Coordination with other areas, such as natural disaster response, which also face similar problems would appear essential if mine action is to find the necessary ways of working. Mine action is simply too small a scale activity to be able to influence overall EC aid delivery strategy on its own. Since mine action is included in the previous and current CSP it should be possible in Colombia to use the geographic budget line for a large part of mine action funding. However, any continuation of the previous work of Geneva Call with non-state actors in Colombia may be very much more difficult to fund as the national government actively opposes this action.

There is limited room for manoeuvre for the EC in planning any further mine action in Colombia. There are restrictions on scope of activities, due to (i) the ongoing conflict, (ii) severe problems with personal security in some areas, (iii) the monopoly on mine clearance by the military, and (iv) the already substantial support for national capacity building from both the national government and donors. MRE and VA appear to be the only two suitable areas for future funding. MRE is being addressed by Community Liaison approaches by a number of actors, VA is being addressed by advocacy and education programmes to make

mine victims aware of their right to medical and other services paid by the state, as well as good quality services for a small number of victims. Until there is a move towards peace there may be little further of real added value for the EC to consider beyond continued support for MRE and VA in either in departments where the local authorities are taking a strong initiative, or in concertation with the large “Peace laboratories” also funded by the EC. Coordination with existing actors appears more likely to give results than new and possibly isolated initiatives, especially in the climate of lack of trust and open repression that is widely reported.

Whilst it may be a political necessity to have plans in place to support any move towards ending the long conflict, there remain difficulties in effectively achieving these goals until there is some survey of landmine impact and victims, and ways to intervene as a neutral actor are identified.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

### RELEVANCE.

The programme appears to have been relevant given the constraints identified in Colombia. An increased focus on working with neutral actors and less direct support for the government might have been more relevant, but has to be balanced against the fundamental relationship of the European Union institutions which is to work with national governments.

### EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

The substantial support to national mine action structures has not been particularly effective, the other projects are still at an early stage so an overall judgement is difficult to make.

### EFFICIENCY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

As with effectiveness, support to national mine action structures has not been particularly efficient, the other projects are still at an early stage so an overall judgement is difficult to make.

### IMPACT OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

The impact has been disappointing. This is due to (i) the significant constraints which apply in Colombia due to the conflict, (ii) the results of the *fragmentation and isolation* of mine action implementation by the EC, and (iii) due to other factors such as the extremely high level of politicisation of mine action in Colombia.

### SUSTAINABILITY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

The Colombian government is providing substantial national funding for mine action and the national structures appear likely to be sustainable. Victim assistance is also supported as part of the national health system. MRE is unlikely to be sustainable at present.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

In any further funding for mine action consideration should be given to supporting independent actors such as the ICRC, UNICEF, Pastoral Social, CCCM or other independent NGOs to reinforce the perceived status of the EC as a neutral and unbiased source of development aid. This is understood as potentially being in conflict with the need to support national mine action structures, but a balance between the two requirements should be identified.

The EC delegation in Colombia should increase contact with EC delegations in neighbouring mine-affected countries to generate and maintain synergies. Regional, or even sub-regional contact - even if occasional and at an informal level - between EuropeAid staff (and, if relevant ECHO staff) who are directly responsible for projects, could make a real difference to the issue of fragmentation and isolation.

Given the large scale support already given to national mine action structures, and the substantial government support for their own programme, it is difficult to recommend any further support to this area.

Given the military monopoly on mine clearance and the difficulty of identifying the outcome of supporting and equipping military personnel as humanitarian deminers, it is recommended that there should be *no* further support for this training or for clearance. It is, however, recommended, that the EC open a dialogue with the Colombian authorities regarding possible future NGO activity in mine clearance after a peace agreement has been achieved.

Any future support for Victim Assistance should be based on (i) further developing the advocacy activities already undertaken by a number of NGOs and international organisations which are working to make people aware of their right to health care and rehabilitation through the national health system, and compensation for mine injuries from the government, and (ii) supporting victims' associations.

Any future support for MRE should continue to develop the relationships established with, and funding for the current project implementers. In line with current best practice, Community Liaison approaches should always be used for MRE. A balance needs to be found between supporting independent NGOs and other organisations, and supporting the national mine action structures who need to put in place guidelines to ensure consistent application of MRE methods and messages in Colombia.

The EC should press both the PPAICMA and CCCM to use the standard reporting method of basing the annual reporting of mine victims on civilian casualties, and casualties amongst *humanitarian* deminers. It may be useful to note military combat casualties, including the *military* deminers that comprise over a third of all casualties<sup>28</sup>, as a separate indicator of ongoing mine use, but the two figures should be reported separately and not aggregated.

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28 "Situación por MAP y MUSE 1990 – 15 Noviembre de 2007" Programa Presidencial Para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, Bogotá.

## 2. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO PERU

### INTRODUCTION

This report provides the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from an independent evaluation of EC-funded mine action activities in Peru. This evaluation is part of a broader regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Latin America, the focus of which is on policy, strategy, and programming. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are appended as Annex 1 of the overall report.

The Peru component of the regional evaluation is based on the findings of a mission by Russell Gasser<sup>29</sup> to Lima from 11 to 15<sup>th</sup> December 2007, coupled with a review of documents.

### BACKGROUND

Peru is the third largest country in Latin America (21<sup>st</sup> in the world). With an area of 1,28 million sq km it is slightly larger than Angola and 29% of the total size of the EU27. The population is estimated at 29 million. The Human Development Index<sup>30</sup> places Peru at a similar level as its neighbours Colombia and Ecuador, around 80<sup>th</sup> in world rank order. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index<sup>31</sup> places Peru in 72<sup>nd</sup> rank order, equal with China, Mexico, India and Brazil. While Peru cannot be considered as a very poor country overall, there are striking differences between rich and poor and the country's Gini coefficient<sup>32</sup> (disparity of income) is over 0.50 (again, very similar to many of its neighbours). About 20% of the population lives in extreme poverty and a further 30% in poverty. The climate varies from tropical in the east to dry desert in the west, and from temperate to frigid in the Andes. There are three distinct regions: the western coastal plain (costa), high and rugged Andes in center (sierra) rising to 6768m, and eastern lowland jungle of the Amazon Basin (selva). Peru is subject to natural disasters including earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding, landslides, and volcanic activity.

**Figure 6 – Map of Peru the area on the border with Ecuador which has mine contamination is ringed in red.**



29 Russell Gasser is an independent consultant working for Humanitarian Technology Consulting Limited.

30 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

31 [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2007](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007)

32 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html> Worldwide, Gini coefficients range from 0.23 in Sweden to 0.71 in Namibia.

## ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION

Peru has two separate and unrelated landmine contamination problems on its national territory, with some contamination by other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)<sup>33</sup>. Peru is also impacted by mines along the border with Chile which are in Chilean territory but which have caused accidents to Peruvians who cross the border illegally for economic reasons.

- 1 There is antipersonnel mine and some limited ERW contamination in a remote jungle region on the border with Ecuador. This is due to the brief but intense border war with Ecuador, the Cenepa war, from 26 January to 28 February 1995. There had been previous brief border wars in the same area in 1829, 1859-60, and 1941. It is now known that both countries laid mines along some parts of a 78 km stretch of the border which was in dispute, though it is only in the last two years that Peru has formally declared the mined areas. Previously Peru had stated that it had not used mines, then moved to stating that 120,000 mines had been used,<sup>34</sup> before lowering the estimate to about 30,000. Some reports suggest that the mines on the Peruvian side may in fact have been laid shortly after the end of active conflict in order to block access routes in the event of renewed hostilities leading to Ecuadoran forces seeking to cross the border.

