
Ted Paterson

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

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Preface

The Evaluation Team wishes to thank the many people who shared their time and views with us, helping to make the mission to Ethiopia a success and leading directly to many of the findings contained in this report. Appendix 2 contains a list of the people we met during the mission, as space does not allow a full acknowledgement of each one’s contributions. We do need, however, to note the roles played by Adam Combs, Geir Bjørsvik of NPA, Oslo who first approached the GICHD concerning the evaluation, and by Valerie Warmington, the NPA Mine Action Programme Manager in Ethiopia, and her team in both Addis Ababa and Gemhalo, who prepared the ground for the mission itself. The evaluation also benefited from excellent cooperation from Etsay Gebre Selassie, Director of EMAO, as well as Alem Teklu, EMAO Manager for the Northern Region and Temesgen, Head of MRE for the Northern Region. Members of the UN Mine Action Advisory Team, and Archie Law, UNDP Regional Mine Action Advisor, were also generous with their time and insights.

Finally, we must stress that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report represent the views of the Evaluation Team. EMAO, NPA, and the Royal Norwegian Embassy are not responsible for the content of this report or bound by its recommendations.

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Tim Lardner GICHD mine action operations management specialist,
Senait Seyoum Expert in Ethiopian development and poverty reduction.
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<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BoLSA</td>
<td>Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>CEM</td>
<td>Country Economic Memorandum (a World Bank document)</td>
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<td>DAG</td>
<td>Donor Assistance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPPA</td>
<td>Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPPFSB</td>
<td>Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.C.</td>
<td>Ethiopian Calendar (see Date &amp; Currency Conventions, below)</td>
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<td>EDP</td>
<td>Ethiopian Demining Programme</td>
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<td>EEBC</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.F.Y.</td>
<td>Ethiopian Fiscal Year (see Date &amp; Currency Conventions, below)</td>
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<td>ELIS</td>
<td>Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey</td>
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<td>EMAO</td>
<td>Ethiopian Mine Action Office</td>
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<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>Emergency Recovery Project</td>
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<td>ERPMU</td>
<td>Emergency Recovery Program Management Unit</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnant of War</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDRE</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia</td>
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<td>FSS</td>
<td>Forum for Social Studies</td>
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<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<td>LSN</td>
<td>Landmine Survivors Network</td>
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<td>MAAT</td>
<td>Mine Action Advisory Team</td>
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<td>MDD</td>
<td>Mine Detection Dog</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MEFF</td>
<td>Macro Economic and Fiscal Framework</td>
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<td>MoFED</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Development</td>
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<td>MoLSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<td>PASDEP</td>
<td>Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty</td>
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<td>PEP</td>
<td>Public Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>QA</td>
<td>Quality Assurance</td>
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<td>RaDO</td>
<td>Relief and Development Organisation</td>
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<td>RNMFA</td>
<td>Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Survey Action Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDPRP</td>
<td>Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program</td>
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<td>SHA</td>
<td>Suspected Hazard Area</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>TIA</td>
<td>Task Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigray People’s Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSZ</td>
<td>Temporary Security Zone</td>
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UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNMAS  United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMEE  United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNOPS  United Nations Office of Project Services
UXO  Unexploded Ordnance

Local terms used

belg  secondary harvesting season (March to August)
birr  Ethiopian currency
Derg  Collective military leadership (a junta) – officially, the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army
kebele  sub-district (cluster of 5 to 10 villages)
kushet  sub-tabia administrative structure in Tigray – the equivalent of a village administration
tabia  term for kebele in Tigray (a sub-woreda administrative unit)
woreda  district

Date and Currency Conventions in the Report

All dollar figures are U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted.

The local currency is the Ethiopian birr, which in recent periods has been reasonably stable at approximately $1 = 8.45 to 8.75 birr.

Ethiopian Calendar – has 12 months of 30 days each, plus an intercalary month of 5 days (6 in leap years, which occur the year before Gregorian leap years) at the end of the year to make the calendar year correspond to the solar year. The year starts on 1 Mäskäräm, corresponding to 11 September in the Gregorian calendar (12 September in leap years). The current year is 1999 in the Ethiopian calendar.

The Ethiopian Fiscal Year (E.F.Y.) is a period covering Hamle 1 of the given year to Säne 30 of the following calendar year. For example, the 1999 Ethiopian Fiscal Year covers Hamle 1 1998 to Säne 30 1999. This is equivalent to 8 July 2006 – 7 July 2007 in the Gregorian calendar.
Executive Summary

Ethiopia is one of the most mine-affected countries in Africa, with contamination stemming from a series of internal and international armed conflicts, including:

- the Italian invasion and subsequent East Africa Campaigns (1935-1941),
- the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-1978),
- a border war with Sudan (1980),
- internal conflict (1974-1991), and

The Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) found more than 1.9 million people living in a total of 1,492 mine-affected communities. Ten of the 11 regions are affected to some degree, but the bulk of the contamination is in Afar and Tigray (bordering Eritrea, with ‘classic’ defensive minefields along trench lines stretching for hundreds of kilometres) and Somali Region (site of the Ogaden War, with more dispersed landmine and UXO contamination). The ELIS also recorded 16,616 casualties, more than half of whom had been killed.

Ethiopia’s humanitarian demining efforts began in 1995, when the U.S. provided training and equipment to the Ethiopia Demining Project – three non-combatant demining companies under the Ministry of Defence. However, in 2001 the Government decided to establish a civilian agency – the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) – to implement the demining component of its Emergency Rehabilitation Programme (ERP), designed for the sustainable resettlement of over 360,000 people displaced by the border war with Eritrea.

With assistance from a Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT) from the UNDP and from the firm RONCO (funded by the U.S.), EMAO trained and equipped two demining companies, which began operations in 2002 in Tigray. Since then, four additional companies have been trained, equipped, and deployed. At the present time, four companies are based in Tigray, one in Afar, and one in the Jijiga woreda of Somali Region. In 2004, EMAO acquired three mini-flail demining machines (by purchase) and six Mine Detection Dogs (MDD – on lease with handlers from ArmorGroup) to support manual demining operations.

In 2004, EMAO and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA – the NGO that conducted the ELIS) began discussions concerning assistance to support EMAO’s capacity development efforts. The Humanitarian Mine Action Project was agreed in mid-2005, with NPA to focus on MDD and Technical Survey capacities (the latter supplemented with socio-economic survey/analysis, which NPA terms Task Impact Assessment or TIA). With initial funding from Norway and Finland, NPA began operations in October 2005. The project is scheduled to run until the end of 2007.

The project also provided for a mid-term evaluation. Accordingly, in early 2006 NPA invited the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD or the Centre) to conduct the mid-term evaluation. The GICHD recommended expanding the

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1 More precisely, there are nine regions and two special urban regions (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa).
scope of the exercise to cover Ethiopia’s mine action programme as a whole, including the contribution of mine action to national development. In July 2006, EMAO, NPA, and the Centre agreed on the broader review as a complement to the evaluation (covering relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and safety) of the NPA project. The three-week evaluation mission took place in October/November 2006.

**Ethiopia’s Mine Action Programme**

EMAO is the most important mine action organisation in Ethiopia. Since it began operations in 2002, EMAO has worked on a series of five demining contracts issued by the Emergency Rehabilitation Program Management Unit (ERPMU), following priorities specified by the ERPMU after consultations with the Regional Governments in Tigray and Afar. In total, the ERPMU has provided about $18.5 million for the demining component (demining plus the procurement of equipment and technical advisors), for which EMAO demined (i.e. cleared or released as safe following Technical Survey) over 24 km² of land.

EMAO currently has a total staff complement of about 840, including 450 deminers, as well as three mini-flails and (currently) 19 MDD provided through NPA. These assets are organised in large demining companies, each of which is based in one location for extended periods – an efficient way of working on the large minefields found in Tigray, Afar, and Somali. Currently, EMAO has limited capacity to respond to small tasks on a responsive basis (e.g. when a community uncovers a cache of UXO or a small minefield), but it is planning to establish Rapid Response Teams.

The Minister of Federal Affairs has responsibility for EMAO, which has a Board chaired by the former Minister of Defence, with members drawn from the Ministries of Defence, Finance and Economic Development, Transportation, Communications, and Foreign Affairs. The Board is charged with establishing policies for and oversight of EMAO’s demining and MRE operations; not for adopting strategies and policies to guide all actors involved in a national mine action programme.

A recent socio-economic assessment of the ERP concluded that “the impact of the demining activities is commendable” and demining has allowed most of the displaced people from mine-affected communities to return in safety. The assessment also concluded that “The experiences gained in successfully implementing the project, particularly the skills and experiences gained by the project staff at all levels...especially in mine clearance, have been remarkable and would remain to be useful in the future.”

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2 This year, EMAO has also had a company demining in Jigiga on tasks identified as a priority by the Somali regional government. The ERPMU has covered these demining costs.

3 The ERPMU estimated an average cost of around $0.77 m², which compares very favourably with other demining programmes in the world. This does not include the cost of technical assistance provided through the UN MAAT, RONCO, or (now) NPA.

4 EMAO community liaison officers also provide MRE for communities in the proximity of demining operations.

5 EMAO originally fell under the Office of the Prime Minister. The Director General of EMAO is also a member of the Board.
EMAO has completed a strategic plan for 2006-2011, which has not yet been approved by the Council of Ministers. This document was prepared as part of the Federal Government’s Civil Service Reform Programme and appears to serve more as a corporate strategy for EMAO as an organisation than a strategy for a national mine action programme (i.e. a document that serves to coordinate the actions of all actors involved, directly or indirectly, in all components of mine action).

There is no other demining organisation operating independently in Ethiopia (NPA’s demining operations are to build EMAO capacities). Until last year, the ERPMU had a small unit responsible for quality assurance (QA) of EMAO’s demining work, which also issued clearance certificates certifying that land has been cleared to international standard. Over the past year, EMAO has assumed responsibility for QA.

Since 1999, MRE services were provided in the Tigray and Afar regions by the Relief and Development Organisation (RaDO); a local NGO supported mainly by UNICEF, which also maintained a victim surveillance system within those regions. In 2004-05, RaDO was asked by UNICEF to transfer responsibilities for MRE and victim surveillance to regional bureaus in both Tigray and Afar, but neither of these regional bureaus has continued the provision of these services on a systematic basis.

Some assistance to landmine survivors is provided by ICRC (via the Ethiopian Red Cross and through a number of government and private prosthetic and orthopaedic centres), while Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) runs a small peer-to-peer assistance programme within Addis Ababa.

Ethiopia ratified the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in late 2004, but has not yet provided an account of its stockpiles or its plans for destroying these as required by Article 7 of the Convention.

**NPA’s Humanitarian Mine Action Project**

NPA rapidly got the MDD component underway, and has been extremely effective in accrediting its dogs and training local handlers nominated by EMAO. The production rates of the MDD teams are excellent given the high quality/safety approach employed by NPA and recently endorsed by EMAO. The mobile MDD base in Gemhalo is well operated. The start-up for the national MDD training centre was delayed some months, but construction was making good progress by the time of the evaluation mission.

