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## Assessment into Operational Mine/UXO Clearance Activities in Kosovo

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**Assessment into Operational**  
**Mine/UXO Clearance Activities**  
**in Kosovo**

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## **Preface**

The Assessment Team wishes to thank the many people who shared their time and thoughts with us, helping to ensure that the mission to Kosovo could achieve its objectives in a short time period.

We note the pivotal roles played by General Chris Steirn, the KPC Coordinator, who foresaw the need for an independent assessment and then made it happen; Major Nick Bunday, Office of the KPC Coordinator; Ahmet Sallova, Chief of the EOD Management Section in the OKPCC, and his colleagues Musa Saphiu and Bajram Krasniqi. We would like to thank the HALO Trust team for their support: Matthew Hovell, Caucasus/Balkans Desk Officer; David Elliott, Survey Officer; and Luan Jaupi, IMSMA Officer. MAT Programme Manager and KPC Trainer Mika Toivonen has also actively supported our work. Outside Kosovo, Chris Clark, former Chief of Operations (until 2001) and Steve Saunders, Chief of the EOD OKPCC until July this year, have directly responded rapidly to our e-mail requests for information.

We stress that the findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations contained in this report represent the views of the Assessment Team. The OKPCC, UNMAS, and other stakeholders, are not responsible for the content of this report or bound by its recommendations.

### *Assessment Team*

Phil Bean GICHD Head of Standards, Team Leader.

Vera Bohle GICHD evaluation and technical consultant.

## **1. Executive Summary**

The GICHD were requested by OKPCC to provide an external and independent review of the outstanding EOD requirements within Kosovo. The findings of the review will be used to assess the future EOD / Mine Action resource requirements. The review was conducted over a ten day period in August 2006 with the prime tasks of assessing the completeness of the task identification and recording systems used for work planning. Within the Kosovo Programme the majority of the survey and clearance activity, involving in excess of 4,500 Dangerous Areas reports, including those that proved to be duplicate reports, had been coordinated by the UN MACC during the period 1999 –2001. Since that period the OKPCC EOD Management Cell have been responsible for managing the remaining activities with a focus on dealing with the residual contamination and establishing appropriate resources for longer term ‘low priority’ tasks and response.

In outline, the operational management process within the EOD Management Cell of the OKPCC involved the identification of Dangerous Areas, and then where appropriate, the tasking of a demining organisation to clear the area. The record of how Dangerous Areas were dealt with is recorded by a paper work trail of operational reports which are filed in a ‘Task Dossier’. A Task Dossier may contain several Dangerous Areas if they are geographically close or linked to coordinated tasking. The ‘tasks’ were specific operational tasks which had been allocated by the mine action centre (now the OKPPC EOD Management Section) to demining organisations. The information product from the individual Task Dossiers is transferred to the Information Management System for Mine Action, IMSMA, for ease of access and analysis. When completed the Task Dossiers are archived after the information has been incorporated in to IMSMA.

Some doubt about the conclusions of the UN assessment of future tasks and the quality of previous mine action operations had been raised by one of the demining organisations which led to this independent review. Currently there are three demining organisations working in Kosovo in addition to the emergency EOD elements of KFOR; these are the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the HALO Trust and the Mine Awareness Trust (MAT). The review team carried out an information management audit to assess whether the recorded information was complete and justified the assessed future operational plans. The Terms of Reference for the Review Mission are attached at Annex A.

In detail the review team conducted a systematic review of the Task Dossiers held by the EOD Management Section to determine whether appropriate actions have been undertaken to declare Dangerous Areas (DAs) as being either cleared, cancelled, or to designate the DA as being a future clearance task. Due to the limited time of the evaluation a sample of 156 Dangerous Areas or Minefields (not counting CBU strike duplicates) included in 90 different Task Dossiers were investigated through the application of an agreed methodology. The selection of Task Dossiers did not follow coincidental or average sampling procedures, but was guided by the review of a list of tasks that one of the demining organisations had identified as questionable or problematic. In addition 29 Dangerous Areas or Minefields that were included in 16 Task Dossiers were chosen through coincidental sampling. It was agreed by all parties to the assessment, that the amount of samples was sufficient to make a clear judgement of the situation, this was tested through one field mission to investigate questions raised over seven specific areas. The detailed methodology of the assessment is described in chapter 4 of this report.

The product of the analyses of the Task Dossiers, including a detailed list of discrepancies as they were encountered, is attached as Annex B to this report.

The tables in Annex B also include recommendations for remedial action, either office based or field based depending on the completeness of the information. A total of three sites that need to be revisited have been identified during the review, of which one is considered by the EOD Management Cell as low priority. Thirteen of the requested Task Dossiers were not available for review and the answers to the questions remain open, additional sites may need to be added for field assessment when they are located and analysed. The results of the Task Dossier assessment are further analysed in Chapter 5 of this report.

The information contained within the Task Dossiers has been compared with the information contained in IMSMA, and any areas of discrepancy have been recorded in an extra column of the assessment tables in Annex B. Additionally, general findings are described in Chapter 5. Recommendations for specific remedial action in each case are included in the tables, while general recommendations are listed below.

Overall, IMSMA reflected the information from the Task Dossiers reasonably accurately, but did not always contain all details. Most of the discrepancies were minor, but problems were identified in seven cases, in which the status of a DA had to change from “Complete” to “Low Priority KPC” or “EOD Response”. However, these were assessed as mostly very remote, low priority surface cleared CBU strike areas, which do not require attention at this stage. Long term, their status could be reconfirmed periodically by KPC.

As an additional investigation, the review team also looked at the Task Dossiers containing tasks that remain to be completed to confirm their number and priority. This totals to 30 future tasks for clearance, of which one could possibly be considered as a priority. The results were compared to the assessment made by UNMAS earlier this year.<sup>1</sup> The UNMAS list was found to be accurate and in line with the Task Dossiers held by OKPCC operations section. Subtracting the tasks completed in the meantime and those that are currently worked on, 16 tasks remain open from that list for KPC clearance, none of them are categorised as being a high priority by the EOD Management Cell. One more task came in after the UNMAS assessment had been made. The review of the Task Dossiers and IMSMA brought up another 6 DAs, which were indicated as “Future Tasks”, but not yet listed. One of these tasks does not require attention at this stage. Furthermore, the 7 tasks mentioned above for eventual re-assessment could be added.

Survey or community liaison tasks identified for re-visit include three areas identified through the review, plus 7 potential areas reported through OSCE (see Chapter 6d, Chapter 7 and Annex C for details).

The current nomenclature (categories) being applied to the status of tasks has been assessed as part of the review. Recommendations for categorising the tasks in accordance with mine action sector standards are made in Chapter 6e. The main change recommended has been to summarize and combine the terms “Future Task”, “Low Priority KPC” and “EOD Response” all as “Future Task”.

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<sup>1</sup> Report on the Landmine and Cluster Bomb Threat in 2006. Situation Analyses and Evaluation of the Kosovo Protection Corps Capacity to address the Problem, UNMAS, 14 May 2006

As a result of the above mentioned investigations, and of the other assessments made which are detailed in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this report, it can be concluded that mines/UXO generally do not impede movement or socio-economic development in Kosovo. This does not ignore the fact that in some rural areas the perceived or real threat of mines/UXO may affect the population.

Accident statistics indicate that the threat is low, and also that the population is well aware of it through mine risk education. The highest threat seems to come from abandoned munitions like hand grenades which when reported, are dealt with well through emergency EOD response tasking either by KFOR or KPC. The attention of the Review Team had been drawn to review accident information and the assessment of that information by the UN and by the EOD Management Section. Whilst there have been a number of tragic accidents that have been classified by the UN as 'being caused by tampering' (such as an incident where 6 children were victims) the instances of accidents as a result of munitions in new or old Dangerous Areas are few. The number of Emergency EOD call outs dealt with by KFOR and KPC provides an indication of the comparatively high levels of munitions in circulation. Comment on accidents is provided in section 6.

There does not seem to be a large scale unknown problem with mines/UXO in Kosovo. Dealing with the outstanding DAs should be well within the capacity of KPC. Planned gradual reduction of KFOR EOD and the conclusion of international demining NGO support has been factored in to plans to increase the resources and activities of KPC.

This Review concludes that the general situation assessment made by the UN in 2001 does not need to be changed or rectified. This view corresponds with that of the MAT and the KPC.

The assessment team appreciated that the review of the Task Dossiers has not been exhaustive. It should be systematically continued by OKPCC EOD to include a full information audit of all task dossiers and the IMSMA records as part of a regular, planned, ongoing management activity.

Whilst the overall information management systems work well, a detailed list of shortcomings in OKPCC EOD filing and data management have been identified, and detailed recommendations for remedial action are proposed below.

## **2. Recommendations**

1.OKPCC EOD should task KPC to conduct surveys at the locations summarized in Annex C of this report.

2.OKPCC EOD / KPC should be more pro-active in order to ensure that they receive information on Dangerous Areas. This includes:

- Enhanced community liaison, especially collection of information on mine accidents with animals.
- Visits to Municipalities to ensure the DA reporting system is understood and working.
- Regular meetings with KFOR and OSCE staff to ensure the national DA reporting system is understood and working.
- Follow-up of the OSCE survey reports.

- Trawl for and find out all relevant information available within Demining Organisations collective staff memory.
- Contact the Team Leader from HALO Trust who claims to have knowledge of minefields, and ensure that information is correctly processed.
- A renewal of proactive communication with the Albanian Mine Action Centre (AMAC) and Danish Church Aid (DCA) about the situation on the Albanian border.
- Continuation of the systematic survey process (ongoing since 1999).

3. OKPCC EOD Operations should consider the following recommendations:

- Completing the ‘follow-up’ actions indicated in Table 2.
- Up date the ‘master registry list’ of Task Dossiers so that the numerical sequence can be followed and all Task Dossiers be accounted for.
- The “Future Tasks” identified through the Task Dossier review and IMSMA research should be added to the “Future Task” list, as detailed in Annex C.
- Reconstitute the missing documents and Task Dossiers and assess them with the help of the developed review methodology.
- Continue the review process of Task Dossiers with the help of the developed methodology, looking carefully for any inconsistencies between the task dossiers and IMSMA records. Create summarizing cover pages for each Task Dossier. Rather than compiling tables as in this Review Mission, make any IMSMA changes directly and document them. Also document which Task Dossiers have been reviewed.
- Having undertaken the above step, cross-reference the DAs covered by all Task Dossiers to those in IMSMA and identify an accurate list of DAs that do not have an associated Task Dossier. Ensure that these too have been appropriately closed and documented.
- Add the centralised survey reports and ‘ops memos’ to the individual Task Dossiers.
- Link the information contained in “Operation Normal Life” to the Task Dossiers.
- Improve the instructions from operations to the data entry clerk to ensure proper data transfer and an auditable record of decisions, for example by using written instructions– even if it is the same person. File the instructions for follow-up.
- When using IMSMA for task identification, take the IMSMA ‘status’ as reference, not the IMSMA “confirmed clear” box. Ensure that all Dangerous Areas have a ‘status’ indicated in IMSMA and where not currently indicated that the status is reviewed before being entered.
- Create proper records before human memory moves on. Transfer all knowledge to the Task Dossiers, into IMSMA and record the process in Standard Work Procedures (SWP).
- Write simple SWPs on such topics as Priority Setting and Reaction on Requests. There is a need to maintain an auditable record of management decisions.
- Apply the agreed revised nomenclature for the status of tasks.
- Consider differentiating between clearance requirement and low priority residual risk (action only when impact changes) for “Future Tasks”.
- Re-assess impact of low priority DAs systematically.
- Assess regularly if the status of ‘KFOR Responsibility’ tasks have changed.
- Re-communicate Kosovo EOD reporting and communication lines regularly.
- Consider writing a guideline on demolition drills for the use of SM systems.



- Consider adopting the procedures developed in Lebanon for random minefields, if singular mines are found or accidents with human beings / animals are reported, (copies of procedures provided).
- Document the human resource / equipment needs of KPC for the coming years. Specifically consider equipment maintenance and remote areas.
- Search for the documents that record the operational follow-up of mine accidents that were not caused through tampering.
- Create a workplan to implement these recommendations.

4. OKPCC should discuss with OKPCC EOD the need for an office manager function to support the work of the EOD cell. The office manager would ensure proper internal management procedures, for example conduct quality assurance of filing/documentation and IMSMA data entry, write SWPs etc. The need for a Community Liaison Officer as assistant to the Mine Risk Education Officer should also be assessed.

5. In an endeavour to transfer responsibility to local capacity and built-up structures following the UN strategic goals for Kosovo, KPC should conduct as many of the identified tasks as possible, all of them co-ordinated through OKPCC. This includes KFOR EOD tasks, which would indicate the need for a senior EOD course for KPC.

6. An external monitoring visit by UNMAS or an external organisation should be conducted once per year to ensure the implementation of the above mentioned recommendations. OKPCC should consider budgeting for this.

### **3. Introduction**

The OKPCC requested the GICHD to carry out an assessment into specific aspects operational mine and UXO clearance activities in Kosovo. One GICHD staff member, Mr Phil Bean, and one technical consultant of the GICHD, Ms Vera Bohle, carried out this assessment during July/August 2006.

According to the Terms of Reference (see Annex A), the OKPCC required an assessment of all Task Dossiers held by the EOD Management Section, to ensure that appropriate action has been undertaken to either clear or cancel tasks, or to designate them for future clearance by the KPC. The purpose of this assessment has been to determine the residual mine and UXO threat within Kosovo, which in turn will enable an assessment of the KPC EOD capacity to deal with it.

The OKPCC had UNMAS conduct a similar assessment in May 2006. However, one of the demining organisations were not satisfied that UNMAS was sufficiently independent and doubted the validity of the assessment. For this reason, an independent assessment by GICHD had been requested.

The Assessment is written for the OKPCC as a situation report and as a planning tool for further action. It is intended to be forward looking but also documents lessons learned.

### **4. Background**

The background to the mine and UXO situation in Kosovo and the subsequent action by the UN and the OKPCC will not be detailed here, but is adequately described in the terms of reference for the assessment mission (see Annex A).

