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Sudan Mine Action Programme Capacity Development Study

Cranfield University

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Prepared by Cranfield University

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Foreword

The contamination of Sudan by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) is the result of more that two decades of armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army. In 2005 the United Nations and national authorities claimed that over a third of the country was contaminated, mainly in southern and central parts of the country. Although it is now acknowledged that the total area of contamination is much less, mines and ERW continue to hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid return and settlement of refugees and Internally Displace Persons and hampers reconstruction and development, particularly in central and southern parts of the country.

Mine action NGOs have been operating in Sudan for over ten years, initially in the South under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan with the focus on mine risk education and victim assistance. Some demining was conducted by the warring factions, but no proper records were kept and the clearance was not conducted to international standards.

The National Mine Action Office based in Khartoum and the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate based in Nairobi were established in early 2003 with support from United Nations Mine Action Service to undertake emergency humanitarian clearance of mines and ERW. However, coordinated mine action started in earnest following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. On 24 March 2005 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1590 to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to establish a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). One of the responsibilities of UNMIS is the clearance of mines and ERW to enable the freedom of movement of peacekeeping forces, and to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian aid.

As mandated by the CPA and the SCR 1590, in early 2005 the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) was established to support the deployment of the UNMIS forces and coordinate and undertake humanitarian the clearance of mines and ERW. The national mine action authorities have evolved to National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) in the north and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission in the south, established by presidential decrees of the Government of National Unity and government of Southern Sudan, respectively.

Currently most of the key mine action activities in the Sudan are managed by the UNMAO. However, the mandate of UNMAO expires in June 2011, by which time the national authorities should have assumed all necessary regulatory and coordination responsibilities. In order to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities to the national authorities, UNMAO is developing a Transition Plan. Clearly, successful transition will depend on a carefully designed and well resourced capacity development plan to reinforce and further develop the national mine action capacities. This study by UNDP, as the lead UN agency for mine action capacity development within UNMAO, is the first step in the design of such a Capacity Development Plan.

UNDP has conducted this study with the support of Ralph Hassall of Cranfield University. The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology has been used as it provides a systematic and defensible method of assessing the capacity gaps and of prioritising capacity development activities and initiatives. The study also includes a draft Capacity Development Plan which covers the transition period and beyond. Much of the capacity development post-June 2011 will be conducted by the national authorities themselves, however it is envisaged that some ongoing international assistance will be required from UNDP and others.

UNDP and its national and international partners will work hard to ensure that the Capacity Development Plan is implemented, and indeed is updated on a regular basis to reflect the humanitarian, development and security goals identified in other national strategies such as the UN Development Assistance Framework, the UNDP Country Programme Document and other relevant strategies.

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Abbreviations

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPD	Country Programme Document
EOD:	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GoNU	Government of National Unity
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
JASMAR	Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines
MACC	Mine Action Coordination Centre
MBT	Mine Ban Treaty (Ottawa Mine Ban Convention)
MRE	Mines Risk Education
MYWP	Multi-Year Work Plan
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NMAC	National Mine Action Centre
NTSG	National Technical Standards and Guidelines
SA	Survivor Assistance
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SCBL	Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
SRCS	Sudanese Red Crescent Society
SSDC	South Sudan Demining Commission
Sudanmap	Sudan Mine Action Programme
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
VA	Victim Assistance

SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY

SECTION 1: STUDY REQUIREMENT

1.1   Background

1.1.1   Sudan's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established on 24 December 2005 and official launched on 7 March 2006 with responsibility to direct and regulate mine action in the Sudan. The NMAA, which is mandated by Presidential Decree[1], comprises a National Mine Action Committee, a General Secretariat, a National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) based Khartoum, and the Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre. In addition, the Southern Sudan Demining Commission on 27 June 2006 [2].   The Committee, which is an inter-ministerial body with representation from civil society, SAF, SPLA, and GOSS and exercises its responsibilities through its Secretary-General, the Deputy Minister of Humanitarian Affairs. The National Mine Action Committee meets from time to time, but not a regular bases.

1.1.2   Many of the key regulatory and coordination responsibilities remain with the UNMAO, including the accreditation of mine action implementing organisations, the development of national mine action standards, and management of the Information Management System for Mine Action [3].   The two national mine action coordination centres, NMAC and SSDC, have grown in size and capability but this has been in the absence of a comprehensive and agreed capacity development plan.

1.1.3   The current mandate of UNMAO expires in June 2011, by which time the national authorities should have assumed all necessary regulatory and coordination responsibilities. In order to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities from UNMAO to the national authorities, UNMAO is developing a Transition Plan. The aim of the Transition Plan is to guide the efforts of the UN and national authorities to enable a smooth and systematic transfer of responsibilities.

1.1.4   An essential part of the transition process is the further development and strengthening of national capacities. But capacity development will not end when the UNMAO mandate expires in three years time; indeed it is assumed that the national mine action authorities will wish to continue to improve their abilities to effectively and efficiently manage and deliver capabilities.

1.2   Aim and scope of the study

1.2.1   The aim of the UNDP study was to develop a comprehensive capacity development plan which will enable the Sudan Mine Action Programme transition to full national ownership.[4]

1.2.2   The study addressed solely the regulatory and management requirements of the national authorities. The needs of the national mine action implementing organisations have not been considered.

1.3   Key references and assumptions

1.3.1   The report is based on the responsibilities for managing mine action in Sudan as defined in the CPA, UN Security Council Resolution 1590, Government of National Unity (GONU) Presidential Decree 299, GOSS Presidential Decree 45 and other related documents including the National Mine Action Strategic Framework Agreement adopted in August 2006.

1.3.2   The CPA established an interim arrangement in which a single state is ruled by the GONU and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). This 'one country two systems' is central to understanding and analysing the effectiveness of the Sudan Mine Action Programme.

1.3.3   Many challenges remain in Sudan. These include restrictions in the use of US mapping software (which limits the application of IMSMA), restrictions on the deployment of some international NGOs and commercial organisations, the lack of security (particularly in Darfur), and restrictions on transferring funds into Sudanese banks which complicates the direct funding of national organisations by international donors. The Capacity Development Plan proposed in this report acknowledges these challenges.

1.4   Terms and definitions

1.4.1   For the purposes of this report:

a.   The Sudan Mine Action Programme refers to the NMAC, SSDC, UN and other international and national bodies and accredited implementing organisations involved in mine action in Sudan, and all current and planned mine action projects and activities authorised by the NMAC, SSDC and UNMAO;

b.   Capacity development is an activity, or activities, which enable individuals, groups, organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability to manage and deliver capabilities in a sustainable manner - and to take ownership of the problem and its solution. In mine action it involves *inter alia* the introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the development of systems of governance and coordination, and the ability of national authorities to mobilise resources. [5]

c.   Technical terms as defined in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS 04.10) have been used.

1.4.2   A summary of the key terms and definitions used in the document is at Annex A.

1.5   Structure of report

1.5.1   Section 2 discusses the component parts of the Sudan Mine Action Programme, and clarifies key terms used in the study including transition, national ownership, trusteeship, governance and capacity development. This provides a firm foundation for the subsequent analysis of NMAC and SSDC and the development of the draft capacity development plan.

1.5.2   Section 3 describes the approach used in the study and explains why the UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology[6] was adopted. The approach provides a powerful way to examine organisations such as NMAC and SSDC from different perspectives and against different criteria.

1.5.3   Section 4 provides an analysis and assessment of NMAC, and Section 5 provides an analysis and assessment of SSDC. This is achieved by:

a.   Determining the required <u>future</u> capacities of NMAC and SSDC in terms of technical functions (such as managing clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance), and of regulatory and management functions (such as developing mine action policy and strategy, national mine action standards and guidelines and systems for accreditation and quality management); and

b.   Assessing the <u>current</u> capacities of NMAC and SSDC in terms of the ability to (1) engage with stakeholders, (2) understand needs, (3) develop policy and strategy, (4) develop, manage and implement projects and budgets, (5) monitor and evaluate projects, and (6) specific governance including planning, tasking and resource mobilisation.

1.5.4   Section 6 establishes a set of capacity development priorities based on the analyses and assessments described in Sections 4 and 5. Three sets of priorities are proposed: one set covering the 'enabling environment' such as the development of national mine action legislation; a second set covering 'organisational performance' such as the transfer of accreditation and quality management responsibilities from UNMAO to the national authorities; and a third set covering the development of human resources.

1.5.5   Section 7 provides a draft Capacity Development Plan covering three periods: 2009 to 2011 (i.e. the period leading up to the end of the current CPA meeting its Mine Ban Treaty obligations), and 2014 to 2017 (i.e. the final phase of the eight year Plan).

Notes on Section 1;

1.   Presidential Decree No 299 of 24 December 2005.

2.   Decree No 299 referred originally to a South Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre, which is now referred to as the South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC), and more recently by some as the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA).

3.   National mine action data is held in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database which is managed by UNMAO on behalf of the GONU.

4.   Aim and scope of study; see Project Terms of Reference, UNOPS 30 May 2008.

5.   The definition used here is an amalgam of (1) Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges, GICHD, Part II Chapter 10, Ted Paterson, and (2) p.3, UNDP – Capacity Assessment Practice Note, 2007, UNDP.

6.   *Capacity Assessment Methodology*, User's Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, May 2007.

SECTION 2: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN SUDAN

2.1 Mine action in Sudan - the current situation

2.1.1 Since 2006, national authorities have been established to regulate mine action in Sudan. At a policy level, an inter-ministerial body with representation from civil society and the military, called the National Mine Action Committee is mandated to regulate the practice of mine action in the country[7]. The Committee's executive authority has been *de facto* accorded to its Secretary-General who is also the Deputy Minister of Humanitarian Affairs. The offices concerned with the coordination and oversight of mine action are NMAC in the north and SSDC in the south[8].

2.1.2 In the northern areas, the NMAC has been embedded within existing government departments and structures with a clear line of management, while in the southern region the national authority has been developed from informal politico-military institutional arrangements. There is a marked difference between the northern and southern approaches in terms of bureaucratic, executive and government systems. There is also considerable variability amongst national agencies in terms of capacity to manage and coordinate mine action operations, evaluated against objectively verifiable criteria. Regardless of these differences, the two poles of national agency operate under a single vision for mine action as outlined in the CPA and expanded in a Mine Action Policy[9] and a Common Strategic Framework[10] which is addressing the landmine/ERW contamination problems in the Sudan. Establishment of all these organisations and the authorship of related mine action policy and legislation represent significant achievements for national mine action in the Sudan.

2.1.3 Alongside the existence of these national agencies, UNMIS comprises the bulk of the mine action effort in the country through its executing arm, UNMAO[11]. The programme is well funded and the UN component is staffed by international and Sudanese national personnel. UNMIS and UNMAO draw legitimacy from the CPA and UN Resolution 1590. While the Security Council mandate directs that international mine action organisations should 'assist' the national authorities with coordination and technical advice[12], in the absence of well established national mine action authorities, UNMAO has assumed direct control over responsibilities for the accreditation of demining organisations, and the conduct of quality assurance and control of all UN-sanctioned operations according to National Standards and Technical Guidelines (NSTG)[13].

2.1.4 The control centre for UN operations is the UNMAO headquartered in Khartoum, supported by three regional offices. To-date, UNMAO activities have been heavily centred on mission requirements, such as the clearance of roads and access routes in support of peacekeepers and opening of roads and routes to facilitate safe access. Within the UN Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy[14], UNDP leads on capacity development. Yet while there is UNDP representation within UNMAO, it is not formally subordinated to UNMAS[15]. UNDP alignment remains focused on the development of the capacity of national authorities to regulate and manage mine action. This has sometimes not been aligned to the mission requirements, or with the requirement for rapid service delivery.

2.1.5 The mine action component of the UN mission is overseen by a UN Mine Action Steering Committee which was established in 2004 to provide policy and establish priorities. However, this committee has not met since June 2006.

2.2 Imperatives for change

2.2.1   The primary responsibility for mine action lies with the government of a mine-affected state. This is normally exercised through a NMAA which is responsible for establishing the national and local conditions to enable the effective management of mine action. In most cases a National Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) or its equivalent will act as, or on behalf of, the 'NMAA'. In certain situations and at certain times, it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all of the functions, of a MACC. This is the case in Sudan where, at the time the CPA was signed in early 2005, the UN was mandated to assume many of the responsibilities of a Sudanese MACC.

2.2.2   Based on the provisions of the Presidential Decrees 299 and 45, since mid 2006 the NMAC and SSDC have steadily been developing capabilities, and now have the minimum required office space, transportation, and office equipment required of national MACCs. Most senior and mid-level managers of both organisations have attended formal management training, and the basis of an in-country coaching system has been established. Yet the original arrangement of early 2005 remains, with UNMAO retaining most of the regulatory responsibilities. There is an understandable desire for change by the national mine action directors and their senior line managers.

2.2.3   The current UNMAO and UNMIS mandates will expire in July 2011, as will the authority of the GONU. By then, the UNMAO must have handed over all remaining responsibilities for regulation and coordination of mine action in Sudan; indeed it would be prudent to transfer all the responsibilities well in advance of the deadline.

2.2.4   The Government of Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 October 2003. The treaty entered into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. This requires Sudan to clear all known mines by 2014. This is a national responsibility and requires national mine action leadership to ensure that the full clearance objective is achieved. Furthermore, Sudanese national authorities need to establish the capability to meet other treaty requirements including the preparation and submission of annual Article 7 transparency reports. It is worth mentioning that the Sudan has met its obligation under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty having destroyed all its known stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

2.2.5   UNMAO is well funded as it forms part of the UNMIS, but funding for other mine action projects in Sudan must compete with humanitarian and development projects worldwide. There is a growing recognition that mine action will soon be affected by 'donor fatigue', and countries such as Sudan with considerable potential income from oil and other exportable raw materials will be expected to fund its own mine action. It follows that the national mine action authorities need to develop the systems, skills and knowledge to mobilise resources and manage funds.

2.2.6   <u>Deduction</u>. There is a need and an expectation for the national authorities to assume full national ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme. This will require UNMAO to transfer some of its existing regulatory and coordination responsibilities prior to its mandate ending, and for the NMAC and SSDC to develop the necessary systems, procedures and skills to regulate and effectively manage all mine action within Sudan.

2.3 National ownership

2.3.1   The dominant narrative of capacity development and transition in Sudan is centred on the concept of *national ownership*. As with all socially constructed concepts, the meaning of the term is debated. This is certainly the case in Sudan, where multiple agencies, including national executive bodies, with different values, cultures, missions and mandates

seek to fulfil their objectives and in so-doing develop different perspectives of the concept of *national ownership*.

2.3.2   The term *ownership* in a legal sense is used to describe the exclusive rights and control over physical or intellectual property. It is embodied in a right of ownership, which is often referred to as *'title'*. Ownership also implies some degree of interest in maintaining, or indeed further developing, the value of the property.

2.3.3   The term *national ownership* in a strict legal sense can be used to describe the ownership of property by the state, but it has slipped into the language of international organisations, NGOs and civil society - in a wider sense - as exercising the right and accepting the responsibility to address issues of national concern such as poverty, disease, human rights and global warming.

2.3.4   In addressing such national issues and challenges, national ownership requires a state to provide effective and appropriate governance (see below), and it needs the engagement of civil society. But national ownership also requires the state to put in place a number of 'technical' capabilities and systems to enable the Government to exercise its responsibilities. These include the development and use of national regulatory processes including appropriate laws, the ability and willingness to plan and prioritise, the ability to mobilise and manage resources, the management and effective use of information, and the development of human capital and physical assets.

2.3.5   However, the term national ownership alone is insufficient to capture the characteristics of accountability and legitimacy which is the essence of governance as exercised by the UNMAO. For example, UNMAO cannot necessarily claim *ownership* on the behalf of the Sudanese people, thus there is nothing 'owned' which can be transferred. The term *'trusteeship'*, which implies a sense of both assumed and sovereign legitimacy in the delivery of certain services designed to bring about social outcomes can be used to bridge this ideological gap[16]. In this study, the term *trusteeship* is used in preference to ownership to describe those responsibilities which are currently vested in the UN and which will, in due course, be transferred to national authorities in Sudan.

2.4   Governance

2.4.1   UNDP acknowledges that development agencies, international organisations and academic institutions define governance in different ways.[17] Some describe governance as the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. Others describe governance in a more limited way as the action or manner of conducting the policy and affairs of a state, organisation or people. For the purposes of this study, the more limited definition of governance was used.

2.4.2   With regard to the regulation and management of mine action in Sudan, governance can be considered as comprising two sets of capabilities: specific and general as described below.

2.4.3   *Specific governance* includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the national authorities to regulate and manage mine action. These include *inter alia* organisational and operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and prioritisation, the mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information management using IMSMA, and the handover of safe, cleared land.

2.4.4   *General governance* refers to the broader environment which enables the specific governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. This includes the ability to recruit and select employees based on merit; the ability to ensure that technical

decision making is not heavily influenced by politics; the ability to ensure that decisions are made in a transparent manner; the ability to ensure that accountability is maintained within individuals within organisations; and mechanisms to ensure a high level of public access to decision-makers to ensure that policy reflects the needs of citizens. At a more technical level, it requires the development of robust management procedures that will allow the efficient and effective management of processes.

2.4.5   This distinction between general and specific governance is applied to the analysis and assessment of the NMAC and SSDC in Sections 4 and 5.

2.5   Transition

2.5.1   The Oxford Dictionary defines transition as '..... the process of moving from one state or condition to another.' This lends itself to the concept of transitioning the Sudan Mine Action Programme to full national ownership, which involves taking the programme from a its current state (where many of the regulatory and coordination responsibilities are being exercised by UNMAO) to a state where these responsibilities are exercised by national authorities, perhaps with some limited international assistance.

2.5.2   UNMAO has appointed a Transition Programme Officer to act as a focal point for this work with the aim of developing a transition framework and plan by the end of 2008. A workshop was held at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi from 25 - 28 February 2008 to address the transition of the Sudan Mine Action Programme to full national ownership. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the issues which will impact on the programme transitioning to national ownership. [18] Two more workshops were held in Nairobi and in Khartoum, and a final workshop will be held in Juba on 18 November 2008.

2.5.3   The development of the transition framework and plan has required the UNMAO, UNDP, NMAC and SSDC to examine closely the detailed capabilities which comprise a national mine action capacity, to identify the responsibilities which need to be transferred from the UNMAO to national authorities, and to consider the elements and components of capacity development. The work has shown that the requirements of transition and capacity development are complementary and mutually reinforcing, but are not identical.

2.6   Capacity development

2.6.1   *Capacity development*[19] is a broad concept which enables individuals, groups, organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability to manage and deliver capabilities - and to take ownership of the problem and its solution. In mine action it involves the introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the development of systems of governance and coordination, and the ability of national authorities to mobilise resources from national budgets. Moreover, it involves the development of national managers through education, training and coaching.

2.6.2   The UNDP Capacity Development Process involves five steps:

   a.   Step 1: engage with partners and build consensus.

   b.   Step 2: assess capacity assets and needs.

   c.   Step 3: prepare capacity development plan.

   d.   Step 4: implement capacity development plan.

   e.   Step 5: monitor and evaluate the development of capacities.

This study addressed the first three steps of the UNDP process.

Notes on Section 2:

7. See Presidential Decree No (299), 2005.

8. See Government of South Sudan Presidential Decree 45/2006, In practice, few reporting lines exist between the southern and northern entities.