The start-up of the Technical Survey component was delayed due to difficulty in recruiting a qualified Operations Manager, but NPA took appropriate steps to prepare an initial draft of an SOP for Technical Survey, avoiding unnecessary slippage. The incumbent Operations Manager arrived a few weeks prior to the Evaluation Team’s mission, and he appears to be suitably qualified and highly experienced.

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6 The Evaluation Team did not receive a copy of the draft strategy – only a presentation summary.
7 The Bureau for Labour and Social Affairs (BoLSA) in Tigray, and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau (DPPFSB) in Afar.
8 RaDO continues to provide some MRE within Sudanese refugee camps in western Ethiopia.
9 EMAO has nominated very well-qualified personnel.
Following a workshop in October 2006, EMAO agreed to proceed with field trials of the Technical Survey SOP proposed by NPA. A key issue is how much land now recorded as Suspected Hazard Area (SHA) can be released as Areas without Obvious Risk (AWOR) based on, first, general survey activities (i.e. analysis of all available data plus a visual inspection) and, second, intrusive investigations of remaining areas deemed ‘low risk’ using a combination of machines, MDD, or manual teams.10

Prior to these trials, NPA will train five 10-person Technical Survey teams in the new SOP (including the use of MDD in support of Technical Survey). At the time of the evaluation mission, NPA was awaiting the assignment of personnel to the training course by EMAO.

In the project design, Task Impact Assessment (TIA) was incorporated as an element of the Technical Survey component.11 NPA brought-in a TIA advisor from Sri Lanka to adapt the system for Ethiopia and to train EMAO staff (principally, their community liaison/MRE personnel, one of whom is attached to each of the demining companies). However, the approach used in Sri Lanka requires substantial adaptation to meet EMAO current requirements. In Sri Lanka, the TIA teams operate separately from, and well in advance of, the Technical Survey teams, and compile an inventory of potential benefits and beneficiaries for a number of mine-affected communities. Priorities are then established for the Technical Survey and clearance teams based on this inventory of socio-economic benefits. Conversely, EMAO has been working on contracts which incorporate a clear set of priorities, broadly established (i.e. to the sub-district or kebele level) by the ERPMU and the regional governments in Tigray and Afar.

More generally, the Federal Government has been pursuing a decentralisation programme for a decade. In at least those regions where decentralised government/administrative structures are well established (as in Tigray), this structure should be used to set local priorities, following criteria set at the national and regional levels (with validation by EMAO to ensure the identified priorities comply with the criteria).

Conclusions and Principal Recommendations

EMAO is a large demining organisation, with growing capabilities, that has performed increasingly well since its establishment. Its demining operations have made a substantial contribution to the resettlement and rehabilitation efforts in the war-affected districts (woredas) of Tigray and Afar, delivering significant socio-economic benefits for those regions and promoting Ethiopia’s post-war recovery.

NPA assistance is well targeted and relevant to EMAO’s existing and future needs. While NPA has experienced some start-up problems, it has been able to manage these to control slippage. It seems likely that the project will achieve its principal objectives by the end of 2007. A question that is not yet fully resolved, however, is how to adapt the TIA model to meet Ethiopia’s requirements.

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10 Currently, EMAP Technical Survey teams release some land based on the general survey analysis, but then the remaining area – both low and high risk portions – is fully cleared.
11 NPA uses TIA to ensure that expensive clearance assets are assigned only to tasks that are likely to deliver worthwhile socio-economic benefits to appropriate beneficiaries without undue delay.
Recommendation 12 (p. 49) – NPA and its EMAO counterparts should undertake a review of the development planning and management systems in place in Ethiopia, including future plans for decentralisation, to understand how to adapt the basic TIA approach in a manner that complements and reinforces local and regional government planning mechanisms.

There have been instances (most notably concerning the importation of project vehicles) where closer cooperation between NPA and EMAO could have saved time and money. More fundamentally, successful partnerships are based on mutual accountability to promote shared objectives. This is particularly true for capacity development projects, where the international agency can only support the efforts of the local partner. Regular meetings could foster this degree of cooperation, strengthen the sense of mutual accountability, and help ensure the project achieves its targets.

Recommendation 13 (p. 50) – EMAO and NPA should institute a system of regular meetings between the EMAO Director General and NPA’s Mine Action Programme Manager to discuss their joint work programme, review progress, identify problems, and agree on steps to resolve these problems. Action minutes should be taken to document any changes to plans and the commitments made by either party.

While EMAO is the pre-eminent mine action organisation in Ethiopia, its legal authority is ambiguous in critical areas and it does not see its mandate covering all mine action pillars, such as stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the transparency obligations of a State Party to the APMBC. As such, the institutional make-up for mine action in Ethiopia is deficient. EMAO management recognises this deficiency and has recommended in its corporate strategic plan (not yet adopted by the Government) that its mandate be enhanced to include responsibility and authority:

- for quality assurance and certification;
- for control, coordination, accreditation and licensing;
- as the national focal point for any mine-action related affairs; and
- to negotiate and sign contracts and donor grant agreements.

The Evaluation Team endorses EMAO’s recommendation as an interim measure, and recommends these additions:

Recommendation 14 (p. 51) – In addition to the modifications recommended by EMAO in its corporate strategic plan, a new decree should:

- charge EMAO with the responsibility for preparing for approval by the Council of Ministers a national mine action strategy encompassing demining, MRE, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the transparency obligations of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention;
- charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining the national mine action database, and for providing relevant mine action data to organisations responsible for the provision of development investments and the delivery of public services in mine-contaminated regions of Ethiopia;
- charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining a national registry of landmine victims and a national surveillance system for recording accidents from landmines and other explosive remnants of war;
- designate which ministries hold the lead responsibility for ensuring Ethiopia meets its various obligations as a State Party to the APMBC, including those for stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and transparency;
- provide for each of the lead ministries to be represented on the Board;
- designate the EMAO Board as the National Mine Action Authority.
In preparation for a new decree, steps should be taken to consult with ministries whose support will be needed if Ethiopia is to meet its Treaty obligations.

**Recommendation 4 (p. 40)** – The Board of EMAO should convene a meeting of representatives from the relevant ministries, including at least the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Health, Labour and Social Affairs, and Legal Affairs to review Ethiopia’s obligations with respect to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and to initiate a process to prepare its initial transparency report as required by Article 7 of the APMBC.

EMAO, with the assistance of the UNDP MAAT, has done a good job in resource mobilisation to date. However, the ending of the World Bank-financed ERP means more attention is needed to mobilise resources from multiple donors. A common feature in the institutional make-up of donor-dependent mine action programmes is a formal mechanism for periodic meetings with donors.

**Recommendation 15 (p. 52)** – EMAO and its Board should formally establish, with the support of UNDP, a Donor Support Group for the national mine action programme, with semi-annual meetings chaired by the Chair of the EMAO Board or the representative from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED).

Ethiopia has an effective demining programme, currently geared to the needs in Tigray and Afar for clearance of ‘classic’ minefields in the mine belt near the border with Eritrea. EMAO has not to date, however, formulated a strategy for a national mine action programme (i.e. one that covers the country’s entire contamination problem and all actors involved, directly or indirectly, in all components of mine action) that fully addresses a number of strategic issues on the horizon, including:

- the transition from World Bank loan financing to multi-donor grant financing;
- transition from a focus on war-affected areas along the Eritrean border to a nation-wide programme;
- shift from working on large minefields within a well-defined mine belt, to more varied and dispersed contamination problems, both large and small;
- the need to assess MRE requirements throughout the country and the challenge of meeting the needs identified;
- the need to address a range of Treaty obligations, including victim assistance, stockpile destruction, and transparency reporting;
- the danger of renewed conflict with neighbouring countries.

Given the tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, and the instability in some of the neighbouring countries, some careful thought about disaster preparedness is also warranted. In addition, now that additional financing from the World Bank ERP loan is unavailable, EMAO will need to make a new case for funding from the Federal Government, which should be based on evidence which demonstrates how mine action promotes the country’s development priorities, such as food security and the expansion of the infrastructure system to reach more rural people.

It is clear that the Director General of EMAO has thought about many of these issues, and the new corporate strategy submitted for government approval provides a good
platform for the analysis of the range of strategic issues in a systematic fashion to formulate a strategy for the overall national mine action programme.

Recommendation 16 (p. 54) – EMAO should initiate a strategic planning process, using its corporate strategy and the findings from the ELIS as a base, to examine the full range of strategic issues on the horizon and with a view to formulating a strategy for a national mine action programme.
Introduction

In 2005, with the agreement of the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) and the financial support of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RNMFA) and the Government of Finland, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) initiated a project designed to enhance EMAO Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) and Technical Survey/Task Impact Assessment (TIA) capacities. These enhanced capacities would then contribute to broader development objectives: (i) the reduction in mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) accidents, and (ii) safe settlement and access to land for target groups (particularly the displaced people and other vulnerable groups in Tigray and Afar regions, where the bulk of EMAO assets are based).

The grant agreement with the RNMFA specified that a mid-term evaluation of the NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project be conducted, in part to inform a decision on whether additional assistance would be provided to this or a modified project. NPA contacted the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD or the Centre) in early 2006 to see if it wished to conduct the evaluation. The GICHD expressed interest, but recommended the scope of the exercise be expanded to review Ethiopia’s mine action programme as a whole, as well as the contribution of mine action to the country’s development. This would allow a better assessment of the NPA project and allow EMAO – NPA’s partner in the project – to ensure that the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the exercise incorporated issues which it wished to have reviewed. Informal discussions with the EMAO Director General during July 2006 in Geneva confirmed a consensus to undertake this broader review.

Subsequently, the GICHD prepared a draft TOR and submitted this to both NPA and EMAO. After some iteration, the final TOR was agreed. The scope of the exercise was to:

- evaluate the assistance provided by NPA to support the development of EMAO capacities in MDD and technical survey (incorporating TIA);
- evaluate the effect of NPA assistance on EMAO’s capacity to plan and manage integrated demining operations using MDD, machines, and manual demining teams;
- review the role EMAO plays within Ethiopia’s national mine action effort; and
- review the contribution of the national mine action programme toward Ethiopia’s development, and efforts made to enhance the alignment between mine action and development priorities.

While the exercise was to promote accountability – (i) of NPA to both EMAO and RNMFA, and (ii) of EMAO both to national authorities and other agencies providing financial support – it was agreed the emphasis should be on learning from:

- NPA experience in implementing its project
- EMAO experience in planning and implementing integrated demining operations

12 Appendix 1 contains the TOR.
The mission to Ethiopia began on 14 October. Broadly, the Review Team was divided into two, with Tim Lardner from the GICHD focussing on the operational and technical aspects of the demining programme, while Ted Paterson (GICHD) and Senait Seyoum from the Forum for Social Studies (FSS) examined the overall mine action programme and its links to broader development objectives. In addition to reviewing documents and conducting interviews in Addis Ababa, team members travelled to Gemhalo in Tigray (the major base of operations for both EMAO and NPA) to observe demining operations and to Mekele (capital of Tigray) to interview officials and conduct visits to formerly mine-affected communities as far as the Eritrean border.

