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Evaluation of Dutch Support to Danish Demining Group (DDG) in Afghanistan, Somaliland, and Sudan

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Evaluation of Dutch Support to Danish Demining Group (DDG) in Afghanistan, Somaliland and Sudan

Vera Bohle, Mohamed Ayan Handulle, Charles Lor, Ted Paterson, Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Anna Wood | Geneva | April 2011

This evaluation was commissioned by the Danish Demining Group
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This project has been managed by Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation and Policy Research, GICHD, t.paterson@gichd.org

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<td>PM</td>
<td>Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation</td>
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Executive Summary

On 31 August 2007 the Netherlands Government (NG) decided to fund the Danish Demining Group (DDG) mine action activities in Somaliland, Sudan and Afghanistan. The funding agreement runs from January 2008 to December 2011 and NG and DDG had preliminary discussions on the continuation of the project. The NG Decision of 31 August 2007 foresees an external evaluation initiated by the grant recipient.

The purpose of this evaluation is two-fold: (1) to evaluate progress towards objectives, thus contributing to improving the programme through documenting lessons learned and providing recommendations; and (2) to evaluate and inform NG and DDG on project relevance, and give recommendations regarding a continuation of the project.

The specific objectives of the evaluation are to ascertain results (outputs and outcomes) and assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the following projects:

1. Survey, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Mine Risk Education, in Southern Sudan
2. Mechanical Support to Mine Action in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan
3. Support to Ammunition Disposal & Community Liaison/Education Teams in Somaliland

The evaluation of the Sudan project was a desk review, based largely on an evaluation of DDG operations conducted earlier in 2010 by the GICHD on behalf of DDG and Sida. The evaluations in both Afghanistan and Somaliland entailed field missions.

Sudan

DDG is one of a number of mine action operators working in South Sudan to address the explosives contamination left from decades of civil war. The mine action programme has been operating in parts of Sudan since 2002. From the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in early 2005, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) has had the responsibility of planning, coordination and regulation. The Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) have also established mine action authorities in Khartoum and Juba respectively. The latter – the South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) – is scheduled to assume overall responsibility for mine action in the South when the UNMAO mandate ends in July 2011.

The evaluation arrived at the following principal conclusions:

Relevance – DDG’s choices of geographic areas, services to deliver and community-centred delivery strategy are all relevant to the needs in South Sudan, and have been useful complements to the efforts of other mine action organisations.

Efficiency – Overall, DDG has implemented the project well and has achieved a number of its output targets. DDG’s policy of employing mainly Sudanese staff and its use of low-tech EOD methods has ensured that it remains flexible, which appears to be operationally suitable for the environment, as well as being relatively cost-efficient. Two areas where efficiency can be improved are in DDG’s greater support to and use of its network of MRE volunteers, and in

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1 Contract no DMV0103631, including a total of €3.2 million for the three countries.
ensuring that national EOD staff are adequately back-up by technical advisors (TAs) until they are sufficiently confident in their tasks – this will reduce downtime due to failed quality assessment (QA) reports.

**Effectiveness** – DDG has been effective in reducing risks to returnees, other community members, and staff from humanitarian and development organisations working in those same communities. DDG has also been effective in enhancing supervisory and technical skills of South Sudanese working for it, SSDC and SIMAS, and recently has initiated more ambitious organisational development efforts with OLAVS – a local NGO. It still needs to address many gender challenges, explore how to integrate disability and the needs of at-risk groups (e.g. those with HIV/AIDS and other debilitating illnesses).

**Sustainability** – South Sudan at this juncture raises enormous challenges for mid- to long-term planning. UNMAO and SSDC have not yet formulated a clear vision for the mine action sector after July-2011, which would provide DDG with at least a strategic framework to build upon. In the absence of this, DDG has weighed the likely scenarios and made realistic and appropriate plans for the future. These include starting up operations in a new state, building links with other recovery/development agencies and diversifying its portfolio of services to include Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), an element of which is capacity development support for national institutions.

**Coverage** – The team found no exclusion based on ethnicity and no serious exclusions based on gender. However, disabled community members are not currently considered in DDG programming.

**Coordination** – DDG coordinates well with other mine action organisations in South Sudan, and its relationships with donors, national authorities and UN agencies appear well established and constructive. It acknowledges that it can do more to communicate and build links with civil society organisations (CSO) and non-mine action NGOs.

**Somaliland**

Following preparatory research, GICHD conducted an evaluation mission to DDG’s Ammunition Disposal Project in Somaliland in January 2011. The project achieved the destruction of more than 10,000 UXO between 2008 and 2010. This impressive achievement was largely due to a regional advocacy workshop; in fact 70% of UXO were destroyed in the month of January 2009 alone.

The project has yet to demonstrate that it can lead to a reduction in the number of new victims nation-wide, in part perhaps because these fell sharply prior to the project start-up. But the project clearly has contributed to a process by which local population could, in confidence, divest ammunition in a politically sensitive context featuring increased enforcement and scrutiny of explosive weapons stocks.

The evaluation arrived at the following principal conclusions:

**Relevance** – The DDG project in Somaliland aimed to tackle the Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) threat, which leads to more victims per year than landmines, in a context of new national policies that ‘securitize’ the issue of explosive weapons.
Efficiency – The DDG operations team demonstrated professionalism and technical know-how. The regional advocacy workshop followed by village sensitization was particularly efficacious and innovative for an issue that required buy-in by community leadership. Increased cost-efficiency while conducting ammunition removal and destruction should be achieved so that the team is able to cover a larger area. However, the evaluation team found the use of program staff and resources to conduct non-technical social surveys inappropriate, particularly when the operations team was efficient in conducting its core activities. In spite of progress, project design and management tools remain deficient in some aspects, reducing the potential pay-off from significant investments made in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities.

Effectiveness – The Ammunition Disposal project was successful in removing ERW and raising awareness of the threat of ERW. These successes have not translated into a reduced number of victims – which had already halved before the start of the project – either for lack of quality data or coverage. There is no evidence of the value-added for ammunition disposal from integrating this with the community safety approach.

Sustainability – The project fills a niche by providing an impartial and neutral ammunition disposal service to communities. Once the problem of ERW is viewed as a residual issue, the police EOD team should be in a position to provide an adequate level of threat response, contributing perhaps to the police being viewed by the communities as contributing to public security rather than the opposite.

Coverage – The advocacy workshops have given a wide reach to the project in Somaliland. However, there are two gaps in coverage: (1) pastoralists, who by DDG's own admission may own more arms than settled populations, and represent half of Somaliland’s population, but are included on an ad hoc basis at the initiative of communities themselves; (2) currently insecure areas on the Puntland-Somaliland border.

Coordination – DDG was noted by villagers for its willingness and ability to link them with other development actors. As well, DDG has been an active participant in the Armed Violence Reduction community of practice in Somaliland. DDG does work effectively with its parent organisation, Danish Refugee Council, but could however liaise more effectively with other development NGOs present in the same areas. In addition, DDG should disseminate a periodic report on key achievements to district authorities so they can follow the progress made on agreed plans and the fulfilment of local needs.

Afghanistan

DDG started its operations in Afghanistan in 1999 with two clearance teams in Kandahar. Since then, DDG has increased substantially and, at various times, has operated in all areas in Afghanistan. Currently, DDG works in the Central Region, which includes Kabul, Bagram, Kapisa and, in future, Panjsher provinces, and in the Northern Region, including Samangan and Balkh.

This evaluation looks at the project “Mechanical Support to Mine Action in Afghanistan”. DDG’s overall objective in Afghanistan is to support the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) in meeting the objectives set by the MACCA strategic plan. There was a clear need for an increase in mechanical assets to meet the goals of MAPA the programme. The deployment of the Mini Mine Wolf has been in line with these requirements. The selection
of the Mini Mine Wolf, rather than other machines, also followed an understandable logic. However, flail or tiller systems are not ideal in many conditions, and parts supply became more difficult when Mine Wolf closed its office in Kabul and other implementing partners stopped using the machine. At this point, a thorough analysis should be conducted regarding further deployment options for the Mini Mine Wolf, together with handover to a national organization. This analysis should consider carefully whether costs outweigh benefits from the machine, and at what point a write-off should be considered.

The evaluation team’s principal conclusions are:

**Relevance** – DDG’s choice of geographic areas and services to deliver corresponds to the needs in Afghanistan and has usefully complemented the efforts of other mine action organisations. Looking at the benefits for civilians, nearly all cleared areas visited by the evaluation team were in use by the local population for settlement, agriculture or construction. One area was used to walk through and for children to hunt birds, but there was no construction or other intensive use because the land belongs to the Ministry of Defence.

The DDG project contributes to increasing safety and security of communities in the Central Region of Afghanistan and it has a positive impact on overall peace and stability. In particular, it addresses the need of refugees for safe return.

**Efficiency** – The deployment of the Mini Mine Wolf has been well managed and monitored overall. The operational environment in Afghanistan is difficult, and DDG faced a number of implementation problems, which have been largely addressed. DDG contributed somewhat to capacity development by training Afghan operators for the Mine Wolf.

The annual action plans have been followed to a certain degree, but had to be adjusted in terms of clearance outputs and handover plans. The task planning has been well managed for the project period, but at this stage it is unclear how many areas suitable for the deployment of the Mine Wolf remain in Afghanistan.

**Effectiveness** – The strategies and approaches DDG adopted have been effective, timely and adequately in line with the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries, in the national context and for the objectives set in the programme. The clearance methods meet the needs of the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries interviewed expressed great satisfaction with DDG’s work. The DDG strategy could, however, contain stronger elements of co-operation with the relevant Afghan ministries.

DDG has only partially achieved the output objectives laid out in the proposal. In terms of clearance, the targets of the proposal had been set too high and needed adjustment. However, even after the adjustment, the envisaged targets were not fully reached. The principal reason for this appears to be the time consuming manual demining process following the Mine Wolf, which DDG seeks to modify in collaboration with MACCA. The objectives relating to handover were modified – no handover of the Mine Wolf to a national organization now envisaged.

Cross-cutting issues such as gender or environment have received some attention from DDG, but further efforts would be beneficial.
Coverage – All communities in the area benefited from the clearance. This includes different ethnic groups (e.g. Pashto and Tajik) and, during summer, the Kuchi nomads. Different population groups such as returnees, community residents, visitors, travellers, NGO workers and the coalition forces have benefited from the project. The documentation of gender and age disaggregated data could be improved to monitor coverage on those dimensions.

Coordination – DDG coordinates effectively with the MACCA, other mine action actors and the communities, and provides regular reports to NG. However, liaison with development actors and Afghan ministries could be more systematic.

Sustainability – The clearance outputs and the benefits from using safe ground are sustainable results. The institutional and financial sustainability of the project is not clear at this stage.

Recommendations

The report covers three different countries and programmes, therefore the recommendations are mostly country-specific. However, some thematic recommendations for DDG are recurrent and are relevant for more than one country programme.

Capacity Development – In all three countries, the need to develop national capacity requires attention from DDG in order to ensure sustainability of mine action programmes and strategies. In Sudan, capacity development needs relate to DDG’s national EOD teams. In Somaliland, DDG should map and systematise its approach to capacity development to enhance accountability for its results. In Afghanistan, an enhanced focus on capacity development is needed in relation to the preparation and implementation of DDG’s exit strategy.

Coordination – In Somaliland and Afghanistan, DDG should strengthen the extent to which it liaises with other development NGOs and with government bodies responsible for mine action.

Impact – DDG should strengthen its efforts to conduct thorough analyses and assessments of the impact of its projects, both in terms of the positive and unintended negative consequences for affected communities and the environment (for example soil conditions after mechanical demining in Afghanistan). Benefits to the beneficiaries should be described more explicitly and in a differentiated way (for example who owns/uses the land). DDG should develop indicators for beneficiary satisfaction and a mechanism to deal with possible complaints. DDG should consequently improve on general monitoring issues, including its monitoring capacities, which would enhance its capacity to evaluate results, leading to better impact assessments.

Gender – DDG should ensure a more gender-sensitive approach to its mine action operations, for example by including gender in impact monitoring activities, ensuring sex and age disaggregated data collection, and ensuring gender-sensitive staff recruitment policies and general project management.

Joint Evaluation – DDG should request donors well in advance to consider joint evaluations when providing support to the same country or group of countries and the possibility of defining a specific period in the year for any donor monitoring or evaluation missions to avoid absorbing too much management time for such missions.
Funding – The Netherlands Government should consider continued funding to DDG, assuming it adequately addresses the recommendations listed in this report.

For complete country specific recommendations, please refer to section 6. Recommendations.
1. Introduction

Rationale, Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

On 31 August 2007 the Netherlands Government (GN) decided to fund the Danish Demining Group (DDG) mine action activities in Somaliland, Sudan and Afghanistan. The funding agreement runs from January 2008 to December 2011 and NG and DDG had preliminary discussions on the continuation of the project. The NG Decision of 31 August 2007 foresaw an external evaluation initiated by the grant recipient.

The purpose of this evaluation is two-fold: 1) to evaluate progress towards objectives, thus contributing to improving the programme through documenting lessons learned and providing recommendations; and 2) to evaluate and inform NG and DDG on project relevance, and give recommendations regarding a continuation of the project.

The specific objectives of the evaluation are to ascertain results (outputs and outcomes) and assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the following projects:

1. Survey, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and Mine Risk Education, in Southern Sudan
2. Mechanical Support to Mine Action in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan

This evaluation was carried out to enhance accountability of the projects to the NG. The evaluation is also intended to set the benchmark for a new discussion between the Netherlands Government and DDG for a potential continuation of the partnership beyond 2011.

Evaluation Mandate

i. Scope

The evaluation (i) documents achievements, experiences and lessons regarding what has affected project implementation, and (ii) provides recommendations regarding future project strategies and approaches. The primary audiences are the NG’s programme officers and strategic managers, the NG’s Human Security Policy Department, DDG managers responsible for this project, and the Policy Unit within the Danish Refugee Council.

Through the provision of risk education plus Explosive Weapons of War (ERW) survey and clearance, the projects are designed to:

- In South Sudan, (i) provide a safe environment for the returnees and the communities, and (ii) facilitate the work of humanitarian organisations
- In Afghanistan, (i) clear and hand over land for use by the local population, and (ii) transfer equipment to a national mine action agency
- In Somaliland, (i) safeguard communities from ERW, and (ii) promote community safety and reduce both ERW and weapons-related accidents.

ii. Project logic

The Evaluation Matrix in Annex 2 details the evaluation questions and sub-questions; the nature of each question and the relevant criteria; possible performance indicators; likely sources of data; and the data collection methods employed. Please note that most of the questions and sub-questions

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2 Contract no DMV0103631, including a total of €3.2 million for the three countries.
are descriptive in nature; the exceptions being the questions on effectiveness where the performance targets (mainly output-level) provide a standard for a normative question.

**iii. Criteria & Evaluation Questions**

The report is being based on seven global criteria which have guided the evaluation questions. The report is divided by country, then by criteria. These criteria and the principal questions associated with each are:

1. **Relevance** of the project objectives and the logic behind them given the situation and needs of the beneficiaries:
   
   - Has the choice of focus areas for the project been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries?
   - To what extent has the support been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs of the beneficiaries?
   - Does the DDG programme strengthen and/or complement other national initiatives, or hinder them?
   - What is the added value of DDG / NG’s activities to increasing the security of communities in Sudan, Afghanistan and Somaliland, and how this impacts on the overall level of peace and stability?

2. **Efficiency** with which the project inputs are translated into activities and outputs via appropriate assets and human resources, sound management, monitoring and evaluation, etc.:

   - Have the strategies and approaches adopted been effective, timely and adequate in line with the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?
   - Has the operation been implemented in the best/suitable operational set up in order to be efficient?
   - How has the programme been monitored? Is the programme using lessons learned and adjusting/developing where appropriate?

3. **Effectiveness** of the project in achieving the objectives set out, including choice of strategies and operational approaches:

   - To what extent has the project achieved the objectives set out?
   - Are the chosen methods and DDG strategy for South Sudan, Afghanistan and Somaliland appropriate in the national context as well as for the objectives set in the programme?
   - Has the operation been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the needs of the beneficiaries/stakeholders?
   - Has the programme been successful in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues, such as gender? If not, why?

4. **Other criteria used were:**

   The **sustainability** of the support provided to the project. Is the support provided institutionally and financially sustainable?

   **Coverage** – which beneficiaries and groups have been included or excluded from the project?

   **Coordination** – the project cannot be evaluated in isolation from what others are doing, including donors, liaison partners and CSOs.
Methodology

GICHD has combined a thorough analysis of available quantitative data (from monitoring and surveys), document review, perceptions of project personnel, direct observation, expert opinion (state and local officials, civil society, representatives of relevant UN agencies and other international NGOs), community perceptions from various segments of society, and stories of most significant change from members of the relevant beneficiary groups.