There may well also be very small numbers of AP mines laid by Ecuadoran patrols advancing into Peruvian territory. Locating these few unrecorded mines (if indeed they exist) would appear to be a nearly impossible task in the dense jungle vegetation.

Some 184,000 people live in the north-eastern part of the border areas with Ecuador that are mine-affected. The south-western end is uninhabited apart from a few army border observation posts. The dense jungle areas of the Peruvian-Ecuador border in Amazonas Department are home to the Shuar and Achuar indigenous peoples on both sides of the border, and the Aguaruna and Huambisa on Peruvian territory. These people were displaced by the border conflict and their ability to return to a traditional way of life is constrained by the landmine and UXO problem, according to UNMAS<sup>35</sup>. In November 1998, the “Families Shuar and Achuar of the Frontier” issued a joint declaration to the international community asking for the governments of both countries to demine the border.


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33 ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO) as well as mines.

34 Landmine Monitor 2001 reported: “Perú estimates that 120,000 antipersonnel mines are laid in its territory along the border with Ecuador in the departments of Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas and Loreto. [...] The most mine-affected area is in the Cordillera del Condór region, where approximately 80,000 nomadic indigenous peoples live.”

35 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2000

Figure 7 – Map of disputed border area (from Wikipedia).



Electric pylons (high-voltage transmission line towers) and some police bases and high security prisons in Peru were ringed by AP mines from 1989 onwards, to protect them from attack by armed insurgents (the Shining Path *Sendero Luminoso* guerillas, and also the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). A special division of the police, 60 officers in total of whom about half had specialist training, placed IEDs (Improved Explosive Devices) (mines of their own improvisation<sup>36</sup>) and later AP mines of a design by the Peru Navy, around the base of the electric pylons. Typically, 30 to 50 AP mines were planted around each of 1,711 towers located at strategic spots in the departments of Lima, Junín, Huancavélica and Ica. Many of the towers are at high altitude and have extreme weather conditions for part of the year. Each time one of the towers needed technical maintenance a safe lane was opened by deactivating and moving the landmines from a strip of land where the same mines would be replanted and reactivated later<sup>37</sup>.

36 The initial design was an adapted army grenade equipped with a system of pressure activation, assembled at the site where it was planted.

37 Further information can be found in a detailed article in the Journal of Mine Action issue 10.2 “Finally, Safe Demining” by Vinicius Souza and Maria Eugênia Sá <http://maic.jmu.edu/JOURNAL/10.2/mip/souza/souza.htm>



3. Mines were planted by Chile on the Chilean side of the border with Peru (and other borders of Chile) between 1975 and 1976. In 1999 it was reported in Landmine Monitor that non-governmental organizations in the southern Peruvian border town of Tacna had protested, and had claimed that the mines have been responsible for at least fifteen deaths and approximately 200 injuries. The NGOs warn Peruvians about the dangers of attempting to cross the border illegally to seek work in Chile, and they have asked for demining of the area since the late 1990s. There continue to be a small number of casualties each year in this border minefield which is the responsibility of Chile even though the victims are from Peru. These are usually reported in the casualty data for Chile. In 2007 Peru made a formal protest to the Organization of American States about the continued presence of the minefield and Peruvian casualties.

## REPORTED CASUALTIES

There have been statements for several years that the Ecuador-Peru border is the main cause of casualties. This is the position taken by the OAS, and other reports may be repeating this information. However, the available data suggests that the ERW contaminated areas inside the country have caused far more casualties than the border region. As far as can be ascertained, all the UXO incidents were in the interior of the country. If this is the case then *reported* border casualties in recent years have been at most one person per year and most probably zero.

Casualties are reported by successive Landmine Monitor reports as follows:

**Table 3 – Casualties (Blank cells on the table indicate no data available)**

Year	Killed	Injured	Total	Mines	UXO
2006	5	8	13	1	12
2005	4	5	9	1	8
2004			5	0	5
2003 accidents	0	13	13		
2003 due to Guerilla mine use	7	1	8	8	
2002	0	19	19	11	8
1995-1999			179		

There is broad agreement (including the Red Cross and the Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields, AVISCAM) that casualty data is likely to be significantly under-reported, in part due to the very remote location of some of the mined areas.

The victims' association has been energetically calling for a full national census of victims and survivors for some years without success. There have been a large number of casualties amongst the police deminers, at least 67 police deminers have been killed or injured, though some sources suggest that a census of the police showed the total is 87. There have also been civilian casualties in areas around electric pylons which have been cleared, leading to demands for re-clearance which is now in progress. And, even then there were further casualties in a number of locations leading to a third round of clearance in some cases. Of the 179 casualties reported from 1995 to 1999, 62 were soldiers and 67 were police, 50 were

civilians. There have also been several incidents on the Chilean side of the Peru-Chile border where Peruvian citizens crossing illegally for economic purposes have been killed or injured. The Peruvian side of the border is not mined.

### REMAINING CONTAMINATION ON THE PERU-ECUADOR BORDER


Following clearance efforts in recent years, the request for an extension to the deadline for clearance under Article 5 of the APMBT gave the following information in April 2007: Total number of mines cleared so far is 1,603. There are 35 dangerous areas remaining in the Cordillero del Condor containing an estimated 30,718 AP mines in a total area of 210,140 square metres.

**Table 4 – Remaining Contamination on the Peru-Ecuador Border**

Location	Number of mined areas	Estimated number of AP mines	Area affected square metres
Santiago	8	5,956	34,365
Cenepa	22	21,256	131,449
Achuime	5	3,506	44,326

The impact of the mines in the border area is low; local people are affected but the region is only sparsely populated.

**Figure 8 – Map of the 35 mined areas on the Peru side of the Peru-Ecuador border. From CONTRAMINAS request for an extension under Article 5 of the MBT**



## REMAINING CONTAMINATION IN OTHER AREAS OF PERU

After some variation of the figures since 2002, Peru now reports that a total of 1,711 electrical towers belonging to the electricity company EDEGEL SA and the company ETECEN S.A. have been cleared, with 59,974 mines destroyed. In 2002, the ICRC reported that approximately 350 communities lived in close proximity to mined towers.<sup>38</sup>


CONTRAMINAS, the national mine action authority estimates that about 700 pylons remain to be demined again to reach humanitarian demining standards following unsatisfactory initial clearance. There have been accidents in supposedly cleared areas.

Other demining tasks to be completed, around infrastructure which was mined as a response to the internal conflicts, include:

- One electricity sub-station.
- Three transmission antennas in Cuto Cuto, Llahuaspuquio and Humurca.
- Two police bases, the anti-drugs base in Santa Lucía and the anti-terrorist base in Tulumayo.
- Three maximum security prisons each of which has about three thousand mines around it: Castro Castro, Yanamayo, and Huacariz.

AVISCAM, the Association of Victims and Survivors who have an official role in observing police demining teams as part of the Quality Management process, estimate that there are about 20,000 mines to be cleared in total other than the Peru Ecuador border area.

**Figure 9 –Left: power line routes and Right: Prisons and Police bases still to be fully cleared of mines.**



## HISTORY OF MINE ACTION

Peru signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in December 1997. In May 1998, the Law for the National Adoption of the Ottawa Treaty (Legislative Resolution 26951) was approved and on 17 June 1998, Peru became the nineteenth nation to ratify the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention.