Some additional background information that was relevant for this assessment is the following:

Relating to the contamination status in Kosovo. A misunderstanding seems to have been produced by press reports in 2001 leading to an interpretation that the last existing mine in Kosovo had been cleared when the exodus of the international NGOs started. To clarify this misunderstanding, and to outline the goals of the Mine Action Programme (MAP) in Kosovo, and the mine / UXO status of Kosovo as perceived by the UN Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) end 2001, the following quotes are of relevance:

The objective of the UNMIK mine action programme

“...is to create a situation where mines and UXO no longer pose a serious threat to the local population or impede development.”<sup>2</sup>

The MACC final report 2001 clarifies:

“Whilst the vast majority of minefields have now been cleared or identified, there is the possibility that some mines will still be found in the future. However, it is unlikely that these will be large scale mined areas, and will be within the clearance capabilities of the teams trained in Technical Survey. Additionally, in the unlikely event of a large minefield, or a number of large

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<sup>2</sup> UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Exit Strategy, 3 January 2001

mined areas being located in the future, then it will be possible to contract specialist assistance as required. Such assistance could include an explosive detection dog team or a mechanical asset for specific clearance tasks over defined periods of time. This is a more cost-effective solution than maintaining these capabilities in the Province when there is little likelihood that they will be used on a regular basis.”<sup>3</sup>

And furthermore:

“The reasoning for this approach is further reinforced by the fact that Kosovo has been extensively surveyed by MACC-coordinated teams for more than two years, and very few new mined areas have been located in the past 12-18 months. These new areas have generally been in extremely remote, difficult to access areas where the impact of the mines is minimal. In most cases, these mines have posed more of a danger to the personnel conducting the clearance task, than any members of the civilian population. In such circumstances in the future, the requirement to clear the area versus the possibility of simply marking the perimeter to warn people of the danger will also be a viable option to be considered.”<sup>4</sup>

The summary of the report outlines:

“At this time (15 December 2001), all known minifields and cluster bomb-affected areas will have been cleared to an acceptable standard, or identified and marked for subsequent clearance by the trained local capacity. This will mean that mines and unexploded ordnance will not be an impediment to social and economic development in the Province, as the situation will be comparable to, or better than the situation that exists in many countries throughout Europe.”<sup>5</sup>

However UNMIK in July 2005 maintained that national capacity required external assistance to deal with the problem of ERW:

“ Continued donor funding is needed for the ongoing operations of international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and training of KP teams, which together have some 250 people involved in the day-to-day clearance of mines and UXO”

“ There is still a requirement for International Non-Governmental Organisations to be engaged in UXO and mine clearance in Kosovo” <sup>6</sup>

As described in the background part of the ToR for this assessment, the work in Kosovo was not considered to be finished, but had been transferred to local authorities. The MACC had become the EOD cell of the OKPCC, staffed with local capacity who has been built up since 1999, supported by international staff who had also previously worked long term in the MAP. The KPC became the implementing partner for clearance and received progressive training and support. KFOR EOD teams continued to conduct small scale clearance and are the main resource for emergency EOD response tasks.

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<sup>3</sup> UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2001

<sup>4</sup> UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2001

<sup>5</sup> UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2001

<sup>6</sup> UNMIK News coverage archives July 2005, UNMIK/PR/1392 dated 19 July 2005

The assumption had been that the residual threat could be handled by the built up KPC capacities and KFOR. The residual risk posed by mines and UXO was considered too low to justify the large scale international funding levels, which the 18 international NGOs and companies previously active in Kosovo had received.

A second aspect seems equally relevant for the assessment: It has been and still is the declared overall strategy of the UN mission in Kosovo to transfer responsibility as far as possible to local institutions.

“An ambitious policy of transferring further competencies should be launched without delay, giving the PISG a greater sense of ownership and responsibility as well as accountability. A more coherent and ambitious policy of capacity-building is urgently needed....”<sup>7</sup>

The UNMIK Mission Restructuring Status Report of February 2006 underlines this strategy by stressing that

“...the transfer of competencies from UNMIK to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government is a key UNMIK responsibility pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)”.

With regard to the deployment of International Organisations or NGOs, the policy is described as follows:

“In this regard, in areas where competencies have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred or at least plans are being developed and implemented to transfer such competencies, it is not encouraged that International Organisations or NGOs assume competencies or engage in areas where a capacity building may be undermined or transferred responsibilities held back and returned unless it has materialised that the Kosovan body to which the competencies were transferred has not proven able to assume responsibility for such competencies. Unnecessary engagement of International Organisations or NGOs needlessly undermines local ownership, capacity building and sustainability of reform efforts.”<sup>8</sup>

To support this strategy, the co-ordination of donor money is considered vital.

“Given existing financial constraints, faced by both the Kosovo Government and the Donor Community in Kosovo, and in order that agreed priorities and strategic direction is complement and implementation thereof facilitated, it is of vital importance that there is effective donor coordination in Kosovo.”<sup>9</sup>

Donor engagement should be coordinated

“... to ensure that they are in line with the strategic direction and priorities as established by the recognised authorities (UNMIK/PISG) upon agreement by stakeholders. There is a system in place which should be utilised.”<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Eleanor Gordon, Political Advisor to OKPCC, quoting from Eide’s Report to the Secretary General of the UN on the situation in Kosovo of 11 August 2004

<sup>8</sup> Eleanor Gordon, Political Advisor to OKPCC, August 2006

<sup>9</sup> Eleanor Gordon, Political Advisor to OKPCC, August 2006

<sup>10</sup> Eleanor Gordon, Political Advisor to OKPCC, August 2006

## 5. Methodology

To meet the terms of reference, the assessment team used the following methodology, (which was agreed by all parties):

Firstly, the method of selection for the Task Dossiers had to be defined. As outlined in the response of the GICHD to the OKPCC request, it was not possible in the given timeframe to thoroughly investigate all Task Dossiers. The aim was to look at as many Task Dossiers as possible, but clear selection criteria had to be agreed upon.

Task Dossier selection would normally have been through applied mathematical coincidental sampling or representative sampling. However, it was agreed by all parties that the primary focus would be on those Task Dossiers that HALO Trust had identified to be potentially problematic following their review of IMSMA. A list of contradictions and anomalies had been presented on the first day of the assessment, which formed the base for the choice of Task Dossiers. Only after the HALO Trust had no more Task Dossiers to propose, coincidental sampling has been applied. This sampling process can not be considered scientific or representative, but it was meant to address the known concerns and thus to contribute to solutions for the problems encountered.

It was furthermore agreed that the Task Dossiers covering known 'outstanding tasks' would also be reviewed.

Secondly, a method to review the Task Dossiers systematically, covering all points requested from the terms of reference, had to be developed. For this purpose, three tables were created (see Annex B).

Tables 1a and 1b are descriptive or quantitative, allowing to register the information from the Task Dossiers. This includes their documentary completeness as well as a comparison with the data contained in IMSMA. It should be noted that Table 1a contains an overview of possible Task Dossier content, clearly not all documents are needed in each Task Dossier. Nomenclature consistency and the age of survey data had been added, but these points proved to be of little value for the assessment, because the nomenclature only referred to the terms used for the status of tasks and thus did not need a separate investigation for each Task Dossier, and the age of survey data only had relevance for the outstanding tasks.

Table 2 is analytical in nature, building on the information contained in Tables 1a and 1b. The questions raised are:

- Is the OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?<sup>11</sup>
- Is the information sufficient for a demining agency to conduct the task?<sup>12</sup>
- Are the clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?<sup>13</sup>
- Is the OKPCC task status appropriate?<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> File processing clear: OKPCC internal file administration clear, nomenclature understandable and consistent, continuation tasks identified. Priority classification clear (only for current tasks): OKPCC priority setting decision trail clear and documented, survey data available (not older than 6 months)

<sup>12</sup> „Sufficient“ is defined as: 1) for survey tasks: DA report available, 2) for clearance tasks: DA report, Survey report or Tasking order available, clear and complete

<sup>13</sup> „Appropriate“ is defined as: 1) for clearance: documentation complete, argumentation understandable. 2) for discredited areas: documentation complete, argumentation understandable: Survey conducted, no signs of fighting, mines or UXO, interviews with affected persons conducted, area used regularly, no accidents

<sup>14</sup> „Appropriate“ is defined as: documentation is complete, file processing understandable, priority classification clear, nomenclature clear, argumentation understandable, no other evidence (accident, new DA report)

The qualifying terms “clear”, “sufficient” and “appropriate” were further defined in their context, see according footnotes. The analyses resulted in the question whether or not ‘follow-up’ action would be required. Three options of follow-up action were identified: 1) document research for missing documents, 2) IMSMA corrections where discrepancies were identified, and finally 3) (re-)survey of an area.

It needs to be noted that one Task Dossier can contain several different Dangerous Areas. The tables are based on the analyses of each Dangerous Area. Only when the same CBU strike area had different DA numbers, were they summarised in table 1a under “Same DA as”.

The outstanding Task Dossiers were compared to the outstanding tasks listed in the Annex of the UNMAS report of May 2006.

In addition, samples from the files containing survey discreditation reports were randomly checked.

The Dangerous Areas which were identified by one member of the Task Dossier review team for survey follow-up were discussed with all team members and OKPCC EOD, in order to integrate all available information and thus to come to common conclusions.

In order to keep the work of the assessment process transparent for interested parties, not only the EOD cell of OKPCC and the coordinator of the KPC had the chance to participate in the research work, but also Matthew Hovell, David Elliot and Luan Jaupi of HALO Trust and Mika Toivonen of MAT. David Elliot and Luan Jaupi were invited to join the review process as ‘active observers’ and contributed to the findings. As requested by the ToR, during the review of the Task Dossiers particular emphasis has been given to identifying areas that have been surface cleared of CBU, but may still require sub-surface clearance.

In addition to the Task Dossier review, in order to meet the requirement to determine the residual mine and UXO threat within Kosovo, i.e. the extent of work that remains, and make a judgement on the ability of the KPC EOD capacity to deal with it in an appropriate time frame, the following measures were taken:

- Review of mine/UXO related accidents after 2001.
- Review of requests for clearance from the local population to OKPCC.
- Review of Operation “Normal Life” reports (samples).
- Review of the assessments of the UN security section and OSCE regional stakeholders with regard to the threat through mines and UXOs.
- Assessment of the current EOD capacity of KPC and KFOR through researching personnel and equipment figures, as well as clearance statistics.
- Assessment of timeframes between reporting of Dangerous Areas and clearance.
- Assessment of survey capacity and results.
- Assessment of the future KPC EOD capacity.
- Assessment of the procedures used by the MACC during the clearance between 1999-2001.
- Interviews with OKPCC EOD and former UN MACC staff (the latter through e-mail).
- Interview with the Programme Manager of DCA, a mine clearance NGO operating on the Albanian side of the Kosovo-Albanian border.
- Interview with the Team Leader of HALO Trust operating in Gorance.

- Interviews with affected persons in Krivenik and Leskovica.
- Interview / e-mail exchange with KFOR EOD.

A one day field visit was conducted to areas in MNB East that were identified as areas of interest for discussion or as problematic cases. These were:

- Kamena Glava (TD E 25-56)
- Leskovica (TD E 7-41)
- Gorance (DA 164)
- Dimce
- Krivenik (TD E 7-49)
- Globocica (DA 4340)
- Jezerc (TD E 25-58)

The assessment team specifically addressed concerns raised by HALO Trust during the assessment, which proposed that there is an unknown and perhaps larger scale problem than expected. The concerns and the subsequent actions of the assessment team are detailed in chapter 7.

The assessment team understands that the measures taken do not equal a complete re-survey of Kosovo, but believes that the available information has been thoroughly analysed in order to determine whether or not a complete re-survey is necessary. The evidence reviewed also enabled an assessment of the statements of the MACC at the end of 2001, the operational situation assessments of OKPCC, and the conclusions of the UNMAS report of May 2006.

## **6. Review and Analyses of Task Dossiers**

A total of 90 Task Dossier covering 156 Dangerous Areas were reviewed by the assessment team. 74 Task Dossiers covering 127 Dangerous Areas have been proposed by HALO Trust. Another 29 Dangerous Areas or Minefields, included in 16 Task Dossiers, were chosen through coincidental sampling. It was agreed by all parties to the assessment that the amount of samples was sufficient to get a picture of the overall situation. However, the sample can not be considered representative, because it focussed on those Dangerous Areas which were identified as most likely to be problematic. As requested, special focus had been given to CBU strike areas: Out of the 156 DAs, 89 were CBU strike areas, 64 minefields, 2 EOD tasks and one house clearance.

In the assessment tables, SN 1-45 were done by Vera Bohle, SN 46-100 and 134-139 by Phil Bean, and SN 101-133 by David Elliot. With regard to IMSMA, Vera Bohle and David Elliot were supported by Luan Jaupi, Phil Bean by Ahmet Sallova. Dangerous Areas proposed for review by the HALO Trust included SN 1-34, 45, 51-95 and 101-130, summing up to about 80% of the total DAs reviewed.

### **6.a Completeness of Task Dossier documentation**

Table 1a only covers the information found in the Task Dossiers. The degree of their completeness varied. In this context it needed to be differentiated if “vital” information was missing, for example the information whether or not an area has been cleared, or just desirable information like a cover page was not available. Cases in which print outs from IMSMA were missing were also considered as minor problem as these could be duplicated.

The following key observations were made:

- As an overall impression, the documentation was thorough, especially for a MACC that started its systems so soon after a war.
- The “Ops Memos”, which are often referred to in IMSMA and which were a specific point of questioning for HALO Trust, appeared in various forms: As instruction from MACC operations to MACC IMSMA – either as a handwritten note or as detailed typed instructions; as MACC or NGO’s survey reports – with the quality ranging from post-it notes to detailed technical survey reports. In many cases Ops Memos by NGOs were presented as one-sentence discreditations, giving statements why a specific area had been considered safe after it had been visited. The terms verification and discreditation were used during survey to indicate if follow up action from a report of a suspected area was necessary, today in other programmes the word ‘cancellation’ might be used for the same purpose as ‘discreditation’.
- Many of the discreditation survey reports of 2000 and 2001 were not included in the Task Dossiers, but in extra files. They did not follow a specific order and it was thus time consuming to locate them. In IMSMA, these reports were often referred to as “Ops Memos” with the addition of the NGO that produced it.
- The post-clearance survey reports of “Operation Normal Life” were also kept in extra files. In the given time frame, they could not be linked with the Task Dossiers and were thus seperately investigated. For this reason, the column “post clearance survey” has a no, even though these surveys have been conducted in many cases.
- KFOR provided very few clearance reports, especially in the early days of clearance.

It needs to be noted that the following Task Dossiers, which HALO Trust had proposed for review, could not be located:

	<b>Task Dossier</b>
1	S 24-14
2	W 11-05
3	W 17-18
4	C 18-66
5	W 02-54
6	N 11-05
7	N 27-07
8	W 17-05
9	W 08-12
10	S 20-30
11	W 02-28
12	C 22-10
13	W 02-37

The findings propose that a continued thorough review of the Task Dossiers is conducted by the OKPCC EOD staff, in order to ensure their completeness. The missing Task Dossiers should be located and the separately filed survey discreditation reports should be added to the Task Dossiers. It could be considered if and how Operation “Normal Life” files and information could be added or annotated to the Task Dossiers.