The evidence was assessed against the programme logic and benchmarks, relevant international standards and alternative explanations.

The following activities have been implemented for the field missions in Afghanistan and Somaliland:
- Meetings with the DDG project management team
- Site visits to observe the implementation teams and to meet with team leaders
- Community visits to observe the MRE and Community Liaison (CL) teams, meet with team leaders, and meet with community leaders and members to discuss their perceptions of the impact of explosives contamination and the benefits stemming from DDG outputs (MRE sessions; CL visits; EOD survey & clearance)
- Review of operational planning, budgets and monitoring documents
- Meetings with representatives from:
  - Other mine action and community safety organisations
  - Government agencies involved with community development and community security etc.
  - UN agencies and international NGOs involved with community development, and community security.

The evaluation of the DDG Sudan project was a desk review that drew upon an evaluation conducted earlier in 2010 by the GICHD of DDG’s Sudan project.

Table 1 – Roles and responsibilities of team members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Status</th>
<th>Role/Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ted Paterson</td>
<td>Head, Strategic Management, GICHD</td>
<td>Task manager, responsible for internal quality assurance and assistance with analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Lor</td>
<td>Expert, Socio-Economic Recovery, GICHD</td>
<td>Lead evaluator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Bohle</td>
<td>Senior Expert, Evaluation &amp; Disarmament, GICHD</td>
<td>Lead evaluator</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Hamid Wardak</td>
<td>Department for Mine Clearance (DMC), Afghanistan</td>
<td>Local consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Wood</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Lead evaluator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan desk review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ayan Handulle</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Local consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Problems encountered/limitations

Sudan

As is common in the immediate period following extended conflicts, we expected little accurate baseline data. Data limitations are a constraint to a full understanding and make it difficult to arrive at rigorous assessments concerning efficiency and effectiveness.
DDG are implementing one project supported by funds from three donors, including the NG. This evaluation assessed the entire project, but where possible special attention was made to identify those assets and activities financed by the NG.

Although there are obvious limitations of a desk based evaluation including access to documents and no on-the-ground interaction with project staff, this was overcome to a great extent by the extra efforts of the DDG personnel to provide the necessary information in good time, and the fact that the evaluator had been part of the Sida evaluation team in February 2010 and was already familiar with DDG operations in South Sudan.

**Somaliland**

The principal challenges faced by the evaluators were the inconsistency and lack of clarity in key project documents concerning actions proposed under the grant. The logical framework (LogFrame) and the planned activities have changed in format, substance and terminology over time and between types of documents (proposal/activity plans/interim reports/study reports). Documents sometimes refer to the DDG Somaliland programme as a whole, sometimes to the Ammunition Disposal project only. As a result, the evaluation is based on a results framework (or project logic) designed by the evaluator based on his interpretation of the documents and the contribution of the NG grant.

The main limitation faced by the evaluation was the absence of a clear set of period and cumulative targets in the initial proposal and subsequent planning documents that could be used to establish benchmarks against which to judge project performance and efficiency in delivery. A partial set of targets only appears in the action plan for 2011.

The period agreed for the field visit corresponded to the activity planning period for the community liaison and risk education teams. The EOD team was also involved in the clearance of a site that was expected to last for up to one month. Therefore, the evaluation team was unable to directly observe a variety of clearance and disposal activities, or any MRE activity.

**Afghanistan**

A one-week field mission is inadequate for a complete assessment unless the project has been designed from the start with baseline data and a control group of comparable communities. Nonetheless, the evaluation team received good cooperation from DDG and the communities, and benefited from a post-clearance audit conducted by the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), as well as a livelihoods study in ERW-affected communities by the GICHD. With this, the evaluation team obtained a good deal of information in the time available. Therefore, we can provide evidence-based conclusions on performance and suggest next steps for the DDG programme.

The evaluation team would have appreciated meeting women from the beneficiary communities, but this was not possible due to the lack of a female translator. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to speak with the large number of development actors in Bagram. However, the evaluation team met with a representative from the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), who coordinates humanitarian assistance in Bagram.

The DDG programme manager returned to Afghanistan on Tuesday 22 February, which meant he could not accompany the work of the evaluation team. He was, however, available for an interview, while an international technical advisor with DDG was available to accompany and support the evaluation team.

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3 Throughout 2009, other donors (Sida and DFAIT Canada) have supported the project with a mixture of operational, personnel and support costs.
The mechanical technical advisor with the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA\textsuperscript{4}) was unavailable for interviews in person or via e-mail during the entire period of the evaluation. He ensured, however, that Hamid Wardak from DMC had access to his computer. In this way, the evaluation team received all test results from the initial accreditation process of the Mini Mine Wolf.

\textsuperscript{4} MACCA is a UN Mine Action Service project and serves as the \textit{de facto} mine action centre (MAC) for the country.
2. Sudan

Context

South Sudan poses many challenges for mine action operators: vast distances, poor infrastructure, and continued insecurity. In addition, at the time of the evaluation, there remains a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the referendum on independence for South Sudan.\(^5\)

DDG is one of a number of mine action operators working in South Sudan to address the explosives contamination left from decades of civil war. The mine action programme has been operating in parts of Sudan since 2002 and, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in early 2005, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) has had the responsibility of planning, coordination and regulation. The Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) have also established national mine action authorities in Khartoum and Juba respectively. The latter – the South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC) – is scheduled to assume overall responsibility for mine action in the South when the UNMAO mandate theoretically ends in July 2011.

Under the leadership of UNMAO, the mine action sector formulated a Multi-Year Plan in 2008. This provides a good outline of the plans until mid-2011, but little clarity on the GoSS vision for mine action in South Sudan once it assumes responsibility for the sector after that date. These many uncertainties greatly complicate the task of future planning for DDG.

DDG started operations in South Sudan in 2006, initially focusing on providing assistance for the safe return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs to Equatoria. This focus has since shifted to support communities in which returnees have already resettled. DDG has a successful community-centred approach, with priorities defined in a participatory manner - in contrast to the normal UNMAO ‘command and control’ manner.

In December 2010, DDG finalised its strategic plan document for 2010-2012.

Findings and Conclusions

i. Needs Assessment and Project Design

At present, UNMAO assigns DDG tasks that are considered priorities based on the data in the LIS and database. DDG has developed a niche in its capacity for cluster munitions clearance and UNMAO has embraced this to the extent that it now assigns such tasks to DDG whenever possible.\(^7\) Outside this basic prioritisation, DDG also responds to direct requests from communities for clearance of spot tasks (and then reports these to UNMAO and SSDA/C).

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that two million people have returned to Southern Sudan since the signing of the CPA in 2005, and a similar number are expected to return from the north in the coming years. As returnees settle and land is opened up, new areas of contamination and nuisance UXO are being, and will continue to be, discovered. Given the nature of the threat posed by mines and UXO in Southern Sudan, any intervention targeting these threats can be seen as relevant to the needs (ensuring a safe environment) of beneficiaries.

\(^5\) A more detailed analysis of the context is contained in Annex 6.

\(^6\) Over 99% of South Sudanese eventually voted in favour of independence, but security remains a concern in the run-up to independence.

\(^7\) UNMAO uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).
### ii. Key Achievements of DDG’s Projects in Sudan

#### Table 2: DDG’s Achievements by Objective in Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Indicators To date (2008-2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong> – Information regarding ERW contamination is enhanced and associated risks reduced on a community by community basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Objective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide beneficiaries and key stakeholders with improved information regarding ERW contamination and an immediate reduction of the threat posed by ERW in order to provide a safe environment for communities.</td>
<td>Improved flow of community and site specific ERW data to the national IMSMA data base&lt;br&gt;<strong>Achieved.</strong> Information has been collected on a weekly basis from each site and forwarded to UNMAO for the IMSMA database&lt;br&gt;<strong>Raised levels of knowledge regarding ERW affected sites and the attendant risks within local authorities and affected communities</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Achieved.</strong> 41,713 people benefited from awareness sessions. 1,180 MRE volunteers trained&lt;br&gt;<strong>Prevention of ERW related accidents and casualties</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Awareness has been raised, but demonstrated outcome in terms of preventing casualties is not possible to determine with any accuracy.</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Improved ERW avoidance behaviour</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Achieved.</strong> Impact monitoring shows dangers are widely known. 81% said they were now aware of ERW in their communities&lt;br&gt;<strong>Activities of beneficiaries &amp; other key stakeholders are less constrained by ERW related matters</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Achieved.</strong> Key informants confirm freer movement of people etc, but are still wary of undiscovered and unreported ERW.&lt;br&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Output 1. General Mine Action assessments are conducted to identify community mine action needs and priorities | Ten general mine action assessments are completed per month. In rain affected months this will reduce depending on the location<br>**Partially achieved.** GMAAs were conducted in all locations, as needed, but fewer than 10 per month due to tasks at certain sites being larger – and taking longer than expected.⁸ |

#### Output 2. ERW threats as prioritised by the community are removed through Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations. | Clearance of ERW on a site-by-site basis of 15 sites per month being dependent on the level of contamination discovered. In rain affected months this will reduce depending on the location<br>**Partially achieved due to taking on large battlefield area clearance tasks, fewer sites were worked upon particularly in 2010.⁹**<br>**ERW contamination is reduced according to community needs and priorities**<br>**Achieved.** 15,315 items of UXO and 265,312 items of small arms ammunition.<br>**Danger Areas (DA) that are unable to be cleared are marked**<br>**Achieved.** These areas (usually mine fields) are reported to UNMAO<br>|

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Indicators To date (2008-2010)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All individuals in the communities visited, regardless of sex, have</td>
<td>All individuals in the communities visited, regardless of sex, have equal access to the benefits of mine clearance (including employment opportunities and training) \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>equal access to the benefits of mine clearance (including</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment opportunities and training)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 3.</strong> Risk taking behaviour is changed and immediate threats are</td>
<td>MRE is delivered to 10 communities per month. In rain affected \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigated by the delivery of Mine Risk Education</td>
<td>months this will reduce depending on the location \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieved. On average 39 villages per month were visited and 22 MRE sessions per month were provided over 2008-2010 \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MRE is delivered through presentation to 3,000 beneficiaries dependent on actual numbers of returnees and size of communities. \</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieved. The total far exceeds this number at over 41,000. \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All individuals at risk in the communities visited have access to culturally appropriate forms of MRE that specifically address those activities that put them at risk. \</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieved. Coverage of villages in the vicinity of contaminated areas was excellent \ (N=1300+) Limited coverage surveys of 200 community members 81% said they were now aware of ERW in their communities \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men and women have equal access to employment opportunities and benefits deriving from MRE initiatives \ 46% of those attending MRE sessions were female and two-thirds of these were girls. \</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Output 4.</strong> Coordination between all stakeholders is maintained and</td>
<td>DDG is represented at monthly SSDC/UNMAO coordination meetings \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enhanced.</td>
<td>Achieved. These meetings were on going through 2008-2009, but were infrequent in 2010. There are expected take place monthly during 2011 and the DDG PM or Operations Manager will attend. \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Working Group (TWG) relating to Survey, Clearance and MRE are attended by DDG technical staff. \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieved. DDG regularly attends scheduled TWG meetings. \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison meetings with local authorities are held in all communities where MRE and Survey/EOD are active \</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Relevance***

By the time DDG began its operations, a number of other mine action INGOs (MAG, NPA and FSD) were already well established in South Sudan, in addition to a number of commercial contractors engaged by UNOPS and UNMAO. DDG’s strategy to use a small, responsive capacity with Community Liaison (CL), Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams gives it a niche and ensures it fits coherently in South Sudan mine Action project.

Ensuring the response to the needs of the beneficiaries is coherent and comprehensive is not entirely in DDG’s hands, as UNMAO and the SSDC are responsible for the coordination of mine action agencies. Within its operational area, DDG addresses the needs of the beneficiaries in a
coherent and comprehensive way by cooperating with local authorities and being responsive to the priorities expressed by the communities.

Returnee figures show approximately one-third of all returnees are unassisted,\(^ {10} \) receiving no support from the UNHCR or IOM and little or no information about the mine/UXO risk in the areas to which they intend to return. DDG’s MRE projects represent a coherent response to these needs and enable communities to manage the risk posed by ERW.

DDG’s ability to carry out spot task clearance and deal with nuisance ERW on recently resettled land in response to beneficiary requests is also relevant.

The role that DDG has played within these communities has provided residents with a degree of additional security. The pilot impact monitoring tools currently being tested by DDG include questions and discussions on beneficiaries’ perceptions of physical safety as well as the economic and developmental situation. The preliminary results from these reveal that MRE and EOD activities have made community members more confident about identifying and avoiding ERW.

Comprehensive coverage could be further increased through more targeted projects aimed at women and children: Information from the IOM\(^ {11} \) highlights that 68% of returnees are female-headed households and 60% are vulnerable groups (children, disabled and elderly).

It will also be interesting to see how specific groups such as nomadic pastoralist, who make up 10% of the population of Eastern Equatoria, are experiencing ERW and conflict and how this compares to the experience of settled communities. In what way can DDG assist them and how can they be used as conduits for information on ERW and MRE?

In addition to DDG’s community role, it also provides useful support to UNMAO\(^ {12} \) and the SSDA/C, including support to capacity development, which complements other initiatives.

There is an increasing demand from the SSDC for international NGOs to support capacity building of national counterpart organisations\(^ {13} \) and DDG has supported this through a recent agreement to work with the Southern Sudanese NGO, Operation Landmine Action and Victim Support (OLAVS), to provide capacity building support for MA, part of which was via MRE training aimed at attaining MRE field accreditation.

DDG is seeking synergies between its ERW projects and its growing experience in Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) which, if achieved, would augment DDG’s contribution towards enhancing security. DDG already has the trust of the communities with which it works and there is an opportunity for it to build on this with AVR.

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12 DDG is UNMAO’s preferred operator for cluster munitions clearance

13 Mine Risk Education Project in Sudan, put forward by the Sudan Mine Action Project. Implementing Partners: Southern Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC), government ministries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO).
iv. Efficiency

Organisation and staffing
In total (as of Dec 2010) DDG employs approximately 80 national staff and 7 internationally appointed staff operating across 4 EOD/BAC teams, 3 MRE teams and 2 Community Liaison teams within MA, and an AVR project.

As well as staff in support roles in DDG’s main office HQ in Juba, the bulk - approximately 76 of DDG staff are field personnel (plus a number of temporary personnel serving as guards, cleaners, etc.) and are split into temporary tented camps depending on areas of work. Currently these camps are located in Kit, Eastern Equatoria and Mundri, Western Equatoria. Both camps are at convenient points within the area of operations, maximising the efficiency of communications and logistic support.

These field teams operate a rotation of three weeks field-work followed by one week national leave throughout the year, except August when there is operational downtime.

The organisational structure of DDG as of October 2010 is shown in Figure 1.

DDG’s policy of employing mainly Sudanese staff and its use of low-tech, non-mechanical EOD methods has ensured that it remains flexible, which appears to be operationally suitable for the environment, as well as being relatively cost-efficient.

Figure 1: DDG Sudan’s Current Staff Structure

To pre-empt any issues that may arise over local staff contracts, DDG has ensured its local employment contract has been fully discussed with the Labour Department and advice has been sought with regards to compliance with Labour Law. DDG hopes this will help reduce the likelihood
of time and funds being needed to deal with legal discussions – as faced by other mine action organisations.

Cross cutting issues
DDG has acknowledged that it does not have a good track record in promoting gender and has a “lack of gender analysis and approach.” Currently, fewer than 10% of DDG’s personnel are female and DDG acknowledges that it struggles to recruit female staff. Besides the relatively low number of suitably qualified female Sudanese nationals, other practical issues concerning the set-up of the field camps place a constraint on the deployment of female staff. This has a knock-on effect in terms of field teams being seen as unapproachable to local women in a society where women are responsible for much of the agricultural labour, fetching water, etc. and are likely to encounter ERW.

In 2010 DDG intended to partner with a local women’s NGO to help strengthen its approach to gender, but this has not yet been done.14

Support to capacity development
National staff are encouraged to obtain technical qualifications and there are now eight staff members qualified to the EOD level 3 level. These have been trained on courses run internally and externally by DDG. A former EOD level 3 operator was promoted to an EOD supervisor and DDG plans to develop and promote another qualified Sudanese to the supervisor level. The capacity of national staff and level of education in general remains considerably lower than that of expatriates, and DDG is to be commended on its approach to developing national staff capacity in EOD – an approach which is still relatively novel in mine action within Sudan and not without its difficulties. In October 2010, for example, a nationally-led EOD team failed an UNMAO EOD quality assurance (QA) assessment, highlighting the need for DDG to remain vigilant and provide refresher training and extra support to national-staff led EOD teams at regular intervals.

