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## EC-Funded Mine Action in Africa: Volume 2 - Country Reports

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## EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION IN AFRICA: VOLUME 2 – COUNTRY REPORTS

Ted Paterson, Vera Bohle, Léonie Barnes, Mohamed Ahmed & Pamela Rebelo |  
Geneva | March 2008

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**The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)** strives for a world free of anti-personnel mines and from the threat of other landmines and explosive remnants of war, and where the suffering and concerns of populations living in affected areas are addressed. The Centre is active in research, provides operational assistance and supports the implementation of the Anti - Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

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In November 2008, after this report was written, the EC published a set of guidelines on how to more effectively link mine action with development for future programming of EC mine action over the 2008-2013 period<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> This Commission Staff working document, “Guidelines on European Community Mine Action 2008-2013” can be downloaded from the website [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/anti\\_landmines/docs/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/anti_landmines/docs/index_en.htm)







## CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	i
1. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO ANGOLA	1
INTRODUCTION	1
BACKGROUND	1
ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION	1
HISTORY OF MINE ACTION	5
Operations	5
Policy, Coordination, and Oversight	6
Capacity Development	7
Conclusions on the History of Mine Action	8
FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION	8
EC Support for mine action	8
Conclusions on funding	11
CURRENT SITUATION	11
OVERALL PLANS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	13
EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA	13
CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS	16
ANALYSIS	17
RECOMMENDATIONS	19
2. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO SOMALIA (SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND)	21
INTRODUCTION	21
Limitations of the Somalia Evaluation Conclusions on funding	21
BACKGROUND	22
ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION	22
HISTORY OF MINE ACTION	23
Somaliland	23
FUNDING	25
CURRENT SITUATION	26
CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT	26
OVERALL PLANS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	27
EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA	28
CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS	29
Somaliland	29
Puntland	31
South Central	32
ANALYSIS	32
Conclusions	38
RECOMMENDATIONS	40
TO THE UNDP/OPS MINE ACTION PROJECT	40
TO THE UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAMMES	41
TO THE EC DELEGATION FOR SOMALIA	41



TO THE HALO TRUST	42
TO THE DANISH DEMINING GROUP	42
3. Report on the Mission to Sudan	43
INTRODUCTION	43
BACKGROUND	43
ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION	43
HISTORY OF MINE ACTION	47
FUNDING	53
EC Funding for Mine Action	54
Conclusions on Mine Action Funding	56
CURRENT SITUATION	57
CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT	57
OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS	58
OVERALL PLANS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	58
EC INVOLVEMENT AND PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN	60
CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS	60
Humanitarian Priorities	61
Recovery and Development Priorities	61
EC Support for Mine Action	63
ANALYSIS	66
OVERALL CONTEXT AND ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	66
EXPLOSIVES CONTAMINATION AND THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME	67
The EC Role	71
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	72
Conclusions	72
Capacity Development for the National Programme	73
Capacity Development of Local Demining Operators	75
Other Issues	75
Recommendations	76
4. Report on the Joint Seminar on the EU-AU Security Dialogue	77
LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED	i
ANNEX 1: ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET IN ANGOLA	i
ANNEX 2: ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET IN SOMALIA	v
ANNEX 3: ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET IN SUDAN	vi
ANNEX 4: TIMELINE ANGOLA	viii
ANNEX 6: TIMELINE SOMALIA	ix
ANNEX 7: TIMELINE SUDAN	x



## FIGURES

Figure 1 – Funding estimates for Mine Action in Somalia.....	26
Figure 2 – Structure of the Somaliland Mine Action Programme.....	30
Figure 3 – Results from the VSDI in Caynabo, Sool Region .....	31
Figure 4 – Estimated annual victims per million (high and low estimates) .....	33
Figure 5 – Estimated victims/year per million in Somalia and selected countries.....	33
Figure 6 – Funding per victim (estimated) .....	36
Figure 7 – Forecasting capacity development requirements for Puntland.....	37
Figure 8 – Landmine/UXO victims recorded by year .....	47
Figure 9 – Regional breakdown of EC support for mine action .....	56

## TEXTBOXES

Textbox 1 – Discretion in demining .....	9
Textbox 2 – Roads and Rural Development in Angola.....	12
Textbox 3 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD).....	14
Textbox 4 – The UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme .....	24
Textbox 5 – Earlier EC Funding for Mine Action in Somalia .....	26
Textbox 6 – Preparing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).....	27
Textbox 7 – Financial Support from UNDP/UNOPS to SMAC, PMAC, & Police EOD teams .....	31
Textbox 8 – How many victims in Somalia? .....	34
Textbox 9 – How many people live in Somalia? .....	35
Textbox 10 – The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) .....	49
Textbox 11 – The establishment of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) .....	49
Textbox 12– Mine Action Survey & Information Management in Sudan.....	52
Textbox 13 – Difficult demining operations in South Sudan.....	57
Textbox 14 – Support to SLIRI/SLR/SLADO .....	64
Textbox 15 – Linking the work of mine action and development agencies .....	65
Textbox 16 – Strategies for proactive versus reactive operations.....	68
Textbox 17 – The EU-AU Common Agenda for Demining & Disarmament.....	77

## TABLES

Table 1 – Angola LIS Results, by province .....	3
Table 2 – Socio-economic blockages (from Angola LIS) .....	3
Table 3 – Recent victims, by province .....	4
Table 4 – Contamination recorded in the Landmine Impact Surveys.....	23
Table 5 – Dangerous areas by region .....	46
Table 6 – EC funding for mine action.....	55
Table 7 – List of demining operators and units in South Sudan (Demining Season 2007/2008).....	63



## ACRONYMS

AIDCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office	JIDU	Joint Integrated Demining Unit
AIDS	Auto Immune-Deficiency Syndrome	JMC	Joint Military Commission
ANC	African National Congress	JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines	LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
APM	Anti-Personnel Landmines	LMA	Landmine Action
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture	LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
AU	African Union	M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
BAC	Battle Area Clearance	MA	Mine Action
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation	MAG	Mines Advisory Group
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of War	MAO	Mine Action Office
CED	Executive Commission for Demining	MDD	Mine Detecting Dog
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
CNIDAH	National Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance	MEDDS	Mechem Explosives and Drugs Detection System
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	MgM	People Against Mines, Germany
CRMAO	Central Region Mine Action Office	MINARS	Ministry for Assistance and Social Reintegration
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	MONUA	United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola
DA	Dangerous Areas	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
DCA	DanChurch Aid	MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
DDG	Danish Demining Group	MRE	Mine Risk Education
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	MRR&R	Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
DFID	Department for International Development	MSF	Doctors without Borders
DG DEV	European Commission Directorate General for Development	MVMMDS	Mechem Vehicle Mounted Mine Detection System
DG RELEX	European Commission Directorate General for External Relations	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
EC	European Commission	NMAO	National Mine Action Office
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Aid Office	NPA	Norwegian Peoples Aid
EDF	European Development Fund	NSAL	New Sudan Authority on Landmines
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	NSMAD	New Sudan Mine Action Directorate
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
EU	European Union	OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces	OSIL	Operation Save Innocent Lives
FAPLA	Angolan People's Armed Liberation Forces	PAM	World Food Programme
FNLA	Angolan National Liberation Front	PDA	Personnel Digital Assistant
FPDO	Friends of Peace and Development Organisation	PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
FSD	Fondation Suisse de Deminage (same as SFD)	PMAC	Puntland Mine Action Centre
GAC	Child Support Group	PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	QA	Quality Assurance
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	QC	Quality Control
GOA	Government of Angola	RAP	Rapid Assistance Programme
GoNU	Government of National Unity	RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
GoS	Government of Sudan	RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
GoSS	Government of South Sudan	ROLS	Rule of Law and Security
GRN	National Reconstruction Office	RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung	RRP	Relief and Rehabilitation Programme
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission	SAC	Survey Action Center
HI	Handicap International	SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
HPP	Humanitarian Plus Programme	SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
ICMA	Inter-ministerial Committee on Mine Action (Somaliland)	SCBL	Sudan Campaign to ban Landmines
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	SCPP	Somali Civil Protection Programme
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	SFD	Swiss Federation for Demining (same as FSD)
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards	SHA	Suspected Hazardous Area
IMATC	International Mine Action Training Centre	SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action	SIMAS	Sudan Integrated Mine Action Services
INAD	National Demining Institute (in Angola)	SLIRI	Sudan Landmine Information and Response Services
INAROE	National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles and Devices	SLR	Sudan Landmine Response
IND	National Demining Institute (in Mozambique)	SMAC	Somaliland Mine Action Centre
INEA	Instituto Nacional de Estradas de Angola	SNRC	Somali National Reconciliation Conference (adopted a Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic)
JASMAR	Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines	Soba	Traditional chief in Angola



SOP	Standard Operating Procedure	UNDP/BCPR	UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement	UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Spot UXO	Isolated UXO which does not impact a community even though it poses a possible threat	UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistic Command
SRCS	Somali Red Crescent Society	UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office
SRRC	Sudan Relief and Reconciliation Council	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN)	UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
SSDC	Southern Sudan Demining Commission	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
SSRMAO	Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Office	USD	United States Dollar
STABEX	Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation	UTA	Technical and Administrative Unit
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation	UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
TA	Technical Advisor	VA	Victim Assistance
TFG	Transitional Federal Government	VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund (of the UN)
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission	VVAF	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
UNCCAS	UN Common Country Assessment	WFP	World Food Programme
UNDG	United Nations Development Group	Xeer	Somali customary law
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	YEMAC	Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre



## 1. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO ANGOLA

### INTRODUCTION

This report provides the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from an evaluation of EC-funded mine action activities in Angola. This evaluation is part of a broader regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Africa, the focus of which is on policy, strategy, and programming rather than performance in implementing individual projects. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are appended as Annex 1 of the overall report.

The Angola component of the regional evaluation is based on the findings of a mission by Vera Bohle and Pamela Rebelo<sup>2</sup> to Luanda from 28 March to 04 April 2007, coupled with a review of documents. The Evaluation Team benefited greatly from the excellent support provided by the EC delegation in Luanda, and by the technical advisor to UTA, the national authorising office for EDF funds (under the Ministry of Planning).

As Angola is one of the biggest EC mine action programmes worldwide, a focus needed to be made to some sectors due to limited time and resources for the evaluation. The evaluation focused on the demining<sup>3</sup> and the capacity building components, as these represent the bulk of EC mine action funding to Angola.

### BACKGROUND

Angola is a huge, sparsely populated country – bigger than France, Spain and Portugal combined, but with an estimated population of only 16 million people. Following a long struggle, it achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, but then suffered from continuing conflict for most of the period until 2002. Rich in oil, diamonds, and other natural resources, Angola has experienced rapid economic growth since the conflict ended, and the government has now shifted from emergency post-conflict measures to large reconstruction and development investments. However, most Angolans remain extremely poor and still lack access to basic public services. Average life expectancy at birth is only 41 years (lower than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa); under-five child mortality is 260 per 1,000 live births (the second highest rate in the world); almost half of Angola's children suffer from malnutrition; and less than 20% of the population has access to electricity. Income distribution – already among the most unequal in the world – appears to be increasing.<sup>4</sup> While in part, these problems are legacies of conflict, corruption hampers progress – Angola is viewed as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 147 out of 179 countries in the Transparency International index for 2007.

### ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION

The landmine and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)<sup>5</sup> contamination in Angola stems from:

- 1961-1975 struggle for independence: Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and its military branch Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA), União Nacional para a Independência Total da Angola (UNITA) and Frente

<sup>2</sup> Vera Bohle is Evaluation and Disarmament Specialist in the GICHD; Pamela Rebelo is a Consultant to the GICHD.

<sup>3</sup> Demining comprises survey, marking, and clearance.

<sup>4</sup> During the 1990s, Angola's Gini coefficient rose from 0.54 to 0.62 (a higher number means greater inequality) – significantly higher even than other African oil producers with acknowledged inequality problems: Nigeria (0.51) and Cameroon (0.44).

<sup>5</sup> ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO).



Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) against Portugal.<sup>6</sup> Independence was achieved on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1975.

- 1976-1989 – civil war between UNITA and the MPLA government. UNITA was supported by the U.S., South Africa and some other Western countries; MPLA by the Soviet Union, Cuba and some other Eastern Block countries, as well as by the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC). Following the New York Accords (1988) and the Bicesse Accords (1991), foreign forces (officially) left the country, monitored by the UN (UNAVEM I and II).
- 1992-1994 – UNITA against MPLA, with involvement of mercenaries. Fighting ended following the November 1994 Lusaka peace accords, monitored by UNAVEM III, followed by MONUA (1997).
- 1998-2002 – UNITA against MPLA, with involvement of mercenaries. Fighting ended with the February 2002 death of Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, and peace has prevailed since.

Angola's complex history of conflict resulted in the death of one million people and the displacement of millions of others, particularly from rural areas. The conflict also led to the destruction and deterioration of the country's transportation infrastructure, and to extensive contamination by landmines and other ERW. Military operations were undertaken by the three Angolan liberation movements (FNLA, UNITA and MPLA) as well as by the Namibian SWAPO and the South African ANC, plus four conventional armies (Portugal, South Africa, Cuba, and Angola – for a considerable time UNITA also operated conventional military operations). Support to the warring factions came from cold war backers (USA; Cuba, USSR/Eastern Europe and China) and from neighbouring countries (South Africa, Zaire and Zambia in particular). The major factions also had access to substantial natural resource revenues (the Angolan army from oil and UNITA from diamonds) enabling them to purchase vast quantities of arms.

The different factions in Angola had regional power bases. After independence, MPLA remained in control of Luanda and the central parts of Angola, UNITA (with support of the South African army) was strong in the East (Moxico Province, with the capital Luena) and in the South, while FNLA was based in Uíge and Zaire provinces in the North.<sup>7</sup> Almost all provinces saw conflict for at least some periods – only Luanda, Namibe, the southern part of Huila and the Cabinda enclave were not directly affected. Millions of people sought refuge in neighbouring countries or were internally displaced.<sup>8</sup>

The conflict featured both guerrilla operations and conventional warfare with pitched battles, leaving a legacy of unrecorded minefields of various patterns. Government and Cuban forces laid defensive minefields around military installations and population centres, and used mines to protect infrastructure (bridges, power lines, etc.). UNITA and other factions mined roads and the approaches to their bases. In addition, there was widespread mine-laying during fights for control of provincial capitals. Hard-to-detect minimum metal mines were often used.

<sup>6</sup> A separatist movement also appeared in the Cabinda region (*Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda - FLEC*).

<sup>7</sup> These geographic power bases reflect, in turn, ethnic divisions. The MPLA draws its support from the Mbundu; UNITA from the Ovimbundu; and FNLA from the Bacongo.

<sup>8</sup> Through the decades of war, Angola had one of the highest percentages in the worlds of IDPs (30.7% of the population, compared to Sierra Leone 20% and Sudan and Bosnia 13%).



The most up-to-date assessment of the contamination is the Angola Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS, conducted between 2004 and 2007). To date, data has been collected from 96% of the settlements in Angola (23,089 of 24,032), and from 17 of the 18 provinces (only Cabinda province, the enclave in the North, remains). Moxico and the central highlands (Planalto, including Huambo, Bie and parts of Kwanza Sul, Benguela and Huila provinces) are most affected. Moxico is also the major transit area for the return of refugees. The results are summarized in Table 1 gives the types of socio-economic blockages in the impacted communities and the percentage of the total blockages in Angola by category.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 1 – Angola LIS Results, by province**

Province	Total Localities	Localities Impacted				Population Impacted	SHAs	Recent Victims
		High	Medium	Low	Total			
Bié	2,825	1	60	221	282	334,724	443	58
Kwanza Sul	1,997	5	34	130	169	200,060	269	30
Huambo	2,938	2	33	118	153	272,597	206	15
Benguela	1,807	4	17	106	127	151,490	190	20
Kunene	426	0	7	119	126	213,970	160	7
Malanje	1,867	4	36	48	88	126,396	165	26
Huíla	1,863	1	9	62	72	93,357	108	13
Kwanza Norte	815	3	22	39	64	108,052	125	18
Lunda Norte	1,058	2	5	23	30	30,673	45	25
Luanda	291	0	1	1	2	8,537	2	0
Kuando Kubango	886	0	30	141	171	398,952	325	6
Lunda Sul	735	0	32	41	73	67,909	152	7
Namibe	419	0	1	2	3	6,560	11	0
Zaire	741	0	9	57	66	48,968	105	0
Moxico	1,670	14	107	169	290	176,978	522	111
Uíge	2,208	0	16	145	161	124,443	281	1
Bengo	540	0	7	67	74	80,633	115	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23,086</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>1489</b>	<b>1951</b>	<b>2,444,299</b>	<b>3224</b>	<b>337</b>

**Table 2 – Socio-economic blockages (from Angola LIS)**

Asset blocked	Number	Percentage
Rain-fed agriculture	1,181	30.2%
Non-agriculture	819	20.9%
Pasture	689	17.6%
Roads	337	8.6%
Infrastructure	317	8.1%
Other water	154	3.9%
Housing	132	3.4%
Potable water	130	3.3%

<sup>9</sup> All data are from the ALIS provided by the IMSMA officer of CNIDAH. The ALIS was conducted mainly by international NGOs that already were in place and had significant knowledge of Angola. Still, there were communication difficulties and the data are considered incomplete by some international NGOs. In Cunene for example, the data collected over many years by MgM was not used by the ALIS teams.



Asset blocked	Number	Percentage
Irrigated agriculture	103	2.6%
Paths	49	1.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,911</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

In addition, landmines are one of the impediments to the already much delayed elections in Angola. (Legislative elections are now planned for 2008 and presidential elections in 2009, with a national census in 2010.)

**Table 3 – Recent victims, by province**

Province	Year			Grand Total
	2004	2005	2006 to date	
Moxico	85	26	0	111
Bié	3	55	0	58
Malanje	26	0	0	26
Kwanza Sul	26	4	0	30
Lunda Norte	4	21	0	25
Benguela	20	0	0	20
Kwanza Norte	0	18	0	18
Huambo	15	0	0	15
Huíla	11	2	0	13
Kunene	5	2	0	7
Lunda Sul	0	5	2	7
Kuando Kubango	0	0	5	5
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>195</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>335</b>

The ALIS has significantly lowered the estimate of the contamination,<sup>10</sup> making the problem appear more manageable. Further reductions can be expected through surveys of individual suspected hazard areas (SHA) and communities.

The ALIS provides adequate data to facilitate operations planning and to improve the effectiveness of mine action operations (demining and MRE), but should not be used as the only source of information when setting priorities, as an LIS is not well designed to analyse contamination on roads,<sup>11</sup> or to incorporate development plans. As well, it is unlikely the data are complete for unpopulated areas and when many refugees have not yet returned.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> From more than 400,000 km<sup>2</sup> (35% of the country), as estimated by the UN in the Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2005, to between 1,239 km<sup>2</sup> and 207 km<sup>2</sup> (upper and lower bounds, respectively) – a reduction of between 99.7% and 99.9%!

<sup>11</sup> Nearly 30% of all mine and ERW related accidents occur on roads, but due to the nature of an LIS, these accidents are classified by community.

<sup>12</sup> This is particularly true for Cuando Cubango. After the big battles in 1988 and other times, it is safe to assume that the province is highly contaminated with mines and ERW. However, it appears as low priority in the ALIS because not many people live in the area (perhaps due to fear of contamination). In addition, Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe plan to create a regional game park, which would include parts of Cuando Cubango.



## HISTORY OF MINE ACTION

### Operations

Mine action started during the “quasi-peace” following the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accord. Until now, most demining has been carried out by the following international NGOs (INGOs): HALO Trust has operated in Angola since 1994 with a focus on the Planalto provinces of Bie, Huambo and Benguela. In 2003, the programme expanded to Cuando Cubango. Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has operated in Angola since 1995 and led a country-wide survey in 1995 and 1996 in addition to clearance and MRE activities. Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) started in 1996, with a focus on mechanical clearance in the south of Angola. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has operated in Angola since 1995, but significantly expanded operations from 2003. It focuses on Moxico and the surrounding provinces. The Italian NGO Intersos started in 1997 with technical advisors for INAROE (see below) and later established its own mine action teams. Intersos ceased demining operations in 2007. Danish Church Aid (DCA) has in recent years been operating in Moxico. In addition, Santa Barbara Foundation (SBF) conducted demining operations in earlier years.

International NGOs have, apparently, been successful in the establishment and support of national NGOs for MRE. This success has not been replicated in demining.<sup>13</sup> INTERSOS built-up the national NGO AJOSEPA, but then had problems itself. The viability of AJOSEPA is also questionable if no national funds are to be allocated to NGO operators.<sup>14</sup>

As is the case in many other countries where they are well established, some of the international demining NGOs remain protective about their independence and are sometimes viewed by the GOA as a law unto themselves. In a number of cases, however, they have forged effective working relationships with provincial vice governors. As well, the INGOs generally incorporate the views of communities when developing their task priorities.

In addition to the international NGOs, the South African company Mechem worked on verification of approximately 4,000 km of primary road network in 1995/6 on behalf of the UN (Mechem was subcontracted by the American company Ronco). Mechem also carried out some contract demining for international development and emergency organisations in the 1990s.

The establishment in 1995 of the Instituto Angolano de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenhos Explosivos (INAROE)<sup>15</sup> was an initial attempt to develop a local mine action capacity (as well as a national mine action authority). The project started to fail in 1997-98.

Between 1994 and 1998, attempts were made to conduct Level One surveys. NPA<sup>16</sup> visited almost 2000 sites in thirteen provinces and prepared fifteen provincial survey reports that

<sup>13</sup> Demining usually is more complex than MRE. But perhaps more fundamentally, demining organisations need significant amounts of equipment and funding, which create adverse incentives. It is difficult for an international NGO or donor to clarify in advance that managers of a local NGO are (i) capable and (ii) truly committed to the public good rather than their own gain. While it might be justifiable to risk comparatively small amounts for the implementation of MRE activities by a local NGO, having a local NGO engage in demining risks far more funds (as well as the safety of deminers and the public).

<sup>14</sup> The procedures to receive international funds are often too complex for local NGOs.

<sup>15</sup> Decree 14/95 of 26 May.

<sup>16</sup> Landmine Survey Programme. Provincial Report Summaries Uige, Bengo, Kuanza Norte, Malange, Benguela. April 1997. This report also analyzed the characteristics of the various conflict periods and the origins of munitions.



included survey information from HALO, MAG and CARE in three provinces.<sup>17</sup> The initial surveys identified a landmine threat in 35% of the country, but this was an educated guess due to access problems (UNITA in particular was hesitant to allow entry to areas it controlled). The technical quality of the survey was, however, good, and the data are still used.

The Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (INAD) was established from the remains of INAROE as a national mine action operator in 2003.<sup>18</sup> INAD is a public agency intended to focus on ‘demining activities required for the implementation of socio-economic projects’, but it also competes for some commercial contracts. Other public operators are the Angolan Army (FAA) and the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN),<sup>19</sup> which focus on demining support to major infrastructure projects, such as the Benguela railway project.<sup>20</sup> As well, there are a number of local demining firms.<sup>21</sup>

In 2005, 6.9 km<sup>2</sup> of land was cleared of mines, battle area clearance was done on 0.04 km<sup>2</sup>, and 16.9 km<sup>2</sup> was released via area reduction. Outputs appear even lower in 2006. Given the ALIS identified between 1,292 km<sup>2</sup> and 207 km<sup>2</sup> of suspected hazard area, it will take 30-50 years to eliminate the problem at current rates of progress.<sup>22</sup> However, the Government of Angola (GOA) has plans to train and equip 43 demining brigades (about 3,000 personnel) in FAA, GRN, and INAD and to develop a significant mechanical clearance capacity.<sup>23</sup> Angolan authorities now estimate that clearance of high and medium priority areas will require 6-8 years to complete, and the other areas can be significantly reduced through area reduction techniques.

### Policy, Coordination, and Oversight

Recognising that INAROE was ineffective, in 2001 the GOA established the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH)<sup>24</sup> as the national mine action authority. CNIDAH reports to the Council of Ministers and has overall responsibility for policy development, strategic planning, coordination and supervision of demining (including quality assurance and control – QA/QC), mine risk education (MRE), and victim assistance. CNIDAH had little capacity until 2003, when donor support was secured (mainly EC contributions).<sup>25</sup> UNDP supports CNIDAH with five technical advisors in Luanda and six field advisors, all EC funded. Originally the project was due to end in December 2006, but has been extended with additional funding for 2007 and 2008.

After the war ended in 2002, UNOCHA played a strong role coordinating emergency aid in the

<sup>17</sup> In 1995, a mine survey component was also included in the UN Angola Verification Mission Number 3 (UNAVEM III), but the results were never registered in the central database.

<sup>18</sup> Decree no. 121/03 of 21 November 2003.

<sup>19</sup> GRN is setting up a demining capacity in support of reconstruction, directly under the control of the President.

<sup>20</sup> International NGOs are excluded from commercial tenders. The quality of clearance of FAA and the demining firms has been questioned by international NGOs, after missed mine incidents.

<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, there are rumours that government mine action officials have financial interests in some of these firms.

<sup>22</sup> The 1,239 km<sup>2</sup> estimate is for suspected hazard area (SHA). Detailed surveys will reduce these areas significantly, releasing much of the land as safe without full clearance. The 207 km<sup>2</sup> estimate is based on an extrapolation of how much SHA has been released as safe by HALO Trust, so presumably all this will require clearance.

<sup>23</sup> Ten tillers and 4 light flails.

<sup>24</sup> The Commission includes the Ministries of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS, as chair), Defence, Agriculture, Health, Labour, Transport, and Planning, plus the Angolan Armed Forces. It has sub-commissions on mine clearance and on victim assistance.

<sup>25</sup> Initially the office set-up and training were funded, then the focus turned to expansion into the provinces. A key project was the EC-UNDP co-funded “Mine Action in Angola 2005 to 2006: Consolidation of the National Mine Action Authority’s Capacity at National and Provincial Levels.”



provinces. This included mine action, as CNIDAH was not yet operational. Now CNIDAH is well equipped and has established 17 provincial operative rooms, linked to the provincial administration. The provincial Vice-Governors are responsible for mine action, and establish provincial strategies. Mine action priorities are decided in a joint approach between the provincial governments, CNIDAH and the INGOs, and this process seems to work effectively in at least some provinces.