Due to time constraints, the assessment team could not search for all of the required discreditation reports. However, this information is important to assess the necessity for a follow-up. For this reason, these Task Dossiers are listed below under “Follow-up Action” as “Document Research”.

All of the other documentation can be progressively and systematically completed and checked as part of the ongoing management activity.

#### 6.b Analyses of Action on Dangerous Areas

Out of 156 Dangerous Areas analysed, questions or problems indicated in Annex B occurred for 32 Dangerous Areas, (30 from areas identified as potentially problematic and 2 from the coincidental sampling). This figure can be subdivided as follows:

- Missing Documents: 14 DAs, (contained in 13 Task Dossiers)
- Follow-up OKPCC survey required: 6 DAs (in 3 areas)
- Discrepancies between Task Dossiers and IMSMA: 12 DAs

The detailed explanations follow.

#### **Follow-up Document Research**

	<b>SN</b>	<b>TD/DA</b>
1	31	S 20-32 / 900
2	33	S 24-31 / 4237
3	34	E 07-39 / 1662
4	51	W 01-13 / 3912
5	72	E 25-19 / 1333
6	101	S 05-25 / 2959
7	105	W 02-66 / 2640, 2639
8	125	W 01-43 / 3277
9	126	W 01-43 / 3225
10	127	W 01-43 / 3242
11	128	W 01-43 / 1818
12	130	N 21 - 07 / 517
13	131	W 08 - 04 / 74

These Task Dossiers were mostly missing discreditation reports, which were in a different file. Due to time constraints during the assessment, these discreditation reports could not be checked, but they could have been important to assess the measures taken to declare an area as cleared or discredited. The proposed follow-up for OKPCC is to search the missing documents, add them to the Task Dossier and analyse them with the help of table 2.

It needs to be noted that in cases where the discreditation report had been found during the assessment, the action taken proved to be understandable and no follow-up was required. Sampling of the files containing discreditation reports led to the same result.

For this reason, it is unlikely that that the above mentioned Dangerous Areas uncover a large scale problem in the field. However they illustrated a need for improvement in document filing.

### Areas for OKPCC survey / community liaison

The following areas have been identified for re-survey or community liaison:

	<b>SN</b>	<b>TD/DA</b>	<b>Priority</b>
1	43	S 24 – 05 / 548	No
2	45	E 07 – 41 / 284 et al	Yes
3	117	E 07 – 49 / 187 et al	Yes

The amount of areas identified for (re-)survey through the Task Dossier review does not propose that there is a major problem, beyond the capacity of KPC.

### **6.c Discrepancies between Task Dossiers and IMSMA**

The 12 DAs listed here from 10 Task Dossiers as having discrepancies with IMSMA only, include those DAs where the analyses of action in table 2 showed a “No” at some stage. The Dangerous Areas requiring minor adjustments in IMSMA will not be listed in detail, as they are indicated in the tables and they have been discussed with OKPCC EOD. They also have no significance for the results of this assessment with regard to follow-up areas.

	<b>SN</b>	<b>TD/DA</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1	53	E25-58 / 1485	No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface clearance has been conducted
2	57	S20-18 / 2964	No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface clearance has been conducted
3	62	S20-23 / 3994	No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface clearance has been conducted
4	70	E25-56 / 4032	No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface clearance has been conducted
5	100	W02-27 / 2723	No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface clearance has not been conducted
6	102	S20-04 / 3847	No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface clearance has been conducted
7	103	S20-05 / 2048	Small areas uncleared due to high metal contamination not accurately recorded in IMSMA yet. Link other DAs to Completion Report.
8	104	C18-12 / 2515, 2516	IMSMA status discredited, but area had been subsurface cleared.
9	107 108	S24-02 / 2322, 2560	107 and 108 same DA area. Unite DAs in one TD, link DAs in IMSMA. Small uncleared/unclearable area left?
10	110	W2-49 2337	No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface clearance has been conducted

EOD OKPCC used IMSMA version 2. Updates produced problems because of numerous customisations that had been applied. For this reason, the old version continued to be used, with some shortcomings like inflexibility for entering small scale uncleared areas of a larger cleared area.

The problematic cases identified are further viewed in the next chapter.

## 6.d Analyses of Outstanding Tasks

The list of current and future mine/CBU clearance tasks annexed to the UNMAS 2006 assessment has been found accurate, it corresponded to the outstanding Task Dossiers examined. Out of the 37 identified tasks, 5 were completed in the meantime and 1 is allocated to KFOR because it is in the northern Serb populated area of Kosovo. 11 tasks have been ongoing at the time of the assessment visit, 1 is used as training area by KPC, 1 is worked on by the Serb army as it is in the far north of Kosovo, 1 is occupied by UNHCR, 1 is within a KFOR response area (see also table below for details). This leaves 16 outstanding recorded tasks for KPC out of this list, non of them being considered as a high priority.

List of outstanding tasks as per UNMAS report, updated:

	<b>TD</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Priority of Future Tasks</b>
1	C 19-12	Ongoing	
2	C 19-34	Ongoing	
3	S 24-29	Completed	
4	E 07-09	Partly completed / Future Task	Low
5	DA 4342	Completed end August	
6	W 01-36	Ongoing	
7	W 01-46	Future Task	Low
8	W 01-48	Ongoing	
9	C 09-12	Partly completed Future Task	Low
10	C 09-13	Future Task	Low
11	C 13-18	Completed	
12	C 18-13	Future Task	Low
13	C 18-66	Ongoing	
14	C 18-68	Future Task	Low
15	C 19-29	KFOR	
16	C 19-35	UNHCR area	
17	C 22-11	Future Task	Low
18	N 11-05	Serb Army Task	
19	N 11-09	Future Task	Low
20	N 28-01	KFOR Task	
21	N 29-01	Future Task	Low
22	DA 4317	Future Task	Low
23	S 16-08	Ongoing	
24	S 20-12	Ongoing	
25	S 20-42	If required Future Task	Low
26	S 20-48	Ongoing	
27	DA 2538	Completed / EOD Response	Low
28	E 25-25	KPC Training Area	
29	W 01-10	Future Task	Low
30	W 01-47	Ongoing	
31	W 02-27	Completed	
32	W 02-32	Completed	
33	W 02-37	Future Task	Low
34	W 02-84	Ongoing	
35	W 02-86	Future Task	Low

36	W 17-16	Ongoing	
37	W 17-22	If required Future Task	Low

Additionally, a low priority Future Task had been identified by OKPCC (C 18-64, DA 1471).

The review of the Task Dossiers identified the following additional areas:

	SN	TD / DA	Type	Surface cleared	Priority Sub-surface	Remarks
1	53	E25-58 / 1485 <sup>15</sup>	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
2	57	S20-18 / 2964	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
3	62	S20-23 / 3994	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
4	70	E25-56 / 4032 <sup>16</sup>	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
5	100	W02-27 / 2723	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
6	102	S 20-04 / 3847	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
7	110	W 02 – 49 (10 DAs)	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse

All of them are BAC tasks that have not been sub-surface cleared, and the IMSMA record needs to be changed from ‘Complete’ to ‘Future Task’.

The tasks should then be added to the follow up future tasks list, but not for active follow up in terms of adding them to the current work plan. If anything they will need follow up survey action periodically to confirm they are still low priority and if the area is accessible.

Searching IMSMA for tasks with the status “Future Tasks”, additional 6 areas were identified that were not yet listed:

	DA	IMSMA Status	Remarks
1	3943	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, MAT survey 2005
2	2550	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, very low priority, no action now
3	2756	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, low priority

<sup>15</sup> Jezerc, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed low priority, despite the survey report proposing high priority.

<sup>16</sup> Kamena Glava, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed no change of landuse

4	4325	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, MAT survey 2003
5	3880	Future Task	Mines, HALO survey 2005, priority
6	4308	Future Task EOD Response	Mines, MAT survey 2003

From an assessment of the documentation, one out of the 6 could be considered as a priority. However, the findings did indicate shortcomings in operational procedures in OKPCC EOD which had not highlighted these DAs for further activity. Four of the tasks were reported after 2001.

The total of outstanding tasks would be the 16 listed tasks plus the one additional task which came up recently, plus the six areas which were indicated as “Future Tasks” but not yet listed, of which at least one does not require attention at this stage. The seven tasks mentioned for eventual re-assessment could be added. This sums up to 30 future tasks for clearance, of which one could possibly be considered as priority, even though not as a high priority as defined by OKPCC, but relatively higher than the very low priority tasks.

Tabular overview of outstanding tasks:

<b>Origin</b>	<b>Number</b>
OKPCC / UNMAS list	16
New DA	1
Additional IMSMA Future Tasks	6
Low priority sub-surface	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>

Additionally, some of the identified survey tasks (see Annex C) could become new clearance tasks.

## **6.e Nomenclature used for the Status of Tasks**

The nomenclature used so far for the status of tasks has been the following:

<b>Status name</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
Complete	Task cleared
Current Task	Task on workplan of the same year
Discredited	Task cancelled by survey
EOD Response	Low priority outstanding clearance task, eg remote CBU strikes sub-surface clearance
Low Priority KPC	Low priority outstanding clearance task for KPC. Possibly hazardous area or a known dangerous area which has received an initial clearance and is usually located in a remote location. These areas are low threat areas in the respect of their socio-economic effect and can be eventually completed by the national capacity. These tasks usually require only limited short term clearance to be completed.
Future Task	Task for future clearance workplan
KFOR Responsibility	Within KFOR camp or 500 metres around it, or other areas KFOR claims responsibility for. Also for areas in northern Serbian community parts of Kosovo.

Outside Kosovo	Task not in Kosovo territory
Suspended	Task where the clearance activity has been interrupted, eg for the winter break
Survey Task	Pending verification or discreditation

As the terms “EOD Response”, “Low Priority KPC” and “Future Task” point in a very similar direction, it could be considered to summarize them all under the term “Future Task”.

At present there is no specific category for areas that have been cleared, but within the areas small scale parts were not clearable for various reasons (for example under a collapsed building). There is also no category for areas with such low priority that they will not come up in a clearance work-plan, or are even unclearable due to their remoteness or inaccessibility. The OKPCC could consider if it would help their work to give these kind of tasks a separate category (for example, category 1 future tasks for the work plan, category 2 future tasks permanently suspended).

In addition to the status, IMSMA provides a tick box called “confirmed clear”. OKPCC should clarify and define in which cases this box is ticked, and record this decision process in accordance with SWPs.

For operational planning purposes in a sense of identifying future tasks, the status should be used as filter when searching IMSMA.

## **7. Assessment of the residual Threat posed by Mines/UXO**

### Mine Action Work 1999-2001

The accreditation and quality assurance (QA) procedures, as described in the according MACC and later OKPCC guidelines can be considered as thorough and they have been used as an example for programmes in other countries. The approach until 2001 has been to trust the work of NGOs once they have completed the accreditation procedures and did not get bad QA rankings. When evidence of an unacceptable standard of work was identified, counter measures such as re-training were taken. If no improvement was achieved, in worst case the accreditation was withdrawn from an NGO.

Since 1999 a total of 4,520 Dangerous Areas had to be dealt with, including 620 minefields, 1,300 CBU strikes and 2,600 suspected UXOs. In excess of 41 million sqm of land have been cleared since 1999.

### OMiK Division of Safety and Security

The Division of Safety and Security of OmiK summarizes the situation in their report “Overview – UXO in Kosovo” of 2006 as follows:

“Kosovo wide, the impact the UXO threat appears to have upon the population can best be described as minimal. It is not suggested that this is due to ignorance.”

## OSCE

OSCE is at present conducting a regional mines survey, the general results for Peja and Prizren were:<sup>17</sup>

“...the majority of UXOs in the area are hand grenades”

“The EOD teams intervention in each case was quick and efficient.”

“The population is in general aware about the danger presented by UXO and a good level of vigilance can be observed.”

“There are no areas where the quantity of UXO found would led to the concern that a certain place can be considered specifically dangerous”.

More specific:

Peja: “CBU are supposedly still present in a remote area on the top of the mountains around the Monastery, but it is supposedly a non-accessible zone, and CBU presence is well known from the population.”

Peja, a formerly affected area, says “There is no problem with remaining mines and/or UXOs.”

Istog: “There is no known minefield in the municipality”

Prizren: “The very small numbers of mines and small numbers of artillery ammunition are showing a low threat in the area”, no accidents were reported and “the daily life is not perturbed”.

Albanian border area: “In spite of the massive illegal border crossing, cattle smuggling, wood cutting in the green border zone, no accidents involving UXOs were reported during the Joint Border Co-operation meetings by KPS, UNMIK, KFOR and Albanian Border Police representatives.”

A roundtable meeting in Junik on 2 August 2006, which was co-chaired by HALO Trust, highlighted some perceived or real problems with mines in the villages Gjocaj and Jasicq. The information will be assembled in a petition, which will be approved by the Junik Municipal Assmby. The OSCE report further explains:

“Once this is accomplished, it will be delivered to Halo Trust who will be entrusted to submit it to the Coordinator of the KPC in Prishtina.”

After receiving the request, KPC should re-visit the two villages mentioned to assess the situation. At the same time, KPC should rectify the impression that such requests should be directed to HALO and explain the Kosovo procedures to the villagers, to OSCE and to the Municipality.<sup>18</sup>

A person from Milaj reported that he did not consider his ground as safe even though it had been cleared a few months ago. And an inhabitant of the village Irznic near Decane raised concerns. Community Liaison is required in both cases to discuss the status and confirm if confidence in land use can be justified.

The situation in the East can be generally summarized as “no negative economic impact on farming or movement”. However, in remote forest areas, especially at the

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<sup>17</sup> Report received through Jens Modvig, OSCE on 4 August 2006, the survey is still ongoing. All quotes on OSCE findings come from either this e-mail or from follow-ups covering the other regions.

<sup>18</sup> Following the OSCE report, another message needs rectification: “Halo Trust is gathering data to assist the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as they conduct an assessment of unexploded mines in Kosovo.” Halo has not been requested to gather data to assist our work, and we are not conducting a specific assessment of unexploded mines. Neither is UNMAS.

border with FYROM mines and UXOs are still suspected. The village Semaja should be (re-)visited.

The Dulje pass area is known for random mining. However, even here the population only feels unsafe about some remote mountain areas above the villages Recak, Belince and Caralevo. The Dulje pass area has been extensively surveyed since 1999 and the identified DAs have been cleared. Exhaustive clearance of remote forest areas is not advisable or possible, therefore these areas do not need to be re-surveyed. They remain for EOD emergency call-out as and when requested.

Two sites in the hills of Nerodime village and the area at Kalaja Fortress (Ferizaj Municipality) are considered potentially unsafe and should be visited by a KPC liaison officer.