The MRE capacity of the project was fully nationalised more than a year ago and is operating under the guidance of a well-qualified member of staff. However, there is still a need for staff to be supported by expert advisors on a regular basis to ensure that standards are being maintained, to provide new ideas and to encourage innovation and constant improvement in the DDG’s MRE work. The recent advisory visit by the DDG CSA was welcomed by the MRE and CL teams for this reason.

In June 2010, DDG Sudan held a three-day general training workshop for 17 junior staff, in addition to a two-day course in January 2011, during which they were introduced to basic management concepts, the Code of Conduct and security awareness. Time was also given to cross-organisational learning on MRE, EOD and AVR to ensure all staff have a broad organisational perspective on DDG and DRC’s work and that they are better able to explain DDG’s activities and objectives to communities.

Following this, 10 EOD staff were prepared for accreditation as Team Leaders. All passed the test and this expanded the capacity of the EOD workforce and boosted confidence of individual team members.

Compared to previous years, DDG has been making particular effort to share the recommendations from monitoring and support visits with senior staff, and to encourage their feedback and involvement in developing and improving the project.

**EOD achievements**

Since the inception of the project in 2008 and up to the end of 2010, DDG’s four EOD teams have destroyed more than 281,175 items of ERW, about 96% of which is small arms ammunition (SAA), as shown in Table 5. Although this represents potential threats removed, the figures do not necessarily demonstrate how significant the threat reduction has been. In 2009 the number of beneficiaries from the clearance activities was 14,585.

DDG invests a great deal of effort on maintaining and improving dialogue with communities and local authorities and this interaction generates a number of extra EOD ‘spot tasks’ in addition to the tasks DDG is assigned by UNMAO.

**Table 3: EOD Clearance Statistics 2008-2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EOD Tasks Completed</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m² Cleared</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66,346</td>
<td>252,197</td>
<td>318,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP Mines Cleared</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT Mines Cleared</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO Cleared</td>
<td>2,847</td>
<td>4,197</td>
<td>8,271</td>
<td>15,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA Cleared</td>
<td>195,151</td>
<td>60,955</td>
<td>9,206</td>
<td>265,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Items Cleared</td>
<td>198,252</td>
<td>65,415</td>
<td>17,508</td>
<td>281,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MRE operations**

DDG has three MRE teams (mixed male and female staff) one of which is fully funded by the NG. All MRE teams provide mine risk information to communities, as well as receiving updated information from the community about UXO threats, which is an important feedback process and highly appreciated by the community.

The MRE activities are generally well implemented – the teams are active in the field and are delivering presentations to the target number of communities.

DDG reports show that over the NG funding period between 2008-2010, DDG has been steadily maintaining the level of MRE at an average of 39 session per month and reaching 41,713 people - 46% of these were female and 66% children. Over 41,000 leaflets were handed out, and, 1,180 community volunteers were trained. Table 4 gives a breakdown of the DDG’s MRE activities since 2006 and Table 5 presents activities under the NG grant and between 2008 and 2010.

Field data are collected from MRE staff and entered into a database every month. This activity has been greatly improved since early 2010 due to the recruitment of a fulltime Impact Monitoring Assistant.

DDG applies participatory approaches (a sound strategy for ensuring its services respond to the needs actually expressed by community members) and direct community feedback obtained during the Sida evaluation visit in February 2010 was certainly positive, with some concrete examples of how DDG addressed community priorities. In response to request from the communities and to ensure that DDG makes time for spot task clearance, DDG put in place in 2009 a policy of setting aside at least one day a week for EOD spot task clearance. DDG is therefore able to clear spot tasks as they arise and while it has a base and EOD staff in the area.
Table 4: MRE Statistics 2008-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRE statistics</th>
<th>2008 (% of total trained in the year)</th>
<th>2009 (% of total trained in the year)</th>
<th>2010 (% of total trained in the year)</th>
<th>Total 2008 - 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MRE presentations (villages covered)</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages visited (for CL and MRE)</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>1,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys receiving MRE &lt;18 yrs</td>
<td>7,164 (37%)</td>
<td>5,414 (36%)</td>
<td>2,891 (39%)</td>
<td>15,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls receiving MRE &lt;18 yrs</td>
<td>5,688 (29%)</td>
<td>4,393 (30%)</td>
<td>2,474 (33%)</td>
<td>12,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men receiving MRE &gt;18 yrs</td>
<td>3,303 (17%)</td>
<td>2,556 (17%)</td>
<td>1,080 (14%)</td>
<td>6,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women receiving MRE &gt;18 yrs</td>
<td>3,247 (17%)</td>
<td>2,480 (17%)</td>
<td>1,023 (14%)</td>
<td>6,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MRE beneficiaries</td>
<td>19,402</td>
<td>14,843</td>
<td>7,468</td>
<td>41,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained community volunteers</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>No figures</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE materials distributed</td>
<td>19,483</td>
<td>15,125</td>
<td>2,645</td>
<td>37,253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broadly, efficiency can be assessed in terms of the achievement of output targets, which DDG has done.

Table 5: Summary of DDG’s MRE Activities. Monthly Average 2008-2010

| Monthly average for last 3 years 2008 – 2010 (only for years where records available) |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| MRE presentations                | 22                              |
| Villages visited for (CL and MRE)| 39                              |
| Boys receiving MRE <18 yrs       | 430                             |
| Girls receiving MRE <18 yrs      | 349                             |
| Men receiving MRE >18 yrs        | 193                             |
| Women receiving MRE >18 yrs      | 188                             |
| Total MRE beneficiaries          | 1,159                           |
| Trained community volunteers     | 49                              |
| MRE materials distributed to volunteers | 1,035                     |

The DDG HQ in Juba is located in a modest house in a small compound. As well as serving as a base for administration, logistics and liaison with other agencies, this also includes the international staff accommodation, providing a relatively secure and cost efficient combination. As from March 2010 the Danish Refugee Council, which had previously been based in Yei (Central Equatoria), relocated its Country Director post to Juba and now shares office space with DDG. This is the first step in what is expected to be a growing collaboration between the two branches of DRC in Southern Sudan, which will probably involve more cost-sharing of core services and, where possible, joint programming. A joint DDG/DRC Head of Finance and Administration has just been recruited to join the Juba team.

**Monitoring**

DDG generally maintains a high level of monitoring, quality assurance and safety in all operations and upgrades technical expertise continuously.
Within DDG Sudan, the Operations Manager reports monthly to the Project Manager with statistics and a narrative report on EOD and MRE operations, and weekly procurement tracking reports are produced. The PM reports quarterly to DDG HQ and monitoring missions by DDG Desk officers take place twice a year. These visits review all aspects of DDG daily operations, including a basic internal financial audit, and seek to identify areas for improvement. The missions have been thorough and well documented. A full financial review by DDG Denmark is scheduled for Spring 2011. DDG Sudan is also supported by monitoring visit from Senior Technical and Operations Advisors from DDG HQ.

Monitoring of operations is based on the project documents for the respective operations, while monitoring of field activities for each EOD and MRE team is carried out through the daily collection of field data. Recording and reporting mechanisms for this are very sound. They are still overseen by expatriate staff in the field (although this is increasingly taken on by national staff) and records are well organised in Juba.

Field data are collected by hand and entered into a computer database. For MRE sessions, data are collected on achievements of the team as well as on other variables such as attendee age and sex. For EOD teams, statistics include number of hours EOD teams operate and daily EOD rates. The continued processing of routine mine action data into a database enables managers to track operational efficiency over time as well as an overview of their project achievements. It also serves to review compliance of the operation to the international and national standards for Mine Action and UNMAO and SSDC reporting requirements (the latter somewhat limited) are fulfilled beyond minimum requirements.

DDG recruited an Impact Monitoring Assistant in early 2010 to support the collecting, storing, processing and monitoring of data for both MRE and EOD. He is also tasked with assisting field impact monitoring activities and continues developing monitoring methodologies. This will provide faster and more useful feedback for project decision-making.

The monitoring team reviews achievement of outputs and activities and if necessary, adjusts the log frames for the operations.

At a higher level, DDG is monitored regularly by UNMAO on the quality of its EOD operations. In June and October 2010 DDG failed (a ‘low-fail’ – there is also a more serious fail that can be issued) its UNMAO EOD Quality Assurance assessment\(^ {15} \) due to several non-conformities. The QA failure in both cases resulted in temporary suspension of activities for the specific EOD teams involved and the teams being put on ‘special monitoring’ status. This allows DDG a short period of time to address the recommendations and/or retrain EOD team members and submit to another inspection before they are able restart activities.

Factors contributing to the QA failures include, in part, the absence of the team TAs who were working on another task in a different part of the country. DDG places great emphasis on supporting its national EOD staff with the objective that they will be able to work without international TA supervision. The failure of the QAs was a test for the national staff and has emphasised to DDG that more time will be needed to build sufficient local capacity. DDG also replaced two TA staff in the second half of 2010, and new personnel are in place for January 2011. This will revitalise the project and help DDG get back on form and to implement its plan for 2011. To mitigate further disruptions due to senior team absences, DDG is also hoping to use its new donor funds to recruit a fourth senior MA team member to provide extra cover.

\(^ {15} \) Mundri, Friday 8\(^ {th} \) October 2010
The number of QA passes and failures DDG receives compared to other MA organisations, as shown in Table 6.

Table 6: UNMAO Organization Quality Assurance Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>High-Good</th>
<th>Medium-Satisfactory</th>
<th>Low - Fail</th>
<th>Fail -</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>% passes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2009 (all existing records)16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>(no figure)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200917</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 (DDG quotes 2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DDG is also monitored internally by DDG advisors and by external consultants. In November 2010 the DDG CSA visited the project to monitor the operations, provide training and highlight areas for improvement. Recommendation made by the CSA will be reviewed and addressed by DDG through 2011. In October and November 2010 a major logistics consultancy took place – providing recommendations for improving DDG’s transport, procurement, stores management and ICT systems and highlighted the need for vigilance and constant monitoring. These recommendations from this are also being considered by DDG.

**Logistics**

DDG deploys its EOD/MRE/AVR teams to the field in monthly cycles of three weeks field work and one week off duty. This means that any complex maintenance and repair tasks need to be dealt with during the 9-day period that the teams are in Juba – a rapid turnover requiring efficient logistical support. In late 2010 a logistics consultant reviewed DDG’s systems and highlighted many areas for improvement. Some of these recommendations have already been addressed while others that require financial investment and time to sort out will be taken up by DDG’s new (January 2011) Logistics Manager.

**v. Effectiveness**

**EOD achievements**

Since the inception of the project in 2006 to the end of 2010, DDG reduced the threat of ERW by destroying more than 281,175 items of ERW, about 96% of which was small arms ammunition.

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16 Consolidated by UNMAO and provided in the monthly reports
(SAA), and marked danger areas that are unable to be cleared immediately. In 2009, DDG’s EOD activities ensured that 14,585 community members now live in a safer environment, and the MRE activities have ensured that community members have a greater awareness of the threat ERW and the measures they need to take to protect themselves. The overall statistics for accidents show year-on-year decrease which suggests ERW related accidents and casualties are being prevented.

Specific DDG activities to reduce ERW include the clearance of UXO stockpiles from the secondary school in Magwi in 2009 which allowed the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) to renovate and expand this property. The school now serves 400 pupils (observed during the Sida evaluation visit February 2010).

The DDG strategy of community-centred operations that allow participation by community members is appropriate in the South Sudan context, and is inherently adaptable as needs evolve. DDG achieves this through its CL component that (prior to the deployment of the Survey/EOD teams) canvasses opinions within target communities, and ensures that they are fully conversant with DDG’s remit and aims and that all local concerns are factored into field planning. This has proved to be highly successful and has helped DDG build strong relationships with communities and local authorities – a relationship that ensures full disclosure of information in relation to ERW-affected areas. Many of DDG’s UXO ‘spot tasks’ are generated through local interaction. The strategy of using relatively small CL, MRE, and Survey/EOD teams also means DDG has the flexibility to adjust to evolving priorities and the needs of the communities - a successful process that supports EOD and facilitates the main project aim.

Requests for spot task clearance are common and DDG is valued for its ability to respond in a timely manner – communities would like a demining agency “on call” to deal with ERW as it is found and beneficiary communities seem to have particularly high expectations regarding support from mine action organisations.

The results from the pilot impact monitoring survey suggest that although the MRE message is being received and understood by 86% of community members, they are not able to attribute this solely to DDG’s MRE activities – other sources of MRE include the government and other NGOs.

**vi. Institutional and Financial Sustainability**

While DDG is making a strong effort to build the management capacity of its national staff and to assist highly motivated individuals to assume management responsibilities, the low levels of education that prevail in South Sudan and the slow influx of qualified returnees means that strengthening national management potential will take time. There is also competition from other agencies that have the ability to offer higher salaries to qualified national staff. DDG does, however, have a strong and loyal national staff base and there remains opportunity for further investment and capacity building.

During 2010 a number of staff from SIMAS, a local mine action NGO, were seconded to DDG to gain training and experience. DDG also organised (in partnership with Norwegian People’s Aid) the first EOD Level 3 course to be held in Sudan, which was conducted early in 2010.

In late 2010 DDG also entered into a capacity building agreement with the local Mine Action NGO, OLAVS. OLAVS provided one EOD team and one MRE team for work in the field and plans are underway to get them operationally accredited in the near future.
vii. Coverage
When DDG began using NG funds in 2008, the focus was very much on returning refugees and DDG based its operations along key corridors and in communities with high numbers of returnees. Over time, refugee returns have diminished and the operational focus has shifted toward IDP movements and communities with high numbers of returned refugees and IDPs. As many people come back unaided, accurate returnee figures are difficult to establish.

Geographically, DDG has worked in Eastern, Central and Western Equatoria, with Central and Eastern Equatoria being the most heavily ERW impacted states in Southern Sudan and those with a high number of returnees. In Eastern Equatoria, Magwi was designated a high priority county, in large part because high numbers of returnees were expected. During 2009 and 2010 inter-tribal conflict sparked massive displacement in Jonglei (145,000) and Eastern Equatoria (14,000) in particular, forcing returnees and settled communities to migrate to areas unknown to them, which potentially were contaminated with ERW and landmines.

There is no apparent exclusion on basis of ethnicity. In Magwi, DDG operates in both the Acholi and Madi corridors. In Kit, where at least two ethnic groups reside, DDG operates in both areas. DDG also recruits MRE volunteers from both communities. Also, there does not appear to be any exclusion in terms of sex: the evaluation team met both male and female MRE volunteers. DDG has female staff on its MRE teams but these are still a minority, and as yet there are no female EOD team members. The ratio of male and female MRE participants is well balanced.

As from the end of 2010, and due to the decrease in available tasks, DDG is likely to discontinue working in Western Equatoria in favour of relocating some EOD, MRE/CL teams to Northern Bahr El Ghazal where the recent DDG/DRC Danida-funded AVR project is based. This move will not only show that DDG is taking a more holistic approach to its programming, but also that it is taking a strategically important step by placing itself in a state that is currently receiving a large number of returnees from northern Sudan – a trend likely to continue through 2011.

Groups such as the disabled are not currently included as fully as they could be. For instance, there is no place on questionnaires and survey forms to record the disability status of respondents and community members (noted by the PM on a visit to Mundri in September 2010). The Sida evaluation in February 2010 also noted, in a meeting at Kagwada, a blind participant complained that DDG did not include him and other disabled members of the community.

The impact monitoring data indicates that DDG actively involved beneficiaries across a range of ages and backgrounds. Data collected on approximate community size in its areas of operation are also helping to estimate the coverage of MRE training in terms of percentage of community members represented.

viii. Coordination
DDG’s project document has three indicators relating to coordination mechanisms:

- DDG is represented at monthly SSDC/UNMAO coordination meetings
- Technical Working Groups relating to Survey, Clearance and MRE are attended by DDG technical staff
- Liaison meetings with local authorities are held in all communities where MRE and Sv/EOD are active

The achievement of these targets is out of DDG control to some degree. Within the context of a country with formal structures that do not work effectively, together with logistical difficulties, DDG
has been effective in maintaining and promoting coordination and has excellent working relations with the two national-level bodies responsible for mine action activities in Southern Sudan: the SSDC and UNMAO. Through 2010, DDG paid particular attention to the requests of SSDC and the GoSS in terms of project implementation, arranging regular liaison meetings and inviting SSDC staff to both monitor and attend training courses. This has helped foster an open and positive relationship with SSDC, which views DDG as an effective and proactive partner.

The National Mine Action Strategic Framework for Sudan commits the Sudan Mine Action Project to: Provide Mine Risk Education (MRE) to communities at risk on priority basis. UNICEF is the UN focal point for MRE and heads the MRE Working Group (MREWG), which brings together practitioners to coordinate activities. The MREWG meets approximately every two months and is attended by the DDG Community Liaison Manager.