9. The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, May 2006.

10. The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework, June 2006.

11. For more detailed assessments that evaluate the performance of the Sudan Mine Action Programme from a range of institutional standpoints see: Paterson and Bohle, 2008; Gomer *et al*, 2007; ICBL 2007; Bolton 2008.

12. See para 4 (c) Sudan Security Council Resolution 1590, 24 March 2005.

13. Based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

14. See Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Interagency Policy (6 June 2005) p.33 paras 97-113, specifically para 105.

15. This is also true of the MRE national coordinator position, which is supplied by UNICEF under a similar. arrangement, although two international MRE officers are incorporated directly into the UNMAO structure.

16. These differences are not purely semantic; they have caused genuine disagreement over the process of transition.

17. Governance Indicators - a Users Guide: www.undp.org/governance/docs/policy-guide-IndicatorsUser Guide.pdf

18. Communique dated 28 February 2008.

19. Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges, GICHD, Part II Chapter 10, Ted Paterson.

SECTION 3: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

3.1   UNDP framework

3.1.1   Many capacity assessment methodologies, frameworks and tools are used by development practitioners. The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology[20] has been adopted for this project. It provides a systematic and defensible method of assessing capacity needs, establishing priorities and sequencing of capacity development projects and activities. The approach can be used in complex development situations when it is not always obvious where best to understand the relative needs and/or the order of implementing capacity development projects and activities. Not least, it provides a common language to facilitate discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity assessment. The method thus represents an appropriate method of determining the capacity development requirements of the Sudan Mine Action Programme.

3.1.2   The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology assumes there are two sets of issues which need to be addressed. These are referred to as *core issues* relevant to the sector being assessed, and cross-cutting *technical and functional capacities.*

3.1.3   *Core issues* include matters which are relevant to the context of the capacity assessment. In the case of this study, such issues include the implications of Sudan's 'one-country-two systems', the need for mine action projects to be based on broader humanitarian, national development and security priorities, and the particular needs of each of the five pillars of mine action. Core issues also include specific matters identified by stakeholders during the design phase of the assessment.

Figure 1: UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework

3.1.4   UNDP define *cross-cutting technical and functional capacities* as '... the capacities necessary for the successful creation and management of policies, legislations, strategies and programmes.' These include the ability of to be able to (1) engage with stakeholders, (2) define realistic goals, objectives and outcomes, (3) develop policies and plans to enable these goals, objectives and outcomes to be achieved, (4) mobilise resources and implement

projects, and (5) monitor progress and evaluate results. At the project level, *functional capabilities* represent the procedures, information and skills needed to execute the project planning cycle.

3.1.5   The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology recognises that capacities exist at different levels: individual, organisation and the external environment which includes the government, civil society and other key bodies with interest in the Sudan Mine Action Programme. Capacity assessments should consider all three levels.

3.1.6   The three dimensions (core issues, technical and functional capacities, and levels of analysis) are referred to as the UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework, and can be represented as a cube consisting of a number of cells; see Figure 2. The UNDP methodology envisages that an assessment team will analyse the effectiveness of current capabilities by focussing on each cell, or groups of connected cells. In this study, for example, SSDC initially were invited to express an opinion on the current effectiveness of key <u>individuals</u> to <u>develop policies and plans</u> with regard to <u>demining projects</u>. These three 'dimensions' provided the focus for discussion on the need for capacity development.

Figure 2: Modified capacity assessment framework

3.2   Study methodology

3.2.1 UNDP provides a 'default' capacity assessment framework which must then be modified to meet the particular needs of the country, sector and organisation being assessed. The default framework is described at Annex C. The modifications used for this study are described at Annex D. These modifications were made at the beginning of the

study and approved by the UNDP Senior Technical Adviser prior to the start of meetings and interviews with the Directors and staff of NMAC, SSDC and representatives of the Government of Sudan.

3.2.2   The future capacity requirements of NMAC and SSDC were defined by referring to the traditional roles and responsibilities of a national mine action authority and coordination centre, modified to meet the particular circumstances existing in Sudan. The requirements were assessed in terms of the five pillars of mine action, and ten core management activities. The future core activities of NMAC and SSDC will be:

      a.   Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action in Sudan;

      b.   Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities;

      c.   Accredit mine action organisations in accordance with National Mine Action Standards and Guidelines (responsive to IMAS) before any mine action activity is authorised;

      d.   Undertake quality management of all mine action activities;

      e.   Revise National Mine Action Standards and Guidelines according to in-country needs and conditions. Once revised, all concerned are obliged to adhere to them;

      f.   Maintain the integrity of IMSMA;

      g.   Coordinate and oversee the implementation of MRE to communities at risk on a priority basis;

      h.   Mobilise the necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve mine action strategic goals;

      i.   Support the Government of Sudan to honour its obligations under the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties; and

      j.   Coordinate and oversee the implementation of VA to ensure physical and psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of the victims and survivors of landmine and ERW accidents.

The future capacity requirements of NMAC are defined in Section 4, and the requirements of SSDC are defined in Section 5.

3.2.3   An assessment of the current capacities was conducted using the assessment framework described at Annex D. It is important to note that the preferred level of analysis for the NMAC was the organisation, whereas the preferred level of analysis of the SSDC was the individual. A series of meetings, interviews and roundtable discussions took place in Khartoum and Juba between 26 July and 20 August 2008.

3.3   Presentation of findings

3.3.1   At the end of the assessment phase, a summary of the initial findings was presented to the UNMAO, NMAC and SSDC. This was shown in the form of a chart which assessed the level of current capacities against future requirements; see Annex D.

3.3.2   Discussion of the initial findings led to a deeper understanding of the capacity gaps, and the need for potential enhancements. This analysis of the gaps and recommendations for capacity development of NMAC is described in Section 4, and of SSDC in Section 5.

Notes on Section 3:

20. See: *Capacity Assessment Methodology*, User's Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, May 2007.

SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 4: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION CENTRE

4.1 Overview and entry level

4.1.1 The NMAC is comprised of politico-military appointees, often on secondment from military units or other governmental departments. As a result there are strong political and military dimensions to work and organisational culture. Staff within the NMAC place emphasis on *organisational* performance, and this was chosen for the entry point for discussions of capacity. As the NMAC is already embedded within extant bureaucratic framework, the organisational structure may be determined by existing policy and regulations. So despite the organisational focus, the discussions regarding the *structure* of the organisation are still ongoing and organisational development recommendations should be mindful that organisational restructuring is "work in progress".

4.1.2 In order to elicit the future end-state, two roundtable discussions were held between the assessment team, the deputy director of the NMAC and the principal staff members, including the heads of department. For evidence of capacity within the functional areas, the roundtable discussions were supplemented by interviews with individual staff members, well informed persons, and any other international staff that have knowledge of the abilities of personnel within the NMAC. Documents outlining the current organisational structure, and the Sudan Mine Action Policy were also used as references, as these are mostly normative to mine action activities in the North.

4.2 Future performance: pillars of mine action

This part of the capacity assessment defines the future requirements of each mine action pillar. It describes the setting within which NMAC will be required to regulate and manage mine action in northern Sudan.

4.2.1 Clearance

If clearance rates continue as they are, the NMAC team envisage that within the next two to three years the majority of high impact clearance in northern Sudan will have been achieved, and the reduced nature of the humanitarian threat will determine the dimensions of the demining programme in northern Sudan. In order to meet the residual threat, the clearance programme will be primarily conducted by national organisations and the Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDU), although international organisations may well still be operating in the country on commercial tasks in support of development, and humanitarian tasks. Logistical and financial support for national demining operations will also be managed through the NMAC, and unless machines are left behind after the departure of other international organisations[21] there will be no fixed assets such as machines. In addition to the clearance work, survey, marking and other operations of organisations will be monitored; however there will be no specific implementation capacity in these areas. Instead the NMAC will have a purely regulatory, supervisory and coordinating role.

Aside from responding to specific clearance requests on a project-by-project basis, the NMAC envisage that policy will be influenced by executive authority within the Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs, the National Mine Action Committee, and other actors such as state governors. The policy process may well be affected by an ongoing decentralisation of authority to the state level. Even if the NMAC itself remains centralised and national the decentralisation process may bring financial implications with it, and this could change NMAC policy. Another influence on clearance policy will be the Ministry of Transport Roads

and Bridges and JIDUs will continue to work on the clearance of strategic routes. There is thus a clear developmental aspect to the clearance work.

4.2.2 Mine Risk Education

There will be no implementation capacity for MRE within the NMAC. Instead activities will be focussed on coordinating, monitoring and training of trainers as well as tasking and allocation of funds. While remaining mindful of the sustained requirements for basic mine awareness, and classic educational announcements, the principal MRE role at the end state is shifted towards community liaison and risk reduction. Therefore, technical MRE capacity will exist to review and approve national MRE initiatives as well as to review and update the national standards as required. The department is also able to monitor implementer activities and evaluate social impact of interventions in terms of knowledge, attitudes and practice. The training of trainer capacity allows MRE staff to brief and train implementers on good practice and emerging techniques within this discipline.

At the local level, community networks and a surveillance system will be in place and these are monitored by the NMAC. At the central government level, there are a number of key partners from line ministries that have an important role to play in the delivery of MRE, these are: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Information. These ministries have representation on the National Mine Action Committee through which they are able to influence mine action policy for MRE. The ministerial partners can also mainstream MRE across existing services, such as incorporating awareness-raising messages into educational curricula of schools in affected states. The NMAC envisages that it will remain able to provide on-going technical support to these mainstreamed initiatives.

4.2.3 Stockpile Destruction

Future performance within the stockpile pillar will centre on two organisational competencies: (1) the ability to liaise effectively with military units regarding caches of landmines that may come to light, and their destruction; and (2) maintenance of a reporting system and catalogue on the retained stockpiles of mines to ensure that the Government of Sudan remains compliant with the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Thus, the role of the NMAC for stockpile destruction is essentially a coordinating one, with coordination taking place between civilian departments at the central and local levels, as well as military units, potentially including those of non-state actors. The performance of the stockpile destruction pillar is closely linked with that of advocacy and the two complement one another.

4.2.4 Advocacy

Within the NMAC, advocacy is viewed as an overarching capacity that encompasses other pillars such as stockpile destruction, MRE and VA. This mine action pillar will thus have shifted in mandate in that it will also include advocating for funds in addition to generalised campaign for meeting Mine Ban Treaty obligations. This assumption is based on the anticipated requirements of the programme, i.e. that as reporting on the implementation of the MBT becomes a reduced technical activity the need for lobbying for external funding support for humanitarian mine action will grow. This shift in requirement means that the role of civil society organisations in the North such as the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines will be diminished, whilst the fundraising responsibilities of the national authorities will increase.

4.2.5 Victim Assistance

VA will continue to remain a high priority to NMAC and donors, who choose to fund national organisations on a bilateral basis. There will also be a greater contribution by government to VA activities as only the government can provide the scope of technical support and care to victims and their dependents in a sustained manner. While much of the VA activity will have

been mainstreamed into general disability programmes within other ministries such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Welfare, the NMAC will retain a supervisory role. This role will include supervising the collection of data relating to landmine and ERW injuries, ensuring that the programmes are compliant with internationally approved practice, and that the particular needs of landmine victims are not lost within generalised disability programmes. The MRE unit will also make sure that data related to victims that is collected during community surveys for the IMSMA database, are consistent with the nationally-held victim data.

The NMAC also note that a new convention on the rights of the people with disability, which Sudan has signed, is due to be ratified. This will bring renewed attention on the issue of victims in general within the country and is a sphere of activity in which NMAC has a clear role to play. The activities of the NMAC in this regard will be supported by clear governmental guidelines that define what exactly constitutes being 'a victim', combined with an advanced technical capacity for supervising the various activities associated with VA such as trauma management, rehabilitation, psycho-social counselling and vocational reintegration.

4.3   Future performance: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the national authorities to regulate and manage mine action. These include organisational and operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and prioritisation, the mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information management using IMSMA and the handover of safe, cleared land, i.e. through ensuring quality of operations. This part of the capacity assessment defines how the NMAC foresees discharging the activities that relative to the specific governance of its mine action programme.

4.3.1   Accreditation and quality

The NMAC see that quality management is a tool for enhancing service delivery and that standards are integral to the conduct of operations, because they are linked to who can, and also cannot, undertake various mine action activities. Standards are also viewed as having strong linkages to capacity development. The NMAC will thus use a system of accreditation and quality management for international and national organisations that will be based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and NTSG. Because of their normative potential, the NTSGs will be incorporated into the standardised metrics used by the Ministry of Measurement and Standards. Once held by this ministry they can be used to further ensure consistency of usage throughout Sudan. This quality assurance mechanism will be managed by the Quality Management Unit which will quality assure activities included within the five pillars of mine action. This will be staffed by military personnel but assisted by technical advice from the functional departments themselves, for example MRE.

The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework is clear that aside from being registered by the Humanitarian Aid Commission in Sudan, all organisations including national and international NGOs, and commercial companies have to be accredited by the National Mine Action Centres in Khartoum or Juba as relevant before they commence undertaking any mine action operations in the Sudan."[22] In addition, quality assurance processes will ensure "implementation of the national mine action standards in accordance with IMAS with the aim to regulate mine action activities in the country."[23] Although the NTSGs will be used in the accreditation for all clearance implementers, the accountability mechanisms used for either state or non-governmental actors may well be different. In both cases, it is intended that future legislation, adapted and applicable to mine action requirements and which refer to NTSGs and other appropriate national standards will provide the clearest framework for accreditation and quality assurance.

For the State, clearance work will continue to be conducted by the Joint Integrated Demining Units. Standing orders will continue to be given to ensure compliance with the NTSGs, and NMAC quality assurance officers conduct site visits to ensure compliance to IMAS and NTSGs. Accountability, in this particular situation, is thus based on a military judicial system; negligence on behalf of the military can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms, and in this manner government can be held to account. The national system is thus viewed by the NMAC as providing a greater level of accountability than the external UN-system, because it is felt that there are less consequences of negligence for operators working under UN accreditation, and thus fewer rights for victims.

For national and international non-governmental organisations, the accreditation process will involve a prequalification stage, which could include issuing requests for expressions of interest, for example. This would require interested organisations to submit details on experience, financing and so on. Following this, the IMAS-model organisational accreditation would take place followed by field accreditation. The standard quality assurance mechanism will then be used to assess whether the organisation remains compliant with the NTSGs.

4.3.2   Information management

Due to current embargoes, use of the Geographical Information System (GIS) software element within IMSMA is restricted within northern Sudan due to the US trade embargo on Sudan. While temporary IMSMA use is permitted under the trusteeship of the UNMAO, it is not clear whether it will be able to be used by the NMAC alone as and when the UN leaves. If it is not, the NMAC may have to resort to other tools to manage and manipulate hazard and impact data in a spatial manner, or UNDP could act as trustee of the IMSMA GIS software on behalf of the national authorities post-2011. Thus the information management team sees itself subject to certain external constraints which will in-turn determine future performance. [Note: it is understood that FMS - the developers of IMSMA - hope to get agreement with US authorities to license IMSMA for use in northern Sudan.]

Regardless of the exact system used, information management will have a critical function within the NMAC; the department will provide operators with information on contamination. However, it will not actively collect data, data collection will be done through operators using dedicated proformas. National military clearance organisations such as the JIDUs will also have dedicated IMSMA officers (or equivalent) attached to the units to provide updates on clearance progress.

4.3.3   Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

In general, financial resource mobilisation will vary with the economic situation of the country, the political importance of mine action, and the willingness of bilateral donors to provide support. The fortunes of clearance operations will also be strongly linked to development efforts within the country. This includes the incidental requirements for clearance in advance of development projects, such as construction in contaminated areas. There are thus perceived linkages to general development initiatives and strategies.

With the exception of special projects such as JIDU operations, planning is likely to follow the status quo of separate north-south operational work-planning, and clearance work will be coordinated by an Operations Department which has liaison officers from the JIDUs. The Operations Department will be the primary developers of yearly work-plans, and five year documents such as the 2005-2011 plan, which will be used to solicit government funding. Activities within the plans could include development of capacity within the JIDUs and supporting the creation of new demining teams, in line with a strong militarised approach to demining. In this regard, the NMAC may attempt to solicit equipment and materials in support of JIDU demining operations.

Related work on stockpile destruction will remain an ongoing process of reporting with reactive activity on discovery of caches of mines – and destroying them in situ – therefore there is reduced requirement for specific planning activity in this area. For other pillars of mine action such as MRE and VA, planning and tasking will be conducted within specialised departments in partnership with Operations and NMAC directors. Planning may also involve the important governmental and civil society stakeholders, as well as representation from international organisations such as UNICEF.

4.4   Assessment of current capacity: programme and project management

Following the analysis of the NMAC's future capacity requirements across the five pillars of mine action, an assessment is required to establish those areas of performance that can be enhanced through intervention. The purpose of this assessment section is to those identify areas of need, by making a review of actual, current performance across the critical functional capacities at the NMAC.

The end states reveal a considerable amount of liaison and advocacy activity, strong coordination mechanisms, and the ability to plan and monitor operations. This will require organisational competency to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, assess needs and create common visions for mine action, develop suitable policies and effective strategies. At a more operational level, the NMAC will need to be able to manage its own activities and initiatives as well monitor and evaluate the projects and programmes of others.

4.4.1   Engaging with stakeholders

The NMAC is competent in retaining linkages with national stakeholders. These include central government departments such as the Ministries of Planning, Health, Education and the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges. Within civil society, good relationships are maintained with those national organisations conducting MRE, VA and advocacy-based activities. In addition, the Sudanese Campaign to Ban Landmines has formal representation within the National Mine Action Committee structure, and are co-located in the same building. In terms of local government, state governors have significant input into mine action operations and staff at the NMAC feel that these relationships are of great importance as the ability to coordinate with military groups and negotiating access to controlled areas must be well maintained. There is general consensus that the quality of relationships between national organisations and the NMAC are sustainable and would not change significantly over time.

With respect to foreign stakeholders such as UN Agencies, international organisations and donor governments, engaging with stakeholders is a more complicated activity. This reflects a combined lack of capacity on the part of some of the most interested and influential external agencies (such as UNMAO) and not only the NMAC to engage effectively. This has not been helped by formal processes which have developed in an exclusionary fashion. For example, external stakeholders have trusteeship of the specific governance elements of the programme and as a result the NMAC is circumnavigated by most international agencies during resource mobilisation, accreditation and tasking processes. Regardless of the origins of this deficiency, the ability for NMAC to engage in a full-bodied partnership with international agencies working inside Sudan is a very pressing short-term requirement, and thus an area which will require specific attention for capacity development.

Recommendation:	Interdependencies between the external and national agencies should be expanded to cover information exchange, joint work processes (such as planning, tasking and accreditation), and resource flows (information and financial). Engagement with the NMAC should be considered an integral part of UN operations. In this way, trust will be developed between the

two sides, and operations will be conducted in a symbiotic manner, rather than in a parallel fashion.

4.4.2 Assessing needs and building visions

Within the NMAC, there is an understanding of the formal needs assessment approach, which requires the rational investigation of need within society, measured at a local level. However, most prioritisation is driven by a top-down process that emanates from the central executive or state governor level and this naturally reduces the perceived utility of such approaches and thus their usages in the absence of external partners. For example, the NMAC is responsible for collecting data from communities and state authorities in a designated area, but tasks within that area are chosen that are politically expedient as well as humanitarian.