CNIDAH still has problems due to shortages of technical personnel (the majority of staff are administrative), and weaknesses in the QA/QC function. In 2006-07, 39 staff were trained for QA, but they are not yet operational for administrative reasons. Once the new staff start, they will still need on-the-job experience to conduct adequate QA/QC activities. QA/QC is still considered the major shortcoming of CNIDAH.<sup>26</sup> Less critically but still a problem is that CNIDAH has not always been supportive of the international NGOs in terms of facilitating visas, entry of equipment, etc.

More recently, the Comissao Executiva de Desminagem (CED) was established in December 2005. CED falls under the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS), but its role is restricted to operations planning to coordinate the three national mine action operators – INAD, FAA, and GRN. CED consists of representatives of the three bodies. It receives support from the EC in form of a one international technical advisor (TA) for management and two national technical advisor for information and training.

In September 2006, the Council of Ministers approved a 2006-2011 National Mine Action Strategic Plan. National mine action standards (NMAS) based on IMAS have also been adopted, but as yet there are no NMAS for the critical tasks of road clearance or land release.

Angola signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBT) on 4 December 1997, and ratified it on 5 July 2002. Treaty obligations include clearance of all known minefields by 2012, and destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines before December 2007. The EC funded a stockpile destruction project (1.5 million Euro, through UNDP) from January 2005 until April 2007. The project is reported to have achieved its objective in April 2007, which means Angola has met the APMBT deadline.

## Capacity Development

There remain questions concerning future support to capacity development for mine action. In many ways, the mine action programme in Angola is quite well established, but support to the development of capacities within, first, INAROE, and, subsequently, CNIDAH and INAD have been less effective than intended. Part of the difficulties seem to stem from an unwillingness on the part of those organisations to acknowledge performance shortcomings. However, UNDP has also had problems: initially, it fielded some inappropriate technical advisors; subsequently, there was an extended gap before a new TA was recruited. An evaluation of the UNDP-CNIDAH capacity building project in 2005 was very negative, but saw faults on both sides.<sup>27</sup> As a result, CNIDAH does not yet have the dynamism and capacity it should have, and the mix of staff skills remains inappropriate (there are not enough technical staff).

<sup>26</sup> Another major problem are the reports that senior CNIDAH officials own or have interests in demining companies, which means the process of accrediting operators may lack credibility.

<sup>27</sup> The EC had requested the evaluation because the project had many problems, and there was a need to identify a second phase of support. More generally, there seem to be difficulties in cooperation between the EC and UNDP (e.g. financial and proposal procedures etc), a theme that might be the topic of a separate evaluation.



The GOA typically insists on the use of Portuguese language in its dealings with the international community. While this policy has many merits, it does create problems – particularly for capacity development – for fields such as mine action in which English is firmly established as the common language.

### Conclusions on the History of Mine Action

Mine action in Angola started as soon as there were opportunities. In a very difficult environment, mine action has achieved tangible results, mainly due to the work of INGOs to this point in time. At the current rate of progress, clearance or release of all recorded SHA will take 30-50 years, but high and medium priorities should be cleared within 5-6 years.

After a false start in the mid-1990s, the institutional framework for a national programme has largely been put into place, although some confusion remains concerning the specific roles of the various organs.<sup>28</sup> Legislation to clarify the roles of all national organs has been promised but not yet enacted. There still remain concerns about CNIDAH's capacity to effectively discharge its responsibilities, particularly in relation to QA and accreditation.

There appears to be growing commitment by the GOA to tackle the contamination problem, but it only finances public sector operators which focus on the national reconstruction programme. International agencies do not have a clear picture of the capability of Angola's public sector demining organisations (INAD, FAA, and GRN). INGOs are welcome to continue operations, and still provide most of the demining for 'humanitarian' purposes.

UNDP is engaged in capacity building, and UNICEF in MRE. In the earlier post-conflict emergency phase, OCHA played a coordinating role in the provinces.

### FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

International donors contributed \$21 million in 2003, \$28 million in 2004, and over \$35 million in 2005 to mine action in Angola. Besides the EC, donors in the mine action sector include Japan, U.S.A. (including State Department funds for testing equipment<sup>29</sup>), Norway, the U.K., the Netherlands, Finland, and Germany, as well as about ten other countries and private foundations.

Coordination among donors is limited to occasional meetings to exchange information. The GOA views such meetings negatively and complains that donors do not provide sufficient information about what they are funding. There appears to be no regular GOA-donor communication mechanism for aid in general or for mine action in particular.

### EC SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The EC Delegation has reported that it committed spent € 60 million on mine action between 2003 and 2007,<sup>30</sup> making it the largest donor and, in the Delegation's view, giving it opportunities for policy dialogue with national authorities. However, the list of mine action projects the Delegation provided only sums to € 42.1 million. In addition, the evaluation team has

<sup>28</sup> For example, the role of CED relative to CNIDAH remains unclear.

<sup>29</sup> The US delegation said they are also developing a capacity building programme for CNIDAH for both victim assistance and QA/QC.

<sup>30</sup> Information from: Report of J.G.Ferreira, Angola EC Delegation Chief, to E. Landaburu, RELEX Director, 7 February 2007.



records of four projects funded by ECHO in 2003 and 2004, totalling over € 1.9 million, giving a grand total of about € 44 million.

**Table 4 – List of EC-funded mine action projects in Angola (amounts in € millions)**

<b>APL Thematic Budget Line (€ 3.8 million), of which</b>			<b>€ 3.8</b>
	2004-05 SAC LIS	€ 1.5	
	2005 HI victim assistance	0.8	
	2005-06 UNDP stockpile destruction	1.5	
<b>8<sup>th</sup> EDF, of which</b>			<b>€ 7.0</b>
	Demining through NGOs	€ 6.0	
	2003-04 UNDP capacity building CNIDAH	1.0	
<b>9<sup>th</sup> EDP (09.ACP.ANG.002), of which</b>			<b>€26.3</b>
	Mine clearance	€ 15.0	
	UNDP institutional support CNIDAH	2.7	
	UNDP rapid response fund	2.0	
	WFP bridge construction	4.0	
	Secondary road reconstruction/inspection	2.0	
	Technical advisor	0.6	
<b>9<sup>th</sup> EDP (09.ACP.ANG.021), of which</b>			<b>€ 5.0</b>
	UNDP institutional support CNIDAH	€ 0.7	
	Clearance MgM Bengo/Kwanza Sul	1.4	
	Clearance HALO Trust Beng/Huam/Bie/KK	2.0	
	TA for CED	0.3	
	not yet allocated?	0.6	
<b>Total of list from EC Delegation</b>			<b>€ 42.1</b>
plus 4 ECHO projects in 2003-04			1.9
<b>Grand total</b>			<b>€ 44.0</b>

International operators consider it an advantage that EC contracts are not too strict about tasking and allow switching from one site to another because objectives are specified in quite broad terms in the funding agreements. This is appropriate given the fact that the international demining NGOs have been working in fairly remote areas in a vast country, and their activities cannot be monitored in detail by either CNIDAH or the EC.

#### **Textbox 1 – Discretion in demining**

Prolonged conflicts have lasting effects on societies, in part because the rule of law breaks down, opening the door to corruption. Understandably, donor officials are wary of corruption, and their decisions concerning which organisations to fund reflect this “risk aversion”, as well as their perceptions concerning competence, costs, national ownership, and so on. One researcher<sup>7</sup> has put forward a simple “corruption formula” as follows:

$$\text{monopoly} + \text{discretion} \text{ minus } \text{accountability} = \text{corruption}$$

Thus, a useful way of analysing the risk of corruption is to consider the amount of discretion left to organisations with a monopoly (e.g. the only demining operator in a province), as well as the mechanisms in place to make such organisations account for how they have used the resources provided to them. In demining for example, the principal types of discretion (and the associated risks or corruption or malfeasance) are:

1. Discretion in setting task priorities (e.g. which land will be cleared first) – there is a danger that clearance decisions will reflect private interests rather than the public good;



2. Discretion in reporting (e.g. on quantities of land cleared) – if demining organisations are paid on the basis of areas cleared, there are risks they will claim to have cleared more than they have in fact done, or will clear larger areas than are required
3. Discretion in the quality of clearance (e.g. whether SOPs and national standards are followed completely) – if demining organisations are paid or judged on the basis of areas cleared, there is a risk they will take shortcuts to increase productivity, magnifying the risk to deminers and civilians.
4. Discretion in techniques – if demining organisations are paid for the area cleared but not the area ‘released’ as safe, they may clear the entire area listed as a suspected hazard area (SHA) even though further investigation would have shown at far less cost that most of the SHA was not contaminated.

When would these types of discretion not be a great concern? Obviously, corruption risks are minimal when some appropriate authority sets the demining priorities, the area of each task can be clearly defined, and the quality of clearance operations can be monitored readily. When these conditions are present, the best way to allocate demining work is via competitive tender – competition will keep costs down, while tasks, areas, and quality standards can be defined in a contract and easily enforced. Such a process might be appropriate for the reconstruction of major roads and bridges. The areas to be demined are clearly defined (the length of road times the width required from the centre line). The responsibility for monitoring can be left to the prime contractor, as this firm will have to bear significant costs if its work crews are delayed by missed mines or UXO, so it will closely monitor the quality of demining (and may even engage a specialist QA firm to do this).

In countries such as Angola, this neat solution often cannot be employed. There are many SHAs in many communities, so it is unclear how best to set priorities. Many of the SHAs are ill defined in area, so it is folly to pay based on area cleared. Many of the impacted communities are remote, making monitoring of clearance quality both difficult and expensive.

In such a situation, some donors will only fund demining organisations which are “inherently trustworthy” such as well-established international NGOs. These are not motivated by profit, but more importantly they live on their reputations – without continued support from donors and, ultimately, their members, international NGOs have no means of sustaining themselves. They must protect their reputations and will take care both in task selection and the quality of clearance. As well, the typical contracting arrangement will be a grant agreement to pay for an agreed set of assets for a period of time – rather than a contract to clear specified tasks, which (first) would be difficult to monitor and (second) would add an incentive that would reward higher productivity, perhaps at the risk of reduced safety standards.

While international NGOs perform valuable roles in mine action, it still would be ideal if local people identified the priorities and if the demining tasks could be assigned by competitive tenders, both to get the lowest price and to encourage the growth of local operators. National Mine Action authorities are established in large part to create local systems for establishing priorities and, then, to hold individual operators to account by undertaking QA activities. However, local systems for establishing priorities may not be transparent (i.e. some individual or organisation still has significant discretion and little accountability), and QA regulations replace some forms of discretion with new ones, specifically:

5. Discretion in enforcing regulations – staff in the national authority could abuse their authority by, say, demanding bribes before awarding licenses or clearance certificates;
6. Discretion in setting the regulations – the national authority could set unreasonable or ill-defined standards precisely to create more opportunities for soliciting bribes or, say, for favouring national firms over foreign organisations.

Thus, while the ideal is for legitimate national authorities to set priorities and for tasks to be



assigned by competitive tender, it is difficult to reach this ideal. Lack of knowledge of the extent of SHAAs plus difficulties in monitoring work in remote areas means many donors will prefer to fund “trustworthy” international NGOs. Missing or poorly written Mine Action legislation, standards, and SOPs leave too much discretion in the hands of local officials, and donors or local citizens may be unable to monitor the decisions of such officials where accountability mechanisms are weak.

\* Robert Klitgaard. See for example *Combating Corruption*, United Nations Chronicle, online edition, available at <<http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/1998/issue1/0198p90p.html>>

\*\* A Study of Local Organisations in Mine Action, forthcoming, GICHD, Geneva

Such approaches are common during periods of emergency because operators must be responsive to emergencies (e.g. movements of refugees; the need to support delivery of humanitarian aid) and there are few data available for setting priorities in a more proactive fashion. This situation has changed significantly now, and it should be expected that most priorities are determined in a more strategic and transparent fashion based on socio-economic criteria. The engagement by the EC Delegation of an independent technical monitor for mine action allows better monitoring of NGO activities, which is appropriate.<sup>31</sup> But it also is important for the INGOs to devise systems for reporting on socio-economic *outcomes* as well as simply *outputs*. The evaluations of the projects completed this year would have been good indicators of how much progress has been achieved in this regard, but most of these were not available at the time of the mission. However, an analysis of one available evaluation suggests that much more needs to be learned in terms of documenting the developmental results of mine action projects.

## Conclusions on funding

There is significant funding for mine action in Angola including support for the development of national capacities.

The EC is the biggest donor for mine action in Angola, with funding coming mainly from the EDF, but with contributions as well from the thematic budget line and via ECHO. Because of the size of its mine action portfolio, the EC has retained a technical monitor, which has proved to be useful and appreciated (the NGOs particularly appreciate the monitor’s support in meeting the EC’s reporting requirements).

The GOA appears to be making significant financial commitments to mine action, but the precise sums are not known, particularly for FAA.

There is no systematic donor coordination in the mine action sector, nor a government structure to coordinate foreign aid more generally.

## CURRENT SITUATION

The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi ushered-in the longest period of sustained peace in decades, and has allowed the government to continue its transition (initiated in 1987) from a highly centralised command economy. However, the government still dominates the economy (in part because of the substantial revenues flowing to it from oil and diamonds) and decentralisation – so critical in a huge, diverse country such as Angola – has been hampered by profound capacity

<sup>31</sup> This is particularly important in countries such as Angola where the official quality assurance mechanism does not function yet.



constraints outside a few major cities, coupled with the lack of clear policies.<sup>32</sup> As well, plans for elections have repeatedly been delayed and are now scheduled for 2008 (for the legislature) and 2009 (presidential elections).

Angola's economy is growing robustly<sup>33</sup> and the medium term prognosis for both economic growth and government finances is positive. The Government's ambitious post-war reconstruction programme can be financed largely by its share of rising oil revenues,<sup>34</sup> the gradual recovery of diamond production, and lines of credit from China. However, implementation of the reconstruction programme has been hampered by capacity constraints – according to IMF data, only half the budgeted public investment programme was spent in 2006. As well, the GOA has not been investing in agriculture, which could have catastrophic consequences for rural households as the reconstruction of roads and railways opens access to the interior.

### Textbox 2 – Roads and Rural Development in Angola

The World Bank's recent Country Economic Memorandum highlights the dangers to agriculture and rural livelihoods in a major oil-producing country such as Angola. While improved transportation links often benefit farmers by reducing their input costs and enhancing their access to urban markets, in Angola's case these benefits will be more-than-offset by the competition from cheap imports. Oil revenues have boosted Angola's exchange rate, making imports cheaper in local-currency terms and making many Angolan products uncompetitive in export markets (this is termed the 'Dutch disease').

*The typical overvaluation of the currency in real terms observed in oil-rich countries can be a major disaster for the agricultural sector. In Angola, for example, every farmer wishing to produce maize for the coastal urban market has been effectively taxed by the real appreciation of the Kwanza, especially over the past 2 years. Casual evidence indicates that they may not be competitive with imports at current exchange rates, but that they enjoy some de facto protection in the interior due to the extremely poor roads. It is thus clear that once the logistical infrastructure is rehabilitated, the rural farm production will have to compete with cheap imported goods and tradable commodities, such as cereals. In this case, a possible way to prevent widespread depression in the agricultural sector is by rapidly increasing its competitiveness... The key question, however, is whether productivity gains can be large enough to offset the disadvantages posed by the strong currency... (p. 97)*

The Bank points out that there is significant potential for increasing agricultural productivity as Angola has large areas of fertile land with adequate rainfall.\*\* But significant investment is needed now before farming households are driven into destitution and retreat into subsistence agriculture. Unfortunately, the GOA has budgeted little for agriculture\* and, even worse, the Ministry of Finance has not released all the budgeted amounts to the Ministry of Agriculture, so salaries consume almost all the funds that are made available.

\* In 2004, just 0.64% of the national budget and less than 2% of the Public Investment Programme. (p. 98)

\*\* "At independence, Angola was self-sufficient in food production, the largest staple food exporter in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the world's biggest coffee exporters." (AfDB/OECD, 2007, p. 5)

<sup>32</sup> The government did adopt a National Strategy for Decentralization in 2001, but has not determined many critical issues such as the divisions of expenditure responsibilities and revenue allocations among the different levels of government.

<sup>33</sup> Real GDP grew by 18.6% in 2006 and a further rise of 31% is projected for 2007 (Preliminary Conclusions from the IMF Article IV Consultations, 6 June 2007).

<sup>34</sup> Oil accounts for an estimated 56% of GDP, up from 49% in 2003. Income from oil and diamonds accounts for about 75% of government revenues.



The GOA prepared a draft *Estratégia de Combate à Pobreza (ECP)*<sup>35</sup> in 2003 (for 2004-07). However, the GOA did not anticipate the huge rise in oil prices and has submitted to the World Bank and IMF a revised and more ambitious draft ECP covering 2006-2008. This proposes a public expenditure program focusing on priorities ranging from reintegration of ex-combatants, food security and rural development, the restoration of social services and infrastructure, and strengthening governance and economic management.

Demining is explicitly mentioned in both strategy papers as a general priority. For the next three-to-four years, demining will remain a key issue for the GOA, with funds earmarked within the MINARS budget.<sup>36</sup>

## OVERALL PLANS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In spite of the massive increases in the government's financial capacity, donors have continued to provide significant amounts of aid, averaging over \$550 million from 2001-05. In large part this is in recognition of the country's need to recover from its long conflicts, plus the extensive poverty that exists in Angola. However, growing government revenues coupled by significant export credits and direct investment from China mean the donor community has modest leverage. Regardless, some donors may keep their aid programmes running to avoid jeopardizing the interests of their country's firms, particularly given the rapid growth in Chinese investment.

Angola is no longer in an emergency phase, but is not yet achieved 'normal' development status. For example, the World Bank still uses an Interim Strategy Note (ISN, covering only one year) rather than a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, covering three years).

## EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA

The overall EU objectives in Angola include:<sup>37</sup>

- Regular political dialogue;
- Assist GOA to strengthen democratic institutions and practices, and to hold free and fair elections;
- Provide assistance to develop pluralistic democracy, foster dynamic participatory civil society and reinforce overall administrative capacity;
- Assist GOA efforts to reform the economy through co-operation with the IMF and the fight against corruption;
- Encourage and assist GoA in its efforts to prepare a PRSP;
- Contribute to efforts to improve the humanitarian situation;
- Assist GOA in reconstruction;
- Encourage GOA to convene an international donors' conference;
- Promote peace and conflict resolution in Angola and the region;
- Poverty alleviation;
- Rule of law;

<sup>35</sup> This is viewed as an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) by the World Bank and IMF, but was never submitted as a final PRSP by the GOA.

<sup>36</sup> Again however, the Ministry of Finance may not release all funds in the approved budget for spending, so real expenditures on mine action will not be clear until the reports from the public auditors on public expenditures are available.

<sup>37</sup> Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, 13 October 2003.



- Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD).

### Textbox 3 – The EU Policy on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

The concept of LRRD originates from the 1980s in response to concerns about the “grey zone” between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development. The instruments and working methods used in these different types of assistance programmes differ in time frames, implementing partners, the role of national authorities, and the content of interventions.

In 1996, the EC developed a basic rationale for LRRD.\* It was acknowledged that short-term relief mechanisms do not and, in some cases, cannot systematically take into account long-term development issues. At the same time, development policy should better assist countries to deal with natural disasters, conflicts and other crises. These deficiencies could be reduced if relief and development were appropriately linked, which is not simply a matter of ensuring a smooth transition from emergency to development assistance; rather, it includes disaster preparedness and preventing/resolving conflicts.

There is no unique model for LRRD. Broad recommendations include: improved donor coordination; adjustment of the EU’s own instruments, working methods and internal mechanisms; avoiding parallel structures for relief and development in a country; and clarifying who is responsible for what.

Demining is mentioned in various contexts in the LRRD documents,\*\* which stress the need to integrate mine action into post-conflict planning and the wider development context.

In theory, LRRD can be promoted within EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP), which analyse all aid-relevant aspects in a country and outline a five year plan (indicative programme). The plan includes aid provided through all EU mechanisms including the EDF, thematic budget lines, ECHO, and the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM).

\* Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM (1996) 153 final of 30.04.1996. See also, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment, COM (2001) 153 final of 23.04.2001

\*\* In the 1996 document under a separate paragraph “The particular case of anti-personnel mines” (p. 8), and as instrument reacting in post-conflict situations (p. 19). The 2001 document also mentions demining under post-conflict situation needs (p. 7), and a separate paragraph on demining stresses the importance of integrating demining within the CSPs (p. 19).

The EC signed the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2002-2007 with Angola in January 2003. The CSP priorities are food security, health and education, but mine action also is mentioned as an issue. Further, the CSP noted that the APL budget line (at the time EUR 13 million for all countries) was insufficient for the scale of Angola’s contamination problem, so additional support was incorporated into the rural development programme to be funded by the EDF.

As outlined earlier, the EC has funded all major components of mine action. Given the size and scope of its assistance to mine action, the Delegation retained a technical advisor to monitor the projects and to support the national authorizing office (UTA is the Portuguese acronym), which has been a bottleneck in approving EDF-funded projects.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>38</sup> The TA to UTA also had a technical field monitoring role for mine action projects. This concept proved to be successful and particularly important in absence of a functioning national quality assurance system.



The mix of EC support for mine action appears relevant in light of Angola's priorities,<sup>39</sup> which included access and circulation; demining in support of major infrastructure projects; and clearance of land and roads for development (and, in the case of roads, elections). As such, the EC has made a significant contribution to the solution of the explosives contamination problem, even though initial funding decisions could not be based on detailed socio-economic impact data and the priorities identified by a Landmine Impact Survey.

Problems occurred in a consortium project in Moxico. The WFP issued contracts for road and bridge construction, and mine action NGOs provided the demining support using their own resources (including MAG, with EC funding). When MAG funding was not continued, the construction programme was delayed. It could only continue once UNHCR provided funding for the demining.<sup>40</sup>

Another problem occurred with the NGO INTERSOS. It became the object of a broader EC investigation, which led to a block of all EC payments to the NGO. This hit INTERSOS in Angola hard. In an effort to protect their salaries, its Angolan staff took all the keys (including those to the explosive stores) and vehicles. INTERSOS is no longer conducting mine action operations in Angola.<sup>41</sup>

The proposals from and, thus, the EC agreements with the INGOs included the attempt to support local capacity building, but this has not proved successful, mainly because INAD seemed to want only equipment, not training. Capacity development has also been a problem with CNIDAH, and the UNDP support to it. (There have been various difficulties, which are further discussed in the analyses section.)

The Evaluation Team also heard concerns about the process by which the proposals for mine action funding are assessed; a lack of clarity was mentioned by one operator as a frustration.<sup>42</sup> However, the EC points out that the selection criteria are publicly available on its website, and that they were in addition discussed with the NGOs in a separate meeting.

The latest round of funding awards to international NGOs specified that they arrange for external evaluations of their mine action projects. At the time of the evaluation mission, most of these evaluations were still outstanding.<sup>43</sup> However, the Evaluation Team obtained a copy of one report, which was further analysed with the result that development aspects were very weak, and more meaningful measures of outcomes would be required.

There will be additional funding for mine action under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, and contracts with HALO and MgM have already been signed. There will also be funding for capacity building support, including technical advisors. The longer term concept is to phase out 'pure' demining and to link mine action with rural and regional development.

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<sup>39</sup> Important points in this regard are the continuity of personnel within the delegation and the existence of a field monitor, who provided first hand information.

<sup>40</sup> In Sudan, WFP applied the lessons learnt from Angola and controlled all funds, including those for demining.

<sup>41</sup> The technical monitor has earlier reported negatively on INTERSOS operations.

<sup>42</sup> The Global Assessment also reported the same problem in other countries.

<sup>43</sup> The concept of a final evaluation was integrated in the proposals and agreements. The NGOs are supposed to arrange it. One NGO reported the allocated funding may not be sufficient to allow a thorough evaluation.



## CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS

In the 2006-2011 mine action strategy,<sup>44</sup> CNIDAH formulated the vision to reduce and regulate the impact of mines and UXO by end 2011. The following strategic goals were specified:

- to significantly reduce the risk to impacted communities and at-risk groups by 2011;
- to support national infrastructure investment and reconstruction through the national mine action program;
- to establish a national mine action capacity that is sustainable after the end of major international assistance; and
- to establish a world-class mine action program in Angola.

In support of the long-term vision, CNIDAH's overall goal for 2007 is "to promote and improve the general level of results, more efficient use of available capabilities, and enhance the safety and quality of operational activities." The enabling objectives are:

- To consolidate CNIDAH as the national mine action authority, efficiently regulating and coordinating the sector, with priority given to completing the landmine impact survey;
- To develop national organisations (INAD, FAA, National Police and NGOs), with priority given to developing the INAD's operational capacity and its Demining School; and
- To support a careful and sustainable expansion of operational capacity, with priority given to promoting improvement in operational output without compromising the safety and quality of the work; resolving problems constraining the operational efficiency of existing capacities; and enhancing coordination at the provincial level and, more generally, within the sector.

This all sounds very sensible as a plan. The question is the degree of commitment, as little progress was made in implementing earlier plans. As well, the Strategic Plan does not appear to be accompanied by a clear financing plan detailing the contributions that would be necessary for implementation from (i) the GOA budget, (ii) reconstruction programme budget, and (iii) international donors. Such a financing plan is an essential tool for monitoring progress in implementing the Strategy, and in the growth in the GOA's contribution to addressing the country's landmine problem. It also is regrettable that key partners such as donors and relevant ministries had little opportunity to participate in the development of the Strategy.

More concretely, the GOA demining entities and local firms conduct demining in support of infrastructure contractors on government-funded<sup>45</sup> rehabilitation projects. The GOA has set up 43 new demining brigades (18 in FAA, 10 in GRN and 15 in INAD), which brings staffing to 3,237 in these three organisations. However, QA is weak and it remains unclear whether any operators beside the INGOs are working to international standards.

There have been protracted discussions between the governments of Switzerland and Angola concerning the use to be made of about \$21 million in funds that had been deposited in Swiss banks by Savimbi. The Swiss proposed the funds be used for mine action. The GOA submitted a proposal to purchase demining machines with it, but without an adequate assessment of the utility

<sup>44</sup> CNIDAH: Mine Action in Angola: 2006-2011 Strategic Plan, Final Version November 2006.

<sup>45</sup> In many cases, the GOA uses concessional loans from China's Export-Import Bank.



of the machines in Angola, and without a proper maintenance package. At the time of the evaluation, the GOA and Switzerland had not agreed on how to spend the money.<sup>46</sup>

In a new development, Angola is included in a proposed regional programme for mine action with the Great Lakes region countries. In cooperation with Zambia and the DRC, mine action coordination and joint programming is to be promoted to increase mine detection, road and area verification capacities, and training.