No coordinating meetings were held by SSDC/UNMAO in 2009, but meetings have been held throughout 2010 and will continue from March 2011 and on. The previously monthly Operations Management meeting has now become a Protection ‘sub-Cluster’ meeting and will be attended by the PM and the DDG Operations Manager.

DDG coordinates at the operational level with other mine action agencies working in neighbouring areas on associated tasks and, at the local level, DDG uses its CL teams to maintain good relations with the local ‘payam’ authorities and the local community leaders (chiefs, elders etc). Currently, the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) assumes the role of the registrar of local organizations at the state level, and aspires to coordinate and facilitate the activities of community-based organisations (CBO). SSRRC organises regular monthly meetings among UN agencies, INGO and the CBOs. During the February Sida evaluation visit, the SSRRC officer in Magwi stated that he was satisfied with the level of coordination between DDG and the SSRRC office.

Concerning coordination with humanitarian and development actors, in general the NGOs are aware of DDG’s work, although some thought that DDG undertakes minefield clearance as well as UXO clearance. Many NGOs said they would like to have more information on MRE, both for the security of their own field staff and to disseminate along with other educational material in their awareness raising projects (HIV/AIDS, nutrition, etc). The NGOs stated that closer collaboration with mine agencies, including DDG, would help achieve this. Although DDGs approach to other organisations appears to be getting more proactive, there is still scope for specific areas for mutual support and collaboration. This is especially so with agencies present in DDG areas of operation: ADRA, ARC, GTZ and DED in Magwi, for example.

DDG’s growing link with DRC will inevitably raise its profile as a humanitarian and recovery agency in South Sudan. This increasingly strong relationship has recently rewarded DDG and DRC with a Danida grant enabling them to merge activities and start a pilot project on Community Driven Conflict Recovery (CDRC), including conflict early warning and conflict management.¹⁰

²⁰ AVR Highlights Jul-Oct 2010, DDG
3. Somaliland

Context

Mine/ERW contamination in Somaliland stems from the Ogaden War of 1977, the Somali National Movement (SNM) insurgency between 1982 and 1988, the civil war of 1991, continuing tension between Somaliland and Puntland, and (perhaps) conflicts between clans. Mines were laid on important paths, ERW were left on battlefields and stockpiles were abandoned by both army and rebel units. A nation-wide DDG Community Safety Survey in 2008/2009 found that 12% of households had access to ERW. The reason most often cited (41%) is that these ERW were left from the wars. Returnees found ERW and retained it in case of internecine conflict, in case another war breaks out, or simply as valuable items that could fetch a good price someday. But a wave of coordinated bombings by the Al Shabaab militia in Puntland and Somaliland renewed the urgency with which the Government of Somaliland has attempted to wrest control over the ownership and trade in ERW.

From 2005 to 2010 (excluding 2006), there were 112 ERW accidents and 64 mine accidents affecting 275 victims; 197 of the victims were men and 78 women.

UNMAS provides assistance to the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC). UNDP oversees Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) actions, which are closely associated to the goals of the DDG Community Safety Programme in Somaliland, notably in terms of small arms control and community-based policing.

In 2009, the largest donors to mine action in Somalia were, in order of importance, Sweden, the USA, the Netherlands, the UK and UNHCR for a total contribution of more than $2.5 million. From 2005 to 2009, international assistance for mine action represented more than $9.3 million. The SMAC currently coordinates the work of DDG, HALO Trust and Handicap International. There is also an incipient EOD capacity within the police.

Findings and Conclusions

i. Needs Assessment and Project Design

The overall objective of the Ammunition Disposal project in Somaliland is to improve safety and security. To achieve this objective, DDG uses a two-pronged approach of clearance of ERW and delivery of community education messages. The originality of DDG’s approach was the recognition that, in addition to conducting BAC, the EOD team would have to convince the population to hand over privately-owned or communally-controlled stockpiles of ammunition.

The initial proposal to the NG referred to Puntland rather than Somaliland, even though the title of the narrative indicated the latter. Due to staff turnover in the country programme, the evaluator was unable to obtain an explanation for this discrepancy. In addition, instead of € 500,000/year requested, DDG was awarded € 300,000 per year for four years. The impact of the reduced budget on the planned activities could not be assessed as DDG did not provide targets for its activities and planned results in the initial submission. As a consequence, this evaluation does not make reference to the project proposal and uses subsequent Logical Frameworks, budgets and yearly activity plans as benchmarks indicative of the needs assessment and intended project design.

ERW comprises Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Ordnance (AXO).
DDG has sought to integrate its Ammunition Disposal project with its Community Safety Enhancement Programme (CSEP). At the same time, the EOD team has continued to carry out spot clearance of ammunition and abandoned UXO throughout Somaliland. In keeping with realities on the ground, the evaluator has considered two components for the Ammunition Disposal project: (1) when activities are taking place in the seven pilot CSEP communities; (2) areas outside the CSP.

The programme logic for the two components has been restated in graphical form by the evaluator as a results framework building upon the LogFrames DDG provided. This restatement provides more clarity on the programme logic, corrects some statements attributed to the wrong level in the LFA, and rectifies some omissions in the LFAs. The evaluator encourages DDG to develop a step-by-step approach to programme development, with clear statements of the complete programme logic, a risk analysis, indicator development and target setting before these elements are integrated into a LogFrame.

DDG has not readily provided numerical targets and budget assumptions for its action under the grant and its expected results to the NG. Targets for some aspects of the Community Safety Enhancement Programme (CSEP) seem have been introduced only later in 2010. It is therefore extremely difficult to estimate the projects’ intent and intensity based only on narrative statements. Project targets are central to effective project design. DDG should systematically provide targets in project proposals and activity plans and review these targets once baseline data collection has been completed if it was not done before the grant start. At the same time, the NG should require such targets.

The first stream of work for the Ammunition Disposal project consisted in organizing district-level advocacy workshops with district and local community leaders to sensitize them on the risks involved, followed-by further community sensitization and intensive ERW/Mine risk education at the local level; the setting up of a threat reporting system; battle area clearance and spot task clearance over time through individual handover of ERW. DDG also provides comprehensive MRE, while the responsibility for the systematic clearance of landmines in Somaliland lies with HALO Trust.

The selection of priority target areas for the first stream is based on the identification of areas of known military camps, battlefields, victims and other evidence that indicates a high probability of an ERW problem. Tasking is officially provided by the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC), but the ongoing relationship between DDG and SMAC, together with the limited capacity within SMAC, have meant that priority target areas identified by DDG contribute to the official tasking to a significant extent.

The second stream builds upon the programme logic for the first stream. An additional action is carried out to organize a community safety planning process. Threats to safety and appropriate solutions are identified at the community level, leading to the drafting and adoption of a community safety plan. Also offered are training in conflict management; small arms safety education; the provision of small arms locks; capacity building for planning project proposal writing; and engagement between the community, the police and local authorities. For the purpose of this evaluation, only the ammunition disposal, community liaison, community planning as it relates to ERW/mine threats and ERW/Mine risk education are evaluated.

Part of the funding of the Ammunition Disposal project financed the community liaison/education team that supported the CSEP in pilot sites during the first two years of the grant period. From 2010, NG funding has gone exclusively towards financing the EOD team. Although DDG documents in relation to the project often completely subsume the Ammunition Disposal project within the CSEP,

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22 See Annex 7.
the geographical coverage of the CSEP is limited. As a consequence, and despite the fact that DDG's reports on the CSEP overall, the evaluation focuses on EOD operations and the CSEP activities that are linked to, enable by, or are supported by EOD operations in any way. Thus, for example, the securing of small arms by locks is considered outside the scope of this evaluation.

The CSEP is a pilot project. Thus, the choice of beneficiary communities was made on the basis of the potential learning opportunities offered by these communities through diversity in locations and conditions. In one of the seven pilot villages, the small extent of the UXO contamination relative to other neighbouring villages did not justify the intervention of the EOD team. Therefore, it is welcomed that DDG retained the ability to assign EOD assets outside the CSEP during the period under review. More generally, DDG documentation on Community Safety programming is not clear on the potential contradiction between the principles of target area selection for participation in CSEP initiatives and priority setting principles for specific individual technical interventions, such as EOD. DDG should retain the ability to give low priority for EOD services to community requests that conflict with the optimal needs-based inter-communal allocation of resources (i.e. when other communities have far greater ERW problems).

In addition, community-based programming is premised largely on the assumption that community members know their priority needs better than outside technical experts. This premise conflicts with the goal of MRE, which is precisely to raise awareness among community members of threats, and to promote appropriate behaviours and responses on the basis of the expert knowledge of the educators. In the first pilot village for the CSEP, ERW were not identified as a risk in the community safety plan, let alone prioritised. It is only later that community members signalled their need to DDG. Simultaneously to underestimating certain risks linked to UXO, it was pointed out by several demining experts that the Somaliland population tends to overestimate the extent of the contamination by landmines. This suggests that DDG needs to carefully review its programme strategy and principles with regard to the rollout of the technical interventions in conjunction with the community-based approach.

Besides the two components of work mentioned above, DDG also schedules in its 2010 activity plan an action aiming to introduce MRE in the Somaliland school curriculum.

**ii. Key Achievements of DDG’s Projects in Somaliland**

The evaluator was provided with conflicting sets of data on achievements; discrepancies were generally within a very small margin. Bearing in mind this limitation, the project achieved in its first three years between 2008 and 2010:

- More than 21,800 people were sensitized on mine/ERW risks
- More than 10,000 UXO destroyed
- 64 mines were destroyed (mines were not a focus of the project)

**iii. Relevance**

The Ammunition Disposal project financed by the NG embodied the new DDG strategy in Somaliland: to focus on ERW while large-scale landmine clearance is left to HALO Trust. This strategy is consistent with the higher number of accidents due to UXO than to mines (Table 7). A nation-wide DDG Community Safety Survey in 2008/2009 found that 12% of households admitted that they had access to ERW. Of all 15 community safety plans examined by the evaluation team, all but three (20%) mentioned ERW as a significant threat.

In the aftermath of the bombings in Hargeisa in 2008, the Government of Somaliland launched a policy to control ERW that could be used in bomb-making and, in an attempt at state building, to assert its role in monopolizing the means of violence. The evaluation team gathered testimony
reflecting that ammunition disposal is seen a security policy priority at the district level as well at the national level. In this context, local populations are fearful they may be suspected of aiding terrorists if they identify ERW to authorities. The Ammunition Disposal project offered the opportunity for the population to dispose of ERW through a neutral, impartial third party.

Table 7: Number of Accidents and Victims by Type, 2005 and 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vict. of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the view of the evaluators, the value added DDG brought in addressing this nation-wide issue is underestimated in current DDG documentation, which focuses on fully integrating ammunition disposal with the CSEP programme. The focus on community-level issues tends to obscure the role of the project in advancing Somaliland’s security objectives. DDG might conduct a thorough political analysis of ammunition disposal and small arms control in relation to national politics and regional security. This analysis should ground the role of DDG in Somaliland according to its mandate, above and beyond the implementation of an innovative programme strategy.

iv. Efficiency

The EOD team is led by a national Operations Manager with two decades of technical experience in Somalia. It comprises a Supervisor, a Deputy Supervisor, four Operators and two Paramedics, plus the drivers. The Operations Manager has completed EOD level 3 and the rest of the team have completed Level 2. The EOD team stands down during the month of September to undertake further training. The Paramedics have received four training workshops arranged by DDG.

If they are not already doing so, the Paramedics should rotate periodically in a health facility to keep honing their skills, and provide services to the community.

The EOD team is well equipped and has sufficient of transportation, including a car dedicated for the ambulance mounted with loudspeakers to warn bystanders approaching a demolition area, and a dedicated fuel transport flatbed truck. The EOD team has a fully-fitted mobile tent camp in addition to benefiting from the hospitality of the local population when it is available and when they are too distant from DDG district-based guest houses/offices.

The EOD team uses Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) translated from the English into Somali. Except for the Operations Manager, who is learning English, the EOD team does not have use of the English-language DDG General Operating Procedure (2008), the DDG Somaliland complete Standard Operating Procedure (English version 1), or any of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). In 2009, translations of the EOD and emergency medical care chapters were completed. In addition, the EOD supervisor could explain SOPs employed in much more detail than the written SOPs currently do including, for example, the issue of disposal sites. DDG should streamline SOPs for the Somaliland programme, continuously ensure that they reflect current practice and provide the opportunity for the EOD team to judge for themselves that they are following IMAS.

The evaluator acknowledges that, given the wealth of experience of the Operations Manager and his team, the SOP review process would in all likelihood not lead to tangible changes and improvements in operations given that the members of the EOD team already display a professional attitude, high regard for safety and command of their roles, responsibilities and appropriate procedures. At no
time during the field observations of their work did the EOD team deviate from the IMAS EOD and Open Burning or their own SOPs. Detailed photographic evidence of demolitions undertaken in 2008 and 2010 further demonstrate the professionalism of the team. Finally, there had been no accident since 2001.

A concern remains with the cost efficiency of the EOD team. During fieldwork, the evaluator observed the EOD team at work on a large dumping site, expected to take up to one full month of the full EOD team’s work time. For security reasons, one Specialist worked on the site under the supervision of the Deputy Supervisor. The other three specialists stood down before rotating every 90 minutes. This setup is not cost effective and reduces the geographical coverage of the EOD team. DDG could have split the EOD team into two teams composed of two specialists and a team leader each.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, this large site could have been excavated mechanically rather than manually, and in just one work day rather than one month. Based on the results of a hazard assessment, DDG might have rented an excavator from a construction company to complete the task. It is thus important that DDG reviews its procedures towards ensuring higher cost efficiency.

Noting the quality, experience and skills of DDG’s Somaliland EOD team, it seems odd to the evaluator that this team participated in 2008/9 in the conduct of social surveys and assessments that required no particular technical knowledge. The productivity of the EOD team in terms of ammunition disposal for 2008 was significantly reduced beyond the decline that would have followed the reduction in staff from previous years. Considering the specialized and unique skills of the EOD team members, the opportunity cost of using this team for social surveys should actually be viewed in terms of forfeited clearance and prolonged threat as well as the financial cost of the EOD staff time (see Figure 2). DDG might have contracted interviewers and trained them specifically for this purpose.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Number of People Sensitized Through MRE and Number of UXO Destroyed 2005-2010}
\end{figure}

Initially, community liaison and risk education (above and beyond what is done by the EOD team itself) was carried out by one team of four facilitators. From 2010, DDG changed its organisational

\textsuperscript{23} From 2009, DDG started to split the EOD team into two sections, but had not done so on this site.

\textsuperscript{24} DDG has pointed out that it was unable to obtain funding for this survey while, at the same time, it was an explicit output of the project plan, so it had no alternative but to use the EOD team, as well as generating savings from other components to finance the survey.
chart to feature one community liaison coordinator and one education coordinator that would each supervise 3 teams and 6 facilitators. In the first two years of the NG Ammunition Disposal grant, it contributed to the cost of the CL/E team. As a consequence, we consider the work of the CL/E teams only insofar as they bear upon ammunition disposal issues, including through community entry and mobilization, and MRE.

The CL and Education teams have at their disposal a comprehensive DDG Community Safety Handbook as well as the English version of the MRE IMAS (standards and guidelines) from which staff members are trained. The national CL and Education coordinators are fluent in English.

The combined productivity of the CL/E and EOD teams in carrying out MRE was seriously impaired by the extensive social survey and assessment work required of them in 2008/9 (see Figure 2).

The evaluator questions the value in terms of new knowledge gained from carrying out a CSEP baseline survey in 2007, a nation-wide community survey/needs assessment in 2008/2009 and another baseline at community entry in CSEP communities in 2009. In addition, it is clear that the methods and tools used were not cost effective. DDG should carry out a review of its data collection and community entry processes with a view towards generating cost-effective and rapid instruments that would quickly pave the way for the start of programme activities.

Besides lacking targets, the LFA features indicators that are deficient with regard to their specificity and measurability, and at times assigned to the wrong level of project achievement. None of the indicators in the LFA are actually defined. It is unclear what DDG Somaliland is measuring and for what purpose; some of the data for outcome indicators is not collected and much data is collected without obvious use. The only document available to support the M&E system is a handwritten wall chart that shows when to use which M&E tool during the project cycle plus chapters on M&E in the CS guidelines. While commendable, these documents combined do not yet constitute a complete M&E framework.

Data management and analysis is also an area where gaps were found. The evaluator was provided with at least three different sets of data on clearance and MRE. Although the discrepancies are not major except for 2008, DDG should ensure that only one set of data is maintained and should conduct a data quality audit. In addition, the results of large surveys should be properly archived and easily available for further analysis. Of note, the survey results documents are deficient in explaining the methodology used and sampling design features; these elements are central to judging the quality of the data, which the evaluator could not ascertain with certainty. Furthermore, survey statistics do not feature any element allowing the reader to judge the level of precision of the estimates, which reduces the confidence one can have on the figures quoted and the differences over time. A portion of the resources devoted to data collection could have been wasted due to faulty design and analysis. The evaluator is encouraged by the creation of an M&E unit in the Somaliland country programme, though the evaluator would urge DDG to apply lessons learnt from this survey when considering whether to undertake another complex sample survey.

