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Afghanistan: Final Assessment Report

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EC Support to Mine Action and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction

Assessment Mission and Preparation of Formulation Proposal and Financing Proposal

Afghanistan

Final Assessment Report

Erik K. Lauritzen, Robert J. Scott, and Max Wennbo

Copenhagen Development Consulting – Member of Agrisystems-led Consortium

31st January 2006
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Afghanistan

Final Assessment Report

The present report has been prepared for the European Commission. The points of view included in this report reflect the opinions of the consultants, and therefore in no way represent the official opinion of the Commission.
Executive Summary

In December 2005 the European Commission (EC) performed an Assessment Mission with the overall objective of assisting the EC in designing its strategy to support the government of Afghanistan in implementing its Mine Action and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programmes. The objective of the mission was to sketch out a strategy for landmine and ammunition stockpile destruction and contribute to its implementation.

The report presents the assessment of the institutional structure, the Mine Action Programme and the Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programme. Following the assessment 20 – non-prioritised - recommendations are presented.

A two-phase strategy of the Ammunition Stockpile Programme is proposed. The short-term goal is destruction or consolidation of all known caches of anti-personnel mines and other items of ammunition before the end of February 2007. The long-term goal is to manage and control all other types of stockpiled ammunition before 2012.

It is proposed that the EC support to the Mine Action Programme should continue with the same level of funding as in previous years.

In line with the support to the Mine Action Programme it is recommended that the EC should support the Ammunition Project, concerning the destruction of anti-personnel mines and ammunition threatening the communities, for two years. The majority of the funds should be included in the budget in 2006 in order to speed up the process of the Ammunition Project. After the two-year period further funding should be considered for the development part of Phase 2 of the Ammunition Management Programme.
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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Ammunition Consolidation Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army (the armed forces under the control of the Afghan government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANBP</td>
<td>Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APERS mine</td>
<td>Anti-personnel mine (an abbreviation for ammunition effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti Personnel Mine (humanitarian mine action Acronym.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMASD</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine &amp; Ammunition Stockpile Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>Ammunition Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Ammunition Supply Point (ammunition storage facility that will be permanent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>Ammunition Survey Team (part of the APMASD project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Acquisition Technical and Logistic (a branch of the MoD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWG</td>
<td>Ammunition Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAFA</td>
<td>Demining Agency for Afghanistan (Afghan national mine action NGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Process (a previous ANDP project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAG</td>
<td>Disbandment of Irregular Armed Groups (ANDP project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD Team</td>
<td>A team working with Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War (often used within humanitarian mine action for the EOD term UXO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS G4</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, Logistics Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device (&quot;terrorist bomb&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementing Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force (the NATO led forces in Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF Sheet</td>
<td>Log Frame Sheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIAT</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Assessment Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOAD</td>
<td>Lightweight Ordnance &amp; Armaments Demilitarisation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACG</td>
<td>Mine Action Consulting Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPA</td>
<td>Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDU</td>
<td>Mobile Disarmament Unit (Part of the DDR project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDDS</td>
<td>The Mechem Explosives Dog Detection System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYFF</td>
<td>Multi-Year Funding Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Department of Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-A</td>
<td>Office for Security Co-operation in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Preparatory Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>Suspected Hazardous Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Result-based and Time-bound (objectives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Temporary Ammunition Consolidation Point (Ammunition storage facility, either open-air field storage or planned to be a permanent location)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Technical and Administrative Provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWG</td>
<td>Technical Working Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMACA</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance (The EOD term for all ERW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTF</td>
<td>Voluntary Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAD</td>
<td>Weapons and Ammunitions Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAD Team</td>
<td>A team working with Weapons and Ammunitions Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCT</td>
<td>Weapons Collection Team (Part of the DIAG project)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

1.1 Mission

In December 2005 the European Commission (EC) launched an Assessment Mission performed by the Agrisystems-led consortium with the overall objective of assisting the EC in designing its strategy to support the government of Afghanistan in implementing its Mine Action and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programmes. Terms of References are enclosed in Annex I.

1.2 Objective

The objective of the mission is to sketch out a strategy for landmine and ammunition stockpile destruction and contribute to its implementation with the following specific objectives:

- To assess the existing and planned demining and ammunition stockpile destruction programmes;
- To identify primary needs and present possible areas of EC intervention to strengthen mine action and ammunition stockpile destruction;
- To draft a Formulation Proposal and Financial proposal, including Technical and Administrative Provisions (TAP) and a Log Frame (LF) sheet.

1.3 Background

Afghanistan is still one of the countries in the world most heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remains of war (ERW). The legacy of war left excessive amounts of explosive remnants of war, which continue to maim and kill people and obstruct the reconstruction and development of the country. Since 1988 mine action has taken place in Afghanistan and more than one billion square metres of contaminated land have been cleared of mines. However, 2,368 communities, comprising some 700 square kilometres, are still affected by mines; 670 known sites of ammunition stockpiles have been surveyed, 550 sites have been cleared and 120 sites need to be cleared. By the end of 2005 the Afghan Government had established the following goals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>All stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>All stockpiled anti-tank mines destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>All other explosive contaminants destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>All other abandoned or unwanted explosive stock destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Afghan Government’s strategic goals. Goals marked in blue mark the obligation according to the Ottawa Treaty and goals in red mark the strategic goals of the Afghan Government.

In December 2005 or early in 2006 the Afghan Government is expected to approve a new Demining Law, which will be effective from 2006. Once the law takes effect the Mine Action Programme in

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1 Afghanistan´s Millennium Development Goals, Vision 2020, Chapter 12: Enhance security (Goal 9), approved October 2005
2 National Mine Action Law, Final version (15) – 10 November 2004
Afghanistan (MAPA) will enter a period of transition from an UN-owned and managed mine action programme to a Government-owned programme. Mine Action in Afghanistan is a mature programme, and all agencies involved in mine action have gained extensive experience. Therefore, the actual mine action programme is considered to be reasonably robust. However, lessons learned must be followed up in order to get better value for money.

The destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines has been an international issue since the Ottawa Convention[^3] began to take place in 1997. On 1st March 2003 Afghanistan became a state party of the Convention. The date of ratification means that Afghanistan has only four years to fulfil its obligation with respect to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. Projects for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines have been implemented since 2004 under the umbrella MAPA and Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP).

The destruction/disposal of other kinds of abandoned or unwanted ammunition, including ammunition for small arms and light weapons, larger calibre ammunition, rockets, air bombs etc., has been performed during the past years in connection with the MAPA and the Demilitarization, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme (now under ANBP). By the end of December 2004 ANBP had launched the Anti-personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (APMASD) Project[^4], (the Ammunition Project) with the objective of surveying of illegal ammunition (from single items to stockpiles of ammunition) all over Afghanistan. However, systematic and structured collection of ammunition was not addressed until the end of 2004 year and the concept is new to most of the key stakeholders and donors.

The EC has supported mine action in Afghanistan for many years. The EC supports the Government’s initiative for transition and its aim to take responsibility and ownership for management of the mine action sector. The Government has requested the EC to continue its support to mine action but in addition to consider support for the destruction of ammunition stockpiles.

### 1.4 Mission

The Mission Team comprising Erik K. Lauritzen (team leader), Robert J. Scott, and Max Wennbo visited Afghanistan from 5th to 21st December 2005, and from 5th to 18th January 2006.

### 1.5 Activities

During the first period in December 2005 the Team concentrated on the assessment of the two programmes: The Mine Action Programme and the Ammunition Project. Meetings were held with key stakeholders and two field trips were performed in relation to the Ammunition Project. A list of visits, meetings and persons met is enclosed in Annex II.

During the second period in January 2006, the Team has focus on the preparation of the draft Formulation Proposal and Financial Proposal, including Technical Administrative Provisions and the Log Frame sheet.

### 1.6 Limitations

The tight time schedule for preparation of the assessment report and the many holidays during the trip to Afghanistan has made it possible to conduct only four field visits, during which ammunition handling and destruction have been observed.