38 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2004

Peru states that its production of antipersonnel mines ceased in 1997, and that the process of converting the production facilities began in March 1999. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Assessment Mission to Peru reported that production of landmines in the country only ceased entirely in January 1999, according to officials at the Ministry of Defense.<sup>39</sup>

As part of the peace agreement of 26 October 1998, Peru and Ecuador agreed to demining of the border under the supervision of the Ecuador/Peru Multinational Observation Mission, MOMEPE. MOMEPE is made up of military representatives from the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

In April 1999, the OAS set up the “Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Perú” (PADEP). The first phase involved clearance to permit placement of border markers. This was done in collaboration with the Ecuadorian military at the beginning of 1999. The operation took ninety days to complete and cost over U.S.\$3.5 million. From the start operations in the border area were extremely expensive, in part due to the difficult access and working conditions.

There were two initial evaluations of the mine problem in Peru. A mission was conducted by the Organization of American States (OAS) in August 1999 to evaluate the AP mine situation along the Peru-Ecuador border. In August-September 1999, UNMAS conducted a multi-disciplinary and inter-agency assessment mission to both Ecuador and Peru.

Canada, Japan, the United States, Spain, OAS and UNDP contributed funds to support mine clearance for demarcation of the Ecuador-Peru border. Peru was formally included in the U.S. humanitarian demining program in February 1999 and received \$3.2 million in assistance in 1999 and 2000.

In 2000 a group of former police deminers established the victim support group Asociación de Víctimas y Sobrevivientes de Campos Minados (Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields) AVISCAM. This is the only nationwide victims’ association in the country, and AVISCAM also undertakes a number of roles including independent monitoring of current police demining teams for quality assurance purposes, victim assistance (VA), some mine risk education (MRE), and advocacy. AVISCAM is also currently active in efforts to ban cluster munitions.<sup>40</sup>

In 2001, the governments of Ecuador and Peru signed separate agreements with the Organization of American States (OAS) for the coordination of international support for mine action through the Program for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AICMA) of the Office for Humanitarian Mine Action (OHMA). Shortly after signing the agreements the OHMA established AICMA Program offices in Quito and Lima and began coordinating efforts to begin mine clearance operations.

In December 2002 the national mine action council CONTRAMINAS was established and a National Mine Action Plan written.

The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has supported demining operations in both countries by providing international monitors since 2003. The IADB coordinates the team of international monitors who compose the Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (MARMINAS).

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<sup>39</sup> Reported in Landmine Monitor 2000.

<sup>40</sup> AVISCAM have produced a video calling for a ban on Cluster Bombs (Bombas de Racimo) available on YouTube <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E402qkbiEoQ>


## NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRUCTURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

Peru has a well established structure for national mine action. The National Mine Action Coordination body is the Peruvian Centre for Action against Antipersonnel Landmines, CONTRAMINAS. This is comprised of an Executive Council whose membership consists of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs MFA (who have the permanent presidency), Defence, Interior, Education, Health, and the National Council for the Integration of People with Disabilities which is part of the Ministry for Women and Social Development. There is also a Technical Secretary is from the MFA (Chancellery) concerned with the UN and multilateral relations who is responsible for implementing decisions made by the council. The permanent secretariat comprises two persons. The Coordinator oversees the four main areas of IMSMA, MRE, Human Rights, and administration. There is also a military officer on secondment to undertake liaison with the Division of Humanitarian Demining of the Army Engineers.

CONTRAMINAS has developed good working relationships with such bodies as the international Red Cross, and the national mine victim association, AVISCAM. They also have a good working relationship with the OAS.

In common with other Latin American countries, the OAS and the national army play key roles in demining. Peru is unusual in that the task of clearance is divided between the army who are responsible for the border demining resulting from the war with Ecuador, and the police, who are responsible for mines inside the national territory which were used during the conflict with internal armed revolutionary movements.

**Figure 10 – Organisational structure for mine action for clearance of Ecuador - Peru border areas. From AICMA website.**



## FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

The internal clearance work by the police and the border clearance work undertaken by the army are funded separately and have different mechanisms.

Both CONTRAMINAS and the Peruvian Army are aware of the need to increase donor interest and to broaden the donor base. Immediately before the evaluation visit, CONTRAMINAS, together with the Peruvian Army, had organised a conference for the local representatives of potential bilateral donors such as the ambassadors of major donor countries. CONTRAMINAS clearly regards this as an integral part of its role, and expressed the view that Peru feels that donors are not particularly interested as it is not an extremely poor country, nor is the mine problem severe by international standards.

The funding for the border clearance is administered through the OAS demining programme. This gives very little visibility to donors and it would be possible to get the mistaken impression that OAS is the key funding organisation - in fact it acts as an *agent* for the donors, in much the same way as international organisations like UNDP coordinate and seek donors for multilateral programmes which they have designed and which they seek to implement.

The AICMA website states that “since the establishment of the AICMA Program in Peru, financial assistance has been provided by the governments of Canada, Italy and the United States, as well as by the European Commission.” This does not adequately reflect the different relative sizes of the donations which range from a few thousand to well over a million dollars.

The police clearance work of the electric pylons is directly funded by the privatised electric companies. This is certainly very unusual in Latin America where the dominant model is for national military (sometimes together with special police divisions) to undertake the work through the OAS. Funding for the clearance of infrastructure by the police will come from either the government or donors, it is not yet clear which.

## EC CONTRIBUTION

On 30 December 2005, Peru and Ecuador concluded an agreement with the EU for funding of €1 million (\$1,244,900 at that time) for joint clearance of the Cordillera del Cóndor region and for MRE. The total cost of the project was €1,405,038 (\$1,749,132), including the €1 million provided by the EC. Peru has not identified how it will contribute its portion of the remaining €405,038 (\$504,232) of the total project cost. However, the governments of Peru and Ecuador are responsible for providing the project with in-kind contributions of demining personnel and logistical support. This is, however, not reflected in the published OAS budget for the project which includes training and equipping deminers, as well as their salaries.

According to available records, principally the Landmine Monitor, the following funding has been received. It is believed that this is not a complete list.

**Table 5 – EU Contribution**

Donor	Date	Amount	Source of information
Spanish Agency of International Cooperation	1998	730,000 US\$ (Army Engineers School)	LM 1999 LM 2000
Russia, Japan	1998	Unspecified - equipment, instructors, training	LM 1999 LM 2000
Argentina, Brazil, Chile	1998	Unspecified donation in kind	LM 1999

Donor	Date	Amount	Source of information
Canada	1999	CAN\$300,000 (USA\$ 198,000) divided between Peru and Ecuador	LM2000
USA	1999 - 2000	approximately USA \$3,225 million in assistance in 1999 and 2000,	LM 1999
USA	2001	\$1.66 million for US Special Operations Forces “train the trainer” programs, vehicles and equipment	LM 2002
USA	2002	US\$1 million for OAS programme	
Japan	2002	US\$594,000 for OAS programme	
Canada, Australia	2001	Can US\$448,616 Aus US\$38,917 For stockpile destruction in Peru, Ecuador and Honduras	LM 2002
ETECEN (Electric Company)	2002	US\$371,000 for clearance of 350 pylons by police	LM 2003
OAS (original donor not specified)	2002	US\$100,000 insurance, equipment, food lodging	LM 2003
ETECEN (Electric Company)	2002	US\$1,991,500 for clearance of further 1,350 pylons by police and navy services.	LM 2003
Italy	2004	US\$19,305 for demining	LM 2006
USA	2004	US\$500,000 through OAS	LM 2006
European Commission	2006	€1 million (USA\$1,244,900) through OAS	LM 2006
Italy	2006	€9,000 (USA\$23,653) through OAS	LM 2006

In 2004, the Peruvian government reported to States Parties its national contributions to mine action in the country, totaling US\$3.38 million from 1999 to 2003. Peru reported national funding for mine action totaling US\$795,413 in 2006, US\$276,983 in monetary contributions, US\$518,430 in-kind. According to CONTRAMINAS, the national government contributes about 20% of the cost of the border clearance operations, some US\$150,000 per year.