In the Prishtina region, the agriculture land is used and there is no limit to movement through mines or UXO. This also refers to Obiliq, Kosovo Polje, Podujevo and Glogovac. The people know where to report stray ammunition when it is encountered. Germija (a hill side wooded region) is a known DA, which is on the future task list for clearance. KFOR should be made aware of the fact that the Serb community in Lipjan has concerns about UXO.

The northern areas, Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Skenderaj, Vzecan and Leposavic report no unsolved problems with mines or UXO.

A summary of places proposed for KPC community liaison is listed in Annex C.

A high level of MRE and awareness speaks out of the reports, as well as the knowledge where to report UXOs. However, in some cases there is confusion in understanding the EOD system:

“KFOR LMT advised OmiK to contact the NGO “Mine Action Center” (MAC), stating that it has the most current and accurate data on the mine situation in Kosovo.”

In these cases, more liaison is needed, as the military personnel have a high turnover rate, to ensure that knowledge of the reporting system and of the responsible organisations is maintained.

### Accident Statistics

In addition to the OSCE reports, all of the accident statistics were investigated. Vera Bohle assessed all accidents from 2002 and 2003, and David Elliot covered 2004-2005. The documentation has been found to be thorough, apart from two missing casualties in 2002, who were not recorded due to reporting problems in the Ministry of Health. The system is now well established and the statistics as listed in the UNMAS 2006 assessment are accurate. Data on victims is obtained through reports of the Public Health Institute, and also pro-actively through newspapers or police reports. The OKPCC Victim Assistance Officer is sure to cover at least 95% of all accidents.

The documentation on each accident contained statements on how it happened. Most accidents occurred through “tampering”, a tragic but typical example is an accident involving 6 children in 2002. A four year old boy found abandoned ammunition in an empty house, where somebody must have placed it. He took it



out and played with it, while friends were watching him. Sadly, it will be difficult to prevent such accidents through the work KPC, KFOR or the international NGOs are conducting. The accident investigation reports enlightened that most people who had accidents, through tampering or other, had received MRE training and – if old enough to understand – were aware of the threat. The fact that the majority of casualties happened through tampering indicates that there is not a large scale problem with unknown mines or UXO.

The documented follow-up activities for four of the accidents which were not caused by tampering on behalf of OKPCC EOD Operations was not been evident, although we were told follow up action happened. The documentation available for the accidents at Dulje pass showed that survey and clearance followed without delay.

### Operation Normal Life

MACC, MRE organisations and KFOR visited 570 villages end 2001, in order to ensure the local communities are both aware of and satisfied with the clearance work that has been undertaken in their respective areas. Maps and information were provided, meetings organised and village representatives invited for discussion of their view of the situation. The results were summarized in the MACC Annual Report 2001:

“In most instances there is little to discuss, because ground that was previously mined has been put back into productive use.”

Of the 570 villages 12 had required some form of follow-up activity.

“In some cases, the concern was caused by confusion regarding the actual area that had been cleared, which was quickly resolved. In other cases, villagers had subsequently discovered single items of unexploded ordnance, and once again EOD teams were able to quickly dispose of these items. Overall the Operation “Normal Life” reports have not yielded any unexpected or dramatic results to counter the belief that the work has been completed satisfactorily across Kosovo.”<sup>19</sup>

Operation Normal Life was continued in 2002: any suspect area that had highlighted were technically surveyed by MAT, any areas that contained any UXO or mines were added to the current task list, which has been continually worked on since 2001.<sup>20</sup>

### Mine Action Stakeholders

OKPCC explained their identification of high priority tasks as sites where accidents occurred, socio-economic development is hindered, and the mines/UXO have a direct negative impact of people’s everyday’s lives. The tasks KPC and the international NGOs currently work on, and the future tasks identified, were said not to have a ‘high priority’, but to be distant and of low impact. They are mostly in remote non-agricultural areas, some of them even on wooded hilltops. During the field visit of the assessment team, no high priority areas have been identified.

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<sup>19</sup> MAC 2001 Report

<sup>20</sup> E-mail information from Steve Saunders 10.8.2006

KFOR<sup>21</sup> reacts on EOD call-outs. The majority of items they find are handgrenades, or other munitions stockpiled in houses. KFOR EOD teams conduct clearance in the northern Serbian populated areas of Kosovo, as KPC would have a problem to work there. They have not reported large scale problems for these parts. In general they perceive a low threat. KFOR confirmed they will clear within the 500 metres area of responsibility around their compounds, and continue with their MRE activities.

MAT, having worked in Kosovo for three years conducting surveys and clearance, as well as supervising KPC, followed the assessment process and came to the conclusion that there are shortcomings in document and data management, but not a large scale unknown threat out in the field.

HALO Trust had identified a number of points of concern, which received specific attention by the assessment team. The concerns, the subsequent actions of the assessment team and the results achieved are:

- Concern: The large discrepancy between mines laid according to the VJ records and mines found during clearance or survey operations.
  - Action: Careful investigation of explanations in Task Dossiers about discredited mines.
  - Result: The explanations about discredited mines were credible.
- Concern: That minefields with sub-surface mines were discredited through visual survey only.
  - Action: As above, with specific focus on minefields that were discredited through survey.
  - Result: None of the Task Dossiers / DAs reviewed indicated that sub surface minefields were discredited through visual survey only, however the remaining Task Dossiers should also be reviewed to complete this assessment.
- Concern: The tasks flagging up in IMSMA as cleared by “Ops Memo”. The suspicion was raised that MACC operations, eager to complete the programme end 2001, closed sites without proper investigation or even from a desk assessment only. This suspicion was aggravated by the fact that the “Ops Memos” were not accessible to demining organisations.
  - Action: Careful investigation of “Ops Memos”.
  - Result: Most Ops Memos were located, their nature has been discovered. No Ops Memo supported the fact that tasks were closed prematurely or from the desk. Ops memos came in various forms, none had been removed to New York archives as had been suggested.
- Concern: Discrepancies identified in IMSMA. A list had been provided in the initial briefing.
  - Action: All available Task Dossiers proposed by HALO Trust were investigated and compared with IMSMA.
  - Result: The results are detailed in this report. The list initially brought up by HALO Trust was considered as dealt with and as “history” by the HALO Trust Desk Officer after the assessment. The investigation process helped to identify some shortfalls in data management and communication which OKPCC will need to rectify.

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<sup>21</sup> Information on behalf of KFOR received through LTC Alberto Bozzano, SO JENGR OPS PLANS/JOC/MINES in KFOR headquarters Prishtina

- Concern: The MACC message at the end of 2001 that the last mine was cleared, whereas since then more mines and new Dangerous Areas have been found. An example list of 7 tasks where HALO Trust found mines/UXO had been provided in the initial briefing (see table below).
    - Action: Investigated the legitimacy of the messages passed by the MACC at the end of 2001. Assessed the 7 tasks from the HALO Trust list, plus two extra tasks that came up during the assessment (Krivenik and Dimce).
    - Result: The messages passed by the MACC end 2001, as detailed in the background chapter, have been legitimate. The tasks from the HALO list (see below, plus Krivenik and Dimce) assessed or visited did not give reason to change this conclusion (see also below). The written statements provided at the end of 2001 were clear, but have since been misrepresented by a number of organisations.
  
- Concern: A HALO Trust team leader had knowledge of uncleared minefields.
    - Action: Interview with the Team Leader, field visit.
    - Result: The team leader seemed to have good knowledge of uncleared minefields since 1999. During the field visit, he indicated that he knows of two more remote minefields. Questions remained open why the minefields had not been formally reported by the Team Leader to OKPCC yet. The two suspected minefields known to the team leader should be reported for follow up action.
  
- Concern: The local population keeps telling HALO Trust that they have a problem with mines/UXO.
    - Action: Assessment of the communication lines available for the local population to report Dangerous Areas to the OKPCC. Assessment of OSCE regional survey reports, UN security report and KFOR EOD response statistics. Investigation of accidents. Interviews with affected persons in two places.
    - Result: Communication lines for emergency EOD call-out seem to work well, but perhaps there are problems with reporting of DAs through Municipalities. Follow-up and pro-activity for OKPCC is recommended to ensure the process is understood and followed at a municipality level. Care should be taken that the right local procedures are communicated. From the OSCE reports, no large scale unknown problem areas for re-visit have been extracted. UN security organisations see no problem, (see above). KFOR EOD response indicates no problem with larger scale areas, the procedural discussion with the EOD Management Cell. same can be deduced from accident statistics. Interviews with affected people showed a need for better community liaison.
  
- Concern: Some of the work done by demining agencies, and the follow-up of the MACC from 1999 until 2001 leaves questions open regarding completeness and reliability.
    - Action: Investigation of accreditation and quality assurance procedures 1999-2001 through
    - Result: The accreditation and quality assurance procedures 1999-2001 were generally thorough (and as a process have provided an example for programmes in other countries such as Lebanon and North Iraq). Even so in a few cases problems had occurred, mines or UXO had been found in areas recorded as clear or discredited, and remedial clearance work was needed to complete a task. In these few cases the process for remedial action was carried out well. The risk of this happening in the future

should be recognised within the planning of residual EOD capacity but the risk, based on current evidence, should be regarded as low.

- Concern: HALO Trust want to know what the mine/UXO situation is in Kosovo before they decide whether to close their programme. For this reason, they planned a survey between now and end 2006. A presentation of that survey has been provided in the initial briefing.
- Action: Assess the knowledge of OKPCC about the mine/UXO situation in Kosovo. Consider the need for the proposed survey after investigating the results of the assessment.
- Result: No evidence could be found that the knowledge of the OKPCC about the mine/UXO situation in Kosovo is not good. Indeed the depth of knowledge within the EOD Management Cell staff was impressive and it was clear that their personal experience throughout the province and the life of the programme was encyclopaedic. The results of the assessment do not lead to a requirement of the proposed re-survey. The assessment did conclude that the systems for community reporting should be proactively assessed and confirmed. The ongoing surveys needs are within the capacity of KPC, this is part of the ongoing operational system and does not need to be a one off activity as was the case for Operation Normal Life back in 2001.

Concern: List of HALO as presented in 1<sup>st</sup> meeting:

<b>Task Name</b>	<b>OKPCC Classification</b>	<b>Landuse</b>	<b>HALO Method of Clearance</b>	<b>Landmines and / or Cluster Munitions Destroyed</b>
Globocica	Never Recorded as a DA	Transit, grazing, wood cutting – 50 beneficiaries per day	Mineclearance	37
Goden	Never Recorded as a DA	Summer habitation, transit and livelihood – 30 beneficiaries per day	Mineclearance	254
Leskovica	Declared as Cleared	Habitation, grazing, and transit – 50 beneficiaries per day	Mineclearance	32
Gorance	Discredited, through Survey, in 2001	Cattle Grazing and transit – 20 beneficiaries per day	Mineclearance (current)	33
Ladrovic	Declared as Cleared in 2001	Transit, habitation, livelihood – Village within 500m – 1,000 inhabitants	Battle Area Clearance	25
Qubrel	EOD Response	School and proximity – 200 beneficiaries per day	Battle Area Clearance	26
Malisevo	Never Recorded as a DA	Transit, habitation, livelihood – Village within 500m – 1,000 inhabitants	Battle Area Clearance	21

Action: Desk assessment, field visit, interviews.

Results:

Globocica, Gorance reported by HALO Team Leader who knew the sites since 1999. Why they had not been reported earlier was unknown. However, once reported there had been a very short time between reporting and start of clearance – no problem in system.

Goden: Remote area on Albanian border, minefield discovered through DCA working on the Albanian side of the border. HALO Trust tasked with clearance. No problem in system.

Leskovica: The clearance agency's clearance in 2000 seemed to have stopped at a point where the minefield went on. Locals found PMA 2s, HALO Trust was tasked with clearance, 32 more mines were found during that clearance. Follow-up is necessary (listed above, TD E 07 – 41), because locals still fear mines in another area. According to them, the clearance agency that had cleared the area had told them in 2001 that it was still dangerous. Identified problem.

Gorance: Discredited through survey in 2001 was another VJ minefield which contained two PMR 2A stakemines. The minefield where HALO Trust is working is a new DA, but had been known to the Team Leader since 1999. Short time between reporting and start of clearance – no problem in system. Low priority remote wooded area.

Ladrovci is said to be geographically close to the same area as Malisevo. The status in IMSMA has been "Low Priority / KPC", which does actually not mean it is cleared. Perhaps the "confirmed clear" box had been ticked – for this problem see the chapter on Nomenclature. According to OKPCC, in July 2004 KFOR were called to the area and destroyed three bomblets that had been located by the farmers. In May 2005 HALO Trust conducted a survey of the area at the request of the land owners and located three more bomblets. After this, the area was entered as a new DA. The clearance was completed in 2005. Conclusion: The original clearance was incomplete, but the EOD reporting system worked.

Qubrel, status "EOD Response". The task has been known to OKPCC as "Low Priority" task. Halo had requested to do the clearance. This does not indicate a problem in the system, however perhaps the priority could have been higher.

Malisevo: see above, Ladrovci.

## **8. Assessment of the EOD Capacity**

### OKPCC

The OKPCC is staffed with local personnel mostly working for the programme since 1999. Through this personnel continuity and through continuous comprehensive capacity building, a good knowledge of the situation in Kosovo, as well as of mine action coordination and management procedures, could be achieved and maintained. The officers have conducted travelled and surveyed throughout Kosovo, and their knowledge of the situation on the ground exceeds the documentation in the Task Dossiers or the IMSMA data base.

The outstanding tasks are known to the relevant OKPCC staff not just from paper, but from personnel visits. For this reason, once a new task is allocated to a clearance agency, as well as issuing a written tasking order, the OKPCC operation

officer accompanies them to the new site for a direct briefing. This ensures proper execution from the outset. The initial briefing is followed by weekly QA visits.

The OKPCC EOD cell has built up a good work relationship with KPC, KFOR, MAT, OSCE, other agencies operating in Kosovo, and the local authorities. They appeared to be well accepted in their role.

The personnel of OKPCC EOD consisted at the time of the assessment visit of one operations manager, one quality assurance officer, one victim assistance officer and one mine risk education officer. The last international manager left in June this year. Mika Toivonen of MAT, who has five years experience in Kosovo and is fluent in Kosovo-Albanian language, is hired for one day per week to support the OKPCC EOD cell.

With a minimum of staff, the OKPCC is fulfilling its role. However, the workload might be better shared if an office manager and perhaps an additional community liaison person could be employed on a temporary basis, especially in the peak times of operations, to address the problems encountered with documentation and data management and to allow more pro-active assessment of any concerns raised by communities or individuals.

The high level of local knowledge within OKPCC EOD and its sustainability is invaluable for priority setting, community liaison and survey. Any ongoing or further survey work has to build on this knowledge, and be conducted as part of the coordinated, managed and progressive activity of the EOD Management Cell rather than a specific 'one off' survey project.