These various deficiencies have clearly reduced data quality, completeness and usefulness, resulting in haphazard annual reporting. DDG organized in the last quarter of 2010 a meeting to map out which tool contributed to what indicator in the LFA. The evaluator hopes that this meeting, coming three years after the start of grant and in the last year of implementation, is only the first step towards created a coherent indicator plan for future projects. In all future projects, DDG should aim for an indicator plan (or performance monitoring plan) giving unambiguous indicator definitions,

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25 Quantitative analysis of the data collected in the survey was the responsibility of Small Arms Survey. Unfortunately, the evaluator has not received a response from the SAS to queries on methodology.
detailing the periodicity, data source, roles and responsibilities in data collection, analysis and reporting, and linking each indicator to a method and a specific tool.

The commitment made by DDG Somaliland to data collection and analysis augers well for the future. This commitment is a very strong base for results-based management, obtaining lessons learnt and evaluating the impact of projects. The use of innovative tools like Participatory Impact Assessments and the planned introduction of participatory monitoring demonstrate the ability of DDG Somaliland to adopt advanced tools that can potentially advance the quality, breadth and depth of the information collected. The EOD team and the CSEP programme as a whole have implemented an extensive set of M&E tools relying on both qualitative and quantitative methods. Given the investments that have been made in M&E processes and the fact that the CSEP programme is a new initiative, with strategic implications for DDG programs worldwide, the evaluator must express his surprise as to the lack of overarching, comprehensive planning tools for performance monitoring and the absence of an evaluation strategy. DDG’s Community Safety manual mentions an M&E framework, but the evaluator was unable to find an M&E plan.

For all sizeable or strategic projects and programs, an M&E plan would first highlight the strategy and central objectives of the M&E system (e.g. audience, extent of evaluation, introduction of participatory M&E etc.). It would detail the resources available to the M&E system. It would provide an evaluation strategy. It would have a detailed M&E budget (e.g. survey costs, equipment, staff time, etc.) that accounts for all resources used besides the ones charged to the M&E budget line. It would explain the organization, roles and responsibilities of staff members. It would contain the logical framework, the indicator plan and detailed indicator sheets for complex indicators. It would provide templates of the tools.

v. Effectiveness

An impact assessment survey by DDG found that in February 2010, 3.2% of households in Sheikh were concerned about small arms and ERW accidents compared to 24.4% in May 2008. But the initial questionnaire did not distinguish the respective contributions of ERW and small arms, the latter being a substantial area of intervention of the CSEP.

Anecdotal evidence from healthcare workers in the areas of intervention points toward a reduction in trauma and injuries from ERW and firearms in the target areas during the grant period compared to the preceding years preceding. But victim data from the SMAC shows a sharp drop in victims one year before the start of implementation in 2009 (Table 8). The large amount of UXO removed so far during the grant period has not led to a further decrease. The stagnation since 2008 suggests that the removal has had little impact so far on the number of victims. However, the evaluator was unable to ascertain the quality of the data. The fact that there is no data for 2006 from September to December 2009 points towards clear deficiencies in data collection by SMAC; SMAC argues that there were no victims past August in 2009, which seems unlikely considering patterns in other years. DDG does not regularly collect nor obtain such data, although it is a key indicator of impact; this data was specifically requested by DDG from SMAC upon enquiry from the evaluator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The level of awareness related to risk education topics is not measured by the projects, although it is a key outcome of interest. No baseline or progress data are available. However, random spot checks by the team found excellent knowledge among interviewees, including women and children, about threats and actions to be taken in the face of a threat.

The step-wise approach of the EOD team seemed to have been particularly effective in convincing the population to handover ERW and in establishing principles and practices by which threats are reported to the DDG team in a timely fashion. By first carrying out advocacy workshops and then conducting MRE sessions at the village level the DDG team persuaded the population to participate actively in the removal of the threat and gave it the means to do so. Advocacy workshops were particularly effective in prompting handover of ammunitions with thousands of UXO identified and destroyed in the month following a workshop. In fact 70% of UXO were destroyed in the month of January 2009 alone.

There is clear evidence that DDG’s community liaison and MRE approach was effective but there is no evidence towards showing that the community safety planning process added value to this established process. Most of the community safety plans do not identify real community safety problems but a lack of intervention, such as the absence of ERW clearance or a lack of human rights training. This technocratic output presented by the plans points towards a reduced effectiveness of the community liaison via community-based planning as a tool to highlight key priorities from the bottom up. Only the Daami pilot plan identifies real safety problems such as rape, revenge killings, or the use of guns.

As a consequence, it is unclear what has been in effect the value added of integrating the Ammunition Disposal project into the CESP programme as opposed to community liaison and awareness raising activities, particularly through advocacy workshops, as implemented by DDG in non-CSEP areas. But, it could be argued that by offering one of the services that can be requested, the ammunition disposal project actually increases the legitimacy of the CSEP programme. However, there is a clear lack of ownership and awareness over the community safety plan. The community safety plan was never mentioned directly by community leaders before the evaluators asked a direct question. It was always referred to as a development plan and only the social and economic development projects that had been identified were remembered; community safety issues, including ERW, were never highlighted as part of a plan for the community. It should be noted that the plans do not contain community-identified progress markers that could be periodically reviewed by the community itself (i.e. a participatory approach). The Community Safety planning process should be thoroughly reviewed and its contribution to ammunition disposal demonstrated before further claims about an integrated approach can be made.

As of the time of writing, the textbooks and education modules in risk and safety education on ERW and firearms were awaiting formal adoption by the Somaliland Ministry of Education. It is not expected that approval will be obtained within the grant period.

vi. Institutional and Financial Sustainability
DDG’s Ammunition Disposal project is geared towards both removing ERW and reducing the acceptability of owning ERW at home or in the vicinity so that prospects for future contamination are limited. The sustainability strategy of the project thus rests on transforming ERW contamination into a residual problem with bottom up reporting of new threats via community leadership structures. In the target areas of the project, DDG should be realizing that goal by the end of the grant period.
It is expected that once the ERW contamination becomes merely residual, the EOD police team should be in a strong position to cover ammunition disposal spot tasks as they arise. The EOD police team is believed to be technically capable but to have deficiencies with equipment and a limited ability to conduct outreach in the districts and in remote areas. However, in the short and medium term, DDG’s EOD team status as an impartial and neutral actor, to which ammunitions can be handed over to, is irreplaceable. In contrast, the EOD police team is a law enforcement initiative that cannot be effective where the population fears imprisonment and prosecution.

vii. Coverage
The ammunition disposal project has covered parts of Saahil, Togdher, Sool, Galbed and Awdal. Specific target areas prioritized for interventions are based on conflict records gathered through an investigation process by the EOD team. The project has also specifically included the 7 CSEP communities, including the displaced camp on the outskirts of Hargeisa and 6 villages in Sheikh district. The choice of CSEP areas was dictated by the need to ensure diversity in the villages included to increase the learning outcomes from the pilot initiative. As a consequence, priority setting for the Ammunition Disposal project did not necessarily match the CSEP areas. The practice of holding district advocacy workshop has allowed the Ammunition Disposal project to reach a large area and for concerned populations to then self-select in the project by seeking the support of DDG for spot tasks. Sool, which was demonstrated by the DDG/Small Arms Survey nationwide study to be where the highest share of households owned ERW, has not been a major zone of intervention for the project.

In 1975, according to the Somali census, at least 59% of the population was nomadic. Nomadic populations have not been systematically reached by the project which has a focus on village leadership and fixed settlements even though DDG’s own documents reveal that the organization suspect that they more small arms and ERW than settled populations (note: the baseline survey did not include a specific survey sampling scheme for nomads). However, community leaders have themselves sought to include nomadic populations when they were present in the village area depending on the season. So if nomads were included in the project it was mere happenstance rather than a conscious strategy. DDG should seek to actively engage with nomadic populations and devise appropriate outreach methods, for example, by identifying key water points or market areas and times and pattern of attendance.

viii. Coordination
The presence of only two international operators, DDG and HALO Trust, plus the EOD police team, has limited the need for coordination but increased the ease with which it can be done by SMAC.

DDG has been an active participant in the Armed Violence Reduction community of practice in Somaliland by liaising with, among others, international agencies, UNDP, UNESCO and UNICEF, international NGOs, HALO Trust or HI, and numerous local NGOs. At the time of the evaluation, however, the PeaceCaravan, an initiative implemented by a local media outlet with UNDP, could not recall meeting with DDG except once in the last quarter of 2010.

As a division of Danish Refugee Council, DDG has naturally gravitated towards its parent in the area of community recovery. All communities visited appreciated that DDG transmitted their needs and community plans to DRC and other actors. DDG could however liaise more effectively with other development NGOs present in the same areas, including, for example, Mercy Corps, which implements not only food security and agriculture projects, but also a large USAID-funded conflict mitigation project.

The EOD team has been particularly commended for liaising with local authorities, including district officials, the police and community leaders. It never failed to apprise local stakeholders of the
purpose of their visits and all were fully aware and supportive of their actions. However, it was noted that DDG does not provide reports on their achievements. DDG should disseminate a periodic report on key achievements to district authorities so they can follow the progress made on agreed plans and the fulfilment of local needs.

DDG strategy documents point towards a regional approach to community safety. The evaluator could not find evidence of leveraging of regional processes despite the claims made by DDG of realized success in this area.
4. Afghanistan

Context

Afghanistan is a mountainous and ethnically diverse country. Efforts by successive national governments to exert effective authority over the country’s isolated and diverse regions have remained a recurrent theme in Afghanistan’s political economy to this day. Starting with the Soviet incursion in 1979, Afghanistan became a central theatre in the Cold War. The conflict has taken its toll in the form of repeated and massive migrations of people plus the growth of war economies (particularly, opium), which provide revenues and regional-ethnic powerbases for insurgents and numerous warlords (or, more politely, “commanders”).

Since the Taliban were dislodged, the international community has maintained a large NATO-led stabilization force and contributed substantial sums in humanitarian and development assistance. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) remains weak and the country is heavily dependent on the international community, including for mine action. Although in 2008 an ad hoc Inter-Ministerial Body designated the Department for Mine Clearance (DMC) to be the government ‘focal point’ for mine action, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) remains the de facto national authority and mine action centre for the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). MAPA is perhaps the largest mine action programme in the world, comprising over 20 international and national NGOs and firms, including DDG.

DDG has a Strategic Programme Document (SPD) on the Country Strategy and Accountability Plan for DDG Afghanistan for the next few years. The strategy foresees capacity building of all employed staff and mentions an exit strategy. This includes nationalizing senior positions within DDG. DDG’s overall objective in Afghanistan is to support the MAPA in meeting the objectives of the MACCA strategic plan.

Findings and Conclusions

i. Needs Assessment and Project Design

Areas of Operations

DDG started its operations in Afghanistan in 1999 with two clearance teams in Kandahar. Since then, DDG has grown continuously and has operated in all areas in Afghanistan. Currently, DDG works in the Central Region, which includes Kabul, Bagram, Kapisa and in future Panjsher provinces, and in the Northern Region, including Samangan and Balkh. The fully-equipped and staffed headquarters is in Kabul; it includes departments for administration and finance, operations, logistics, and one for training and quality assurance. There are two operation bases in the Central and Northern Regions. The project funded by NG is based in Charikar/Bagram, in the Central Region, where it gets all support required within a short distance to the area of deployment.

Staff and activities

The current capacity includes 72 clearance sections, three mechanical demining units (MDU), seven MRE teams, and six survey teams, plus the management, and support staff totalling about 765 staff members (including 12 international staff). DDG also supports eight clearance sections funded by the Japanese Mine Action Service (JMAS). An overview of the DDG organisational structure and the team distribution is in Appendix 6.

26 See Annex 7 for a more complete context analysis.
Activities include survey, clearance (manual and machines), EOD, conventional weapons disposal, demarcation, MRE, community liaison, and local capacity development, with an emphasis on mechanical clearance for the NG project. The MDU are important to prepare the ground for safe manual clearance and for area reduction. Apart from the Mine Wolf, DDG has two non-intrusive machines.

The post clearance survey, which is being further developed, will enable the assessment of the impact of demining on development.

DDG has engaged in capacity development for its staff, some examples of the support include:

- English language courses
- Computer courses
- Training on-the-job.

DDG is currently funded by nine donors: DANIDA, NG, SIDA, VTF, Germany, UNOPS, US Department of State, Canada and the shipping company MAERSK, totalling about $10 million per year.

**Strategy**

DDG has provided the evaluation team with a Strategic Programme Document (SPD) on the Country Strategy and Accountability Plan for DDG Afghanistan, dated 10 November 2010. The duration of the strategy is 3-5 years. The overarching objective is “...to build mine action capacities to assist the Government of Afghanistan in achieving the targets of both the Ottawa convention and the Afghan Compact and ultimately work towards a country unaffected by ERW.”

The SPD mentions it is unlikely that these targets will be met, but DDG has instituted changes to provide a greater level of support, including:

1. Increasing the clearance capacity of DDG
2. Increasing section output through increased supervisory knowledge and understanding
3. Capacity development of DDG staff in preparation for opportunities outside of mine action, as part of an exit strategy
4. Creation of a stand-alone operation servicing the Panjshir valley
5. Train, equip and deploy survey and impact monitoring teams to do polygon surveys with the aim to reduce or cancel suspected areas without the need for clearance
6. Strengthening the DDG support departments
7. Establishment of Information Management structures and electronic databases

There is a consensus within MAPA that an increase in mechanical assets is needed to meet the goals of the programme. The deployment of the Mine Wolf was in line with these requirements. The DDG needs assessment was valid for the time covered by the NG project.

The project objectives and planned results are defined as follows in the Action Plan 1\textsuperscript{st} January 2008 – 31\textsuperscript{st} December 2011:

**Operational Objective:** The objective of the project will be to increase socioeconomic impact of the DDG mine action teams.

**Specific Objective:** To provide key stakeholders and beneficiaries with mechanical support in order to increase the clearance rate of any one DDG team and thus increase the rate at which cleared land is returned to the impacted communities.

\[27\text{ Non-intrusive machines do not enter the minefields but operate from its verges; for example, excavators.}\]
**Result 1:** 5,030,000 m² of land cleared and handed back to civil society benefiting an estimated 1.5 million people.

**Result 2:** The machine is handed over to a national organisation for use to clear the residual mine threat.

The project design is basically to support faster release of land through the deployment of the Mine Wolf, and with this to promote socio-economic growth and safety in the lives of the beneficiaries. This part of the project design follows a clear and understandable logic, as the lives of the Afghans in the Central Area/Parwan, where the Mine Wolf has been deployed most of the time, are still heavily impacted by mines and other ERW.

The selection of the Mini Mine Wolf rather than another machine also followed an understandable logic. Among other things: transport is easier for a smaller and lighter machine; the operator stays on safe ground due to the remote control; good clearance/ground preparation results have been achieved with similar conditions in other countries; and Mine Wolf provides a good training and maintenance package.\textsuperscript{28} However, flail or tiller systems are not ideal under many conditions, and parts supply became more difficult when Mine Wolf closed Kabul office and other operators such as UXB stopped using the machine. DDG is now the only operator deploying a Mine Wolf, which means it cannot benefit from spare parts stocked in Afghanistan.

However, the needs assessment for the deployment of a second Mini Mine Wolf starting in 2011, funded by MAERSK, has been weak and this affects the future deployment of the NG-funded Mini Mine Wolf. The Mini Mine Wolf requires a certain terrain and, at the time of the evaluation visit, there were only a few suitable areas left in DDG current areas of operations.\textsuperscript{29} The search for new suitable areas is ongoing.\textsuperscript{30}

The second objective of the NG project, as described in the proposal, is the handover of the machine to national ownership at the end of the NG project. The needs assessment for this, and perhaps a ‘reality check,’ had been deficient. The problems related to handover have since been identified by DDG, and in its annual report 2009 DDG proposed to abandon this plan. This aspect is further discussed in the relevant sections below.

\textsuperscript{28} More technical details on the Mini Mine Wolf are in Appendix 8.

\textsuperscript{29} According to the DDG mechanical TA, there are suitable areas for the deployment of both machines until end May 2011. The lack of suitable areas for deployment is one of the reasons other operators have not procured a tiller system.