## ANALYSIS

Angola is often described as a resource-rich but policy-poor country. The Government has shown capability in stabilising the economy, leading to very rapid growth: but as yet there is no national development vision and plan to translate that growth into improved wellbeing for the majority of regions and people in the country. Buoyant government revenues and large loans from China mean the international community has only modest leverage in terms of ‘policy dialogue’ and transparency, in spite of significant flows of development assistance.

The Government has launched a large infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction programme, which will open the interior and, potentially, create new opportunities for rural residents. However, new roads and railways will also mean competition from imported goods, which will appear cheap in local currency terms because of the appreciation of the kwanza due to high oil revenues. Without efforts to enhance agricultural and agro-processing productivity, the rural economy could be devastated, destroying the livelihoods of many people in mine-affected communities.

The Government has also announced a decentralisation strategy, but has made only fitful progress in implementing this, in part because of the very significant capacity constraints outside a few major centres.

In response to widespread poverty, international donors have continued to provide substantial assistance through non-government channels (UN agencies, international NGOs, etc.) to address poverty and support more balanced growth. However, coordination among donors, and between donors and the government, remains weak because there are no mechanisms for regular dialogues on policy and aid delivery.

In most respects, the mine action sector reflects this broader situation:

- the GOA is substantially increasing its expenditures on mine action, but with a strong focus on demining in support of the National Rehabilitation Programme;
- international mine action actors have access to few details on the government-financed demining in support for reconstruction, and have expressed concerns about the transparency of the contract awards,<sup>47</sup> the quality of the demining operations, and the safety of construction crews and civilians;<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Interestingly, the Angolan government is refusing to proceed with the vocational training activities that would be supported by a portion of these funds until disagreements on the mine action portion have been resolved.

<sup>47</sup> It is rumoured that a number of mine action officials have established demining firms that compete for contracts issued by government agencies (which might then be influenced by the same mine action officials).

<sup>48</sup> Some operators have reported signs of poor QC and accidents by local demining firms. Although experience from other countries has shown that operators are quick to level accusations against their competitors, it is quite possible that such accusations are correct.



- accordingly, most donor support to mine action still flows through international NGOs for ‘humanitarian’ purposes – principally demining in rural areas, secondary roads, etc. In many cases, the INGOs coordinate effectively with the vice-governors in the provinces, who are now supported by CNIDAH operative rooms;
- there is little coordination among mine action donors or between donors and the GOA vis-à-vis mine action.

In this situation, the LRRD concept remains extremely relevant, particularly for mine action. To this point in time, mine action has entailed a mix of short term actions for emergency response (access for emergency aid; MRE and demining support for returnees; etc.) and medium-term programmes (support to the reconstruction of transportation infrastructure and to national capacity building efforts). Programming by the EC Delegation has reflected the need to support both short-term and medium-term activities, in line with the LRRD approach. The remaining question is whether mine action actors could and should play a role in facilitating long-term development in Angola’s interior, where rural livelihoods will soon be under threat due to competition from imports.

Now that Angola has emerged from its emergency, it is important that mine action is more tightly aligned with development priorities at the national, provincial, and local levels. This is happening, but it remains impossible to assess how much mine action is contributing to development because the INGOs and other mine action actors have not yet devised systems of reporting progress and achievements based on meaningful measures of *outcomes* (e.g. changes in the well-being of people in mine-affected communities, plus growing national capacities) rather than simply *outputs*.

There remain serious questions concerning the Government’s commitment to capacity development so it can assume its responsibility for Angola’s landmine problem. In particular, there appears to be a reluctance to acknowledge performance shortcomings and discuss realistic ways of overcoming these. However, many observers believe that CNIDAH’s performance has improved in some areas and that some of its staff are both capable and committed. It may be feasible to work with these individuals and focus more tightly on the most essential capacities (e.g. information management/IMSMA and QA/QC), while recognising that strengthening CNIDAH overall will require greater senior-level commitment than currently exists.

Similar concerns have been reported about efforts to support the capacity of INAD as a national operator. INAD has been augmenting its capacity largely by hiring experienced personnel away from the INGOs rather than on the basis of a strategy outlining INAD’s requirements and the type of capacity development support sought from the INGO operators.

While there remain concerns whether there is adequate commitment in Luanda to build the appropriate capacity for the national mine action programme, there might also be a credible option at the province level where Vice Governors appear to be engaged, reasonably well-informed, and not overly confident about their capacities. As a result, coordination is better at the provincial level, with a move toward provincial mine action plans generated in cooperation with the international community. Over time, the provincial governments might voice demands for increased government attention to the development priorities of the interior, including mine action and, more generally, rural development.

It appears that the EC should base any strategy for future support to mine action on two broad principles:



- the need to address Angola's humanitarian and development requirements (which in many areas will require mine action), as well as the MBT objectives,
- the fact that it is – first-and-foremost – the Government's responsibility to meet the needs of its citizens and to address the country's landmine problem. The new Strategic Plan for Mine Action is an improvement on earlier plans, but it is for the GOA to take the lead on implementing this strategy and meeting the targets, with donors playing a supporting role.<sup>49</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

While continued support for mine action is warranted, the EC Delegation should now formulate more thorough plans for its future support to mine action in Angola. These should be based on the discussions with the Government, centred on its Mine Action Strategic Plan (supplemented with a clear financing plan for the Strategy), and incorporate the following features:

- a medium-term indicative programme with a 'baseline case' and two alternatives:
  - higher funding, based on good progress by the GOA on implementing its Mine Action Strategic Plan and meeting its Treaty obligations
  - lower funding, based on disappointing progress by the GOA on implementing its Mine Action Strategic Plan
- continued progress in LRRD transition away from mine action justified in terms of 'emergency relief' toward mine action in support of development priorities;
- a more explicit policy to allocate funding on the basis of performance in addressing problems and achieving good development outcomes;<sup>50</sup>
- an explicit strategy for capacity development<sup>51</sup> based on a clear forecast of the likely 'residual problem' and the national capacities that will be required to address that residual problem;
- a tighter focus for any future EC contributions to capacity development;
- an exit strategy incorporating a phase-out with a gradual but predictable decline in the total level of funding for mine action.<sup>52</sup>

The EC should continue to base its support to international demining NGOs on the LRRD philosophy by:

- requiring the international demining NGOs to frame their proposed objectives in terms of development results, and to report progress and achievements based on meaningful socio-economic outcomes as well as simply demining outputs;<sup>53</sup>
- encouraging tighter links between demining operators and development actors (including provincial governments) with a particular focus on enhancing agricultural productivity and diversifying rural livelihoods;

<sup>49</sup> The likelihood that Angola will meet the APMBC deadline of January 2013 seems low. This could create pressure for donors to provide more funds.

<sup>50</sup> This might also aim at encouraging the replication of successful innovations in, for example, the development and implementation of provincial mine action plans.

<sup>51</sup> This should be done with national officials in conjunction with the UNDP. It should be based on the Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006-2011, but go into more detail on specific capacity requirements, GOA commitments, and the roles of the UNDP and, where relevant, the INGOs.

<sup>52</sup> The exit should be gradual and predictable so funding recipients can plan their investments in new equipment, etc. appropriately.

<sup>53</sup> For this, the results of the ALIS can and should be considered, but not as the only source of relevant data.



- considering consortium approaches in which demining INGOs provide the necessary demining support to their development partners in the consortium;<sup>54</sup>
- including a mine action budget line in those EC-funded development projects that work in mine-affected regions or in sectors whose work programmes are constrained by explosives contamination. This would allow the implementing agencies of these development projects to hire the necessary demining support so they can address, rather than avoid, mine-affected communities.

In recognition that it is more difficult to assess socio-economic outcomes than demining outputs, the EC Delegation should:

- encourage the international demining NGOs to include modest components for post-clearance land use surveys, community studies, etc. within their proposals for funding;
- continue to fund external evaluations of all demining projects but encourage a more meaningful analyses of project's outputs in socio-economic terms;
- in addition to the NGO's evaluations, commission an in-depth, development-focussed evaluation of EC support for the mine action programme overall.

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<sup>54</sup> This model is now being used in Sudan – see the Country Report for Sudan.



## 2. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO SOMALIA (SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND)

### INTRODUCTION

This report provides the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from an evaluation of EC-funded mine action activities in Somalia. This evaluation is part of broader regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Africa, the focus of which is on policy, strategy, and programming rather than performance in implementing individual projects. The Terms of Reference (TORs) are appended to the overall report.

The Somalia component of the regional evaluation is based on the findings of a mission by Ted Paterson and Mohamed Ahmed<sup>55</sup> to Nairobi, Hargeisa, and Garowe from 24 March to 6 April 2007, coupled with a review of documents. The Evaluation Team benefited greatly from the excellent support provided by the UNDP Mine Action team for Somalia, and by their counterparts in the Somaliland and Puntland Mine Action Centres (SMAC and PMAC). The UNDP Regional Coordinators stationed in Hargeisa and Garowe also assisted in logistical arrangements in Somaliland and Puntland respectively.

### Limitations of the Somalia Evaluation Conclusions on funding

The Evaluation Mission was unable to visit South Central Somalia because of the insecurity in that region. This was not a major problem as few mine action activities have been conducted in South Central because of the prolonged insecurity.

A more significant problem was the absence of the EC officer responsible for mine action in Somalia, who was on leave for the duration of the evaluation mission.<sup>56</sup> While we understand this leave was unavoidable, its timing meant that the Evaluation Team was unable to benefit from the experience and insights of the officer most closely involved with EC assistance to mine action in Somalia.

After arriving in Nairobi, the Evaluation Team discovered that the current Grant Agreement for mine action between the EC and the UNDP indicates that the GICHD would be asked to complete an evaluation of the project. The GICHD had not been advised before the evaluation mission that this was the case, and it remains unclear whether UNDP and the EC believed the project evaluation would be part of the EC Regional Evaluation for Africa.

As noted above, the Regional Evaluation has been designed to focus on broader policy, strategy, and programming issues, and not to provide a detailed assessment of the implementation of individual projects. Regardless, the evaluation team has endeavoured to provide a more detailed assessment of the project strategy and design within the context of Somalia's needs and opportunities, and the broader UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) programme. This may mean that a further evaluation of the specific project will not be required, but this is a decision for the EC and/or UNDP.

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<sup>55</sup> Ted Paterson is Head of the Evaluation Unit at the GICHD; Mohamed Ahmed is the GICHD Regional Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa.

<sup>56</sup> The dates for the mission had been agreed in February 2007.



## BACKGROUND

### ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION

Landmine and other explosive remnant of war (ERW) contamination in Somalia stems from:

- the Ogaden War (1977-78), resulting in contamination along the border with Ethiopia
- civil wars against the Siad Barre regime – including the Somaliland Liberation War (1988-91), which led to extensive contamination along roads and tracks,<sup>57</sup> around military camps and other installations, and water sources used by the nomadic population;
- continuing civil wars (e.g. for Somaliland, 1992 and 1994-96; for South Central, intermittent since 1991);
- inter-clan conflicts.<sup>58</sup>

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) implemented a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in the accessible regions of Somaliland<sup>59</sup> in 2002-03, which was followed by an LIS for Puntland in 2005 and, starting in 2006 and still on-going, a third phase to survey the disputed regions of Sool, Sanaag, and the south-western districts of Togdheer.<sup>60</sup> The findings of the surveys are summarised on the following page, but the following points seem of particular importance:

- contamination from landmines and other ERW<sup>61</sup> is extensive – about 80% of all districts and 30% of all communities (home to 35% of the total estimated population) are impacted;<sup>62</sup>
- significant numbers of victims were recorded in Somaliland, the disputed districts, and parts of Puntland, with some districts recording extremely high casualty rates on a per capita basis;
- over 1000 suspected hazard areas (SHA) have been recorded, of which over 60% are on roads;<sup>63</sup>
- smaller numbers of SHA block water resources or irrigated crop land (45 and 13 respectively) which, however, had a greater impact on communities;
- over 400 recent victims were recorded (80% or more male; most in the 5-14 years and 15-29 age groups)<sup>64</sup>
- UXO plus abandoned munitions (AXO), official stockpiles, and private stockpiles of munitions are very widespread and, in most parts of the country, constitute a greater threat than do minefields.

<sup>57</sup> Many communities, particularly in Somaliland, are impacted mainly by suspected contamination on roads and tracks. Usually, the contamination density is low and alternative routes or parallel tracks are available.

<sup>58</sup> It is also believed that the mines have been laid recently by both the Ethiopian forces backing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and those of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).

<sup>59</sup> Awdal, Galbeed, and Sahil, together with most of Togdheer.

<sup>60</sup> The Survey Action Centre (SAC) implemented Phases 2 and 3 of the Somalia LIS.

<sup>61</sup> ERW comprises unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO).

<sup>62</sup> In addition, an extensive array of explosive munitions are held in stockpiles, both formal (i.e. official militaries and police) and private (clans, households, etc.). The LIS is not intended to document these.

<sup>63</sup> In Somaliland, people simply use parallel tracks when a section of road is mined, so mined roads often do not block a community's access to other areas and communities.

<sup>64</sup> It is widely suspected that some communities provided inflated numbers of recent victims (a problem also experienced in the Somali region of Ethiopia) which meant that many of the community impact scores were not valid and reduced the utility of the LIS as a tool for priority-setting.



**Table 5 – Contamination recorded in the Landmine Impact Surveys**

	Districts	Communities	Population
<b>Somaliland – totals</b>	23	841	2.3 million?
Surveyed	23	589	2.0 million?
Impacted	23	357	1.34 million
<b>% of total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>58%</b>
<b>Puntland – totals</b>	15	541	2.0 million?
Surveyed	15	172	0.8 million?
Impacted	8	35	0.15 million
<b>% of total</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>8%</b>
<b>Disputed areas – totals to date</b>	17	244	??
Surveyed	13	148?	0.34 million
Impacted	13	83	??
<b>% of total</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>??</b>
<b>Total</b>	55	1626	4.6+ million
Surveyed	51	908	3.1 million
Impacted	44	475	1.8 million
<b>% of total</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>39%</b>

## HISTORY OF MINE ACTION

### Somaliland

Mine action began with clearance in Somaliland starting in 1991-93 by the company Rimfire.<sup>65</sup> These operations used techniques that did not comply with currently accepted practices for humanitarian demining,<sup>66</sup> and resulted in a reduction rather than an elimination of risk.<sup>67</sup>

The current mine action programme began in 1998 (again in Somaliland), with the beginning of a UNDP mine action programme, followed by the arrival of three international mine action NGOs – the Danish Demining Group (DDG), the HALO Trust, and St. Barbara Foundation.

After an initial offering of clearance contracts to commercial firms,<sup>68</sup> the UNDP assisted in the establishment of the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC)<sup>69</sup>, and its focus has since remained on capacity development of local mine action organisations. In mid-2001, UNDP supported the establishment of two Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams (each with 1 driver, 1 medic, and 4 EOD technicians), which have since operated from Hargeisa. In 2005, three additional teams were created and equipped, and in late 2006 these new teams received additional training at the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Nairobi.<sup>70</sup> These new teams are based in three regions outside Hargeisa, but have not been functioning as yet due to a lack of on-the-job training and support (planned to begin later this year).

<sup>65</sup> This was funded by a donor consortium including the EC, Britain, the Netherlands, and the U.S.

<sup>66</sup> Deminers suffered significant numbers of casualties (54 according to HALO Trust).

<sup>67</sup> This was before the adoption of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

<sup>68</sup> Both Mine-Tech and Greenfields received contacts via UNOPS, financed by a EUR 300,000 grant (SOM/97/002 – BL B7-661).

<sup>69</sup> Established via a resolution by the House of Representatives, 2 February 1999.

<sup>70</sup> IMATC is supported by the Ministries of Defence of Kenya and the U.K.



Originally UNDP mine action assistance was provided as a component of the Somali Civil Protection Programme (SCPP, begun in 1997), which subsequently evolved into an even broader Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme (see textbox). Mine Action is one of five components in ROLS.

#### Textbox 4 – The UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme

ROLS is an ambitious programme with the following components:

- Judiciary,
- Law Enforcement (basically, strengthening police services),
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), coupled with
  - Small Arms Control,
  - Mine Action, and
  - Gender and Human Rights.

ROLS evolved from the Somali Civil Protection Programme (SCPP) which started in 1997 with funding mainly from Italy. SCPP was managed by UNOPS but, due to “serious management and efficiency problems”, UNDP redesigned it as ROLS for direct execution, which started in 2002 (DfID, 2005). Mine Action is the only component still managed by UNOPS. Funding has come from Canada, DFID, the EC, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UNDP/BCPR, and USAID.

ROLS covers all regions of Somalia, but in practice most activities and expenditures have been in Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland.

Assessments of ROLS were conducted by DfID (in December 2004) and the EC (January 2006). Both missions were broadly positive and recommended continued donor support, but provided a number of recommendations for enhancements, including:

- adopt a more strategic approach based on a longer-term vision
- focus more on enhancing local ownership and capacities
- conduct baseline surveys and regular assessments to ensure interventions are based on local perceptions of priorities
- recruit area managers for Somaliland and Puntland, and do more to decentralise authority

Unfortunately, **neither assessment mission examined the mine action component** because the relevant DfID and EC funds did not cover mine action. In turn, this seems due to UNDP mobilising resources for mine action separately from the other ROLS components, perhaps because mine action is executed by UNOPS rather than by UNDP directly.

Further, the evaluation team had the distinct impression that this bifurcated approach to resource mobilisation is a serious problem for the mine action component. Recent documents on ROLS issued by UNDP Somalia have often failed to include any budget allocation for the mine action component.\* As well, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) documents\*\* make scant mention of the need for mine action, with the RDF Report for Somaliland lacking anything at all on mine action. Finally, the draft UNDP Country Strategy Paper dropped any mention of mine action (although some key donors asked for it to be included during consultation meetings the week of 17 April 2007).

This suggests that UNDP and ROLS management view mine action as something apart from the directly executed components of ROLS, which may be why comparatively little has been done to capitalise on the clear synergies between mine action and other security system components (law enforcement; DDR; SALW).\*\*\* These synergies are discussed in the Analysis section of this report.



\* For example, UNDP Somalia (2006), *Rule of Law and Security Programme (ROLS): Programme Strategy Phase II 2006-2008*, June 2006

\*\* The RDP incorporates four main volumes (the overall RDP plus one volume each for Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central) based on the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) reports for six priority clusters and three cross-cutting issues. All are available from:

<http://www.somali-jna.org/index.cfm?Module=ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=home>

\*\*\* This may also reflect a tendency on the part of previous CTAs for Mine Action to see their role as a traditional technical advisor rather than as a project manager.

St. Barbara Foundation ceased operations in 2003 and DDG ended its mine clearance operations in March 2006, retaining only mobile EOD teams, who also provide MRE and collect victim data.<sup>71</sup> The HALO Trust has not downsized and plans to continue its operations (survey, mine clearance, EOD) over the mid-term, and to expand if funding allows.

In 1997, Handicap International (HI) began a Mine Risk Education (MRE) programme in Somali refugee camps in Ethiopia. It undertook a Knowledge-Attitudes-Practice (KAP) survey in Somaliland in 2002 and, based on the KAP survey and the LIS, began an MRE programme in Somaliland in 2005, through which it provided coordination and training for the other mine action organisations (DDG, HALO, SMAC, PMAC, and the Police EOD teams in both Somaliland and Puntland).<sup>72</sup> HI also distributed MRE materials (posters, stickers, t-shirts), supported a youth group and radio Hargeisa to produce and air radio programmes, and (in conjunction with the SMAC regional liaison officers) provided training for 80 village MRE committees.

Few health facilities are capable of providing assistance to landmine victims. The Norwegian Red Cross and a few international NGOs support physical rehabilitation facilities for disabled people in general. HI also provides some support to the Somaliland National Disability Forum – an umbrella body for disability agencies. There is no comprehensive surveillance system for recording new victims and monitoring survivors.


## FUNDING

It appears that total mine action funding for Somalia has been reasonably steady at about \$4+ million since 2001 (see graph). The bulk of this funding (80-85% if funds for the LIS are included) has been delivered via international NGOs (INGOs), with all the remainder channelled via the UNDP. Perhaps 90% or more of total funding has been expended in Somaliland.

<sup>71</sup> DDG teams visit over 600 communities four times each per year. They have recorded 42 casualties since July 2005. DDG believes they are capturing about half the incidents in the accessible districts of Somaliland, which implies about 45-50 victims per year in the regions of Somaliland the DDG teams can reach.

<sup>72</sup> Delivery of MRE outside of large towns and via radio is delivered mainly by operators such as HALO.



**Figure 1 – Funding estimates for Mine Action in Somalia**

Since 2002, the bulk of EC funding for mine action has been provided via the dedicated budget line for mine action, managed in Brussels. This funded two project agreements totalling approximately € 3.3 million (about \$3.95 million).<sup>73</sup> This represents about 16% of total donor funding for Somalia over that period. Both grants were awarded to UNDP for support to (i) the LIS (Phases 2 and 3 respectively) and (ii) capacity development (of the regional MACs, Police EOD teams, plus mine action policy development).

#### Textbox 5 – Earlier EC Funding for Mine Action in Somalia

The Evaluation Team obtained evidence that the EC provided funding for (i) mine clearance by Rimfire in the early 1990s,<sup>a</sup> (ii) commercial mine clearance contracts issued by the UNDP Somali Civil Protection Programme in the late 1990s (\$315,397 via the UNDP Voluntary Trust Fund),<sup>b</sup> (iii) demining by DDG in support of the reconstruction of the Adadley-Mandhera Road in Somaliland (\$140,200 in 2000),<sup>c</sup> and (iv) the LIS Phase 1 (\$618,673 in 2002).<sup>d</sup>

a. Personal communication with Alistair Craib, DfID Consultant-Advisor for Mine Action

b. UNDP (1998?), *Substantive Report for Voluntary Trust Fund #339: UNDP Mine Action Somalia*

c. Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body Donor Report for the EC + ECHO for 2000

d. Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body Donor Report for the EC + ECHO for 2002

Funding for both of the recent grant agreements came from the special mine action funds managed by the EC mine action team in Brussels. In at least the second case, the EC Delegation for Somalia opposed the grant, but was overruled by Brussels.

## CURRENT SITUATION

### CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The conflicts in Somalia (particularly South Central) have evolved rapidly over the past year. First the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) established control over much of South Central Somalia during mid-2006, limiting the internationally-recognised Transitional Federal Government

<sup>73</sup> The first (€ 1.5 million) was from funds available in 2002 (but not awarded until 2003), while the second (€ 1.8 million) was from funds available in 2004, but not awarded until 2006.



(TFG)<sup>74</sup> to the Baidoa area. Ethiopia then moved troops into Baidoa to reinforce the TFG, and reports suggest that both sides constructed trenches/berms and laid defensive minefields.

In late December 2006, TFG and Ethiopian forces broke through the ICU lines and quickly took control of virtually all South Central Somalia. However, the TFG announcement in early January of a disarmament programme – enforced if necessary – provoked demonstrations in Mogadishu and the plan was quickly suspended.

On 19 January 2007, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council authorised the deployment of an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), comprising 8,000 troops, 270 police trainers, and a civilian component.<sup>75</sup> In spite of promises of logistical and funding support from the U.S. and EU, the AU has had difficulty in obtaining commitments for troops or police from its member states. So far, only Uganda has fielded troops (two battalions plus a force headquarters), which are now stationed at Mogadishu airport.

The continued presence of Ethiopian forces then led to renewed violence, particularly in Mogadishu, which reached a crescendo in April, leading to an exodus of refugees. Fighting has died down, but substantive progress hinges on a political solution, which in turn requires agreement among the principal clans on an equitable power-sharing formula.<sup>76</sup> Such an agreement has not been reached.

## OVERALL PLANS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Following the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter in January 2004, a donor conference in Stockholm (October 2004) agreed a draft Declaration of Principles to guide assistance from the donor community. This called for a short-term Rapid Assistance Programme (RAP) to address immediate needs plus the preparation of a longer term Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The following year, the United Nations and World Bank initiated the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) to provide the basis for the RDP (see textbox).

### Textbox 6 – Preparing the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)

In late 2005-2006, the UN Development Group (UNDG) and World Bank mobilised a technical needs assessment team to conduct a post-conflict Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) of South Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. Working under the guidance of the Coordination Support Group,\* the team produced six 'cluster reports' covering:

1. Governance, Security and the Rule of Law (which included extensive material on mine action)
2. Macro-economic policy and data development
3. Infrastructure
4. Social services and protection of vulnerable groups
5. Productive sectors and the environment
6. Livelihoods and solutions for the displaced

<sup>74</sup> The TFG was formed following the adoption of a constitutional framework for a five-year transition based on federal principles – the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic – by the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in January 2004.

<sup>75</sup> On 20 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of AMISOM.

<sup>76</sup> The '4.5 power-sharing formula' agreed during the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (2002-04) provides for equitable distribution of positions in the transitional institutions for the four main Somali clans, with remaining posts allocated to minority clans.



From this, the UN and World Bank teams for Somalia produced a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP, in four volumes covering Somalia as a whole, South Central, Puntland, and Somaliland), structured along three ‘pillars’:

- Deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance
- Strengthening essential basic services and social protection
- Creating an enabling environment for private sector-led growth

The RDP now serves as the principal framework for international assistance to Somalia. For example, the draft UNDP Country Assistance Strategy is derived from the RDP, and the World Bank has just adopted an Interim Support Strategy based on the RDP. As well, the EC Somalia Strategy for EDF 10 follows the three RDP pillars.

\* Comprising the key supporting donors (EC as chair, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK); the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the International Finance Corporation, the NGO Consortium, and the UN and WB.

The RDP is a five-year, \$2.25 billion programme of sequenced activities agreed with Somali authorities (TFG, plus Puntland and Somaliland),<sup>77</sup> which is intended to provide a framework for donors to design their own assistance programmes. As a durable peace is far from certain, it remains unclear whether the increases in assistance envisaged by the RDP will be feasible, so key agencies are also revising their short- and medium-term plans. For example, the UN country team has determined its short-term focus will include “strengthening the national police force...disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (*Report of the Secretary General*, 20 April 2007, p. 10) – core elements of the UNDP ROLS programme but, apparently, not including mine action.

The UN country team has also prepared a Transition Plan for 2008-2009, with one of the core areas being “contributing to better public security and access to justice to replace impunity and mistrust in institutions.” (ibid, p. 11) Again, it is unclear whether this embraces mine action.

## EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA

As Somalia was not in a position to ratify the Lomé IV Convention or the Cotonou Agreement (23 June 2000), it had no access to the 7<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> EDF. However, the Chief Authorising Officer of the EDF assumed the responsibilities of the National Authorising Officer (NAO) for Somalia, and in December 2001 the ACP-EC Council of Ministers granted access to EDF 8 (€ 50 million) and 9 (€ 149 million), to uncommitted balances of previous EDFs (€ 9.8 million), and to other EC budget lines (e.g. the dedicated budget for mine action). Accordingly, the EC drew-up the *European Commission Strategy for the Implementation of Special Aid to Somalia: 2002-2007*, with the following priorities:

- enhancing good governance
- reduction of widespread vulnerability
- enhancing access to social services
- economic growth and diversification

<sup>77</sup> As in the past, there is provision for ‘asymmetric engagement’ in recognition that security and absorptive capacities vary widely across Somali regions.



While the current strategy and programming document does not preclude support to mine action, it is clear that the EC Delegation for Somalia does not believe it should be providing such support. It does not see landmines and ERW as priority requirements for the country and, in line with the principles of the Paris Declaration,<sup>78</sup> the Delegation is trying to focus the EC programme more strategically on a limited number of sectors. For EDF 10, its planned priorities follow the pillars of the RDP and are:

- governance (including the links to security)
- education (consistent with the EU Consensus and EU Strategy for Africa), and
- livelihoods (particularly related to trade, in line with the Cotonou Agreement)

## CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS

### Somaliland

On paper, Somaliland has a good institutional structure for mine action. SMAC is officially recognised by the Somaliland government as the coordinator of all mine action.<sup>79</sup> It reports to the Vice-President<sup>80</sup> who also chairs the Somaliland Mine Action Committee (the national authority) comprising eight ministers.<sup>81</sup> A National Policy for Humanitarian Mine Action was drafted two years ago but has not yet been adopted by the legislature (elections intervened and the legislative agenda has been heavy).

SMAC has 32 staff (including eight regional liaison officers and 10 in QA teams), who have always been paid by UNDP. It has the latest IMSMA system installed with the LIS data, but does not task operators and has not been recording the survey and clearance work done by operators, which is a serious deficiency. Previous UNDP/OPS TA personnel arranged training, equipment, facilities, and remuneration for SMAC personnel, and advice on policy matters. But they provided no on-going support to help SMAC personnel apply their training (perhaps because the UNDP/OPS TAs did not have adequate experience in a mine action centre and did not have the expertise to provide continued support relating to the functions actually performed by a MAC).<sup>82</sup> As a result, SMAC did not perform effectively.

However, the arrival of the new TA for Operations has helped revitalise SMAC. It is now holding regular coordination meetings with operators and work is underway to enter the backlog of survey and clearance data from the operators into IMSMA.<sup>83</sup>

The SMAC Program Manager and UNDP Operations Advisor have also agreed on plans for revising the role of the QA teams. Henceforth, these will no longer conduct time-consuming quality control testing of areas cleared by operators ('busy work' with little benefit) and will instead focus on inspections of on-going tasks, surveys of suspected hazards in the IMSMA database (to confirm or discredit these, and obtain more accurate assessments of their boundaries and areas), investigations of accidents, etc.

<sup>78</sup> *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results, and Mutual Accountability*, 2005.

<sup>79</sup> Presidential decree 83/2003 dated 18<sup>th</sup> February 2003


<sup>80</sup> Presidential decree no: 016/2004 of 11 March 2004.

<sup>81</sup> The draft National Policy states these might include the Ministries of Rehabilitation, Repatriation and Re-integration (MRRR), Planning, Health and Labour, Education, Information, Interior and Foreign Affairs.

<sup>82</sup> This finding is corroborated by multiple sources. At one point, the TA for Operations was based in Hargeisa but would not work with SMAC as he stated his responsibility was only to PMAC! In this he was supported by the CTA based in Nairobi.

<sup>83</sup> IMSMA version 4 (much superior to earlier versions) was installed shortly after the evaluation mission.



**Figure 2 – Structure of the Somaliland Mine Action Programme**

Until last year, that the Somaliland Government has not allocated any funding to SMAC, which both reflected and bolstered the impression that SMAC was a UNDP rather than a government agency. In 2006, the government did allocate \$15,000 (but disbursed only \$7,000), and has included the same amount in the 2007 budget.<sup>84</sup>

The government has declared the National Demining Agency (NDA) as the national demining operator. It reports to the Ministry of Defence and has about 20 personnel, but none are trained or equipped for demining. Accordingly, NDA has never conducted demining operations. There is an expectation that NDA demining platoons will be staffed by military personnel,<sup>85</sup> but international support for training and equipping the necessary troops has not been forthcoming.

HALO Trust has the bulk of the demining capacity in the country,<sup>86</sup> with 430 local personnel and the following assets (all based in Somaliland):

- 8 manual demining/Battle Area Clearance (BAC) teams
- 4 EOD/Survey teams
- 3 mechanical teams
- 1 MRE team

HALO Trust plans to continue operations in Somaliland, and to introduce two additional mechanical teams in 2007.

DDG wound-up its mine clearance operations March 2006, dropping from over 120 personnel to 54 (two of whom are expatriates). It now focuses on mobile EOD teams (four teams, each with a supervisor, 2 EOD technicians, a medic, and a driver) that conduct the Village by Village Clearance (VBVC) project.

<sup>84</sup> Somaliland uses the calendar year as its financial year.


<sup>85</sup> Somaliland officials are aware of the UNDP plans to support the *Daraweesh* (formerly a *gendarmarie*-type police force, but now essentially an army/official militia) in Puntland, discussed below.

<sup>86</sup> HALO Trust is funded by Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K.



In 2006, DDG ran a pilot project with the local NGO Haqsoor aiming to collect items from private weapons stockpiles in towns and villages (the Village Stockpile Disposal Initiative – VSDI).<sup>87</sup> The pilot was extremely successful and, for the first time, town residents turned over items from private stockpiles (see graph). However, DDG has not been able to obtain funding to continue the VSDI, and plans to end its Somaliland programme in March 2008.<sup>88</sup>

**Figure 3 – Results from the VSDI in Caynabo, Sool Region**



HI has temporarily discontinued its support to MRE due to lack of funding, but expects to resume shortly with support from Ireland and Luxemburg, which would allow it to expand its support to Puntland as well (starting with a Knowledge-Attitudes-Practice survey as a basis for designing an MRE project). UNICEF has also requested HI to provide some MRE capacity development assistance for local NGOs in South Central Somalia once the security situation allows.

## Puntland

Mine Action began in 2003 with the establishment of the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC). Like SMAC in Somaliland, PMAC is supported principally through Mine Action component of the UNDP ROLS programme, although it only has only three personnel (down from a maximum of eight), compared to 32 in SMAC.

In early 2004, UNDP contracted the firm Mechem to train 18 Police officers in EOD. Many of the trainees were inappropriate for EOD work and only five remain – enough for one team. Operations have been hampered because one of the two vehicles provided was destroyed in a road accident before handover, and because of a shortage of explosives to destroy UXO.

### Textbox 7 – Financial Support from UNDP/UNOPS to SMAC, PMAC, & Police EOD teams

SMAC, PMAC, and the Ministries of Interior (for Police EOD) sign contracts directly with UNOPS. These are termed 'sub-contracts' in UNDP budgets and are for about \$275,000/year for SMAC and \$95,000/year for PMAC. For Police EOD teams, UNDP/UNOPS provides about \$13,500/year for each team, covering 'incentive payments' (\$60/month per person) and insurance (\$155/month

<sup>87</sup> This built on a traditional mediation/conflict resolution project run by Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in conjunction with Haqsoor that has significantly reduced reprisal killings.

<sup>88</sup> Subsequent to the mission, Nick Bateman, Regional Representative for Somalia and Sudan, advised that DDG is re-considering its exit strategy and may continue with the VSDI if funding can be obtained.



per person).

A clear problem is that the so-called ‘incentive payments’ to Police EOD personnel do not provide the desired incentives (i.e. to go to the field and clear explosives). The \$60 is really a salary supplement and there are no additional payments to cover expenses when in the field. For 2007, UNDP has proposed daily allowances to cover such field costs (\$4/day per person).

The UNDP ROLS programme has a separate scheme for covering appropriate costs for personnel in the Police Special Protection Units (SPU – set up for the protection of the humanitarian and diplomatic community). SPU officers are provided \$4/day when on assignment, plus \$7/day when required to remain overnight. The SPU scheme seems preferable, as payments are related to performance of the desired tasks. Regardless, it is unclear why the same UNDP programme would have two distinct remuneration systems for two different units within the same Somali organisations.

This year’s plan called for training and equipping 40 members of the *Daraweesh*<sup>89</sup> in demining. This has not been done as the *Daraweesh* were transferred to the border with South Central to confront ICU forces.

Senior UNDP officials have stated recently that training and equipment would not be provided to the *Daraweesh* as it functions as the military for Puntland. The Evaluation Team met the Chief of Operations for the *Daraweesh* who stated that it would be more appropriate to transfer knowledgeable *Daraweesh* to the Police to serve as deminers/EOD personnel. The Ministry of Interior also believes the demining and EOD capacity should be part of the Police, but they would welcome the transfer of knowledgeable *Daraweesh* to the police service for this purpose.

With assistance from Cranfield University, PMAC developed a five-year strategic plan in 2005 (subsequently endorsed by the Ministry of Interior). It states that international NGOs are encouraged to address the high priority contaminated areas, but as yet no INGO has established a programme in Puntland.

## South Central

No sustained mine action activities have been possible in South Central due to the ongoing conflicts. Two Police EOD teams from Jowhar were sent for basic EOD training at IMATC in late 2006, but they have not been able to function. Once the security situation allows, rough plans exist to:

- establish a MAC
- train and equip two 40 person mine clearance teams
- train and equip an additional Police EOD team
- contract international specialists (EOD, underwater, explosive detection dogs, mechanical clearance) to do mine clearance and EOD in Mogadishu, and to destroy significant stockpiles of munitions.

## ANALYSIS


The case for mine action in Somalia appears to have been **misdiagnosed** and **undersold** and for many years. While data are sparse and sometimes inconsistent, the best available evidence indicates that Somalia is – relative to any other African country – significantly impacted by both landmines and UXO. It also faces major problems from abandoned ordnance (AXO) and

<sup>89</sup> Formerly a *gendarmarie*-type police force, but now essentially an army/official militia.




stockpiled munitions. While complete figures for landmine and other ERW accidents are unavailable in any African country, the number of victims per capita in Somalia appears to be higher than any other country in the continent. The graphs below provide (i) a comparison between Somalia and African countries with large mine action programmes, and (ii) South Central, Puntland, Somaliland (undisputed regions), the disputed regions, Buuhoodle district (perhaps the most impacted) against the other African countries with the greatest number of victims per capita.

**Figure 4 – Estimated annual victims per million (high and low estimates)**



**Figure 5 – Estimated victims/year per million in Somalia and selected countries**



Notes: See following textboxes for data sources on Somalia. For other countries, most victim data is from Landmine Monitor (latest two years) and, where available, landmine impact surveys. The numbers of recorded victims is used for the low estimate, while for the high estimates the recorded numbers are multiplied by an adjustment factor depending on how complete the victim surveillance system is in each country: for Angola, Chad, and DRC, high estimate = recorded victims \* 2; for Ethiopia, high estimate = recorded victims \* 5; for Eritrea and Mozambique, estimate = recorded victims \* 1.5.



### Textbox 8 – How many victims in Somalia?

Victim surveillance systems are inadequate in all regions of Somalia. Estimates of recent victims seem to be further complicated because communities give inflated figures, perhaps because they believe this will make it more likely they will receive some assistance. A quick survey of the various estimates gleaned the following:

#### Somaliland (accessible areas)

- in 2000, 43 recorded (Taylor:12)
- SMAC has recorded over 250 victims over the past three years, including 97 in 2006
- the DDG Village-by-Village EOD teams have recorded 42 victims since July 2005. DDG believes it is capturing about half of all victims, implying about 45-50 casualties per year
- the LIS, Phase 1 documented 276 victims in the prior 24 months, implying approximately 135-140/year – it is generally believed that the claims from some communities were inflated and the actual number of victims is lower than recorded
- summarising, the number of victims for accessible areas of Somaliland appears to be in the range of 40-80 per year, with 60% or more due to UXO

#### Disputed areas

- the LIS Phase 3 has so far recorded 69 victims in the past 24 months, implying about 35 per year (it has surveyed 13 or the 17 districts in the disputed areas). The LIS team believe this to be a reliable estimate, so we will use the range 25-35 victims per year.

#### Puntland

- the LIS Phase 2 recorded 64 victims in the prior 24 months, implying approximately 32 per year – it is generally believed to be a reliable estimate
- some communities – likely to be heavily impacted – could not be reached, so a reasonable estimate for the undisputed areas of Puntland might be 30-40/year.

#### South Central Somalia

- SOCREd and SOMMAC each recorded between 204 and 227 victims in South Central and Puntland for 2005 (the last year for which figures are available. Subtracting the estimate of 35/year for Puntland would imply approximately 170-190 victims per year for South Central Somalia
- It is unclear how reliable or complete these estimates are. A conservative approach would be to assume about 180 victims per year for the upper bound of the estimate, with a lower bound set at half that figure (i.e. 90/year)

Also of note are the results from the 2002 Socio-economic Survey (UNDP & World Bank, Table 1.12, p. 62), in which Somalis reported that 3.6% of all deaths in the past year had been caused by landmines (the comparable figures for 'war' were 4.3% of all deaths, and 'accidents, excluding mines' were 7.4%).\* These results from a survey that should not result in an overestimate of the landmine and ERW problem, suggest that the number of mine victims from other sources was vastly underestimated, at least in the early years of this millennium. Regardless, we will use the range of estimates generated from other sources, which are summarised in the following table.

	Low	High	Mid-point
<b>Somaliland</b>	40	80	60
<b>Disputed areas</b>	25	35	30
<b>Puntland</b>	30	40	35
<b>South Central</b>	90	180	135
<b>Total</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>260</b>

\* These results are similar to findings in Cambodia when, in 2000, 5% of deaths were caused by SALW and 3% by mines/UXO. (Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey 2000, cited in GICHD, n.d., p. 35)



**Textbox 9 – How many people live in Somalia?**

The population of Somalia and its regions can only be roughly estimated, and the issue is a political one. Population estimates issued by local authorities in Somaliland and Puntland tend to be the highest and may incorporate estimates of all citizens (including the large Somali diasporas) rather than permanent residents.

The 2002 Socio-Economic Survey estimated 6.8 million for Somalia as a whole, and the public domain report did not provide a breakdown among regions. This LIS Phase 1 estimated that 1.34 million lived in mine-affected communities, suggesting a population in the undisputed areas of Somaliland of over 2 million. Wikipedia articles for Puntland and Somaliland give population estimates of 2.4 million and 3.5 million respectively. The Somaliland government recently reported a population of 3 million (*Somaliland in Figures*, 2004)

We will use the estimates from the UNDP-World Bank Joint Needs Assessment of 2006, which gave the total population as 7.7 million, broken as follows:

Somaliland	1.7 million
Puntland	1.1 million
South Central	4.9 million

The LIS Phase 3 has estimated 338,000 residents in the communities surveyed to date. Given there may be double-counting and inflated figures provided by local authorities, we will use a rough estimate of 300,000 for all the disputed districts, giving final estimates as follows:


Somaliland (undisputed areas)	1.4 million
Disputed districts	0.3 million
Puntland (undisputed areas)	1.1 million
South Central	4.9 million

The following graph depicts a needs-based funding comparison, using estimates of funding from international sources per victim in Somalia and other African countries.<sup>90</sup> On this comparison, Somalia received about half the level of funding as Chad and Ethiopia,<sup>91</sup> about one-fifth the level of funding as Eritrea, one-twelfth the level as Angola, and one-twenty-fourth the level of Mozambique.

<sup>90</sup> Funding estimates are from Landmine Monitor for 2004 and 2005. We use the mid-point of the victims estimates for the same two years.

<sup>91</sup> For Ethiopia, funding estimates do not include significant expenditures financed by a World Bank loan.



**Figure 6 – Funding per victim (estimated)**

While it seems beyond reasonable dispute that Somalia is the most intensely impacted country in Africa and therefore warrants more assistance relative to what has been provided to other African countries, the problem with large minefields does not appear to be extensive.<sup>92</sup> The large minefields, requiring large demining capacity, stretch along the border with Ethiopia and can be cleared in the medium term, meaning that local capabilities to manage large demining operations are neither required nor warranted.<sup>93</sup> Thus, the appropriate strategy would be (i) supporting international organisations to clear the large border minefields, and (ii) supporting the development of for mine action centres and Police EOD/demining teams,<sup>94</sup> as these capacities will be required for decades.

This strategy would result in a pattern of costs along the lines depicted below (provided for illustrative purposes).<sup>95</sup> Thus, the strategy outlined in existing UNDP documents to support the development of local capacities for traditional demining operations appears inappropriate, at least for Somaliland and Puntland.


<sup>92</sup> This assessment could, of course, change depending on the extent of mine laying in the recent conflict between the ICU and TFG/Ethiopia, and the course of future conflicts.

<sup>93</sup> Such capacities require (at the best) three-to-five years to develop, by which time the bulk of the large minefields should have been cleared.

<sup>94</sup> Eventually, these should be EOD teams cross-trained in survey, mine clearance, and battle area clearance. It would be easier to start new personnel on mine clearance and then provide cross-training over time.

<sup>95</sup> To keep the graph as simple as possible, we only depict the operating costs of the INGO, EOD teams, and PMAC – we have not included estimates for the costs of equipping new teams or the cost of UNDP technical advisors. As well, the length of time for the surge phase to clear the large minefields would depend, of course, on levels of funding as well as the extent of the minefields found in the LIS Phase 3 and, eventually, for South Central.



**Figure 7 – Forecasting capacity development requirements for Puntland**

Even more critically, UNDP plans for the mine action component have, for many years, advocated the development of local demining capacities within Somali militaries. It is questionable whether this is an appropriate approach for a country in conflict, and it is dubious whether such a strategy would be consistent with the longstanding arms embargo on Somalia.<sup>96</sup>

Further, these UNDP plans appear to be based on a serious misconception that the ‘military model’ for humanitarian demining has been successful in many other countries. For example, there are repeated references to the Yemen model as a successful example of using the military as the national demining capacity. In fact, Yemen’s mine action agency (YEMAC) was established as a civilian statutory body, reporting to the Office of the Prime Minister, largely because of dissatisfaction with the performance of the army demining units. YEMAC is a civilian agency using demobilised military personnel who have been retrained to demine to international mine action standards. The civilian YEMAC has been extremely successful, while the military model was a failure. YEMAC has been supported for many years by UNDP, so these facts should be common knowledge among the UNDP and UNOPS mine action personnel.<sup>97</sup>

As well, there seems to be little weight given to the existing and potential synergies between mine action and the other security components within ROLS. Most obviously, the Police Department has benefited from the training and equipment provided via the mine action component. This allows greater police presence in communities by well-trained officers performing skilled jobs that engender respect among the populace. Further, these Police EOD personnel are collecting a significant amount of SALW ammunition, reducing the twin threats of accidental explosion and armed violence. The same is true for the DDG and HALO Trust EOD

<sup>96</sup> Much of the equipment and supplies for demining would be ‘dual purpose’ and could be used for military operations as well as humanitarian demining.

<sup>97</sup> Closer to home, the very successful Ethiopia Mine Action programme is based on demobilised military engineers working in a civilian agency under civilian authority.



teams. Collectively, these teams have collected and destroyed tens of thousands of explosive devices and hundreds of thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition.<sup>98</sup>

The mine action component could also boost the DDR component of ROLS once the plan to build demining capacity within the militaries is abandoned. In Puntland, for example, many of the *Daraweesh* would be strong candidates for a demining programme implemented by an INGO because of their experience with munitions and with military command-and-control structures. It would not be surprising if an INGO recruited 100-200 or more from the *Daraweesh*, which would represent the primary DDR achievement in that region where the component has focused on preliminary registration of personnel with the aim of pensioning-off the aged, disabled, and infirm.<sup>99</sup> Such actions are more akin to civil service reform (i.e. to ‘right size’ the civil service and reduce the wage bill) than to disarmament and demobilisation. The conversion of 100-200 fit and able military into civilian deminers would represent a signal achievement.

DDR objectives would also be promoted if some future members of the Police EOD Teams were recruited from the regional militaries, put through the Police Training College, and then trained in demining, EOD, and similar skills.<sup>100</sup>

A properly conceived and managed mine action programme would also promote security system reform in a broader manner, by providing points of entry for engagement with militaries/militias, government authorities, and with communities that have benefited little from state-provided public services in over a decade. The Pilot VSDI project run by DDG in cooperation with *Haqsoor* suggests there is significant potential for EOD teams to contribute more to SALW, both by clearing private stockpiles of munitions and, over time, in fostering a virtuous circle of reduced levels of violence leading to a reduction in demand for weapons, and the registration or even handover of weapons.<sup>101</sup>

In addition, mine action contributes to other pillars of international support to Somalia. By clearing pastureland and traditional migration routes, mine clearance enhances livelihoods and reduces vulnerability for pastoralists. All aspects of mine action can also be viewed as simply public services, the effective delivery of which restores public confidence in the state and its organs.

## Conclusions

While the UNDP mine action programme for Somalia has supported important achievements in terms of the creation of the Puntland and Somaliland MACs and EOD teams, an appropriate, evidence-based strategy has never been formulated for the national mine action programme, or for regional programmes in Puntland and Somaliland. In particular:

<sup>98</sup> It should also be emphasized that, in Somalia, landmines have been actively used in inter-clan conflict, so clearance and stockpile destruction of landmines brings the same types of benefits sought by SALW.

<sup>99</sup> Information provided by Yasin Salad Galeyr, Chief of Operations for the *Daraweesh*. See also the modest objectives set for DDR in the ROLS Strategy for 2006-2008 (e.g. “This exercise to downsize the security forces has the objective of reallocating resources to productive and social sectors.”, p. 6; and “One of the main objectives of security sector reform is to free financial resources allocated to security services...”, p. 11)

<sup>100</sup> New teams would probably start on mine clearance of small minefields and surface clearance of UXO (Battle Area Clearance – BAC), then be trained on survey and EOD.

<sup>101</sup> The DDG VSDI project was based in part on the Traditional Governance Project run by the Danish Refugee Council and *Haqsoor*, which has resulted in a significant reduction in retaliation killings among clans in Somaliland.



- the strategic dialogue with the international mine action NGOs operating in Somaliland has been inadequate, and the potential contribution of these organisations in terms of operations, data exchange, and resource mobilization has not been fully considered;
- the plan to develop local demining capacity for Puntland and, perhaps, Somaliland within the militaries was based on faulty information and is probably inappropriate for Somalia;
- adequate material and advisory support has not been provided following the establishment of the MACs and EOD teams in both Puntland and Somaliland – as a result, the capacities of these bodies have not been fully employed and further developed through the learning-by-doing process;
- the analysis underpinning the exit strategy for UNDP assistance is inadequate (in part due to problems noted above) – most fundamentally, a clear picture of the sustainable capacities required to address the residual landmine and ERW problem has not been formulated and validated in discussions with Puntland and Somaliland authorities;
- important contributions (both actual and potential) of the mine action programme to peacebuilding, security system reform (Law Enforcement, DDR, and SALW), and state-building have not been adequately documented and disseminated within UNDP Somalia and the donor community, leading to lack of support for mine action within the ROLS programme, the broader UNDP Somalia programme, and the principal donors;
- because appropriate strategies for Puntland and Somaliland are not in place, there is no proven model for the institutional make-up of a national mine action programme for Somalia.

The new UNDP/OPS TA team has made a good start in coming to grips with the true nature and extent of the explosives contamination problem. But they must still revise the overall strategy for the national and regional mine action programmes, and mobilise resources to implement the revised strategy, the key features of which should include:

- encourage/assist the HALO Trust to raise resources and open a demining programme in Puntland, focussing on the large border minefields and abandoned stockpiles (west of Galcaayo and, probably, in the disputed districts of Sool, Sanaag, and the south-western districts of Togdheer)
- assuming the larger minefields will be cleared by the HALO Trust, build a modest and sustainable local EOD capacity<sup>102</sup> in both Puntland and Somaliland to address the more dispersed and smaller minefields left from internal conflicts, as well as stockpiles (both abandoned and private) and battle areas. In both regions, the EOD/demining capacity should be established under the Ministry of Interior rather than the Ministry of Defence or (for Puntland) the *Daraweesh*;
- in at least Puntland, future EOD personnel should be recruited from the *Daraweesh* (thus contributing to all components the DDR programme), transferred to the Police service, sent for training at the Armo Police Training Academy, and then provided with training in mine clearance;
- continued support for the Police EOD teams to respond to reports of UXO and AXO, isolated landmines, etc.;
- scaling-up of the pilot Village Stockpile Disposal project run by DDG in conjunction with the local NGO, Haqsoor, in order to reduce private stockpiles of explosives and small arms ammunition (thus contributing to the SALW programme and reinforcing

<sup>102</sup> Perhaps 40+ deminers, cross-trained in survey, BAC, and EOD, plus medics, drivers, etc. for both Somaliland and Puntland.



respect for the police and, more broadly, the perception that the state delivers needed public services);<sup>103</sup>

- cooperation with HI in building MRE capacities throughout Somalia;
- strengthening the victim surveillance system for collecting, recording, and analysing data on landmine and ERW incidents and victims;
- maintenance of the mine action information systems (IMSMA) so these provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date pictures of clearance done and the remaining contamination problem.

The above strategy implies that the vision of the mine action programme should incorporate peacebuilding, state-building, and the enhancement of human security. The national and regional mine action strategies should include objectives relating to:

- peacebuilding at the community and inter-clan levels;
- security system reform, including support for the Law Enforcement, DDR and SALW control components supported by ROLS;
- clear ownership of the national and regional programmes by government authorities to ensure mine action is perceived as a public service provided by the state rather than an aid programme delivered by the UN or donors.

Similarly, the UNDP/OPS mine action programme needs to coordinate more fully and strategically with the other components of ROLS, particularly DDR, SALW control, and Law Enforcement (principally police reform).