This system has two implications: (1) that decisions for allocating resources are based on politics and not needs, which if this is in the interest of the electorate is acceptable from a rights-based rather than a needs-based perspective, and (2) that heavy influencing of technocratic processes such as humanitarian tasking could have implications for humanitarianism, as less-vocal but nevertheless impacted communities could be excluded from the delivery of services such as mine action.

Addressing needs in an effective manner requires aligning stakeholders with a common vision. In it turn building a vision requires strong leadership, and the ability of those leaders to coalesce diverse viewpoints around common interests. At the top of the national authority structure, the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs is highly influential in developing policy for the organisation. This executive level could be supported by the National Mine Action Committee by incorporating a wider range of central government interests. This may help to facilitate dialogue, exchange of information and other resources between northern and southern mine action authorities. At present, the relationship between the two centres is of a formal, nature, defined through interaction in military-led tasking of the JIDUs, and governed through the use of military liaison officers.

Recommendation:	The needs assessment process should be formalised. In this way, incorporating the needs of impacted, and perhaps less focal communities, can be made established and opportunities for subordinating humanitarian objectives at the expense of political ones may be reduced.
Recommendation:	Begin to reconvene the National Mine Action Committee. The Committee is established to provide oversight and inclusive policy-level support to the NMAC. It has representation from civil society organisations, and the GOSS has de facto representation through particular ministers that sit on the Committee. By ensuring that the Committee meets regularly, it is likely that work will remain aligned with justifiable developmental or humanitarian objectives into the strategic timeframe.

4.4.3 Developing policy and strategy

Policy and strategy development principles such as ensuring participation are not articulated. In addition, formal opportunities for public-policy dialogue do not exist, and it is unclear whether joint strategic planning sessions between northern and southern authorities could be conducted without third-party facilitation. This has not been assisted by the Mine Action Policy Framework, which although it sets out the roles and responsibilities of the mine action organisations and actors in the country, and some general principles of action, does not specify how policies and principles may be expanded. The result is a formal policy vacuum –

at least visible policy – and this means that (a) technocratic processes may become distorted through political pressure, and (b) reactive decision making may be arbitrary and inconsistent, which could lead to unjust practice.

At a project level, the framework approach to planning is relatively well understood within the NMAC. Directing staff are able to articulate the meanings of aims, missions, and objectives in general, and are aware of the specific aims, missions and objectives of the NMAC. There is familiarity with a range of techniques for developing policies and strategies, and this is perhaps attributable to the participatory approaches employed in the development of the Mine Action Strategic Framework, Mine Action Policy and attendance on a range of training courses that cover programme and project management. However, it is therefore unclear how normative these technical approaches are to the northern Sudanese planning approach, and thus whether they are sustainable within a northern Sudanese context.

Culturally-speaking, dominant bureaucratic thinking places emphasis on technical work planning on a yearly basis rather than at a strategic timeframe. Instead, a policy of reactive adjustment to changes within the programme is more apparent. For example, the *Wau-Babanossa* railway project which called the JIDU capacity into being was apparently in reaction to specific UN positioning regarding accreditation, quality management, and contracting. In addition, strong executive authority that governs the activities of the NMAC places little incentive on departmental strategy development; priority and policy is dictated by external agencies such as the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges or State level authorities for specific mine/ERW clearance. While specialised technical departments such as MRE appear to have a greater interest in long-term planning, the utility may well become negated as these activities are increasingly mainstreamed into other government departments and ministries.

Recommendation:	The current policy framework for Sudan should be expanded, based on the principles set out within the Policy Framework. While the National Mine Action Policy Framework provides the general limits within which organisations can work, it only defines who can work and what they can do, rather than *how* they can do it. This means that the Policy does not specify how activities will be developed, who they will be developed for, and how they should be implemented. By creating a specific set of policies that defined NMAC action, opportunities for formalising and embedding local-level participation will present themselves, and the potential for political interference. In addition, relations between internal and external agencies will become more predictable, and thus manageable.

4.4.4 Budgeting, managing and implementing

Accountancy and budget control are managed through the Administration and Finance department. Between February 2007 and July 2008, the NMAC managed approximately $5.5 million (US) worth of expenditure. This expenditure was mainly on heavy and specialist equipment for the JIDUs; funding was mostly from national budgetary sources, or financial assistance through UNDP. In addition to this, the NMAC prepares regular budgets for personnel travel and subsistence allowances, and also provides direct financial budgeting assistance to the JIDUs. The NMAC has also been able to plan and budget for the development of a new headquarters building in Khartoum, as well as for a number of regional offices. This suggests that there is a level of competency in developing budgets and managing expenditure, but that there is room for improvement.

In terms of human resource management, the NMAC is covered by a range of normative government policies and labour laws. Recruitment and selection are centralised, and

appointments are made within existing government structures. There is no evidence to suggest that individuals from non-governmental organisations can work-share within, or transfer across to government departments such as the NMAC. Aside from generalised employment policies, the NMAC has a comparatively open management style for a highly militarised department. There are regular briefings and interdepartmental meetings, extensive coordination with military units, and visits from members of parliament and other government stakeholders.

The NMAC does not claim to be an implementing agency. However it is involved directly in planning and tasking, for example, in the tasking of national NGOs for MRE in conjunction with UNMAO, with facilitation from UNICEF. For the limited operational tasking processes in NMAC – in the current scope of work – there is a planning officer who also has responsibility for tasking. The planning officer is supported by a finance and logistics section, which is also used to provide direct support to the JIDUs when they are on operations. During operations of the JIDUs, IMSMA officers are also deployed to the field. This is so that they can report directly to the NMAC on the progress of operations and this allows the NMAC a greater degree of control over implementation. For more sizeable operations, the NMAC draws on logistical support from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs.

Recommendation:	Where possible, external agencies should attempt to conduct organisational development of the Administration and Finance Departments within the NMAC. This should include accountancy, book-keeping as well as preparing and managing budgets. Since the systems are normative to standard governmental procedures, intervention should seek to augment and reinforce existing mechanisms, rather than to overhaul or completely change current practice.
Recommendation:	Establish a human resource policy for the NMAC, which reflects the realities of the prevailing system but which also follows the intent of the Strategic Framework for mine action in Sudan. This policy should establish the former working arrangements of personnel within the NMAC, including: their selection and recruitment, job-sharing possibilities, performance review procedure, length of service and the manner by which they should be trained and developed.
Recommendation:	The UNMAO and UNICEF officers in charge of MRE should continue to provide assistance in terms of planning support to the NMAC. As far as possible, NMAC staff should also continue to be involved in the management, monitoring and evaluation activities associated with these plans. This will build interdependencies as well as ensure the flow of established practice in these areas.
Recommendation	External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted organisational development of the Logistics Department within the NMAC. Activities should reflect the current and future scale and scope of NMAC resources, e.g. fleet of cars, facilities and the type and amount of equipment in the stores.

4.4.5   Monitoring and evaluation

Staff within the NMAC are aware of the importance of monitoring and evaluating projects. As an institution designed for supervision and coordination, they see this as a core component of their work. Staff recognise that the ability to monitor and evaluate is tied to (a) a

developed understanding of the technical task at hand, for example the technical requirements of reporting and cataloguing mines; and (b) skill in evaluation, and understanding and demonstrating attribution of impacts, for example it was stated by the MRE team that there were shortfalls in developing monitoring and evaluation packages that could explore the consequences of social intervention in detail. This is a state-driven request for further development in these areas and implies a desire to move away from the relatively constrained notions of process driven, quantitative evaluation that tends to dominate discussion of monitoring and evaluation in mine action. However, there was no demonstrated understanding of the need for participation in monitoring and evaluation and its potential for learning and developing capacity.

Recommendation: External agencies should support the NMAC request for a more nuanced understanding of policy development and impact analysis. Intervention should address the manner by which policies are created and developed, the constituencies they serve, and the constituencies that they create.

Recommendation: Wherever possible, external agencies should embed a participatory approach into developing NMAC policy. Participation could extend to the use of beneficiaries and other mine action organisations (e.g. from civil society sector), where appropriate.

4.5 Assessment of current capacity: general governance

General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. The purpose of this part of the assessment of current capacity is to outline the general governance environment within the NMAC, in terms of facilitating or constraining future performance, and the permissiveness towards intervention and positive change.

Most staff appointments are made through military mechanisms or through recruitment from a pool of retired military personnel. Heads of department have thus demonstrated competency in military service, and since mine action is viewed primarily through a security lens, the appointment of senior officers reflects the political importance of mine action. Other, non-military staff positions such as the director of the MRE department are competent. However, while the appointment system can be said to be generally meritocratic, talented staff within certain fields such as information management, are not often found within state structures. This is due to the lower salaries available to skilled Information Technology workers compared with the private sector. There is thus a risk that appointments to certain critical posts such as within the information management team may be less based on competency and more on other factors; and that rotations of staff can produce capacity gaps within the organisational structure which will impact on performance.

In the early stages of organisational development of the NMAC, decision-making was a top-down process. This may be attributable to the military background of personnel, which strongly influences organisational culture. However with placements of staff on a range of management courses, including senior and middle management courses, changes in institutional culture have been observed. While there is still as centralised dimension to decision making, there are now regular meetings between the director and staff during which, issues are discussed, agreement reached and decisions taken. Compared with other governments in the wider region, decision-making can be considered participatory in spirit. The NMAC thus has the capability to take informed decisions on a wide range of issues without difficulty. On matters of political significance, executive decisions are taken by the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs.

This ability to make decisions may be linked to a greater levels of accountability vested in individual decision makers, which has been developed through an good understanding of boundaries of responsibility. Once apprised of the boundaries in which they work, staff are able to speak their mind on work-related matters, in a relatively unhindered fashion. While ultimate accountability is vested within the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, the director and his staff are able to take responsibility for actions. For example, MRE, VA and Information Management departments are able to take decisions on matters relating to day-to-day issues, as well as provide input into planning processes with other agencies.

The NMAC is not specifically mandated for higher-level policy development, this is the responsibility of the National Mine Action Committee. The Committee includes representation from Civil Society organisations, e.g. the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines. However, for as long as the Committee does not meet regularly, direct public access to policy development will continue to be limited. This is not to say that public access to policy does not occur. State governors are able to influence the work plans of both the NMAC and the UNMAO, through a consultation process via the NMAC. Since tasks and requests are often of a political or developmental character rather than of an overtly humanitarian nature, a degree of interaction between local government and the community leaders within those states is reported to occur. That being said, instituting a formal mechanism of public access through civil society organisations, through the Committee would raise the effectiveness of public policy dialogue.

There are limits to the degree that political influence over the technocratic process can be said to be beneficial. Owing to the political interest in mine action – defined through the CPA, and consolidated by its visibility and the large funding streams that support the programme – there is a high level of political interest. To-date, the developments may be seen as positive since they provide a counterbalance to the development-focussed priority-setting agenda of the NMAC as it takes the majority of its tasks from the Ministry of Transport Roads and Bridges. However, it may mean that decisions are not taken in the interests of humanitarianism, nor in terms of efficiency or effectiveness of operations. Although if the majority of high-to-medium humanitarian tasks in northern Sudan are cleared by 2014 this may not pose any particular problems.

Recommendation:	The NMAC should create an institutionalised knowledge management system, which ensures that skills and knowledge are not lost with reallocation of staff. This could include a system whereby changes to departmental staffing arrangements are staggered to ensure that employees can transfer skills between one another. It could also mean preparing documented handover notes. The creation of formal policies, systems and procedures that define the NMAC will also enhance continuity of service delivery. This is because personnel will need to refer to established systems and procedures rather than provide ad hoc solutions which may well vary in quality and consistency.
Recommendation:	The National Mine Action Committee should begin to reconvene regularly, and formal mechanisms for public policy dialogue should be established within NMAC systems and procedures. While the Committee will provide an oversight and accountability mechanism, as well as the opportunity for formalised civil society participation in the policy development process, more operational level systems and procedures that incorporate the views and opinions of beneficiaries and other, micro-level stakeholders will ensure that macro-level policy is being implemented in a just and equitable manner.

4.6   Assessment of current capacity: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the national authorities to regulate and manage mine action – the core business of a national authority. This part of the capacity assessment therefore defines the NMAC's progress towards achieving the required levels of performance in the regulation and management of a mine action programme.

4.6.1   Accreditation and quality

Operations and quality assurance staff are comfortable discussing the purpose and wider aims of monitoring and evaluation operations in mine action. In addition they can make suggestions as to how currently accredited organisations do, or do not, represent good quality in terms of efficiency or effectiveness. It was clear from discussions that a nationally-led accreditation process could become focused on the need to demonstrate organisational effectiveness and value for money.

Staff appear familiar with the NTSGs. For example the MRE guidelines were viewed by national staff as being technically sufficient and fit for purpose. In addition the direct organisational links with the JIDUs through defence channels means that there is a feeling of operational understanding of the NTSGs. These factors imply that capacity exists to critically engage with the standards. What is lacking is an demonstrated ability (to external stakeholders) to ensure implementation of the NTSGs. However, the lack of evidence does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of capacity. There has been a traditional reluctance from the UNMAO to acknowledge the existence and operations of the JIDUs and thus no serious effort to understand their working practices. Nevertheless, the NMAC should be a position to take over the quality management and accreditation duties of the UNMAO, and in both areas of activity they are yet unproven.

From a separate UN standpoint there is also no evidence that the NMAC has any intention of accrediting JIDUs. It is possible that if the *Wau-Babanossa* incident had not resulted in disengagement, UN agencies could have maintained enough leverage to persuade this to be otherwise. However, in the current absence of consensus on this matter – and a reluctance to discuss it openly – it may now remain to develop other forms of accountability system for both JIDU personnel and victims of negligence, such as through current legislation.

Recommendation:	Quality management staff within the NMAC should begin to demonstrate their familiarity with the NTSGs, to quality management staff within external agencies. In turn, external agencies such as the UNMAO should provide opportunities for creating interdependencies between quality management staff between the two organisations – potentially through a project-based approach.
Recommendation:	Quality assurance staff should become involved in the process of accrediting and assuring quality on the current set of organisations conducting clearance in northern Sudan. This should be a gradual process that begins with basic training, secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example initially performing organisational accreditation in an assisted manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion.
Recommendation:	The NMAC should formalise and make explicit its position on the quality management and potential accreditation of the

JIDUs. Once accreditation and the processes that accreditation supports: protection for beneficiaries; confidence in performance; and protection for demining agencies, are understood, then external agencies and other stakeholders can begin to integrate into wider governance and judicial reform initiatives (e.g. a current UNDP programme of enhancing local level awareness of the justice system)

4.6.2 Information management

The current information management system within the NMAC is paper-based. This is consistent with the information management arrangements across other government departments. The capacity of the NMAC for actively managing information using sector specific databases such as the IMSMA is currently assessed to be low. This is said to be due to the low availability of military NMAC staff for training due to other work commitments. In addition, the requirement of NMAC IMSMA operators to travel from Khartoum to the UNMAO regional office in Kadugli where data entry for the northern sector takes place has exacerbated the difficulties in extensive training.

Training on the *operational* use of IMSMA and the Quality Assurance database is conducted every year and this has had some impact. So while there is a better understanding of how to employ IMSMA in the field, there is little capacity for inputting and manipulating data, creating maps, conducting spatial analysis and extracting other types of data from the IMSMA. Because the IMSMA database is a live system and of such importance to all demining efforts in the country, national or otherwise, there is a reluctance to decentralise its management. This makes sense for operational reasons, as it ensures the quality of information in the database, but it does not necessarily provide the right conditions for access to for NMAC staff.

Owing to ongoing sanctions on Sudan, there is also the issue of ownership of software for GIS. As it currently stands, the UNMAO is a custodian of the GIS software, however it is not allowed to transfer this to national ownership under the currently politico-security conditions currently in-force.

Recommendation:	The UNMAO should consider whether it is essential to continue to have data input for IMSMA at the Kadugli regional office. It is recommended to align operations and the information management centre of operations with those of the NMAC and the SSDC respectively; it is unlikely that the location of Kadugli represents as sustainable location for IMSMA data entry as neither the NMAC nor the SSDC are necessarily likely to continue to use it beyond the end of the mandate. The current system is a potential constraint to national performance in this area.
Recommendation:	IMSMA staff should become involved in the process inputting and managing data on the current set of organisations conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This should be a gradual process that begins with basic training and secondments followed by advanced courses. Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example initially managing data and creating graphical products in an assisted manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion.

Recommendation:	The UNMAO IMSMA operators, in conjunction with their counterparts from the NMAC should begin investigating potential alternatives to the IMSMA system. These systems should be certified for use in northern Sudan (under current sanctions in-force on the country), and provide a sufficient level of information management capacity to sufficiently run mine action operations.

4.6.3 Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

The primary development in terms of planning in Sudan for mine action is the development of the Multi-Year Work-Plan document. This plan is designed to demonstrate the attainment of obligations outlined under the Ottawa commitments over multiple years. It draws in all actors and main stakeholders in Sudan, and many different groups were involved in its development. The NMAC played a role in the development of the plan, but as of yet, they do not have ownership of the plan and at the time of writing, perceive it more as a UN-tool rather than a national one.

Most other work-planning is on a yearly basis, there is also reactive project planning activity in response to political directives, e.g. clearance tasks in support of development or political processes. Plans involve substantive finance and logistics components, and they are demonstrated to be workable through the operation of the JIDUs. The NMAC staff are confident in their abilities to plan within the limits of the information and tools available to them. There is no demonstrated competency in using IMSMA to assist planning, however until the Landmine Impact Survey project is completed, the ability of both national and international agencies to task against impact is limited.

The ability to task clearance organisations does not explicitly rest with the NMAC. JIDU activities are determined by the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs who is chairman of the National Mine Action Committee, and operations are implemented directly through military channels. However, the NMAC does have the ability to adapt the requirement, and make suggestions for amending the clearance task. The NMAC has a monitoring and reporting role, rather than a direct tasking one. However, there is some tasking of national organisations within the MRE and VA pillars.

With assistance from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the NMAC has been able to mobilise national resources for clearance tasks. Core funding for positions within the NMAC are also maintained through central financing processes, and these have generally been satisfactory. For as long as mine action remains relevant in Sudan, there is no evidence to suggest that the government budgets would not be able to support the core components of the NMAC. However, there will almost certainly be a requirement to lobby for increased external funding for specific clearance projects. If the NMAC does not demonstrate value for money, professionalism and impact, it will not necessarily receive financial support from the government. External funding sources that have presented themselves as potential revenue streams include the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

Recommendation:	Planning ability should be prioritised in the capacity development process. Staff should also be made aware of how to link their resource requirements to objectives, and be able to articulate needs to donors in a considered manner, i.e. a resource mobilisation strategy should be devised and implemented. The Multi-Year Work Plan is a suitable tool for training in this area, however it is critical that the principal authors of the plan take time to integrate the NMAC planning officers and senior managers into the process.

Recommendation: The NMAC should continue to lobby the government for financial support. This can be supported by UN agencies, by demonstrating the potential for NMAC performance both externally to donors and internally to other government departments. By encouraging the performance of the national authorities, the UN will improve their chances of sustainability.

Notes to Section 3:

21. Under the terms of entry, organisations registered by the Humanitarian Aid Commission are entitled to bring equipment into the country without taxation, customs or other import duties. Under this arrangement these organisations are obliged to leave machines and other assets for the use of the Sudanese government. The UN operates under a different system and is not subject to the same conditionality.