## Textbox 1 – Strategic and Technical Goals of Project Funding

The EC funding for Peru Ecuador border clearance was made available in the context of support for “consolidation of the peace process” - this was the overall strategic goal, rather than demining being the overall goal. The project was identified in 2002-3, and then proposed by Peru in 2004 and subsequently by Ecuador. In 2005 a letter of agreement was signed by both countries and in 2006 the project formally started. The EC delegation noted the considerable political importance to the Peruvian government of demining the border.

The cost per square metre cleared of the programme was already high in the proposal, around USA\$15-20 per square metre, largely due to the inaccessible location. The number of inhabitants of the zone is low. From the outset the impact of the demining itself was going to be very limited, and in the end, on the Peruvian side, the goals were not achieved with results an order of magnitude less than planned.

However, in the broader context of the project there have been very substantial achievements. The former head of Military Humanitarian Demining in Peru, General Juan Méndiz, while recognising the failure to achieve the technical goals and the clear need for improved field efficiency, was enthusiastic about the strategic achievements. In his words “I can now pick up the phone and call my colleague in Ecuador and we just discuss how to resolve any difficulties. At the start of the project I did not know who he was, and we had to get the OAS to arrange the first meeting and act as mediator.” At this level the Peruvian military clearly feel positive about working together with the Ecuadoran military to clear the ERW from a bitter war that took place only 12 years previously - after over 150 years of border disputes.

CONTRAMINAS took a similarly positive view. “Signing a piece of paper in the capital does not bring peace, we need to change how people think, especially soldiers. This project is the only example of direct military cooperation [with Ecuador] in the field, and support of the EC was crucial in this.”

In one of the summit meetings of the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador after the peace agreement was signed, demining was discussed and collaboration in working and logistics agreed. A further meeting to discuss demining was planned for the Defence Ministers of the two countries for February 2008. There is thus considerable evidence that the EC funded project has materially contributed to the broader goal of consolidating the peace.

There appears to be no available mechanism within the EC project assessment and evaluation processes to be able to take into account both the *technical* value and also the *strategic* value of the impact of the mine action project. Assessment for project selection does not appear to be able to include sufficient technical expertise, whereas evaluation is frequently undertaken on technical grounds without including sufficient appreciation of the strategic goals. The lack of technical expertise in the existing project proposal assessment was noted in the 2005 Global Assessment. The usual approach of the EC delegations of having subject matter specialists in the staff is not realistic for such a small area as mine action. The project description, and especially the evaluation of the EC “Mine Action in the Condor Mountain of Peru/Ecuador” could have significantly benefitted from such a balanced approach.

However, it should not be forgotten that the aim is to achieve success in both strategic and technical domains, and not simply one of the two areas.



## EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO PERU

In line with the change to the new Instruments for Cooperation in late 2006, future support for Peru will be closely linked to the Country Strategy Paper (CSP)<sup>41</sup> which is in turn dependent on the National Demining Strategy. The 2002 to 2006 CSP mentions landmines on the border with Ecuador both in section 5.3. “EC priority areas of intervention” and also in section 3.1.4 in discussion of the “International and regional context”, in particular the war with Ecuador. This section ends by stating “Even though the process of de-mining in that area has been effectively monitored by the OAS in co-ordination with the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and some donors are already strongly involved in this activity, there still remains a strong need for funding.”

The landmines and UXO in the interior of the country, which have been the cause of more accidents than those on the border, are not mentioned.

How the OAS contribution is judged to be effective when it has significantly failed to reach even the very modest objectives of the project it designed (e.g. 197 mines cleared when the target was 1,500 out of about 30,000 to be cleared) is not clear.<sup>42</sup>

The 2007 to 2013 CSP includes the need for mine action in greater detail, and also puts it in the context of regional cooperation and security.

“Action against mines: in the 2005-07 multiannual indicative programming on EC mine action, Peru (and also Ecuador) feature among the countries most affected by anti-personnel mines. In Peru, mines are mainly concentrated in three areas: in the north on the border with Ecuador; on the territory inland of the Pacific coast up to the Andean plateau; in the south on the border with Chile. By supporting a mine clearance programme in the Peru-Ecuador cross-border area, especially in the Condor mountain area (EC contribution €1 million), the 2005-07 strategy contributes to international efforts to eliminate anti-personnel mines from this area along the border between Peru and Ecuador. **This type of action is very important for enhance regional integration and confidence building.**” (Emphasis added).

The assertion that Peru is a country heavily affected by landmines is inaccurate, and careful study of the EC strategy does not support this suggestion. By any of the usual measures Peru is not a heavily affected country. There are very few victims and the economic impact of the mines is limited. Landmine Monitor reports just one mine victim for each of 2005 and 2006, with 8 and 12 UXO victims respectively. This should be seen in the context of neighbouring Colombia with about 350 civilian ERW casualties a year. Over half of the border contamination in Peru is in uninhabited areas which are mineral mining concessions not yet explored. The 2005-7 EC mine action strategy states as a guideline for the selection of projects “Mine clearance should increasingly prioritise mined areas of highest impact on the local populations”. The selection of countries for funding by the EC mine action strategy is not based simply on a single “most affected” criterion.

The statement that there are mines inside Peru on the Chilean border is incorrect according to

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41 There is already another significant issue arising from this approach in Peru - reconstruction aid for the victims of the recent earthquake. Once the emergency phase of the EC response is over the funding changes from emergency funding administered by ECHO to reconstruction funding administered by EuropeAid. However, the earthquake was - obviously - not included in the CSP and the mechanisms and tools to be used for this type of funding are only now being developed and tested. It is not yet entirely clear whether the instrument in its current form will prove adequate, or if it will require a judicial decision on the interpretation of part of the Stability Instrument to resolve this, or a minor amendment to the text of the Instrument.

42 Effectiveness: A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives. See OECD website for further information

[http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34435\\_2086550\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html)

all sources consulted. The problem on the border with Chile is reported as being due to mines located in Chile affecting Peruvian people who cross the border illegally for economic reasons.

In section 5.2 the “General Response strategy” the CSP also clearly links mine action to security/stability concerns, and in particular to Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation (SALW) issues.

“- maintain coherence and complementarities with European policies with an impact on cooperation policy such as the fight against drugs, action against mines and explosive residue, organised crime, including the fight against trafficking and illicit spread of small arms and light weapons and the corresponding ammunition, migration, trade, people trafficking etc;”

## ANALYSIS

### THE OAS AICMA PROGRAMME

The OAS programme for clearance of the mined areas on the border between Peru and Ecuador has had very substantial funding over the last eight years. A total of about 7 million US dollars in donations has been identified, excluding significant contributions in kind and in cash from the Peruvian and Ecuadorian governments. Even allowing for extreme access difficulties, and the difficult nature of the terrain, the results are simply not commensurate with this sort of expenditure and appear to give an overall clearance cost, in terms of the actual results, of the order of hundreds of dollars per square metre<sup>43</sup>.