### KPC

KPC has 94 trained EOD/demining staff, with 59 deminers, and the rest being team leaders and medical staff. They are subdivided in seven teams, each operating in their region. All teams have been trained in manual demining, battle area clearance, explosive ordnance disposal (up to 100 mm Land Service Ammunition), and house clearance. By end 2005 each team had a community liaison officer. The team leaders and medical staff are trained to "train the trainer", to train EOD and first aid. By the end of this year five of seven teams will be trained in technical survey.

MAT have four training instructors working with KPC, and additionally two survey teams of their own operating Kosovo-wide. With the latter teams, MAT concentrates on areas where KPC has difficulties to work, for example remote hilltops that require overnight stays and camping equipment.. The two ten man teams are funded from August 2006 until November 2007 specifically to enhance and support the verification of all remaining suspect areas and then hand them over to KPC.

In 2007, the KPC clearance capacity will be expanded by 24 more staff to allow senior personnel to progress in order to take on the EOD response role of KFOR, who are in a process of reducing their capacity. With the new team members, the transfer of KFOR responsibility should be possible to be handled, but the training of senior EOD personnel is still required. This concept would be in accordance with the principle of building national structures. For the 24 new recruits, it would be good if KPC would take on already experienced deminers from the agencies like the HALO Trust who will be closing down by the end of this year.

The KPC clearance rates had been low in the early days for various reasons, such as ongoing training, limited work hours, unwillingness to stay overnight in

operational theatres, or influence taking of local commanders. KPC clearance rates seem to have improved to an acceptable level now through progressive training and management. However, it is difficult to assess clearance statistics, because the ground conditions are not known.

Detailed operational planning in a sense of time per task is equally difficult when sites are cleared following the “inside-out” principle. For this reason, it is difficult to predict how much time KPC will require for the outstanding tasks. However, as none of the tasks has a direct negative impact on the local population, they can be cleared progressively without time pressure.

Shortcomings have been encountered with regard to equipment repair facilities, especially for detectors and locators, a point that should be addressed for future planning. Furthermore, KPC has no equipment to work in remote areas where camping is required. Also their current working hours would not enable such work. For this reason, the support MAT is providing in this matter is helpful. But for the future, solutions need to be found for these cases.

### KFOR

The KFOR EOD capacity is considered a NATO secret, for this reason no details were provided. The nations involved include Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, USA. The teams are on permanent stand-by, ready to intervene at short notice. No problems were encountered with regard to KFOR EOD response. KFOR is planning to downsize, the details of this were also considered secret. It can be hoped that the downsizing happens in a dialogue with OKPCC to enable proper planning. As the communications have proved to be good, this can be assumed. The increase of KPC should compensate the downsizing of KFOR. As hardly any new priority DAs come up for clearance, there should not be a resource problem.

KFOR/NATO contracted the commercial company Armour Group to clear 35,000 square metres at Prishtina airport prior to a construction activity. No mines, UXO or abandoned ammunition were found. However, the contract illustrated that larger scale clearance needs can be addressed in this way, (i.e. by commercial contract) which is certainly appropriate in financial terms. The agency requesting work should in such cases also pay for the clearance, not the international donor community.

### Communication lines for Reporting of UXO / DAs

When an explosive item is found by the local population, an emergency request can be sent to the police, KFOR or KPC. The requests are forwarded to either OKPCC or KFOR, who would then send out an EOD team. So far in 2006 there were 838 of these requests. This figure, as well as the interviews conducted with KFOR, indicate that there is no problem with the reporting of explosive devices or emergency response. The figures do illustrate the relatively high numbers of munitions in circulation.

The reporting process for an ‘area’ that an individual believes is dangerous or suspicious, is more structured. The person has to approach the Municipality to write to the Office of Emergency Response, who in turn write to OKPCC. Once the request has come to OKPCC, they assess the information against their records, they look for coordinate or location identifiers, a point of contact to liaise with and then initiate a KPC visit. In 2004, twelve of such reports reached OKPCC, in 2005 there

were five and in 2006 so far two. This may be an indication that there is no problem with DAs, which would also be supported by the accidents statistics, but it might also indicate that there is a problem in the reporting process. This aspect should be followed up by OKPCC.

Once a DA is reported to OKPCC, it is dealt with in due time. For example the clearance tasks in Goden, Gorance or Leskovica have been completed or will be by the end of August.

The communication lines between KFOR and OKKPC were established, the details of their quality could not be assessed due to time constraints.

As part of the ongoing MRE campaign, the local television sends MRE messages on a daily bases. The clips inform the population about what measures should be taken if a suspicious item is found.

## **9. Conclusions**

Mines/UXO generally do not impede movement or socio-economic development in Kosovo. This does not ignore the fact that in some rural areas the perceived or real threat of mines/UXO may affect the population. However, accident statistics indicate that the real threat is minor, and that the population is well aware of it through mine risk education. This means there is no emergency situation requiring quick action, but progressive improvement is possible.

The outstanding clearance time projection is difficult – but guided by priority and resources, no artificially imposed deadline is necessary. Priorities should be met, resources should be utilised to their best potential, but the end of 2006 is not a deadline for completion.

The OKPCC historic file processing and priority classification is clear in the majority of cases, the clearance or cancellation documentation and measures taken are appropriate for majority of the Task Dossiers examined. The task status has been found appropriate for most cases. The information is sufficient for a demining agency to conduct the task. The classification of areas as cleared, cancelled or as KPC tasks is generally clear and understandable.

The amount of areas identified for (re-)survey through the Task Dossier review and the other measures would appear to be within the projected capacity of KPC and KFOR. As most areas are low priority, there is open capacity to adjust work plans for incoming new DAs that might have a higher priority.

The review of the Task Dossiers has not been exhaustive and focussed on the known problematic areas. However, the amount of Task Dossiers viewed allows conclusions to be drawn. The Task Dossier review should be continued by OKPCC EOD with the methodology applied so far to precisely assess the situation. Some shortcomings in OKPCC EOD filing and data management have been identified, and recommendations for remedial action have been provided.

The concerns raised by the demining organisation were investigated. The discussion around missing “Ops Memos” resulted in the realization that they have not been produced by the MACC Chief of Operations at his desk in a rush to close the programme in 2001, as suggested during the initial briefings.



As the known DAs lay in the capacity of KPC, any follow-up survey needs to build on the work done in previous years, and on the experience gained. It should be considered as a continuous process conducted by the local capacity. The planned gradual reduction of KFOR EOD should be compensated through the increase of KPC in 2007.

Considering 4,520 Dangerous Areas dealt with from 1999, and the number of agencies and organisations involved with EOD activity, then a small proportion of discrepancies, whilst unfortunate, seems feasible. This is not enough to undermine the credibility of the work done by accredited and QA'd NGOs.

From this independent review the assessment team supports the key findings of the UNMAS Kosovo assessment report 2006, in that the planned KPC capacity is sufficient for residual EOD requirements.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore the assessment team conclude that the general and actual situation assessment made by the UN in 2001 does not need to be changed or rectified.

Some of the findings of the assessment would not have been visible without the 'questions' raised by the HALO Trust. With hindsight it would have been better and more productive if the communications and trust between HALO and the OKPCC would have allowed them to solve the problems internally and progressively. External programme monitoring, i.e. from outside of Kosovo might have assisted in earlier recognition of this communication problem and reached a more timely solution.

## **10. Lessons Learned**

General lessons learned in Kosovo that can be applied to programmes of a similar nature in other countries include the following:

- The need for progressive data management, including regular review of files and a quality assurance process for data entry, is recommended. This is particularly relevant for UN programmes that are completing and closing down, in order to hand over easily accessible data. IMSMA Version 4 is designed to help in this regard.
- The production of IMAS for Cluster Strike Clearance and Data Management could be considered.
- The need for Mine Action Programmes to maintain an auditable record of decisions and why they were made.
- That programmes should be supported by an external monitoring and evaluation component.

Annex A	Terms of Reference for Assessment
Annex B	Evaluation Assessment Tables
Annex C	List of DAs to be (re-)visited by KPC

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<sup>22</sup> Report on the Landmine and Cluster Bomb Threat in 2006. Situation Analyses and Evaluation of the Kosovo Protection Corps Capacity to address the Problem, UNMAS, 14 May 2006

## List of Abbreviations

BAC	Battle Area Clearance
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
DA	Dangerous Area
DCA	Danish Church Aid (NGO)
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GICHD	Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	The Halo Trust (NGO)
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	International Management System for Mine Action
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
MACC	Mine Action Co-ordination Center
MAP	Mine Action Programme
MAT	Mines Advisory Trust (NGO)
MNB	Multi-National Brigade (sector)
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OKPCC	Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps Coordinator
OmiK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Government
QA	Quality Assurance
SWP	Standard Work Procedures
TD	Task Dossier
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VJ	Serb Army

## **Annex A: Terms of Reference**

### **TERMS OF REFERENCE** **FOR AN ASSESSMENT INTO OPERATIONAL** **MINE/UXO CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES IN KOSOVO**

#### **Situation Overview/Background**

Following the hostilities in Kosovo and subsequent NATO-led bombing campaign in 1999, the province was contaminated with mines laid primarily by Serbian military forces, and unexploded cluster bomb sub-munitions (CBU) dropped by coalition air forces. Under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was mandated by Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 to act as the interim administrative authority in Kosovo until such time as its final status could be determined, a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) was established to oversee all mine action activities in the Province.

As part of the coordination function, the MACC collected and collated all available information on mine and unexploded ordnance contamination within the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The information loaded into the system included NATO bombing data; Serbian military minefield records; reports provided by the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission; survey reports from mine action NGOs, including those submitted by HALO Trust which was funded by UK DFID to undertake a rapid survey of contaminated areas; NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) reports; and miscellaneous information provided by humanitarian agencies and members of the public. At one point, IMSMA contained some 4,000 reported "Dangerous Areas" (DAs), and although many were either known or suspected to be duplicate or erroneous reports, the MACC made a conscious decision to include all information until the accuracy of each report could be verified.

From June 1999 - December 2001 the MACC coordinated survey, clearance and mine risk education (MRE) activities within the Province. This included a systematic survey/evaluation of all DAs recorded in IMSMA. Those DA that were confirmed as containing a hazard required some form of clearance activity. Those DA that were not considered to contain a hazard required a certified explanation as to why this was the case. In both situations, appropriate reports were required to be submitted before an area was declared cleared or cancelled.

During clearance operations from 1999-2001, the clearance of CBU affected areas was generally undertaken as a two-step process. The first stage involved the initial clearance of items on, or just below the surface using instrument and visual search techniques. This had the advantage of quickly removing the major, easily accessible threat that was responsible for the vast majority of CBU accidents, as well as better defining the actual contaminated area. This meant that the second step, which was sub-surface clearance down to 50cm could be completed more efficiently. Where it was ascertained that the land would be used for agriculture or building purposes, sub-surface clearance was undertaken from the outset.

In December 2001, the responsibilities undertaken by the MACC were passed to a number of different government departments that were established under the Joint Interim

Administrative Structure (JIAS), pending a political settlement in Kosovo. The responsibility for ongoing mine and UXO clearance was transferred to the Department for Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness (DCSEP). DCSEP was responsible for the management and oversight of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which had been assigned responsibility for assisting in demining under UNMIK Regulation 1999/8. The DCSEP subsequently became the UNMIK Directorate of Civil Protection (UNMIK DCP) in January 2002, and later it became the UNMIK Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC).

The OKPCC includes the UNMIK EOD Management Section, which is tasked to: act as the focal point for all mine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) clearance in Kosovo; plan, coordinate and monitor all mine and UXO activities in Kosovo; conduct Quality Assurance and Quality Control checks in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS); train and develop the KPC operational capacity; and liaise with all organizations operating in Kosovo.

As part of the transfer of responsibility for operational clearance to the KPC, a number of remaining DAs were left for the KPC to complete. These DAs were primarily located in an area known as the Dulje pass. There were also a number of CBU-affected areas that had not yet been sub-surface cleared and were considered low priority tasks that the KPC EOD teams could complete over a longer period of time. These were designated “EOD Response”, in that it was expected that items could be discovered from time to time. These items would be dealt with as they were discovered, and the areas would remain on a ‘watch-list’ until such time as they were systematically cleared by the KPC teams. There are currently 42 tasks that are designated EOD response and are planned for systematic clearance in the future.

The coordination of these clearance tasks is the responsibility of the EOD Management Section. As was the practice in 1999-2001, all tasks are held in “Task Dossiers”, which are a hard copy compilation of all available information on the particular DA concerned, including survey/clearance activities that have taken place to date on the site. There are currently 677 archived task Dossiers held by the EOD Management Section and 31 which remain open

The IMSMA is a combination database/Geographic Information System (GIS) and can be used to graphically display the information contained in the Task Dossiers relating to each DA. It is essential that IMSMA accurately reflect the actual status of each cleared or remaining DA, in accordance with the information contained in the Task Dossiers.

### **Purpose of the Assessment**

The OKPCC requires an assessment of all Task Dossiers held by the EOD Management Section, to ensure that appropriate action has been undertaken to either clear, cancel, or designate the task for future clearance by the KPC. This is because there have been some questions raised as to the extent of clearance work that remains in Kosovo, and a concern that it may be beyond the capability of the KPC EOD/Survey capacity. The purpose of this assessment is to determine the extent of work that remains in Kosovo, by auditing the work that has been completed to date. Particular emphasis will be given to identifying areas that have been surface cleared of CBU, but still require sub-surface clearance.

### **Requirement**

The OKPCC requires the following activities to be undertaken:

- a. Conduct a systematic review of the Task Dossiers held by the EOD Management Section to determine whether appropriate actions have been undertaken to declare DAs as being either cleared, cancelled, or to designate the DA as being a future clearance task by the KPC. Provide a detailed list of discrepancies as they are encountered and a recommended remedial action.
- b. Determine whether there is a requirement for the OKPCC to re-visit any DA to confirm its status, based on a lack of supporting information contained within the Task Dossier. Provide a list of DA to be re-visited.
- c. Compare the information contained within the Task Dossiers with the Information contained in IMSMA, identify any areas of discrepancy, and make recommendations for remedial action in each case.
- d. Determine the number of tasks that remain to be completed, either as a result of the DAs being designated as EOD Response Tasks, or by virtue of the fact that full clearance has not yet been completed and/or recorded.
- e. Assess the current nomenclature being applied to the status of tasks, and make recommendations for categorising the tasks in accordance with mine action sector standards.

It is envisaged that most of this activity will take place within the OKPCC. However, one or more trips to the field for orientation purposes are considered to be necessary. The team should also be prepared to visit a number of the sites where any discrepancies are identified, in order to provide some analysis of the nature and impact of the situation.