22. The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, May 2006, Para 16

23. Ibid., Para 22 (5)

5.1   Overview and entry level

5.1.1   The SSDC is an independent government institution which reports directly to the Vice-Presidency. It is composed of five commissioners supported by a Director General who manages the Authority. The SSDC therefore represents a complex mix of institutional interests and as a result, the organisation is subject to strong political influence. Since the SPLM/A is the primary political and military force within the southern part of the country, there are significant linkages to the military, specifically the military engineering units and this is represented in the appointments of senior military officers to the commissioner posts. Like all other formal state structures in southern Sudan, the SSDC has been assembled from first principles. This has meant the creation of completely new roles and responsibilities for personnel within the organisation and the recruitment of staff, either directly across from SPLM/A, or from related organisations.

5.1.2   At the first roundtable meeting, the management team from the SSDC felt it would be appropriate to use the human resource level as an entry point for analysis and assessment. There was a general consensus that organisational capacity is at the moment, merely the sum of the capabilities of each member of staff within the SSDC, and therefore an analysis of individual capabilities and performance would be more meaningful. As such, the performance appraisal of specific members of staff was used to elicit information of current capacity, predict future performance and thus establish capacity development priorities. To ensure continuity, a standard performance appraisal sheet prepared by the SSDC was used for the exercise. Performance appraisals were conducted for ten employees within the organisation. At the end of the performance appraisal process, a further roundtable discussion was held with the senior directing staff to discuss the initial findings and to agree the way ahead. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff throughout the organisation on an on-going basis.

5.2   Future performance: pillars of mine action

This part of the capacity assessment defines the future requirements of each mine action pillar. It describes the setting within which SSDC will be required to regulate and manage mine action in southern Sudan.

5.2.1   Clearance

The southern regions are the most heavily mined parts of the country and will thus continue to represent a clearance challenge for some time to come. The majority of the clearance operations have been road-clearance tasks that allow access for UN and other civilian vehicles, and future priorities will turn towards demining in support of impacted local communities. Clearance will require a growing national demining capacity. A large number of former humanitarian deminers are currently unemployed and they will be selected, refreshed and deployed within national organisations such as SIMAS, OSIL and SLR. A number of international organisations are also likely to be in-country. In addition, JIDU personnel draw military pay, and are provided with rations so they represent a sustainable option for clearance. They will be utilised after receiving assistance and support, for example in becoming accredited.

As the governmental focal point for demining, the SSDC will have a coordinating role for clearance operations and will be involved in the tasking of mine clearance organisations. It will lead a priority setting process within the southern Sudan Mine Action Working Group which is envisaged to be chaired by the SSDC. SSDC policy may well be impacted upon by a process of decentralisation of government authority to the state level – a process which is being undertaken throughout southern Sudan. From a centralisation perspective, there may be room for responding to joint policy directives from the National Mine Action Committee which is located in the North, and which has representation from SPLM ministers. This may prove difficult as the Committee rarely meets, and de facto has little influence.

As part of its clearance-related responsibilities, the SSDC will lead on the development of procedures for making the hazardous area data in southern Sudan more realistic, and thus achievable. For example, the current survey data will be reviewed and augmented with more accurate surveys, as there is a pressing need for area reduction; impact data will be continually reviewed to take into account population migrations and development of communities. Procedures that support this process, for example a national standard for the handover of non-cleared land, which is consistent with the new IMAS 08.20[24], will be developed.

5.2.2 Mine Risk Education

The principal MRE capacity will be trained school teachers who will deliver MRE to schoolchildren who will then bring awareness-raising messages home to parents and relatives. The goal is to achieve a completely mine-aware generation. In order to achieve this goal, MRE will have been completely mainstreamed into the curricula of standing educational programmes which are supervised by the Ministry of Education. The SSDC will provide on-going technical support to these mainstreamed initiatives.

Not all impacted communities will have been identified by the Landmine Impact Survey and so a limited emergency capacity will be required to remain within the SSDC to support rapid deployment MRE operations. The SSDC will coordinate and oversee the implementation of MRE to these communities at risk, which will be identified on an as-needed basis. In support of this role, the MRE department will be responsible for creating MRE plans and strategies in partnership with national and international stakeholders.

5.2.3 Stockpile Destruction

While all *known* stocks of antipersonnel mines were destroyed in order to meet the obligations of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), the potential for discovering significant numbers of abandoned caches means that more mines may still come to light. Stockpile destruction is seen as an ongoing process, which is closely linked to advocacy. The SSDC will need to continue lobbying senior military commanders to ensure that any new landmines that are discovered are reported, documented and destroyed. This mine action responsibility will thus require close coordination with the SPLA and the general security apparatus.

5.2.4 Advocacy

With a referendum on the horizon, there is the continued possibility that southern Sudan will choose to separate from the northern regions of the country. If such a situation is to occur, the issue of compliance with the MBT will also need to be addressed, as the current, single-nation signature would be insufficient to meet the requirements of two nations. In the event of southern Sudan becoming an independent state then it may be necessary to advocate for the new Government to commit itself to signing the Treaty. Were a new state to be formed, and were it to sign the MBT, then SSDC's responsibilities would shift from advocacy to supporting the new Government meet its obligations as a State Party to the Treaty. The

SSDC will be the governmental institution that would lead on the process of reaffirming commitment to the MBT.

Although southern Sudan is currently held by the MBT with the SPLA previously committed under the Deed of Commitment for non-state actors, attitudes and behaviours are difficult to change, Agreement on the need to outlaw a military capacity such as landmines will not be total. Continued advocacy will be required to ensure that antipersonnel mines are not viewed as a legitimate choice of weapon. This will require building strong grass-roots support for the MBT. The SSDC would be assisted by the formation of a civil society body equivalent to a Southern Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines organisation that would act as a suitable pressure group.

5.2.5   Victim Assistance

By 2011, most VA activities will have been completely mainstreamed into other government departments. As these government departments develop and grow, they will begin to implement a wide range of general disability programmes which can better serve the needs and interests of disabled persons and their families. VA activities will continue to be steered by a working group, which includes the SSDC, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Welfare.

Although VA may become part of the mainstream social welfare system in the form of benefits and even compensation for injury, the SSDC will retain an oversight role on data collection, so that information on mine victims remains accurate, and that data can be used for both prioritisation and advocacy purposes. In addition, the VA department will scrutinise the development of all VA teaching aids and awareness raising materials, to ensure that they are compliant with international good practice, are sustainable and meet the needs of victims and their families. In addition, specific projects may be monitored to understand the range and numbers of beneficiaries, and the achievement of objectives. It is assumed that civil society organisations which recognise landmine victims will also have an important role in maintaining pressure on government to fully meet its obligations as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

5.3   Future performance: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the national authorities to regulate and manage mine action. These include organisational and operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and prioritisation, the mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information management using IMSMA and the handover of safe, cleared land, i.e. through ensuring quality of operations. This part of the capacity assessment defines how the SSDC foresees discharging the activities that relative to the specific governance of its mine action programme.

5.3.1   Accreditation and quality

A large component of the SSDC mandate is the quality management of mine action, including the accreditation of mine action implementing organisations. The SSDC see quality management as a tool for enhancing service delivery, and accept that national mine action standards as integral to the conduct of operations. The SSDC will thus use a quality management system, including the accreditation of both international and national organisations and this will based on the existing National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG). National standards that are based on IMAS represent a global consensus on best practice in mine action. So long as they do not interfere or conflict with national legislation, NTSGs provide a suitable mechanism for ensuring quality and accountability. However, the mechanisms for achieving full accreditation of all *national*

organisations including the JIDUs will require a cooperative approach from external agencies who will aim to support – rather than limit – national efforts to participate.

The SSDC accreditation processes will also be concerned with financial accountability of both NGOs and commercial organisations receiving both bilateral and multilateral funding, for example through the UNMAS-managed Voluntary Trust Fund. National authorities need to convince themselves of the value for money of clearance operations, and that they are consistent and aligned with national aims and objectives. In addition to a review of standard operating procedures, the organisational accreditation may therefore also require interested organisations to submit details on experience, financing and so on. Following this, the IMAS-model organisational accreditation would take place followed by an operational accreditation. The standard quality assurance mechanism will then be used to assess whether the organisation remains compliant with the NTSGs. The quality process will be managed by quality assurance officers who will monitor and evaluate all mine action activities for which the SSDC is responsible post transition.

5.3.2   Information management

As the coordinator for all mine action activities in southern Sudan, the SSDC will be supported by robust information management systems that are established within the SSDC. An IMSMA department supported by trained operators located in all regional offices will provide implementing partners and other interested groups with information on contamination. The SSDC will collate, analyse and manage the information in IMSMA using data collected by external organisations using standard proformas. Instead, it will store, manage and analyse the data. Usage of the GIS software element within the IMSMA system is not restricted within southern Sudan, thus the information management personnel within the SSDC see themselves as future custodians of the existing IMSMA database as it is currently constructed.

5.3.3   Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

The SSDC will have a strategic plan with a vision, mission and strategic objectives of mine action in southern Sudan and have a developed understanding of how these objectives will be met. This could include integrating with the Multi-Year Work-Plan, but this will not negate the need for further work-planning for specific departments and technical functions such as MRE.

Work on stockpile destruction will remain an ongoing process of reporting both internationally to the States Parties to the MBT, and nationally to the national security apparatus. As most activity in this area will be reactive activity on discovery of caches of landmines there is reduced requirement for long-term planning activity in this area. For MRE and VA, planning and tasking will be conducted within relevant departments in partnership with Operations and SSDC Commissioners and the Director General. Planning may also involve interested governmental and civil society stakeholders, as well as representation from international organisations such as UNICEF.

International organisations will be required to have their mine action activities coordinated, and will be specifically tasked by the SSDC who will distribute task identification numbers and provide certificates of cleared land. The SSDC will have an effective, transparent and accountable system for issuing and evaluating tenders, awarding contracts and monitoring compliance. With the exception of special projects such as JIDU operations, clearance planning is likely to follow the status quo of separate North-South operational work-planning. Work will be coordinated by an Operations Department which will contribute to yearly work-plans which can also be used to solicit government funding. Aside from clearance, activities within the plans may include development of capacity within the SSDC.

In terms of resource mobilisation, core funding for the SSDC will continue to come from the government Donations for equipment, facilities development and up-keep, will be solicited from international partners such as UNDP, wherever possible. Foreign governments will be encouraged to support mine action in Sudan, although it is accepted that the majority of external funding will continue to be on a bilateral basis directly from donors or multilaterally-sourced and managed by the UN. In general, *national* sources of funding will be tied to the perceived political importance of mine action, and the economic fortunes of the country.

5.4   Assessment of current capacity: programme and project management

Following the analysis of the SSDC's future capacity requirements across the pillars of mine action, an assessment is required to establish those areas of performance that can be enhanced through intervention. The purpose of this assessment section is to those identify areas of need, by making a review of actual, current performance across the critical functional capacities at the SSDC.

Anticipated future performance reveals a need for supporting advocacy activity, strong coordination mechanisms, and the ability to plan, monitor and evaluate operations. This will require organisational competency to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, assess needs and create common visions for mine action (including advocacy for the MBT) and develop suitable policies and effective strategies. At a more operational level, the SSDC will need to be able to manage its own activities and initiatives as well monitor and evaluate the projects and programmes of others.

5.4.1   Engaging with stakeholders

The SSDC is developing linkages with national stakeholders including state governors, and these parties have a significant input into the current mine action prioritisation process. Engagement is enabled through formal mechanisms such as the Mine Action Working Group, as well as through informal networks of contacts. These are characteristically nascent arrangements due to the recent establishment of the southern Government in general and a corresponding lack of awareness of the purpose and practice of mine action.

In the civil society sphere, the benefits of symbiosis between civil society and the state is an idea that is specifically articulated within the SSDC and there is every indication that future relationships will be harmonious; the SSDC appears to perform well in terms of engaging with national NGOs. The perceived role of self-organised advocacy and pressure groups, and their interaction with government are western-democratic in outlook, and it suggests that cooperation and coordination with these entities will be effective.

Relationships with the principal external stakeholder, UNMAO mission, has been mostly strained or non-existent. This reflects a lack of willingness as well as capacity, to engage effectively on both sides. The result for the SSDC has been a reduced consistency and effort in supporting, chairing and organising multi-stakeholder meetings, such as monthly coordination meetings. It is not the purpose of this report to provide in-depth reasons for reticence regarding collaboration and equitable decision-making with government, however it may stem from (1) a lack of interdependency in work processes, (2) an emergency response culture that pervades the UN mission, (3) leadership style incompatibility, (4) a desire to avoid duplication of roles, and (5) perceived constraints arising from cooperation. The lack of positive synergy and partnership represents one of the biggest constraints to deliberate efforts for capacity development of the SSDC.

Recommendation:	The relevant SSDC technical personnel should be present in negotiations and dialogue with GOSS that relates to mine action. The SSDC feel that they have been sidelined by international agencies, e.g. in VA, and in the interests of good

relationships, and fostering partnership, it is important not to exacerbate tensions. If necessary interaction with SSDC should become a formal policy instituted by the GOSS, and where necessary supported by facilitating legislation. However, the SSDC is strongly advised to develop a consistent approach to organising, supporting and chairing meetings and working groups.

Recommendation: Engagement with the SSDC should not be viewed as a constraint to be avoided. As the governmental focal point for mine action in southern Sudan, emphasis should be placed on creating genuine partnerships between UNMAO the SSDC. This will require proactive attempts to foster equitable relationships. Likewise, the SSDC should understand the operational limitations, and an emergency-phase 'culture' within UN organisations that have previously limited concerted capacity development. They should also recognise current willingness on behalf of the UN for engagement and should capitalise on continued opportunities for creating interdependencies.

5.4.2 Assessing needs and building visions

Terms of reference (job descriptions) for all staff have been drafted, and a performance appraisal system has been instituted. Most employees are generally aware of the need to further develop their own knowledge, understanding and skills to enable them to improve their own competencies and capabilities, and thus improve the performance of the SSC/A. At an organisational level, departments are seen to be lacking in core functionality although no comprehensive needs assessment has taken place of organisational performance. Within the institutional environment, the SSDC is also able to identify constraints and opportunities that impact on capacity and performance.

In terms of conducting needs assessment to support sound planning, discussions with staff reveal that refugee movements, suspected levels of contamination, past coverage of operations, and ongoing development activities should all guide prioritisation in some way. However, the needs assessment process is largely intuitive, informal and lacks consistency; there is little access to data, and knowledge of how to manipulate it. There is strong commitment to future usage of empirical sources of data such as the Landmine Impact Survey and planning processes which are rooted in a firm response to need. Within all cases, priority is placed very much within impacted communities. The MRE and VA officers at the UNMAO have provided some assistance in developing capacity in this area, and the responsible manager for these areas at the SSDC feels that he has gained some limited understanding of certain planning processes. However, there has been no consistent and sustained attempt to integrate the MRE/VA manager and staff into the needs assessment and planning process – they are invited to attend, rather than trained to lead these events. This is a situation which has been aggravated by the separation of site between the UNMAO and SSDC offices.

While needs identify the direction in which a public-service organisation should move, leadership is required to move it. The leadership arrangement within the SSDC is complex. Technocratic decision making, as opposed to political decision making, is invested within the Authority element of the SSDC, which is currently headed by an acting Director General. Decisions that have political ramifications are addressed by the group of five commissioners: a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and three members. These persons may consult on any technical matters that they feel appropriate. The commissioner positions are political appointments, and there is thus a strong influence of politics on technical matters. In the

absence of completely formalised reporting lines, and with an organisational structure that can still be considered formative, this may be confusing to lower level staff, who seek clear guidance and direction. It may also give rise to decision-making processes – which although are consensual – may take some time to come about as heads of department seek to clarify what they can and cannot do within a complex political context, even on lower-level and technical issues.

In terms of leadership styles, there is an open and cordial atmosphere maintained between junior and senior staff. At performance appraisals, junior and mid-level staff are encouraged to identify problems and issues within their parts of the organisation and are happy to engage in constructive criticism. This being said, the majority of senior appointments are military appointments, and this has its own influence on organisational culture. The result is that while there is an air of participation, and multi-dimensional feedback, decision-making is a top-down process. There is thus a centralised management approach which may not necessarily encourage high performance in complex, multi-stakeholder activities such as mine action.

Recommendation:	External agencies should recognise the political environment in which the SSDC operates, and understand that capacity development practices requiring rapid institutional changes will not work. Changes will come about through influence, rather than direct instruction alone and this will be determined by the quality of working relationship, for example through experiential trust developed through interdependency.
Recommendation:	The UNMAO IMSMA and planning components should attempt to integrate SSDC counterparts into their planning processes, throughout all stages including needs assessments – not simply on data consolidation and for approval of work-plans. SSDC should be exposed to the entire process of using needs to conduct spatial analysis to develop objectives and subsequently derive action plans.
Recommendation:	The commissioners should attempt to create a formal policy framework within which the Authority may operate. This will free up time for the commissioners for higher-level matters, will create clear boundaries of responsibility and will allow senior to mid-level managers to make swifter decisions and judgement calls.

5.4.3 Developing policy and strategy

At a project level, the framework approach to planning is relatively well understood in principal by some but not all senior managers; but there is limited evidence that it is used in practice. Directing staff are able to articulate the specific aim and mission of the SSDC; there is familiarity with a range of techniques for developing policies and strategies. This is perhaps attributable to the participatory approaches employed on a range of training courses that cover programme and project management, and the previous work experience of these senior staff in development-related fields. There is evidence to suggest that these approaches will become normative to the southern Sudanese government institutions, which are being developed along the principles of management within which, programmes of results-based projects are well-used. However, within departments themselves, planning ability is very weak. Some staff do not appear accustomed to thinking at a strategic timeframe, and there is a lack of clarity as to the core components of a plan and how they may be derived.

It is unclear how far in advance operational work-planning will extend, current budgeting systems suggest on a yearly basis. Policy and strategy development principles such as ensuring participation are not articulated, yet formal mechanisms – such as the Mine Action Working Group, and the multi-stakeholder yearly prioritisation process – are in place to ensure a degree of participation is embedded within the process. Prioritisation policy and strategy for clearance operations will be coordinated by the SSDC, with input from the Mine Action Working Group which will include agencies such as the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges. In addition, although there has been some MRE and operations input (e.g. into the yearly prioritisation process), there have been inconsistent opportunities for building capacity within the SSDC with respect to planning.

Recommendation:	External agencies should capitalise on the consistency between planning approaches accepted by the SSDC, and their own, and begin to draw SSDC staff into the mainstream planning process. For example, the SSDC should be given the time and space to understand the Multi-Year Work Plan, and then the opportunity to engage critically within it, on a power-neutral basis.
Recommendation:	Ensure that formal participatory mechanisms become completely normative. This includes all multi-stakeholder consultancy processes that are currently managed by the UNMAO. This will help to ensure that future SSDC mechanisms and processes are participatory in practice.

5.4.4 Budgeting, managing and implementing

Accountancy and budget control is managed through the Administration and Finance department. However actual budget and occasional, supplementary budget development is conducted by the senior directing staff within the SSDC. For the current year, the SSDC has a budget of approximately $1.5 million. This implies an ability to mobilise a relatively large amount national resources. There is also financial assistance towards facilities and transport that is provided by UNDP, but in general there are large shortfalls in equipment such as computers and vehicles, as well as for allowances for staff to travel to regional offices. The lack of equipment and travel budget continues to pose a significant institutional constraint to capacity development.