Clearance from April to July 2006 in the border area resulted in just two mines being cleared. Even allowing for the important difference between measuring square metres cleared and counting mines, with an estimated 30,000 mines still to clear these figures cast doubts on the credibility of the calculations being used to determine the time and cost of clearance for the extension to the Ottawa deadline. Peru’s request for an extension until 2009 is based on a calculated time from the number of demining teams and their theoretical capacity in square metres per day. This calculation has not been based on the actual clearance rate in the last years which is more than an order of magnitude lower.

Even if clearance could be achieved at the OAS proposed cost of 20 million dollars (which currently seems unlikely) the question arises whether or not this is the best possible use of such funds. At present the casualty rate due to mines is very low with just one mine victim reported in each of 2005 and 2006. The OAS approach has apparently not been concerned with cost efficiency, and questions need to be asked as to the value achieved for the large expenditure. As noted above, the value to consolidating the peace process is not negligible and should be included in any assessment.

With only 21 hectares to clear there appears to be no reason to continue investing large amounts of money in training army deminers when there are already 80 available. Total clearance would require each current deminer to undertake less than 3,000 square metres.

Most of the PPE used in the OAS programmes is essentially combat equipment and would be considered as outdated and unsuitable by many specialist humanitarian demining organisations, especially in the hot and humid border region. Short but very thick visors are

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43 Worldwide, typical costs for NGO and commercial clearance operators are often in the range two to eight dollars per square metre, depending on the threat, terrain, access etc. However, there is clear evidence from a number of peacekeeping programmes that, when militaries undertake humanitarian demining, costs are not unusually over US\$100 per square metre.

now uncommon for humanitarian deminers, other than those who work in OAS programmes, ballistic jackets with full back protection and full combat helmets are being replaced by frontal protection and lightweight long-visors mounted on light open head frames in hot zones.

There was some criticism of the OAS programme by other key actors including the EC delegation, AVISCAM, and the Military Deminers. The transparency of the programme is low and the total cost of both administration and monitoring together is well over 50% of the budget.

The most forceful criticism came from AVISCAM, the victims' association, who regarded the approach of supplying prostheses and rehabilitation to a small number of people as unsatisfactory while there had still not been any national census to identify and locate mine and UXO victims

The interface between a military organisation like the AICMA programme and the humanitarian aid approach of the EC appears to be difficult to manage, especially in areas such as the use of Project Cycle Management and LRRD. OAS AICMA have until now not been able to supply the project documentation usually regarded as standard for any organisation receiving funding from the EC.

The current added value offered by the OAS to the clearance work on the Peru Ecuador border was apparently not clearly understood by the Peruvian Army, the initial work by the OAS in establishing contact between the Peruvian and Ecuadoran armies had been very important, but more recently the contribution was less clear.

The OAS approach of engaging with the armed forces, and at times the police, presents some specific challenges. Care is required to avoid any potential difficulties regarding the financing of armed services, even when taking a humanitarian role, from a humanitarian budget.

## POLICE DEMINING OF INFRASTRUCTURE

The lack of external support to the police demining teams clearing the electric line pylons in training, quality assurance and equipment is a lost opportunity. The proposed budget for finishing all infrastructure clearance is 650,000 dollars which gives a much better cost-benefit ratio in terms of accident reduction than the border clearance. Indeed, this represents very good value for money. The large number of accidents to police deminers (between 67 and 87) is tragic. The need to clear some pylons no fewer than three times due to poor operating practices and poor quality management is a waste of resources. Even a modest investment in improved training, and quality management might have resulted in very significant gains. This once again highlights the need for EC Delegation staff to have access to mine action expertise if they are to fund mine action.

The funding of the clearance around electric pylons by the privatised electric companies is very unusual in Latin America and possibly worth further attention. There may well be a link between the high cost-efficiency of the work and the use of private funding which could be further investigated.

## FRAGMENTATION<sup>44</sup> OF EC MINE ACTION, ISOLATION OF EC STAFF

With just one project there is no possibility that the delegation in Peru can have a specialist in mine action on the staff and the person responsible for the project will have very limited time and resources for mine action amongst a large portfolio of other projects. Even at an overall level of Latin America there is no justification of a staff post for a mine action specialist. Except for Colombia there has been no more than one EC mine action project in any country in Latin America.

The CSP contains a number of minor factual errors in the section on mine action. These have been highlighted to illustrate a specific point: it is usual for mine action projects to take a disproportionate amount of management effort for EC staff, so it is entirely rational to accept the risk of minor errors in order to keep the workload manageable. The evaluation team does not wish to criticise the author of the section who was probably already trying to balance accuracy, acquiring knowledge and a heavy workload. This is part of a more general problem of *fragmentation* of mine action which is discussed in more detail in the regional report, and the associated issue of the *isolation* of EC staff acting as project officers for mine action projects. Typically, these staff will have no prior experience of mine action and just one mine action project in their portfolio. One way to mitigate the isolation – and in turn reduce the negative impact of fragmentation - would be improved contact between programme officers dealing with mine action in different countries in Latin America. For example, it seems probable that staff in Chile and Peru could have worked together to identify the issue of the border minefields inside Chile that are affecting Peru. For the CSP, staff in Colombia would have noted that Peru is not heavily impacted by mines when compared to Colombia. A further mitigation action would be to provide EC programme officers with (a) good quality reference documentation about how to design, negotiate, manage and evaluate mine action projects (b) expert technical support in the critical phases of contract design and evaluation.

## CONCLUSIONS

Peru has well established and good quality national mine action structures.

In terms of the broader strategy of peace-building through demining, Peru presents a positive example despite the lack of effectiveness of the clearance work on the border with Ecuador.

There is little or no mine action justification for any further funding to border clearance work – there are very few casualties, the work is extraordinarily expensive and poor value. However, given the impact it has had on consolidating the peace process, and its political importance to both Ecuador and Peru, there may be strong political pressure to continue funding. If this is the case new approaches must be taken to improve both the speed and the cost effectiveness of the demining operation.

International assistance to the border area where there are few casualties and the cost of clearance is very high, has not been matched by similar support to clearance within the country where there are more casualties and much lower clearance costs. The infrastructure clearance by the police could have benefitted very significantly from improved training and quality management. An opportunity for a small amount of funding to produce significant added value appears not to have been identified.

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44 Fragmentation of funding is more correctly used in the area of Development to describe many donors funding one recipient, and the EC mine action situation of one donor dispersing funding a lot of different projects is more correctly called Proliferation. Fragmentation is used in this report as it has a clear non-technical meaning.

The funding of the police clearance by private companies is – at least for Latin America - novel and worth further study to find if the very fast low cost clearance was a result of the funding mechanism (despite the serious quality control problems).

The EC delegation in Peru had only one mine action project so cannot be expected to have expertise in the area. The severe fragmentation of mine action and associated isolation of EC staff responsible for mine action projects is evident in a number of areas, including minor errors in mine action section the CSP. These are probably unavoidable as there is no reason for a programme officer to spend the time required to become expert in mine action for a single project.

Mine action is fully included in the current CSP, the end of the thematic budget line for landmine action should not affect mine action funding which can be requested as a geographic budget item on the basis of the CSP.

Despite repeated calls from the victim association there has not yet been a nationwide survey of mine victims. This is urgently required to move VA forwards from the current *ad hoc* support to individuals to an integrated and advocacy based model.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

### RELEVANCE.

The border clearance project was relevant in that it supported the consolidation of the peace process and also provided mine clearance both to reduce the local impact of the mines and to assist Peru in meeting its clearance obligations as a State Party to the APMBBC.