### **Duration and Team Composition**

It is expected that the assessment would be undertaken by a team of up to three people over a period of 10 days. At least one of the team should have experience in utilising IMSMA, although support for this does exist within the OKPCC and suitably qualified staff will be made available to assist as required. Knowledge of mine action operations, including survey and clearance activities will be essential.

The staff of the OKPCC EOD Management Section will be on hand to provide support to the assessment activity as required by the team.

### **Deliverable**

A report that meets the requirements listed above is to be provided to the OKPCC within four weeks of the completion of the assessment activity in Kosovo.

**Annex B: Assessment of selected Task Dossiers part 1a (descriptive)**

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
1	W02-67/2377	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
2	W2-18/2376	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
3	S20-29/1148	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2332, 2333
4	S20-30/2332	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Ref DA 1148	No	No	2333
5	S16-13/1521	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Acc rep 169
6	N28-1/3894	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
7	N28-1/2534	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	2529
8	N28-1/1998	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	2816
9	N28-1/2432	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
10	N28-1/2435	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
11	W 2-23/2783	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
12	W 2-23/2784	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
13	W 2-23/2785	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
14	W 2-23/2786	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
15	W 2-29/2595	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	
16	C19-22/3926	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	2726, 2621

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
17	W 2-76/ 2350	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes (Ops Memo)	No	
18	W 2-59/ 3951	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
19	W 2-59/ 2336	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
20	W 2-59/ 2343	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes (actually discred.)	No	No	No	
21	W 2-59/ 2601	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes (actually discred.)	No	No	No	
22	W 2-59/ 3953	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes (actually discred.)	No	No	No	
23	W 2-14/ 2646	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
24	W 2-14/ 2647	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Ref 3917	Ref 3917	No	No	No	
25	W 2-14/ 3917	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
26	C 9-11/ 3002	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes (Ops Memo)	No	
27	W 2-30/ 3266	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (for VJ MF)	No	
28	C 19-28/ 3884	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes (Ops Memos)	No	
29	C 19-19/ 3200	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes (Ops Memos)	No	
30	N 28-2/ 2420	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes (Ops Memo)	No	2421, 2422, 2423, 2483, 2484
31	S 20-32/ 900	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	3414, 3415, 1153, 1154, 3413, 2752, 2753 in same TD
32	S24-31/ 4266	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
33	S24-31/4237	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Also valid for: 4249, 4250, 4254, 4257, 4260
34	E 7-39/1662	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	1620, 1597, (MF 281, MF 293?)
35	E 23-17/1992	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	1747
36	C 9-6/1224	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
37	W 2-28 2714	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Ops Memo change of files	No	DA 2714 and 2723 moved to TD W 2-27, W 2-28 no longer exists
38	E 25-3/1486	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
39	C 3-15/MF 490	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
40	C 3-15/MF 491	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
41	C 3-15/MF731	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
42	C 3-15/3948	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	
43	S 24-5/548	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	
44	N28-1/2433	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
45	E 7-41/MF 284	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes (2)	No	No	No	
46	W02-27, 3756	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
47	W02-27 3738	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
48	E25-34 2355	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Duplicates of TD,E7-9, current task



SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
49	E25-35 2356	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Duplicates of TD E7-9, current task
50	N11-11 4034	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Duplicate of TD N 11-10
51	W1-13 3912	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	3966,2789,2760, single CBU strike
52	S24-06 2559	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
53	E25-58 1485	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	2348
54	W2-78 2413	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
55	E10-1 3860	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
56	W2-20 104	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
57	S20-18 2964	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	2060,2061,2062 2063,2523,2524, 2961,2962,2963
58	W02-60 3754	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	3257,3256
59	S24-27 3906	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	
60	S20-35 3275	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	3274
61	S20-21 2548	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	2545
62	S20-23 3994	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	3909

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
63	E25-47 2331	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
64	W01-45 4075	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
65	W17-10 2445	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	2776,2775,2431, 2770,2782
66	C18-43 2774	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	3600 DAs 2581,2586,2607,2743, 2746,2747,2748,2758, 2768,2771,2772,2773, 2791,1357 passed to Serbia
67	W17-5 1871	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	2477,2497
68	C13-15 4028	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
69	C13-15 2571	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	BACTEC Ops memo 14/3/00	No	2570
70	E25-56 4032	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	
71	W01-25 2547	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	3962
72	E25-19 1333	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
73	E25_19 3610	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	
74	W02-03 1833	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
75	W02-58 3556	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	4065,3988,3851
76	W02-32 2384	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
77	W02-52 2562	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	4271
78	C13-22 2576	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Ops memo 19/6/01	No	3127
79	C13-23 2513	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Ops memo 19/6/01	No	1407
80	C13-24c 2021	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Ops memo 19/6/01	No	2328,2329,2984,2985 2022,2326,2327,2985, 2984,2329,2328,2021
81	N21-2 4071	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	3872
82	W01-29 2557	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
83	E7-44 3886	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Duplicate of MF220
84	E7-44 3385	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Duplicate of MF204 1707,1795,1794 1711.
85	E7-44 3384e	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Duplicate of MF204 1617
86	E7-44 1705	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	3463,1708
87	E7-44 1713	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Ops memo	No	3722
88	E7-44 3689	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
89	E7-44 1706	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
90	E7-46 3378	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
91	E7-46 3379e	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
92	E7-46 3380	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
93	E7-40 1674	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
94	E7-40 1073	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
95	E7-40 1673	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
96	S24-25 2764	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	2765
97	W02-27 2396	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	2397
98	W02-27 2397	See 2396									
99	W02-27 2714	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
100	W02-27 2723	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
101	S5-25 / 2959 /	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	2960 / 3907 / 2058 / 2395 / 2394 / 2393 / 2059
102	S20-04 / 3847	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
103	S20-05 / 2048	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	2942 / 2047 / 2941 / 2050 / 2051 / 2944 / 2945
104	C18-12 / 2515 2516	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
105	W2-66 / 2640 / 2639	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
106	S24-02 / 2323	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	
107	S24-02 / 2322	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
108	S24-02 / 2560	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
109	C13-17 / 1993 / 1995 /	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	1994 / 1996 / 2501 / 2792 / 2793 / 2794 / 2795
110	W2-49 2337 /	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	2340 / 2341 / 2342 / 2596 / 2602 / 2603 / 2604 / 2615 / 4033
111	C09-07 / 2635 / 2636	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	
112	C3-17 / 2536	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	
113	C3-17 / 2387	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
114	C19-32 / 2042 / 3938	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	
115	C09-09 / 2034 / 2899 / 2900	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
116	N12-02 / 2892	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	2026
117	E07-49 / 187 / 188 / 189 / 190	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	
118	E07-49 / 229 / 264	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
119	E07-49 / 872 / 876 / 3830 / 4277 / 4279	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	

SN	TD / DA No.	Cover pages	DA Report(s)	Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch	Tasking Order	Suspension Report(s)	Completion Report(s)	Completion Survey(s)	Discreditation Report(s)	Post Clearance Survey	Same DA as
120	W1-44 / 3228	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	3231 / 3494
121	Deleted	by DE	See SN 122								
122	E7-25 / 221 / 222	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	E7-25 / 3384 / 3389 / 1681 / 1680 / 224 / 225
123	W01-43 / 418 / 434	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
124	W01-43 / 436 / 431	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
125	W01-43 / 3277	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
126	W01-43 / 3225	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	DA listed on cover page
127	W01-43 / 3248	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	
128	W01-43 / 1818	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	DA listed on cover page
129	W08-03 / 3819	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
130	N21-07 / 517 (DA)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
131	W08-04 / 74	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	
132	C13-05	Deleted	by DE								
133	S05-10 / 548 / 549 / 551	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	
134	E26-4 2456	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No	Yes	No	No		2457
135	E26-15 1694	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No	Yes	No	No		MF154
136	E26-15 1693	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No	Yes	No	No		MF153

<b>SN</b>	<b>TD / DA No.</b>	<b>Cover pages</b>	<b>DA Report(s)</b>	<b>Map, VJ, Photo, Sketch</b>	<b>Tasking Order</b>	<b>Suspension Report(s)</b>	<b>Completion Report(s)</b>	<b>Completion Survey(s)</b>	<b>Discreditation Report(s)</b>	<b>Post Clearance Survey</b>	<b>Same DA as</b>
137	E26-15 1695	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No	Yes	No	No		MF 155
138	E26-15 1695	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No	Yes	No	No		MF 156
139	N21-16 3667	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	No	Yes	No	No		MF 540

## Annex B: Assessment of selected Task Dossiers part 1b (descriptive)

S N	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data? <sup>23</sup>	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
1	W02-67/ 2377	CBU Strike	EOD Response	Manual Clearance	Yes	N/A	Completion not yet entered	DA 2380, 2787, 2788 missing as hard copy in TD
2	W2-18/ 2376	CBU Strike	Discredited	Reconnaissance (survey) Ops Memo of 15/7/00	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
3	S20-29/ 1148	CBU Strike	No status given	KFOR response (camp Prizren)	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
4	S20-30/ 2332	CBU Strike	KFOR Responsibility	KFOR Response (camp Prizren)	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
5	S16-13/ 1521	House Clearance	Complete	House Clearance and Re- Survey	Discreditation report is Mine/UXO Area Reconnaissance and Survey Report	N/A	TD says accident possibly CBU, -> IMSMA classifies CBU task	Yes
6	N28-1/ 3894	CBU Strike	Discredited	KFOR Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
7	N28-1/ 2534	CBU Strike	Discredited	KFOR and OKPCC Survey	Yes	N/A	No discreditation report in TD, only in IMSMA	Discreditation report missing
8	N28-1/ 1998	CBU Strike	Low priority / KPC and ticked confirmed clear (2816) Survey Task	KFOR Surface Clearance	Yes	N/A	1998 ticked as cleared	Yes
9	N28-1/ 2432	CBU Strike	Survey Task	Sub-surface cleared	Yes	N/A	IMSMA not reflecting completed clearance	Yes
10	N28-1/ 2435	CBU Strike	Survey Task	outstanding	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
11	W 2-23/ 2783	CBU Strike	Discredited	Reconnaissance (survey) Ops Memo of 15/7/00	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
12	W 2-23/ 2784	CBU Strike	Discredited	Reconnaissance (survey) Ops Memo of 15/7/00	Yes	N/A	No	Yes

<sup>23</sup> Only for current tasks



SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
13	W 2-23/ 2785	CBU Strike	Discredited	Reconnaissance (survey) Ops Memo of 15/7/00	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
14	W 2-23/ 2786	CBU Strike	Discredited	Reconnaissance (survey) Ops Memo of 15/7/00	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
15	W 2-29/ 2595	CBU Strike	EOD Response	Confirmed clear see CR 1566 of 3/9/04 Manual Clearance	Yes	N/A	Completion report describes uncleared area left, not in IMSMA	Yes
16	C19-22/ 3926	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Clearance	Yes	N/A	No, only date reference for Ops Memo	Yes
17	W 2-76/ 2350	CBU Strike	Discredited	Survey / Ops Memo of 21/11/01	Yes	N/A	Reference to Ops Memo of 21/11/01, TD only contain Ops Memo of 27.7.01	Ops Memo of 21/11/01 missing
18	W 2-59/ 3951	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Clearance subsurface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes (ELS Ops Memo of 30/10/00 missing, but other documentation is sufficient)
19	W 2-59/ 2336	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Clearance subsurface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes (as above)
20	W 2-59/ 2343	CBU Strike	Complete	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes (as above)
21	W 2-59/ 2601	CBU Strike	Complete	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes (as above)
22	W 2-59/ 3953	CBU Strike	Complete	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes (as above)
23	W2-14/ 2646	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Clearance Subsurface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
24	W2-14/ 2647	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Clearance Subsurface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
25	W2-14/ 3917	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Clearance Subsurface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
26	C 9-11/ 3002	CBU Strike	Complete	Survey Ops Memo 14/3/00 KFOR compound	Yes	N/A	No, only date for Ops Memo (14 instead of 9/3/00)	Yes

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
27	W 2-30/3266	CBU Strike	EOD Response (conf. clear)	Manual Clearance Subsurface	Yes	N/A	IMSMA does not contain information about remaining marked area, where a BLU container had been cleared down to 1,5 metres and then marked	Yes
28	C 19-28/3884	CBU Strike	Discredited Ops Memo 23/11/01	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Documentation of KFOR clearance not available
29	C 19-19/3200	CBU Strike	Discredited Ops Memo 26/7/01	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
30	N 28-2/2420	CBU Strike	Complete Ops Memo 31/5/00	Survey / KFOR Clearance	Yes	N/A	No	Documentation of KFOR clearance not available
31	S 20-32/900	CBU Strike	Conf. Clear Ops Memo	Not assessable	Yes	N/A	Not assessable without documents	Only DA reports in TD
32	S24-31/4266	Minefield	Suspended	Manual Mine Clearance	Yes	N/A	IMSMA status suspended, but task is completed	Yes
33	S24-31/4237	Minefield	No status in IMSMA, conf. clear	Survey Ops Memo	Yes	N/A	Not assessable	No paper documentation available
34	E 7-39/1662	Minefield	Cleared by Survey	Survey	Yes	N/A	DAs not in IMSMA, only accessible through MF numbers	The TD only contained DA reports, the compl rep has been in the survey file. Details on MF 281 and 293 not in TD, probably also in survey file.
35	E 23-17/1992	Minefield	Conf. Clear No Status	Survey	Yes	N/A	DA 1747 is not in IMSMA.	Yes
36	C 9-6/1224	CBU Strike	Conf. Clear No Status	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
37	W 2-28/2714	CBU Strike	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	No	Yes

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
38	E 25-3/1486	CBU Strike	Conf. Clear No status	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
39	C 3-15/MF490	Minefield	Cleared	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
40	C 3-15/MF 491	Minefield	Cleared	Manual Clearance	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
41	C 3-15/MF731	Minefield	Cleared	Manual Clearance	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
42	C 3-15/3948	Minefield	Conf. Clear No Status	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Discreditation report
43	S 24-5/548	Minefield	MCO Mine Complete	Survey	Yes	N/A	IMSMA has Completion and Discreditation report	Completion & Discreditation Report missing in TD
44	N28-1/2433	CBU Strike	Survey Task	Surface cleared by KFOR	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
45	E 7-41/MF 284	Minefield	Completed	Clearance	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
46	W02-27, 3756	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
47	W02-27 3738	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
48	E25-34 2355	CBU Strike	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
49	E25-35 2356	CBU Strike	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
50	N11-11 4034	CBU Strike	Complete	Sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
51	W1-13 3912	CBU Strike	Completed,	Manual surface	Yes	N/A	Not entered as just surface cleared. DA indicated clear but no subsurface completion report, ref to Ops Memo 24.9.2001 indicating task is clear, suspension report not entered into IMSMA	IMSMA discrepancy indicates either ops memo, discreditation or completion report is missing