For the funds that it controls, the SSDC is able to prepare budgets for travel and subsistence allowances for personnel. Officers within the finance department display an interest in their work, and have an understanding of what they still need to achieve in terms of personal career development. For example, accounting principles and budget control are understood at a basic level, yet there is a recognised need to be able to enhance performance in these areas, as well as adding extra competencies such as financial planning. There is thus a nascent competency in developing budgets and managing expenditure.

In terms of human resource management, the SSDC is covered by a range of government policies and labour laws. However, there is sometimes lack of clarity on which regulations on general labour policy hold – central governmental or local organisational – and this is likely to continue until the government systems become more mainstreamed. Labour regulations do not include centralised recruitment of new staff. Recruitment and selection is conducted by the SSDC, through a formal selection process: job notices are well advertised locally, recruitment notices are played on the radio, interviews are held, and selection is made. There is a genuine desire amongst senior staff to manage in accordance with established "western" principals. Yet while there is a developed understanding amongst some senior Commissioners and similar grades within the Authority, these ideas have not been obviously communicated to more junior staff.

The SSDC does not claim to be an implementing agency. However it participates in planning and in the tasking of some national NGOs, for example, MRE in conjunction with UNICEF and UNMAO. For the limited operational tasking processes in SSDC – for the current scope of work – the Operations Department has responsibility for tasking. They are supported by the Administration and Finance department, and a Logistics section. Logistical support within the SSDC has only very basic operational competency which includes storekeeping, purchasing of sundries, and the maintenance of simple records on equipment such as computers which are held at the SSDC premises. There is no claimed ability for fleet management, storage of large amounts of equipment or maintenance and care of large-scale facilities.

Recommendation:	There are specific human-resource level actions that can be immediately implemented to provide capacity development "quick wins". For example, self-identified opportunities for personal career development which are achievable and reasonable can be supported[25]; and which were identified through the performance review process.
Recommendation:	External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted organisational development of the Administration and Finance Department within the SSDC. This should include improving performance in accountancy and book-keeping as well as preparing and managing budgets.
Recommendation:	External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted organisational development of the Logistics Department within the SSDC. Activities should be harmonised with the controlled growth of the SSDC fleet of cars, facilities and the type and amount of equipment in the stores.
Recommendation:	The UNMAO officers in charge of MRE and VA, should continue to provide assistance in terms of planning support to the SSDC. As far as possible, SSDC staff should also be involved in the management, monitoring and evaluation activities associated with these plans. Where possible the SSDC should also make assets available so that their staff can work with external agencies.
Recommendation:	The lack of funds for equipment such as computers and vehicles means that there is a natural constraint to operations, as well as capacity development activities. As a matter of some urgency, the SSDC (with UNDP) should make an inventory of required equipment, which is rationalised against sound planning assumptions. Wherever possible, external agencies should attempt to solicit the required equipment and provide it in a controlled and sustained manager that is appropriate for a combined improvement of performance with growth.

5.4.5   Monitoring and evaluation

As an institution designed for supervision and coordination, the SSDC sees monitoring and evaluation as a core component of its work. Senior staff view the standardised IMAS-based approach, i.e. use of the NTSGs, as the basis for discussions on quality. However, there is some confusion amongst lower level staff as to who should be accrediting demining

organisations working in southern Sudan – they see duplication of their roles within the UN and have questions regarding the purposes of the two organisations.

Within the functional departments, there is little demonstrated knowledge of the utility of classical monitoring and evaluation systems for projects that are designed to generate social impacts, such as MRE or VA. Participatory approaches to evaluation and the subsequent, beneficial outcomes of accountability, learning and capacity development are not explicitly recognised.

Recommendation: Skills and knowledge for monitoring and evaluation should be transferred to those VA, MRE and other project-based staff working towards external, social goals. Basic tools and techniques should be supplemented with supporting information on how participatory evaluation can be used to heighten accountability, ensure learning and improve capacity.

5.5   Assessment of current capacity: general governance

General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. The purpose of this part of the assessment of current capacity is to outline the general governance environment within the SSDC, in terms of facilitating or constraining future performance, and the permissiveness towards intervention and positive change.

Decades of conflict means that like most organisations in southern Sudan, the SSDC has faced considerable difficulties in finding competent staff. Governmental positions are not as well paid as similar positions within commercial or international organisations, and this has added to the difficulties. For purposes of expediency and perhaps political necessity, a range of executive appointments were made when the commission was established. At that time the SPLA was the only credible pseudo-governmental organisation operating in the country and most of the commissioners were drawn across from the military. Since the military commissioners are all of a relatively senior rank, it reflects the political importance attached to these positions. Senior non-military staff were selected on the basis of experience within mine action, or knowledge of socio-economic development programmes. More recently, selection procedures for later staff hires, are formalised and presumably meritocratic. Employment notices, interview processes, and the public announcement of successful candidates are a critical step towards institutionalising a rational-legal organisation that ensures efficiency and effectiveness. Performance appraisal activities, which are still formative and *ad hoc*, are also an important addition for staff development and promotion within the SSDC.

The mixture of military personnel and civilian professionals, sometimes gives rise to contradictory organisational culture in which liberal, new-management practices and ideas are enforced with top-down executive authority. This is facilitated by a hybrid organisational structure that has merged the Commission with the Authority[26]. This convergence of organisations is not merely physical, but culturally embedded in terms of organisational values, attitudes and beliefs. A classical, policy-forming Mine Action Authority creates the political space for technical service delivery by a Mine Action Centre, and automatically produces a natural vertical accountability mechanism between the two organisations. However, the current political/technical mandate of SSDC is amorphous, and the accountability mechanism is decentralised across multiple locations within the organisation. The result is that decision making processes can become obfuscated and technical decisions may quickly become political. In the current security climate, there may be good justification for keeping mine action matters close to the attention of politico-military organisations such as the SPLA. Yet under future conditions of peace and prosperity, decision making would become needlessly hampered.

Recommendation:	Continue on the current path of meritocratic recruitment. Performance appraisals should be applied to senior directing staff as well as mid-to-junior level staff within the Authority. Political appointments of commissioners will be complemented by a growing appreciation of mine action, and the increasing technical competency of the Authority itself.
Recommendation:	As far as possible, the Commissioners should try to create a formalised and well-understood political framework, within which the technical departments within the Authority can operate. This will greatly facilitate decision-making and increase the potential for rapid service delivery.

5.6   Assessment of current capacity: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the national authorities to regulate and manage mine action – the core business of a national authority. This part of the capacity assessment therefore defines the SSDC's progress towards achieving the required levels of performance in the regulation and management of a mine action programme.

5.6.1   Accreditation and quality

Apart from the some individuals on the senior directing staff, operations and quality assurance staff are not yet comfortable discussing the purpose and wider aims of monitoring and evaluation operations in mine action. Quality assurance and operations staff are unfamiliar with the NTSGs, and this can be attributed to a lack of skills and knowledge of mine action activities. This may also be due to a lack of awareness of the purpose of standards in general and IMAS in particular. This is not helped by a lack of equipment and facilities which would allow participation in field activities, and this is due to a lack of funding. Quality assurance performance is also hampered by the fact that the SSDC are not currently responsible for accreditation in practice.

Recommendation:	Quality Assurance staff should become involved in the process of accrediting and assuring quality on the current set of organisations conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This should be a gradual process that begins with basic training, secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example initially performing organisational accreditation in an assisted manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion. In order to support this process, it is strongly recommended that the SSDC ensure that Quality Assurance staff gain a comprehensive knowledge of mine action. In addition to manual demining, this should include Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), mechanical demining, and use of mine detection dogs.

5.6.2   Information management

The current information management system within the SSDC is paper-based, although middle and senior-level staff communicate using email. The capacity of the SSDC for actively managing information using sector specific databases such as IMSMA is currently assessed to be generally very low, although potential for doing so rests with some employees.

Training on the *operational* use of IMSMA and the Quality Assurance database is conducted every year and this has had some impact. Certain staff are able to open IMSMA, locate dangerous areas and extract a limited amount of data. One staff member with a more developed understanding is able to check on the accuracy of information in the database relating to his region of operations, and occasionally reports discrepancies to the UNMAO IMSMA department. So while there is a better understanding of how to employ IMSMA in the field, there is no demonstrated capacity for inputting and manipulating data, creating maps, conducting spatial analysis and extracting other types of data from the IMSMA.

Because the IMSMA database is a live system and of such importance to all demining efforts in the country, national or otherwise, there is a reluctance to decentralise its management. This makes sense for operational reasons, as it ensures the quality of information in the database, but it does not necessarily provide the right conditions for access to for SSDC staff. This is especially the case since the UNMAO IMSMA staff and SSDC offices are now some distance apart.

Recommendation:	IMSMA staff should become involved in the process inputting and managing data on the current set of organisations conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This should be a gradual process that begins with basic training and secondments followed by advanced courses. Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example initially managing data and creating graphical products in an assisted manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion.
Recommendation:	The UNMAO should consider whether it is essential to continue to have data input for IMSMA at the Kadugli regional office. It is recommended to align operations and the information management centre of operations with those of the NMAC and the SSDC respectively; it is unlikely that the location of Kadugli represents as sustainable location for IMSMA data entry as neither the NMAC nor the SSDC will continue to use it beyond the end of the mandate.

5.6.3   Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

The primary development in terms of planning in Sudan for mine action is the development of the Multi-Year Work-Plan document. This plan is designed to demonstrate the attainment of obligations outlined under the Ottawa commitments over multiple years. It draws in all actors and main stakeholders in Sudan, and many different groups were involved in its development. The SSDC played a role in the development of the plan, but as of yet, they do not have ownership of the plan and at the time of writing, and perceive it more as a UN-tool rather than a national one.

Staff throughout the SSDC show an appreciation of the concepts of contamination and impact, and there is an agreement that landmine impacted communities are the basis from which planning and prioritisation should take place. However, there is no demonstrated competency in using empirical data in planning processes. However until the Landmine Impact Survey project is completed, the ability of both national and international agencies to task against impact is limited. In terms of other planning approaches, there is limited competency particularly in being able to link resource requirements to specific objectives; staff members are aware of their limitations.

Despite the general lack of planning ability, the SSDC is keen to begin tasking agencies. However in without access and control of the IMSMA system it is unable to assign agencies with task identification numbers; in the absence of a credible quality management system, it is also unable to provide clearance certificates. The result is that despite a will for tasking, and an apparent compliance on the part of certain international implementing partners to engage with the SSDC on a tasking and certification basis, it will require skills development in planning and quality assurance and access to specific IT tools to undertake this role. However, outside the traditional, UN-led tasking system, the SSDC has input into the tasking of JIDU operations in areas that are of joint northern-southern control, or indeed clearance in southern areas.

Core funding for positions within the SSCD/A is maintained through central financing processes. However, financing does not appear to be sufficient enough to remove certain key organisational constraints such as lack of transport. While mine action remains relevant, there is no evidence to suggest that the government budgets would not be able to support the core component of the SSDC. Government organisations such as the JIDUs are already funded with soldiers drawing salaries from military sources. The SSDC thus views the JIDUs as a sustainable clearance option, and an asset that should be used to expand clearance operations. The SSDC is thus able mobilise a certain amount of funding from national budgets, and that in terms of clearance options there is a partially-funded national clearance asset available for use. These two factors imply a level of financial sustainability. There is also no indication that international financial support would completely dissipate on the departure of the UN mission. Agencies such as UNDP will still be available to continue providing support, and the Voluntary Trust Fund may also receive ear-marked funds for Sudan. Individual donors with specific interests in the development of national capacity may also choose to continue funding SSDC development and other national operations.

Recommendation:	Priority should be placed on generating advance understanding of the purpose and potentials of the Multi-Year Work-Plan; the SSDC senior staff should understand how they can engage with the plan and use it as a tool for eliminating impact, developing their own capacity, engaging with other stakeholders, and mobilising resources. Understanding how to link empirical data on need to the allocation of assets over time is a critical activity. Planning ability should be prioritised in the capacity development process, across all departments. Staff should also be made aware of how to link their resource requirements to objectives, and be able to articulate needs to donors in a considered manner.
Recommendation:	IMSMA and Quality Assurance capacity should receive particular attention within the capacity development process. Without these skills and abilities, the SSDC cannot begin tasking and issuing clearance certificates.
Recommendation:	The SSDC should continue to lobby the government for financial support. This work should be linked in with future advocacy initiatives designed to draw public attention – and thus public pressure – to the dangers of antipersonnel landmines.

Notes on Section 5:

24. This IMAS is yet to be formally endorsed by the IMAS Steering Committee
25. For example, this capacity assessment process identified a night-school accountancy course available in Juba, at a cost of approximately $600.
26. This can loosely be considered to represent a combined Mine Action Authority with a Mine Action Centre as they are classical conceived

SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 6: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

6.1   Introduction

The gap between the current capacities of NMAC and SSDC, and the required future needs of the Sudan Mine Action Programme, was discussed in Sections 4 and 5.   The recommendations provide a list of issues which need to be addressed and actions which need to be taken.

The recommendations were discussed with NMAC, SSDC and UNMAO, and from these discussions the recommendations were grouped into themes. These themes include: (1) specific activities to be undertaken by the national authorities and external agencies, such as developing policy and legislation, and (2) principles of good practice that cross-cut across all activities such as the development of collaboration. These themes were then arranged as priorities under three categories: the enabling environment, organisational capacity and the development of human resources. In order to develop a realistic capacity development plan, not every recommendation has been integrated into the list of priorities.

6.2   Enabling environment priorities

The enabling environment includes Government Ministries, civil society, international organisations and other entities which can influence the way in which the NMAC, SSDC and UNMAO can regulate and manage mine action in Sudan.

Priority is being given to actions which will enable the development of national capacities and will encourage the rapid transfer of regulatory and management responsibilities from the United Nations to national authorities.

Priority One   **Improve existing systems and procedures for the regulation and coordination of mine action in Sudan, and enable capacity development and transition to full national ownership**

The UN Mine Action Steering Committee in Sudan represents a suitable oversight mechanism within the UN system; aside from setting an example of good practice, it provides the most appropriate forum for development of a common position on transition, and the best oversight and accountability mechanism for implementation of the process. It should oversee organisational changes as the UNMAO itself transitions from managing emergency post-conflict mine action to an arrangement where mine action is undertaken in support of nationally-led reconstruction and development.

The National Mine Action Committee (which forms part of Sudan's NMAA) represents the most appropriate national mechanism for (1) creating interdependency between northern and southern programmes, (2) ensuring input from civil society into formal policy development, and (3) ensuring that the national authorities meet their objectives in a justifiable and technically defensible manner. UN agencies and national authorities should encourage the Committee to reconvene and meet on a regular basis.

Priority Two	**Change the role of international staff from regulating the programme and managing projects to assisting, advising and mentoring national managers**

As the emphasis changes from supporting UNMIS and emergency mine action to the development of national capacities, UNMAO staff need to become more actively engaged in developing interdependencies with their national counterparts. Engagement must be on a power-neutral basis that recognises the sovereignty of the national government. Since interdependencies have not evolved naturally, they will need to be supported by formal organisational policy and directives. These should include a well promoted policy on engagement with the national authorities for all those mine action activities which are not explicitly in support of UNMIS, i.e. humanitarian tasks, or tasks funded through multilateral sources, provided for humanitarian mine action in Sudan.

Priority Three	**Develop national legislation which allows the national authorities to regulate and coordinate mine action organisations and activities**

NMAC and SSDC currently draw authority for their work from the CPA and Presidential Decree 299, although neither document will provide the two organisations with the mandate to regulate and coordinate mine action activities post 2011. In particular, the legal status of SSDC is unclear.

National legislation should be developed as a matter of urgency. It should clarify *inter alia* the role and responsibilities of a central National Mine Action Authority and its two national Mine Action Coordination Centres (NMAC and SSDC), and the role of the NMAO as trustee of certain regulatory functions. Legislation should also address issues such as the implementation of relevant international treaty obligations, the development and maintenance of national mine action standards, the accreditation and monitoring of mine action operators, and the extent of liability for accidents caused by mines and ERW.

The development of national legislation should draw on the experience of proven legislation in other mine-affected countries.

Priority Four	**UN agencies should understand better the resource constraints in which the national authorities work, and address the transparency issues that hamper partnerships**

There is a significant imbalance in the funding made available to the UNMAO and the funding of NMAC and SSDC. This is partly due to the UNMAO's role in supporting the well-funded UNMIS mission, but it also reflects a deliberate decision to channel most funds through the UN system rather than through the Government of Sudan. If the national authorities are to play a meaningful role alongside the UNMAO, then the UN should place greater emphasis on developing opportunities for supporting NMAC and SSDC by providing more resources where possible and where appropriate.

To improve the current situation, the national authorities should be encouraged to release information on financing; demonstrating how

nationally-sourced funds are allocated within the national demining effort will demonstrate sound financial management and will encourage donors to support nationally-led initiatives. Since finances are currently a point of contention, UNMAS (via implementing agency UNOPS) should consider releasing the value of demining contracts on the UNOPS website, along with other contracts that have values above $100,000[27].

Priority Five   **Institutionalise the use the Multi-Year Work-Plan (MYWP) as a sectoral device for supporting national capacity development;**

The MYWP defines the UNMAS-managed mine action portfolio for Sudan. It enables donors to understand the UN's priority for funding in support of the programme's strategic goals, and places capacity development projects alongside other complementary requirements. The MYWP includes tools for monitoring progress, and as such is suitable for charting the development of national capacity and the progress of transition.

Priority Six   **Link mine action capacity development to wider development strategies and approaches**

Capacity development of the national authorities should clearly demonstrate linkages to other important development programmes and initiatives such as the UN Development Assistance Framework and the UNDP Country Plan for Sudan. This is consistent with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and will assist in demonstrating macro-development outcomes, and progress in meeting goals such as the Millennium Development Goals.

6.3 Organisational priorities

The following priorities are aimed at improving the ability of the NMAC and SSDC to regulate and manage mine action in Sudan.

Priority One   **Raise the quality management capacity of the national authorities, so that they can accredit organisations, quality assure operations, and certify cleared land**

Accreditation and quality assurance are two key functions of national mine action authorities. Both NMAC and SSDC should become involved in the process of awarding organisational and operational accreditation to demining organisations who can demonstrate they are able to conduct technical survey and clearance effectively and safely in Sudan. NMAC and SSDC should also become involved in conducting quality assurance of organisations during survey and clearance, and conducting post-clearance quality control to allow cleared land to be handed over to local authorities and land owners/users in accordance with national standards. These regulatory responsibilities should be transferred from UNMAO to the national authorities in a timely and controlled fashion, allowing the national authorities to develop the necessary systems, procedures, knowledge and skills, and to assume responsibility in a sustainable manner.

| Priority Two | **Improve information management capacity within the national authorities so that they can support mine action operations through better planning and operational support** |

Capacity within the national authorities should be developed so that they can undertake the process of inputting, managing, and manipulating data provided by organisations conducting clearance in Sudan. In the South this should be based on the IMSMA system, in the North where the GIS components of IMSMA is currently restricted due to US trade embargo on Sudan, training should take place on the IMSMA system, but alternative mechanisms of manipulating the data in a spatial manner should be investigated. Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example initially managing data and creating graphical products in an assisted manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion. [Note: it is understood that FMS - the developers of IMSMA - are close to getting agreement with US authorities to license IMSMA for use in northern Sudan.]

| Priority Three | **Ensure efficient and effective administration and logistics systems are in place, and ensure transparent and appropriate financial systems are developed** |

One of the key problems in Sudan has been the difficulty in providing timely and effective logistical support to demining operations. However, logistical support capacity within the national authorities is currently only rudimentary. There is no claimed ability to manage fleets of vehicles, store large amounts of equipment, or maintain large-scale facilities. If the national authorities are to become a viable coordination mechanism, effective and efficient logistical support is required to manage fleets of vehicles, facilities and equipment. Likewise, the quality of administrative support for activities (including human resource management) within the national authorities is variable; in the North, over-reliance on paper-driven systems and in the South a general lack of capacity. Finally, financial systems are normative to the overarching bureaucratic framework, so while they cannot be completely overhauled, they can be streamlined to demonstrate greater levels of effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability to the Government of Sudan and potential donors.