During the second week of the mission, the UNDP Regional Mine Action Advisor (Archie Law) was in Addis Ababa conducting a review of capacity development support provided to EMAO by the UNDP Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT). The Review Team benefited greatly from an exchange of information and views with Mr. Law, and recommends that, when opportunities arise, missions from different mine action agencies be coordinated in this fashion, both to benefit from information exchange and to reduce the time demands on mine action officials and practitioners.

The mission ended on 2 November, on which day the Review Team presented its preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations in a debriefing to officials at the EMAO (attended by representatives from the Royal Norwegian Embassy, NPA, and others).

The remainder of this report is organised as follows:
• Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of Ethiopia’s socio-economic features, the history of conflict and political developments, and the nature and scope of landmine and UXO contamination;
• Chapter 2 summarises some of the key features of development planning and management in Ethiopia (with some detail provided in Appendix 4);
• Chapter 3 presents a history and analysis of the Ethiopian national mine action programme;
• Chapter 4 describes and analyses NPA’s Humanitarian Mine Action Project;
• Chapter 5 provides conclusions and recommendations.

In some cases, the recommendations do not fully specify how they are to be implemented (e.g. which agencies are responsible for doing what and when) and the set of recommendations are not sequenced into a road map. This is purposeful, as the intention is to follow-up with a stakeholders’ workshop in early 2007 to review the recommendations, modify these where warranted, and formulate a preliminary implementation plan.

Appendixes contain the Terms of Reference, the itinerary and list of people met, a timeline giving milestones in Ethiopia’s mine action programme, further details on development management in Ethiopia, and a list of documents consulted.
1. Background

1.1 Ethiopia’s society and economy

Ethiopia is a large and ethnically diverse country, with the second largest population in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) – over 70 million. Most (85%) are rural,\textsuperscript{13} heavily-dependent on rainfall,\textsuperscript{14} and very poor,\textsuperscript{15} with 44% of the population falling below the basic needs poverty line in 2000. In recent years, there have been improvements in wellbeing indicators stemming from decentralisation of responsibilities for the provision of basic public services coupled with an increase in the proportion of pre-poor spending from 39% of the budget in 1999/2000 to 54% in 2005/06. However, levels of human and physical capital remain low even by SSA standards, and Ethiopia ranks 170 of 177 countries in the Human Development Index for 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 – Socio-economic statistics: Ethiopia and sub-Saharan Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethiopia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross National Income per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-nourishment (% of pop.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to potable water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated land (% of cropland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road density (km/1000km\textsuperscript{2})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical power consumption (kwh p.c.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households owning a radio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The structure of the economy has remained remarkably unchanged, with agriculture accounting for over 40% of GDP. Because of this, economic growth is driven principally by the performance of the agricultural sector. After a disastrous period caused by droughts and conflicts in the 1980s, growth accelerated to an average of 4.4% in the 1990s. But the economy plummeted by -3.8% in 2003 because of another drought, illustrating the vulnerability of the economy and the millions of people dependent on good rains for crop and livestock production.

Ethiopia is also hampered by weak capacity. Consultations leading to the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP – Ethiopia’s initial Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) highlighted widespread discontent with the level and quality of public service delivery. The private sector is also weak, in part because of the policies adopted in the 1980s by the socialist Derg regime. Exports are based on agricultural, and highly concentrated in a few commodities such as coffee, for which world prices have been falling.

\textsuperscript{13} Eighty-five percent of the rural population has been continuously residing in the woreda they were born in.
\textsuperscript{14} More households report drought as the worst shock they have experienced, than report death of the household head or a spouse. Only 5% of potentially irrigated land is now irrigated.
\textsuperscript{15} The main income source for 87% of rural households is subsistence agriculture, and 7 or 8 million people are chronically food insecure, unable to feed themselves for more than six months even in the absence of drought.
The current government, which assumed power in 1991, is well aware that Ethiopia needs substantial investment, particularly infrastructure such as roads and electricity to enhance productivity and economic growth. With substantial international assistance to augment its own resources, the government markedly expanded infrastructure investment in the 1990s (the road network grew by 75% overall, and rural roads almost tripled). However, growing tensions with Eritrea and the 1998-2000 border war led to the destruction of infrastructure and a diversion of government resources from productive investment to defence. Donor assistance also fell, as it did after the controversial 2005 elections.

1.2 Conflict and politics

Ethiopians are proud of their long history of independence. Ethiopia is the only sub-Saharan African country that has not been colonised, except for a brief period (1936-41) following the Italian invasion that presaged the Second World War.

Following the expulsion of the Italians, there were no significant conflicts during much of the long reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. Since 1970 however, Ethiopia has been beset by crisis, with a severe famine in 1973-74 leading to an intensification and ultimate success of a civil war against Haile Selassie. Following the Emperor’s overthrow in 1974, a Marxist regime (the Derg) assumed power and, three years later, Somalia invaded to initiate the 1977-78 Ogaden War. Somalia occupied a large portion of Ethiopian territory for a period, and landmines were laid throughout the occupied areas, along much of the Ethiopia/Somalia border, and on all main roads.

Conflicts continued throughout most of the 1980s, with a border war with Sudan at the beginning of the decade, an intensifying war for independence in Eritrea, and more widespread civil conflict culminating in the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, at which point Ethiopia recognised Eritrea’s independence. After a period of relative calm, border disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea led in May 1998 to open war. The conflict was characterized by trench warfare with relatively short periods of heavy fighting resulting in significant casualties. On 18 June 2000, the two governments signed an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities.

Textbox 1 – The socio-economic impact of the war with Eritrea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In addition to military casualties and the economic cost of conducting the war, about 330,000 civilians were displaced in Tigray and another 34,000 in Afar. Following the cessation of conflict, many civilians returned to their communities, but an estimated 50% remained internally displaced, unable to return to their homes due to the presence of landmines/UXO, the proximity of Eritrean forces, or because their homes, water supply, or other essential resources and infrastructure were damaged or destroyed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As well, an estimated 76,000 persons of Ethiopian origin who had been residing in Eritrea returned or were deported, with another 33,000 expected to come into Ethiopia in the near future, bringing the total number of deportees/returnees to about 110,000. The overwhelming majority of these were women, children, and the elderly who arrived with no means of supporting themselves.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Road density is one-fifth the average for similarly low-income countries, and electricity consumption one-thirtieth! Households are on average 10 kilometers away from a dry weather road.

17 Expenditures on defence shot-up from 2% in fiscal year 1996/97, to over 13% in FY 1999/2000.

18 One of the enduring images that fuelled discontent was of the Emperor’s dogs, who remained well-fed while thousands people were dying of hunger during the famine. Undoubtedly, this is a factor in the resistance of EMAO to expend any of its own resources on Mine Detection Dogs.
Further, an estimated 36,000 civilian war casualties (including militia) were bread winners, leaving their families (about 144,000 people) on the verge of destitution.

The war also caused widespread destruction that led to the loss of employment for many non-rural people, and ended cross-border trade, which previously made up a significant portion of the local economy in border areas and included sales of livestock, vegetables, spices, etc. — this in a chronically drought affected region where poor rains during the 1999 meher (main harvest) season led to significant reductions in crop production.* Even those who returned to their farming communities (some without official sanction) found their lands contaminated by landmines and UXO. This lead to a sharp rise in victims to an estimated 400 in 2002, 65% of whom were children.

* Even under normal conditions, average land holdings in Tigray are insufficient to support farm households for more than six months. Seasonal migration to find employment in Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and other parts of Ethiopia is traditional, but the conflict with Eritrea curbed this significantly.


Subsequently, both sides agreed *ex ante* to abide by the decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC), established by the United Nations. However, Ethiopia has not implemented the April 2002 EEBC ruling that required it to withdraw from the town of Badme, which was awarded to Eritrea. In November 2004, Ethiopia recognised the ruling of the Border Commission “in principle”. However, the Government still seeks dialogue with Eritrea on its implementation while Eritrea calls for immediate, unconditional implementation of the ruling. Tensions remain high, with allegations that Eritrea and Ethiopia are actively supporting different factions in Somalia, and reports during the course of this mission that Eritrea has moved troops and tanks into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) monitored by UN peacekeeping troops from the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

**Political developments**

The 1991 overthrow of the Derg had been accomplished by a number of regional movements, and the government established by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) represented a coalition of these, with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) being dominant. The new government adopted a development strategy of balanced regional progress based on participatory development. It embarked on a bold process of decentralisation, supported by large transfers of untied resources from the federal government to the regions.

In May 2005, the first openly contested elections in Ethiopia’s history were held. During open public debates with opposition parties preceding the election, the Government pledged its commitment to a clean process. Voting was peaceful according to international observers (the EU, the AU, and the Carter Center), with high participation. Official results showed the ruling EPRDF retaining a majority in Parliament, while the opposition increased its seats and gained control of the Addis Ababa city government. However, the international monitors reported the elections did not conform to international standards and the opposition disputes the result.

Election-related violence began in June 2005. Many members of the largest opposition party boycotted Parliament. In November, clashes occurred between civilians and government security forces in Addis Ababa and several other cities. Thousands of civilians were arrested, including journalists and key opposition leaders.
Since then, most of the opposition parliamentarians have taken their seats and there has been progress towards the formation of an opposition-led city government in Addis (which remains under a mayor appointed by the Federal Government). The Government had made a number of other accommodations (changing parliamentary rules intended to limit the power of the opposition and talk of easing media restrictions). However, key opposition leaders and journalists still remain jailed, and trials on treason charges began in February 2006.

In summary, Ethiopia today faces continuing tensions, both internal and regional. This insecurity undoubtedly conditions many government attitudes and decisions.

### 1.3 Nature and scope of the contamination

Two main data sets exist on the landmine and UXO contamination in Ethiopia. In 2001, HALO Trust conducted a survey of ‘dangerous areas’ in Tigray and Afar. Shortly thereafter, NPA began implementing a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) to provide a nationwide assessment of the contamination problem, in part to provide a basis for the formulation of a national mine action strategy.