\textsuperscript{30} DDG does not consider the deployment of the MAERSK Mine Wolf to be relevant to the appraisal of the Dutch, but agrees on its relevance for future tasking. In April 2011, the DDG Afghanistan desk officer confirmed that enough tasks exist to keep both machines busy until the end of August 2011. The program would then either identify enough tasks to keep the Dutch funded machine working until the end of the contract period or use the months after August to deal with the hand-over of the machine and any required training necessary for a national operator to take responsibility for its future deployment. DDG pointed out that no needs assessment had been done for the MAERSK project, as it was based on obligation and not needs.
**ii. Key Achievements of DDG’s Projects in Afghanistan**

The NG funds covered the following over the past four years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>€ from NG</th>
<th>Personnel &amp; assets funded by NG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January – 31 December 2008</td>
<td>675,390</td>
<td>2 Mine Wolf operators, 1 mechanic (all national staff) Mini Mine Wolf, 2 vehicles, PPE, GPS and other equipment Running cost and maintenance for Mine Wolf Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January – 31 December 2009</td>
<td>163,203</td>
<td>2 Mine Wolf operators, 1 mechanic (all national staff) Running cost and maintenance for Mine Wolf Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January – 31 December 2010</td>
<td>175,336</td>
<td>2 Mine Wolf operators, 1 mechanic (all national staff) Running cost and maintenance for Mine Wolf Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January – 31 December 2011</td>
<td>186,071</td>
<td>2 Mine Wolf operators, 1 mechanic (all national staff) Running cost and maintenance for Mine Wolf Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table below details the planned and achieved outputs for the NG-funded project by year. DDG has partly achieved its output targets listed in the action plan. The green colour highlights the expected achievements that have been fully achieved, the red colour highlights the expected achievements have not been achieved or have been modified, and the yellow colour highlights the expected achievements have been partially achieved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expected achievements (outputs)</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td><strong>MDU:</strong></td>
<td><strong>MDU:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deploy Mine Wolf</td>
<td>• Mine Wolf has been deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recruit and train mechanical staff</td>
<td>• Mechanical staff has been recruited and trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Obtain accreditation and licence</td>
<td>• Accreditation and licence have been obtained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct operations to achieve and handover cleared ground</td>
<td>• Operations have been conducted, ground has been cleared and handed over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recruit and deploy survey and MRE teams to support mechanical asset</td>
<td><strong>Not achieved/modified</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 800,000 m² cleared (as per Action Plan 2008-2011 LFA)</td>
<td>• Scheduled for 2009, but survey and MRE teams have not been recruited and deployed. This asset did not appear in the revised project budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Partially achieved</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 143,344 m³ prepared / verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Expected achievements (outputs)</td>
<td>Achievements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td><strong>MDU:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Fully achieved</em></td>
<td><em>Fully achieved</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deploy Mine Wolf</td>
<td>• Mine Wolf has been deployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct operations to achieve and hand over cleared land</td>
<td>• Operations have been conducted, cleared ground has been achieved and handed over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Partially achieved</em></td>
<td><em>Partially achieved</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,350,000 m² cleared (as per Action Plan 2008-2011 LFA)</td>
<td>• 309,778 m² prepared / verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 800,000 m² cleared, handed over to 10,000 beneficiaries (as per Action Plan 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Handover:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Handover:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Not achieved/modified</em></td>
<td><em>Not achieved/modified</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Handover is no longer mentioned as an objective in the Action Plan 2009, but it appears under the Schedule of Activities for 2009 as:</td>
<td><em>Partially achieved</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Partially achieved</em></td>
<td>• As explained in the box for 2008. From 2009, DDG uses this headline to describe the continuous training of their Afghan mechanical staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capacity development of national staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td><strong>MDU:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Partially achieved</em></td>
<td><em>Partially achieved</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,440,000 m² cleared (as per Action Plan 2008-2011 LFA)</td>
<td>• 296,040 m² prepared / verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 940,000 m² (as per Annual Report 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 650,000 m² (as per Action Plan 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>31</sup> The 2009 Action Plan says 300,000 m², but this seems to be a typo. The Interim Report 2009 says 800,000 m².
The evaluation team benefited from the visit of a Danish Refugee Council (DRC) delegation which supported demining activities in Afghanistan. The areas are now in productive use if owned by the beneficiaries, but mainly to reduce accidents. When they saw the first approach with manual clearance, they thought demining would ‘take forever’. The Mini Mine Wolf speeded up these operations significantly in their view. The areas are now in productive use if owned by the community or safe for passer-bys if owned by the government, which is the case for one area.

The handover of the flail machine is covered in detail in sections below.

**iii. Relevance**

**Was the deployment and handover of a flail machine relevant to the needs of beneficiaries?**

The deployment of a flail machine has been relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries. The tasks selected for mechanical ground preparation are large and in quite densely populated areas. The beneficiaries reported during the evaluation visit that they urgently needed the land not only for residential and productive use, but mainly to reduce accidents. When they saw the first approach with manual clearance, they thought demining would ‘take forever’. The Mini Mine Wolf speeded up these operations significantly in their view. The areas are now in productive use if owned by the community or safe for passer-bys if owned by the government, which is the case for one area.

The handover of the flail machine is covered in detail in sections below.

**To what extent has the support been a coherent and comprehensive response to the needs of the beneficiaries?**

The Mine Wolf has been deployed to Bagram, in the Central Region of Afghanistan. For more than a decade Bagram, has been one of the most contaminated and dangerous areas in the world, following extensive ground battles. It is also an important agriculture area north of Kabul, which is growing dramatically. Refugees have returned and keep coming in significant numbers. The nearby

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expected achievements (outputs)</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handover:</td>
<td>Handover:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Same as for 2009</td>
<td>• Same as for 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>MDU:</td>
<td>MDU:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partially achieved</td>
<td>• 3,300 m2 by end February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1,440,000 m² cleared (as per Action Plan 2008-2011 LFA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 940,000 m² (as per Annual Report 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 650,000 m² (as per Action Plan 2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handover:</td>
<td>Handover:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Same as for 2010</td>
<td>• Same as for 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summarizing, from 2008-2010 the deployment of the NG-funded Mine Wolf has lead to 748,756 m² area prepared or verified, 3504 AP mines destroyed, and 45 UXO destroyed.

DDG estimates that beneficiaries number about 10,000 per year, totalling 30,000 from 2008-2010.

**Plans for the future**

DDG intends to continue operations at the current level or if possible extend capacity as far as possible with available donor funds. A geographic expansion towards Panjshir is planned.

The evaluation team benefited from the visit of a Danish Refugee Council (DRC) delegation to Afghanistan. The DRC representatives mentioned that a regional extension of DDG into Tajikistan is being considered. At the same time, DRC and DDG work on a global framework to link mine action with other development activities. A closer link between the DRC development and the DDG demining activities is also planned for Afghanistan; a consultant for this matter will arrive in March.

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32 DDG is the mine action branch of DRC.
US airbase creates income opportunities, which is an additional magnet for people to move to Bagram even if they have not lived in the area before. This situation creates a need for rapid demining, and the deployment of the Mine Wolf contributed to meeting this need.

The three tasks cleared by the Mine Wolf are now used for different purposes. In one area located inside the community, other development organizations have supported residential projects and reconstruction programmes. Many households established new homes in the former minefields. In addition, shops were opened. Other cleared areas visited during the evaluation have been used for agriculture, grazing and gardening.

The area where the Mine Wolf was operating during the evaluation visit has multiple beneficiaries: one part is administered by the Ministry for Refugees, which distributes the safe land to refugees from a nearby camp. Another part is used for a project for handicapped persons. A large part belongs to a community that lived in the area before and is now gradually returning from Pakistan and Iran. All beneficiaries interviewed regarded the clearance highly and explained how important it was as the base for any kind of further activity. There were many accidents (both people and livestock), and a number of the victims children.

In addition to the residential communities and the returnees, Kuchi nomads benefit from the clearance when they cross the area with their livestock in summer. As the evaluation took place in February, it was been possible to interview Kuchi.

The communities interviewed reported that there was still one area left for clearance that is suitable for the Mine Wolf. Otherwise, different development needs such as a school, a clinic, a road, a water system and measures to control drug-related crime were voiced to the evaluation team.

DDG liaised with the population during and after clearance, but has not clearly defined or recorded the benefits to the people in the area in a systematic way. However, DDG has conducted case studies illustrating the needs of, and benefits accruing to two communities. In addition, a larger post-clearance survey project is ongoing; baseline data has been collected and the second phase of re-visiting the communities to collect the ‘after’ data is just about to start. However, the areas cleared by the Mine Wolf are not covered by this systematic survey because the clearance was underway when the first phase of the post clearance assessment started, which meant it was not possible to collect ‘before’ data.

The beneficiaries interviewed did not report any problems with the cleared areas, neither with missed devices nor with degraded soil. However, the MACCA reported there had been concerns expressed by some beneficiaries that the fertile topsoil could be damaged by the Mine Wolf.

In addition to the observations by the evaluation team, data were collected by DMC during its post-clearance audit, and via a Landmines and Livelihoods Survey the GICHD (both conducted in 2010-2011). The results indicate that people feel generally safe after clearance. Communities reported that clearance enables them to:

- Return home from within and outside Afghanistan
- Re-build homes, businesses and communities
- Access and improve their gardens
- Access grazing land for both villagers and nomadic Kuchi
- Access fuel and wild food, & stone, sand and soil for building from the mountains
- Build mosques, schools, telecom masts, cemeteries and petrol stations
- Use paths/roads for access, recreation and sport
- Use cleared battlefield used for markets/shops
- Undertake major infrastructure projects (e.g. power line or railway line)
- Open new or re-furbished factories
- Repair watercourses
- Build new settlements for displaced people

These findings confirm the information received during the evaluation team’s community visits. During the livelihood survey, the communities also complained about the slow and inadequate development support after clearance. The evaluation team found the same, particularly when interviewing the refugees in the refugee camp – they reported that only a fraction of the wells that were built by a CSO was still functioning, creating a serious water problem.

Another group of stakeholders benefiting from clearance are the development actors. This includes the Afghan government and international organizations. The representative from the Afghan National Disaster Management Agency (ANDMA – the parent organisation of DMC) presented the evaluation team a list of over 30 CSOs active in the region. The benefits include safety for the aid workers and the opportunity to conduct (re-)construction without the threat of mines or UXO.

Finally, parts of the Bagram area are popular leisure and picnic destinations for people from Kabul and other provinces. They benefit as well from the increased safety.

In conclusion, rapid clearance has been the precondition for safe return and for many community development initiatives. It makes a significant contribution to the normalization of life after decades of war, destruction and displacement.

**Does the DDG programme strengthen and/or complement other initiatives in the region or hinder them?**

There is a varying number of mine action operators in Bagram, depending on the season, including Afghan NGOs (MCPA, MDC, and ATC), HALO Trust, and commercial operators. At the same time, there is a high density of suspected hazardous areas. The work of the operators seemed to be well coordinated due to proper planning and coordination. A number of operators (including the largest, HALO Trust) use mechanical support for their manual clearance teams, but only DDG is using a Mine Wolf at this stage.

In development terms, the DDG programme both strengthens and complements other activities. It supports the large-scale National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and a range of national and provincial projects such as power line construction.

**What is the added value of DDG/NG’s activities to increasing the security of communities in the central region of Afghanistan, and how this impacts on the overall level of peace and stability?**

The contribution to community security and, with this, to peace and stability is significant, with benefits including:

- Accident reduction
- Support to safe return
- Secure use of land
- Facilitation of peace and stability by allowing development projects to proceed
- More security for traffic in transit
- Security for the growing population of Bagram itself
In addition to benefits for the communities, international and national aid workers as well as the international security forces can fulfil their duties in support of peace and stability in Afghanistan safer and more effectively.

The deployment of the Mine Wolf directly contributes to the achievement of the goals defined under the headline “Security” in the Afghan Compact.

**iv. Efficiency**

*Has the deployment of the Mini Mine Wolf been effective, timely and adequate?*

The Mini Mine Wolf was expected in Afghanistan in February 2008, but due to import delays (shipping and customs took more than three months) it only arrived 30 April 2008. DDG had already prepared Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for intrusive machines, which were accredited by the MACCA on 9 April 2008. The training of the operators started in May 2008, and the MDU passed the MACCA acceptance test on 4 June 2008. The Mine Wolf has been operational on 5 June 2008, which means that training, licensing and deployment followed a strict schedule.

The tasks selected for the Mine Wolf were well suitable for the use of the machine and, and the Mine Wolf has significantly increased the clearance output where it has been deployed. DDG operations presented one example from 2008: in task number MF-186, three deminers cleared 560 m$^2$ in 19 days without ground preparation by the Mine Wolf. In the same task after mechanical ground preparation, four deminers completed 2,728 m$^2$ in 16 days – a 333% increase in productivity per man-day.

The MDU faced a number of technical problems; for example, a broken remote control receiver and easily damaged protection covers. Many of the minor repairs could be done in the DDG workshop with spare parts on stock, but some repairs required special spare parts that had to be ordered from abroad, which lead to stand-down times of the machine. Total working days lost due to mechanical failures were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This trend is in part a consequence of the use of the machine under the harsh conditions in Afghanistan, but also due to supply-chain problems (e.g. spare parts held in customs). Generally, DDG found a good balance between spare parts required in stock and those that are too expensive to keep ‘just in case’. An additional challenge is that the DDG Mine Wolf is now the only one operating in Afghanistan, and Mine Wolf has closed its representation in Kabul.

The trend has an effect on the further deployment plans of the Mine Wolf and on the concept of handover to a national organization: it needs to be considered carefully at what point the machine’s costs outweigh the benefits, and at what point a write-off should be considered.

*Has the deployment of additional survey teams been effective, timely and adequate?*

So far, there was no training in preparation for the handover of the Mine Wolf to a national organization, as foreseen in the proposal and early action plans. However, the training of DDG’s national staff operating the Mine Wolf has been effective. There has been a steady increase in knowledge through workshops and on-the-job coaching by the technical advisors.

*Has the operation been implemented in the best/suitable operational set up in order to be efficient?*

The efficiency of the NG-funded project benefited from a number of aspects:

- DDG has an administrative infrastructure in place in Afghanistan
• DDG has a good technical support system and an international mechanic as head of the fleet
• DDG provided an international technical advisor to supervise the NG project
• DDG has a well-managed field camp close to the deployment site of the Mine Wolf, which includes a workshop
• DDG found a suitable, guarded parking area for the Mine Wolf close to the clearance site, which significantly reduces travel times and allowing prolonged work hours
• Other donors funded complementary assets, such as:
  - the JMAS-funded manual teams, who do the follow-up demining of the ground prepared by the Mine Wolf
  - the pick-up vehicle required for the team transport of the MDU
  - the survey and MRE teams supporting the deployment of the machine.

Mine Wolf offers a support package that comes with the machine. It includes a truck that contains all basic maintenance and repair items and tools. Furthermore, Mine Wolf specialists provided regular training. DDG personnel working with the machine, including the international TA and the national operators, appeared well qualified and perfectly capable of running and maintaining the machine.

During the deployment period, DDG follows its operations mission plan foreseeing an average of about 20 working days per months. The normal work sequence is about 21 days of continuous work followed by about 10 days mission leave. DDG has a policy of working at least six hours in the field per day, not including travel to and from the worksites or breaks.

The workdays lost due to mechanical failures have been highlighted above. It deserves attention that there were no stand-down times due to staff sickness or turnover. This is remarkable, particularly as only one team of three persons has initially been trained to operate the Mine Wolf. DDG confirmed it intends to train a larger number of staff in the next round of workshops to compensate for absences when required. At the same time, it will be important to analyze the reasons for stand-down times over the past years: were there planning problems or problems in the site management?

The attempt to increase efficiency by deploying a second shift of Mine Wolf operators to have the machine running double-time failed. The outputs achieved did not increase, but the stand-down times did. Problems occurred due to a lack of clear responsibility; one shift blamed the other if there was a problem with the machine.

Overall, the number of expatriates (twelve for 765 national staff) in the programme seemed high to the evaluation team, at least in a place like Afghanistan with such a mature programme. This adds to the costs and can constrain the emergence of national capacities and ownership. However, the NG project is not funding any expatriate positions apart from the annual training visit of the Mine Wolf technical advisor. At the same time, it appears that DDG human resource management is effective; there are high satisfaction and little turnover among the national staff.33

The key problem with efficiency and effectiveness has been the manual follow-up of the areas prepared by the Mine Wolf. So far, a 100% excavation drill is applied. During the evaluation visit, only two deminers in a vast area were doing excavation, while one deminer was used as a guard. The whole system of manual follow-up needs to be re-visited based on a proper risk assessment, and DDG is about to seek agreement with MACCA on suitable and more efficient processes. This

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33 The DDG Afghanistan desk officer correctly noted that not all expatriates are ‘permanent’ (i.e. deployed for more than six months). Three of the expatriates are only temporarily in the country working on specific tasks to address needs identified in the programme.
agreement will be the key to good clearance outputs, but at the same time DDG should ensure the manual follow-up teams are currently deployed in the most efficient manner.  