[^3]: The Convention on the Prohibition of the use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their destruction, Ottawa 1996 (The Ottawa Treaty)

[^4]: The start of the project was achieved under the Preparatory Assistance, funded by Canada, designed to undertake the initial survey and planning of the project document, which was presented in June 2005.
Most of the key persons within the MAPA and the ANBP structure have been met. However, towards the final stages of the writing of the report many stakeholder representatives left Kabul, which means that some observations and conclusions included in the report have not been verified.

1.7 Definitions

In general, the terms used within the mine action sector are in accordance with the UN International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) no. 04.10 Glossary of mine action, terms and abbreviations.

According to the IMAS 04.10 the term “stockpile” refers to a large accumulated stock of national explosive ordnance, and the term “stockpile destruction” refers to the physical destruction procedure used towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile.

With respect to the Ottawa Mine-Ban Convention the term “Anti-personnel Mine Stockpile Destruction” is clear. With respect to the APMASD Project the term “Ammunition Stockpile Destruction” needs clarifying.

According to the Project Document the APMASD project comprises: Survey, transport, destruction and storage. Ammunition Stockpile destruction is only a part of the project, because much ammunition is sorted, transported and stored for use by the Afghan National Army. Furthermore the project does not handling only stockpiles. It deals with all types of stocks of ERW from small stock of explosive items or small arms ammunition to large stocks (stockpiles) of munitions. The stocks comprise both unwanted ammunition to be destroyed and serviceable ammunition requested by the army.

In the report the following terms are used:

_Ammunition Consolidation Point (ACP)_
Guarded facility for the storage of collected ERW under the control of ANBP and Afghan National Army.

_Ammunition Project_
Name for the ANBP Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Project, which is assessed during the mission.

_Ammunition Programme_
General term for the ammunition logistic and safety management in Afghanistan

_Cache_
Ammunition that is not stored in a proper ammunition depot under normal storage regulations. It will usually consist of mixed natures of ammunition pre-positioned either covertly or overtly in the expectation of being used in a relatively short time span.

_Destruction_
Destruction of mines and munitions by open burning or open detonation

_Disposal_
Disposal of munitions using best practice and technologies in order to reduce the impact to the environment and to exploit options for the recycling of materials and chemicals.

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5 According to the ANBP Project Document, June 2005
Stockpile
Ammunition of the same generic type, normally stored in an ammunition depot or storehouse that is accounted for.

1.8 Report

The assessment report presents the findings and recommendations, which will be discussed with the EC Delegation, MAPA and ANBP in early January 2006. On the basis of the draft Assessment Report and the comments received to the report the Team will prepare a draft project proposal for the EC support to MAPA and ANBP in 2006 and 2007.

The assessment of the institutional structure and overall management of the mine action and ammunition handling is presented in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 present the assessment of the Mine Action Programme and the Ammunition Programme. Chapter 5 contains the Summary of the Recommendations and Proposals, including an outline of the project proposal which will be described in detail in the Formulation Proposal and Financial Proposal in January 2006.

There is a list of references in Annex III.
2. Assessment of the Institutional Structure

2.1 Introduction

Security is critical for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Weapons, ammunition and mines pose a threat to security and development. During recent years considerable progress has been made in the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition. Demining has been performed since 1988. Weapons have been collected and destroyed through the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme followed by the Disbandment of irregular Armed Groups (DIAG) Programme.

2005 is a bridging year for the mine action and ammunition stockpile destruction in Afghanistan. After several years of planning and discussions it is expected that the National Mine Action Law (the Demining Law) will be approved in 2006. Once the Demining Law takes effect the ownership and management of the mine action programme will be handed over from the UN to the Government of Afghanistan.

Following the ammunition stockpile survey, which commenced in December 2004, the Government, UNDP and ANBP presented the Anti-personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Project Document in June 2005. The project document does focus not only on the destruction of anti-personnel land mines, but also on the survey, sorting, collection and destruction of other types of ammunition.

The future challenge of the two programmes is to co-operate and integrate with other development programmes in Afghanistan in order to promote peace, reconciliation and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This challenge includes keeping donor interest and to attract continued support from those donors in order to keep the programmes running.

2.2 Context

2.2.1 Situation

The Mine Action programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is the largest programme of its kind in the world. The MAPA is implemented by partner organisations, most of which are Afghan or international non-governmental organisations, and is co-ordinated by the United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA). The Afghan Government oversees the work via the Mine Action Consultative Group, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The MOFA is also chairing a working group that is partnering the transition of the co-ordination function from the UNMACA to the Government.

During the demining process, the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) of unexploded ordnance (UXO) has taken place as an integrated activity of the MAPA. Following the Afghan Government’s ratification of the Ottawa Treaty in March 2003 the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines has become an important issue for the MAPA. In 2005 the Afghan Government launched a project for anti-personnel mine & ammunition stockpile destruction, comprising all ammunition. The project is managed by ANBP under the Ministry of Defence (MOD).

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6 See definitions, section 1.7
7 Started by 1st July and approved by the Government on 31st July
The results achieved by the work, including statistics, of the MAPA and the Ammunition Programme are shown in the box below.

In 2002 – 2003, the EC provided EUR 23 million for demining. EUR 15 million has been provided for 2004, with a minimum of EUR 5 million to be linked to disarmament and demobilisation. The EC has also contributed over EUR 2 million for the UNDP Landmine Impact Survey. In 2005 EUR 15 million was donated for demining, plus EUR 1.5 million for anti-personnel mine stockpile destruction.

| Victims: | Some 100 victims (dead or injured) per month by mines and UXO. UXO is responsible for 50% of these victims. Over 90% of victims are male. Some are children. In total the figure of victims since 1979 is some 100,000. 6 deminers killed by terrorist actions and 5 deminers killed by mines. |
| Current Contamination: | 32 out of 34 provinces, some 2,368 communities with 4.2 million persons, contain 716 square kilometres of suspected hazardous areas (as of 6th January 2005). |
| Recent Clearance: | Over 100 million square metres (100 square kilometres) of minefields and battle area were cleared from April 2004 to March 2005. From April to September 2005 75 million square metres were cleared. 5,276 anti-personnel mines, 533 antitank mines, and 403,505 items of UXO have been destroyed. |
| Historical Clearance: | Since 1990 over one billion square metres (1000 square kilometres) of contaminated land have been cleared. Some 320,000 anti-personnel, 25,000 anti-tank mines, and over 8 million items of UXO have been destroyed. |
| Return of displaced persons: | Assisted returns 513,242 individuals and Spontaneous returns 210,771 individuals (UNHCR Weekly statistic report 4th-10th December 2005) |
| Stockpile destruction: | Until now 32,000 anti-personnel mines are destroyed. The Ammunition Project has surveyed country-wide 670 caches and some 30,000 tonnes of ordnance, destroyed 1183 anti-personnel mines and more than 5,000 tonnes of loose and unsafe ammunition. Some 4,200 tonnes of boxed and loose ammunition have been consolidated. It is estimated that 550 caches of varying sizes have been cleared. This indicates that 120 caches await sorting and handling. |
| Mine Risk Education: | Since 2002 over two million Afghans a year have received some form of mine risk education. |
| Personnel: | The MAPA partner organisations employ some 8,700 Afghans. The ANBP employs 47 local staff and 47 international staff in corporation with other involved staff and workers all over Afghanistan. |
| Funding: | The MAPA has a USD 100 million annual budget. EC is a major donor with a share of approximately 15 %. In 2005, the first year of The Ammunition Programme after project preparation, the budget by June 2005 for the next two years was USD 15 million. |

Facts of the MAPA and the Ammunition Programme by the end of 2005

2.2.2 Expected end situation

The vision of the Government of Afghanistan is presented in the paper “The Way Ahead” and the UNMAS Appeal:

“The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is committed to the vision of an Afghanistan free from landmines and ERW, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to national development and where landmines and ERW survivors are fully integrated in society and thus have their rights and needs recognised and fulfilled.”