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### TO THE UNDP/OPS MINE ACTION PROJECT

Assist SMAC and PMAC in revising their mine action strategies based on:

- the evidence from the LIS and victim statistics,
- participation in the planning process by the international mine action NGOs, which will raise their own resources and focus on the larger minefields and other large munitions clearance tasks,<sup>104</sup>
- continue building a modest and sustainable EOD capacity within the police service or in a statutory body reporting via the Ministry of Interior,<sup>105</sup>
- where possible, promote DDR by recruiting police EOD personnel from the Somaliland army and the *Daraweesh*,
- modestly expanding the capacities of the Police EOD teams, and broadening their roles to include community-level peacebuilding in conjunction with local conflict resolution NGOs such as Haqsoor,
- coordination of all demining/EOD and MRE agencies by the MAC,
- maintaining complete, accurate, and up-to-date data on clearance, remaining contamination, and victims;
- oversight of the national mine action programme by an inter-ministerial committee (the national/regional mine action authority);

<sup>103</sup> DDG should be encouraged to build the capacity of the Police EOD teams to work with Haqsoor at the community level on accessing private stockpiles.

<sup>104</sup> INGOs should have opportunity to participate in the strategic planning exercise.

<sup>105</sup> The principal advantage of a statutory body is that it does not need to adhere to overly-restrictive civil service regulations and salary levels.



- modest but growing contribution by the Somaliland and Puntland governments.

Continue capacity development support by UNDP for the core local capacities, namely:

- SMAC and PMAC,
- the Police EOD teams (cross-trained in mine clearance and BAC, and in survey)
- policy and oversight responsibilities of the national/regional mine action authorities.

Formulate an exit strategy for continued UNDP support to the mine action programme, with the following graduation points:

- graduation from full time technical advisory services<sup>106</sup> once the following local capacities are in place and functioning adequately:
- national/regional authorities
- Mine Action Centres (SMAC and PMAC)
- Police EOD teams
- modest demining units.<sup>107</sup>
- graduation from further technical support from UNDP for mine action;<sup>108</sup>
- graduation from any further assistance from UNDP.

Prepare a request to the EC for a no-cost extension of the existing grant agreement for mine action. The funds budgeted for establishing a mine clearance capacity within the *Daraweesh* should be re-allocated to allow the extension of other capacity development support (SMAC, PMAC, Police EOD teams, and policy advice to the TFG) until a new programme strategy is in place and additional funds mobilized.

## TO THE UNDP COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

Convert the position of Chief Technical Advisor for Mine Action into a Project Manager for the Mine Action Component of ROLS,<sup>109</sup> to be responsible for management of all aspects of the mine action component (including the establishment of links with other ROLS components) and to serve as part of a ROLS programme management team.

Review whether the role of UNOPS in executing the mine action component has led to the component being treated as something apart from the rest of ROLS and, if so, resolve the problem.

## TO THE EC DELEGATION FOR SOMALIA

Approve the no-cost extension request referred to above (assuming basic process and quality requirements are met).

<sup>106</sup> At this point, there **may** be no need for a separate mine action component within ROLS or a successor programme. A security system reform programme (or component of ROLS) would probably be able to provide the requisite level of support (financial plus short-term technical assistance). This will largely depend on the security situation in South Central – if security allows the establishment of a mine action programme in those regions, then a distinct mine action component might still be warranted.

<sup>107</sup> These results would take 18-24 months to achieve, given adequate resources.

<sup>108</sup> After this point, further financial assistance might still be warranted and might be channeled via the UNDP to support mine action in Somalia.

<sup>109</sup> The Evaluation Team understands that discussions are underway within UNDP-Somalia to convert the CTA positions into Project Managers of the various programme components, using the PRINCE2 (**PR**ojects **IN** Controlled Environments) model.



### TO THE HALO TRUST

Consider initiating a mine clearance programme in Puntland, to focus on the larger minefields in the border regions of Northern Mudug. To the degree possible, suitably qualified and motivated members of the *Daraweesh* should be selected for training as potential deminers.

Participate actively in the preparation of revised mine action strategies for Somaliland and Puntland.

### TO THE DANISH DEMINING GROUP

Participate actively in the preparation of revised mine action strategy for Somaliland.

Consider a further extension of the DDG programme in Somaliland to scale-up the pilot Village Stockpile Destruction Initiative (VSDI) in cooperation with the Somaliland Police EOD Teams, with a view to transferring responsibility for this programme to the Police service.



### 3. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO SUDAN

#### INTRODUCTION

This report provides the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from an evaluation of EC-funded mine action activities in Sudan. This evaluation is part of a broader regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Africa, the focus of which is on policy, strategy, and programming rather than performance in implementing individual projects. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are appended as Annex 1 of the overall report.

The Sudan component of the regional evaluation is based on the findings of a mission by Vera Bohle to Khartoum from 21-27 March 2007 and of a mission by Léonie Barnes<sup>110</sup> to Juba from 10-20 April, coupled with a document review by the team leader, Ted Paterson. The Evaluation Team benefited greatly from the excellent support provided by the EC delegation in Khartoum, and by the United Nations Mine Action Offices in Khartoum and Juba.

#### BACKGROUND

##### ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION

The first mentioning of the use of (field-manufactured) landmines in Sudan dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century British army campaigns in Africa. In 1884, following operations in Sudan, General Gordon wrote *“Landmines are the thing for defence in the future. We have covered the works with them, and they have done much execution.”*<sup>111</sup>

The current landmine and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination in Sudan stems from:

- World War II – conflict between Germany and the U.K. around the Sudanese-Chadian-Libyan-Egyptian border, resulting in minefields along the northern borders of Sudan.
- First Civil War (1955-1972) – 17 years of fighting between North and South Sudan, initiated before independence (1 January 1956).
- Second Civil War (1983-2005) – 22 years of fighting between North and South Sudan. The main combatants were the Government of Sudan (GOS) military and the opposition in the South, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), together with its political branch, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The bulk of mines in the southern and eastern provinces were laid during this period.
- Darfur (2003-) – A civil war in Western Sudan creating a major humanitarian crisis, despite the involvement of African Union peace-keeping troupes. So far, there is no evidence of the use of landmines, but there is a growing ERW problem.
- Chadian-Sudanese conflict (2005-) – There are also no reports of mine laying, but any fighting will lead to ERW contamination.
- Fighting among various local militia groups plus inter-ethnic/tribal conflicts have further complicated the picture, as has the ongoing incursion of the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), into and surrounding the south-western part of South

<sup>110</sup> Vera Bohle is Evaluation and Disarmament Specialist in the GICHD; Léonie Barnes is National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) Officer.

<sup>111</sup> Mike Croll: *“The History of Landmines”*, Pen & Sword Books, November 1998.



Sudan and Uganda, which has also led to limited landmine and ERW contamination on the Ugandan border.<sup>112</sup>

The second civil war was a guerrilla conflict with the government holding towns and SPLA controlling the countryside. The GOS used anti-personnel landmines to protect its garrison towns and to interdict the movement of SPLA supplies and forces. On the other side, SPLA used landmines to block government forces in the towns and to interdict their supply lines by planting anti-vehicle mines on roads. Landmines were also used to terrorize local populations to diminish support for the opposition. Further, Human Rights Watch reports that the GOS has used landmines in its efforts to control the oil fields in southern Sudan.<sup>113</sup>

As a result, 21 of the 26 states in Sudan are believed to have an explosives contamination problem, with contamination heaviest in the South, where the bulk of the fighting took place in the last North-South civil war. In the North, three main areas have been affected: Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) and Blue Nile states, plus the Abyei area – the so-called “Three Areas”<sup>114</sup> (see map).

In the South and in the Three Areas, landmine and ERW contaminated areas include agricultural land, livestock grazing land, areas utilized for firewood and producing charcoal, access routes and connection roads between major towns and villages; bridge, and major transport routes to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Kenya. Landmine and ERW contamination threatens civilian social and economic infrastructure and impedes socio-economic recovery and development. In addition, the contamination either prevents or delays the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees to their home communities.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> The Landmine Monitor (2006) reports alleged use along the borders with Chad, Eritrea, Libya and Uganda up to 2004.


<sup>113</sup> Human Rights Watch interviews with witnesses to casualties caused by government-laid land mines, Kenya-Sudan border, August 1999

<sup>114</sup> The Three Areas have a mixed ethnic composition and oil reserves, and the disputed border between the North and South runs through them.

<sup>115</sup> The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006 to 2011 (May 2006)



# General Threat Map with the Result of LIS



The Survey Action Centre (SAC) got involved in Sudan in June 2003, conducting an Advance Survey Mission in Southern Kordofan. By March 2007, Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) had been completed in two states: Eastern Equatoria (South) and Blue Nile (Three Areas).<sup>116</sup> In Eastern Equatoria, 43 of 400 communities are impacted, with 83 suspected hazardous areas

<sup>116</sup> By October 2007, seven states had been completed.



(SHA) and 28 recent victims identified, which indicates a moderate landmine and ERW problem. A total of 83,000 people dwell in the affected communities, and the LIS identified a further 53,000 refugees and IDPs yet to return. In Blue Nile (north), only two communities were categorized as highly impacted, two as medium, and 29 as low. Thus, only 6.3% of the 523 communities are impacted by landmines in this state, with only 10 victims between November 2004 and January 2007 – a modest problem.<sup>117</sup>

So far, the full extent of contamination is not determined: *“In this type of fast-moving warfare, records are rarely kept, and those that may exist are often inaccurate or out of date.”*<sup>118</sup> By March 2007, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) has registered dangerous areas (DAs) in seven regions (some regions such as Darfur, Kordofan and Equatoria have more than one state).<sup>119</sup>

**Table 6 – Dangerous areas by region**

Region	Total number of DA	DA cleared	DA awaiting clearance
Bahr El Ghazai	350	123	227
Blue Nile	138	46	92
Darfur	53	44	9
Kassala	46	17	29
Equatoria	678	138	540
Kordofan	543	355	188
Upper Nile	97	14	83
Total	1,905	737	1,168

Since 2002, of the known 1,905 DAs, over 735 have been verified as safe or cleared,<sup>120</sup> with 3,238 anti-personnel (AP) mines, 1,682 anti-vehicle (AV) mines, 232,645 small-arms ammunition rounds and 408,225 UXOs/AXOs found. A total of 1,168 DAs are awaiting clearance, of which a slight majority (656) are suspected minefields. So far, clearance efforts indicate that there are not large numbers of mines and the perceived threat is far greater than the actual threat.

By August 2007, more than 18,500 kilometres of key supply and access routes have been confirmed safe to travel. Over 1,810 km of roads have been demined,<sup>121</sup> and more than 1.7 million Sudanese have received mine risk education (MRE).<sup>122</sup> Compared to 2002, the landmine/ERW casualty rate has dropped from over 170 to under 100 in 2006. However, the numbers of recorded victims has actually increased between 2005 and 2006, and may further increase if accidents continue in 2007 at the current rate. As victim statistics cannot be considered comprehensive, it is difficult to determine whether this represents more accidents or simply reflects more complete recording.

<sup>117</sup> Figures from SAC (2006), Landmine Impact Survey Sudan: Eastern Equatoria State, SAC (2007) Landmine Impact Survey Sudan: Blue Nile State.

<sup>118</sup> UN Landmine and UXO safety leaflet for Sudan, June 2003.


<sup>119</sup> All figures from UNMAO IMSMA Monthly Report, March 2007.

<sup>120</sup> The majority of the cleared DAs were unexploded ordnance (UXO) or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) rather than minefields (528 UXO spots, 47 ammunition dumps, 43 confrontation areas and 9 ambush areas, compared to 107 minefields). The clearance of minefields is far more time consuming than UXO or AXO tasks.

<sup>121</sup> Demining includes both survey and clearance.

<sup>122</sup> See also: The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006 to 2011.



**Figure 8 – Landmine/UXO victims recorded by year**

Since early 2004, there have been no reports on landmine use in Sudan, which can be considered a great success stemming from the Government's adoption of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and SPLM's signing of the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.<sup>123</sup> It also shows the commitment of both the GOS and SPLM/A to live up to these international commitments. Unfortunately, this does not mean that the problem is solved, as there remain conflicts in Sudan. Even worse, in April 2006 al-Qaeda reportedly instructed the *mujahadeen* in Sudan to begin stockpiling landmines and other weapons for long-term war in Darfur.<sup>124</sup>

The main conclusions on contamination are:

- Landmines and other ERW create a problem in Sudan, mainly in the South and the Three Areas, by hindering refugee return, the delivery of emergency aid, and development efforts.
- Suspected contamination on roads has been the principal difficulty.
- The full extent of contamination is not yet known, and remains difficult to assess.
- There are not large numbers of mines, but the perceived threat is a problem that inhibits use of infrastructure and other socio-economic assets.

## HISTORY OF MINE ACTION

Acknowledging the problems of landmine contamination, in 1996 the SPLM/A declared a unilateral moratorium on the use of landmines provided the GOS reciprocated. The SPLM/A also created Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL), in part to address the issue of landmines and UXO in the areas under its control. OSIL later became one of the national partner 'NGOs'<sup>125</sup> for international NGOs.

In 1999, GOS and SPLM/A pledged not to use mines and asked for international assistance in the clearance of landmines. SPLM/A invited international NGOs into the areas of their control to begin mine clearance.

<sup>123</sup> The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment is an instrument committing non-state actors to the same obligations as States Parties to the Ottawa Convention.

<sup>124</sup> Landmine Monitor 2006

<sup>125</sup> Organisations like OSIL in the South or JASMAR in the North are called national NGOs, even though they are closely affiliated with the respective governments. It would be more accurate to view them as parastatal organisations.



In 2001, the Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI) was created with funds from the EC, contracted through Oxfam, to initiate cross-line information gathering and to develop plans for mine action. SLIRI then established 15 Sector Operation Centres in both GOS and SPLM controlled areas.

The 2002 Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement between GOS and SPLM/A established the international Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the ceasefire and created an opportunity for safe mine action in Southern Kordofan. In the same year, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the GOS, SPLM, and UNMAS. The ensuing concept plan for Emergency Mine Action in Sudan<sup>126</sup> established national and regional coordination mechanisms in Khartoum, the Nuba Mountains and Rumbek.

JMC had a civil-military coordination (CIMIC) component to promote peace, and the first mine clearance projects were also launched as peace-building initiatives.<sup>127</sup> Deminers were trained from both north and south to work in the same organisation. It was hoped that the survey teams' data gathering on the impact of mines and UXO would help overcome regional divisions. The JMC completed its mission mid-2005.

Both GOS and SPLM/A showed further commitment to a mine action programme in Sudan by accepting the obligations of the APMBC. SPLM The signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001. GOS ratified the Convention in October 2003 and it entered into force on 1 April 2004.

The Swiss Federation for Mine Action (FSD) route survey teams began operations in February 2004. In collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNMAS, priority routes for reconstruction were assessed and DAs identified. Mechem, under contract with UNOPS, began survey and clearance of routes in March 2004.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) had been working in southern Sudan most of the time since 1986, and expanded their programme from food security, health care, and other humanitarian/development components to include mine action in 2004, when sustainable peace seemed in sight.

Also in 2004, GOS, SPLM, and the UN signed the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework.<sup>128</sup> These frameworks stated that mine action in Sudan would have a "one-country-approach" covering the period 2005-2011. It established cross-line cooperation and allowed for more systematic data gathering and survey,<sup>129</sup> starting first in the Nuba Mountains and gradually with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) spreading through the south, concentrating initially in and around the garrison<sup>130</sup> towns of Wau, Malakal and Juba.

<sup>126</sup> Chris Clark, Technical Advisor, Sudan 19<sup>th</sup> April 2002

<sup>127</sup> The NGOs Danish Church Aid (DCA) and Landmine Action U.K. (LMA) started operations in the Nuba mountains. LMA had taken over from Oxfam, was EC-funded and worked with SLIRI. DCA had the national NGO partners JASMAR from the North and OSIL from the South. The idea behind this was capacity development, which has proved to be extremely difficult, as discussed below.

<sup>128</sup> The latest (draft) versions of the Strategic & Policy Frameworks are dated June 2006.

<sup>129</sup> Including the EC-funded Technical Survey Teams for Emergency Mine Action Programme (Nuba Mountains). EUR 400,000 was provided to UNMAS, which in turn sub-contract FSD for the work.

<sup>130</sup> These were held by the GoS armed forces inside the SPLM/A area of operations. They are strategic transport hubs in the south, and heavy fighting around them plus minefields along the routes in and out led to significant contamination.



Collectively, these initiatives allowed a flexible response to mine action needs even prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in early 2005. However, mine action efforts expanded significantly after the signing of the CPA.

#### **Textbox 10 – The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)**

Following the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sponsored peace talks in Kenya from September 2002 to December 2004, the parties (GOS and SPLM) signed the CPA on 9 January 2005. The CPA builds on a number of protocols and arrangements, including the:

- Machakos Protocol of 20 July 2002, in which parties resolved *“the status of State and Religion and the Right of Self-Determination for the people of South Sudan.”*
- Agreement on the Security Arrangements during the Interim Period of 25 September 2003: parties agreed to an *“internationally monitored ceasefire which shall come into effect from the date of signature of a comprehensive peace agreement.”*
- Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-Interim and Interim Period of 7 January 2004: parties agreed to create wealth sharing mechanisms.
- Protocol of Power Sharing of 26 May 2004: Parties agreed on power sharing and the need for *“democracy, respect for human rights, justice, the devolution of powers...”*. This provides for a largely autonomous government for Southern Sudan, as well as a role for Southern Sudan within the national Government.
- Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities during the Pre-Interim and Interim Period of 31 December 2004.

The CPA states that a power-sharing government consisting of the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) will rule the country for six years until 2011, after which a referendum will be held in the south to decide whether to stay as a united Sudan or to form a separate state of South Sudan. Specific regulations have been agreed for the Three Areas, where the final North-South boundary has not yet been agreed.

The CPA also asks for UN involvement to “support the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter”, including Humanitarian Assistance, Recovery and Development. The CPA explicitly calls for assistance of peace support missions in the area of mine action.

#### **Textbox 11 – The establishment of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)**

The basis for the current UN Peace Support Operation was laid in July 2004, when the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) was established in response to the signing of the Naivasha/Machakos protocols by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. While the Advance Mission’s mandate had a strong focus on the development of peace operations in support of a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government and the SPLM/A, from the beginning it had to deploy many of its resources in support of the continuing crisis in Darfur.

Following the signing of the CPA, the international community established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with the adoption of resolution 1590 in the Security Council on 24 March 2005. The UN had been involved as an observer in the peace talks, and was requested by the parties in the various protocols and in the CPA to constitute a “lean, effective, sustainable and affordable UN peace support mission”<sup>131</sup> with the key task of monitoring and verifying the ceasefire agreement and a broader role in supporting the full implementation of the CPA as provided for under Chapter VI in the UN Charter.

<sup>131</sup> “Sudan Unified Mission Plan”, page 32, [www.sudanig.org](http://www.sudanig.org)



The Mission Mandate according to Security Council Resolution 1590 expresses the determination to help the people of Sudan to promote national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability, and the protection of all citizens. UNMIS should support the implementation of the CPA by performing various tasks, including support for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigations of violations, donor liaison, assist DDR programmes and in restructuring the police services, promote the rule of law and human rights, facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs, and humanitarian assistance, *inter alia*, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions. Within the mandate, UNMIS should also “assist the parties to the CPA in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination”<sup>132</sup>

A Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is mandated to coordinate all activities of the UN system in Sudan, and to mobilize resources and support from the international community. As the peace-building process also concerns militias and foreign armed groups (e.g. Lord’s Resistance Army – LRA – the rebel group from Northern Uganda), which may threaten the peace in Southern Sudan, the Mission has a force protection mandate, which can provide the necessary means to protect UN personnel and facilities and to ensure the freedom of movement for UN personnel. The Military component of the Mission is headed by the Force Commander, who is responsible for the monitoring/verification and Force Protection functions of the Mission.

The UNMIS mandate has a time frame of seven years from the signature of the CPA: six months pre-interim, six years interim, and six months post-interim to see through the implementation of the result of the referendum on national unity.

The overall goal of UNMIS is to serve to make national unity attractive for Sudan, in a three pillar process:

1. Make peace sustainable;
2. Guarantee human rights of all the people of Sudan, irrespective of race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth;
3. Reduce poverty and the high levels of economic inequality and lift the standard of living of the poorest segments of society through good economic governance.

The decisions of the mission are consent based, and depend thus on the full cooperation of all parties.

Chapter VI of the CPA states that UNMIS will assist the Parties’ demining efforts by providing technical advice and coordination. (This is also reflected in UN Security Council Regulation 1590, which established UNMIS.) According to the UNMIS Unified Mission Plan,<sup>133</sup> UNMAS is the coordinator of a common UN mine action program. Mine action will focus on three key areas:

- Development of a mine action programme, surveying of potentially contaminated area, clearance of priority areas, victim rehabilitation and mine risk education.
- Clearance of priority roads to facilitate the deployment of the military and civilian police components of the Mission. This includes Juba airport and UNMIS and other UN deployment sites.

<sup>132</sup> “Sudan Unified Mission Plan”, page 7, [www.sudanig.org](http://www.sudanig.org)

<sup>133</sup> The “Sudan Unified Mission Plan” is available at [www.sudanig.org](http://www.sudanig.org)



- National capacity building through support to the national mine action authorities and national NGOs in both the North and the South. This includes the development of national technical standards.

The Mission Plan further proposes the development of a country-wide mine action strategy for the United Nations and its partners to:

- Support the GoNU and the GoSS in their development of national capacity to carry out their mine action programme;
- Oversee the work of UNMAS and UNDP, as well as other UN mine actors;<sup>134</sup>
- Assist in creating a safe and secure environment for humanitarian and development activities, and the deployment of UNMIS.<sup>135</sup>

UNMAS, in collaboration with UNOPS, has established a UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) in Khartoum, with regional offices in Juba (controlling sub-offices in Wau, Rumbek, Malakal and Yei), Kadugli (controlling sub-offices in Damazin and Kassala), and Darfur (controlling the sub-office in Al Fashir). This decentralised structure is expensive as it requires many international personnel, but it serves the needs of a large country with little infrastructure.

The main implementing partners for mine action remain the international NGOs (mainly in cooperation with national ‘NGOs’) and commercial contractors. UNMAO has not only taken on a coordinating role, but it also administers and supervises contracts<sup>136</sup> for the tasks identified as priorities by Steering Committees.<sup>137</sup> In addition, UNMAO coordinates the tasking of the demining assets of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC).

WFP also issues contracts for survey and road clearance.<sup>138</sup> Coordination between WFP and UNMAO has generally been sound, and priorities for road work are clear as the criteria are (i) opening access to Uganda and Kenya and (ii) supporting IDP and refugee return through major regional areas and then to smaller communities.

The CPA specifies the establishment of two national demining authorities (Northern and Southern). These should coordinate their activities in close cooperation with UNMAO. In the North, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established 24 December 2005 through Presidential Decree No. 299 and officially launched on 07 March 2006. It is based in the same building as the UNMAO, and reports to the government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), which in turn reports to an inter-ministerial commission under the lead of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs.

<sup>134</sup> The UN Interagency Policy and Strategy specifies roles for a number of UN agencies such as UNDP (capacity building), UNICEF (MRE), WFP (mine action in support of emergency assistance/food delivery), UNHCR (mine action in support of repatriation of refugees).

<sup>135</sup> “Sudan Unified Mission Plan”, page 32, [www.sudanig.org](http://www.sudanig.org)

<sup>136</sup> Technically, UNOPS issues the contracts on behalf of DPKO/UNMAS.

<sup>137</sup> The bulk of mine action funding has come from the ‘assessed budget’ for UNMIS, covering the UNMIS ‘forces mission’. The UN’s Voluntary Trust Fund for mine action covers other humanitarian priorities and can thus also fill gaps that appear in the UNMIS funding. The Steering Committees comprise representatives of UNMIS and the Sudanese Governments.

<sup>138</sup> On signing of the CPA, WFP switched all efforts to road repair and reconstruction to reduce costs – since 2002/3 WFP has reduced the percentage of airlifted food from 80% to under 7%. Some 300 Sudanese are employed on the demining programme and over 1400 Sudanese employed in road repairs work. This demining project is a component of a large road construction programme, running from 2004 – 2008.



In the South, the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (NSMAD) was formally established in Juba<sup>139</sup> in 2005. It is also collocated with the UNMAO Regional Office. NSMAD was established in name only with little capacity to conduct coordination activities, liaison, or mine action planning. In August 2005, the Deputy Director of the NSMAD was removed from his duties by the SPLM/A without explanation. In June 2006, NSMAD was re-named to Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC), through the GOSS Presidential Decree No. 45 and headed by the same Director, who wants to establish sub-offices throughout the regions to fulfil the coordination and liaison role and, eventually, for direct operational control over the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDU) of the armed forces.<sup>140</sup> As well, in 2006, the Transport and Demining Steering Committee was established in Southern Sudan to agree mine action priorities. It is chaired by the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator and is said to work well.

Since 2001, a variety of projects have supported landmine surveys of various types (see Textbox). Due to access and security problems, these surveys have not yet provided a complete picture of explosives contamination in Sudan or the socio-economic impact of this contamination. In spite of this, the EC has not financed Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) in Sudan, although it has been one of the principal donors for LIS in general.

#### Textbox 12– Mine Action Survey & Information Management in Sudan

There is great confusion relating to the types of surveys utilised in the mine action field. They can be categorised by scope (broad or single task) and focus (explosive hazards or socio-economic impacts). Within each category, surveys can organise and analyse the data by individual demining task or by community (i.e. embracing all the Danger Areas [DA] affecting a community). Examples include:

	<b>Broad (i.e. covering all or a large region of a country)</b>	<b>Single task (or cluster of tasks in the same area)</b>
<b>Suspected hazard areas (SHA)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level 1* or general survey (some just focus on hazards)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Task planning survey ('Level 2')</li> <li>• Technical survey ('Level 2')</li> <li>• Clearance certification survey (QC – 'Level 3')</li> </ul>
<b>Socio-economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General survey (some incorporate socio-economic data as well as hazards data)</li> <li>• LIS**</li> <li>• (broad) Post-clearance land use survey</li> <li>• Landmines &amp; livelihoods survey (Yemen)**</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Post-clearance land use ('Level 4')</li> <li>• Task Impact Assessment (TIA) for single tasks</li> <li>• TIA for community (Sri Lanka)**</li> <li>• Community Integrated Mine Action Planning (Bosnia)**</li> </ul>

\* Levels 1, 2, 3, 4 survey is old terminology, but still in use.

\*\* Community survey (as opposed to task survey)

Different surveys serve different purposes. Broad surveys are required to get an overview of the scope and nature of contamination in a country at a particular point in time. These are typically commissioned during an emergency (e.g. when masses of refugees are returning following a peace agreement) or as a prelude to the development of a national mine action strategy, when important resource allocation decisions must be made (e.g. the quantity and mix of demining

<sup>139</sup> Having been relocated from Nairobi where it had been since its formation in 2002.