**Textbox 2 – Types of Surveys in Mine Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspected hazard areas (SHA)</th>
<th>Broad (i.e. covering all or a large region of a country)</th>
<th>Single task (or cluster of tasks in the same area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1 or general survey (some – e.g. HALO Trust’s Dangerous Areas Survey)</td>
<td>Level 2 (task planning) survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technical survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Level 3 (quality assurance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic</th>
<th>General survey (some)</th>
<th>(broad) Post-clearance land use survey</th>
<th>Landmines &amp; livelihoods survey (Yemen)**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 4 (post-clearance land use)</td>
<td>Task Impact Assessment (TIA) for single tasks</td>
<td>TIA for community (Sri Lanka)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task Impact Assessment (TIA) for community (Sri Lanka)**</td>
<td>Community Integrated Mine Action Planning (Bosnia)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Community survey (as opposed to task survey)**

Different surveys serve different purposes. Broad surveys are required to get an overview of the scope and nature of contamination in a country at a particular point in time. These are typically commissioned during an emergency (e.g. when masses of refugees are returning following a peace agreement) or as a prelude to the development of a national mine action strategy, when important resource allocation decisions must be made (e.g. the quantity and mix of demining assets, and the allocation of demining assets across affected regions). In such instances, time is of the essence, so a big survey is done on a campaign basis. Because the intent is to get the ‘big picture’ in short order, not enough data on SHA or communities are collected for operational tasking of demining assets.

Thus, mine action programmes also need the capacity to conduct on-going surveys for

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19 This was never fully completed because of restrictions on the disclosure of data and difficulties in obtaining complete and accurate minefield maps.
detailed assessments of specific demining tasks or the requirements of a specific mine-affected community. These surveys will eventually cover all communities and SHA on a rolling basis over a period of years.

In short, while there are overlaps in the data collected in the different survey categories, they serve complementary purposes. We need both the big picture to allocate resources and detailed information to establish priorities for specific tasks. We need technical data to ensure the right quantity and mix of demining assets are assigned to a specific task, and socio-economic data to assess which tasks will deliver the greatest benefits and, therefore, should be accorded priority.

The LIS found that almost two million people in 1,492 communities were affected by contamination (about 3% of the population and 10% of all communities in Ethiopia). Approximately 10% of these communities were heavily impacted, 21% medium-impacted, and 69% low impacted. The most heavily impacted regions were Afar, Somali, and Tigray. Most of the communities were small (50 to 550 households) – either compact farming villages or dispersed communities of pastoralists.20 Almost half the communities (700+) were affected by landmines and UXO stemming from 1976-80 (i.e. the Ogaden War with Somalia, plus civil conflict against the Derg), while about 200 were affected by mines laid during the war with Eritrea.

Textbox 3 – The Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS)

The ELIS was implemented by NPA, with oversight by EMAO, the Survey Action Center (SAC) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), over 2½ years (2001-2004). NPA employed the internationally-recognised protocols established by the Survey Working Group. The ELIS cost over $4 million, including $800,000 in equipment left with EMAO.

Of almost 15,000 communities in Ethiopia, the survey found 1,492 (10%) were impacted, spread through 10 of the 11 regions, with 82% of the impacted communities in the northern and eastern parts of the country (Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions). Communities were affected by from one to seven suspected hazard areas (SHA). Only 49 communities (3%) reported that some mine clearance had taken place.

In a parallel initiative, SAC contracted Cranfield Mine Action to undertake three missions to facilitate strategic planning, which eventually contributed to the recent submission of a draft Five Year Strategic Plan covering 2006/07 to 2011/12.

Unsurprisingly, most of the 1,300 recent victims21 were farming, herding, or travelling when the accident occurred, with the vast majority of victims (82%) being male. Approximately 30% of the surviving victims received some sort of emergency care. Very few have received subsequent physical rehabilitation or vocational therapy. Regardless, a large percentage of survivors are engaged in some sort of productive work (e.g. herding, farming, domestic work).

The graph on the following page depicts the principal asset blockages. As well, pastoralist communities reported the loss of large numbers of livestock.

The nature of the contamination differs significantly across regions. Close to the border with Eritrea Tigray and Afar regions, most of the minefields are ‘classic’

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20 A separate questionnaire for pastoralists was used to gather data not only on a nomadic group’s base area (i.e., the specific community with which it is officially affiliated), but also on watering points and grazing areas, and the migratory routes used to reach those strategic resources.
21 Recent means within two years from the time a community was surveyed. The survey found a further 15,321 victims before 2002.
defensive fields with many anti-personnel landmines along the line of trenches, which stretches for hundreds of kilometres. After the cessation of hostilities, the Ethiopian army conducted clearance operations to ‘lift’ landmines, but this did not conform to international standards and a number of landmines, plus significant UXO, remain. In this area many of the minefields are littered with shrapnel, complicating manual clearance operations which rely largely on metal detectors. Pastures and farmland are the most common blockages.

Figure 2 – Percentages of communities reporting key blockages

![Diagram showing percentages of communities reporting various blockages]

The pattern is very different in Somali region where most of the contamination stems from the Ogaden War in the 1970s, which featured mechanised warfare over a vast theatre of operations. Anti-tank mines are far more common than elsewhere in Ethiopia, and local trails and paths are the most commonly reported blockage.

The next most contaminated region is Oromiya, where the contamination stems principally from the Italian invasion and the civil war to overthrow the Derg. A smaller proportion of the affected communities are classified as high or medium impact. Pasture and rain-fed crop land were the two principal blockages reported.

The prevalence of contamination, and its impacts on communities, are far more modest in the rest of the country, except (perhaps) parts of Gambella, which the ELIS could not adequately survey due to insecurity.

Textbox 4 – Impact scoring for the ELIS

While remaining compliant with international protocols agreed for the LIS, the impact scoring system used in Ethiopia differed in some ways from that employed for previous surveys. For an LIS, community impact scores are the sum of three categories of indicators: recent victims; the presence of landmines and UXO; and socio-economic blockages.

As with other surveys, the number of recent victims is the most significant factor, with 2 points added for each recent victim in a community. The ELIS also gave 2 points for the presence of

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22 The 18 June 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities specified the following undertakings for both Ethiopia and Eritrea: …both parties shall conduct demining activities as soon as possible with a view to creating the conditions necessary for the deployment of the Peacekeeping Mission, the return of civilian administration and the return of the population…”

23 In addition, the army cleared roads for their own operational requirements, which has also allowed road and power line rehabilitation financed by the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme.
landmines and 1 point for UXO (consistent with other surveys).

It is in the socio-economic blockages category that the ELIS is innovative. Previous impact scoring exercises used a simple list of socio-economic assets (irrigated crop land, rain-fed cropland, potable water sources, etc.) adding to a maximum of 10 points. For the ELIS, EMAO decided on the following system, featuring asset categories, with maximum scoring limits for each category (also summing to a maximum of 10):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category/Asset</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Max for category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cropland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rain-fed growing fruit, trees, and other perennials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rain-fed growing grains, pulses, vegetables, or other seasonal crops</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drinking/potable water source</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of water for all other uses</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other assets</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastureland/foraging land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood foraging land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing area</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings and facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, Ethiopia is one of the most mine-affected countries in Africa and the world, with extensive contamination representing – in the various regions – very different challenges for both demining and mine risk education (MRE). It also has a large number of landmine survivors, with more accidents occurring regularly.
2. Summary of Development Management in Ethiopia

2.1 Background

To link effectively with development efforts, mine action officials and advisors need to understand the development planning, management, and financing mechanisms in their country, including:

**Which decisions are made where, and by whom** – Countries allocate responsibility for public service delivery and the implementation of investment programmes in different ways. The main divisions of authorities generally are defined in the constitution. Most mine action programmes find they need to deal with various different central-level ministries, and one-or-more sub-national governments or administrations. If mine action officials and advisors do not understand how authorities are divided across ministries and among government levels, they will be frustrated when they seek decisions from officials who are not empowered to make that decision. Just as critically, they also may fail to obtain information from officials who are best placed to guide the priority-setting process.

**How decisions concerning financial resource allocations are made** – Public expenditure management systems generally comprise a variety of mechanisms for the allocation of resources over the long-, medium-, and short-term. The most critical is the annual budget authorising expenditures for designated purposes in the coming year. But it is unlikely poor countries will be able to find adequate resources in the short-term from their own sources to sustain the essential components of a mine action programme. Loans to governments from development banks also take years to put in place. Thus, mine action officials and advisors need to start the process of obtaining budget allocations even when donor support appears adequate for the coming few years. To do so requires understanding not only the budget, but also the long- and medium-term expenditure planning and management mechanisms.

**When budget decisions are made** – Countries establish budget calendars for their annual budget cycle (planning, execution, monitoring and evaluation). If a national mine action programme is to receive funds through the government budget, it has to be well prepared at each milestone in the annual budget calendar. Eventually, programmes will need to adopt the national budget calendar for their annual planning purposes rather than to those imposed by various donors.

**Aid modalities** – International aid can be delivered in a variety ‘modalities’, including:

- discrete projects,
- ‘common pool’ contributions by many donors to a national programme,
- ‘earmarked’ contributions to the government treasury, and
- direct budget support, which is not earmarked for specific projects or programmes.

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24 Governments have their own authorities to enact laws, and often are elected. Administrations do not have distinct authority to pass laws – their powers are delegated from a higher level.
The modalities toward the top of the list are less risky for donors in terms of the likelihood for misappropriation of their funds, and give greater opportunities for ‘showing the flag’ to claim credit for the project or programme. But the proliferation of donors makes it impossible for the recipient government to formulate a development strategy for the country or a key sector, while the fragmentation of aid into many distinct projects overwhelms administrative capacities of the local government. Both types of proliferation lead to ‘institutional destruction’ rather than capacity development – a process that has been well known and documented for over 20 years.

Textbox 5 – Reforming the aid system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In recognition that a proliferation of donors and projects is no way to help a country, most donors have adopted policies designed to enhance aid effectiveness,* based on the following principles:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ownership – Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alignment – Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Harmonisation – Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Managing for results – Managing resources and improving decision-making for results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mutual accountability – Donors and partners are accountable for development results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This has important implications for mine action programmes, the most important being that, in countries where the development effort is improving, there will be a progression from a situation of (i) no overall strategy and multiple decision makers toward (ii) a single national strategy and single resource allocation process (i.e. the national budgetary process). Even in well-managed countries, this process will take years, but the direction is clear.** In Ethiopia, many donors have joined the Development Assistance Group (DAG), which works with the government to advance the aid effectiveness agenda.***

* Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, 2005.
** Government of Ethiopia, 2002, Partnership for Enhanced Aid Delivery to Ethiopia
*** See <www.dagethiopia.org/DAGStructuring.aspx>

2.2 Key Features

Division of authority – Ethiopia is a federal state, with five levels of public administration:

- Federal government
- Regional government
- Zonal administration
- Woreda government
- Kebele or (in rural areas) Farmer/Pastoralist Associations

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25 Morss, Elliot, 1984, Institutional destruction resulting from donor and project proliferation in Sub-Saharan African countries, World Development, 12:4
26 Further details are provided in Appendix 4.
The current government has initiated two waves of decentralisation; the first (starting in the mid-1990s) transferred significant expenditure responsibilities to the regional governments, and the second (starting in 2002) transferring many regional responsibilities to woredas. As a result, many of the decisions that mine action personnel require from other government agencies to establish priorities (e.g. with respect to land use, resettlement schemes, local development plans, etc.) are now the responsibility of regional or woreda governments. Given this governance structure, it is vital that the mine action programme establishes strong links with government officials at the regional level and below.