At this stage, it is not possible to make a direct comparison of the efficiency of Mine Wolf deployment between two operators because DDG is the only operator using this machine.

Having in mind the difficult and harsh work conditions in Afghanistan, DDG has found good solutions and ensured, so far as possible, an efficient deployment of the machine.

**How has the programme been monitored? Is the programme using lessons learned and adjusting/developing where appropriate?**

The programme has different layers of monitoring.

**Internal monitoring**

On the technical side, there is well-documented internal quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) conducted by the international TA and senior national management staff. There are also five persons dealing specifically with QA; three in the Centre and two in the North. The results of the QA/QC visits are recorded. Lessons were learned in the attempt to increase the efficiency in the deployment of the machine.

On the management side, different sections in the Afghanistan programme are involved in the regular monitoring of the project; for example, finance and logistics. However, the monitoring of the annual action plan, including underlying assumptions and modifications to the plan, could have been better documented. This kind of documentation and its analysis would be important to explain in detail why clearance rates have not been achieved and why DDG dropped plans for handover. At the same time, it would provide a solid basis for planning and lead to more realistic production targets.

DDG headquarters have visited the project regularly to monitor progress. The main emphasis of these visits seemed to have been to get the machine up-and-running and to battle the practical difficulties encountered, which is understandable. However, more systematic and better documented monitoring of progress towards output targets would have been useful.

DDG does not have a specific evaluation unit carrying out internal evaluations, but it facilitates donor-requested external evaluations.

Reports to the donor are made on an annual basis (by 31 March for the previous year), which means information on progress towards achieving the goals of the action plan appears when it is only possible to make adjustments from the 2nd quarter of the next year.

**Results Monitoring**

DDG result-monitoring with regard to the socio-economic impact of the clearance is in its second phase, as described earlier. This is a positive development. There is, however, no baseline data for the areas cleared with the support of the Mine Wolf to this stage. At the same time, priority setting for the Mine Wolf depends much more on the suitability of the terrain than on the precise needs of

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34 The DDG Afghanistan desk officer commented that the issue of the deminer being used as a guard was dealt with on the spot by the TA present at the time; and that, unfortunately, these things happen when attention is diverted elsewhere. It was seen by DDG as a good example of why international staff is needed. DDG commented further that the issue of reducing manual follow-up to 10% was approved by the MACCA International staff prior to being hijacked by its own QA department (staffed by Afghans) and returned to the old level of 100%. The issue here isn’t DDG but rather with national capacities in the MACCA.
the beneficiaries. So far, both matched and the areas visited were clearly high priority areas for the beneficiaries as well.

**Monitoring by MACCA**
MACCA set up a detailed testing and licensing system prior to the deployment of the machine. Furthermore, MACCA carries out external QA and QC visits, certifies the cleared land prior to handover and, with this, assumes liability for subsequent mine/ERW accidents on the cleared land. In addition to the regular QA/QC, there are specific investigations of ‘incidents’ (for example, demining accidents). The QA departments from MACCA and its regional offices confirmed they were satisfied with the quality of DDG’s work; they only encountered two major non-conformities in 377 QA visits, neither of which concerned the NG project.

MACCA is applying a balanced score card system to monitor the not-for-profit mine action operators. The indicators monitored include the operational plan, quality management, demining accidents and reporting. DDG achieved good results over the past years, with an aberration in the 2nd quarter of 2009 when a demining accident occurred.

Another tool MACCA is using to monitor the work of the implementing partners is the so-called *project monitoring tool*. With this, MACCA controls ‘what is’ against ‘what should be’ in terms of clearance results for each project. Unfortunately, this tool has not yet been applied on the Dutch project because the work of the Mine Wolf is considered as ground preparation and not as clearance. In the view of the evaluation team, this approach should be re-considered and the project monitoring tool should also cover projects such as the NG Mine Wolf project.

MACCA also offers a proposal review service for potential donors. This service had not been used for the NG proposal; therefore the proposal review team was unable to comment on the proposal. 36

**Joint initiatives**
There has been a Quality Circle Meeting between MACCA and the operators on how to improve the efficiency of the follow-up behind machines. The discussions included sifter solutions, the use of rakes, and the reduction of safety distances between the deminers due to the low risk of missed mines. DDG has actively participated in this meeting and provided data from its programme in Sri Lanka.

In conclusion, there are a number processes for monitoring and evaluation and, with this, for learning and performance improvement in the MAPA and DDG’s own project cycle. These could be better interlinked and strengthened to highlight shortcomings in achieving targets and ensure that recommendations are actually implemented. DDG is working on a new database system which might help to address these issues.

35 1. A signal had been missed in a cleared area, parts of the area had to be re-done, then the non-conformity report was closed. 2. 12m² had been marked as cleared but had not been cleared. After the missing parts were cleared, the non-conformity report was closed.
36 The DDG Afghanistan desk officer explained that the NG proposal was done from DDG HQ in 2007 and included two other DDG programs, which is why MACCA was not consulted. The review was offered mainly for the Afghan NGOs, which have been weak at preparing donor proposals and require more funding from the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. For example the US Department of State requires the Afghan NGOs to clear all proposals through U.S. representatives in Afghanistan prior to submission, for the same reason; it does not require this of DDG or HALO Trust.
v. Effectiveness

To what extent has the project achieved the objectives set out in terms of clearance?\textsuperscript{37}

The key achievements of the project have been summarized above. The summary shows that the proposal contained unrealistic clearance estimates, probably based on general output estimates by Mine Wolf.\textsuperscript{38} These figures were adjusted downwards by DDG within the first year, and again in 2009. The second year of deployment had a more realistic output figure of 800,000 m\textsuperscript{2}, which has still far higher than what was achieved (309,778 m\textsuperscript{2}). Consequently, the already adjusted output target of 940,000 m\textsuperscript{2} for 2010 was reduced once more, but still remained high at 650,000 m\textsuperscript{2} – in the end, 296,040 m\textsuperscript{2} was achieved.

The figure of 650,000 m\textsuperscript{2} in 2010 was mainly based on the assumption a second shift of operators would increase the output.\textsuperscript{39} In addition, the TA notes:

- 2008 figures were affected by machine failure and long term repair
- the Mini Mine Wolf had been only recently introduced, so operator skills might not have achieved full performance levels.

However, the TA then used the four ‘good’ months (March – June) as the basis for the output calculation, but only counted nine months per year.

In the 2008 annual report, the programme manager wrote of a number of measures to increase the output of cleared area (in addition to the planned double shift):

- Reduction of safety distance between operators on the follow-up clearance – due to renewed risk assessment.
- Utilization of one-man rakes on follow-up clearance
- Develop and implement mechanical sifter to considerable increase the pace of follow-up clearance activities.
- Further development of training syllabus for manually clearance operators deployed jointly with the Mini Mine Wolf.

Steps to implement these measures have not been recorded and, at the time of the evaluation visit, there were no rakes or sifters in use.

The reasons for not achieving the output target in 2010 were not fully analyzed by DDG at the time of the evaluation visit, but one factor was the failure of the second shift experiment. Despite this, the output target for 2011 has again been set at 650,000 m\textsuperscript{2}. This is hard to understand, particularly when looking at the increased number of stand-down days per year due to mechanical failure. The main reasons for the reduced output identified in the 2009 Interim Report were:

- Environmental conditions (much dust)
- Weather (cold winters)
- Mine detonations (causing stress to the machine)
- AMAS (100% follow-up required)

\textsuperscript{37} The term clearance needs explanation: At this stage, MACCA only accepts ground as cleared if it has been 100% followed-up by manual or mechanical assets. The work of the Mine Wolf is therefore called ground preparation, area verification or soil processing, and not clearance. This difference is explained in the DDG NG 2009 report.

\textsuperscript{38} See appendix 8, Mine Wolf speaks of 5,000 m\textsuperscript{2} -12,000 m\textsuperscript{2} output per day.

\textsuperscript{39} The mechanical TA prepared a document on 12 July 2009 revising the output figures, estimating 700,000 m\textsuperscript{2} – 720,000 m\textsuperscript{2} was realistic.
• Mine field orientation (obstacles in minefield such as trenches or streams, limited clearance boxes – all requiring much manoeuvring of the machine)
• Importation / customs (hard to get spare parts)
• Management (full-time expatriate TA needed)

The changes resulting from this analysis include:
• Provision of a dedicated TA
• Employment of a mechanical engineer as fleet manager
• Operational methodology: discussions with MACCA about the 100% follow-up rule

Summarizing, the deployment of the Mine Wolf has increased clearance productivity significantly and made the work of the follow-up deminers much safer. However, the objectives set out in terms of clearance have not been achieved as planned in the proposal and action plans.40 DDG took action and tried to increase the output through a number of measures, but so far with limited success. However, the Mine Wolf has achieved results in a very difficult working environment. Unfortunately it is not possible to compare these results to other organizations deploying the same machine to see if they would achieve more.

Progress towards the overall objective (to increase socioeconomic impact of the DDG mine action teams) and the specific objective (to provide key stakeholders and beneficiaries with mechanical support in order to increase the clearance rate of any one DDG team, and increase the rate of cleared/released land that is returned to the impacted communities) has been achieved. However, the quantitative targets set were only partially achieved, both in terms of productivity and the number of beneficiaries.41

To what extent has the project achieved the objectives set out in terms of handover?
The handover of the machine to a national organization was one of two objectives of the original proposal of the project. However, this aspect of the project did not appear in the Annual Report for 2008 or the 2009 Action Plan. It is mentioned only in the Annual Report 2009:

“The planned hand-over of the machine at the end of 2011 is cancelled and instead DDG proposes to seek continuation funding from the Netherlands Government or another donor to secure its continued use. DDG will by that point have four years of institutional knowledge with regards to the implementation of Minewolf operations. In addition continuation funding will benefit from already existing capital equipment and need only running costs and limited equipment replacement and repair.”

While the points made are clear and it may ultimately prove to be the best solution, it is not easy to understand what caused the radical change in the strategic approach of the project. The evaluation team is not aware of a serious assessment of potential partner organizations, or a systematic analysis of which ‘package’ would be workable for a potential partner.

Some early DDG documents mention MACCA as a potential partner for handover. MACCA rules out this option, because it is a coordination centre and not an operator.

The DDG exit strategy for the NG-funded Mine Wolf project now depends on the following points:

40 DDG notes that it has revised the action plan every year and consistently put in ambitious, ‘stretch’ targets and then attempted to reach them.
41 The number of beneficiaries has been overestimated in the proposal (1.5 million), and DDG reported more realistic figures (about 10,000 per year) in its annual reports.
• First and foremost: is suitable terrain for the deployment of the machine available and, if so, is it in a region in which DDG can operate?
• Whether or not NG or another donor is willing to continue funding the machine
• Whether or not a national partner organization can be found in the near future to take over the NG-funded Mine Wolf. This partner organization will, however, still depend on international funding.

If there is no suitable terrain in the DDG area of operations, the option to hand the machine over to another organization (for example, operating in the South where more flat areas with anti-personnel minefields might be available) might become more attractive for DDG – particularly given that DDG will soon receive a second Mine Wolf.

The idea of a handover was not well thought through in the planning stage, and has not been adequately pursued during implementation. This means, questions such as: “which areas suitable for the Mine Wolf remain in Afghanistan? Where are they? Which organization might be a suitable partner? Is the organization interested, or what has to be done to make the handover-package workable for them? Would it be the easiest and cheapest option if DDG kept operating the Mine Wolf in Afghanistan, or perhaps in another country should there be no suitable terrain left in Afghanistan?” could not be adequately answered at the time of the evaluation.

Also of note is that no funds had been allocated for the handover component, which means no donor money has been lost through the change of strategy yet. The future payoff to the funds invested in the Mine Wolf will, however, depend on a workable solution for handover. If no such solution is found, additional cost may be incurred; for example, to transport the Mine Wolf to another country.

**Are the chosen methods and DDG strategy for Afghanistan appropriate in the national context as well as for the objectives set in the programme?**

The DDG strategy to introduce the Mine Wolf into Afghanistan was suitable given the national context and for the objectives set in the programme. The deployment of the Mine Wolf has increased productivity, although by less than planned. The strategy of supporting manual clearance teams with the Mine Wolf was appropriate in terms of productivity and deminer safety.

The DDG strategy could contain stronger elements on co-operation with the Afghan ministries, which are taking on more responsibilities in the mine action sector. This aspect is addressed in greater detail below, under the criterion ‘co-ordination’.

Additional issues deserving consideration in DDG strategies for Afghanistan are:
1. Implement quality, efficient and impact-driven operations to mitigate the threat posed by ERW to support sustainable livelihoods and development.
2. Continue to improve DDG’s ability to prioritise operations and to measure and report the impact activities have on development and livelihood.
3. Ensure DDG’s work in Afghanistan supports the national mine action authorities, capacities and regulatory processes
4. Ensure DDG’s work in Afghanistan support the integration of mine action into broader development plans.
Have the strategies and approaches adopted been effective and adequate in line with the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries?
DDG has maintained good liaison with the beneficiaries throughout the programme. Decisions concerning clearance priorities were taken jointly and based on the needs expressed by the beneficiaries, as well as the site requirements for the Mine Wolf.

The planned second phase of impact monitoring should provide further answers to this question and, in particular, should endeavour to obtain the views of women and children. DDG should ensure its impact monitoring results are shared with relevant partners such as MACCA and DMC.

Has the operation been implemented in the best operational manner in order to meet the needs of the beneficiaries/stakeholders?
The beneficiaries explicitly appreciated the deployment of the Mine Wolf, because it significantly increased clearance rates. The persons interviewed were very positive about the results achieved and voiced no complaints. The fear of some persons that the tiller would damage soil fertility, which were raised by MACCA, appear to have been unfounded.

Has the programme been successful in mainstreaming cross cutting issues, such as gender? If not, why?
Gender in mine action programmes is relevant in two distinct ways: (i) employment opportunities within DDG and (ii) in terms of the beneficiaries receiving the outputs of DDG’s work.

DDG carried out an extensive Gender Field Study in Afghanistan in January 2010. Some quotes from the study are listed below:

“The interviews conducted during the field visit showed that the general knowledge and awareness by DDG staff of the existing gender policy framework was very limited.” (Page iii)

“At present, DDG only addresses gender issues explicitly in one of the two pillars of mine action they engage in Afghanistan, namely Mine Risk Education (MRE). In the other phases of implementation; prioritising of areas, community liaison/technical analysis, and handing over of land, gender issues are not included. Disaggregated data is collected on victims and on people who have received MRE, and in reporting gender issues are mentioned in relation to the MRE activities. But for all other areas, data collected does not distinguish on gender and diversity and neither do reports.” (Page iii)

“In line with MACCA and other IPs operating in Afghanistan, DDG does at present not analyse if and how mine action eventually affects women’s right to and control over resources and they are not aware of any rights/control problems caused by mine clearance. This risks worsening the situation for already vulnerable groups...To avoid this it will be important to adopt a gender sensitive strategy and make a gender analysis of the access to and use of land by all members of society.” (Page iii)

“The organisational setup of the DDG Afghanistan operation does not in itself prevent the incorporation of gender. However, with the exception of the MRE teams, all staff in the field are men, and this considerably limits the possibilities for incorporating gender in different phases of the operation and of interacting with the female part of the population.” (Page iv)

“The maintenance of the gender-balanced MRE teams is a major achievement for DDG, which should be acknowledged and strongly commended. In addition, DDG has put considerable effort into

42 The reference documents for this field study have been Denmark’s National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, the Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes from the United Nations and the DDG Gender Policy of 2006.
Improving the gender balance in the organisation by encouraging women to apply, by creating part
time trainee positions, by increasing awareness also among male staff of appropriate codes of
conduct, and by opening up for a constructive dialogue with the families of current and potential
female staff in order to lower resistance to their employment.” (Page iv)

The report contains a list of recommendations to address the aspects identified on different levels:
- Overall Policies, Strategic planning and Standing Operational Procedures
- Tasking, Surveying and Clearance
- Mine Risk Education
- Handing Over of Land
- Impact Monitoring Tool
- Gender, age and diversity in the DDG Organisation
- Working Environment
- Staff Gender Awareness

The findings of the evaluation team match the findings of the DDG Gender Field study. The vast
majority of DDG staff in Afghanistan are male. The main reason provided by DDG was that it was not
possible to hire female deminers because it is against cultural norms, and the operations would
become more costly due to the necessity to provide double facilities for accommodation and
personal hygiene. None of the other implementing partners employ female deminers. There is
gender balance in the DDG MRE teams, which is good and important to ensure all beneficiary voices
are heard. This balance should be maintained.