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10 MAPA November 2005 Fact Sheet, and information provided by MAPA and ANBP.
12 Afghanistan Submission 2006 to the UNMAS Appeal 2005
The term “Free from landmines and ERW” is very elastic, because Afghanistan will never be free from mines and ERW. In operational terms it means that all communities in Afghanistan are to be free from the impact of landmines and ERW, and that the Afghan people must live with an acceptable and tolerable level of risk of landmines and UXO. Like Kosovo, the acceptable level of risk could be compared with the existing risk of landmines and UXO in Western European countries, e.g. Germany, France, UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. Every year mines and especially UXO have to be cleared and accidents caused by UXO occur from time to time. This will also be the future situation in Afghanistan.

**2.2.3 Government strategy**

The Afghan Government finds that without an adequate level of security, not only will the country fail to achieve the Millennium Development Goal, but that progress achieved during the last four years will be reversed. Such a scenario could increase the likelihood of large-scale conflict resuming. It is also found:

- that ANBP has been quite successful in the disarmament and demobilisation components of the DDR process. However, in a fragile security environment it will be impractical to aim for complete disarmament and collection of illegal ammunition. Forcible disarmament of commanders and other powerful individuals may lead to increased insecurity, and

- that in a situation where there is a large movement of population, and where development and reconstruction projects are impeded by the presence of mines/UXO, it is necessary to expand the demining program and make faster progress toward the elimination of the problem of landmines.

With reference to the World Bank report on the socio-economic impact of mine action in Afghanistan, and the Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey completed in 2004, the Government has established a set of priorities for the clearance of contaminated land. The unit cost of clearing the remaining identified and surveyed minefields in Afghanistan has been estimated by UNMACA at approximately USD 1 per square metre. The Government finds that in a situation where there is an end to conflict and large numbers of refugees and displaced persons return to their homes, land use and movements of people will increase with associated higher risks of mine accidents. So it makes sense – according to the Government – to expand the demining programme and make faster progress toward eliminating the problem of landmines for the bulk of the Afghan people. It is proposed that approximately 30 square kilometres of high impact mined areas and about 70 square kilometres of high impact UXO-contaminated battle areas be cleared during 2005-06.

In the Government’s strategy it is stated that the stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and landmines pose a much more unpredictable threat to communities compared with the threat of landmines. It is mentioned that a stockpile blew up in northern Afghanistan in May 2005, killing 30 people and injuring a further 70. An alarming trend, which emerged in 2003, was the use of landmines as a basis for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), used to target Government officials, national and international aid workers, donors and the international military.

In order to meet the Millennium Development Goals (see Table on the next page), the Government will require the international community to maintain support for Afghanistan with a focus on building the capacity of an independent National Mine Action Agency. This will be critical in ensuring that the necessary skills, expertise and experience are available nationally to continue the mine action programme.

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The Government’s strategy to meet the target of destroying all emplaced and stockpiled landmines and ERW is being co-ordinated with UNMACA. The National Mine Action Strategy includes:
- implementing a co-ordinated strategy for mine action
- equipping national authorities with the tools and expertise to assume a long-term co-ordination and policy-making role for mine action in the country
- providing mine risk education
- conducting mine surveys,
- clearing mines and UXO, and
- providing resource mobilisation and advocacy support to landmine and explosive remnants of war accident survivors.

**Millennium Development Goals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline value (2005)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All emplaced anti-personnel mines destroyed by 2013. All other explosive contaminants destroyed by 2015</td>
<td>Number of severely impacted communities</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number of impacted communities</td>
<td>2,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Afghans directly affected</td>
<td>4.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of mine/UXO victims (deaths and injuries)</td>
<td>100 per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All stockpiled anti-personnel mines destroyed by 2007. All other abandoned explosive stocks destroyed by 2020</td>
<td>Number of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines destroyed</td>
<td>28,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of remaining ERW stockpiles destroyed</td>
<td>To be decided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Targets, indicators and baseline values of mine action and ammunition stockpile destruction according to Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals.

The Government finds that the identification of stockpiled landmines is an additional challenge. Since 2001, new caches of weapons, ammunition and landmines have been uncovered on a regular basis. Hidden stockpiles are a typical feature of post-conflict countries. Such stockpiles are often considered as “insurance” by the former commanders and militia forces that have little trust in the Government and the efforts of the international community to bring lasting peace in Afghanistan.

### 2.3 Programmes and organisations

The work of demining and ammunition stockpile destruction in Afghanistan follows two separate programmes aligned in two separate pillars headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The programmes follow the strategy of the Government as described in section 2.2, but they have their own lives as “twin sisters”. The two programmes will be presented in chapters 3 and 4.

In general terms UNMACA is responsible for mines and UXO below the ground surface in the field and ANBP is responsible for stockpiled mines and ammunition above surface. UNMACA refers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of the political commitment with respect to the Ottawa Treaty. ANBP refers to the Ministry of Defence because of the technical relationship between ammunition management and the Afghan Army. A sketch of the two pillars of MAPA and the Ammunition Programme with their key stakeholders is presented in the figure on the next page.

The MAPA is co-ordinated by the Mine Action Consultative Group (MACG), which includes representatives from Government ministries and departments, UN agencies, and implementing partners, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. After the transition of the MAPA to Government ownership, the UNMACA will be changed to the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan under the Afghanistan National Mine Action Board.
The co-ordination between the mine action programme and other Ministries and departments, including MOD and the Ammunition Programme, will be done by the Inter-ministerial Committee. For the transition process MACG has created a Mine Action Task Force.

The Ammunition Programme is co-ordinated by the Ammunition Steering Committee, which includes representatives of MoD, Embassy of Canada, UNMACA, OSC-A and ISAF, chaired by the Ambassador of Canada. Further co-ordination takes place in the Ammunition Working Group, where implementing partners are represented.

Overall structure of MAPA and the Ammunition Programme

In principle, the basic work processes in the MAPA and the Ammunition Programme are the same: survey and clearance of explosive items. The greatest difference is that the clearance of mines is much more unpredictable and time consuming than the clearance of ammunition stockpiles above the surface. For the two organisations the anti-personnel mine stockpile destruction is a mutual task, which is carried out by the implementing partners of both organisations. However, UNMACA has the official responsibility for anti-personnel mine stockpile destruction, while ANBP must report to UNMACA on the number of anti-personnel mines destroyed, as shown in the figure.
With respect to the humanitarian issue and donor policy, only some of activities of the Ammunition Programme can be characterised as humanitarian support and sustainable development. The management of serviceable ammunition for storage and use by the Afghan Army is military capacity building. However, there is a great need for co-operation between the MAPA and the Ammunition Programme at all levels, including donors and other stakeholders.

2.4 Transition and capacity building

Transition of the ownership of UNMACA to Afghan national ownership is one of the important issues in the demining sector. A plan for the transition was presented in May 2004\(^{14}\), with an estimated transition period of 12 to 16 months. By December 2005 an analysis of the current UNMACA performance\(^{15}\) was being done and a comprehensive and detailed overview of current strengths and bottlenecks within the current UNMACA had been started. Capacity development activities are currently being undertaken at three levels: strategic planning, organisational development, human resources development.

The transition process in itself should not influence the current demining projects, because most changes will be at a high political and administrative level.

The overall precondition for the transition is the Governmental legislation and the institutional framework, especially the approval of the National Mine Action Law (the Demining Law). The final version of the draft law was issued in late 2004\(^{16}\). During a meeting at the MACG on 10\(^{th}\) December 2005 the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said that he expected that the Demining Law would be approved by the end of 2005 or early 2006.

UNMACA\(^{17}\) is positive concerning the time schedule of the Government’s approval of the law but finds that the last version translated into the Afghan language needs some corrections. UNMACA finds that the transition process is very complicated and to a certain degree unpredictable, and finds that there is a need for improved support by international advisers. As a result of the many years of capacity building of local deminers, team leaders technical advisers and managers UNMACA is well prepared for the transition, provided that the structure, organisation and staff are maintained.