6.4   Human resource level priorities

The following priorities are aimed at improving the competencies if managers within NMAC and SSDC to regulate and manage mine action in Sudan.

| Priority One | **Ensure that formal training, coaching and mine action exchange activities are offered only to managers who well benefit from such opportunities** |

Senior managers from the national authorities, UNDP and UNMAO should select only appropriate national staff for formal training and for other staff development opportunities. Selection criteria should be used to chose individuals for training, but this should be accompanied by semi-structured discussions between the senior NMAC and SSDC

managers responsible for nominating participants, and UNMAO and UNDP staff responsible for sponsoring the training development.

Priority Two   **Develop resource mobilisation and donor liaison skills within the national authorities**

While NMAC and SSDC have made some progress in getting funds from the Government of Sudan, the national authorities are passive in their approach to resource mobilisation. To ensure sustainability of demining efforts in the country post-2011, the NMAC and SSDC should develop better relationships with the international community in general and with mine action donors specifically. This will require individuals involved in raising both internal and external funding to learn how to interact with stakeholders, market their respective organisations, present robust business cases for support and demonstrate accountability and effectiveness through regular reporting to donors. Consideration should be given to seeking professional fundraising guidance from organisations such as the International Trust Fund for Human Security[28] who have recently adopted a programme of international outreach.

Priority Three   **Develop needs assessment, project management, and monitoring and evaluation skills within operationally-focussed departments**

In their capacity as MACCs, the NMAC and SSDC need to be able to identify the requirement and prepare the specification for mine action projects including demining tasks conducted by JIDU clearance teams. The NMAC has developed a basic capability to define and prioritise requirements, design and manage projects, and provide effective oversight through monitoring and evaluation, SSDC needs much more assistance. The development of NMAC and SSDC staff skills in project management should be a combination of formal instruction followed by on-the-job coaching and supervision by qualified international staff.

Priority Four   **Recognise individual commitment and support personal initiative**

Quality and the commitment of staff varies between and within organisations. Individuals who demonstrate commitment and are clearly motivated should be encouraged to develop at an accelerated speed, and not at the pace of less motivated and less committed staff. When individuals identify their own training needs in a rational and well-considered manner, these should be supported by UNDP and UNMAO. For example, the SSDC finance officer has identified a night school training opportunity in Juba, that could help to enhance his accountancy and book-keeping skills, at a cost of US$600. By ensuring attendance on similar courses, external agencies would support both the trainee, but also the local institution. This process of identifying ongoing training opportunities should be formalised, and embedded within a structured performance appraisal process. The SSDC should continue to institute its own performance appraisal process, and preferably with observation and input from a UNDP technical adviser, with access to a funds for local training. The NMAC

should consider establishing a similar process, in addition to its standard civil service performance appraisal systems.

Priority Five   **Broaden understanding of the regional context of mine action**

UNDP is encouraged to broaden the understanding of the staff of national authorities to the regional and global context of mine action. Interaction with staff from neighbouring countries and the wider world is important to ensure the adoption of best practice through comparison of alternative management systems, procedure and practices.

Notes on Section 6:

27. See, http://www.unops.org/english/whatweneed/Pages/Contractawards.aspx, accessed 20 September 2008.
28. Formerly the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance.

SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 7: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN

7.1   Overview

The capacity development plan includes projects and activities which aim to improve the enabling environment, organisational capacities, and the competences of individual members of staff. The plan is designed to address the priorities identified in Section 6 in a timely manner, and to ensure the development of sustainable national mine action programme.

The plan consists of three phases, each of three years duration. The first phase covers the remaining period of the UN Mission; the second phase covers the period leading up to the deadline of the Mine Ban Treaty; the third phase covers the period following the removal of all known mined areas - when the emphasis will be on delivering mine action services which support broader national reconstruction and redevelopment goals. For practical reasons, this plan places more emphasis on the details of the first phase than on subsequent phases.

	2009 - 2011	2012 - 2014	2015 - 2017
Phase	Transition	MBT deadline	National development
Lead	United Nations	Government of Sudan	Government of Sudan
Mine action objectives	Clear all high and medium impacted communities	Clear all remaining suspected hazardous areas	Conduct MRE and VA, and address the residual threat as and when hazards are discovered
Development objectives	Enable national authorities to be capable of regulating and managing mine action in all provinces of Sudan	Enable national authorities to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and safety of mine action in all provinces of Sudan	Enable national authorities to regulate and manage mine action which supports broader reconstruction and development goals.

The Transition Phase runs from 2009-2011. It is designed to enhance the capacities of the national authorities and to ensure that they are able to regulate and manage mine action in all provinces of Sudan by the end of the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan. Interventions under this phase will contribute to the mine action capacity development goals specified in both the UN Development Assistance Framework 2009-2012, and the UNDP Country Planning Document 2009-2011, namely:

- **UNDAF 2009-2012**, 1.2.1

  "Strengthen national institutions' capacity to prioritise, coordinate and manage all aspects of mine action at central and state levels, including implementation of national and international obligations under the Ottawa Convention (UNMAO, UNDP, UNV)"

- **CPD 2009-2011**, 7.1

  "National/sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action programme"

It is important to note that during this phase capacity development is aligned with the transition process, but is not driven by it. That being said, activities must capture the

opportunities presented by a large UNMAO presence in the country up until 2011, to maximise the skill and knowledge transfer potential between the various organisations.

The second phase takes place between 2012 and 2014, and represents the "Ottawa" MBT phase, in which emphasis is placed on meeting Sudan's obligations as a State Party to the Treaty. It will therefore be highly consistent with the UNDAF Goal 1.2.1. There may be new mine action requirements to be met and new governance issues to be addressed after the referendum of 2011, but for current planning purposes the "one-country-two-systems" approach is appropriate. This second phase is followed by a "National Development" phase where emphasis is placed on meeting a residual threat through a highly mainstreamed system. In this phase it is assumed that development priorities rather than humanitarian ones will be the norm.

7.2 Transition Phase (2009 - 2011)

7.2.1 Activities in the enabling environment

Enhancing facilitating factors and removing constraints to performance are the primary activities in this phase. Without favourable institutional conditions and enabling environment, capacity development will be stifled. UNDP and UNMAO are strongly encouraged to undertake the following activities within this phase:

a. **Reinstitute the UN oversight mechanism.**

   The national Interagency Coordination Group for Mine Action in Sudan should be established to provide oversight of mine action activities in the country and in particular the capacity development and transition processes. The oversight mechanism will act as a top-down driver for change, as well as provide accountability for achieving results. It can also help to provide the political space in which change and negotiation can take place.

b. **Regularise meetings of the national oversight mechanism.**

   The National Mine Action Committee should be convened on a regular basis. It will maintain and improve interdependencies between northern and southern programmes as the Committee has representation from both northern and southern ministers. The oversight mechanism will ensure that implementation of the mine action policies and strategies are monitored in a regular and transparent way, and is designed to meet the needs of impacted constituencies in a balanced and just manner.

c. **Develop relevant national legislation that clearly defines the roles, responsibilities and powers of the national authorities.**

   Specifically, this should include legislation, which allows the SSDC to exercise its authority in accordance with principles of good governance. Proper legislation will create the framework in which organisations can grow. It will also ensure accountability and security for the national authorities and the organisations working in mine action in Sudan (either foreign or national). Lastly it will give the SSDC the legitimacy it requires in order to begin functioning effectively.

d. **Use the MYWP as a sectoral device for supporting national capacity development.**

   The MYWP provides a suitable framework for supporting national mine action capacity development and offers the prospect of financial sustainability until the Ottawa MBT deadline. It will align the efforts of all stakeholders and thus

improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the sector in general, and the national authorities specifically.

e. **Continue to provide resource support to the national authorities.**

Support should be in a manner that is directly linked to clearly defined, strategic objectives and directives. By resource support, the international community is removing a clear constraint to implementation.

During this phase, UNDP, UNMAO and the national authorities should work together to establish a workable system for ensuring knowledge retention and management within the national authorities. This could either be through the development of better knowledge management systems, internal (peer-to-peer) training, handover periods, and a career structure in which individuals are promoted within the organisations, rather than across different government departments One externally driven incentive system could be the establishment of a fund for local training, which can be used to train individuals according to their personally identified training needs, through agencies identified within the local market.

By addressing these institutional concerns, the capacity development plan covers the primary enabling environment priorities identified during the course of this analysis and assessment. In order to be realistic and achievable, UNDP should spot opportunities for intervention at the enabling environment level as they arise, and practitioners should note that given the political and procedural nature of these activities, there is no specific order for implementation.

7.2.2   Activities at the organisational level

Traditionally, performance at this level can be enhanced through concerted organisational development. However, in this plan, intervention at the organisational level is proposed through specific capacity development "projects" that align different agencies with different mandates with a common vision and approach. This is based on the realisation that for both NMAC and SSDC, the lack of interdependency during the formative periods of national agency development has meant that traditional organisational development approaches may be seen as interfering, rather than assisting. This would be exacerbated if new public management approaches were employed that sought to limit or reduce the number of staff within each organisation; particularly in light of the costs and staffing levels currently existing in the UN programme. The utility of the project approach is also based on the opportunity to embed capacity development projects within the MYWP. The MYWP is a sectoral initiative, which demonstrates how the mine action programme as a whole will meet the Ottawa MBT deadline, and how clearance will be funded and achieved passed the end of the UN mission mandate in 2011.

The approach offers considerable opportunities for mobilising resources for capacity development initiatives over a number of years, and will be tracked to the performance of the programme as a whole. The projects link directly to the Mine Action Strategic Framework and offer an opportunity for UNDP to harmonise its results-based planning approach – the Country Planning Document – with the objectives of the programme, and for the UNMAO to track progress towards transition. Each project is fully equipped with performance indicators that can be used to track capacity development and progress towards achieving full "national ownership". Finally, because the project is managed by the UN, all agencies involved in its implementation are committed to achieving the project outcomes.

Therefore, it is proposed that a number of projects are developed which cover the main areas of specific governance (1) quality and monitoring, and (2) information management and planning. These projects would be supported by a general governance project designed to raise performance in logistics, administration and finance, i.e. (3) a support systems project. The projects are based on the assumption that the NMAC and SSDC as organisations will remain completely responsible for managing their own affairs as organisations. In the

subsequent phases, once interdependencies have been constructed around the resource, accountability, and information flows generated through the project, more traditional organisational approaches and projects can be used.

a. Quality and Monitoring Project

Strategic goals:

National Strategic Framework Goal: *Strengthen the national mine action institutions to be able to plan and monitor all aspects of mine action.*

Supporting Outcome: *NMAC and SSDC plan effectively, efficiently and conduct quality assurance in accordance with NTSGs, across all pillars of mine action, and are supported by robust administration, logistics and finance departments.*

UNDAF 2009-2012, 1.2.1 *Strengthen national institutions' capacity to prioritise, coordinate and manage all aspects of mine action at central and state levels, including implementation of national and international obligations under the Ottawa Convention (UNMAO, UNDP, UNV)*

CPD 2009-2011, 7.1 *National / sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action programme.*

Target groups:

Quality assurance director and staff. Operations managers may be involved depending on circumstance and anticipated future role. Only individuals from the national authorities should be involved.

The project targets the quality assurance function within the national authorities. It addresses the quality management priorities identified as a capacity development priority at the organisational level; since it is addressing quality management, it will develop specific governance capabilities within the national authorities. Quality assurance staff will become involved in the process of accrediting and assuring quality on the current set of organisations conducting clearance in Sudan. This will be a gradual process that begins with basic training, secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example initially performing organisational accreditation in an assisted manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion. The project will be coordinated by UNDP, but the critical partner agency will be UNMAO where technical expertise currently resides. Other agencies such as NGOs operating in the country, and which have good relations with the national agencies can be used to assist quality managers in gaining technical skills.

Year One activities:

Translation of the National Technical Standards and Guidelines from English into Arabic; formal training on quality and quality management; organisational participation in the accreditation process; technical advice and work placements; field visits alongside UNMAO quality management team as advisors; purchase of necessary equipment (including

vehicles); workshops to define quality management policy and practice within the programme

Year Two activities:	Refresher training on quality approaches; UNMAO provide assistance in nationally-led accreditation; field visits with UNMAO quality management team as observers; two workshops on Quality Assurance policy; continued support for equipment running costs and maintenance; a training of trainers course so that quality managers can transfer skills effectively.
Year Three activities:	Field visits with UNMAO as observers; nationally-led accreditation with UNMAO as monitors; workshop on quality policy and practice; supply equipment running costs and maintenance; a training of trainers course so that quality managers can transfer skills effectively.

Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex G.

b.   Information Management Project

Strategic goals:	Same as the Quality and Monitoring Project
Target groups:	IMSMA officers from the national authorities' headquarters and regional sub-offices. Planning and staff from operations and other functional departments with a responsibility for planning and strategy development. Only individuals from the national authorities should be involved in the training.
	The project targets the IMSMA and planning functionalities within the national authorities. It addresses the information management and planning– specific governance concerns – identified during the course of this assessment. In this project, IMSMA and planning staff are involved in the process of overseeing the collection of data, manipulating data in a spatial manner and extracting products on impact, threat and mine action activities in accordance with internationally accepted practice, both for planning purposes and in support of implementing agencies and other government departments This will be a gradual process that begins with basic training, secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example formal training to ensure a base-level competency, then coaching and assistance until in year three, the national authorities are monitored on their performance. The project will be coordinated by UNDP, but the critical partner agency will be UNMAO where technical expertise currently resides. Other agencies such as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining can be used to assist IMSMA operators in gaining technical skills.
Year One activities:	Formal training courses on the basics of IMSMA to ensure that training target groups are familiar with the fundamental elements of, and purpose of, IMSMA; assisted data-entry/manipulation with UNMAO IMSMA department and technical officers; technical advice on the use of the IMSMA database for accessing and retrieving data and making simple IMSMA products for the operations and planning

departments; assisted work-plan development using data extracted from IMSMA with direct assistance of UNMAO programme management section and planning officers; equipment procurement and installation (IT, navigation, vehicles); field visits

Year Two activities: Formal training courses on intermediate level IMSMA topics; managing data entry, producing maps and graphical products at the request of implementing partners and planning and operations departments, with monitoring from UNMAO IMSMA operators; ensuring that the quality of the information in the database is maintained, under the supervision of the UNMAO; operations and planning departments creating work-plans and long-term strategies based on empirically defined need, under monitoring from UNMAO.

Year Three activities: Refresher training on IMSMA and any IMSMA updates; externally-led courses on specific topics, e.g. on spatial analysis; custodianship of the IMSMA database in partnership and under monitoring of UNMAO IMSMA operators; strategy and work-plan development, with assistance and monitoring from UNMAO as-required.

Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex H.

c. Support Systems Project

Strategic goals: Same as the Quality and Monitoring Project

Target groups: Administration managers and personnel (including human resource managers), logistics managers, fleet manager, storekeepers, finance directors and officers. Only individuals from the national authorities should be involved in the training.

This project targets the administration, logistics and finance functions within the national authorities. It specifically addresses the administration, finance and logistics priorities for capacity development, identified at the organisational level. On completion of the project, personnel within these support departments will be able to support the core business processes of the national authorities through efficient, effective and transparent administration, logistics and finance. The project recognises that national authorities are embedded within existing or emerging governance environments, and processes and formalities arising from the projects will be consistent with overarching government regulations, for example on financial accounting. The process of capacity development will be incremental and skills and knowledge will be gradually transferred, for example formal training to ensure a base-level competency, then coaching and assistance, until in year three the national authorities are monitored on their performance. The project will be coordinated by UNDP. Other agencies and organisations which specialise in administration, logistics and finance and associated management support systems, and which have

good relations with the national agencies can be used to assist administration and finance personnel in gaining technical skills.

Year One activities:	On the job training within administration, logistics and finance departments; business management software installed; IT procurement; office supply and partial operational expenses
Year Two activities:	Implementation of coaching system; advanced training courses (including personnel from Operations, MRE, VA); training consultancies for specialist knowledge and skill requirements; IT equipment procured; office supply and partial operational costs
Year Three activities:	Monitoring of previous coachees; short term training consultancies targeting logistics, administration and finance requirements in the MRE, VA, Operations departments; IT and communications equipment purchased; office supply and partial operational expenses

Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex I.

7.2.3 Activities at the human resource level

Activities at the human resource level should capitalise on the availability of large numbers of international personnel working in the programme. However, to-date there has been a passive, "open-door" approach towards technical advice and direct mentoring or coaching of staff from the national authorities. If skills and knowledge transfer is to occur at the levels required, external agencies must make a cultural shift towards proactive technical advice, mentoring and coaching of the national authorities. This may be assisted through specific training on technical advice, skills and knowledge transfer techniques, which is targeted at UNMAO staff which may work directly with national authority counterparts. Since the specific governance areas of quality and information management are covered under the project approach, technical advice will be in a reduced number of areas, and will generally relate to core competencies.

a. Develop resource mobilisation and donor liaison skills within the national authorities

A mentoring system between UNMAO programme officers and UNDP technical advisors should be established so that financial forecasting, marketing and donor reporting skills are enhanced. This should also include opening direct channels of communication between appropriate donors and the national authorities themselves. However, expectations should be managed; it is unlikely that any significant budgetary support will be allocated to the national authorities unless they are well developed and demonstrating significant accountability and transparency. National authorities should therefore place emphasis on helping to raise funds for the programme as whole, and identifying and securing funding sources for indigenous civil society and commercial sector organisations. This will in-turn build the legitimacy of the national authorities amongst national stakeholders and civil society organisations, for example.

b. Develop needs assessment, project management, and monitoring and evaluation skills within operationally-focussed departments

Specific training courses may be used for this development intervention.

(1) Needs assessment training

Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA departments within the national authorities.

Specific learning objectives of the training:

By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to…

- Explain the advantages and disadvantages of a range of research methods

- Demonstrate how needs assessment can be embedded in the project cycle

- Demonstrate an understanding of the need to establish baseline data

- Explain the most appropriate methodologies for a given rapid needs assessment in the mine action sector

- Demonstrate an understanding of how needs can be converted into objectives for action

(2) Project management training

Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA departments within the national authorities.

Specific learning objectives of the training:

By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to…

- Explain the benefits and limitations of using a project life-cycle approach

- Create a work breakdown structure for typical projects in the Sudan mine action programme

- Describe the project planning process and develop project plans

- Select an appropriate risk management strategy.