If demining is not acceptable because it is considered dangerous or ‘inappropriate’ and it proves very
difficult to gain the understanding and support of community leaders for female deminers, then at
least female employment could be encouraged for administration and support functions. Further
considerations include:

- Women can be actively encouraged to apply in the vacancy advertisement, and the whole
  recruitment process could actively target women
- If it is not acceptable for women to work with a team of male deminers, then maybe an all
  female demining team could be set up or teams comprising husbands and wives or brothers
  and sisters.
- Employing female deminers as trainers could encourage other women to apply for a job as
deminers and facilitate a more active female participation during the training.

It is worth looking at examples from other countries where it was supposedly ‘impossible’ on cultural
grounds to have female deminers (Somaliland, Jordan, Sudan, Lebanon), but where it eventually was
possible.43 There are also ethnic and social differences when it comes to the role of females, for
example between rural Pashtoons, Hazara, Tajiks or the urban families with higher education.44

DDG pointed out that they tried to hire female staff for administrative positions, but they were not
very successful. There seemed to be some consideration of female employment, but DDG could have
taken more initiative; it did not appear to be a priority for senior management.

43 It may be interesting to consider that Afghanistan had its first female General in 2002, a parachutist.
44 The DDG Afghanistan desk officer commented on this aspect that she was not completely familiar with
Somaliland or Sudan, but she knew about Lebanon and Jordan and there was a huge difference between
Jordan, Lebanon vs. Afghanistan when talking about hiring female deminers. It could not be compared. DDG
could certainly put more effort in to trying to hire females but the lengthy process due to family considerations
etc. is an obstacle. A Gender Action plan within SPD was in place. As an employer it was important to
understand and rule by the fairness principle so ‘no harm’ is occurring to either females or males.
On the beneficiary side, the evaluation team came across no evidence that women did not benefit equally from general risk reduction through clearance. There was, however, no opportunity for women to express their views in the evaluation team interviews, as there were no female translators available and the women cannot meet any men. Normally the entire household would benefit from reconstruction, additional safety or income arising from clearance. However, there have been many development evaluations which concluded that benefits do not always accrue equitably among household members. These are only brief observations; the topic deserves more attention during the post-clearance assessments, and it refers to all DDG clearance, not in particular to the work of the Mine Wolf.

Environmental aspects received moderate consideration by DDG. There was no mention of an environmental SOP to ensure environmentally friendly operations. The clearance contributes to de-contamination of areas. There is, however, a chance that the tiller of the Mine Wolf may have a negative impact on the soil. The beneficiaries interviewed during the evaluation visit did not state there was a problem, and the evaluation team observed that plants seemed to grow without problems on the ground prepared by the Mine Wolf. However, MACCA personnel reported that thick layers of fine dust remain after the deployment of the tiller, particularly in summer. DDG did not consult with agriculture experts to ensure and officially document there is no damage.

**vi. Institutional and Financial Sustainability**

*Is the support provided institutionally and financially sustainable?*

The safe ground achieved by demining is sustainable. This also provides a sustainable basis for accident reduction and further development investments.

The sustainability of the deployment of the Mine Wolf has some question marks. DDG said it might be able to find alternative funding for the Mine Wolf if NG decided to cease funding, but first DDG should determine whether it is worthwhile to continue operating the machine in Afghanistan. If it is worthwhile, but only in areas where DDG is not operating, handover to another organization would become the obvious option. However, even if the machine was handed over to a national NGO, future funding for running costs will be required.

Institutionally, DDG is an international organization that will not stay forever in Afghanistan, which limits the institutional sustainability. It is highly unlikely the Afghan government would fund an international NGO such as DDG, even if it was fully ‘nationalized’ in staff terms. With transition to national ownership, the MAPA will face a fundamental re-structuring and – in likelihood – downsizing. Even the future of the Afghan operators is unclear at this stage, as they are internationally funded.

The future structure of the national mine action programme, and who will deal with the residual contamination problem, is not yet determined. However, the key question on sustainable deployment of the Mine Wolf is whether or not there remain suitable areas for this type of machine. This question needs to be addressed first.

**vii. Coverage**

*Which beneficiaries and groups have been included/excluded from the project?*

This question is very relevant for the DDG programme overall, but in the context of the Mine Wolf the choice of areas for clearance mainly depended on the suitability of the terrain for the deployment of this particular machine. Regardless, representatives from the local communities (Shora) ensured that all communities in the area benefited from the clearance. This includes different ethnicities such as Pastho and Tajik, and the Kuchi in summer. Many different groups such as nomads, returnees, community residents, people travelling, aid workers and coalition forces benefited. It was not obvious that any group which should have been included had been excluded.
However, there currently is no gender, ethnic and age disaggregated data available to confirm this observation. The DDG Gender Field Study notes:

“One group that is reported to be particularly at risk and that seems to have been left out by MACCA and DDG are the Kuchi nomadic group. Sometimes the grazing areas they use are cleared but they are not targeted as a specific group even though they are present in the DDG Area of responsibility. Reasons behind this are partly their lack of ownership of the land and partly the relatively low frequency by which they use the land. Also IDPs are a particular group, who have not yet been considered explicitly.” (page iii)

viii. Coordination
Is DDG able to coordinate effectively in light of donor, liaison partner, and CSO actions?
DDG coordinates effectively with the MACCA, other mine action actors and with the communities, including with the local Shora. However, the evaluation team could not see any evidence of systematic liaison with international development actors operating in the same region. Furthermore, liaison with the relevant ministries of the Afghan government could be improved. A lot of the mine action responsibilities have been transferred to national authorities, and there are a number of initiatives such as country-wide MRE campaigns. DDG should ensure its work complements these initiatives. By 2013, national authorities are supposed to assume responsibility for mine action, and DDG should ensure it is on track with this evolution and maintains close contacts with authorities.

Liaison with the MACCA, DMC, Afghan ministries and other actors will be particularly important in the context of the impact monitoring: it will be important to (i) generate data that matches and complements other initiatives, (ii) co-ordinate survey activities to avoid duplication, and (iii) share the results.

In light of donor liaison, DDG has been in contact with the donor and provided timely and complete annual reports as required by the NG; this donor liaison was lead by the DDG headquarter in Copenhagen. In February 2010, there was an e-mail exchange in which the NG asked DDG for clarification on the suspension of the handover concept and on the outputs that were lower than expected. DDG provided an Exit Strategy summary\(^{45}\) and explained the output targets had to be reduced due to the experiences of the previous years. In the view of the evaluation team, the DDG communication on these vital parts of the project, and the decisions related to them, could have been more timely and exhaustive.

\(^{45}\) The main argument brought forward in this document why DDG does not intend to hand over the Mine Wolf to a national organization is the lack of specific technical knowledge on the machine in other organizations. This argument is certainly valid, but on the other side the project concept included building up exactly that type of expertise over three years.
5. Common Features of DDG Programmes

Having had the opportunity of evaluating three DDG programmes in three countries/territories, the evaluation team is in a position to make some general observations, highlighting common features of DDG initiatives.

- DDG is working in a number of challenging environments and, overall, its programme management is sound given the challenges raised in such environments.
- DDG is a comparatively small for an international demining NGO and has difficulty garnering economies of scale. For example, it has a high ratio of expatriates relative to the larger demining NGOs. Rather than focusing on expanding the size of its country programmes, DDG has instead sought to make a virtue of its relatively small size by being more nimble. For example, it has introduced Results-Based Management more quickly and more thoroughly than most of the other international demining NGOs. Within countries, DDG has embraced a niche-role, focussing on gaps within the broader national mine action programme (e.g. introducing the Mine Wolf into Afghanistan) and adding project components that seem to address specific features in each country context.
- For example, DDG has recognised that mine/ERW clearance and risk education addresses only one of a number of sources of insecurity faced by the communities it serves, and has been modifying its programmes to address security and development issues in a more holistic fashion.
- DDG tries to include developmental considerations in its projects, which is not the case for all mine action operators. However, most of these initiatives are still nascent and, understandably, need further refinement.
- Given the number of innovations it has been introducing, and the complexity of some of the new issues it is tackling (such as armed violence reduction), DDG quite rightly works hard at continual improvement. However, its results-based project design and M&E systems require further strengthening, which DDG HQ recognises.
- DDG is trying to forge closer operational links at the country level with its parent, DRC, which is an appropriate strategy. Some progress has been made but the main dividends from this lie in the future.
- DDG has a focus on gender and tries to consider gender and diversity aspects as deeply as possible and practicable. However, it is not always easy to find qualified mine action programme managers who are also concerned about gender issues.
- DDG’s coordination within the mine action sector is always good, but could be improved with the wider development arena. For example, in Afghanistan, it will be important to match the Impact Monitoring efforts with MACCA and DMC activities and information gathering.
- DDG has thorough documentation and records, such as strategies, action plans, etc., and its field reporting appeared sound. However, monitoring reports could be more systematic. What is needed is a more systematic M&E system, carefully linked to the design and, specifically, the logic model for each programme.
6. Recommendations

Sudan

DDG should:

- Continuously monitor capacity building of its national EOD teams.
- Keep to a minimum the absence of senior staff, including TAs, and provide sufficient cover when staff are absent; the option of recruiting another senior team member to support the EOD operations should be considered in 2011.
- Immediately implement the recommendations that came out of the Logistics consultant’s visit in October 2010, including:
  - Office space reorganisation
  - Improving:
    - Logistics documentation
    - Vehicle management – maintenance, equipment, monitoring of use and driver skills
    - Inventory management
    - Communications - radios
    - Camp accommodation – replacing old tents and equipment
    - Power supply at tented camps
- Seek advice from and work with a Sudanese gender advisor, who should carry out a review of DDG’s project and make recommendations on how to address the current staff gender imbalance and highlight opportunities within DDG field operations to increase its gender sensitivity and engagement with female community members. Staff awareness raising and a gender review of the Impact monitoring tools should also be included. DDG should set itself a deadline for this to take place in early 2011.
- Discuss the recommendations made by the DDG Community Support Advisor (CSA) regarding the MRE and CL components, and immediately address those considered a priority.

The Government of the Netherlands should:

- Consider continued funding to DDG, assuming it adequately addresses the recommendations listed above.
- Work with other mine action donors to encourage UNMAO and SSDC to update the Multi-Year Plan for the Mine Action Programme, which should incorporate clear statements on:
  - The projected extent and impact of the contamination that will remain as of mid-2011 (i.e. the needs assessment)
  - The capacities that will be required to address the threat remaining after mid-2011, and
  - The GoSS vision and strategy for how those capacities will be financed and delivered, including the capacities required for:
    - making policy and strategy
    - operational planning and coordination
    - delivery of mine action services
**Somaliland**

DDG should:

- Review and justify the programme logic linking EOD operations and the Community Safety Programme and strengthen its analysis of EOD operations and security policy with a view towards ensuring that its EOD operations concord with its mandate and relevant strategies. It is the judgment of the evaluator that the ammunition disposal project has value-added on its own and the programme logic including the Community Safety Programme remains to be clearly outlined and justified. A central challenge to be addressed is the contradiction between a community-led approach and technical, needs-based and awareness-raising interventions linked to ammunition disposal.

- Accelerate its systematic, stepwise approach to programme development, with a clear statement of the complete programme logic, a risk analysis, an indicator matrix/performance monitoring plan and target setting before these elements are integrated into an LFA, with a view towards being accountable for its results.

- Explore opportunities to target nomadic populations and to expand towards areas of Somaliland with the highest rates of ERW possession.

- Streamline SOPs for the Somaliland programme, continuously ensuring that they reflect current practice and promote cost-effectiveness.

- Never use its EOD team for social surveys but rely on interviewers specifically contracted and trained for this purpose, and ensure provision for this is reflected in project budgets.

- Liaise more effectively with other development NGOs present in the same areas, including, for example, Mercy Corps, which implements, besides food security and agriculture projects, a large USAID-funded conflict mitigation project.

- Disseminate a periodic report on key achievements to district authorities so they can follow the progress made on agreed plans and the fulfilment of local needs.

- Seek to improve its cost effectiveness, addressing operational cost-effectiveness as well as the use of its human and financial assets for extensive, unfocused and, so far, largely unproductive monitoring.

**Afghanistan**

The principal recommendations, linked to specific criteria, are:

**Relevance:**

1. Define expected benefits to the beneficiaries explicitly and in a differentiated way (for example who owns/uses the land).
2. Record more clearly who has benefited from the clearance in which way. For this, the collection of gender, age, ethnic, religious and socio-economic grouping data would be relevant. This data will hopefully become available as a result of the second phase of the DDG post-clearance survey.
3. Develop indicators for beneficiary satisfaction and develop a mechanism to deal with possible complaints.
4. Liaise with ANDMA in Parwan on potential priorities for clearance.

**Efficiency:**

1. If DDG seeks further funding for the Mine Wolf, NG should ask DDG to provide a cost-benefit analysis based on the experience gained and on realistic assumptions.
2. All expatriates in the programme should have designated national counterparts for both on-the-job capacity development and as part of an exit strategy.
3. DDG should ensure its projects are assessed by the MACCA proposal review team and included in the project monitoring tool.

4. DDG should improve the documentation of its internal monitoring to ensure non-conformities with the proposal and action plan show up and are addressed and reported to the donor timely.

5. DDG should request donors – well in advance – to consider joint evaluations and the possibility of defining a specific period in the year for any donor monitoring or evaluation missions to avoid absorbing too much DDG and MACCA management time for such missions.

Effectiveness:

1. The DDG management should start a serious process of analyzing exit strategy options and provide NG with a report including well-analysed recommendations.

2. NG should ask for this kind of report and ensure a solution is found and agreed. An external view on the DDG analysis might be sought, for example, from MACCA.

3. Write an environmental SOP based on the AMAS on environment.\(^{46}\)

4. DDG should consider potential harmful impact of its actions beyond missed mines. Consider consulting an agriculture expert (for example, from the Ministry of Agriculture) to ensure there is no environmental damage or damage to soil fertility caused by the tiller system.\(^{47}\)

5. Extend the DDG impact monitoring to cover unintended consequences of Mine Wolf use.

6. MACCA should consider to include an investigation of the soil condition after application of a mechanical system in its initial test package to assess potential positive or negative impacts such as soil productivity/fertility, erosion, compacting.

Coverage:

1. Ensure the impact monitoring collects gender, ethnic and age disaggregated data and covers groups such as Kuchi nomads and IDPs.

Coordination:

1. DDG should improve its liaison with development actors and the Afghan government bodies responsible for mine action. This is particularly important in the context of the impact monitoring project.

In addition to the recommendations linked to specific criteria, the following recommendations reflect the conclusions from the evaluation and the areas of improvement the evaluation team has identified.

DDG should:

- Conduct a thorough analysis/revised assessment of handover options and prepare a report for NG, including the information mentioned below (recommendation 1 under NG).
- Prepare an action plan based on the revised assessment.
- Continue to work on increasing the output rates of the Mine Wolf, including through increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the follow-up methods.

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\(^{46}\) The DDG Afghanistan desk officer noted on this point that DDG Afghanistan was currently following the AMAS environmental SOP and would write a DDG Afghanistan SOP once the DDG generic SOP on environment has been finalised by HQ. This was work in progress.

\(^{47}\) DDG sees this rather as a MACCA initiative. The evaluation team agrees with the observation that MACCA should be involved, but still sees room and reason for initiative from DDG side.
The Netherlands Government should:

- Request DDG to present a revised assessment on the future deployment of the NG-funded Mine Wolf. This assessment should include information on:
  - how many areas suitable for the Mine Wolf remain in Afghanistan (possibly approved by MACCA/DMC),
  - whether these areas are in the DDG area of operations,
  - potential partners and modalities for handover,
  - a cost-benefit analysis of future Mine Wolf deployment based on the experiences from 2008-2010/2011, including an assessment of work time lost due to mechanical, operational or other problems,
  - alternative solutions and their advantages and disadvantages.
- Based on the assessment, ask DDG to prepare an action plan. The plan should be supported by MACCA/DMC and, possibly, by the potential partner.
- Come to an agreement with DDG on the future (funding) of the Mine Wolf, based on the information mentioned under recommendation 1.
- Ask DDG to provide substantial evidence that all measures were taken to improve the output rates of the Mine Wolf.
- For future evaluations, consider providing funds for engaging a local consultant, in meaningful roles, on the evaluation teams. Local consultants can contribute important background, historical and cultural information, and provide the chance for local staff and beneficiaries to express their views directly. Furthermore, this is important for building local monitoring and evaluation capacity.

MACCA / DMC should:

- Support DDG in finding procedures to increase the output rates of the Mine Wolf, including through increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the follow-up methods.
- Consider how projects such as the NG-funded project could be monitored through the project monitoring tool.
- Consider the inclusion of an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture in the testing and licensing of demining machines, in order to determine the degree of ground disturbance and the impact of the machine on the fertile layers of soil.