Besides the Demining Law the availability of competent local managers is a basic presumption, not only technical specialists, but also financial, operational, and managing specialists on high level. With reference to the May 2004 plan for transition\(^{18}\) “This will be one of the key capacity building objectives of the transition”

It should be noted that Demining Law only comprises demining, and that ammunition stockpile destruction is not covered.

With reference to the Ammunition Project Document, the transition of the UN ownership of the Ammunition Project to the MOD will be discussed and initiated on the basis of the review, directed by the Ammunition Steering Committee, by April 2007\(^{19}\).

\(^{14}\) Draft as of 13\(^{th}\) May, Plan for the transition of the United Nations Mine Action Program in Afghanistan to Afghan National Ownership

\(^{15}\) Hubert Glielissen, briefing note on capacity development activities presented at the MACG, meeting 1st December 2005


\(^{17}\) Meeting on 18\(^{th}\) December 2006 with Daniel Belamy, Allan Mansell, Charles Longston and M. Sediq Rashid

\(^{18}\) Draft as of 13\(^{th}\) May, Plan for the Transition of the United Nations Mine Action Program in Afghanistan to Afghan National Ownership

\(^{19}\) ANBP Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Project Document, Part IV.
2.5 Funding

2.5.1 General principle of funding

The MAPA is funded by international donors through direct funding to the implementing partners or via trust funds, typically the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF). In some cases the donor in question is an Afghan Government Ministry, which has itself received international funding support, e.g. clearance of Kabul International Airport.

The mine action funding for Afghanistan can be considered to fall into three major categories:

- Humanitarian funding is provided for demining and UXO clearance, with a focus on responding to prioritised community needs.
- Reconstruction funding is provided for demining and UXO clearance in relation to major reconstruction projects, such as road construction, power line repairs and irrigation system rehabilitation.
- Peace-Building funding is provided for the Mine Action for Peace DDR initiative and the destruction of anti-personnel mine stockpiles.

In the future it is expected that reconstruction demining will constitute a greater part of the demining activities in Afghanistan.

Demining in relation to reconstruction is carried out by the implementing partners of the MAPA under the management of UNMACA. This might raise concerns because the reconstruction projects are usually lump sum contracts signed after a tendering process. According to the good practice of EC, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank the clearance of mines and UXO must be an integrated component of the overall reconstruction project, and not a component funded outside the project by other donor money. The involvement of donor-funded NGOs might give rise to problems with respect to the achievement of goals and schedules.

In 2003 it was estimated that the cost of making Afghanistan mine-effect free was in the order of USD 500 million. The cost of MAPA in 2003 was USD 65 million. During the financial year from April 2004 to March 2005 the actual cost of the MAPA was USD 100 million. The total budget of the four-year period from 2005 to 2008 is USD 380 million.

The activities of ANBP have until now been funded by Canada, and it is the intention that Canada will continue contributing funds to the Ammunition Project for two years.

2.5.2 EC funding

The EC has been present in Afghanistan since the 1980s and has supported the Afghan population throughout a difficult period. Since 2002 the EC has been one of the top donors to the MAPA among the 15-16 international donor countries. The EC’s average annual donation in 2002, 2003 and 2004 was some EUR 10 million, which will be increased in 2005–2008 to EUR 13 million per year. The EC funded 15.5 % of the budget for demining from January 2003 to 20th March 2004.

In the draft Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2007–2013 the objectives and policies of the EC support to Afghanistan until 2013 are given. In the CSP it is mentioned that the Landmine Impact Survey, which was conducted in 2004, has improved mine action with respect to economic development and the return of refugees and displaced populations. The EC finds it critical that rural areas be demined in order to stem the continued rural-urban shift in population which has been unabated since the end of the war.

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20 Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Public Investment Programme SY 1383 – 1385, May 2004
21 In the spring of 2004 the ATC/Intersos ran out of funds under demining work at Kabul Jalalabad road
22 The Public Investment Programme, The National Development Programme SY 1384 - 1387
In the National Indicative Programme of European Community Support (NIP) 2005-2006 the budget for 2005 and 2006 is EUR 26 million. In the description of focal areas the EC pursues the same specific objectives, expected results and activities as presented in the Afghan strategy and project documents. It is also mentioned that the issue of security to implementation is of major concern. It is assumed that the international community stands ready to provide assistance for a number of years to achieve agreed mine action goals.

Besides the funding of mine action, the EC has expressed an interest in funding the Ammunition Programme, which will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

2.6 Findings

2.6.1 Assessment of the expected end situation in general

The Team finds that the expected end situation, presented as end goals, is clearly described and provides a good basis for the government strategy.

The Government must realise that the end situation is a ‘mine impact free’ situation, and not a “mine free” situation. It must be foreseen that there will be a need for an organisation that can take care of mines, UXO and ammunition.

2.6.2 Assessment of the Governments Strategy

The achievement of the strategic goals and a sustainable development of the cleared mine fields, battle areas and caches are met by a number of constraints which have to be overcome.

The political, economic, social and environmental situation must be stable in order to attract the international donors’ interest in investment.

The overall security situation at the moment is critical to the demining and ammunition operations. On a daily basis UNMACA and ANBP workers face the risk of weapon and bomb attack. The EC and other donors assume that the security situation will improve; otherwise the speed of the fieldwork will be reduced and the cost increased.

The Government targets for mine action and ammunition stockpile destruction are measurable and time bound. However, the strategy does not address the problem that there will be a need for continuous mine action and dealing with UXO and ammunition stockpiles. It is recommended that a revised institutional set up for the future clearance and disposal of mines and ERW be considered. The set-up could be ANA teams working on an ad hoc basis in when mines or ERW are found.

The Government strategy addresses prioritising mine clearance with respect to the socio-economic impact of the landmines and the challenge of building the national mine action capacity, and “The Way Ahead” paper presents a list of influencing factors. However, there is no mention of specific targets for these issues, such as the number of displaced persons returned, square metres of cleared land reclaimed for productive use, the number of people employed in activities following the mine action and removal of ERW, or other possible indicators. However, the Team has noted that the strategy will be revised in late 2005 with the approval of “end goals” and the development of specific, measurable, achievable, result-based and time-bound (SMART) objectives for a medium-term plan for the period of 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009.

23 “Overall, the security situation seems to be gradually improving, despite continuing insurgency in parts of the south and east of the country during 2005”. EC Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, section 2.1 page 5.
The targets of the destruction of anti-personnel landmines before the end of February 2007 and the clearance of all other mines and UXO by 2013 are based on the requirements of the Ottawa Treaty. Until now approximately 30,000\(^24\) APM have been destroyed. Taking into account that 550 caches of stockpiled ammunition were handled during 2005 and that 120 caches are still to be handled, then it is a realistic expectation that the target can be achieved, even if new stockpiles should be discovered in 2006. It should be remembered that we are talking about known stockpiles and that the Government is committed to allocate all necessary resources for the fulfilment of the goal.

One billion square metres (1000 square kilometres) have been cleared since 1990 and there are still 716 square kilometres of suspected hazardous areas (as of 6\(^{th}\) January 2005). Over 100 million square metres of minefields and battle area were cleared from April 2004 to March 2005, and 75 million square metres were cleared from April to September 2005, which indicates that the clearance productivity with the existing capacity is more than 100 square kilometres per year. With reference to the annual average productivity since 1999\(^25\) (approximately 70 square kilometres of battlefield and 30 square kilometres of minefield), the target for clearance of the remaining hazardous areas is realistic but not very ambitious. It is noted that a shift to a more technically difficult urban area has taken place and there is a great difference in the speed of minefield clearance and battlefield clearance. So it makes sense – according to the Government – to expand the demining programme and make faster progress toward eliminating the problem of landmines for the bulk of the Afghan people. Considering the Government’s priority of speeding up the demining process it is recommended that more ambitious targets for productivity and the time for the clearance of the remaining hazardous areas are set.