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
52	S24-06	CBU Strike	Completed	Manual surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
53	E25-58	CBU Strike	Completed	Manual surface	Yes	N/A	IMSMA Shows complete, TD shows suspended surface task	Yes, but IMSMA information not
54	W2-78 2413	CBU Strike	Completed	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
55	E10-1	CBU Strike	Completed	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
56	W2-20	Minefield	Completed	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
57	S20-18	CBU Strike	Completed	Manual surface	Yes	N/A	Yes, GIS shows suspended as surface clearance only, but IMSMA status shows complete	Yes
58	W02-60	Minefield	Cleared	Manual subsurface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
59	S24-27 3906	CBU Strike	Discredited	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
60	S20-35 3275	EOD	Discredited	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
61	S20-21 2548	EOD	Discredited	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
62	S20-23 3994	CBU Strike	Discredited	Surface clearance	Yes	N/A	Yes, should be suspended for assessment as a further EOD Response task	No, no completion reports
63	E25-47 2331	CBU Strike / Minefield	Completed	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
64	W01-45 4075	Minefield	Completed	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
65	W17-10 2445	CBU Strike	Completed	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	Yes, part of the area is cleared, part surface cleared part uncleared and marked, the uncleared and surface cleared areas are not shown as such on IMSMA	Yes
66	C18-43 2774	CBU Strike	Completed	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
67	W17-5 1871	Minefield	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
68	C13-15 4028	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
69	C13-15 2571	CBU Strike	Complete	Not known	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
70	E25-56 4032	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Surface only	Yes	N/A	Yes, need to indicate for assessment for sub surface clearance and link to area north of the DA with just visually cleared areas	Yes, but missing supporting letter
71	W01-25 2547	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual Sub surface	Yes	N/A	Yes, IMSMA status, okay but needs Completion report 1554 data added to IMSMA record	Yes, but IMSMA record should refer to the detail completion report
72	E25-19 1333	Minefield	Complete	Not known	Yes	N/A	Yes, IMSMA has no discreditation or clearance report reference	IMSMA: refers to an Ops Memo that is not in the TD
73	E25-19 3610	Minefield	Complete	Not known	Yes	N/A	No,	Yes
74	W02-03 1833	Minefield	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
75	W02-58 3556	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
76	W02-32 2384	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
77	W02-572 2562	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
78	C13-22 2576	CBU Strike	KFOR responsibility	Not known	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
79	C13-23 2513	CBU Strike	KFOR Responsibility	Not known	Yes	N/A	No	Yes

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
80	C13-24c 2021	CBU Strike	KFOR Responsibility	Not known	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
81	N21-2 4071	CBU Strike	Discreditation	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
82	W01-29 2557	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
83	E7-44 3886	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
84	E7-44 3385	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
85	E7-44 3384e	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
86	E7-44 1705	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
87	E7-44 1713	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
88	E7-44 3689	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
89	E7-44 1706	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
90	E7-46 3378	Minefield	Complete	Manual and MDD	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
91	E7-46 3379e	Minefield	Complete	Manual and MDD	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
92	E7-46 3380	Minefield	Complete	Manual and MDD	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
93	E7-40 1674	Minefield	Confirmed clear	Manual and MDD	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
94	E7-40 1073	Minefield	Confirmed clear	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
95	E7-40 1673	Minefield	Confirmed clear	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
96	S24-25 2764	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
97	W02-27 2396	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual surface	Yes	N/A	Small uncleared / unclearable area not indicated in IMSMA	Yes
98	W02-27 2397	See 2396						
99	W02-27 2714	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
100	W02-27 2723	CBU Strike	Complete	Manual surface	Yes	N/A	Yes. IMSMA showed complete, but only surface clearance conducted.	Yes
101	S5-25 / 2959	CBU Strike	Complete – Discredited	Level 1 survey in IMSMA	Yes	N/A	Yes. ‘Cleared’ in IMSMA through level 1 survey but no report in TD	No. Survey report missing in TD
102	S20-04 / 3847	CBU Strike	Surface cleared	Surface clearance & Ops Memo in IMSMA	Yes	N/A	Yes. Task ‘cleared by surface clearance’ in IMSMA but no clearance report in TD – only suspension report. IMSMA closes DA with Ops Memo but missing in TD	No. Clearance Report and Ops Memo missing in TD
103	S20-05 / 2048	CBU Strike	Complete – subsurface cleared	Subsurface Clearance + Completion Report + reference to Ops Directive in IMSMA	No. Task ‘cleared’ but small piece of ground uncleared. Task closed by ‘Ops Directive’	N/A	Yes. Completion report covers all DAs but in IMSMA only DAs 2048 and 2050 state that a completion report is available	Yes
104	C18-12 / 2515 / 2516	CBU Strike	Discredited	Subsurface clearance to 10cm + completion report in IMSMA	No	N/A	Yes. One DA flagged as discredited but has actually been surface cleared	No. Clearance report detailing 50cm subsurface not in TD
105	W2-66 / 2640 / 2639	CBU Strike	Complete – surface cleared	Surface clearance + Ops Memo on 13 Aug 01 in IMSMA	No	N/A	Yes. Cleared in IMSMA by Ops Memo but only suspension report available in TD	No. Ops Memo missing in TD

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
106	S24-02 / 2323	CBU Strike	Cleared by survey	Cleared by Ops Memo in IMSMA	No	N/A	No	No. 2 Ops Memos (30/10/00 & 21/11/01) mentioned in IMSMA but missing in TD
107	S24-02 / 2322	CBU Strike	Subsurface cleared (no clearance depth)	Clearance + completion report in IMSMA	Yes. Marked as minefield in IMSMA but actually cluster strike	N/A	Subsurface cleared in IMSMA but no depth given in TD – suggests surface clearance only	No
108	S24-02 / 2560	CBU Strike	Cleared by survey	Surface clearance in IMSMA	Yes	N/A	Yes. Suspension report in TD but IMSMA states DA is cleared by survey	No. Ops Memo (21/11/00) for survey clearance missing in TD
109	C13-17 / 1993 / 1995 /	CBU Strike	Complete – subsurface cleared	Subsurface clearance + completion report in IMSMA	No	N/A	No	Yes
110	W2-49 2337 /	CBU Strike	Complete – surface cleared	Surface clearance then suspended. MACC Ops Memo then closed task based in IMSMA on low priority for subsurface clearance	No	N/A	Yes. DA has been closed but only surface cleared. Change status to suspended	No. No cover page
111	C09-07 / 2635 / 2636	CBU Strike	Complete – discredited	Survey	Yes	N/A	No	No. No cover page in TD
112	C3-17 / 2536	CBU Strike	Complete	Cleared by Ops Memo in IMSMA	No	N/A	Yes. DA suspended with surface clearance and uncleared area remaining but IMSMA marks task as closed	No. Ops Memo (13/08/01) missing in TD
113	C3-17 / 2387	CBU Strike	Complete	Cleared by Ops Memo in IMSMA	No	N/A	Yes. DA completed but no survey or clearance report in TD	No. Ops Memo (13/08/01) and survey report missing in TD but mentioned in IMSMA
114	C19-32 / 2042 / 3938	CBU Strike	Complete – EOD response	Clearance + completion report in IMSMA	No	N/A	No	Yes



SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
115	C09-09 / 2034 / 2899 / 2900	CBU Strike / Minefield	Complete – KFOR cleared	KFOR Clearance in IMSMA	No	N/A	Yes. IMSMA status should be changed from complete to KFOR responsibility	No. KFOR completion report not included in TD
116	N12-02 / 2892	CBU Strike	Complete	Surface clearance + discreditation survey in IMSMA	No. Tech Survey Form used for discreditation report. Completion report used for EOD call out	N/A	Yes. Cleared in IMSMA but actually KFOR responsibility	Yes
117	E07-49 / 187 / 188 / 189 / 190	Minefield	Cleared by survey	Survey + Survey Report in IMSMA	Yes	N/A	Yes. All minefields cleared in IMSMA but insufficient evidence in TD of clearance/ survey reports	No. Cover page, map or survey/ clearance report missing in TD
118	E07-49 / 229 / 264	Minefield	Cleared by clearance	Clearance + completion report in IMSMA	Yes	N/A	No	No. No cover page or map in TD
119	E07-49 / 872 / 876 / 3830 / 4277 / 4279	Minefield	Cleared	Clearance + completion report in IMSMA	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
120	W1-44 / 3228 / 3231 / 3494	Minefield	Cleared by clearance and discredited	Clearance and discreditation reports	Yes	N/A	No	No
121	E7-25 /	Deleted	by DE					
122	E7-25 / 221 / 222	Minefield	Cleared by clearance	Clearance	Yes	N/A	Yes.	Yes
123	W01-43 / 418 / 434	Minefield	Cleared by clearance	Clearance	Yes	N/A	Yes. All minefields are cleared in IMSMA but no clearance report in TD	No. Clearance reports missing in TD
124	W01-43 / 436 / 431	Minefield	Cleared by clearance / suspended	Clearance and handed over to Albania MACC	Yes	N/A	No	Yes

SN	TD / DA No.	Type	IMSMA Status	What action taken to clear or cancel?	Nomenclature consistency	How old is survey data?	Discrepancies with IMSMA database	Documentation complete (ref 1a)
125	W01-43 / 3277	Minefield	Cleared by Ops Memo	Cleared by Ops Memo	Yes	N/A	Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo but missing from TD	No. Ops Memo missing in TD
126	W01-43 / 3225	Minefield	N/A – DA not in IMSMA	N/A – DA not in IMSMA or TD	N/A	N/A	N/A – DA not in IMSMA or TD	No. All documentation missing in TD
127	W01-43 / 3248	Minefield	Cleared – discredited	Suspension report in IMSMA	No. DA discredited by suspension report	N/A	Yes. DA closed but no supporting documentation in TD	No. Suspension report missing in TD
128	W01-43 / 1818	Minefield	Cleared by Ops Memo	Cleared by Ops Memo	Yes	N/A	Yes. DA closed but Ops Memo missing from TD	No. Minefield report & Ops Memo missing from TD
129	W08-03 / 3819	Minefield	Cleared – no status	Cleared by Ops Memo	Yes	N/A	Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo but missing from TD	No. Ops Memo missing in TD
130	N21-07 / 517 (DA)	Minefield	Cleared by survey (no status)	Cleared by Ops Memo	No. No status in IMSMA	N/A	Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo but missing from TD	No. Ops Memo missing in TD
131	W08-04 / 74	Minefield	Cleared by survey (no status)	Cleared by Ops Memo	No. No status in IMSMA	N/A	Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo but missing from TD	No. Ops Memo missing in TD
132	C 13-05	Deleted	by DE					
133	S05-10 / 548 / 549 / 551	Minefield	Cleared by clearance	Clearance + clearance report	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
134	E26-4 2456	BAC	Complete	Sub surface	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
135	E26-15 1694	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
136	E26-15 1693	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
137	E26-15 1695	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
138	E26-15 1695	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes
139	N21-16 3667	Minefield	Complete	Manual	Yes	N/A	No	Yes

## Annex B: Assessment of selected Task Dossiers part 2 (qualitative / analytical)

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear? <sup>24</sup>	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task? <sup>25</sup>	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate? <sup>26</sup>	OKPCC task status appropriate? <sup>27</sup>	Action required?
1	W02-67/ 2377	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA: Change status to complete, Doc: Add DAs
2	W2-18/ 2376	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
3	S20-29/ 1148	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Change status in IMSMA to “KFOR Responsibility”
4	S20-30/ 2332	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
5	S16-13/ 1521	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
6	N28-1/ 3894	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
7	N28-1/ 2534	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No, KFOR deals with it. Doc. follow-up, add cover page
8	N28-1/ 1998	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Recorded outstanding task for sub-surface clearance, but in Serb area, therefore KFOR responsibility. IMSMA: untick conf. clear for 1998
9	N28-1/ 2432	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No, KFOR deals with it. MSMA: change status to complete
10	N28-1/ 2435	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Recorded outstanding clearance task, but in Serb area, therefore KFOR responsibility.

<sup>24</sup> File processing clear: OKPCC internal file administration clear, nomenclature understandable and consistent, continuation tasks identified. Priority classification clear (only for current tasks): OKPCC priority setting decision trail clear and documented, survey data available (not older than 6 months)

<sup>25</sup> „Sufficient“ is defined as: 1) for survey tasks: DA report available, 2) for clearance tasks: DA report, Survey report or Tasking order available, clear and complete

<sup>26</sup> „Appropriate“ is defined as: 1) for clearance: documentation complete, argumentation understandable. 2) for discredited areas: documentation complete, argumentation understandable: Survey conducted, no signs of fighting, mines or UXO, interviews with affected persons conducted, area used regularly, no accidents

<sup>27</sup> „Appropriate“ is defined as: documentation is complete, file processing understandable, priority classification clear, nomenclature clear, argumentation understandable, no other evidence (accident, new DA report)

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
11	W 2-23/2783	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
12	W 2-23/2784	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
13	W 2-23/2785	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
14	W 2-23/2786	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
15	W 2-29/2595	Yes	N/A	Yes	New status needed for completed tasks with small areas remaining uncleared, eg due to high metal contamination?	IMSMA: Indicate uncleared area left from Compl. Rep. 1566 Change status?
16	C19-22/ 3926	Yes	N/A	Yes, the areas were ploughed in 2000, however, in 2005 BLUs were found. LL: Future tasks consider ploughed areas still may require subsurface clearance.	Yes	IMSMA: Correct Ops Memo dates to 19/10/00 for all three DAs, note in DA 3926 Compl. Rep. 1610
17	W 2-76/2350	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No, because the Ops Memo of 27/7/01 is clear enough for discreditation
18	W 2-59/3951	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
19	W 2-59/2336	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
20	W 2-59/2343	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
21	W 2-59/2601	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
22	W 2-59/3953	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
23	W2-14/ 2646	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
24	W2-14/ 2647	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA: Ref 2647 same as 2646
25	W2-14/ 3917	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
26	C 9-11/ 3002	Status should be KFOR responsibility and not complete	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA: change status from complete to KFOR responsibility
27	W 2-30/ 3266	Yes, but DA report 3266 referred to a VJ minefield, which was discredited, not to a CBU strike. Formally, a new DA report could have been produced for the CBU strike area, factually, it would not have changed anything about the result.	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA: Add description of uncleared area to Compl. Rep. 1569
28	C 19-28/ 3884	Yes	N/A	Yes, but the discrediting Survey/ Ops Memo is only a handwritten post-it	Yes	No
29	C 19-19/ 3200	Yes, but BACTEC Ops Memo not clear	N/A	Yes, but the discrediting Survey/ Ops Memo is only a handwritten post-it	Yes	No
30	N 28-2/ 2420	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes, the task is a KFOR base cleared by KFOR	No
31	S 20-32/ 900	Not assessable	Not assessable	Not assessable	Not assessable	Search missing documents, add to file, assess
32	S24-31/ 4266	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes, but IMSMA status needs rectification	IMSMA: Change status from suspended to completed. Check status for other DAs at Dulje pass, change to completed if completion report available.