<sup>140</sup> However, according to the UNMAO South Deputy Programme Manager, there are no current plans for the JIDUs to work in areas where SSDC has opened sub offices.



assets, and the allocation of demining assets across affected regions). In such instances, time is of the essence, so a big survey is done on a 'campaign basis'. Because the intent is to get the 'big picture' in short order, not enough data on SHA or communities are collected for operational tasking of demining assets.

Thus, mine action programmes also need the capacity to conduct on-going surveys for detailed assessments of specific demining tasks or the requirements of a specific mine-affected community. These surveys will eventually cover all communities and SHA on a rolling basis over a period of years.

In short, while there are overlaps in the data collected in the different survey categories, they serve complementary purposes. We need both the big picture to allocate resources and detailed information to establish priorities for specific tasks. We need technical data to ensure the right quantity and mix of demining assets are assigned to a specific task, and socio-economic data to assess which tasks will deliver the greatest benefits and, therefore, should be accorded priority.

Apart from survey, clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance, and capacity building, the destruction of AP mine stockpiles as required by the Ottawa Convention has started with the first batch in April 2007. All stockpiles need to be destroyed by 30 April 2008.

Conclusions on the history of mine action:

- Mine action in Sudan started as soon as there were opportunities.
- In a very difficult environment, mine action has been a significant peace-building tool, supported by all stakeholders.
- Both the GoNU and SPLM/A have shown commitment, at least at the political level. The CPA, the Sudan National Mine Action Policy & Strategic Frameworks, the APMBC, and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment have established the basic foundation for a national mine action programme, although the UNMAO now serves as the principal mechanism for planning, coordination, and oversight of operations.
- A mechanism for coordinating international assistance for mine action has also been established, and efforts to develop national capacities have been initiated. The latter needs to be considered as work in progress, and is seen as a priority by UNMAO until its departure in 2011. For various reasons, cooperation with the national centres has not always been good.<sup>141</sup>
- Survey and clearance have been initiated and appear to be delivering results.<sup>142</sup>

## FUNDING

Following the adoption of the CPA and considering the ongoing crisis in Darfur, a donor conference in Oslo (April 2005) resulted in pledges of USD 4.5 billion for Sudan. These pledges were confirmed by the Sudan Donor Consortium meeting held in Paris in March 2006.

Funding for mine action in Sudan is provided through various channels:

- the DPKO Assessed Budget to support peacekeeping operations (i.e. wherever UNMIS has a mandate to operate);
- the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) in support of mine action generally (including where the Assessed Budget contribution is insufficient);

<sup>141</sup> This was mentioned by many representatives from international mine action organizations. Undoubtedly, national mine action officials have their frustrations with international actors as well.

<sup>142</sup> The Evaluation Team did not investigate MRE and landmine survivor assistance in any depth, as the EC has not provided significant funding for these.



- the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) managed through the Deputy Resident Coordinator – mainly for national MRE agencies, but also for survey (including part of the LIS), clearance and emergency route verification;
- the WFP for survey and clearance in support of road repair and reconstruction;<sup>143</sup> and
- grants from donors directly to international NGOs.

Mine action in Sudan has received significant amounts from the international community. Since 2004, UNMAO has registered a total of over USD 100 million (see tables in Annex). Between 2004 and 2005, the budget quadrupled from USD 10 million to USD 40 million; mainly due to increases in the assessed budget. In 2006, it increased again to over USD 50 million, a sum that will probably be achieved in 2007 as well. These figures do not include, for example, rural development programmes with a demining component, or clearance done on behalf of oil companies by demining firms. They also do not cover WFP funds. Furthermore, some purely mine action projects do not seem to be included in the UNMAO data (for example the EUR 1.5 million EC grant to MAG in 2005).<sup>144</sup>

The largest share of funding has been channelled through DPKO (of which UNMAS is a part). In 2004, the assessed peacekeeping budget provided 20% of all mine action funds, but since then it made up about 50%. In 2007, it is likely to increase to 75% of the total budget. According to the UNMAO, 70% of the UNMIS budget is used to deal with UNMIS priorities, which means primarily roads. Other donors included the EC (Europe Aid, EDF, and ECHO), EU member states, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and USA.

In addition, WFP had a budget of USD 12 million for mine clearance. At the moment, it has let contracts for six major roads in the South.<sup>145</sup>

To this point, the extent of the contributions from Sudan's governments to mine action remains unknown. All the staff of the national mine action centres and sub offices are on government payrolls, and the GoNU has funded demining operations for certain infrastructure projects.<sup>146</sup>

## EC Funding for Mine Action

Although it is difficult to compile a comprehensive accounting of EC-funding for Mine Action in Sudan,<sup>147</sup> it appears that, since 2001, the EC has funded 16 projects totalling approximately EUR 12.5 million. Over half of this came via the dedicated budget line for mine action (APL budget line).<sup>148</sup> The EDF Humanitarian Plus Programmes (HPP 1 & 2)<sup>149</sup> funded 4 projects, and others

<sup>143</sup> Most of the WFP road projects are funded by the GOSS.

<sup>144</sup> There are also other inconsistencies between the UNMAO list of donor contributions and the EC list of projects. For this reason, all figures are estimates. The Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions 2002-2004 (March 2005) also noted the difficulty in compiling a complete account of EC/ECHO-funded mine action.

<sup>145</sup> The WFP roads project is included in the reporting of the Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) as a component of the Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project (SETIDP), with a total budget of \$30 million. Other SETIDP projects have a total budget of \$777 million, of which \$250 million is via the MDTF. Funds for demining support are incorporated into the financing plan.

<sup>146</sup> See "Minister of Finance Receives Certificate of Achievement on Landmine Action", *Sudanese Media Centre*, 10 July 2007.

<sup>147</sup> This echoes the finding reported in the Global Assessment. The list of projects identified by the Evaluation Team is given in an Annex.

<sup>148</sup> From 2004, these funds were managed through the EC delegation in Khartoum rather than directly from Brussels.



were funded by ECHO (3 projects) and the Rapid Response Mechanism (1 project).<sup>150</sup> As well, the Community Based Relief and Rehabilitation Programme (RRP), with EUR 50 million in STABEX funding<sup>151</sup> at its disposal, has granted EUR 10.7 million to two NGO consortia for projects that incorporate mine action.<sup>152</sup>

**Table 7 – EC funding for mine action**

EC Funding Channel	Amount
APL budget line (6 projects)	EUR 6,645,000
EDF (HPP – 4 projects)	1,788,018
ECHO (3 projects)	1,238,442
RRM (1 project)	1,100,000
Unclear (2 projects)	1,806,000
<b>Total (16 projects)</b>	<b>12,577,460</b>
Pending (ECHO?)	<b>588,328</b>
<b>Memo item:</b> The STABEX funded Community Based RRP has provided EUR 10.7 million for two projects incorporating mine action support.	

As depicted in figure 2, the bulk of EC-funding for mine action has been directed to the Three Areas (primarily Southern Kordovan – Nuba Mountains), with support going also to the South and Eastern regions once programming became possible in these areas in 2005 and 2006 respectively (see Figure 9). Much of the EC assistance has been provided to three international NGOs (in sequence, Oxfam, LMA, HALO Trust) which sought to work with SLIRI and its associated local NGOs (see Figure 10).<sup>153</sup>

<sup>149</sup> The first HPP (EUR 15 million) was released from unspent EDF balances in 2002, on the condition that the GOS would delegate administration to the EC (i.e. the NAO was not involved) so it could be channeled ‘around’ the government. A further EUR 12.5 million was made available in 2004 (HPP 2).

<sup>150</sup> The Rapid Reaction Mechanism was created by EC Council Regulation No 381/2001 “...to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence of crisis.” This was administered via a separate budget line, managed by Brussels (similar to the APL budget line).

<sup>151</sup> STABEX (*Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation*) was an EC compensatory financing scheme to smooth export earnings from agricultural commodities for ACP countries. It was part of the Lomé Convention, and abolished by the Cotonou Agreement in 2002.

<sup>152</sup> MAG is providing mine action services for one consortium, which DanChurchAid (DCA) covers the second. These are discussed later in the report.

<sup>153</sup> SLIRI was originally established as an NGO in Kenya, and has never managed to obtain legal standing as a local NGO in Sudan. It formed SLR, which did obtain NGO status from the GoSS, and – somewhat later – SLADO, which sought registration from the GoNU. Their experience is discussed later in this report.



Figure 9 – Regional breakdown of EC support for mine action





Figure 10 – Recipients of EC funding for mine action



### Conclusions on Mine Action Funding

- UNMIS and donors have allocated significant amounts to mine action in Sudan;
- The UN agencies have been successful in raising the funds required to implement their plans. Contributions such as the EC grants to NGOs can be considered as welcome additions to the plan;
- The outlook for international funding to Sudan seems positive until 2011 unless the continuing conflict in Darfur precipitates a larger crisis. The mine action share within the overall funding envelope is not clearly defined for future years; and
- The EC has provided significant assistance to mine action, but most of its support is not being channelled via the UN system, or incorporated into the UNMAO annual work plans.



## CURRENT SITUATION

### CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Sudan's political development is at a critical juncture after decades of war. There have been delays in constitutional reform and the delineation of the North-South border. In the South, GoSS institutions and programmes are slowly being strengthened, with uneven implementation of the relevant actions in the CPA. The conflict and humanitarian crisis in Darfur threatens to crowd-out UN efforts elsewhere. The donors' aggregate commitments to Sudan are on track relative to the Oslo pledging conference, but the composition of aid has shifted significantly towards Darfur.<sup>154</sup>

The CPA between the North and South allows humanitarian and development assistance activities. Peace-building efforts appear to be making progress, but until the referendum is held in the South in 2011 it would be over-optimistic to speak of a sustainable political solution. The elections planned for 2009 will be a good indicator of the overall mood of the population. For this reason, it is important that the peace dividend comes quickly, especially in the South, to make peace more attractive than conflict.

At present the situation in South Sudan remains stable yet tense. Inter-clan conflicts continue to flare-up in various parts of the ten states (generally, cropland versus cattle conflicts). The Lord's Resistance Army continues to trouble communities in and around the southern border areas. Good governance at national, regional and community levels remains an ongoing struggle which contributes to the general level of stress within the Southern Sudanese community. People who have lived with conflict for an extended period find it difficult to grasp the concept of negotiation – violence is often a first response rather than last resort. The general feeling within the communities, repeated at all levels, is however that, "if the peace holds", life will improve.

#### Textbox 13 – Difficult demining operations in South Sudan

In the last two years, two expatriate deminers and one local deminer were killed in an ambush while conducting a road survey. Another two expatriates were abducted and force-marched at gunpoint. During the evaluation mission, two senior expatriate staff of an NGO were arrested and confined to office for over two weeks, while the life of a member of the UN was threatened by an armed senior officer of the SPLA, who then stole the UN vehicle. In 2005 another UN officer was threatened with gaol while on a liaison task between SPLA Police and a demining company.

Local deminers recently went on strike, demanding pay rises effectively immediately, which made it impossible to continue with any mine action for a period of time. Negotiations between deminers and agencies were tense and in the end were facilitated by the UNMAO and members of the UNMIS and SPLA rather than the SSDC.

Two expatriate programme managers have effectively been expelled from the region – one declared *persona non grata*; the other denied a visa.

Important progress has been made in terms of establishing the government apparatus in the South. Ministries have been created; ministers and secretaries have been appointed; steering committees are established; annual budgets and reviews made; and work plans developed, shared and implemented at the Government and UN agency levels.

<sup>154</sup> Assessment of the World Bank, in *World Bank Sudan: Multi Donor Trust Funds Progress Report*, 1 May- 31 October 2006.



The situation in Darfur remains a problem, and there is no solution in sight. The African Union (AU) peacekeepers in Darfur cannot control the situation. From news reports, they are unable to operate due to logistic problems. The lack of security makes work for international NGOs dangerous or impossible. A controversial Darfur Peace Agreement has not been implemented, and the existence of multiple militias, which are in conflict among themselves as well as with the government, complicates the task of the international community in its relations with the GoNU.

As well, the unresolved situation of the Three Areas has the potential to derail the peace process. The definition of the North/South boundary is still a sensitive issue, due in part to oil fields in these areas.

### OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The level of reconstruction and development that has occurred in the 18 months since signing of the CPA is staggering. Roads have been rebuilt; access to regional and rural areas improved; the cost of building materials has fallen, as have market commodity prices; access to health facilities and schools has improved; and local industry in the major towns has grown remarkably.

The IMF has given a positive assessment on economic performance in Sudan following its annual Article IV consultations. Economic growth is robust and, by 2010 the IMF forecasts that nominal GDP will be more than double its 2005 value in US dollar terms, and it will be more than four times its 2000 value.<sup>155</sup> This growth is fuelled in large part by foreign investment, particularly by the Chinese and focused on natural resources. This robust economic growth and the expanding commitment by China means the GoNU has significant resources to pursue its own priorities without the need to placate Western donors.

### OVERALL PLANS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

After the IGAD peace talks and the signing of the CPA, the World Bank and the UN, with endorsement and participation of the Sudanese governments,<sup>156</sup> launched a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to assess recovery and development needs.<sup>157</sup> In lieu of a Government Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the JAM has led to a framework and roadmap accepted by most stakeholders. The UN and the World Bank are aligning their assistance strategies with the JAM, as are many donors including the EC.

The JAM follows a sectoral approach with eight thematic clusters:

1. Capacity Building and Institutional Development
2. Governance and Rule of Law
3. Economic Policy
4. Productive Sectors
5. Basic Social Services
6. Infrastructure
7. Livelihoods and Social Protection
8. Information and Statistics.

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<sup>155</sup> GDP 2000 \$12.3 bn (actual); GDP 2005 \$27.7 bn (actual); GDP 2010 \$59 bn (projected).

<sup>156</sup> Seventeen UN agencies, 10 bilateral donors, seven multilateral organisations and other Sudanese and international stakeholders participated and engaged in the JAM.

<sup>157</sup> The result has been a report in three volumes: Joint Assessment Mission Sudan Volume I (Synthesis. Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication), Volume II (Cluster Costings and Matrices), and Volume III (Cluster Reports), 18 March 2005



Cross cutting issues are environment, HIV/AIDS, conflict, human rights, and gender. Furthermore, there is a specific geographic focus on the Three Areas.

The JAM process has led to much stronger coordination among donors at a sectoral level, especially among the key donors (EC, Netherlands, Norway, U.K., and U.S.).

The 2005-2011 planning horizon is subdivided in two phases. Phase I lasts until the end of 2007. The overall funding needs for Phase I are estimated USD 7.9 billion, of which USD 4.3 billion is for Northern Sudan (including Darfur and USD 0.7 billion for the Three Areas), with USD 3.6 billion for Southern Sudan. These figures include the cost for the UN peace support mission.<sup>158</sup>

From the outset, mine action has been integrated into the overall planning. It is covered under Cluster 7, Livelihoods and Social Protection, which also deals with refugees and IDPs, community-driven recovery, and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). However, mine action is also mentioned in other chapters, and close cooperation of all sectors with mine clearance is recommended.<sup>159</sup> In another chapter, mine action is mentioned as a cross-cutting issue.<sup>160</sup>

JAM mine action cost estimates include, for Phase I, a total of USD 169.8 million, (USD 99.1 million for Southern Sudan, USD 35.9 million for the National Government, USD 34.8 million for the Three Areas).<sup>161</sup> So far as can be estimated at this stage, these funds have been made available and will be spent by the end of 2007.

Two multi-donor trust funds (MDTF) were created after the Oslo donor conference – one for the GoNU and one for the GoSS (both managed by the World Bank). The objective of these funds is to support the priorities of the JAM, and they are linked with the respective government budgets. Twelve donors have pledged USD 558.5 million to the MDTFs for 2005-2007.

Key priorities of the MDTF North are the Three Areas, other war affected areas in Northern Sudan, marginalized urban areas, the East, and (once peace is established) Darfur. The guiding principles are to consolidate peace and support investment programs, rural development, pro-poor growth, decentralisation, and good governance.

The World Bank's Strategy for the Three Areas acknowledges a large number of mines and other ERW, but does not offer concrete solutions.<sup>162</sup> The National Emergency Transport Project is a key initiative to reconstruct the Babanusa-Wau railway as well as critical infrastructure along the Port Sudan-Wau rail corridor; improve the navigable waterway between Kosti and Juba; and reconstruct critical roads in the Three Areas and Eastern Sudan.<sup>163</sup> Mine clearance for the Babanusa project is being conducted by the national army, without accreditation or quality assurance by the UNMAO.

In the South, ownership and capacity building are the key priorities of the MDTF to enable GoSS to set priorities for recovery and development. The strategic objectives include: establishing

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<sup>158</sup> JAM Vol. I, summary

<sup>159</sup> JAM Volume II, page 157

<sup>160</sup> JAM Volume II, page 209

<sup>161</sup> JAM Volume III, pages 12, 13, 15

<sup>162</sup> World Bank: Support to the Three Areas. Intervention Strategy, MDTF-National, Discussion Paper, Version 15 March 2007

<sup>163</sup> World Bank Sudan: Multi Donor Trust Funds Progress Report May 1 – October 31 2006



public sector administration; consolidating peace through access to basic services and education; basic infrastructure; health, agriculture and private sector development; and harmonising development assistance.

Eleven major refugee return corridors were identified in 2007, with about 102,000 refugees expected to return from seven countries. About one million IDP have already returned to their homes in the South from the North. The Danish Demining Group (DDG – funded by ECHO) supports UNHCR in the Kajo Keji area while MAG (also ECHO funded) works in Eastern Equatoria, again with the focus on the return of IDP and refugees.

At the second Sudan Consortium meeting (19-21 March 2007 in Khartoum & Juba) the UN representative said about mine action that victim assistance has not been adequately addressed. Further, links between mine action and long-term development should be strengthened as a means to improve livelihoods. The UN also pointed out that future infrastructure projects should address the problem of explosive contamination and include a demining budget as emergency humanitarian demining resources will not necessarily support implementation of infrastructure and long-term development projects.

## EC INVOLVEMENT AND PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN

EDF assistance to Sudan for development ceased in March 1990 due to concerns about human rights, democracy, and conflict. Thus, Sudan had no access to EDF 7 or 8, although the EC provided EUR 450 million in emergency assistance, food aid, etc., channelled mainly through NGOs and UN agencies. Assistance officially resumed after the CPA in 2005,<sup>164</sup> at which point Sudan received an indicative allocation of EUR 108 million from the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF.<sup>165</sup> In addition, unspent balances from previous EDFs (EUR 83 million) and the STABEX facility (EUR 191 million) were made available. With continuing emergency assistance and contributions to the UN and AU peacekeeping missions, the EC has contracted approximately EUR 700 million for Sudan since the signing of the CPA.<sup>166</sup>

The EC response strategy focussed on two issues – Food Security and Education. Additionally, support was provided for the resettlement of IDPs and for capacity building to improve governance. Mine clearance is specifically mentioned in the context of DDR. Mine clearance received funds through the EDF (HPP 1 + 2), as well as from the APL budget line, ECHO, and the Rapid Response Mechanism.

## CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS

Overall objectives laid out in the Mine Action Strategic Framework, and referred to in the JAM Volume II report,<sup>167</sup> include:

- The implementation of national policies, a strategic plan and priorities for Mine Action
- Strengthening and support national mine action structures

<sup>164</sup> However, prior to 2005 the EC made EUR 450 million available, mainly through ECHO, food aid, and co-financing with NGOs. Most funding was channelled to NGOs and UN agencies.

<sup>165</sup> This was divided into an 'A allocation' and a 'B allocation', with the latter covering items that might be triggered by specific events (e.g. emergency assistance, debt relief, etc.). B allocation funds were not part of the Indicative Programme. (EC: Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programme (NIP) for the period 2005-2007.)

<sup>166</sup> EC Statement at Donor Consortium meetings in Khartoum and Juba, 2007. This appears to include over EUR 200 million from the Africa Peace Facility for the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur.

<sup>167</sup> Page 245 ff.



- Development and implementation of a national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
- Establishment of a credible and sustainable national mine action capability
- Clearance of all high and medium priority mine and ERW contaminated areas in Sudan
- Mobilization of adequate resources to achieve the mine action mission.

Implementation is subdivided in three phases, each with key activities. At present, most of the Phase I activities have been tackled, such as the establishment of mine action offices responsible for accreditation of implementing partners; tasking in accordance with the priority lists;<sup>168</sup> quality assurance; and installation of IMSMA at all levels of the coordination structure, the delivery of MRE, survey, and clearance. The program can now be considered in Phase II, in which key activities are Landmine Impact Survey (LIS); route clearance and clearance of high/medium impact areas; quality assurance; MRE; victim assistance (VA); capacity building (which includes the development of a transition plan); and compliance with the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) obligations. Phase III will focus on the implementation of the transition plan including the development of operational national mine action coordination and implementation capacity, and the achievement of a mine-impact free Sudan.

In its 2007 Workplan,<sup>169</sup> the UNMAO defines its strategic priorities for mine action as:

### Humanitarian Priorities

- Assessment and clearance of priority roads to facilitate mission and humanitarian operations, and the safe movement of population.
- Conduct survey, marking of dangerous areas, and the clearance of minefields and ERW contaminated areas in high impacted communities in support of mission and humanitarian activities.
- Provide targeted Mine Risk Education to IDPs, refugees and mine/UXO affected communities to reduce the risk of injury from landmines and ERW by raising awareness, public information dissemination, training, and community mine action liaison; training of trainers; provision of materials to school teachers, health and/or community workers; and providing Landmine Safety training and briefings to UN and aid agency personnel.

### Recovery and Development Priorities

- Development of national mine action institutions and operational capabilities.
- Strengthen and expand the existing national capacities to ensure physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of mine/ERW victims and survivors into communities.
- Destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines and the advocacy in support of a total ban on anti-personnel landmines; and to promote the development of, and compliance with, international legal instruments that address the problems of landmines and ERW, and promote the human rights of affected people.

The participating partners are UNMAS for overall planning and coordination, marking, and (with the health sector) victim assistance; UNICEF for MRE; UNDP for capacity building and

<sup>168</sup> These are approved by the respective mine action steering committees, comprising representatives from UNMIS, the Sudanese governments, and the UN Country Team based on input from central and state governments, UN agencies, community leaders, NGOs and religious groups. Annual lists are approved, but there are reviewed periodically.

<sup>169</sup> UNMAO Sudan, 2007 Work Plan: Mine Action Sector Plan



advocacy; WFP for road clearance;<sup>170</sup> and UNHCR for clearance, survey and MRE. NGO partners include DDG for clearance, survey and marking; MAG; OSIL; Nuba Mountain Mine Action Sudan (NMMAS); Handicap International; Sudan Evangelical Mission (SEM); Agency for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan); Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO, a national NGO); and Sudan Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR, a national NGO). The actions and plans of specific actors are described below.

## **UNDP**

UNDP is the lead agency within the UNMAO structure for supporting the development of mine action capacities. The UNDP mine action project is managed by a Senior Technical Advisor, based in Khartoum, with a technical advisor based in Juba. With technical assistance from UNDP, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established on 24 December 2005 in the North through GONU Presidential Decree No. 299, and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) was established in the South on 27 June 2006 through GOSS Presidential Decree No. 45. With support from UNDP and UNMAO, the National Mine Action Policy Framework and the National Mine Action Strategic Framework were developed in June 2006 and approved by the council of ministers (GONU) in August 2006. To date, staff for the national MA offices have been recruited and senior and middle management courses have been delivered. Deminers from both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have been trained (133 personnel) using the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Nairobi for deployment as Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDU), initially assigned to demining operations in support of railway reconstruction with funds from GONU. The UNDP also provided technical advice to assist the GONU and GOSS to include mine action in their budgets for the first time in 2006. Future priorities include:

- establishment of a legal framework for national NGOs (to facilitate the involvement of national NGOs in mine action),
- additional capacity enhancement for staff of the national authorities,
- stockpile destruction,
- support of the six sub-offices, and
- implementation of a victim assistance project.

UNDP support to MA is under the Human Security and Recovery budget line, included in multi-year project (USD 120 million/per year, of which USD 1 million is budgeted for mine action).

## **WFP**

WFP has contracted MAG and the firm RONCO to provide mine action support during the reconstruction of five major roads. There is good cooperation between the UNMAO and WFP, with UNMAS providing support during the tendering process. WFP is seeking funds to cover gaps for road maintenance, and is looking to recruit a mine action liaison officer.

## **UNICEF**

The focus of UNICEF is on mine/UXO awareness, and also in mainstreaming MRE into the education system in Sudan. As the EC is not funding MRE, the evaluation did not deal with this aspect in detail.

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<sup>170</sup> Up to width of 26 meters in order to allow for a safe corridor in which rehabilitation of the road can be executed.



## INTERNATIONAL DEMINING OPERATORS

The table below lists the operators and TCC demining units working in South Sudan, and their multiple relationships with funding agencies.

**Table 8 – List of demining operators and units in South Sudan (Deminig Season 2007/2008)**

Operator	Role/assets	Funding
MECHEM (firm)	3 route survey & clearance teams	UNMAS (assessed budget)
	1 route survey & clearance teams	UNMAS (assessed budget)
Armour Group (firm)	8 route/area survey & 4 technical survey teams with 1 support team	UNMAS (assessed budget)
TDI (firm)	6 clearance teams & 3 ground preparation / mechanical teams	UNMAS (assessed budget)
MineTech Int'l (firm)	2 mechanical clearance teams	UNMAS (assessed budget)
Ronco (firm)	2 route clearance teams	WFP
MAG (NGO)	2 survey & clearance and 2 ground preparation teams	Bilateral + EC
	1 survey & clearance	UNMAS (VTF)
NPA (NGO)	4 manual clearance teams & 1 ground preparation / mechanical clearance team	Bilateral
SIMAS/FSD (NGO)	Capacity building	Bilateral
DDG	2 survey & EOD teams	Bilateral + EC
<b>Deminig Units – Troup Contributing Countries</b>		
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kenya		

## EC Support for Mine Action

The EC has been involved in funding mine action in Sudan since 2000, when LMA received a grant via IGAD for research on landmines and pastoralists. Most funding has been provided directly to international NGOs,<sup>171</sup> with a smaller amount channelled through UNMAS (which then subcontracted international NGOs). Grants varied in value between EUR 18,000 and EUR 2 million. The broad focus has been survey and clearance in South Sudan. Projects were, in some cases, part of the overall UN plan, but this has not been a criterion for the selection of a proposal; rather, the reputation of the implementing partner and their presence in a priority region were the decisive factors. These grants have not followed a formal strategy or indicative programme, but have depended on a combination of the commitment of the desk officer in the EC delegation, and well-targeted resource mobilisation by NGOs. As a result, it is difficult to predict the level and nature of EC support for mine action in the future.