The target for the destruction of all other explosive stocks by 2015/2020 is not very ambitious. By the end of 2005 the baseline value of destruction was the fact that 670 caches had been surveyed and 550 cashes had been cleared in 2005. On the basis of information provided by ANBP, the Assessment Team finds that the remaining 120 stockpiles should be cleared in 2006, and the target for destruction of all known ammunition stockpiles should be set to March 2007, like the target of destruction of APM. However, ammunition will be found continuously far beyond 2020.

2.6.3 Assessment of the relationship between the two programmes

Co-operation on all levels among all involved partners is essential. The “twin sisters” live their own lives, according to their respective references, humanitarian and military, which might imply reservations among the donors concerning funding the Ammunition Programme. Changes in the two organisations and their donor relations might cause problems in the future.

To date, one year after the start of the Ammunition Programme, everybody seems happy with the structure. However, seen from an economic perspective, the two organisations might co-operate more closely in their daily work and benefit from their mutual administrative technical capacity. The Team finds that a lot of synergy is unused on the administrative management level as well as on the work in the field.

2.6.4 Assessment of the transition process

The transition process is progressing, but it needs a final kick in the shape of an approved Demining Law. It is also the impression that the process needs more support from international specialists to advise the respective Afghan departments.

The local capacity building inside UNMACA has taken place for many years and the management of UNMACA is quite prepared for the transition process.

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\(^{24}\) Recent figure according to MAPA November 2005 fact Sheet.

The transition of ownership of the Ammunition project is expected to be discussed in 2007. However, there is no plan for the transition at the moment.

2.6.5 **Assessment of funding**

Funding of mine action in recent years has been based on an annual budget of some USD 100 million, of which the EC has funded some 15%. It is expected that the budget level in the period of 2006 – 2008 will remain at this level.

Funding for the destruction of stockpiled ammunition, as opposed to anti-personnel mines only, is a “new business”, where, until now, the only international donor for the ANBP Ammunition Project has been Canada. The implementing partners Ronco, UXB and HALO Trust are supported bilaterally. Ronco, released by UXB, has been supported by the United States. The Weapons and Ammunitions Disposal (WAD) teams of HALO Trust have received grants from the UK, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and the United States.

The transition in the development cycle from emergency phase to the development phase must be considered. To some extent, the humanitarian demining performed by NGOs will be reduced and reconstruction demining will be taken over by commercial companies. It is assumed that lump-sum contracts and fixed prices will be introduced instead of necessary manpower resource contracts.
3. Assessment of the Mine Action Programme

3.1 Introduction

The assessment of the MAPA is based on a comparison of the eight objectives26 or component parts of the programme as identified by the UNMACA27 and the Government’s strategy (see section 2.2.2). The data and information collected is based upon written documentation, interviews with UNMACA personnel and interviews with stakeholders and implementing partners.

3.2 The Mine Action Programme

Since the start of demining in Afghanistan the structure of a mine action programme has been developed with international donors and implementing partners in the driving seat. In 2003 Afghanistan became a partner of The Ottawa Treaty and following this political commitment, the MAPA was transferred from the MOD to MOFA.

The day-to-day co-ordination of the MAPA is assured by the UNMAS through UNMACA, with the MOFA providing overall policy guidance on behalf of the Government. The MOFA provides policy direction to the UNMACA through the MACG. The MACG includes members from Government ministries concerned with mine action, mine action donors, the United Nations, and mine action implementing partners.

The Public Investment Programme (PIP), 1384 – 1387 28(2005 – 2008) includes eight projects, which have been continued from the previous PIP: Co-ordination, Mine and UXO Clearance, Mine and UXO Survey, Monitoring and Evaluation and Training, Mine Risk Education, Mine Action for peace (DDR), the Destruction of Stockpiled Anti-personnel Mines, Landmine Victim Assistance and Capacity Building.

The MAPA includes the UNMACA, eight UN Area Mine Action Centres (AMACs) and 16 NGOs working as implementing partners. In total MAPA employs some 8,700 Afghans and 29 international staff, making it one of the largest civilian employers in Afghanistan.

The MAPA was evaluated in 2003 by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Department for International Development29 and in 2004 by the EC30.

3.3 Findings

3.3.1 Assessment of the co-ordination

The programme has been running for many years, has had many obstacles to overcome in its history and faces further challenges. Viewed from a statistical perspective it is undoubtedly achieving its main goals: mine victim numbers are down and land is being cleared of mines/UXO.

26 The Mine Action for Peace Programme has not been assessed.
27 As stated in Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan: 1383 Progress Report
28 Since 2004 the official Afghan calendar year is from 21st March to 20th March, according to the Islamic calendar.
29 Review of the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan and its plans for the future development of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, by Baric (Consults), February 2003
UNMACA acts as the primary co-ordinating body for the implementation of the MAPA. UNMACA, in consultation with Afghanistan’s Department for Mine Clearance, produces an annual National Operational Work Plan. The document allocates UNMACA controlled resources and acts as a guide to implementing partners when formulating their project proposals, operational and training plans. This document is reviewed quarterly using information gathered from a series of Technical Working Groups (TWG).

A strategic plan of MAPA 2003 – 2012 has been drafted with specific objectives and estimates of the decreased resource requirements and reduction of the annual budget to some USD 20-30 million. Also a working Plan of Action 1385 - 1387 has been drafted in October 2005. The plan will include the SMART objectives (specific, measurable, achievable, result-based and time-bound objectives).

With reference to the two earlier evaluations in 2003 and 2004, the Team finds that UNMACA has improved the planning work with respect to the strategic planning as well as the short and medium-term planning.

3.3.2 Assessment of the Capacity building

The process of handing ownership of the programme over in its entirety to the Government of Afghanistan is slower than predicted. There may be skills gaps at the middle and senior managerial level, which need to be addressed.

Transition and capacity building have been discussed with UNMACA. UNMACA is positive concerning the time schedule of the Government approval of the Demining Law, but finds that the last version translated to Afghan language needs some corrections. UNMACA finds that the transition process is very complicated and to a certain degree unpredictable, and finds that there is a need for additional support by international advisers.

As a result of many years of capacity building of local deminers, team leaders, technical advisers and managers, UNMACA is well prepared for the transition. It is assumed that the existing structure, organisation and staff of UNMACA will be kept in the new National Mine Action Centre.

3.3.3 Assessment of the mine and UXO survey

Issues associated with prioritisation of Suspect Hazardous Areas (SHA) should now be largely solved with the completion of the LIS and the intended upkeep of this database through the use of Landmine Impact Assessment Teams (LIAT).

Some NGO’s, notably HALO Trust, have their own priority system, which does not necessarily reflect the priorities produced by the LIS. In order to implement the National Operational Work Plan effectively there should be agreement among all implementing partners that the priority system resulting from the LIS is the way forward. UNMACA should seek acknowledgement from all implementing partners that the LIS classification of SHA should be the common accepted database from which to formulate a clearance plan. However, bilateral donors and their implementing partners might have their specific priorities.

With reference to the MAPA evaluation in 2004, the use of dogs, the Mechem Explosive Dog Detection System (MEDDS) and the quality of the survey have been discussed with UNMACA. The...
Team has noted that work on improving the quality of the survey using dogs and the MEDDS system is ongoing in co-operation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

All funding from the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) should be directed at those programmes that support the National Operational Work Plan.

### 3.3.4 Assessment of mine and UXO clearance

The completion of the LIS in conjunction with the Landmine Impact Assessment Teams (LIAT) has given the UNMACA a powerful tool with which to prioritise clearance operations within Afghanistan. Based on past predictions of clearance rates and the rates actually achieved the Team finds that National Operational Work Plan 1384 (2005/6) is a realistic document.