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
33	S24-31/4237	Not assessable	Not assessable	Not assessable	Not assessable	Search missing documents, add to file, assess
34	E 7-39/1662	No, the survey-completion report was not in the TD	N/A	Yes	Yes	Sort documents: put survey-completions in according TD (MF 281 and 293). Check MF281 and 293 survey-completion reports IMSMA: Enter/ link DAs and MF to compl. rep.
35	E 23-17/1992	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA: 1747 deleted because it is the same as 1992. Add status for 1992.
36	C 9-6/1224	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA: add status
37	W 2-282714	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	No
38	E 25-3/1486	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA: add status. <sup>28</sup>
39	C 3-15/MF490	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
40	C 3-15/MF 491	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
41	C 3-15/MF731	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
42	C 3-15/3948	Yes	N/A	Yes, reference the above 3 cleared areas, the survey has rather been a confirmation that no other DAs are left in the place.	Yes	Put discreditation report in TD. IMSMA: Add status.

<sup>28</sup> Note on DA 1486: DA 1486 discredited, understandable. In discreditation report reference to Cluster Strike Area at other grid reference (EM 043 895). Checking in IMSMA: Grid reference refers to 2759 and 2769. Both DAs have been discredited through survey later. In 2004 a Cluster Strike Area was reported to the HI team working at another strike not too far away. The strike was about 3-4 kilometer further uphill from the originally reported area (2759, 2769). The area is densely wooded and steep. The strike was subsequently cleared (CR 1536), missing in IMSMA: perimeter of cleared area, devices found, comment on uncleared area not clear.

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
43	S 24-5/ 548	Yes	N/A	Survey reports indicate population still perceive mines	Yes	Re-visit area to ensure the reported second hazardous area has been dealt with.
44	N28-1/ 2433	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Recorded outstanding task for sub-surface clearance, but in Serb area, therefore KFOR responsibility
45	E 7-41/ MF 284	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Despite proper procedures and documentation, clearance of further areas became necessary in 2005 and PMA 2s were found. For this reason, the locals are also not confident about other cleared areas. Community liaison / survey required, including the whole of the TD.
46	W02-27 3756	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
47	W02-27 3738	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
48	E25-34 2355	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
49	E25-35 2356	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
50	N11-11 4034	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
51	W1-13	No, because Ops Memo is not available	N/A	No, because Ops Memo is not available, so measures not auditable	No	Find and assess Ops Memo. If not found or argumentation not clear: survey. And re-assess
52	S24-06	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
53	E25-58	Yes	N/A	No, Suspension appropriate, or record as future task	No	IMSMA: Low priority future task.

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
54	W2-78	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
55	E10-1	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
56	W2-20	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
57	S20-18	Yes	N/A	No, Suspension appropriate	No	IMSMA: low priority future task. IMSMA action
58	W02-60	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
59	S24-27	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
60	S20-35	Yes	N/A	Yes, GP bombing not CBU	Yes	None
61	S20-21	Yes	N/A	Yes, GP bombing not CBU	Yes	None
62	S20-23	No	N/A	No, should show subsurface clearance still required for BLUs and one GP bomb	No	IMSMA: low priority future task, action only when landuse changes.
63	E25-47	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
64	WO1-45	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
65	W17-10 2445	Yes	N/A	Yes	New status needed for completed tasks with small areas remaining uncleared, eg due to high metal contamination?	IMSMA: Indicate uncleared area left.
66	C18-43	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
67	W17-5	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None, an amalgam of suspension and clearance reports completed the site
68	C13-15 4028	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
69	C13-15 2571	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
70	E25-56 4032	No	N/A	No	No	IMSMA: low priority future task, action only when change of landuse.



SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
71	W01-25 2547	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	IMSMA clearance report 1554 detail with six uncleared areas needs to be added to data base for reference
72	E25-19 1333	Yes	N/A	No, it might be, but supporting documentation missing	No	Search documents, assess
73	E25-19 3610	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
74	W02-03 1833	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
75	W02-58 3556	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
76	W02-32 2384_	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
77	W02-52 2562	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
78	C13-22 2576	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
79	C13-23 2513	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
80	C13-24c 2021	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
81	N21-2 4071	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
82	W01-29 2557	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
83	E7-44 3886	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
84	E7-44 3385	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	TD E7-44, serial 84 – 89. These related DA numbers and MF numbers and took much time to correlate, some

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
85	E7-44 3384e	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	areas were cleared and supported by completed clearance reports,
86	E7-44 1705	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Others by reference to Ops Memos which are
87	E7-44 1713	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	in the task dossiers, and finally referenced by a comprehensive summary file note instruction,
88	E7-44 3689	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	written by Albie
89	E7-44 1706	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	The explanations when aggregated together indicate clearance or reasonable discreditation, more supporting documentation may be found in the verification / discreditation files which should be cross referenced to the task dossiers
90	E7-46 3378	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
91	E7-46 3379e	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
92	E7-46 3380	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
93	E7-40 1674	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
94	E7-40 1073	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
95	E7-40 1673	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
96	S24-25 2764	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
97	W02-27 2396	Yes	N/A	No	No	IMSMA: Cleared, but small uncleared/ unclearable area left.

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
98	W02-27 2397	See 2396				
99	W02-27 2714	Yes	N/A	No	No	None
100	W02-27 2723	Yes	N/A	No	No	IMSMA: low priority future task, action only when change of landuse.
101	S5-25 / 2959	No. Insufficient evidence for DA to be closed	N/A	No. Level 1 survey undertaken, but task marked as surface cleared (as opposed to cleared by survey) even though not all the area has been investigated (i.e. bushy areas). AT mine evidence report but no further clearance undertaken before DA closed.	No. The DA should be outstanding. The level 1 survey is not sufficient to close a verified BLU strike and a suspected AT minefield (items found during first survey)	Yes, search missing documents with discreditation report and reassess, if in doubt revisit site and confirm situation
102	S20-04 / 3847	No. TD classified as cleared but comment in suspension report says 'work would continue after suspension', but no further work undertaken	N/A	No. DA has been closed by an Ops Memo in IMSMA that states that subsurface clearance is not required as land is only used for grazing. In survey reports, however, the land is classified as cultivated for crops.	No. DA classified as cleared but TD says that task is suspended. Surface clearance only has taken place.	Yes, if land use changes
103	S20-05 / 2048	Yes	N/A	No. Uncleared area closed by 'Ops Directive' but no reference as to what or where Ops Directive is. No further details in TD.	No. Task is marked as complete but some area is left uncleared (as it is highly contaminated with metal). No suitable task nomenclature available	IMSMA: ensure uncleared area left is accurately recorded. Link other DAs to Completion Report.

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
104	C18-12 / 2515 2516	No. IMSMA one task as discredited when it has actually been subsurface cleared	N/A	Yes	No. Clearance depth should be changed to 50cm as detailed in missing completion report	IMSMA as described
105	W2-66 / 2640 / 2639	Yes	N/A	Unknown - depends on details in Ops Memo	Unknown - depends on details in Ops Memo	If ops memo can not be located?
106	S24-02 / 2323	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
107	S24-02 / 2322	Yes	N/A	Not possible to say as no clearance depth stated in TD	No. No evidence of subsurface clearance in TD	IMSMA: Link DAs. Small uncleared area left? Match with DAs 1598,4341 in one TD.
108	S24-02 / 2560	No. DA cleared by survey but no supporting documentation	N/A	No. Surface clearance only on suspected CBU strike. DA then closed by ops memo	No. TD is suspended, IMSMA is cleared by survey	IMSMA: Link DAs. Small uncleared area left? Match with DAs 1598,4341 in one TD.
109	C13-17 / 1993 / 1995	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
110	W2-49 2337	Yes	N/A	No. Clearance agency recommendation is that 'area will require subsurface clearance at a later date' and that terrain in agricultural area. MACC however has closed task on basis that it is low priority clearance	No. Task should remain suspended as only surface clearance undertaken and clearance agency state that subsurface clearance required	Yes, if land use changes IMSMA: Change to only surface, low priority, action only when landuse changes
111	C09-07 / 2635 / 2636	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
112	C3-17 / 2536	No. No explanation as to why a suspended DA is closed	N/A	No. Suspension report states that uncleared area remains as no work took place on DA, but DA closed without evidence of further clearance or survey	No	Yes. To clarify whether uncleared area remains <i>Note by PB/VB: Ops memo located during assessment, no action required</i>
113	C3-17 / 2387	No. No explanation as to why the DA is closed in IMSMA	N/A	Unknown - depends on details in Ops Memo	Unknown - depends on details in Ops Memo	If Ops Memo cannot be located? <i>Note by PB/VB: Ops memo located during assessment, no action required</i>
114	C19-32 / 2042 / 3938	Yes	N/A	Yes	No. Task marked as complete and EOD response in IMSMA, which contradict each other	No
115	C09-09 / 2034 / 2899 / 2900	Yes	N/A	Unknown as KFOR clearance report and actions taken not available	Yes	IMSMA: Change to KFOR responsibility
116	N12-02 / 2892	Yes	N/A	No. Surface clearance undertaken on a number of occasions. Survey has then discredited DAs without any subsurface clearance and has become KFOR responsibility	No. Task ticked as confirmed clear when there is some 'uncleared area' left	IMSMA: Change to KFOR responsibility
117	E07-49 / 187 / 188 / 189 / 190	Yes	N/A	Unknown – depends on details in survey report which are not available in either IMSMA or TD	No. No survey report available in either IMSMA or TD to justify closure	Yes. If survey report cannot be located in files as local info suggests existence of mines
118	E07-49 / 229 / 264	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
119	E07-49 / 872, 876, 3830, 4277, 4279	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No

SN	TD/DA No.	OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?	Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?	Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?	OKPCC task status appropriate?	Action required?
120	W1-44 / 3228 / 3231 / 3494	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
121	E07-25 /	Deleted by DE				
122	E07-25 / 221 / 222	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No, only delete DA numbers for clarification
123	W01-43 / 418 / 434	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
124	W01-43 / 436 / 431	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
125	W01-43 / 3277	Yes	N/A	Unknown – Ops Memo not available	Unknown - depends on details in Ops Memo	If Ops Memo cannot be located?
126	W01-43 / 3225	N/A – DA not in IMSMA or TD	N/A	N/A – DA not in IMSMA or TD	N/A – DA not in IMSMA or TD	If DA documentation cannot be located?
127	W01-43 / 3248	No. Task marked as cleared by discreditation but only suspension report mentioned (no discreditation report)	N/A	No. Suspended DA cannot be cleared/discredited without further investigation	No. DA cannot be discredited without a discreditation report	If discreditation report cannot be located?
128	W01-43 / 1818	Yes	N/A	Unknown – Ops Memo and DA report not available	Unknown – Ops Memo and DA report not available	If Ops Memo cannot be located?
129	W08-03 / 3819	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
130	N21-07 / 517 (DA)	Yes	N/A	Unknown – Ops Memo and DA report not available	Unknown – Ops Memo and DA report not available	If Ops Memo cannot be located? IMSMA: Add status
131	W08-04 / 74	Yes	N/A	Unknown – Ops Memo and DA report not available	Unknown – Ops Memo and DA report not available	If Ops Memo cannot be located?
132	C 13-05	Deleted by DE				

<b>SN</b>	<b>TD/DA No.</b>	<b>OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?</b>	<b>Info sufficient for demining agency to conduct task?</b>	<b>Clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?</b>	<b>OKPCC task status appropriate?</b>	<b>Action required?</b>
133	S05-10 / 548 / 549 / 551	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	No
134	E26-4 2456	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
135	E26-15 1694	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
136	E26-15 1693	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
137	E26-15 1695	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
138	E26-15 1695	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None
139	N21-16 3667	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	None

Note for all tables: SN 1-45 were done by Vera Bohle, SN 46-100 and 134-139 by Phil Bean, assessment team members, and SN 101-133 by David Elliot, HALO Trust. Whilst the assessment team agreed on the “Action required” for all SNs, the individual commentaries are attributed to the individual authors. Dangerous Areas selected by HALO include SN 1-34, 45, 51-95 and 101-130.

## Annex C: List of DAs / areas to be (re-)visited by KPC

Areas identified for re-survey following the review of the Task Dossiers:

	SN	TD/DA	Priority
1	43	S 24 – 05 / 548	No
2	45	E 07 – 41 / 284 et al	Yes (Leskovica)
3	117	E 07 – 49 / 187, 188	Yes (Krivenik)

The OKPCC MRE Officer or a Community Liaison qualified KPC staff member should visit the following places to assess the situation and to explain the Kosovo mine/UXO reporting procedures to the villagers, to OSCE and to the Municipality:

- Gjocaj (near Junik)
- Jasicq (near Junik)
- Dimce (FYROM border near Deneral Jankovic)
- Nerodime village (Ferizaj Municipality, hilltops Rrafshi I Kodres se Madhe and Kodra e Shullanit)
- Kalaja Fortress (river junction to Maja, Ferizaj Municipality)
- Irznic (near Decane)
- Milaj (Prizren Municipality, explain cleared areas again)

KFOR should be made aware of the fact that the Serb community in Lipljan has concerns about UXO, if not happened before.

If accessible and not too remote, the priority for sub-surface BAC should be re-assessed next year for the following Task Dossiers:

	SN	TD / DA	Type	Surface cleared	Priority Sub-surface	Remarks
1	53	E25-58 / 1485 <sup>29</sup>	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
2	57	S20-18 / 2964	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
3	62	S20-23 / 3994	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
4	70	E25-56 / 4032 <sup>30</sup>	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
5	100	W02-27 / 2723	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
6	102	S 20-04 / 3847	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse
7	110	W 02 – 49 (10 DAs)	CBU Strike	Yes	Low	Further action only when change of landuse

<sup>29</sup> Jezerc, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed low priority, despite the survey report proposing high priority.

<sup>30</sup> Kamena Glava, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed no change of landuse



Add to the "Future Task" list:

	<b>DA</b>	<b>IMSMA Status</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1	3943	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, MAT survey 2005
2	2550	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, very low priority, no action now
3	2756	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, low priority
4	4325	Future Task EOD Response	CBU strike, MAT survey 2003
5	3880	Future Task	Mines, HALO survey 2005, priority
6	4308	Future Task EOD Response	Mines, MAT survey 2003

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