- Create a project budget and cash flow appropriate for activities undertaken by the national authorities

- Understand need for effective communications and negotiation, with a particular emphasis on working with external stakeholders

- Articulate the main concepts of leadership, teamwork, and their value to project management

This training should be synchronised with the organisational performance projects, so that staff gain a symbiotic understanding between needs assessments and IMSMA, and likewise between project implementation and quality assurance.

(3) Monitoring and evaluation training

Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA, departments within the national authorities.

Specific learning objectives of the training:

By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to…

- Demonstrate an understanding of the differences between monitoring and evaluation and describe their usage

- Explain the benefits of participation in evaluation and the linkage between participation, capacity development and accountability
- Develop indicators that can reflect performance in terms of quality and impact
- Suggest practical ways of monitoring and evaluating projects that may arise in Sudan (e.g. emergency projects)
- Demonstrate the linkage between accountability, performance management and quality management
- Analyse how policy develops and shapes constituencies, and suggest how tensions and conflict may arise from macro-level policy, using examples from VA and MRE in Sudan

c. **Develop a system of work exchanges and placements for employees of the national authorities**

This could include facilitating work exchanges for employees that demonstrate particular aptitude and commitment to their current roles. Foreign visits and exchanges may thus be used effectively as part of an incentive system linked to performance, but it is important that incentives are duly attached to other capacity development activities and priorities as outlined above. Activities in this phase can be used to prepare for capacity development interventions in the Ottawa Deadline Phase by selecting visits that highlight the potential of specific forms of intervention, e.g. ISO quality management.

7.3   Ottawa Deadline Phase (2011 - 2014)

The Quality Management and IMSMA projects in the Transition Phase address the specific governance issues of: accreditation, quality assurance and control, information management, and planning. The Support Systems project addresses a number of key, general governance issues such the need for probity and accountability within the programme. Through learning the core processes that define a national mine action authority, personnel within the authorities will become familiar with mine action in both principle and practice, and thus gain knowledge of the sector, in a sustained and experiential manner. However, there is space for further improvement of all organisations. Organisational development may come in a number of formats – all have the aim of improving organisational efficiency and effectiveness. This may require changing the structures of organisations, and the manner in which they conduct their businesses. However, in the state sector, reform is a difficult process and before transition it is unlikely that the UNMAO has enough leverage to institute reforms within the national authorities. That being said commitment to change need not be externally driven, it can be lead internally through the usage of quality management systems that are designed to lay bare the business processes of an organisation, and justify how they contribute to stakeholder satisfaction.

It is thus recommended that during the Ottawa Phase, that once the national authorities are familiar with their roles and responsibilities, a quality management system is introduced within them. There are a range of commercially available quality management systems that can be used, but they all have certain elements in common. Firstly, they require a detailed analysis and understanding of how the organisations deliver products and services, and secondly that the organisations develop a commitment to continually improving the manner in which those products and services are delivered and perceived to be delivered. A national authority that openly demonstrates a commitment to quality through practical application, will be more resource efficient, transparent, accountable and focused on achieving outcomes. The organisations are donor friendly and attract sustainable funding.

7.4   National Development Phase (2015 - 2017)

In response to diminishing need, and reduced levels of resources the programme will have changed in scale and scope by 2014. It is likely that a raft of new capacity development priorities will have been identified; and Sudan may or may not have asked for an extension for its Ottawa Treaty obligations. Experience in other countries and programmes indicate that at a mature phase, mine action programmes are highly mainstreamed. Tasking and prioritisation where it occurs, is aligned with the needs of specific development priorities and private sector work; the NMAC already recognises its future role along these lines. It is likely that efficiency, effectiveness and value for money are the watchwords of this Phase. It is strongly encouraged that UNDP conduct a further, detailed capacity assessment in mid or late 2011 – in addition to its regular reviews – in order to ascertain the priorities and subsequent way ahead for the National Development Phase.

7.5   Monitoring and evaluation approach

The mine action programme in the Sudan has been characterised by a lack of interdependency between national and international agencies, and this leads to partisan positioning around some key issues. In order to avoid bias in the monitoring and evaluation approach, participation of all primary stakeholders is critical. Firstly, this will ensure accountability over the results of the evaluation – negotiations and accommodations must be sought, rather than the executive delivery of judgments. Secondly, participation will promote learning and capacity development as successes and failures are shared throughout the programme. In addition to an ethos of participation, the monitoring and evaluation methodology should incorporate a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative data. Both types of data are mutually reinforcing – quantitative data provides strong evidence for processes and outputs, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness, while qualitative data provide an understanding of the quality of deliverables and outcomes, i.e. efficacy and effectiveness, as well as information on the manner in which activities are conducted, e.g. probity. To ensure that the capacity development plan remains appropriate and fit for purpose, it is assumed that a formative approach to monitoring and evaluation be adopted, i.e. evaluation is ongoing and the interventions are adjusted to ensure that they consistently meet the requirement.

Evidence for performance at the enabling environment level can be reviewed through discussion between UNDP, UNMAO and national authorities and other key stakeholders. At these occasions, success in removing constraints may be informally evaluated, while new and emerging constraints and opportunities may be identified; intervention at the enabling environment level may be considered an ongoing exercise. The capacity development projects, which are designed to address capacity development priorities at the organisational level, are equipped with their own indicators. For monitoring and evaluating performance at the human resource level, it is strongly suggested that tailor-made approaches are developed for each specific intervention. For example, training interventions may be accompanied by instructor reports on trainee performance and development, formal testing, and line manager reviews on an enhancement in the skills and knowledge of trainees after they have returned to work. Work exchanges may be evaluated through interviews with the exchange student, and the host organisation as to the perceived benefits derived through the process.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Capacity development	A broad concept which enables individuals, groups, organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability to manage and deliver capabilities – and to take ownership of the problem and its solution. In mine action in involves the introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the development of systems of governance and coordination, the ability of national authorities to mobilise resources from national budgets, and the development of national managers through education, training and coaching.
Civil society	Civil society is composed of the totality of voluntary, civic and social organisations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the formal structures of the state. In theory, the mechanisms of civil society should be distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. [Adam Ferguson 1723-1816, philosopher and historian of the Scottish Enlightenment.]
	In this paper the term is used to describe groups – often NGOs - such as the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL), the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and the Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR)
End state	The term originates from the military. US Field Manual (FM) 100-5 defines the term as ".... a set of conditions which determines that the strategic objectives have been met."
	In this paper the term is used to describe a set of conditions which determines that a mine action programme has achieved a state in which:
	a) stable and sustainable national ownership has occurred;
	b) the impact from the remaining landmines and UXO is deemed to be manageable;
	c) substantial external assistance is no longer needed.
Governance	The action or manner of conducting the policy and affairs of a state, organisation or people [Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition]
	In this paper, the term is used to describe the actions or manner of the national government of conducting the policy and affairs of the state.
	Governance (UNDP definition)
	Governance is the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector. It is the way a society organises itself to make and implement decisions - achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the

mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and provide incentives for individuals, organisations and firms. Governance, including its social, political and economic dimensions, operates at every level of human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality, nation, region or globe.

IMAS	International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are documents developed by the UN on behalf of the international community, which aim to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some cases, by defining international requirements and specifications.

IMAS 04.10 notes that:

They provide a frame of reference which encourages, and in some cases requires, the sponsors and managers of mine action programmes and projects to achieve and demonstrate agreed levels of effectiveness and safety.

They provide a common language, and recommend the formats and rules for handling data which enable the free exchange of important information; this information exchange benefits other programmes and projects, and assists the mobilisation, prioritisation and management of resources.

IMSMA	International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
MAC, MACC	Mine action centre (or mine action coordination centre) is an organisation that carries out mine risk education training, conducts reconnaissance of mined areas, collection and centralisation of mine data and coordinates local (mine action) plans with the activities of external agencies, of (mine action) NGOs and of local deminers. [UN Terminology Bulletin No. 349]
Mine action	Activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).

IMAS 04.10 notes that:

Mine action is not just about demining; it is also about people and societies, and how they are affected by landmine and ERW contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW contamination, and in which the victims' needs can be addressed. Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities:

a) *mine risk education (MRE);*

b) *humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance;*

	c) *victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;*
	d) *stockpile destruction; and*
	e) *advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.*
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the government department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) in each mine-affected country charged with the regulation, management and coordination of mine action
	IMAS 04.10 notes that:
	In most cases the national MAC or its equivalent will act as, or on behalf of, the NMAA; and that in certain situations and at certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all the functions, of a NMAA.
National ownership	In a strict legal sense, the term can be used to describe the ownership of property by the state, but it is used by international organisations, NGOs and civil society in a wider sense as exercising the right and accepting the responsibility to address issues or challenges of national concern such as poverty, disease, human rights and global warming.
Objective	Specific targets set by the organisation to achieve its *vision*. An *objective* should be precise and quantifiable, and should be achievable with the resources which are likely to become available.
Ownership	In a legal sense, the term is used to describe the exclusive rights and control over property, which may be an object, land, real estate, or intellectual property. It is embodied in a right of ownership, which is often referred to as title. Ownership also implies some degree of interest in maintaining, or indeed further developing, the worth of the property.
Sudanmap	The Sudan Mine Action Programme
Transition	The process of changing from one state or condition to another [Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition]

TRANSITION, NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CAPACITY

Transition

Despite a dual mandate of service delivery and capacity development, few interdependencies have been developed between the UN-led mine action effort and the national authorities in terms of work-sharing, skills transfer or the exchange of information, funds or physical resources[29]. The effect that this lack of interdependency has had on the programme are further-reaching that perhaps originally anticipated; it has led to the development of three essentially parallel coordination structures and capacities – NMAC, SSDC, UNMAO – which although sometimes co-located, share little apart from a general vision for a Sudan free of the threat of landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The effects of this institutional disengagement[30] led a GICHD evaluation team to warn that national agencies operating outside of the main thrust of internationally-led mine action activity could lead to: the loss of a single definitive source of information on the landmine threat; greater difficulty in enforcing international standards; the potential requirement to re-clear land; and finally the ability to recognise government capacity[31].

Lack of interdependency and differing views on what constitutes acceptable service delivery have resulted in different standpoints between national authorities and international agencies on how legitimacy and accountability are constituted within the programme. This issue is particularly prescient because if the UN-mission is disbanded prior to the attainment of humanitarian targets, certain roles and responsibilities currently invested in the UN will need to *transition* to the government[32]. In addition to the capacity to coordinate mine action activities in accordance with normative international standards transition is strongly linked to issues of governance, accountability and legitimacy, which themselves will have profound impacts on the development of an effective, practical and sustainable transition plan. Yet without interdependencies, the danger exists that the UN and specifically the principle UNMAS component may lack sufficient leverage to bring about organisational reforms to ongoing national working practices; reforms that the UN feels that are required for a successful transition process. Unless managed carefully, future activities are likely to be defined by sanctions rather than incentives, or that the parallel structures will simply continue to grow in dimension and mandate and thus broadening the potential for conflict

National ownership and capacity

The dominant narrative of transition in Sudan is centred on the concept of *ownership*. As with all socially constructed concepts, both terms *transition* and *ownership* are contested. This is certainly the case in Sudan, where multiple agencies, including national executive bodies, with different values, cultures, missions and mandates seek to fulfil their objectives and in so-doing develop and propagate different worldviews. Many external stakeholders view transition as the appropriation of specific technical functions by national authorities, as their own programmatic strength is reduced. Whereas national stakeholders including ministries and national authorities view transition through a political lens in which certain, sovereign rights and responsibilities have always remained with the national authorities. It is likely that a compromise position – if such a position exists – occupies a domain somewhere in-between these generalised technical and political extremes.

Although the details may be challenged, the basic premise that transition involves the transfer of power and responsibility in some format is a reasonable assumption. This may be considered the realm of *governance* which is concerned with deciding how services are to be provided, who will provide them, and deciding to which constituencies and for which purposes they will be provided. The term ownership alone is insufficient to capture the characteristics of accountability and legitimacy which is the essence of governance, as it is provided by the UNMAO. For instance, UNMAO cannot necessarily claim "ownership" on the

behalf of the Sudanese people, thus there is nothing "owned" which can be transferred. The term *trusteeship*, which implies a sense of both assumed and sovereign legitimacy in the delivery of certain services designed to bring about social outcomes can be used to bridge this ideological gap[33].

From this frame of reference, the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GONU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) claim *ownership* over their relevant constituencies in the North and the South. This is a form of trusteeship based on *political* legitimacy – theoretically defined through electoral and policy development processes, taxation systems and the redistribution of wealth through social services[34]. Trusteeship in this sense may mean taking decisions that are developmental rather than humanitarian in nature. The UNMAO however, has *trusteeship* vested within it by the international community for the technical delivery of certain services in support of peacekeeping and general humanitarian purposes. External agencies such as UNMAO must also prove their legitimacy with respect to their managers and donors, as well as their beneficiaries and national partners. UNMAO do this through the efficient and effective delivery of their essential humanitarian and peacekeeping services[35]. However, the national authorities may not necessarily feel the need to demonstrate legitimacy to external stakeholders in the absence of clear incentives and/or sanctions.

This brief analysis highlights significant differences in accountability flows between internal and external agencies – they are at the heart of the conflict between development and humanitarianism. The tangible result is that external humanitarian agencies such as UNMAO seek assurances of technical efficiency and effectiveness of the National Authorities; they equate ownership and thus transition with the development of technical capacity from which responsibility will follow. On the other hand, the government supports the intentions of capacity development, but naturally defines ownership with the formal legitimacy accorded to it by the Sudanese people rather than through the international community – uniting concepts of citizenship, sovereignty and national sentiment. Thus while they recognise the need for skills and knowledge transfer, they view transition in terms of an existing responsibility from which capacity can subsequently be derived. The result is a fundamental confusion between the means of achieving what are essentially the same ends. The implications for both capacity development and transition are profound.

Capacity and transition

As shown above, there are certain elements of ownership of the programme that can never be claimed by external stakeholders such as a single UN agency, while the nation-state is functional, and thus ownership cannot be viewed in terms of technical capacity alone. So although they are related, capacity and transition are not interchangeable terms. What is more useful to consider is a process of transition of specific governance functions which are under the trusteeship of the UN, to national ownership. In this sense, ownership may be considered the capacity to exercise governance of a mine action programme, i.e. determining what mine action services are to be delivered, the manner in which services are delivered and who benefits from the service.

Governance can be divided into two components: (a) specific governance characteristics, and (b) general governance characteristics. *Specific governance* characteristics include the processes by which demining organisations are accredited, funded and tasked. It also includes the capacity to set priorities and make plans that reflect both humanitarian as well as national priorities; the capacity to generate funding through a range of mechanisms (national and international) for mine action tasks; and the capacity to control and ensure the integrity of information on hazard and impact data.

General governance capacity on the other hand, means providing an environment that enables the specific governance processes as well as technical management. This includes

the ability to recruit and select employees based on merit; the ability to ensure that technical decision making is not heavily influenced by politics; the ability to ensure that decisions are made in a transparent manner; the ability to ensure that accountability is maintained within individuals within organisations; and mechanisms to ensure a high level of public access to decision-makers to ensure that policy reflects the needs of citizens. At a more technical level, it requires the development of robust management procedures that will allow the efficient and effective management of processes.

While specific governance tasks will be strongly influenced by the environment in which they are carried out, the UN is not in a position to transfer these general governance capacities. They are subject to wider development implications and as such must be built over the long term. Instead, the UN has assumed trusteeship of the specific governance characteristics alone[36], and these should form the principal basis of discussion on transition. The current trustees for these functions should be explicit in expressing their conditions for the transfer of trusteeship, in terms of general governance and functional capacity.

The governance processes are supported by a range of *functional capacities*. Even though there is no defined implementation requirement for the national authorities this does not mean that functional capacity should be subordinated with respect to governance. The specific outputs of mine action are defined by the five pillars of action, therefore the ability to be able to accredit, plan, task, monitor and evaluate impact of activities within the five pillars will be strongly linked to a technical knowledge of these activities. Thus the functional capacities and governance processes should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Capacity within the functional areas will include competency in monitoring and coordinating each of the five mine action activities throughout the project cycle. The cycle should begin at the process of identifying programme priorities and raising suitable amounts of funds. It should also include the ability to work with a wide range of stakeholders to build plans of action before planning, allocating resources, implementing, monitoring and evaluating.

Notes on Annex B:

29. Some of these dependencies (such as direct budgetary support from the mission) are not possible, owing to international defined statutes. For a review of UN-programme responsibilities for capacity development and transition see UN Inter-Agency Policy (2005) para 62-64; 75; 85

30. Disengagement is typified by the so-called *Wau-Babanosa* railroad incident of 2007. For this joint funded World Bank and Government of National Unity project, the national authorities decided to conduct clearance without the assistance of the UNMAO, deeming that they could do more, in less time for less money using military Joint Integrated Demining Units. When the national authorities requested QA support for clearance certificates, the UNMAO declined on the basis that it cannot conduct quality assurance on unaccredited organisations such as the JIDU. The national view is that the UN may accredit on *behalf* of the government and not accredit the government itself, and subsequently an *impasse* has developed on the issue, resulting in two exclusive coordination mechanisms – national and UN. The clearance has been completed but is unrecognised by the UN. For a detailed account of the incident see Paterson and Bohle, *Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project*, February 2008, pp.19-23

31. Ibid. p.21

32. This is in addition to the international imperative to transition, see UN Inter-Agency Policy (2005), para 63-64.

33. These differences are not purely semantic; they have caused genuine disagreement over the process of transition.

34. These are forms of governmental capacity that are specifically supported by the UNDP.

35. Factors that demonstrate legitimacy to national partners include: adhering to the apolitical UN mandate, demonstrating respect of cultural norms and values, and perhaps most importantly showing a commitment to the implementation of the CPA.

36. Embedded within a general governance environment of its own – the UN governance environment.

UNDP CAPACITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Many capacity assessment tools and approaches are available to development practitioners. Some are linear and hierarchal while others apply 'softer' assessment methods, but all share the same three stage approach which is (1) to understand future requirements, (2) to analyse the suitability of current capabilities, and (3) by comparing current capabilities with future requirements, to assess the gap in capacity which needs to be closed through a programme of development projects.

The UNDP Capacity Development Assessment Methodology has been adopted for this project. It provides a systematic and defensible method of assessing capacity needs, establishing priorities and sequencing of capacity development projects and activities. The approach can be used in complex development situations when it is not always obvious where best to understand the relative needs and/or the order of implementing capacity development projects and activities. Not least, it provides a common language to facilitate discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity assessment. The method thus represents an appropriate method of determining the capacity development requirements of the Sudan Mine Action Programme.

This Annex describes the basic principles of the UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology as outlined in the User's Guide[37]. The adaptation of these principles to the study is explained in Annex D.

General principles

The methodology is based on a conceptual framework which provides structure to a number of issues which need to be considered during the assessment exercise. The framework may be used to develop questions and provide lines of enquiry that are designed to elicit information on the capacity of an organisation, individuals within the organisation, or a whole social system. The capacity development framework proposed by UNDP is referred to as the 'default framework', and practitioners are encouraged to adapt it to reflect local conditions and requirements. The default framework represents a complete system of capacity issues which need to be considered during any assessment; and are described as (1) the points of entry to the assessment, (2) the core issues, and (3) cross-cutting, functional and technical capacities.