Security will be a major challenge in the coming year. The demining teams will now be excluded from working in some areas or will require an armed presence in order to continue to function. This will impact both on production results and cost. Innovative solutions will have to be sought in order to guarantee the continued engagement of international NGOs. Experience from Iraq would indicate that merely increasing the amount of armed protection does not increase the physical security of those being protected and may actually increase the risk.

The Team has noted the following:

- In the Operational Work Plan UNMACA identifies that ‘the issue of physical security is of major concern’.
- Some 60% of clearance assets deployed now require armed guards in order to carry on work.
- 12 deminers have been killed in shooting and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks in the last two years.

However, it is also noted that donors and locals are positive in their view of the future situation and that many of the security problems will be solved.

### 3.3.5 Assessment of APM stockpile destruction

According to the Government’s mine action strategy the objective of APM stockpile destruction is included in the objective of Mine/UXO clearance. With the implementation of the ANBP related to the control, consolidation and destruction of ammunition stockpiles the term ‘stockpile’ is now used with two distinct connotations on APM and other types of ammunition.

When the ANBP is fully funded this programme will probably be better suited to handling the physical aspects of collecting and storing landmines for destruction. ANBP should be given responsibility for this aspect.

UNMACA should retain responsibility for reporting and co-ordinating the destruction of anti-personnel landmines until 2007, by which time the goal of APM destruction should have been attained.

UNMACA might continue to destroy any ammunition stockpiles found, but it is recommended that the objective of stockpile destruction should be removed from the MAPA.

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35 Discussion Scott-Powell 14:12:05
36 Discussion Scott-Powell 14:12:05
37 UNMAS Appeal 2006, Annex 2
38 se definitions, section 1.7
3.3.6 Assessment of Mine Risk education

Casualty figures have been declining in recent years (100 a month in early 2005 down from an estimated 150-300 a month in 2002). These figures are thought to represent some 75% of casualties. The discrepancy is due to the lack of infrastructure to support the accurate reporting of casualties.

ERW is causing casualties at almost twice the rate of all types of landmine.

The Team finds that the reduction in casualties can be attributed to the effectiveness of the MRE programme combined with the clearance of high priority areas. The targeting of specific groups should be re-examined to reflect the reality of those most at risk from mines/UXO. (e.g. special emphasis on women – Casualty figures for 2004 indicate that of the 895 known victims only 25 were women with an additional 49 being females under 17).

3.3.7 Assessment of Monitoring and evaluation and training

During 2005 it has become evident that some of the Implementing Partners (IP) do not have the managerial capacity to carry out their allotted role within the MAPA. This weakness is being addressed by the UNMACA. The indigenous NGO, known as META, has been disbanded and the field personnel have been/are being absorbed and retrained within UNMACA.

The final report of the audit conducted by Price Waterhouse should be released as a matter of some urgency.
4. Assessment of the Ammunition Programme

4.1 Introduction

According to a memorandum of understanding signed by MOD and UNDP in December 2004, a preparatory project was started to undertake the initial survey and planning of ammunition stockpile destruction. The project comprises not only the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines but also all other types of stockpiled ordnance in Afghanistan. A description of the operations is presented in Annex V.

This is an assessment of the Ammunition Programme (ammunition logistic and safety management in Afghanistan) and the Ammunition Project (ammunition stockpile destruction project proposed by ANBP). The project includes destruction of anti-personnel landmines and all other ammunition over a period of one year. The assessment which follows the structure project document creates the basis for the proposal of EC support to ammunition stockpile destruction in 2006 – 2007.

4.2 The Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme

ANBP was established in 2003 and comprises two new projects as a continuation of the DDR programme:

- Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction (Ammunition Project)
- Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)

The Ammunition Project started in December 2004 as a Preparatory Project funded by Canada. In June 2005 a project document was prepared. According to ANBP, the document acts as a combined strategy programme and a project document in traditional terms. A draft strategy for the destruction of landmines was developed in 2004 by UNMACA, and has not been followed up. The proposed budget for 24 months is approximately USD 15 million.

Since the start in December 2004 ANBP has surveyed approximately 30,000 tonnes of ordnance and destroyed 5,000 tonnes of ammunition and 1200 anti-personnel mines. The ANBP programme is managed under the umbrella of UNDP and the Ministry of Defence with ANBP, HALO Trust, UXB, and the Afghan Army as implementing partners. ANBP has eight regional offices.

Until now the Ammunition Programme has expended funds of approximately USD 1.9 million, of which Canada has provided USD 1.4 million and UNDP USD 500,000. The implementing partners HALO Trust, Ronco (until August 2005) and UXB (after August 2005) are supported by bilateral funds from UK, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and United States.

The strategy of the Ammunition Project calls for the ownership of the project to be transferred to the MOD. However, there is no plan for the transition process.

39 See definitions in section 1.7.
40 Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Project Document by ANBP, June 2005
41 Meeting with ANBP, Paul Beardmore, 15th December 2006
42 Afghanistan Transitional Authority. Draft Strategic Plan for the National Destruction of Anti-Personnel Landmines, March 2004
4.3 Findings

4.3.1 Assessment of situation analysis

The Team finds that ANBP has successfully established a project organisation and performed the first year of the Ammunition Project with good results.

Estimate of the total amount of illegal/abandoned ammunition vary considerably. In December 2005 the estimates of Ronco, UXB and HALO Trust were 50,000 – 80,000 tonnes\(^{43}\). UNMACA’s estimate was 70,000 - 150,000 tonnes\(^{44}\).

According to the up-dated ammunition statistics, approximately 30,000 tonnes of ammunition were surveyed in 2005. The table below presents a rough statistic of surveys performed by the three Ammunition Survey Teams (ASTs) nos. 1 – 3, registered by the ANBP database from December 2004 to December 2005. Assuming that the figures are representative of the whole survey performed by of all eight ASTs, the Team finds that most of the larger caches were found at the beginning of the programme, early in 2005, and that it was predominantly small caches that were being found by the end of 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey size, total weight, t</th>
<th>December 04 – March 05</th>
<th>April 05 – June 05</th>
<th>July 05 – September 05</th>
<th>October 05 – December 05</th>
<th>Number of surveys</th>
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<tr>
<td>0 – 1 t</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 – 10 t</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – 100 t</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100 t</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of surveys</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table presenting the numbers of surveys made by ASTs 1, 2 and 3 from December 2004 to December 2005 classified in four groups of total weight of boxed and unboxed ammunition per survey, according to the registration by ANBP on 7\(^{th}\) January 2006. The total weight of the ammunition surveyed by the three teams is approximately 13,000 tonnes, which is 43 % of the total amount of ammunition surveyed by ANBP. The figures indicate that the largest caches were surveyed early in 2005, and that it was predominantly small caches that were being found by the end of 2005.

It is the impression of the Team:
- that most of the large caches have been found,
- that the future survey will be dominated by many small caches,
- that the total amount of illegal/abandoned ammunition of 50,000 tonnes, included the surveyed stocks, is a realistic estimate, and
- that the total amount of ammunition, which is expected to be discovered in the future will reach figures of some 20,000 tonnes.

It is estimated that 80 – 95 % of the ammunition is unserviceable. The ammunition types are often mixed in the same store, boxed and un-boxed (loose) including anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, and it is a general rule during sorting and transport, that all boxed ammunition in good condition will be recovered. It is important that the stockpiled ammunition is destroyed or moved to secure and safe locations (Ammunition Consolidation Points) as quickly as possible.

According to the ANBP Ammunition Update Paper some 5,000 tonnes of ammunition have been destroyed and some 4,200 tonnes have been consolidated, indicating that the majority of the 30,000 tonnes have not been registered as consolidated or destroyed\(^{45}\). ANBP does not register ammunition

\(^{43}\) Meetings with the HALO Trust and Ronco, 10.12, and UXB 13\(^{th}\) December 2005
\(^{44}\) Meeting UNMACA 6\(^{th}\) December 2005
\(^{45}\) For instance AST 1 survey report no MAZ 008 contains approximately 4,000 tons air bombs, which are not included in the reported figures of consolidated or destroyed ammunition.
which is removed by the ANA. The Team finds that the figures of consolidated and stored ammunition, including the ammunition required by the army, are not clear and need to be verified.