Recently, difficulties between the HALO Trust and the GoSS led to the expulsion of HALO Trust from Sudan. (see textbox) The sudden termination of the project released EUR 1.75 million, and a joint donor letter of protest against the expulsion has not elicited any response from the GoSS. This indicates strains in the relations between the GoSS and donors, and demonstrates the limited leverage that donors have.

<sup>171</sup> Geneva Call, Oxfam, LMA, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), DDG, and HALO Trust. In addition DCA is part of an NGO consortium that has received a grant through the Community Based RRP project, while FSD undertook sub-contracts for UNOPS which were financed by EC grants.



**Textbox 14 – Support to SLIRI/SLR/SLADO**

In 2001, the EC provided a grant to Oxfam for a project with two main aims: (i) to initiate cross-border mine action (both survey and clearance) and (ii) to support the capacity development of a local NGO – Sudan Landmine Impact Response Initiative (SLIRI) – that was independent of the North-South warring factions. Oxfam sub-contracted Landmine Action (LMA) for the technical mine action work, and subsequently handed the project over to LMA, which continued to raise funds from the EC and others for a series of projects extending to late 2006.\*

Meanwhile, SLIRI had been unable to register as a Sudanese NGO with the national government but, after the CPA, was able to register under the name of Sudan Landmine Response (SLR) with the GoSS. Finally, SLIRI disbanded, re-established itself as the Sudan Landmine Action and Development Organisation (SLADO), and succeeded in registering with the GoNU authorities in mid-2006.

The projects were plagued with difficulties, including regular delays in obtaining visas, clearing equipment, etc. As well, little of the data gathered on the location and impacts of contamination was entered in the central mine action database maintained by UNMAO because the UN believed it was inaccurate (i.e. the geographic coordinates) and unreliable.\*\*

In spite of the fact that its primary mandate was research and advocacy, LMA appeared in many ways to be a reasonable choice for the project – when it did support advocacy and MRE projects in mine-affected countries, LMA had invariably worked through local partners. However, demining operations were outside LMA's core mandate and area of expertise. It decided to withdraw from the project in 2005 and spent a year in trying to find a demining NGO to continue the programme.

Ultimately, the HALO Trust reached an agreement with SLR (the South Sudan NGO that emerged from SLIRI) and obtained a grant of EUR 1.75 million from the EC for the project. HALO also experienced many administrative problems with the GoSS and was evicted from the country in early 2006, effectively terminating the project and leaving the demining equipment and supplies unsecured.

\* Oxfam & LMA appear to have raised EUR 6.5 – 7 million for their projects with SLIRI/SLR/SLADO.

\*\* Only 2.67 % of dangerous area reports in the IMSMA database are identified as coming from SLIRI/SLR.

Thus, the only ongoing EC mine action project during the evaluation mission was the MAG project in Eastern Equatoria. There, MAG continues with its ‘integrated’ demining approach consisting of mine clearance and ERW disposal and supported by community liaison. It reports to the UNMAO Juba.

Apart from the EC delegation, ECHO recently has supported three recent mine action projects in South Sudan through MAG and DDG, with values between EUR 270,000 and EUR 568,000. ECHO is responsible for emergency help and relief, but in support of the EU policy to link relief with recovery and development (LRRD), its projects sometime overlap with mine action projects funded by other EC mechanisms.

In addition to the “pure” mine action projects, the EC is supporting a EUR 50 million+ nationwide post conflict community-based recovery and rehabilitation programme (RRP). Again, the RRP project is part of an overall LRRD approach and draws on unspent STABEX balances. It is designed for three years and, since the CPA, has been managed through UNDP and the National Authorising Office (NAO), which sub-contract NGO consortia to implement specific projects. Two of the successful consortia include demining NGOs to provide mine action services



in support of the community development initiatives.<sup>172</sup> These two projects have received a total of EUR 10.7 million for their projects, which will last at least three years. Experience from elsewhere suggests there may be some problems due to risk aversion of the development NGOs (see Textbox). Regardless, bundling mine action support into community and area development projects appears to be an appropriate way of addressing contamination problems that are not yet perceived as priorities by UNMAO or the national mine action authorities.

#### **Textbox 15 – Linking the work of mine action and development agencies**

Perceptions of risk from explosive contamination in a country – sometimes inflated by the mine action community in order to attract donor attention\* – create special problems for development in mine-affected areas. Development agencies (UN, NGO, governmental, etc.) typically have no experience or expertise in dealing with landmines and UXO and, naturally, are averse to (i) undertaking tasks which place their staff at risk, (ii) accepting the extra task of arranging for demining support, which costs time and money and may make it harder for them to achieve their performance targets. Many such agencies simply adopt a policy of avoiding communities in which there are suspicions of contamination, with the result that these communities are ‘doubly damned’ (i.e. not only do they suffer from contamination but they are also denied development assistance).

A partial solution is to attempt to coordinate the work planning processes of the mine action and community development programmes. This has proved to be difficult as mine action agencies adopt detailed work plans well in advance to overcome the logistical challenges that threaten both quality control and the efficient use of expensive assets: development agencies (particularly when working in a fluid, post-conflict environment and when they are financed with short-term grants) typically have far less concrete annual work plans, and cannot assure demining agencies precisely when they will be doing what, and where.

A second approach is to have the development agencies determine demining priorities by either (i) giving these agencies a budget to contract demining operators or (ii) incorporating demining operators (typically NGOs) in consortia to implement a community or area development programme. This approach also has problems. First, the development agencies may still have difficulty in forecasting their precise requirements far enough in advance, so there is some sacrifice of demining efficiency. Second, development agencies may be so risk adverse that they require the demining agencies to clear land that is unlikely to have explosives contamination.

The solution to this latter problem requires a combination of (i) good information to development personnel about the true risks (which usually are far lower than the extravagant initial claims made by mine action actors seeking to raise funds) and (ii) clear guidelines from the national authority about what constitutes reasonable steps to come to an assessment that there is no apparent risk from explosives contamination at a proposed development site.

\* For example, the former head of UNMAS once stated to donors that the landmine problem in Sudan is as bad as in Afghanistan.

The EC is also supporting a EUR 80 million Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme in ten states (five each in the North and South). This includes, for example, capacity building for state administrations, rural development, irrigation, rehabilitation of the livestock economy (water points, stock routes), and crop agriculture. So far, the project has no demining component

<sup>172</sup> MAG (working with JASMAR) is in a consortium led by Islamic Relief (UK) and including Save the Children (Sweden), the Spanish Red Cross (with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society), Child Rights International, and the Blue Nile Network for Development Organisations. DCA is working with a consortium headed by Save the Children Fund (USA) and including the Nuba Relief Rehabilitation and Development Organisation and the Diocese of El Obeid.



but there are plans to incorporate this whenever necessary. The biggest individual project, the Wau-Tambura road (including feeder-roads), may need demining support if the road had only been cleared to an eight metre width<sup>173</sup> because the construction teams will need more space.<sup>174</sup> The main implementer will be the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The contracts for the project are not yet signed, but the financial agreements are.

Furthermore, the EC contributed EUR 24 million to the MDTF for WFP reconstruction of village-level infrastructure, a project which also requires demining assistance. A total of EUR 44 million has been allocated from the MDTF for three years, of which half is for the North (including Darfur and Eastern region) and half for the South.<sup>175</sup>

The CSP for 2008-2013 will probably not mention mine action explicitly. The EC plans to focus on two sectors – rural development and education. The geographic focus will be the reconstruction and development of Southern Sudan (45% of total funding will be directed specifically to the South) and, in the North, the most war-affected regions, particularly the Three Areas and Eastern Sudan (55%, but including projects with national scope).<sup>176</sup> Darfur will be included once the political and security situation allows. The EC will propose about EUR 300 million in new commitments for Sudan from the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, which will start in 2008, for long-term development.

## ANALYSIS

### OVERALL CONTEXT AND ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Sudan now has two systems within one country, and there is no assurance that tensions between the GoNU and the GoSS will be resolved peacefully. Particular concerns are the lack of agreement on the final North-South border and the unresolved conflict in Darfur.

Sudan's economy is growing rapidly, fuelled principally by foreign investments in oil and other natural resources, which generate significant government royalties. As well, there is large scale donor engagement in Sudan and, thus, no lack of funding for humanitarian and development priorities.

Given this context, the international community faces difficult choices. Officially, national union is promoted, but at the same time two separate systems are being supported. In this situation, a peace-building component is automatically added to every nation-wide project. The ongoing tensions make long-term planning difficult. As well, Sudan's rapid economic growth and the massive foreign investments mean that donors do not have as much leverage as normal, given the impressive sums at their disposal.

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<sup>173</sup> This is the normal width for clearance specified in the UNMAO contracts

<sup>174</sup> There is also the danger that villages will relocate to the side of a road once it has been refurbished, and explosives should be cleared for public safety.

<sup>175</sup> Total funding for the three reconstruction and development projects amounts to nearly EUR 180 million. While the sums for mine action are unknown, even 5% would be EUR 9 million.

<sup>176</sup> It is intended to channel more EU funding through the MDTF



## EXPLOSIVES CONTAMINATION AND THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

A complete picture of the explosives contamination problem does not yet exist. The country-wide LIS will be expensive<sup>177</sup> and, in some parts of the country at this time, it may not provide adequate information for setting priorities as population movements may continue.<sup>178</sup> Further, socio-economic data quickly becomes outdated, so some surveillance mechanism will be needed, at least for regions where the contamination will not be eliminated in the next few years. Finally, socio-economic data from an LIS or other sources is useless unless it is analysed to turn it into information (i.e. data in the right format, at the right level of detail, presented in time to inform the choices made by decision-makers).

In spite of the absence of a complete picture of the contamination problem and its impacts, international mine action actors have set up a large programme under difficult conditions. International NGOs were in place at an early stage, and the early projects in the Nuba Mountains were an important symbol of the willingness of the hostile parties to cooperate.<sup>179</sup> Since then, mine action has been a useful tool for promoting human security, peace, the return of refugees and IDPs, and the implementation of the CPA.

UNMAO is well established and achievements appear in line with plans.<sup>180</sup> UNMAO appears to have done a good job in a difficult situation in managing the network of mine action operators.<sup>181</sup> The willingness of disparate mine action organisations to accept coordination, direct tasking, and monitoring by UNMAO reflects, in part, the fact that the bulk of funds flow via UNMAS, allowing it to dominate the market for demining services.

However, survey and systematic data gathering and analysis remain key tasks. This refers not only to the location of suspected hazard areas and the determination of socio-economic impacts, but also to data analysis such as which mines are found how deep, with which metal content – information that would facilitate task planning and the best use of assets. The current focus on clearance of road surfaces (eight metre wide) also leaves problems for the future in areas where breached minefields remain (hopefully accurately recorded and entered into IMSMA). Such data gathering and analysis is required to generate both forward plans for UNMAO operations in future years and a forecast of the residual threat that will remain after UNMAO winds-down.<sup>182</sup>

So far, UNMAO has been able to meet the most pressing humanitarian priorities, in spite of the LIS being incomplete. Eventually an approach will be required to incorporate other priorities; principally rehabilitation and development requirements. This is particularly important in areas where UNMAS road clearance has allowed the return of refugees/IDPs to remote areas, but where no further clearance has been conducted to secure access to essential livelihood assets. This is an issue for which directly-funded NGOs might play an important role.

<sup>177</sup> SAC believes it will complete the LIS in the South by mid-2008.

<sup>178</sup> Mine action surveys, and particularly an LIS, depend on local people for much of the data on the location and impacts of suspected hazards. If people have not returned, or have not resumed their livelihoods (e.g. agriculture, livestock rearing), they cannot inform the survey teams.

<sup>179</sup> It appears that the pursuit of peace-building objectives meant the demining operations were not as efficient as might otherwise have been expected.

<sup>180</sup> UNMAS administered an Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Sudan, carried out in February-March 2007. The Evaluation Team was advised that the report has not been finalised.

<sup>181</sup> There are at least 40 agencies registered in South Sudan for mine action activities (demining, MRE, and victim assistance).

<sup>182</sup> In this light, the failure of the survey and capacity building projects of LMA and HALO Trust to link in with UNMAO information systems is regrettable because the situation in many parts of South Sudan remains unknown or unrecorded.



UNMAO managers believe that the bulk of mine action work will be completed over the next 2–3 years; in particular the demining of roads and the completion of the LIS, which will provide a more complete picture of the remaining landmine/ERW impact. Assuming this is true, it now appears that Sudan will not need massive demining capacity to deal with residual contamination after the end of the UNMAO mandate. At minimum, however, a sound management structure will be needed to cope with the sheer size of the country, the remoteness of some of the mine-affected areas, and the difficulties imposed by the harsh climate and by security concerns. Clearly, the national organs will not need the same level of capacities that UNMAO has mobilised, but still it will take some years to build the requisite capabilities within the key national organs (NMAO and SSDC).<sup>183</sup> Therefore, it is important that staff in NMAO and SSDC are more involved in the planning, tasking, and monitoring cycle so they benefit from on-the-job experience in these critical functions.

The basic UNMAO business model (direct tasking from the ‘centre’ via competitive tenders and monitoring for safety and contract compliance) provides effective coordination vis-à-vis the priorities in support of the UNMIS mission (both military and humanitarian). In such a large country however, this business model requires an expensive network of demining experts. More generally, this approach is most effective when (i) priorities are clear for the mine action centre and (ii) tasks are large or can be bundled into a single contract for which performance can readily be monitored.<sup>184</sup> This ‘contracting-and-control’ business model may not be sustainable or appropriate once the fairly obvious demining priorities (roads, TCC camps, etc.) are completed. A more flexible business model will be required to address residual contamination and to support the actions of multiple development partners assisting state and district administrations, and working on grassroots development projects. (see textbox)

#### **Textbox 16 – Strategies for proactive versus reactive operations**

Explosives contamination stemming from long-running civil wars presents immense challenges for mine action practitioners. Some tasks are clear, with well defined hazards in reasonably accessible areas (e.g. along key transport routes; perimeter minefields surrounding garrison towns and military bases). At the other extreme, isolated or low-density minefields often exist in remote areas – possibly in regions abandoned by most of the population because of the conflict or ‘ethnic cleansing’. Ever after the return of refugees/IDPs, local residents may be unaware of the location of some of the minefields for some years, until their livelihoods are re-established and the ‘economic footprints’ of the communities expands to bring people into contact with minefields.

It is comparatively easy to set priorities relating to the well-known, accessible minefields, and even to establish a multi-year work programme for many of them based on reconstruction plans, peacekeeping mandates, etc. A ‘proactive’ programme based on centrally-determined priorities and performance monitoring is feasible.

Planning and priority-setting for remote minefields is far more challenging. First, they must be discovered, and even nationwide surveys will miss some hazards because local informants do

<sup>183</sup> International experience suggests at least two years is needed once basic pre-conditions are in place (i.e. there is a committed government and technically capable staff and managers have been appointed to key positions in adequately resourced government organs). Such pre-conditions might exist in transition economies (e.g. Croatia, Albania) but not in countries where technical education and training levels are low, such as Sudan (and particularly the South). Therefore, one should anticipate at least three years effort once the pre-conditions are in place and assuming no significant setbacks.

<sup>184</sup> For example, UNOPS contracts for Sudan specify the demining assets to be provided by an operator for a specific period. These are then assigned specific tasks and their performance is monitored by UNMAO personnel.



not know where they are when the survey reaches their communities. Priority-setting is also difficult, even for the identified minefields, because socio-economic data on impacts must be collected from each community, different socio-economic groups within a community will have different preferences, etc. As well, impacts will change over time as socio-economic development proceeds: such changes in impacts will be more dynamic when socio-economic changes are rapid (such as in post-conflict periods).

In such situations, a significant amount of 'bottom-up' input is required. This needs to be updated periodically and, ideally, mechanisms are needed for communities to request rapid assistance. In such areas, the mine action programme needs to be responsive and flexible.

Similar differences exist with respect to monitoring – the performance of an operator is easier and less expensive to assess for tasks which are (i) larger, (ii) well-defined, and (iii) accessible. The ability to clearly define demining tasks and to monitor performance makes it feasible to establish competitive regimes for such tasks, individually or in 'job lots' (e.g. survey and clearance of a length or road). Converse, when hazards are small, remote, and hard to define, it is difficult for a central body even to establish priorities let alone monitor operator performance. What coordination and 'contracting regime' is appropriate for this type of contamination?

In reasonably well-functioning countries, priority-setting, monitoring, and even implementation might be handled by government agencies\* – local government officials will report contamination, assess task priorities, and hold operators to account. This is beyond the capacity of most post-conflict countries, including Sudan, where the government may not even extend beyond district centres. The typical strategy for donors is to contract international mine action NGOs to provide services in remote areas, particularly before a complete picture of the contamination and its impact is available. Established international NGOs (INGOs) are generally preferred over firms as they are not-for-profit organisations and often have a strong 'public good' ethos plus a hard-won reputation to protect. NGOs based in developed countries are also required to have more stringent and transparent systems for organisational governance than is the case for most firms. A second strategy, increasingly used, is to provide funds to international development NGOs to contract for mine action services (typically, they contract mine action NGOs for this).

Thus, INGOs are selling trustworthiness as well as competence. But, typically, they do not complete the job. Mine action NGOs often pull-out once the 'humanitarian' phase of mine action ends, while development NGOs normally work with only a small sub-set of communities, and are unable to 'scale-up' to provide the essential public services nationwide.

Two solutions seem feasible for the long-term. One is to build government capacity so it can deliver public services, such as mine action, to all communities throughout the country. The feasibility of this strategy needs to be assessed in detail in each country. But public service delivery depends on a government's commitment as well as its capacity, and some governments are not committed to the wellbeing of all its citizens, such as those in remote communities.

In theory, the second strategy is to foster the capacity of local NGOs to provide responsive mine action services. But regulatory systems in most developing countries are weak and many 'legal' NGOs are not 'authentic' NGOs – they lack the public-good ethos, independence, and internal governance systems, and many are really profit-seeking firms masquerading as NGOs. In such situations, how does a donor identify 'authentic' local NGOs? Donors may be willing to risk small grants for, say, MRE activities, which would allow some local NGOs to demonstrate their integrity. However, far larger sums are required to support demining operations. Because of such problems, there have been very few cases where local demining NGOs have been successfully established.\*\*

\* It is more common for reasonably well-functioning governments to sub-contract larger tasks and have a responsive 'fire-brigade' capacity within the army, civil protection, or police to deal with smaller tasks.

\*\* Apparently the Nuba Mountain Mine Action Service (NMMAS – a local NGO) is conducting manual



clearance in Blue Nile State, and UNMAO has just provided it a grant to obtain mechanical demining assets. Unfortunately, the Evaluation Team did not encounter NMMAS during its mission.

However, before an adequate capacity development strategy and plan can be formulated, certain strategic decisions are required on the overall institutional and organisational make-up of the national programme, such as:

- should the JIDU be part of the military or lie outside the Ministry of Defence? If these are to be military units, will civilian mine action authorities be able to supervise and coordinate them effectively? If not, what roles will civilian authorities play?
- in the long-term, should the mine action strategy be proactive (i.e. operators tasked by the mine action centre based on priorities determined centrally) or reactive (i.e. operators responding to specific requests from communities or development agencies), or will a mixed strategy be required?
- will the scope of residual contamination justify the need for local NGO operators in addition to the JIDU, and will attempts to maintain both types of capacities be sustainable? If not, which approach (JIDU or local NGOs) are the GoNU and GoSS prepared to support?
- will the GoNU and GoSS fully finance NMAO, SSDC and the national demining capacity (e.g. JIDU or local NGOs), or will a resource mobilisation strategy be required to secure assistance from the international community?

In addition, capacity building for operational functions remains a problem for all international mine action operators. The problems experienced by LMA and HALO Trust are obvious examples, but other NGOs and agencies met by the evaluation team highlighted this as a concern. Most fundamentally, capacity building efforts at the operations level appear disconnected from national capacity development plans or a clear vision of what residual capacities will be required once the UNMIS mandate ends. More concretely, progress in building capacities within local demining NGOs has been difficult due to the limited education and skills of local personnel, the militancy of the work force, alcohol abuse, high absenteeism and, more generally, a lack of commitment by capable national partners.<sup>185</sup> A common denominator is that the international operators have chosen or been required to work with newly established local NGOs, which do not have a track record demonstrating their capacity for implementing projects. The financial, administrative, and personnel problems encountered may have been reduced if local partners that were already established had been used (e.g. local NGOs working in the health sector, water and sanitation, etc.). Just as important, some of these local NGOs might have a reputation for trustworthiness that takes years to develop.

In the South, there has been a lack of timely support from the GoSS in resolving the many problems faced by operators. Perhaps this could be mitigated through greater engagement with the SSDC at the beginning of each project and more active involvement by SSDC throughout the life of these projects.

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<sup>185</sup> More fundamentally, there are real questions whether the local mine action NGOs are truly NGOs, as they appear to have strong connections with their respective governments, and proper governance structures do not seem to be in place.



## The EC Role

The EC has supported all phases of mine action in Sudan, but without adopting an explicit mine action strategy for the country. UN/national mine action strategies and plans appear to have had little influence in specific decisions of what and who to fund; rather the decisions taken were constrained due to the limited choice of suitable partners. For example, the current geographic focus for EC-funded mine action activities is the South because there is no suitable mine action partner in the Three Areas.

The current officer responsible for mine action in the EC delegation is convinced of the importance of mine action in Sudan. Future funding will depend on personal commitment of a successor, particularly now that the thematic budget line for mine action has been closed.

The effectiveness of the EC-funded projects is difficult to assess because there has been no independent evaluation of these projects. Quality assurance (QA) is carried out by the UN, but this only looks at safety and efficiency; not effectiveness issues. In one case however, the Geneva Call project (which had a modest budget) certainly contributed to a worthwhile outcome – the signing of the Deed of Commitment.<sup>186</sup>

Given the context, the programming decisions by the EC delegation have been relevant to the needs of the country. This also applies to the decision not to fund the LIS, despite the fact that such surveys are explicitly mentioned as a priority in the overall EC Mine Action Strategies. There are various factors influencing the usefulness of a country-wide LIS, such as accessibility (the effort to get the data), reliable informants (influencing the quality of data), the options for a follow-up before the data is outdated (utility of the data), and, from a management perspective, the determination which information will be required to make strategic decisions. In the case of Sudan, access has been difficult, reliable informants scarce or absent, and timely follow-ups hard to achieve. As well, the immediate priorities (particularly the opening of roads) were apparent even without an LIS.

All in all, EC-funded mine action is a small portion of overall EC aid to Sudan. It is also a small portion of the overall mine action budget. As such, the EC has modest leverage with either the UN system or national mine action authorities. This situation may, however, change as direct funding to the UN drops, which is foreseeable once the UNMIS priorities (roads, TCC camps, etc.) have been addressed.

There is a recognised need to coordinate mine action efforts when so many actors are involved, which in the current context means it is important that UNMAO receives enough funding to remain predominant. Still, direct funding of NGOs is appreciated by all parties. Direct grants provide NGOs with programming flexibility, probably secure them some influence in the decisions made by UN and national agencies, and allow some worthwhile programmes to proceed even though these are not UNMIS/UNMAO priorities. Little or no funding for mine action has gone directly from the EC or other donors to Sudanese governments. Given the EC experience in some other sectors where funds channelled through government mechanisms did not reach the final beneficiaries, this is probably for the best. In the future, however, some direct funding to national authorities and/or operators may be warranted if: (i) the scale of the residual problem proves to be larger than currently anticipated; (ii) an appropriate strategy for the national

<sup>186</sup> However, it is unfortunate that the data gathered by the EC-funded projects in the Nuba Mountains have not been entered in the central database, which means this series of projects has delivered only modest benefits to the mine action programme.



mine action programme is in place, (iii) adequate capacities have been developed in line with the requirements of the national mine action strategy, and (iv) donor funding serves to catalyze domestic political support for mine action.

The National Mine Action Policy and Strategic Frameworks are important documents that list a variety of measures required to both (i) address the current needs in Sudan and (ii) support the development of national capacities to assume greater ownership over time and, eventually, to deal with the residual contamination. However, these frameworks do not provide a clear picture of:

- the likely capabilities that will be required to address the residual contamination after the UNMIS mandate, and
- the ways, means, and timings for transferring responsibilities progressively from UNMAO to national organs.

Without these, a proper implementation plan for capacity development support cannot be formulated.<sup>187</sup>

Therefore, a multi-year strategy and plan for capacity development is required, including steps for progressive handover of functions (including resource mobilisation and alignment of mine action with development plans at the national, regional, and state levels). The capacity building strategy should be adopted by the GoNU and GoSS, and based on essential strategic decisions made by these governments in terms of (at minimum):

- the institutional make-up and responsibilities of the policy and regulatory organs (e.g. NMAA; NMAO and SSCD);
- the broad strategic approach to the residual threat (proactive; reactive; or mixed)
- the choice in terms of the national demining capacity (e.g. JIDU; national NGOs) to address the residual threat in line with the chosen strategic approach;
- the operational capabilities that the national demining capacity will require (e.g. just small EOD and BAC operations, or will large demining tasks remain)

The capacity building strategy should incorporate contingency plans to allow appropriate adjustments if the critical assumptions underlying the strategy prove incorrect, such as:

- Sudanese governments do not make timely decisions concerning the national capacity requirements (e.g. for demining, choosing between the JIDU and local NGOs);
- UNMIS is unable to mobilise the resources needed to fully implement its plans;
- the LIS eventually demonstrates that the extent of the residual contamination will be greater than current forecasts indicate.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Conclusions

At this juncture, the mine action programme in Sudan faces a number of strategic choices that need to be made by the country's governments, but drawing on the expertise of the international community. First, decisions are required on a number of issues to ensure local capacities are

<sup>187</sup> UNMAS is hoping to have a Transition Planning Officer in place before the end of 2007. But the first task is not to plan the transition process but rather to clarify what capacities will be required to address the residual threat.



developed for the management and implementation of mine action by the end of the UNMIS mandate. Second, mine action support needs to be provided to development agencies working in contaminated areas that are beyond the current focus of the UNMAO. These decisions are, of course, interrelated. Mine action support for development work in remote areas could emphasize the development of local capacities to continue such service delivery after the departure of INGOs. But this then requires a clear decision concerning the type of organisation that will assume this longer-term role: local NGOs or the JIDU working under civilian direction would be two options.