As in most countries that are pursuing a policy of decentralisation, there is a fiscal imbalance in Ethiopia. Most expenditures are the responsibility of sub-national governments, but 85% of all revenues are collected by the Federal Government. To address this imbalance, the Federal Government provides significant unconditional grants to the regions, which then provide similar grants to woredas.

The ‘offset’ is an important feature in the current system for unconditional grants. Basically, if the Federal Government is aware of aid funds flowing directly to a regional government, it offsets (i.e. deducts) 100% of that amount from its unconditional grant to that region. This is a strong disincentive for a Regional Government to seek aid directly from donors, as the unconditional grant will be reduced by an equal amount, without an allowance even to cover the transaction costs of negotiating the grant and reporting to the donor.

Mine action donors need to consider the ‘offset’ in any plans to support the transfer of responsibilities (e.g. from the national government or NGOs) to regional governments. The regional governments may be unwilling to accept the new responsibilities – even when funding assistance is available – because the Federal Government will reduce the annual unconditional grant by an equal amount.

To illustrate the issue, consider the efforts by UNICEF to transfer responsibilities for MRE to the regional governments in Tigray and Afar. If the Federal Government offsets any grant provided by UNICEF directly to the regional governments, those regions will be worse off, assuming a new responsibility with no additional resources.

Recommendation 1

Mine action donors should be careful when supporting the transfer of responsibilities to regional governments, even when the donor is willing to provide financial assistance, because the ‘offset’ policy could leave the regional government with additional responsibilities but no additional resources.

Budget management

Like many other countries in Africa, Ethiopia has a number of reforms underway to strengthen public financial management, including the introduction of a Macro Economic and Fiscal Framework (MEFF) and a rolling Public Expenditure Programme – both providing three-year forecasts to facilitate medium-term planning.

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27 Further details on the allocation of expenditure responsibilities are provided in Appendix 5.
28 This is discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.5 in the next chapter.
It is important to note, however, that budget execution has been relatively disciplined, with low levels of corruption relative to many other countries in the region, and no significant expenditure arrears.

The Federal Government has made significant financial contributions to the national mine action programme, financed principally from a soft-loan from the World Bank for the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme. The Federal Government provided some start-up funding for EMAO (e.g. salary repayments to a number of ministries which had staff seconded to the start-up task force that designed EMAO, drafted the decree, etc.). The Government continues to make an annual budget provision of 17-20 million birr ($2+ million) for ‘contingencies’ (i.e. not spent unless required). For the most part, these budgeted funds have not been spent and, in E.C. 1998 (i.e. 2005-06), EMAO repaid over 11.5 million birr ($1.35 million) to the treasury for disbursements made by the Federal Government from 2002 to 2005.

**Textbox 6 – Funding mine action in Ethiopia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethiopia has had an unusual pattern of funding for mine action to date. After receiving training and equipment support via the U.S. Ministry of Defense, the government financed the operations of the Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) for over two years. Following the war with Eritrea, the government obtained World Bank a loan that financed the bulk of demining for five years. Starting in 2007, most of the funds will be coming from donor grants.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is the precise opposite of the pattern seen in most poor countries, which begin with donor grants, then start using loan funds for demining in support of reconstruction and development projects, and (presumably, as few countries have made this transition fully) eventually finance mine action from their own sources of revenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although Ethiopia’s pattern has been reversed, and donor funding will enable EMAO to complete the bulk of the demining, it will again need to get funds through the government budget to complete demining its known minefields and address the residual risk.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Development Planning and Management**

The Government of Ethiopia seeks to promote rapid, broad-based, and equitable growth, and has decided to adopt a market-led strategy. Because the vast majority of Ethiopians live in rural areas, equitable growth must be based on rural development. This will require massive investments in physical capital (roads, telecommunications, and public services actually reaching rural communities) and human capital (so people are able to take advantage of market-based opportunities). As development planners in Addis Ababa cannot know in detail what rural communities most need, the Federal Government has adopted a strong decentralisation programme which (in tandem to market-led growth and human capital development) is intended to empower the poor and expand the choices and control that people have over their lives.

These strategic elements are reflected in the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP) – Ethiopia’s initial PRSP. The Government has been working on a ‘second generation’ PRSP, called the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) to run until 2011, but this has not yet been released.
Coordination with Other Development Actors

Ethiopia has also been one of the pilot countries for work on improving donor practices, and has made significant progress towards coordinating assistance and harmonizing ODA flows. Until the 2005 elections, the donor community had been supportive, but recently the donors agreed among themselves to: (i) move away from direct budget support in favour of alternative instruments; (ii) reduce aid over time if governance does not improve; and (iii) focus on new governance programmes.

The government tries to coordinate the work of the NGOs in the context of its Poverty Reduction Strategy (the SDPRP, soon to be replaced by the PASDEP), with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) responsible for this down to the woreda level. In Tigray for example, the DPP Bureau monitors about 25 NGOs (three or four of these are international).

Disaster Management & Related Issues

DPPC also takes the lead role in coordinating the emergency responses to disasters. In Tigray, the DPP Bureau has also assumed responsibility for ‘resettlements’ such as the voluntary resettlements from the overcrowded highlands in Eastern Tigray to the lower areas in Western Tigray). This is important for mine action as the bulk of EMAO demining resources are now based in the Kefta Humera woreda in Western Tigray, to clear land for resettlements.

Textbox 7 – Possible future conflict in Humera

Growing pressure on land and other natural resources has been leading to conflicts between pastoralists and farmers throughout much of Africa, including Ethiopia. In many cases, governments promote voluntary resettlement of farmers onto grazing lands traditionally used by pastoralists. This promises to raise total food production and reduce food insecurity, because nomadic herders typically use the land for only a few months in a year. However, if the pastoralists have no alternative options for grazing livestock in those months, their livelihoods may become unviable. Often the solution proposed by governments is to encourage the pastoralists to settle and convert to crop farming – an option many pastoral communities find unacceptable.

A number of groups have been working on dispute resolution measures to protect pastoralist livelihoods. In Somali region, the government has adopted policies to protect nomadic communities. In Tigray however, the Evaluation Team understands the Regional Government has not adopted such policies.

EMAO currently has many of its assets in Humera, demining land traditionally used by pastoralists on which the government of Tigray is planning to resettle farmers. While this is in keeping with Ethiopia’s and Tigray’s food security policies, there is potential for future conflict unless measures are taken to protect the livelihoods of the pastoralist communities.
3. The Ethiopian Mine Action Programme

3.1 Overview

An Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) was established in 1995 as a non-combatant unit of the Ministry of National Defence, distinct from the Army Corps of Engineers. The U.S. provided equipment and training assistance, and the deminers worked in a number of regions of Ethiopia, sometimes in support of infrastructure projects.

In 1998, the UN conducted an assessment mission, but provided only advice and support for MRE because of the conflict with Eritrea. Following the June 2000 ceasefire and the peace agreement that December, the government of Ethiopia invited the UN to provide further advice and assistance to revive the national mine action programme. The subsequent mission provided a number of recommendations in this regard, one of which was the establishment of a civilian mine action agency, outside the Ministry of Defence. In February 2001, the Council of Ministers established the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) and, later that year, the UN fielded a Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT).

Even before the creation of EMAO, the Federal Government and the World Bank agreed a loan to help finance the Emergency Recovery Programme (ERP), designed to assist with household rehabilitation, road reconstruction, and humanitarian demining in war-affected areas. The Bank’s project design documents originally envisaged that demining would be undertaken by the Ethiopian Demining Project (i.e. the non-combat demining companies in the armed forces), but once EMAO was established, it assumed the implementation role for the demining component.

3.2 Institutional Make-up

Legislation

Ethiopia was among the first cohort of countries to sign the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 3 December 1997; however, it did not ratify the Convention until 17 December 2004. It became a State Party on 1 June 2005. The Government has not enacted legislation to implement the treaty domestically. Thus, the only domestic legal instrument relating to mine action is the decree establishing the Ethiopian Mine Action Office.

Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO)

EMAO was created as an autonomous statutory body by the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 70/2001 issued on 5 February 2001. Originally EMAO reported to the Office of the Prime Minister, but in a public sector reorganisation last year, responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Federal Affairs.

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29 One reason the government agreed with this recommendation was the possibility of developing a demining capacity that eventually could compete for international work.
30 World Bank policy does not preclude the use of military deminers, so long as these operate under civilian direction.
31 Following the cessation of hostilities, the army rapidly demined most of the suspected minefields, but clearance was not to international standards and many mines were missed, leaving civilians at risk.
32 There is a possibility that responsibility will be transferred back to the Office of the Prime Minister.
The decree states that EMAO’s objectives are to:

- prevent landmines and UXO from causing death, injury, and damage to property;
- destroy such explosives; and
- provide MRE.

Its responsibilities include:

- survey and clearance;
- MRE;
- cooperation with agencies responsible for certifying the safety of cleared areas;
- cooperation with domestic and foreign organizations in the mine action field;
- other activities necessary to attain its objectives.

To discharge these responsibilities, EMAO may establish offices anywhere in the country; own property, contract, sue and be sued; and charge for its services.

There is no mention of any responsibility concerning victims and survivors, and the decree is silent or ambiguous on a number of issues that would, ideally, be covered (see textbox). The powers accorded to the Board fall short of what is expected for a National Authority for Mine Action, and the Office is not explicitly given the range of powers expected of a national Mine Action Centre (MAC), such as responsibilities to formulate a national Mine Action Strategy and annual plans; to certify clearance and accredit operators; to maintain the national repository of mine action data; and to coordinate other mine action organisations.

It appears that the Government’s primary motivation at the time it established EMAO was to create a civilian agency that could implement the demining component of the ERP. The loan agreement with the World Bank had already been signed, specifying that the ERPMU had many of the responsibilities normally vested in a national mine action authority and MAC (discussed below), so the decree establishing EMAO was written to be consistent with the loan agreement. Regardless, EMAO has functioned as the de facto ‘focal point’ for demining activities.\(^{33}\)

**EMAO Board**

The Board comprises members appointed by the government from among ‘pertinent institutions and public bodies’. Currently, it has seven members:

- the former Minister of Defence (recently appointed as the President of Oromiya Region) serves as chairman, plus representatives of the ministries of
- Defence,
- Finance and Economic Development (the Manager for the Mine Action component of the ERP),
- Transportation,
- Communications, and
- Foreign Affairs, as well as the

\(^{33}\) Demining embraces survey, marking, and clearance.
• Director General of EMAO.

In addition to general oversight of EMAO, the Board’s powers and duties are to issue administrative policies; determine the organisation structure; appoint the Director; and fix fees for services provided by EMAO. It is to meet once a month.  