The lost opportunity to work with the police demining programme could be considered as significantly reducing the overall relevance of the programme.

### EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

In terms of the peace process the programme outcome was highly effective. In terms of demining it was ineffective.

### EFFICIENCY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

It is difficult to quantify efficiency of support to consolidating the peace process, especially in the absence of clear and objectively verifiable programme goals. However, the results are very positive. The efficiency of the demining programme is extremely low, even taking into account the very difficult terrain.

### IMPACT OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

The same remarks as efficiency apply – for the consolidation of the peace process there has been a good impact, as indicated by repeated contacts at head of state and minister level, as well as contact between deminers in the field from both countries. The impact of demining the border region is very limited. The prioritisation process has maximised the limited impact by clearing the key areas first.

### SUSTAINABILITY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME

Once again this is mixed. There are some very good and sustainable results in the peace process. The demining is heavily dependent on donor aid and completely unsustainable.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The EC delegation in Peru should consider in the next review of the CSP:

1.1 If it is not already completed, including the infrastructure demining being undertaken in Peru as an activity which could benefit from donor support to: training, quality management, and equipment. Whether or not clearance is complete, support for establishing

a long-term capacity within the police to deal with residual ERW on a permanent basis could be a useful and cost-effective project and is recommended.

1.2 Any further support for mine clearance on the Peru-Ecuador border through the OAS can *only* be on the basis as a contribution to peace consolidation. As a demining activity it is not cost effective and has low impact. See also recommendation 3 below.

1.3 Including the urgent need for a national census of mine and UXO deaths and survivors in order to establish a basis for Victim Support. Support for such an action is recommended.

1.4 Including the need for MRE in settlements in Peru near the border with Chile which is mined on the Chilean side.

1.5 Addressing the minor inaccuracies about humanitarian demining in the CSP which are identified in this report.

2. The EC delegation in Peru should urgently consider increased contact with EC delegations in neighbouring mine-affected countries to generate and maintain synergies. One example is coordinating with Chile regarding the border minefield in Chile's territory which causes Peruvian casualties. Regional, or even sub-regional contact - even if occasional and at an informal level - between EuropeAid staff (and, if relevant ECHO staff) who are directly responsible for projects, could make a real difference to the issue of fragmentation.

3. In the event that further support for border mine clearance on the Peru-Ecuador border becomes a political imperative then:

3.1. In the likely event that border clearance is maintained as a monopoly of the army, make every effort to obtain a more realistic price per square metre, very substantially less than 40 dollars.

3.2. Insist on payment being made only against independently certified performance of clearance, on the basis of payment per square metre completed.

3.3. Insist of full implementation of Project Cycle Management in accordance with EC guidelines.

3.4. Insist on full implementation of the EC policy on LRRD.

3.5. Seek alternatives to the OAS multi-donor programme which appears to have very high overheads and limited added value.

3.6. Use independent specialist technical advice when negotiating a clearance contract.

4. If a further commitment to mine action is envisaged, maintain the existing working relationships with CONTRAMINAS, OAS (regional level) and AICMA (national level). Further build the relationship with AVISCAM (victims' association) and the National Police demining structures.

## ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

### Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America 2002-2007

#### 1. BACKGROUND

In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL).<sup>45</sup> These (referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated and focused policy.

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: *The Commission shall regularly assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness of future operations.*

The APL Regulation goes on to state: *Every three years after entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment of all Community mine actions...* (Article 14)

The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007<sup>46</sup> further specifies that “*more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing the results and their impact*” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.

To implement these provisions, the EC:

1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 2002-2004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to, *inter alia*, manage the programme of regional evaluations to identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following regions:<sup>47</sup>

• Africa	• Caucasus-Central Asia	• Latin America
• Asia-Pacific	• Europe	• Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005,<sup>48</sup> while the agreement with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.

<sup>45</sup> Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1) and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.

<sup>46</sup> This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.

<sup>47</sup> Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:

- provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and similar studies;
- train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
- support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).

<sup>48</sup> Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, *Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004*.

## 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION

The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and recommendations from the Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global Assessment or critical programming issues.

### Overall objective:

To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programmes, and policies.

### Specific objectives:

- To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
  - the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and 2005-2007;
  - national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
  - EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected countries in Latin America 2002-2006;
  - EC strategy documents for Latin America or major sub-regions in Latin America.
- To analyse the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in Latin America, and across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
- To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
  - addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
  - fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
  - supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the beneficiary countries;
  - supporting local mine action organisations;
- To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a country (national; UN; OAS, donors; international NGOs; etc.);
- To assess the role & performance of multilateral agencies active in the national mine action programme (e.g. Inter-American Defence Board/OAS, UN agencies, etc.);
- To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to mine action in Latin America, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these projects;
- To assess the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of implementation;
- To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor assistance (including plans for sustainability);
- To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
- To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines and the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from the EC to Latin America;
- To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of EC-funded mine projects;
- To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among mine action programmes in Latin America and globally.



### **Expected results**

The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to Latin America, and to particular mine-affected countries in Latin America, since 2002. It shall incorporate more detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases to illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations will aim in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of support to mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national authorities, other donors, and UN agencies for the next years.

### **3. METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:

- Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
- Desk Research
- Country Missions (to be confirmed)
  - Colombia
  - Peru/Ecuador<sup>49</sup>
- Analysis and Reporting

#### **Country Missions**

As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and collect documents and data from:

- EC delegations
- national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
- UN agencies supporting mine action
- representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
- representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
- other key government officials
- representatives from key regional organisation (where present).

#### **Additional data collection**

Additional information will be obtained from:

- Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final reports, as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where available;
- Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);
- Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC Delegations, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations’ headquarters and on the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.).
- EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.

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<sup>49</sup> Relating to the cross-border project Mine Action in the Condor Mountain Range of Peru/ Ecuador, approved in 2005.

- National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine Action Strategies from the focus countries
- Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for mine action) and the World Bank
- Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
- Other sources, as appropriate.

#### **4. OUTPUTS**

An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning and data collection stage (late October 2007).

A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and other stakeholders at the end of each country mission.

Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks.

A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels.

All reports will be in English, with the final Executive Summary translated into Spanish as well.

All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm). The GICHD logo shall be provided by the GICHD.

## Annex 1

Among the key conclusions of the Global Assessment were:

- The need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will receive EC funding for mine action;
- In light of ‘deconcentration’, the need to clarify “who does what” in mine action within the EC;
- Request for proposal and selection processes, including:
  - The need for more high quality proposals,
  - The need to reduce the number of proposals rejected on technicalities, and
  - The need for more rigorous assessments – including technical criteria – of proposals and projects.
- Contracting issues, including:
  - The need for greater contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements;
  - The need for greater clarity in defining the chains of responsibility and authority;
  - The limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short durations.
- All interventions should incorporate exit strategies.