The strategic choices made or avoided by the Sudanese Governments will largely determine whether mine action contributes to rehabilitation and development in a sustained fashion. Thus, mine action could be a useful entry point for a meaningful dialogue with the Governments. The EC has a choice whether to encourage the GoNU and the GoSS to make appropriate decisions and to implement them.

The EC also has a choice whether to focus its assistance on one or both of (i) capacity development for the national programme, or (ii) mine action service delivery in support of rehabilitation and development in more remote areas. If the latter option is chosen (which would be consistent with the EC support for mine action to this point), it should be done in a manner consistent with the decisions concerning capacity development of the national programme overall (assuming such decisions are made). In any case, these are difficult and risky areas for programming, and the EC contribution may depend as much on its expertise in working effectively with the various mine action actors as on its funding.

### Capacity Development for the National Programme

Interrelated decisions such as we have been discussing should be made during the formulation of a strategic plan rather than separately. Therefore, the UNMAO should assist the GoNU and the GoSS in formulating a strategy for capacity development based on an assessment of the likely residual contamination that will remain after the UNMIS mandate. The plan for implementing that strategy should include:

- the institutional make-up and responsibilities of the policy and regulatory organs (e.g. NMAA; NMAO and SSCD), and from this deriving:
  - the specific capabilities required by personnel within these organs (e.g. strategic planning; operations planning and budgeting; priority-setting; tasking; quality management; information management; resource mobilisation; linking with development actors; etc.)
  - forecasts of the numbers of personnel required to discharge the various responsibilities.
- a transition plan, jointly agreed with UNMAO, for the progressive transfer of responsibilities from UNMAO to national organs,<sup>188</sup> and from this derive:
  - a time-phased plan for specific actions (recruitment of staff; training courses; study tours; on-the-job training assignments; etc.) and responsibilities (e.g. government; UNMAS; UNDP) to develop the capabilities required to implement the transition plan without jeopardising (i) the safety or efficiency of mine action activities, and

<sup>188</sup> In many cases, the responsibility for specific functions should be transferred progressively (e.g. national personnel receive training, then work under the direction of international experts, then assume responsibility with continued mentoring from international advisors, then assume full responsibility).



- (ii) accountability for the proper and effective use of national and international resources)
  - joint monitoring indicators so all parties can: (i) monitor progress in the development of capabilities and the progressive transfer of responsibilities; (ii) identify reasons for inadequate progress (e.g. delays on the part of the government or the various UN agencies); and (iii) initiate corrective action in a timely manner
- an assessment of the appropriate strategic approach(es) for addressing the expected residual contamination:
  - proactive clearance coordinated centrally (which requires a complete record of contamination and a surveillance system to monitor the impact of this contamination)
  - reactive response by mobile teams to community requests for assistance (which requires both a community request system and monitoring and evaluation from the centre)
  - some combination of the two.
- the choice in terms of the national operators (e.g. for demining, JIDU or national NGOs or both) to address the residual threat;
- the operational capabilities that the national operators will require (e.g. for demining, just small EOD and BAC operations, or will large minefields remain); and from this derive:
  - the specific individual and organisational capabilities required by the national demining operator(s)
  - forecasts of the numbers of personnel and other assets required, and the budget implications
  - a time-phased plan for specific actions and responsibilities (e.g. government; UN agency; international NGO) to develop the capabilities required by the national operator(s), together with
  - joint monitoring indicators so all parties can: (i) monitor progress in the development of capabilities and the progressive transfer of responsibilities; (ii) identify reasons for inadequate progress (e.g. delays on the part of the government or the various UN agencies); and (iii) initiate corrective action in a timely manner.
- contingency plans to allow appropriate adjustments if the critical assumptions underlying the strategy prove incorrect, such as:
  - Sudanese governments do not make timely decisions concerning the national capacity requirements (e.g. for demining, choosing between the JIDU and local NGOs);
  - UNMIS is unable to mobilise the resources needed to fully implement its plans;
  - the LIS eventually demonstrates that the extent of the residual contamination will be greater than current forecasts indicate.

Training programmes should utilise the existing skills of mine action staff in Sudan, including both UN and NGO personnel. Building expertise in mine action is not achieved solely through attendance at management training courses; rather, the knowledge gained from such courses must be cemented through experiential learning (on-the-job training, plus mentoring).<sup>189</sup>

Similarly, collocation of national and UN staff provides no guarantee that coaching and mentoring will take place to support the development of local capacities. The job descriptions of

<sup>189</sup> This was also one of the central findings of a recent evaluation of UNDP support to senior and middle management courses for mine action. This is not surprising, but reflects hundreds of other evaluations of management training programmes.



UN technical personnel would have to incorporate such responsibilities, and recruitment and selection procedures would need to give some weight to the skills and attitudes required to support the capacity development of local personnel.

### Capacity Development of Local Demining Operators

It is clear that, in the current environment in Sudan, it is difficult to build the capacity of new NGOs within a large, well-funded project. The ‘money on the table’ creates strong incentives for opportunistic behaviour. If INGOs wish to help establish a local demining NGO, it would be better to partner with an established organisation that has a track record of solid work in the public interest. The alternative would be to start much smaller than has been done to date when working with new organisations, with slower planned progress but perhaps with some achievements sustained at the end.<sup>190</sup>

### Other Issues

The SSDC should assume a more hands-on approach. Although there remain limitations in its capacity vis-à-vis mine action operations, it would be of great assistance to other mine action actors and, ultimately, the people of South Sudan, if the SSDC served as a “one stop shop” to help resolve logistics issues, customs clearances, and industrial disputes between deminers and agencies. Even without operational mine action experience these are more government related issues which can be resolved through personal contact and the establishment of procedures that would allow the SSDC to make a unique contribution to mine action in the South.<sup>191</sup>

Mine action donors should ensure that directly funded mine action operators are accredited, tasked, coordinated and quality assured by UNMAO and the national authorities, and that they submit regular reports to these central bodies in appropriate format. If required, the UNMAO should provide model language for contract/grant agreements for these aspects.

At present the UNMAO mine action programme in Sudan is sufficiently funded, but the situation should be re-assessed regularly.

Infrastructure projects in areas affected by explosives contamination should provide for the necessary demining support within the financing plan for the project, as is being done by the WFP and, we understand, as is planned for the MDTF road reconstruction programme.

Note: The points above are presented as conclusions that would help the mine action programme, particularly with respect to the development of local capacities to address the residual contamination after the completion of the UNMIS mandate. We have not framed them as recommendations to UN and Sudanese agencies as this is beyond our evaluation mandate. However, with obvious modifications the points could be turned into recommendations. The real issue is whether the EC is able to take forward such issues to the UN and government agencies; an issue to which we now turn.

<sup>190</sup> According to UNMAO, in June 2007 UNMAS decided to provide a VTF grant to Nuba Mountain Mine Action Service (NMMAS – a local NGO) for mechanical assets to support manual clearance in the Blue Nile State. NMMAS is the first National NGO to conduct clearance activities. The evaluation team did not come across NMMAS during its mission to Sudan.

<sup>191</sup> Collocation of the SSDC Sub-Office with the UNMAO South sub offices would further cement this concept and could have the added benefit of “on the job” skills transfer between the UN advisers and the SSDC staff.



## Recommendations

Most fundamentally, the EC Delegation should agree on whether to focus on either or both of the following broad goals:

1. capacity development for the national programme;
2. the delivery of mine action services in support of community and area development programmes in rural areas.

Regardless of the strategic focus adopted, the complex programming environment means that expertise is as important as financial resources. The EC needs to ensure that its Delegation in Sudan has access to the requisite skills for making sound decisions concerning mine action. The officer now responsible for the mine action portfolio has been committed to mine action and has built-up significant expertise. However, the EC policy of periodic rotation of staff makes continuity difficult.

Project cycle management principles need to be followed with regard to monitoring and evaluation. This could be done by a one-off external evaluation, or by a technical monitor who visits regularly and provides recommendations for further planning on the project, touching on programming and policy issues when warranted. If the scale of the mine action portfolio in Sudan does not allow for such a position, it could be provided at a regional level.

In light of the lack of effective support to date from the SSDC, the EC should encourage the demining operators it funds to develop close relations with the State Governors' Offices. The influence of the governors will grow as more resources (either local or from donors) are made available to state governments, and the governors are more likely to be supportive of organisations working in areas remote from Juba.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> This has already happened to a large degree in Angola, where mine action agencies feel cooperation with state governors is much more effective than cooperation with the national mine action organs in Luanda.



## 4. REPORT ON THE JOINT SEMINAR ON THE EU-AU SECURITY DIALOGUE

This seminar – held in Addis Ababa on 18-20 April 2007 – sought to advance a common EU-AU agenda for demining and disarmament. There were over 130 participants representing the EU, AU and many of their member states; major sub-regional groupings (CEEAC, CED-SAD, COMESA, IGAD, SADC, UMA, etc.); NGOs and NGO umbrella organisations; policy research centres (Small Arms Survey, Institute for Security Studies, SaferAfrica, GRIP, etc.); plus mine action organisations (demining NGOs, Geneva Call, GICHD, etc.) and consultants.

Following the initial session of speeches in celebration of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), the opening session was on *From Demining to Disarmament: A Continuum*. I was one of four presenters, and delivered a presentation entitled *Mine Action & Africa – the Record to Date*, which touched on the following issues:<sup>193</sup>

- Africa and the Ottawa Treaty
- Mine Action in Africa
- Mine Action and Security

Within the last of these issues, I emphasised the contributions mine action makes to human security, to disarmament more generally (destruction of formal, private, and abandoned munitions stockpiles), to DDR, and to regional security (still more potential than realised). During the discussion, a number of participants commented on points from my presentation, or asked questions.

The second day focused on more traditional security system topics, with only limited mention of mine action or the links between mine action and other disarmament topics. Sessions covered:

- the contribution of disarmament and arms control to peace and security
- SALW, natural resources, and development
- strengthening the state for implementation

A joint statement from the co-chairs was released late morning on the third day. This states that the EU and AU have agreed on a six point common agenda.

### Textbox 17 – The EU-AU Common Agenda for Demining & Disarmament

1. Promote the full implementation by AU and EU Member States of their national, regional and multilateral obligations.
2. Define and actively pursue common objectives in relevant international fora.
3. Explore ways and means to pursue human security objectives within the disarmament agenda, in ways that enhance the coherence between security and development.
4. Strengthen cooperation and exchange of information between relevant AU and EU institutions, including the Pan African Parliament and European Parliament, to promote a common peace and security agenda and facilitate its implementation.
5. Enhance the capacity of civil society and all relevant stakeholders to actively contribute to the development and implementation of the AU-EU common agenda.

<sup>193</sup> An electronic copy of this has been submitted separately to the EC in Brussels.



6. Ensure that APL, ERW, SALW, disarmament and arms control are fully integrated into our common efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and to promote sustainable peace building.

Of course, the issuance of a joint statement following a seminar such as this is often a formality, and little in the way of practical action is expected. However, the mood in this seminar suggested that there was indeed a consensus that it is time to promote peace and security issues far more vigorously, and that the EU and AU were natural partners. The common agenda could prove to be an important achievement in establishing a platform for a more fruitful partnership on mine action and a number of other disarmament issues.

A question for mine action in particular is: how to move from the common EU-AU agenda to concrete programming? The existence of the common agenda may make it more likely that EC Delegations will be mindful of mine action and other disarmament issues, but work on the Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for 2008-2013 would have been well advanced before this seminar. More fundamentally, the AU and the main sub-regional associations are not engaged in mine action, and it is unclear who in the EC would be responsible for formulating regional/sub-regional mine action programmes, or how they might get such programmes adopted.



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## ANNEX 1: ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET IN ANGOLA

Date	Organisation	Persons met
Tuesday 27 March and Wednesday 28 March Pamela Rebelo and Vera Bohle arrive in Luanda		
Thurs. 29 March	EC Delegation Angola	Dominique Albert, Rural Development Adviser
		Walter Viegas, Rural Development
		Rogério Castro, Technical Demining Adviser to UTA
	CED/INAD/FAA	Eng Leonardo Severino Sapalo, Director General INAD and member of CED
		Dora Domingas Gristavao, Adminstrations Director INAD
		Ernesto Chiquito, CED Operations
	CNIDAH	Edgar dos Santos Lourenço - Planning Studies and Operations Assistant
		Rita Jesus, Chief of Planning
		Manuel Buta, Chief of Operations
	UTA	Faustino Lourenco, Chief of Programming
WFP	Bradley Guerrant, Country Director	
Friday 30 March	NPA	Oddvar Bjorknes Resident Representative
		Rebecca Thomson Director, Demining Programme
	Intersos	Gianpaolo Tongiorigi, Programme Manager
	HALO Trust	Helen Gray, Project Officer
	MgM	Hendrik Ehlers, Director
		Carlos Haller da Silva, National Director
MAG	Mark Naftalin, Programme Officer	
Monday 2 May	Swiss Cooperation	Roland Beutler, Administrator
	Embassy of USA	Doreen P. Bailey, Political Secretary
		Nina Maria, Fite Adviser, Political and Economic Affairs
	Embassy of Japan	Mitsuo Takahashi, Second Secretary
	Embassy of Norway	Paul Sverre Tharaldsen, Second Secretary
	UNDP	Alfredo Teixeira, Deputy Resident Representative
Marc Bonnet, Chief Technical Adviser		
Tuesday 3 May	EC delegation Angola	Dominique Albert
		Walter Viegas
		João Gabriel Ferreira, Ambassador, Head of Delegation
Wednesday 4 May + Thursday 5 May departure Vera Bohle and Pamela Rebelo		



## ANNEX 2: ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET IN SOMALIA

Date	Organisation	Persons met
<b>Weekend 24-25 April – Evaluation team arrives Nairobi</b>		
Mon. 26 March	UNDP Somalia	Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action
Tues. 27 March	UNDP Somalia	UN Security Briefing (David Lavery, Field Security Coordination Officer)
		Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action
		Eric Overvest, Deputy Resident Representative
		Sidi Zahabi, Programme Manager, ROLS
Wed. 28 March	EC Delegation – Somalia	Laurel Patterson, Programme Officer ROLS
		Richard Hands, Counsellor
	Danish Demining Group	Marcelino Benet, Field Officer, Garowe
		Nick Bateman, Representative
<b>Thursday 29 April – Evaluation team flies to Hargeisa</b>		
Thurs. 29 March	UNDP Mine Action office, Somaliland	Mark Frankish, MA Operations Advisor
	ROLS, Somaliland	Ali Ugaas, National Mine Action Officer
Fri. 30 March	Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC)	Fatima Ibrahim, Area Coordinator, ROLS
		Dr. Ahmed Ali Mah, Programme Manager
		Hamoud Ali, Admin & Finance Officer
	Survey Action Centre (SAC)	Tour of SMAC facilities
	Handicap International	Nidaa Zein, Survey Manager
Sat. 31 March	DDG	Dahib Mohamed Odwaa, MRE Project Manager
	Ministry of Defence	Craig McDiarmid, Operations Manager
	National Demining Agency	Aden Mohamed Mire, Minister
	HALO Trust	Ismail Hashi Madar, Chairman
	European Commission	Neil Ferrao, Somaliland Desk Officer
Sun. 1 April	Police	Christopher Pym, Operations Manager
		Hassan Kossar, Operations Officer
	SMAC	Lulay Goitom, Office/GIS Officer
	UNDP Mine Action office	Andre ?, Regional Coordinator
<b>Monday, 2 April – Evaluation team flies to Garowe</b>		
Mon. 2 April	Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC)	Mohamed Segadi Herla, Commissioner
	EC Area Office	Omer Abdallah, EOD Commander
Tues. 3 April	Ministry of Planning	Debriefing
	Ministry of Interior	Debriefing
	ROLS Area Office	Abdirahim Abikar, Area Coordinator
Wed. 4 April	Police Department	Col. Sayid Jama Abdulli, Vice Commissioner
		Major Abshir Osman Ali, EOD Commander
	<i>Daraweesh</i>	??, EOD Team Leader
<b>Thursday, 5 April – Ted Paterson flies to Nairobi, Ahmed Mohamed remains in Garowe</b>		
Fri. 6 April	UNDP Somalia	Yasin Salad Galeyr, Chief, Operations
		Greg Lindstom, CTA Mine Action



## ANNEX 3: ITINERARY AND PERSONS MET IN SUDAN

### NORTH SUDAN

Date	Organisation	Persons met
<b>21<sup>st</sup> March Evaluation officer Departs Berlin, arrives in Khartoum</b>		
Thursday 22 March	EC Delegation	Achim Ladwig, First Secretary
		Mustafa Yassin, Programme Assistant
Friday 23, Saturday 24 March	EC Delegation	Achim Ladwig
Sun. 25 March	MAG	Frederic Maio, Project Manager North Sudan
	EC Delegation	Maria Horno Comet, Operations Coordinator
	UK Department for International Development (Sudan)	Alicia Herbert, Social Development Advisor
	WFP	Marian Yun, Donor Relations Officer
Mon. 26 March	JASMAR	Dr. Hussein Elobeid, General Manager
	UNDP	Qadeem Khan Tariq, Senior Technical Advisor
	NMAC	Baballa Biraima Baballa, Deputy Director
		Yousif M. Osman
	UNMAO	Jim Pansegrouw, Programme Manager
		Jacobus Nieuwoudt, Operations Officer
		Akiko Kobayakawa, Programme Officer
		Mohammed Kabir, Chief of Information
		Christina Greene, External Relations
Tuesday 27 March	EC Delegation	Ben Wilkinson, National QA Coordinator
		Paul Symonds, Food Security Coordinator
	Worldbank	Eulogio Montijano, Rural Development Coordinator
		Joseph Hoenen, Senior Operations Officer
	FSD	David Tooke, Deputy Programme Manager
	Embassy of Japan	Yoichiro Toda, Attaché
	EC Delegation	Achim Ladwig, Mustafa Yassin
<b>Wednesday, 28th March – Evaluation officer flies to Angola</b>		

### SOUTH SUDAN

Date	Organisation	Persons met
<b>11-13<sup>th</sup> April Evaluation officer Departs Geneva, arrives Juba 13<sup>th</sup> April</b>		
Friday. 13 April	UNMAO Regional South	Simon Porter, Deputy Programme Manager
	EU Regional Office	Brigitta Brosskinsky
Sat. 14 April	Juba	Simon Porter, UNMAO
		Ulrich Tietze, Technical Adviser, UNDP
		Bodil Jacobsen, Programme Manager, DDG
		Tommy Thompson, WFP, Roads Manager
		NPA – Rune Kristian Andersson, Programme Manager
Sun. 15 April	Juba	MAG, Phillip Halsfield, Technical Operations Manager



Mon. 16 April	UNMAO Juba	Simon Porter, Deputy Programme Manager, Paul Eldred, Regional Operations Officer
	Danish Demining Group	Bodil Jacobsen, Programme Manager, DDG
	ECHO Regional Office	James Duku, Programme Officer
Tues.17 April	New Sudan Mine Action Directorate	Mr Jukuch Barach Barach Ms Margaret XXXX
	FSD	Alex van Roy, Programme Manager
	Ministry of Roads and transport	Dr Desmond Wann, Secretary
Wed. 18 April	Ministry of Finance	Cancelled
	Ministry of Agriculture	Cancelled
	UNDP	UlrichTietze, Technical Adviser, UNDP
<b>Thursday, 19th April – Evaluation officer flies to Nairobi</b>		
Fri. 20 April	WFP	Tommy Thompson, WFP
	MAG	Abigail Hartley, Programme Manager, MAG
Sat.21 April	Nairobi	Research
<b>22 – 23<sup>rd</sup> April – Evaluation officer returns to Geneva (flight delayed by 10 hours)</b>		



## ANNEX 4: TIMELINE ANGOLA

<b>Conflict History</b>	1961-1975	Struggle for independence: MPLA, FAPLA, UNITA and FNLA against Portugal. Independence achieved on 11 <sup>th</sup> November 1975
	1975	Independence from Portugal achieved on 11 <sup>th</sup> November 1975.
	1976-1988	Power struggle between MPLA government and UNITA
	1988	New York Accords
	1991	Bicesse Accords - signed by UNITA leader Savimbi and President Dos Santos of MPLA - prepare transition to multi-party democracy under the supervision of UNAVEM II
	1992 -1994	Renewed fighting between MPLA and UNITA after Dos Santos and MPLA win presidential and parliamentary elections
	1994	Lusaka Protocol peace accords end fighting. The accords are monitored by UNAVEM III, followed by MONUA (1997)
	1998-2002	Full scale fighting between UNITA and MPLA resumes. UN plane is shot down and Angola intervenes in civil war in the DRC to support President Kabila
	1999	UN ends peace keeping mission
	2002	UNITA leader Savimbi killed by government troops. UNITA signs ceasefire and demobilisation starts
	2003	UN mission overseeing peace process winds up
	2006-2007	Final repatriation of Angolans who fled the civil war and President Dos Santos announces parliamentary elections for 2008
<b>Mine Action</b>	1994-1998	Mine action started following the Lusaka Peace Accord; HALO Trust, MAG and NPA were some of the first operators; Mechem (South African demining company) also carried out some contract demining; attempts to conduct Level One surveys
	1995	Attempt to develop local mine action capacity through the establishment of INAROE. Problems in 1997-8
	2001	The GOA established the CNIDAH as the national mine action authority
	2002	Angola ratified the APMBT. According to its treaty obligations it must clear all known minefields by 2012 and destroy all stockpiled AP mines before December 2007
	2003	INAD is established from the remains of INAROE as a national mine action operator
	2005	The Angola Demining Executive Commission is established
	2005-2006	Low outputs in clearance and land release
	2006	The Council of Ministers approved the 2006-2011 National Mine Action Strategic Plan



## ANNEX 6: TIMELINE SOMALIA

<b>Conflict History</b>	1960	British and Italian parts of Somalia become independent, merge and form the United Republic of Somalia
	1963	Border dispute with Kenya
	1964	Border dispute with Ethiopia erupts into hostilities
	1966	Border war with Ethiopia
	1977-1978	Ogaden War: landmine contamination along the Somali-Ethiopian border
	1988	Peace Accord with Ethiopia. Full civil war breaks out which leads to extensive landmine contamination within Somalia
	1991	Somaliland declares unilateral independence
	1998	Puntland region declares autonomy
	2005	Somali government begins returning home from exile in Kenya
	2006	Transitional government and the Union of Islamic Courts begin peace talks in Khartoum. Drought and possibility of war.
<b>Mine Action *</b>	2007	African Union Peacekeeping after US air strikes and interim government's declaration of state of emergency
	1991	Rimfire starts clearance in Somaliland
	1992	ICRC & UNESCO start MRE in Mogadishu
	1993	Rimfire ceases clearance in Somaliland
Somali Civil Protection Programme (SCPP) (Mine Action, Police, DDR/SALW, Justice/corrections)		
	1998	Mine Action (MA) component begins (demining via contracts)
	1999	SMAC established under UN & SCPP-MA shifts to capacity building
	1999	87 deminers trained
Rule of Law and Security Programme (ROLS) (SCPP components plus Gender/Human Rights)	2001	Agreement to establish Police EOD teams (2 x 8 people)
		PMAC established
	2002-03	Phase 1 of LIS conducted (4 regions of Somaliland)
	2004	Police EOD Team starts in Puntland
	2004-05	Phase 2 of LIS conducted (15 districts of Puntland)
	2005	HI trains DDG, HALO, SMAC, & Police EOD in MRE
	2006-	Phase 3 of LIS underway (disputed districts)

\* Somalia is not a state party to the APMBT



## ANNEX 7: TIMELINE SUDAN

<b>Conflict History</b>	1955-1972	First Civil War led by the Anya Nya movement begins in the south (initiated before independence on 1 January 1956)
	1972	Addis Ababa Peace Agreement between the government and the Anya Nya: the south becomes a self-governing region
	1983	Second Civil War breaks out again in the south (SPLA/SPLAM) and lasts until 2005
	1988	Cease fire agreement is drafted but not implemented
	1990	EU withdraws from formal assistance to the Sudan
	1993	IGAD led Peace Process begins
	1999	EU/ Sudan engage in formal political dialogue
	2001	EU/ Sudan agree Article 8 of Cotonou
	2001	Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement GOS/SPLA cooperation
	2002	Framework peace established and JMC created to monitor the Nuba Mountains Cease fire Agreement
	2003	Humanitarian crisis in Darfour despite the involvement of AU peacekeeping troops
	2005	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed
<b>Mine Action</b>	1996	SPLM/A declares a unilateral moratorium on the use of landmines provided the GOS reciprocates (put into practice in 1999) and creates the OSIL
	2001	SLIRI is created with funds from the EC. GOS and SPLM/A sign the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.
	2002	Emergency Mine Action Programme (EMAP) established by UNMAS at request of GOS and SPLM/A. UNICEF and UNDP establish independent projects: Mine Risk Education and Capacity Development respectively. UNMAS, UNICEF and UNDP collocated in Khartoum
	2002	National Mine Action Office of the GoS established (collocated with UNMAS in Khartoum)
	2002	New Sudan Mine Action Directorate (SPLM/A) established in Nairobi, Kenya
	2003	“Cross line” operations implemented to allow movement of deminers for humanitarian demining purposes, project ends 2005 June. SAC gets involved and a LIS is completed in Eastern Equatorial and Blue Nile
	2004	Sudan becomes a state party to the APMBT on 1 April UN deploys UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), UNMAS conducts limited route verification and clearance. Coordination structure unclear Regional EMAP sub office established in Rumbek, South Sudan Regional EMAP office established in Kadugli (North). FSD Tech survey project commences Feb 2005 – June 2006
	9 Jan 2005	CPA signed, Chapter 4 (security) stipulates creation on UN Mine Action Office to assist both parties (GoS and SPLM/A) with technical advice, coordination and additional demining assistance where necessary. CPA constitutes new Interim Constitution of Sudan, thus



		NMAS (north) and NSMAD (south) obtain legal status as equal and independent entities.
	March 2005	Resolution 1590 mandates all peacekeeping demining to conduct work in accordance with IMAS
	June 2005	UNMAO Sub office established in Juba
	Jun – Dec 2005	UNMAO Sub Office established in Wau, Malakal and Yei (South), New Sudan Mine Action Directorate moves from Nairobi to Juba (collocated with UNMAO Regional South) Members of Joint Integrated Units (GoS and GoSS) are trained on basic demining course in IMATC, Nairobi Kenya
	March 2006	CIDA funds LIS in Eastern Equatoria
	Sep 2006	UNMAO Regional Office West established in Dafur (upgraded from Mine Information Office)