4.3.2 Assessment of strategy

With reference to the Government strategy\textsuperscript{46}, all stockpiled anti-personnel mines must be destroyed by 2007 and all other abandoned or explosive stocks must be destroyed by 2020. Based on the pilot APM destruction project completed in February 2004 a strategic plan for the destruction of APM was drafted in March 2004\textsuperscript{47}. The draft strategic plan, which did not comprise ammunition other than APM, gave an outline of management and methodologies for the destruction of APM. The technical methodology was based on the IMAS guidelines\textsuperscript{48} and military technical support from NATO and ISAF. The budget was estimated at USD 3 million. No specific objectives, milestones or time schedule were given, other than the goal of completion before the end of February 2007.

The project is intended as a complement to collaborative working arrangements already in place between key national stakeholders and UN bodies. In particular, the effort will be strongly linked with the DIAG programme. The main components of the project strategy are:

- Survey
- Transportation, destruction and storage
- Capacity building

Besides the destruction of APM the goal of the project is to ensure that over time the MOD is positioned to assume increasing levels of responsibility for project management and implementation. As part of the governance of the project the Ammunition Steering Committee will periodically focus on aspects of the work that can be taken over by MOD. Through a gradual transition of control and co-ordination elements of the project it is hoped that at some unspecified point in time the MOD will be completely self-sufficient with respect to dealing with surplus ammunition and APM stockpiles.

To enhance the technical capacity and expertise of the MOD, the project envisages the installation of a senior international technical adviser and two international trainers at the MOD Headquarters, supported by the US Military’s Office for Security Co-operation in Afghanistan (OSC-A).

The team finds that the Government’s strategy should be detailed and have milestones. It is the impression of the Team that the destruction of the surveyed ammunition caches could be completed much earlier than stated in the Government’s strategy, even by the end of February 2007.

Transferring the ownership of the Ammunition Project from the UN to MOD is mentioned in the last sentence of the Project Document. The Team finds that the transition is a very important issue, and that it should have been clearly expressed in the ANBP strategy. The intended development of a transition plan by April 2007 should be followed by an exit plan prepared for ANBP concerning the organisation of the Ammunition Project.

4.3.3 Assessment of management arrangements

The headquarters of ANBP and the Ammunition Project are in the UN’s main compound on Jalalabad Road. Eight AST are deployed at Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kundunz, Kandahar, Gardez and Panjsher, where they operate in close co-operation with the DIAG WCT teams and other implementing partners. The tasks and routines are described in the Standard Operating Procedures.


\textsuperscript{47} Afghanistan Transitional Authority, Draft Strategic Plan for the National Destruction of Anti-Personnel Landmines, March 2004

\textsuperscript{48} International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.10 Guide for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
The status of work and regional priorities for the next three months are given in the Ammunition Project Update paper, December 2005.\(^{49}\)

In the Ammunition Update paper the planned work for the next three months is presented. However, the Team finds that the planning work should be much more detailed. The time required for the survey of ammunition caches might be difficult to predict, but the clearance work of known ammunition caches, including sorting, transport and destruction is predictable. The work should be measured in terms of time and resources, which should form the basis for a much more precise and operational plan.

No progress indicators are given in the Project Results Resources Framework sheet\(^{51}\) and there is no background for an evaluation of the speed and quality of the work. However, it is the impression of the Team from several meetings that the work is proceeding slowly\(^{52}\) and needs to be speeded up.

The goal of destroying all APM mines before the end of February 2007 must be followed up with intermediate goals and milestones in order to assure UNMACA that the main goal will be reached.

Based on performance during 2005, comprising surveys of 670 caches and clearance of 550 caches, it is the general impression of the team that the bulk of the work of the Ammunition Project could be completed within the deadline for the destruction of the APM. This impression was supported by General Hotak during a meeting on 17th December 2006.

The Project Standard Operating Procedures do not specifically reflect health & safety and quality management. ANBP has explained that the implementing partners are responsible for health & safety and management\(^{53}\). Many of the staff and implementing partners involved work on the basis of their training and experience from mine and UXO clearance. This is far from sufficient for dealing with ammunition. It is noted that three ammunition technicians will assist and train MOD in ammunition management.

The Team is concerned about the lack of importance that has been attached to the issues of health & safety quality procedures, and finds that ANBP has the overall responsibility for health & safety and quality.

It is very important that the transport of ammunition and the storage of ammunition in all Ammunition Consolidation Points as well as the transport and storage of ammunition owned by ANA should fulfil international rules for ammunition safety, e.g. the Manual of NATO Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication\(^{54}\).

### 4.3.4 Assessment of reporting, monitoring and evaluation

In the project document it is mentioned that specific mechanisms have already been developed to ensure the specific outcome, indicators and outputs. The indicative activities include the establishment of an international advisory and overseeing capacity in mobile ammunition and destruction elements, and a Government-owned database for ammunition-related data. Besides the Ammunition Project Update paper it is the impression of the team that no monitoring or evaluation has taken place until now.

\(^{49}\) ANBP: Standard Operating Procedures for Ammunition Survey Teams, Anti-Personnel Mine (APM) & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Project
\(^{50}\) UNDP/ANBP: Ammunition Project Update, as at December 2005
\(^{51}\) Annex 1 to the Ammunition Project Document
\(^{52}\) Including meeting with General Hotak on 18th December 2005
\(^{53}\) Meeting ANBP on 5th January 2006.
\(^{54}\) See for example NATO AASTP-2 Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives
The Team has noted that the government-owned EOD Frontline database is only used for the registration of surveys, movements, destruction operations and consolidation reports. The EOD Frontline database is not used for any statistical evaluation or planning. Besides the EOD Frontline, ANBP has established a parallel database using Microsoft Access, but only for recording the data received from the AST.

The ANBP reports do not include the Net Explosive Quantities (NEQ)\textsuperscript{55}, which is an important parameter with respect to safety management during transport, storage and destruction of ammunition.

ACT team leaders report to ANBP in accordance with SOP. However, it is the impression of the Team that ANBP do not have an overall view of the progress of the work processes. The Team has also noted that it is not possible to trace the ammunition from the surveyed caches to the ammunition consolidation points, military storage or destruction.

In August 2006 ANBP, MOD and OSC-A will launch an informal evaluation of the capacity building component of the project. A review, to be directed by the Ammunition Steering Committee, is planned for April 2007. The review will identify the elements of project management and coordination that can be transferred to the MOD. A corresponding transition plan will be developed on the basis of a positive evaluation.

The Team finds that the form of the Ammunition Update report is good, but it should also include statistics on the resources used and costs, and a more detailed work plan in terms of resources and economy.

The Team recommends that the proposed reviews of the capacity building of MOD should be accompanied by an evaluation of the entire programme in mid-2006, in order to ensure the achievement of the deadline for the APM destruction.

4.3.5 Assessment of budget

The budget of the proposed two-year programme is presented in Annex 4 of the Project Document. The total budget is USD 14,769,866 divided into five activities\textsuperscript{56}:

1. Project management
2. APM/ Ammunition Survey
3. APM & Ammunition collection / Transport / Security
4. Integrated Technology Systems, and
5. Support to Government Capacity Building.

Because ANBP also run other projects some costs are shared between projects. Besides the presentation of the organisation, no comments or justification concerning the budget are presented.

The Team has been informed that the Ammunition Project does not at present have sufficient funding. Out of the proposed budget only USD 1,300,626 has been received.