## ANNEX 2 ORGANISATIONS CONTACTED IN COLOMBIA

Organización en Español	Organisation in English	Person
Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas CCCM	Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines	Alvaro Jiménez Millan, National Coordinator
Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia CIREC - programa “Semillas de Esperanza”	Integral Rehabilitation Centre of Colombia, “Seeds of Hope” Victim Assistance programme.	German Ruiz Z, Director. Four members of “Semillas” team.
Delegación de la Comisión Europea, EuropeAid.	European Commission Delegation, EuropeAid	Thierry Duderme, Head of Trade section, Manuel de Rivera Lamo, Cooperation Specialist.
Delegación de la Comisión Europea, ECHO.	European Commission Delegation, ECHO.	Natalia Cepeda, Programme Assistant Marie Zazvorkova, Programme Assistant
Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal	Presidential Programme for Integrated Action against AP Mines	Andrés Dávila, Director Katerina Patón, Programme Director
Secretariado Nacional de la Pastora Social	National Administration of “Pastoral Social” (Caritas International)	Mnsr Héctor Fabio Henao Camilo Serna Irma González, Natalia Velasquez
AICMA/OEA Programa de Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal	OAS Integrated Mine Action Program, Regional Office	Guillermo Leal, Coordinador Regional para Sur America
UNICEF	UNICEF	Sharon Ball, Mine Action Officer

Organización en Español	Organisation in English	Person
Following contacts by phone and e-mail:		
Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, Colombia	International Committee of the Red Cross, Colombia	Andy Wheatley
PNUD	UNDP	Alessandro Preti, Programme Coordinator
Embajada de Gran Bretaña, Bogota	British Embassy, Bogota	Oriel Willox, Attache

<b>Organización en Español</b>	<b>Organisation in English</b>	<b>Person</b>
Delegación de la Comisión Europea en Chile, EuropeAid	European Commission delegation in Chile, EuropeAid	Soledad Suárez G. Sección Cooperación
Following meeting additional to the original work plan.		
Delegación de la Comisión Europea en Nicaragua, EuropeAid	European Commission delegation in Nicaragua, EuropeAid	Pilar Suárez, Cooperation Specialist, and other staff.
Delegación de la Comisión Europea en Nicaragua, ECHO	European Commission delegation in Nicaragua, ECHO	Peter Burgess, Head of ECHO office.

### ANNEX 3 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO MINE ACTION IN COLOMBIA

From	To	Implementer	Donor	Actual amount USA dollars	Total for year
2002			Government of Colombia	\$3,300,000	\$3,300,000
2003	2004	OAS	Canada	\$115,000	
2003	2004	CCCM	CCCM own funds	\$26,546	
2003			Int Org for Migration	\$116,000	
2003	2004	CCCM	Int Org for Migration and USAID	\$98,448	
2003			Plan Colombia	\$12,000	
2003		Geneva Call	EC	\$237,000	
2003		GICHD (MRE)	Switzerland	\$50,000	
2003	2004	UNICEF (MRE, VA, Advocacy)		\$428,063	
<b>2003</b>			<b>TOTAL FOR 2003</b>		<b>\$1,083,057</b>
2004		Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE	“Children of the Andes,” the Diana, Princess of Wales Fund & own resources	\$120,000	
2004			Antioquía Health Dept	\$17,392	
2004		CIREC - advocacy	Canada	\$47,822	
2004		OAS (Demining, VA, MRE)	Canada	\$178,169	
2004		UNICEF - MRE	Canada	\$192,057	
2004		National Antimine Programme	EC	\$3,109,500	
2004		Antipersonnel mine Observatory	Government of Colombia	\$863,000	
2004		Antipersonnel mine Observatory	Int Org for Migration	\$116,267	
2004		CIREC	Int Org for Migration and others	\$140,000	
2004		Corporación Paz y Democracia - MRE	ISAGEN (Electricity Generating Company of Colombia)	\$21,927	
2004		OAS (Demining, VA, MRE)	Italy	\$19,335	
2004		Colombian Red Cross	Not known	\$25,000	
2004		UNDP- Antioquía training	Not known	\$7,827	

2004	Antipersonnel mine Observatory -earmarked for Meta, Antioqía, Montes de María regions	Not known, via UNDP	\$50,000	
2004	Corporación Paz y Democracia - Mine Action plans	Not known, via UNICEF	\$99,299	
2004	Antipersonnel mine Observatory, GICHD (MRE)	Switzerland	\$123,200	
2004	Antipersonnel mine Observatory, GICHD (MRE)	Switzerland	110000	
2004	OAS - Bogota office	US State Dept	\$75,000	
<b>2004</b>		<b>TOTAL FOR 2004</b>		<b>\$5,315,795</b>
2005	Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE	"Children of the Andes", Diana Proneess of Wales foundation	\$174,135	
2005	Not known - MRE	Adopt a Minefield	\$84,215	
2005	OAS AICMA - technical survey	Canada	\$132,893	
2005	UNICEF - MRE	Canada	\$206,356	
2005	Diakonie - MRE	EC	\$25,554	
2005	Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE	EC	\$99,658	
2005	UNICEF - MRE and VA	Germany	\$174,032	
2005	National Antimine Programme	Government of Colombia	\$934,100	
2005	Hogar Jesús de Nazareth, Bucaramanga - VA	Int Org for Migration	\$42,757	
2005	Hospital Universitario del Valle Evaristo García - rehabilitation centre	Japan via Int Org for Migration	\$656,496	
2005	CCCM - MRE and VA	Norway	\$333,323	
2005	Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE	Norway	\$9,980	
2005	Antioquía - Mine Actionplans	Not known, via UNDP & UNICEF	\$22,174	
2005	Hospital Universitario del Valle Evaristo García - rehabilitation centre	Own funds	\$187,976	

2005	Not known - VA	Spain	\$267,653	
2005	UNICEF - MRE	Sweden	\$125,000	
2005	Not known - MRE	Switzerland	\$120,395	
2005	UNICEF - VA	Switzerland	\$140,461	
2005	UNICEF - MRE	UK	\$135,000	
2005	Landmine Survivors Network	USA	\$177,311	
2005	Hospital Universitario del Valle Evaristo García - rehabilitation centre	Valle de Cauca departmental government	\$127,544	
<b>2005</b>		<b>TOTAL FOR 2005</b>		<b>\$4,177,013</b>
2006	Handicap International - capacity building	Canada	\$123,452	
2006	OAS	Canada	\$420,090	
2006	UNICEF - MRE and VA	Canada	\$220,450	
2006	CARITAS - Pastoral Social	EC	\$847,800	
2006	HI - victim assistance	EC	\$1,004,800	
2006	Regional Govt of Antioquía	EC	\$659,400	
2006	National Antimine Programme	Government of Colombia	\$213,400	
2006	OAS (Demining)	Italy	\$11,720	
2006	Not known	Slovenia	\$22,100	
2006	UNICEF - MRE and VA	Spain	\$376,890	
2006	UNICEF and others	Switzerland	\$279,300	
2006	CIREC - victim assistance	USA	\$70,000	
2006	OAS capacity building	USA	\$300,000	
		<b>TOTAL FOR 2006</b>		<b>\$4,549,402</b>
		TOTAL 2002 to 2006		\$18,425,267



## ANNEX 4 LIST OF EC CO-FINANCED MINE ACTION PROJECTS IN COLOMBIA 2002-2007

Contract number	Country	Contract Title	Contractor's signature date or start date of activities	End date of activities	Contracting Party	Amount of EC cofunding	Notes
MAP/2003/074-967 EC	Colombia and Middle East	Engaging armed non-state actors (NSAs) in a landmine ban: Colombia and the Middle East	02/12/2003	01/12/2005	Geneva Call	250,000 €	Total budget was 500,000 €- assumed 50% spent on each of Colombia and the Middle East,
MAP/2004/088-125 DE	Worldwide	International Campaign to Ban Landmines: activities proposal 1-9-04 to 30-9-05 including Landmine Monitor Initiative	01/09/2004	30/09/2005	International Campaign to Ban Landmines Asbl	5,000 €	Total budget was 500,000€ Very difficult to identify the small part relevant to Latin America, estimated at 10,000€(2% of total)
DDH/2004/097-944	Colombia	MRE "Estrategia de Comunicación para la prevención de accidentes por minas antipersonales y artefactos explosivos abandonados con y para niños, niñas y jóvenes"	01/02/2005	01/02/2006	Fundacion Antonio Restrepo Barco	59,799 €	
ALA/2006/132-419	Colombia	Institutional Strengthening of the Colombian National Mines Action Capacity	01/01/2006	26/12/2010	Departamento Administrativo Presidencia de la Republica, Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal DAPR-PPAICMA	2,500,000 €	