THE OFFICE

EMAO has its headquarters in Addis Ababa and maintains an office in Mekele, the capital of Tigray – the region most affected by the war with Eritrea. Currently it has an approved establishment of 1050 positions, of which 840 (including about 450 deminers) are currently filled. The organisation chart is given on the following page.

Textbox 8 – Ambiguities in EMAO responsibilities and powers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMAO considers itself to be the ‘focal point’ for mine action in Ethiopia. However, the Council of Ministers decree is unclear on a number of issues:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXCLUSIVITY</strong> – the decree empowers EMAO to serve as an implementing organisation for demining and MRE. It does not preclude other organisations from providing these services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE MINE ACTION</strong> – EMAO is authorised to ‘establish relations’ with other domestic and international organisations involved in demining or MRE, but the decree does not explicitly confer any authority over any or all of these organisations. In short, the decree does not establish EMAO as the national authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRATEGY AND POLICIES</strong> – no mention is made of a national strategy for mine action (the Director is required to submit an annual work program and budget, and to implement this upon approval). As well, there is no mention of any authority for setting policies that other organisations would be required to follow. Arguably, the need for a strategy and national policies falls under the provision to ‘carry out other activities as are necessary for the attainment of its objectives’. However, the Board is only empowered to issue ‘administrative policies of the Office’ (i.e. policies for internal operations), so it appears EMAO could only propose national strategies and policies to the minister responsible. In the absence of national mine action legislation to confer specific authorities vis-à-vis landmines and UXO on the minister responsible, it is unclear whether such a strategy or policies would legally bind other public or private organisations (particularly important in Ethiopia where the Constitution and legislation provide regional and woreda governments with extensive authorities). This suggests that, for a national strategy or policy to have full effect, it would have to be adopted by the Council of Ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA)</strong> – EMAO clearly has authority to establish internal QA. However, the decree states clearly that EMAO is to ‘cooperate with organizations assigned to certify that the areas in which [landmines and UXO were present] are cleared from such explosives’ (i.e. the ERPMU, which had already be given the authority to certify clearance to comply with the World Bank loan agreement). This suggests that EMAO cannot issue such certification on its own authority, although the provision to ‘carry out other activities as are necessary for the attainment of its objectives’ might justify this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES</strong> – The decree was passed before Ethiopia became a State Party to the Ottawa Convention. It makes no mention of either stockpile destruction or victim assistance, and EMAO has not undertaken activities in these components of mine action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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34 Reportedly, there have been regular meetings, albeit not once a month.
Figure 3 – EMAO organisation chart

- Minister of Federal Affairs
  - Supervisory Board
    - Director General
      - Audit
      - Admin. & Finance
      - Deputy Director
      - Logistics
      - Quality Assurance
      - Training Service
        - Plan & Control
        - Field Coordination
        - Communication
        - Medical
      - Operations
        - Regional Office (Mekele)
          - Demining Companies 1-5
      - MRE
      - Info Service (IMSMA)
      - Demining Company 6 (Jijiga)
      - International Advisors (MAAT)
**UN Agencies**

**UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION ADVISORY TEAM (MAAT)**

At the request of the Federal Government, the UNDP established the Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT) at the beginning of 2001 to assist the country in developing an Ethiopian national mine action capacity. The MAAT supports the EMAO headquarters as well as its field operations. It has:

- provided advice concerning the establishment of EMAO;
- trained four manual demining companies and ‘trained-the-trainers’ who subsequently trained the fifth and sixth demining companies;
- assisted in setting-up of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and training personnel in data base administration and GIS;
- advised on the formulation of Ethiopian national mine action standards and EMAO Standing Operating Procedures (SOP);
- advised on the purchase of mechanical equipment for demining and on contracting for Mine Detection Dogs (MDDs);
- advised on the incorporation of MDDs and machines into demining operations.

In recent years, the primary focus of the MAAT has been on field activities, including training in quality assurance and advice of the structure and operations of Rapid Response Teams (RRTs – small, mobile teams to respond to reports of UXO or isolated landmines).

**UN OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES (UNOPS)**

The UNDP contracted UNOPS as the executing agency for its MAAT. In addition, UNOPS received a contract from the Emergency Recovery Programme Management Unit (ERPMU) to provide Mine Action Quality Assurance consultants to advise on how to contract for demining services and to monitor the mine action assets in the field. It also served as the procurement agent for the purchase of demining equipment (e.g. mine detectors; personal protective equipment), vehicles, etc., drawing mainly on World Bank funds through the ERPMU.

**UNICEF**

UNICEF has been supporting mine risk education activities in Tigray since 1999 and in Afar since 2001. Implementation has been carried out through a local NGO, the Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO), and in close cooperation with regional and community-level counterparts.

In August 2003 UNICEF introduced a two-year phase-out strategy, asking RaDO to transfer MRE and victim surveillance responsibilities to the regional governments. In 2005, UNICEF commissioned an independent evaluation of the MRE programme from the GICHD, following which UNICEF commissioned RaDO to undertake a survey of a number of mine-affected communities to prepare ‘village profiles’ outlining their development requirements.  

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35 The MRE and village profile projects are further discussed in the section on RaDO.
In future, UNICEF plans to incorporate its mine action support into a more comprehensive disability programme.

UNHCR

In October 2005, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) commissioned RaDO to provide MRE to Sudanese refugees in five camps in western Ethiopia. This is continuing.

Emergency Rehabilitation Programme

Following the long civil war that forced the Derg from power in 1991, the new Transitional Government launched an Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Program, financed by a number of donors and the World Bank. Among this project’s objectives was to support reconstruction of roads, power, telecommunications, and civil aviation facilities as well as rehabilitation of social infrastructure at the community level. Much of the reconstruction work took place in Tigray. During this period, the army’s non-combatant Ethiopian Demining Project provided demining services for the reconstruction of a number of roads and telecommunications facilities.

After the war with Eritrea, a second programme – the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme – was launched; again with World Bank financing. The ERP was designed by the Ethiopian Government to mitigate the human, social, and economic crises stemming from the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. The ERP consists of two loan-financed Projects: the Emergency Recovery Project and Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP – briefly discussed in a later section).

The objectives of the Emergency Recovery Project are to assist the Government to:

1. help the war-affected people to rebuild their lives and resume productive economic activities;
2. reconstruct and rehabilitate destroyed and damaged infrastructure to restart the provision of services; and
3. support macro-economic stability in the country.

The ERP has the following components:

- Rehabilitation of households;
- Rehabilitation of community and economic infrastructure;
- demining; and
- HIV/AIDS.

The objective for the demining component itself is to carry out demining in war-affected areas to enable the return of the displaced population and the rehabilitation of their homes and livelihoods.\(^\text{36}\) Specific tasks include: (i) establishment of a humanitarian mine action quality assurance unit within the Emergency Rehabilitation Program Management Unit; (ii) provision of humanitarian mine action equipment and

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\(^\text{36}\) The performance target was to clear 27 km\(^2\) of suspected hazardous area to create an environment conducive for the safe return of at least 85% of the IDPs (some 64,000 people in Tigray alone) to their homes and livelihoods. In addition, a long term objective was the creation of a national capacity to respond to the landmine/UXO threat on a country-wide basis.
Typically, World Bank loans are provided to a government to allow it to implement a project. Accordingly, an Emergency Recovery Project Management Unit (ERPMU) was established within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) to coordinate activities, and to monitor overall progress in implementation. The ERPMU is also responsible for contracting goods and services, requesting disbursement of funds, and keeping of accounts on expenditures for regular reporting.

For Tigray, a project implementation management office was opened at the regional level in Mekele to manage the operational implementation, with branches at the zonal and woreda levels. Rehabilitation Task Forces (RTFs)37 were established in woredas and tabias to assist carrying out need assessments of affected populations, monitor, review complaints and recommend adjustments when required. This community structure allowed needs assessments of each individual beneficiary, as well as their uses of benefits received. (MoFED, Baseline Study for Environmental & Social Assessment, 83)

It was the ERPMU, in consultation with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) bureaus in the regional governments, which established the demining priorities for EMAO. In brief, EMAO conducted a general survey to document the woredas, tabias/kebeles, and communities that were affected by landmines. This information was sent to the ERPMU which, following consultations with the regional governments, returned a priority ranking of woredas in Tigray (eight woredas) and Afar (three woredas). Within each woreda, the mine-affected kabeles/tabias were ranked by priority. In total, 50 kabeles/tabias were included, of which 44 were in Tigray. The ERPMU and regional governments gave top priority to those woredas and tabias where large numbers of people were displaced – the densely populated areas of Eastern and Central Tigray.

Following this priority ranking, the ERPMU negotiated annual contracts with EMAO, starting in 2002. In addition, the ERPMU was responsible for:

a) setting the standards for mine clearing works;
b) reviewing the SOPs and safety regulations of mine clearing agencies;
c) conducting quality assurance (QA) tests to ensure compliance of mine clearing agencies with accepted international standards for humanitarian mine clearance and UN guidelines; and
d) ensuring that all mine clearing activities are carried out and all mines cleared under the Project are promptly destroyed in accordance with appropriate safety standards and guidelines.

(World Bank 2000, Technical Annex…, 41)

37 In Tigray, RaDO had already established Task Forces for MRE, which were merged into the RTFs. At each level, these are chaired by the chief executive (e.g. the woreda president), with BoLSA as the secretariat. All sector bureaus/offices are represented as are, at lower levels, the associations for women, youth, farmers, etc., faith-based organisations, and NGOs.
For these purposes, it had international demining consultants in its headquarters, and QA monitors attached to each of the demining companies. It should be recognised that, when the demining component of the ERP was designed, the government and the World Bank expected that the armed forces would conduct the demining. World Bank policy requires that, if military deminers are used on projects it funds, they must work under the control of civilian authorities. Thus, the ERPMU was given extensive oversight authority over demining (which was the only ERP component in which a government agency worked under contract to the ERPMU). Had EMAO been in existence prior to the signature of the loan agreement, it may have been given some of the powers vested in the ERPMU.

**Other Public Sector Agencies**

**DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS COMMISSION (DPPC)**

The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) is the government agency that coordinates relief programs in Ethiopia, including mine action during the emergency and rehabilitation phases. In the aftermath of the war with Eritrea, the DPPC regional office in Mekele worked with the ERPMU to prepare the list of the 50 most infected kebeles/tabias in Tigray and Afar regions.

The DPPC is also responsible for coordinating and evaluating the work of both local and international NGOs in Ethiopia and its Regions.

**MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (MoLSA)**

MoLSA is the ministry responsible for coordinating rehabilitation services for people with disabilities. As such, it has been sending a representative to recent meetings of States Parties to the APMBC, as well as Intersessionals, to discuss victim assistance. However, there is no specific national programme for landmine victims. MoLSA also oversees four Prosthetic and Orthotic Centres (POCs), but it is widely thought that only a small percentage of disabled people, including landmine survivors, receive adequate medical and physical rehabilitation services.