This can be shown graphically as a three-dimensional block; see Figure C.1. This block is divided into cells, with each cell corresponding to a coordinate comprised of three variables. These cells can be used to structure an inquiry into capacity development within a social system being analysed. By addressing cells in sequence or order, or across different people, organisations or systems, one can compare and contrast capacity or performance and thus promote better understanding of the current and required competences of individuals and the capabilities of organisations.

Points of entry to the assessment

The 'points of entry' define the scale of investigation of capacity of a social system. The 'individual', 'organisational', or 'enabling environment' levels mean beginning a structured investigation of capacity at these levels respectively. It should be explicitly recognised that capacity at any of the levels will be influenced and impacted by issues occurring at the other two levels. This is because the enabling environment facilitates or constraints the actions of organisations, and organisations facilitate or constrain the actions of individuals. Likewise, the capacity of individuals will affect the performance of the organisation, and the summation

of organisational performance within a given social system will define the overall vector of performance of that system – the enabling environment.

Core issues

The Core issues are those issues that UNDP is most commonly called upon to address. These issues represent a mixture of tangible qualities such as levels of resources or financing, and intangible qualities such as quality of leadership. The developers of the framework see that not all of the issues covered by the default framework will necessarily be totally relevant for the purposes of particular assessment.

Cross-cutting capacities

The cross-cutting functional capacities are those capacities (individual competences, organisational procedures and practices, and soft issues such as leadership, morale and common purpose) that are critical for '.... the successful creation and management of policies, legislations, strategies and programmes' (UNDP, 2007, p.5). They correspond to specific activities within programme and project management cycles, i.e. beginning with problem identification, generating support for achieving a goal, managing a process, and finally culminating in monitoring and evaluation of activities. The cross-cutting issues are supported by a series of technical capacities which relate specifically to the type of capacity being analysed. These technical capacities include knowledge of the systems and processes that are specific to the area of capacity development, such as the mechanical clearance of landmines.


Figure A1: UNDP Capacity Assessment 'Default' Framework

Comparing current capacities to future needs

Most capacity assessment methodologies have a similar approach and the default UNDP methodology is no exception. The type of capacity and required level of performance is analysed, and then the current level of capacity with respect to an agreed end state is then assessed. It can therefore be seen whether the level of capacity meets the requirement, falls short of the requirement or even exceeds the requirement. In a rigorously applied, default UNDP system, this process would be conducted cell-by-cell, and considerable detail on the levels of capacity may be elucidated for comparison. However, owing to the flexible nature of this capacity assessment method, cells within the framework may be analysed in a non-sequential manner and this will allow the more critical elements to be considered first, if time and resource constraints pose restrictions on depth of analysis.

At the end of the process, the results are summarised and analysed. This will allow an understanding of where capacity gaps and excesses exist. In this way, interventions may be designed to enhance capacity in areas where it is lacking, and perhaps divert or redistribute assets away from areas where capacity levels exceed the requirement.

Benefits of UNDP methodology

The User Guide states that the UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology:

- Provides a comprehensive view of the issues that could be addressed in a capacity assessment;

- Brings rigour and a systematic method to determining future capacity needs and assessing existing capacity assets;

- Creates a common language to facilitate discussion among potentially disparate parties;

- Provides a structure for discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity assessment exercise and about expectations of the capacity development effort more generally;

- Provides a method for generating quantitative as well as qualitative data to support the development of a capacity development action plan;

- Makes sense of complex development situations, when it is not always obvious where best to intervene to promote capacity development;

- Improves the consistency, coherence and impact of the work of UNDP; and

- Increases the ability to share experiences.

Notes on Annex C:

37. See: *Capacity Assessment Methodology*, User's Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, May 2007

MODIFIED CAPACITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Adaptation of default framework

As a first step in the analysis and assessment process, the default capacity assessment framework (as described in Annex C) was adapted to suit the objectives of this project, i.e. to establish the capacities of the national authorities for managing and regulating mine action in order to develop a capacity development plan that will improve their performance. The UNDP default framework was therefore adapted so that it was (1) relevant, by ensuring that it is compatible with the requirements of mine action as a standalone discipline, (2) mindful of the specific requirements of transition, and (3) inclusive of the core competency areas which constitute the ability of national authorities to coordinate and supervise mine action

In order to do this, the core Issues were adapted to reflect the core issues of mine action, in this case the *specific governance* issues that dominate the discussions on transition and capacity development in Sudan. These core issues are Accreditation and Quality; Information Management; Planning, Tasking and Resource Mobilisation. In addition to the default Functional Capacities – which are essentially skills competencies – a cross-cutting Technical Capacity (a knowledge competency) was added to the framework. This knowledge competency refers to the specific knowledge of systems and processes that are particular to the mine action sector. For example, knowledge of the National Technical Standards and Guidelines, which would allow a quality assurance officer to conduct his work, this knowledge is in addition to the project management skills that an officer would require to discharge their duties effectively and efficiently. These technical capacities were cross-cutting and were considered where appropriate, as the national authorities would not be undertaking all of the activities implied by these issues. In order to ensure that against each of these issues, the capacity to design, gain support for, implement and assess results were covered, the Functional Capacities were slightly adjusted to ensure that each was relevant and appropriate for the purposes of the study. The Points of Entry categories remained the same.

For the purposes of this particular assessment it was determined that the assessment approach would remain more qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, this was because it would (1) allow the assessment team to explore areas of future performance of the national authorities which had not been established up until this point, (2) reveal linkages between performance and facilitating and constraining factors, (3) reflect the problems of working with agencies that are still formative and frequently changing in scope and mandate, and (4) represent a more realistic and achievable assessment approach given the operational constraints, as it contains a greater degree of flexibility.

Owing to the flexible nature of this capacity assessment method, cells within the framework were then analysed in a non-sequential manner and this allowed the more critical elements to be considered first. This meant assessing which cells would provide the most appropriate entry points, and initially placing emphasis at that dimension; focussing specifically on the performance-related requirements of the national authorities. In practice, the NMAC chose to enter discussions related to capacity based on Organisational performance, whereas the SSDC chose to begin discussions at the Human Resource level. From the entry point, specific linkages to the other levels (enabling environment, organisation, and human resource) were explored depending on their relevancy measured in terms of their ability to constrain or facilitate organisational performance.

Sources of information

The information used for making the assessment was drawn from a number of sources. It included a study of relevant documentation[38] and printed materials, as well as interviews with key informants or high interest stakeholders who strongly influence organisational – and thus programme – performance. One of the key reference documents is the UNMAO data on

capacity, which has been collected in support of the transition process. These transition summary sheets are rich source of information on capacity.

During interviews, a semi-structured interview technique was used. This technique has the advantage for drawing down on critical issues and investigating causalities; both of which are important features of an informative and relevant capacity assessment analysis. In addition to these investigatory methods, a number of roundtable discussions took place with those national staff assigned with the delivery of the five pillars of mine action. The roundtable discussion approach was initially used to elicit the nature of the end states[39].

In order to maximise the effectiveness of resources in the time available, the assessment at the organisational level covered the principal national authorities alone and did not extend into the tactical, implementation sphere. While it is recognised that implementers have a central role to play, the political importance of the national authorities and their various abilities to control, coordinate and mobilise resources from government budgets affords them a critical role. Intervention for aims of national capacity development (and the subsequent support to transition processes) will therefore be most influential at this level.

Presenting results – the Results Based approach

Following the summary, a number of specific recommendations are provided, which reflect the capacity development requirements of the programme. These recommendations cover organisational performance and the facets of the enabling environment that can be improved to facilitate rather than constrain this organisational performance (i.e. capacity). Recognising that organisational performance is built on the quality of human resources, the assessment also presents some recommendations at the human resource level and suggests a number of proposed interventions which may include training, coaching, mentoring, study visits and other forms of skills and knowledge transfer.

Technical performance of national authority

	Clearance	Mine Risk Education	Victim Assistance	Stockpile Destruction	Advocacy
Engage with stakeholders					
Conduct needs assessments					
Develop policy and strategy					
Task, budget and implement					
Monitor and evaluate					

Governance performance of national authority

	Accreditation	Quality Management	Planning and tasking	Resource mobilisation	Information Management
Organisational and human resources					
Enabling environment					
General governance permissiveness					

No evidence of performance	0
Performance (assisted and/or basic competency)	1
Performance (assisted and/or medium competency)	2
Performance (assisted and/or advanced competency)	3
Unassisted, meets requirement	4

Notes on Annex D:

38.   Primarily the *Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework*, June 2006
39.   One limitation of the assessment method is the requirement to hold separate discussions with both northern and southern authorities. It is assumed that the discussions will remain faithful to the "one country, two-systems" approach. Where possible, the assessment team will identify opportunities for linkage and areas of cooperation.

VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF CAPACITY - CAPACITY BASELINE

Technical performance NMAC

	Clearance	Mine Risk Education	Victim Assistance	Stockpile Destruction	Advocacy
Engage with stakeholders	orange	green	green	green	green
Conduct needs assessments	red	yellow	yellow	green	green
Develop policy and strategy	yellow	yellow	yellow	green	green
Task, budget and implement	yellow	yellow	orange	green	green
Monitor and evaluate	orange	orange	orange	orange	green

Governance performance NMAC

	Accreditation	Quality Management	Planning and tasking	Resource mobilisation	Information Management
Organisational and human resources	red	orange	orange	yellow	orange
Enabling environment	orange	orange	orange	orange	red
General governance permissiveness	orange	orange	orange	orange	orange

Technical performance SSDC/A

	Clearance	Mine Risk Education	Victim Assistance	Stockpile Destruction	Advocacy
Engage with stakeholders	orange	orange	orange	yellow	yellow
Conduct needs assessments	orange	red	red	yellow	yellow
Develop policy and strategy	orange	orange	orange	green	yellow
Task, budget and implement	red	red	orange	green	orange
Monitor and evaluate	red	red	orange	green	orange

Governance performance SSDC/A

	Accreditation	Quality Management	Planning and tasking	Resource mobilisation	Information Management
Organisational and human resources	red	orange	orange	yellow	orange
Enabling environment	orange	red	red	orange	red
General governance permissiveness	yellow	yellow	yellow	yellow	yellow

Description	Colour	Value
No evidence of performance	black	0
Performance (assisted and/or basic competency)	red	1
Performance (assisted and/or medium competency)	orange	2
Performance (assisted and/or advanced competency)	yellow	3
Unassisted, meets requirement	green	4

Note: "general governance permissiveness" does not directly equate to performance, instead it represents the extent to which international "good" governance practices may be observed within the programme, and additionally the ease in which these practices may be promoted within the specific authority.

Note: where performance of the "enabling environment" is weaker than that of the "organisational and human resources", this should be considered specific areas of policy level concern, and may require introspection on the part of external agencies working with the programme, as to whether or how they are constraining or facilitating performance

Note: the matrices employed above are adapted from a matrix and approach developed by Sekkenes S., and Luff L., 2006.

CAPACITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES

Phase	Activity	Date	Persons Contacted and Met	Target	Methodology	Product
1.	**Scoping study, confirmation of requirement, development of methodology and approach; institutional level analysis and assessment**	16 June – 25 July 2008	NMAC: Awad Al-Basheer; Abdel-Monim Jiha; Baballah Brima Baballah, SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter Doku, Margaret Mathiang UNDP: Qadeem Tariq; Edward Meaby; Khalid Abdin. UNMAO: Jim Pansegrouw; Karin McLennan	NMAC, SSDC	Review of normative policies and strategies to the programme; preparatory discussions with well informed persons, contact with senior directing staff within national authorities; literature review of important documents and evaluations related to the programme	Agreed understanding of requirement, approach and methodology for the assessment. Preliminary institutional level capacity development recommendations.
2.	**Organisational and human-resource level analysis and assessment on performance, with NMAC and SSDC**	26 July – 20 August 2008	NMAC: Awad Al-Basheer; Abdel-Monim Jiha; Baballah Brima Baballah; Adel Abdel Hameid; Khalid Ibrahim; Sylvia Michael; Fath El-Rahman Gangari; Dr. Ahmed Al-Bedawi; Abdel Alielah Khalid; Hesham Mohammed; Mozamil Abo Doum. SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter Doku, Margaret Mathiang; Egido Taban; Philemon Majok; Mike Rashid; Malek Deng; Manyiok Nul; Lokujo Pater Jonah; Victor Yuggu; Albino Deng Juach; Peter Deng; Pater Mangezire; Aresto Doku; Rebecca Nyakuoth; Joespeh Lesuk Samuel ;Jurkuch Yaak; JIDU: Bior Kuir Deng; Basheer Hassan Ahmed Ministry of Planning: Kamal Awad UNDP: Auke Lootsma; Sue Tatten; Ganiyu Ipaye; Musa Ahmed Ibrahim; Massimo Diani; Omer Ishag; Qadeem Tariq; Edward Meaby; Khalid Abdin;	NMAC, SSDC	Meetings and semi-structured interviews with director, senior management and middle management in the NMAC and SSDC to analyse future performance and assess needs. This stage included a performance appraisal with SSDC staff	Analysis and assessment of current capacity measured against anticipated future performance Detailed institutional, organisational and human-resource level capacity development priorities.

			Pacifico Auguestino UNMAO: Nigel Forrestal; Joseph McCartan; Lou Luff; Reiko Kurihara; Louai Jalal Eldin Mohammed Osman; Bjorn Vjokovic; Mohammed Kabeer; Karin McLennan UNICEF: Insaf Nizam SCBL: Abdel Aati Abdel Khair Eid. NPA: Charles Frisby Cranfield University: Jeff Whitworth			
3.	**Presentation of early findings, endorsement of early recommendations, input into Transition Policy**	24 August 2008	NMAC: Al-Awad Al-Basheer; Jihat Abdel-Monim; Adel Abdel Hameid SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter Doku, Margaret Mathiang; Mike Rashid; Simon Yak Deng. UNDP: Sara Sekkenes; Katrine Kristensen; Qadeem Tariq; Edward Meaby UNMAO: Karin McLennan, Nigel Forrestal; Lou Luff; Reiko Kaurihara; Severine Flores; UNICEF: Insaf Nizam	NMAC, SSDC, UNMAO, and UNICEF	Workshop held in Khartoum for key stakeholders on Transition, with input from UNDP in partnership with Cranfield University. Input designed to integrate early capacity development findings with the transition process. Buy-in of recommendations sought from senior directing staff and UN colleagues	Transition policy that is compatible with the capacity development plan, supported by UNDP. Capacity development approach (primarily project based approach within the Multi-Year Work Plan) that has been agreed in principle by all principle stakeholders to the programme.
4.	**Presentation of final report and detailed capacity development plan for the 2009-2012**	November 2008	Cranfield University, UNDP	NMAC, SSDC, UNMACO, wider development community (including donors and agencies)	After internal review of sections of the report by selected UNDP and Cranfield University staff; the final report and capacity development plan are presented to a wider audience	Development plan to raise skills and competencies for governance and management that is linked to UNDAF, UNDP Country Planning Document, and the Multi-Year Work Plan

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE QUALITY MANAGEMENT PROJECT

Result	SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development
NMAC and SSDC quality managers have understood and are able to work with the NTSGs.	1. By month 3 (after the project start date), NMAC and SSDC have sent the QM departments of all national mine action agencies in their region an approved Arabic translation of the NTSGs. 2. By month 13, 75% of quality managers of NMAC and SSDC have passed a practical test on the content of the NTSGs that required them to engage critically with them and respond to questions and queries, making reference to the original IMAS and the local operational requirements. 3. By month 36, 4 quality managers, 2 from NMAC and 2 from SSDC, have managed a multiple-stakeholder review process for an NTSG.
NMAC and SSDC quality managers are able to conduct accreditation in a transparent and formal process in accordance with NTSGs.	1. By month 6 (after the project start date), 90% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have participated in operational accreditation of a demining organisation that was proposing to conduct clearance work in the country, with UNMAO. 1. By month 13, 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have passed a written test on the entire accreditation process, and have also passed a practical test on the conduct of accreditation field visits. 2. By month 25, 50% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have express valid views and opinions on the accreditation of agencies in review meetings or through their individual written reports. 3. By month 36, 75% of mine action agencies surveyed, whether implementing partners or those proposing to conduct clearance, have reported satisfaction with the effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of the NMAC and SSDC-led accreditation process.
NMAC and SSDC quality managers can manage quality in a fair and transparent manner, in strict adherence to NTSGs.	1. By month 13 (after the project start date), 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers on payroll have qualified to EOD level III, and have thus demonstrated practical understanding of the importance and application of NTSGs in the field. 2. By month 13, 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have passed a verbal test that requires them to explain the purpose of quality management and the principal activities associated with quality assurance and quality control. 3. By month 25, 75% NMAC and SSDC quality managers have conducted one quality management visit in partnership with the UNMAO quality assurance team and are able to express valid opinions on operations (with respect to the NTSGs) and the level of confidence in cleared land. 4. By month 36, 75% of mine action implementing partners surveyed express satisfaction with the competence of NMAC and SSDC-led quality assurance missions.
Performance measurement approaches for mine action in Sudan have been established.	By month 6 (after the project start date), one trial of mine action performance measurement guidelines has been completed by NMAC and SSDC quality management units.

Note: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning, to assisted, to monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in the field, and not simply based on UNMAO or national authority subject positions.

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

Result	SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development
NMAC and SSDC have understood and worked with the IMSMA.	1. By month 6 (after the project start date), 50% of NMAC and SSDC IMSMA officers have received formal training on the basics of IMSMA operation and have been placed by UNMAO according to their performance during training. 2. By month 25, 90% of NMAC and SSDC IMSMA officers have passed an IMSMA test that required them to retrieve data and make simple analysis in support of planning and operations. 3. By month 36, 75% of mine action implementing agencies surveyed have reported satisfaction with the NMAC and SSDC-led IMSMA product generation process. 4. By month 36, the UNMAO operational management adviser has expressed confidence in the integrity of the IMSMA database.
NMAC and SSDC have developed strategy and work-plans in accordance with empirically defined need.	1. By month 13 (after the project start date), with the direct assistance of the UNMAO, the NMAC and SSDC operations and planning departments have created a yearly work-plan that is consistent with the MYWP, based on empirically defined needs and informed by formal policies. 2. By month 25, with monitoring by the UNMAO, the NMAC and SSDC operations and planning departments have developed a longer-term strategy for their region that is based on empirically defined needs and informed by formal policies. 3. By month 36, 75% of the major mine action donors for Sudan, Sudan government partners and implementing agencies report that the NMAC and SSDC are able to create effective yearly work-plans and longer-term strategies in a justifiable and consistent way.
NOTE: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning to assisted to monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in the field, and not simply on UNMAO or national authority subject positions.	

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

Result	SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development
Providing administrative, financial and logistical support to the mine action authorities	1. By month 13 (after the project start date), 100% of NMAC and SSDC administration, logistics and finance officers have received formal training on the basics of their core business processes, and have reported satisfaction with an emerging coaching system. 2. By month 25, 75% of NMAC and SSDC administration, logistics and finance personnel pass a test on familiarity with their work requirements and ability to effectively and efficiently support operations. 3. By month 36, 75% of NMAC and SSDC donors report satisfaction with NMAC and SSDC in terms of finance, logistics and administration.
NOTE: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning to assisted to monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in the field, and not simply on UNMAO or national authority subject positions.	