Contract number	Country	Contract Title	Contractor's signature date or start date of activities	End date of activities	Contracting Party	Amount of EC cofunding	Notes
ECHO/-SM/BUD/2006/01005	Colombia	Our future is today III: Re-integration in the educational system and increased protection against mines and UXO's	01/03/2006	Feb 07	Diakonisches Werk der EKD - Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe Germany 682,000 € total of which 28,113 € for Mine Action	28,113 €	Reported as 100,580 in EC "Mine Action in the World" report,
ECHO/SM/BU D/2006/01016	Colombia	Access and Humanitarian Aid for populations putting up resistance, those that have returned and those displaced, in the municipalities most affected by the conflict and the displacement in the departments of Valle del Cauca and Nariño,	01/07/2006	Jun 07	Solidaridad Internacional 600,000 € total of which 1001 € for Mine Action	1,001 €	
MAP/2007/143-289	Colombia	MRE "Educación en el riesgo (ERM) de la población vulnerable y Atención a las víctimas de minas antipersonal y municiones sin explotar en el sur de Colombia"	01/10/2007		Deutscher Caritasverband e.V., (Caritas Germany)	675,000 €	
MAP/2007/143-269	Colombia	VA "Asistencia a víctimas civiles de accidentes de Minas Antipersonal y Municiones Sin Explotar (MAP y MUSE) en Colombia"	01/12/2007		HI Belgium	800,000 €	

Contract number	Country	Contract Title	Contractor's signature date or start date of activities	End date of activities	Contracting Party	Amount of EC cofunding	Notes
MAP/2007/144-541	Colombia	MRE in Antioquia "Institucionalización y sostenibilidad de la educación riesgo de minas y la atención biopsicosocial a víctimas de MAP y MUSE, a través de educadores y personal de salud en municipios prioritarios del Departamento de Antioquia"	01/12/2007		Antioquia Local Government	525,000 €	
<b>EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROJECTS (ECHO) STARTING IN 2007 IN COLOMBIA WITH IDENTIFIED COMPONENTS OF MRE AND OTHER MINE ACTION, NO SEPARATE FINANCIAL DATA FOR THE MINE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE GENERALLY IN SUPPORT OF THE MAIN AIMS OF THE PROJECT, All projects end in 2008 after the end of evaluation period,</b>							
Contract number	Country	Contract Title	Start date	End date of activities	Contracting Party	Amount of EC cofunding	Description
ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01006	Colombia (ECHO)	To provide protection, relief and assistance to people affected by the internal conflict in Colombia in the rural and urban areas located close to the border with Venezuela, in the Cesar departments,	Apr,07	Feb,08	Movimiento por la Paz el Desarme y la Libertad (MPDL)		Multisectorial project with a mine risk education component (under R6): Workshops on antipersonnel mines and UXO for IDP families and tranings of communitarian Mine Risk Education multipliers

Contract number	Country	Contract Title	Contractor's signature date or start date of activities	End date of activities	Contracting Party	Amount of EC cofunding	Notes
ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01007	Colombia (ECHO)	ICRC assistance and protection activities	Feb,07	Jan,08	International Committee of the Red Cross		The component of economic support for residents (R3) contains provision of food assistance up to three months and EHI on a one-time basis for 100 families of the missing or affected by land mines,
ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01011	Colombia (ECHO)	Amélioration de l'attention médicale portée aux populations vulnérables d'Arauquita, dont en particulier, celle du service de santé publique,	Jul,07	Jun,08	Croix-Rouge Française		The project focused at providing health assistance has also a component of mine risk education and awareness (R2): Formation de leaders communautaires dans chaque point d'attention sur la thématique des mines durant 3 jours, avec distribution du matériel didactique, Réalisation de 10 ateliers sur les mines pour les populations infantiles et adultes avec une distribution de matériel didactique
ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01013	Colombia (ECHO)	Humanitarian assistance to isolated or blocked rural communities, populations at risk of displacement and other population directly affected by the armed conflict in the Municipalities of Remedios and Zaragoza, Department of Antioquia, Colombia,	Jul,07	Jun,08	Spanish Red Cross		This project focused on providing health assistance has also a component of mine risk education and awareness (R2): talks on antipersonnel mines for children and adult population in each of four focal communities

Contract number	Country	Contract Title	Contractor's signature date or start date of activities	End date of activities	Contracting Party	Amount of EC cofunding	Notes
ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01014	Colombia (ECHO)	Access and humanitarian aid for populations putting up resistance, those that have returned and are displaced, in the territories of ethnic communities most affected by the armed conflict in Valle del Cauca and Nariño	Jul,07	Jun,08	Solidaridad Internacional		Multisectorial project with a component of institutional and community strengthening (R1 and R5) that will contain specific activities (to be defined by the indigenous communities in the next weeks) such as sensitisation events regarding risk related with landmines and/or development of contingency plans in case of landmine accidents in Nariño department,
ECHO/-SM/BUD/2007/01001	Colombia (ECHO)	Our future is today: Protection of Indigenous Populations and Children	Mär,07	Feb,08	Diakonisches Werk der EKD - Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, Germany		

ECHO/- SM/BUD/2007/ 01020	Colombia (ECHO)	Provision of coordination services for humanitarian response in Colombia	Mär,07	Feb,08	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA	Among its coordination and information activities, OCHA also collects and disseminates information related to landmines
ECHO/- SM/BUD/2007/ ?	Colombia (ECHO)	Improving humanitarian protection of communities living in the midst of the conflict,	Okt,07	Jun,08	OXFAM GB	Multisectorial project with a capacity strengthening component that contains actions to improve the information and communication relating to the routes for treatment of populations affected by landmines, among others (R2)*,

## ANNEX 5 ORGANISATIONS CONTACTED IN PERU

Organización en Español	Organisation in English	Person(s)
Asociación de Víctimas y Sobrevivientes de Campos Minados AVISCAM	Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields	Carlos Estrada, President
Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal CONTRAMINAS	Peruvian Centre for Action against Antipersonnel Mines.	Dr Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Coordinador General.
Cancillería de Perú	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru	Ministra Consejera Liliam Ballón represented by Juan Pablo Guerrero, Second Secretary
AICMA/OEA Programa de Acción Integral Conra las Minas Antipersonal	OAS Integrated Mine Action Program, Regional Office	Guillermo Leal, Coordinador Regional para Sur America
AICMA/OEA Perú	OAS Integrated Mine Action Program in Peru	Giselle Vasquez, Administrator
Delegación de la Comisión Europea en Perú	EC Delegation in Peru	Leonor Suárez Ognio, Development Cooperation. Jean Charles Fiehrer, Head of Section, Development Co-operation. Karl-Heinz Vogel, Cooperation Attaché
Dirección General de Desminado Humanitario del Ejército del Perú	Peruvian Army Humanitarian Demining Command	General de Brigada Juan Méndiz. Mayor David Fernández
Policía Nacional, División de Seguridad Contraminas DIVSECOM	National Police Division for Antimine Safety DIVSECOM	Not possible to arrange meeting at suitable time.