**BUREAU OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS (BoLSA) AND DISASTER PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS AND FOOD SECURITY BUREAU (DPPFSB)**

These are the regional bureaus that UNICEF has attempted to transfer responsibility for MRE and victim surveillance in Tigray and Afar respectively. In at least in some woredas in Tigray, BoLSA officers appear to monitor MRE activities and collect accident reports. However, it seems this information is not transmitted to EMAO.

**Funding agencies**

**THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**

The Federal Government provided some start-up funding for EMAO (e.g. salary repayments to a number of ministries which had staff seconded to the start-up task

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38 The *Credit Agreement* for the World Bank loan specified that the ERPMU establish a quality assurance unit within the ERPMU secretariat, which included at least one international expert.

39 EMAO initiated its own QA in 2004 and, with the wind-down of the ERP, recently assumed responsibility for this function.
force that designed EMAO, drafted the decree, etc.). The Government continues to
make an annual budget provision of 17-20 million birr ($2+ million) for
‘contingencies’ (i.e. not spent unless required). This was drawn-up often in the first
year due to delays in securing the initial contract with the ERP. Since then, some
contingency funds have been expended for items not covered by World Bank loan
funds (deminer insurance and some types of vehicle expenditures). However, in E.C.
1998 (i.e. 2005-06), EMAO repaid over 11.5 million birr ($1.35 million) to the

In addition, the Government contributed $6.5 million to the ERP overall, although this
is not earmarked for demining. Thus, Government financial contributions from its
own revenues to mine action have been modest to date. Most funding has been
provided by the World Bank ERP loan. The loan will have to be repaid eventually, so
this represents an important contribution and a good indication that the Government
takes its landmine problem seriously.

**WORLD BANK EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROJECT (ERP)**

The major objectives are to help the war-affected people rebuild their lives and
resume productive economic activities; to reconstruct and rehabilitate destroyed and
damaged infrastructure; and restart provision of services. This was financed by a $230
million credit from the International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan
arm of the World Bank. In addition, the Government provided $6.5 million and the
community contributions were valued at $6.6 million.

The loan originally provided $30 million for the demining component, which was
subsequently revised down to $15 million. In the past year, an additional $3.5 million
was transferred to the demining component, bringing the total to $18.5 million. Five
contracts were issued to EMAO for the demining component, and UNOPS was
contracted to procure equipment for EMAO and QA experts for the ERPMU itself.

The recent report on the impact of the ERP reports that a total of 24.3 km$^2$ of land had
been demined, implying an average cost of $0.77 per m$^2$, which is extremely cost
effective by international standards.

A sister World Bank-financed project also provided substantial assistance to disabled
war veterans, including landmine survivors (see textbox).

**Textbox 9 – Survivor Assistance through the Emergency Demobilisation &
Reintegration Project (EDRP)**

The EDRP was a $170.6 million sister project to the Emergency Recovery Project that
assisted the government in demobilising and reintegrating 148,000 veterans (98.6% of the
original target).

An estimated 17,000 disabled veterans were designated as a special target group, eligible for
somewhat higher economic reintegration assistance payments ($605 for mildly disabled and
$675 for moderately disabled, compared to $425 for other veterans), as well as targeted
medical assistance.

To meet the demand for prosthetic-orthotic and physiotherapy care for the 17,000 disabled
war veterans, the project paid to rehabilitate, equip, and staff the Alage rehabilitation centre
(to serve as the National Rehabilitation Centre) and five regional prosthetic orthotic centres
(POCs). The Alage centre provides intensive care to the approximately 1,000 severely disabled veterans, while the other POCs address the needs of the 16,000 less severely disabled veterans. The original budget provided $12.3 million for this component, but Landmine Monitor 2002 reported that over $19 million would be spent.

It is unclear how many of the disabled veterans were survivors of landmine accidents.

**EUROPEAN COMMISSION**

The EC originally provided over $1 million in funding for the ELIS. In 2004, the EC and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Secretariat agreed in principle to allocate €10 million to both Eritrea and Ethiopia for peace-building initiatives.\(^{40}\)

Subsequently the EC and ACP Secretariat agreed with the Ethiopian Government to allocate €8 million of this to mine action. The financing agreement for the Ethiopian project has just recently been signed by the EC and the ACP States.

The EC is now revising its Country Strategy Paper for Ethiopia and, if mine action is included as one of the focus areas, more funds could be forthcoming for EMAO in the future. In addition, the EU is forging stronger links with the African Union (AU), which is headquartered in Addis Ababa. This could lead to spin-off benefits for Ethiopia’s mine action programme.

**NORWAY AND OTHER BILATERAL DONORS**

Norway provided significant funding to both NPA ($1.02 million) and the UNDP ($374,500) for the ELIS. It has since funded UNDP for the MAAT and, in 2005, agreed to fund the NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project through at least the end of 2007. The Embassy advised the Evaluation Team that Norway is open to the possibility of additional mine action support in the future.

Funds for mine action in Ethiopia have also been provided by (at least) Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S.\(^{41}\)

We estimate that over $31 million has been provided for mine action from 2001-05, with a peak in 2002 due to heavy equipment purchases. About half of the total funding to date has come from the World Bank loan.

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\(^{40}\) This was from EUR 50 million in unexpended monies from the Seventh European Development Fund (EDF VII) that was allocated for peacebuilding initiatives. EDF funds are not part of the EC budget, and are financed by voluntary contributions from EU member states and managed jointly by the EC and the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Secretariat in Brussels.

\(^{41}\) LMM 2004 reported that the U.S. provided $8.8 million in assistance from 1993-99.
Operators
EMAO is the principal operator in Ethiopia, and the only civilian agency currently engaged in demining. In addition, it has community liaison officers attached to each of its demining companies who inform communities of planned clearance activities and obtain details of how mines and UXO impact the communities, which they feed back to the demining company commanders responsible for the clearance activities.\footnote{According to RaDO, the work of EMAO community liaison officers has resulted in improved cooperation with demining teams, reduced removal of minefield markers, improved respect for minefield fences and signs, and increased the number of suspect mines and UXO reported to EMAO teams. (LMM, 2005)}

RONCO
In 2001 the U.S. Department of State funded the firm RONCO to provide start-up assistance to EMAO. It trained and partially equipped the first two demining companies, and monitored their operations for some months.

NORWEGIAN PEOPLE’S AID (NPA)
NPA implemented the Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) from late 2001-04. In mid-2005, NPA initiated its Humanitarian Mine Action Project, designed to support EMAO’s capacity development in the area of MDDs and technical survey/task impact assessment (TIA – NPA’s ‘brand name’ for socio-economic assessment of demining tasks). The current NPA project is discussed in the next Chapter.

REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (RaDO)
The Rehabilitation and Development Organization, an Ethiopian NGO, was founded in 1997 with a mandate to help and rehabilitate physically disabled persons. Starting in late 1999, RaDO received a grant from the World Bank to initiate emergency mine risk education in Tigray. Later that same year, UNICEF began funding the MRE in Tigray\footnote{Initially, UNICEF also provided technical assistance to RaDO.} and, in 2001, Afar.
In mid-2003, UNICEF adopted a two-year transition strategy in which RaDO’s role was to build capacity in regional government units in both Tigray and Afar. Following this, UNICEF commissioned RaDO to undertake a Village Profile Project to assess the development priorities in 11 mine-affected communities (some cleared but others still impacted by contamination). RaDO submitted its draft report in 2006, but this has not been finalised.\[44\]

Since October 2005 on behalf of the UNHCR, RaDO has also been provided MRE to Sudanese refugees in five camps in Western Ethiopia.

**OTHERS**

A number of other organisations have modest programmes that provide assistance to landmine survivors, in programmes that focus specifically on landmine survivors or (more often) as part of broader disability assistance programmes. These include Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Ethiopian Red Cross, and four orthopaedic workshops administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA): the Addis Ababa Prosthetic Orthotic Centre (POC), as the national referral centre for physical rehabilitation; the Mekele Orthopaedic and Physiotherapy Centre; and POCs in Dessie and Harar.

### 3.3 Strategy

**Current Strategy**

Until this point, EMAO’s operations have been financed principally by the ERP and so it has operated largely within the framework of the ERP strategy. The objectives of the ERP centre on the need to resettle – in a sustainable manner – IDPs displaced by the war, plus returnees and deportees from Eritrea. Sustainability means that the war-damaged social and economic infrastructure has to be rehabilitated, and that the large minefields in agricultural areas have to be cleared, which provides a clear focus for the demining component.

The specific objectives of the demining component of the ERP are to:\[45\]

- mitigate the threat of landmines and UXO; and
- create an environment conducive for the safe and sustainable return of civilians to their homes and livelihood.

**Draft Strategy**

In parallel to the Landmine Impact Survey, the mine action section from Cranfield University undertook a number of missions in 2003-04 to advise and conduct a workshop on strategic planning for mine action, but this did not lead to a strategic plan. EMAO subsequently established a strategic planning team and all staff members had an opportunity to participate in the formulation of a draft plan for 1999-2003 E.C. (i.e. July 2006 to June 2011). This has been submitted to its Board for adoption, but has not yet been approved by the Federal Government.\[46\]

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\[44\] The Evaluation Team has been unable to obtain a copy of the draft report.
\[45\] From the Technical Annex for the World Bank loan.
\[46\] The Evaluation Team did not obtain a copy of the draft strategy; rather, EMAO provided a copy of a PowerPoint presentation on the strategy.
The draft strategy sets the following goals:

1. Elimination of the socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO in mine-affected communities;
2. Provide mine risk education effectively to mine affected communities and thereby reduce the number of victims;
3. Build an internationally competent mine action program;
4. Build a mine information system capacity which will assist in planning of demining and MRE, and will provide full information to other developmental [actors?]

It is important to note that the draft strategy was prepared according to the guidelines issued by the Federal Government’s civil service reform programme. As such, it appears to serve more as a corporate strategy for EMAO as an organisation than a strategy for a national mine action programme (i.e. a document that serves to coordinate the actions of all actors involved, directly or indirectly, in mine action). For example, the specific objectives for MRE relate only to communities in which EMAO is conducting mine clearance, together with neighbouring communities – there is nothing concerning the MRE requirements in the rest of the country.

As well, the draft strategy is silent on stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and other Treaty obligations, which were not mentioned in the February 2001 decree. At the same time, it is clear that EMAO management is aware that its mandate laid out in the decree is too narrow, and the draft strategy recommends revising the decree to include responsibility:

- for QA and certification of land clearance
- for control, coordination, accreditation, and licensing (presumably, of other organisations providing mine action services)
- to directly negotiate and sign contracts and donor grant agreements
- to serve as the national ‘focal point’ for all mine action issues.