The Team notes:

- that only 17% of the budget is for actual destruction of ammunition and EOD/ammunition technical assistance provided by the HALO Trust,
- that the WAD teams of HALO Trust are bilaterally supported by UK, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway.
- that UXB is funded separately by the United States State Department

\textsuperscript{55} or Net Explosive Mass (NEM)
\textsuperscript{56} In the budget sheet 6 activities are mention, Activity 4 is missing (error),
that 33% of the budget is for ANBP International staff. 15% of the budget is for project management.

The Team finds that the budget requires a detailed review with respect to the actual tasks of the Ammunition Project.
5. Recommendations

5.1 General Recommendations

1. The Government’s strategy for mine clearance and destruction of stockpiles other than APM needs to be reviewed, and it is recommended that measurable goals be introduced in terms of economic, social and technical indicators. The strategy should also include long-term actions to be implemented after the goals have been met. It is recommended that a revised institutional set-up for the future clearance and disposal of mines and ERW be considered.

2. In order to exploit all opportunities of co-operation and to obtain maximum synergy between the Mine Action Programme and the Ammunition Project, the Team encourages the donors and the management of the two programmes to support and maintain the good relationship.

3. All organisations should support the transition process of the Mine Action Programme and ensure that the process is fully supported by qualified staff and international advisers.

4. Reconstruction demining should be included in internationally-funded projects as any other contractual agreement, with a separate budget within the overall project. Like other mine actions reconstruction demining should be performed under operational control and supervision of UNMACA.

5.2 Recommendations for the Mine Action Programme

5. UNMACA is encouraged to accelerate the development of “end goals” and the establishment of specific, measurable, achievable, result-based and time-bound (SMART) objectives for a plan in the medium term, i.e. for the period from 1st April 2006 to 31st March 2009.

6. UNMACA should seek acknowledgement from all implementing partners that the LIS is the commonly accepted database from which to formulate a clearance plan, and should ensure that there is agreement among all implementing partners that the priority system resulting from the LIS is the way forward. Donors and implementing partners are encouraged to follow the LIS priority system.

7. UNMACA might continue to destroy any ammunition stockpiles found, but it is recommended that the objective of stockpile destruction should be removed from the MAPA to the Ammunition Programme. UNMACA should retain responsibility for reporting and coordinating the destruction of anti-personnel landmines.

8. The Team estimates that the reduction in casualties can be attributed to the effectiveness of the MRE programme combined with the clearance of high-priority areas.

9. UNMACA should undertake a review of the MAPA aiming at the identification of the aspects (if any) of the programme that make implementing partners vulnerable to terrorist attack.

10. UNMACA should establish a contingency plan that allows the demining processes to continue even if the security situation deteriorates further.

11. With respect to the security of the deminers, the United Nations should be encouraged to engage the Government of Afghanistan, along with community and religious leaders, in a
dialogue aimed at making the humanitarian clearance aspects of the MAPA a ‘neutral’ project which is ‘off limits’ to disaffected parties.

12. The Government of Afghanistan should be assisted to improve the reporting system of mine/ERW accidents. The more accurate the figures become, the more focused the response will be, both in terms of MRE and in terms of prioritising clearance efforts.

13. The targeting of specific groups should be re-examined, in order to reflect the reality of those groups exposed to the highest risk from mines/UXO.

14. UNMACA should ensure that adequate capacity building and effective quality control measures related to management functions are being conducted within implementing partner organisations that are receiving funding via the VTF.

### 5.3 Recommendations for the Ammunition Programme

15. The Team recommends that the strategy for the Ammunition Programme (ammunition logistic and safety management in Afghanistan) should be analysed and reviewed on the basis of the experience and results achieved by the operations during the first year of the ANBP Ammunition Project. New strategic goals should be established, and the possibilities for clearance/consolidation of all known caches before the end of February 2007 should be considered. This will also fulfil the objectives stated within the Ottawa Treaty. See the proposed strategy below.

16. The Ammunition Steering Committee is encouraged to review the ownership transition of the Ammunition Project as soon as possible. The intended development of a transition plan by April 2007 should correspond with an exit plan prepared for ANBP concerning the organisation of the Ammunition Project.

17. ANBP and MOD should focus on the detailed short-term and long-term planning of operations. The work should be measured in terms of time and resources, which should form the basis for operational, logistic and financial planning. The planning must consider the need for disposal of excess ammunition in the future following the supply of new munitions to the Army.

18. ANBP is encouraged to evaluate the work processes and develop performance indicators that can be used for the improvement of the work speed. For this purpose the EOD Frontline database should be improved, so it can provide necessary statistics for the evaluation and the planning of operations.

19. International rules for transport and storage of ammunition must be implemented by ANBP and MOD as soon as possible. Risk of major explosives accidents must be assessed and reduced. It is recommended that the management of health, safety and quality be evaluated by an international ammunition specialist as soon as possible in 2006.

20. The Team estimates that the proposed reviews of the capacity building of MOD should be accompanied by an evaluation of the entire programme in mid 2006 in order to comply with the fixed deadline for the destruction of APM.

### 5.4 Proposed strategy for the ammunition programme

The Team recommends the following strategy, which is described in detail in Annex VI:

57 See definitions, section 1.7
Phase 1, 1st January 2006 – 28th February 2007, Destruction and Consolidation Phase

During this phase all known ammunition, including APM, shall be surveyed and either destroyed or consolidated. The work of ANBP shall continue with temporary ammunition consolidation points and ammunition supply points. Detailed plans for Phase 2 must be prepared.

National capacity within ANA shall be established to:
- Continue the survey of ammunition caches.
- Destroy unsafe/unwanted ammunition.
- Move required ammunition to Temporary Ammunition Consolidation Point and Ammunition and Ammunition Supply Points
- Manage the ammunition in the Temporary Ammunition Consolidation Point and Ammunition and Ammunition Supply Points according to international safety rules.

Phase 2, 1st March 2007 – 2012? Ammunition Management Phase

Continued survey and destruction / management of all other ammunition items. The end year of Phase 2 is arbitrary, and must be considered during the planning of Phase 2.

The phase should be divided into two separate components:
- A military component, comprising sorting and rehabilitation of serviceable ammunition for the army, carried out by the ANA assisted by international advisers. All ammunition stores shall become permanent and all ammunition shall be tested for serviceability. All unserviceable ammunition shall be collected and prioritised for industrial disposal.
- A development component, comprising continued industrial disposal of all unserviceable ammunition in an economic and environmentally friendly way, according to general rules and in accordance with the IMAS58 and international good practice for ammunition management.

5.5 Primary needs for EC intervention


58 International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.10 Guide for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, IMAS 11.20 Principles and procedures for open burning and open detonation operations, and IMAS 11.30 National planning guidelines for stockpile destruction.
5.5.1 EC Support to the Mine Action Programme

The EC support to the MAPA should continue with the same level of funding as in past years.

It is recommended that the EC should focus on the transition process, eventually by funding supplementary resource support and training high-level MAPA staff in financial management and strategic planning.

5.5.2 EC Support to the Ammunition Programme

In line with the support to the MAPA, it is recommended that the EC should support the Ammunition Programme.

There is an urgent need for survey and control of the ammunition caches all over the country. With appropriate planning and progress control the Team estimates that within two years the bulk of the ammunition can be managed, destroyed or stored under military control.

The Ammunition Programme needs funding; so far only Canada has pledged some funding of the USD 15 million budget. It is highly recommended that the EC should support the Ammunition Programme in order to speed up and complete the programme as soon as possible.

It is recommended that the EC should focus on the following issues:
- Destruction of anti-personnel mines
- Overall planning based on cost minimisation and SMART objectives
- Health, safety and quality management
- Logistic resources management
- Sustainable development with respect to ammunition safety and disposal.

5.6 Proposed EC funding strategy

The following strategy is proposed:

- Continued support to the MAPA in 2006 and 2007, in line with previous support, to be distributed equally over the two years.

- Support to ANBP during the coming two years. Most of the funds should be included in the budget for 2006 in order to speed up the process of the Ammunition Project. After the two-year period, further funding should be considered for the development of Phase 2 of the Ammunition Management Programme.