### 3.4 Priority-setting

To date, the location and sequencing of demining operations have been dictated principally by the list of priorities (woredas and tabias/kebeles) established in 2002 by the ERPMU in consultation with regional governments in Tigray and Afar. In 2005, EMAO converted its MRE personnel into community liaison officers who – in addition to their MRE tasks – review demining plans with local authorities. According to the Director General of EMAO, these consultations have only resulted in two changes to the original priority list. EMAO was able to accommodate one of these requests without the need for an adjustment to the established list of priorities. For the other (in a remote part of Afar), EMAO has examined the requested change, but is unconvinced it is warranted given the criteria established for determining priorities, or that the security in the area would allow the demining teams to work in safety.

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47 All public organisations were required to prepare a strategic plan encompassing expected outcomes, key result areas and objectives.
48 There are five sub-programmes to the Civil Service Reform Programme: (i) improve leadership/management structure; (ii) personnel management improvement; (iii) improved service delivery; (iv) resource use & expenditure management, and (v) ethics and anti-corruption.
The current priority-setting system is geared to establishing priority rankings for large areas (i.e. minefield belt in a tabia) that will be addressed by large demining units (companies). The Evaluation Team was unable to make a complete assessment of how well the micro task sequencing (i.e. which parts of the minefield belt within a tabia are cleared first) is conducted. The existence of the community liaison officers attached to each demining company suggests that there is at least a channel for local communities to voice their preferences, and all of the regional, woreda, and tabia officials we met expressed satisfaction with the work of EMAO deminers.

EMAO has on occasion responded to requests by sending small demining teams to address emergencies,\(^\text{49}\) but it appears the priority-setting system does not readily accommodate emergency requests relating to small clearance tasks (e.g. a few mines or UXO) from communities outside the areas in which the demining companies happen to be located. The evidence from other mine action programmes suggests that the ability to respond quickly to such requests is important as a casualty reduction measure, particularly as the ‘footprints’ of communities expand due to economic and/or population growth, bringing community members into contact with more remote contamination. Presumably, such requests could be handled in the future by the proposed Rapid Response Teams (RRT) once these are operational.

The more fundamental issue is that the current system for establishing priorities is unlikely to be adequate once demining companies are re-located from the mine belt along the Eritrean border\(^\text{50}\) to other regions of the country, where minefields are smaller and more dispersed. The draft strategy does not appear to address this issue in any depth, and simply proposes the following criteria for setting demining priorities:

1. Alleviation of human suffering in areas where casualty rates are high;
2. Enable the resettlement of internally displaced people;
3. Support for regional and national reconstruction/rehabilitation programmes; and
4. Food security projects to increase the availability of agriculture and grazing lands.\(^\text{51}\)

### 3.5 Operations

#### Demining

**MANUAL MINE CLEARANCE**

In 1995, the U.S. Defense Department provided training and equipment\(^\text{52}\) to three non-combatant army demining companies – each with 100 personnel – which conducted demining operations (along with limited MRE) as the Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) in various areas of the country until 2001. The original plans for the demining component of the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme envisaged that the

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\(^{49}\) For example, it sent a team of eight deminers and support personnel to Addis Ababa following an explosion of an ammunition stockpile, as this was a national priority.

\(^{50}\) A company is also working in Jijiga woreda of the Somali region, but we understand it is also working on large perimeter minefields around Jijiga airport.

\(^{51}\) These are virtually the same criteria reported in the Draft ELIS report from 2004.

\(^{52}\) The German Government also donated equipment in 1997.
EDP would be the government’s demining contractor, however, the Government subsequently decided to establish an autonomous civilian agency (EMAO) and to transfer most of the EDP personnel to it.

Accordingly, in 2001-02 the U.S. State Department contracted the firm RONCO to re-train and partially equip EMAO’s first two manual demining companies. These were deployed to Tigray in March 2002, and for some months RONCO provided a technical monitor attached to both companies. Training of a third manual demining company began in September 2002 and, in December 2002, this was deployed.

In 2004, a fourth demining company was trained and deployed, and the UN MAAT also conducted a train-the-trainers sessions, allowing EMAO trainers to complete the training of the fifth and sixth demining companies in 2005, one of which was deployed to Jijiga woreda in Somali region.

EMAO now has six demining companies located in three separate regions – four companies in Tigray, one in Afar and one in Somali region. The general structure of the companies is shown below.

**Figure 5 – Structure of demining companies**

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53 World Bank policy does not prohibit the use of military deminers on Bank-funded projects, so long as these function under the direction of civilian authorities and the demining “is an integral part of a development project or a prelude to a future development project or program to be adopted by the borrower.” *World Bank Operational Guidelines for Financing Land Mine Clearance*, 1997.

54 A number of considerations appear to have influenced this decision – UN advice that a civilian agency could be managed more effectively and attract more donor support, plus the hope that a civilian agency might eventually be able to compete successfully for international demining contracts.

55 The training provided to EDF deminers in 1995 predated the adoption on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), so the re-training was, in part, to ensure demining was IMAS-compliant.

56 EMAO received its first demining contract from ERPMU in August 2002.

57 These were military deminers seconded to EMAO. In 2006, these deminers were formally transferred from the Ministry of Defence to EMAO.
A company commander has three or (for the 5th & 6th companies) four platoons and, depending on the operational need, may have mechanical or dog support attached to his unit (see below). The manual deminers, who form the core of the company, are well equipped and trained, and appear to work in a professional manner.

**Figure 6 – Growth in EMAO manual demining capacities**

Based on site visits in Western Tigray, it appears that EMAO’s manual demining operations compare favourably with others from Africa and internationally. This appears to be the result of the discipline of the Ethiopian deminers (most of whom originally served in the armed forces); effective management and supervision by the officers in each company, and by the Mekele office and Addis Ababa headquarters; and the training and technical advice offered to EMAO through UNDP.

**Mine Detection Dogs (MDD)**

EMAO originally introduced MDD into its demining operations when it issued a one-year contract to the firm ArmorGroup in 2004 to provide six dogs and handlers. The ERPMU would not extend this contract with World Bank funds, but DfID agreed to finance an extension to continue MDD support to demining operations until NPA could import, acclimatise, and accredit its MDD (discussed in the next chapter). ArmorGroup donated its dogs to EMAO in the summer of 2006. After an assessment, NPA decided not to use any of the six ArmorGroup dogs. It now is operating with 19 dogs imported from NPA’s Global Training Centre (GTC) in Bosnia and the NPA programme in Mozambique.

From observing the operations of the MDD in Tigray region, it is clear they are an excellent addition to the capacity of EMAO. Although the change from the concept employed by ArmorGroup (essentially free running and long-leash dogs) to the NPA approach (long- and short-leash dogs) was not universally endorsed in advance, it appears that NPA’s concept is well conceived and the implementation has been effective. The local handlers are extremely professional and dedicated to the effective use of the dogs. Although the output of the NPA dogs is lower than achieved by ArmorGroup (whose contract had a performance target of 2,000 m² per day per dog.

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58 NPA procedures call for (in most cases), ground to be covered by a dog on a long leash, then a second pass by a dog on a short-leash.
whereas NPA procedures produce up to 1,400 m$^2$ per day, and average less), this has been accepted because there were concerns as to the quality of the previous output.  

Six more MDD are due to arrive in March 2007, bringing the total to 25.

IMAS 09.40 (draft Edition 2) states that a central feature of the implementation of IMAS standards for MDD must be the operational accreditation of MDD teams (dogs and handlers). EMAO Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSG) lay out the process of accreditation of MDD. The accreditation area at Gemhalo offers sufficient boxes and facilities to complete an effective accreditation procedure and the one accreditation process viewed as part of this process appeared to have been undertaken professionally and to have followed the TSG.

**MECHANICAL GROUND PREPARATION**

In 2004, EMAO purchased three Bozena IV mini flails from Slovakia to provide mechanical ground preparation support for both the MDD teams and the manual demining companies. The purchase was financed from the World Bank loan administered by the ERPMU. Training services and a stock of spare parts were also part of the contract.

Bozena IV’s are widely viewed as well-designed and durable demining machines, suitable for ground preparation in a variety of conditions. From observations during the site visit to Western Tigray, it is apparent that EMAO mechanics are well trained and the three Bozenas are well maintained and operating effectively. These machines appear to have been a sound purchase.

**TECHNICAL SURVEY**

The current EMAO Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) defines Technical Survey as “a step between the National Survey and actual demining activities.” The current modus operandi for Technical Survey is a platoon of deminers who are sent to a task shortly before a company is deployed for clearance. The SOP does offer some description of the physical process required to undertake such a task but, on the ground, the Technical Survey Platoons essentially operate as minefield marking and delineation teams (i.e. they do not probe into the suspected minefield to determine its boundaries more precisely and, thereby, release as much land as possible).

Still, the process of delineating and marking minefields in preparation for clearance has improved significantly since operations in Tigray commenced, in part because greater use is being made of minefield sketch maps handed over by the Eritrean army following the peace agreement. This has resulted in more land being released through a fairly simple re-survey without clearance, thereby focussing expensive clearance operations on areas where there remains a strong suspicion that landmines are present.

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59 Training MDD is not yet a science, and there are heated debates over which concept is better. Free running dogs tend to cover more area, but it is harder to ensure the entire area is adequately covered (e.g. dogs may not keep their noses close to the ground). The performance of dogs working on a short leash is easier to monitor, but daily productivity rarely averages as much as 1000 m$^2$ per dog.

60 In addition to IMAS 9.40 – Use of MDD, there are IMAS 9.41 – Operational procedures for MDD, and IMAS 9.42 – Operational Accreditation for MDD.
### Release of land through demining

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Area released</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-survey (with Eritrean sketch maps)</td>
<td>82.3 km²</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical survey</td>
<td>3.3 km²</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance</td>
<td>23.7 km²</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109.3 km²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTEGRATION**

EMAO now has a range of complementary assets in its demining ‘toolbox’ – manual companies; machines; MDD. Each of these is functioning well and EMAO’s overall productivity compares favourable with most other demining programmes in the world. The challenge is to continue the performance improvement process. Experience elsewhere suggests that further performance improvements could come from three sources (which are not mutually exclusive).

1. Incremental productivity improvements through ‘learning by doing’, supplemented by exchanges with other programmes;

   How effectively a demining ‘toolbox’ is utilised depends largely on the demining commanders and supervisors, who must understand how each type of asset will perform given the conditions (weather; slope; vegetation; metal content of the soil; types of munitions present; etc.), and how to combine the different assets to best take advantage of their complementary performance characteristics. This takes experience, but the learning process can be accelerated if commanders and supervisors have the opportunity to visit other demining programmes to exchange experiences with others employing integrated demining approaches.

2. Use of machines and dogs for more aggressive area reduction, reserving expensive full clearance operations for areas in which there remains a strong suspicion of the presence of landmines;

   Initial surveys of landmine contamination rarely have adequate data or the time to accurately delimit minefield boundaries, and much more land is recorded as ‘suspect’ than ultimately will be found to be contaminated. Many national demining programmes are experimenting with ways to release suspect land without full clearance. EMAO has been achieving more land release in recent years because of better investigation based on Eritrean minefield sketch maps, but does not have procedures in place to release even more land based only on the use of machines and/or MDD (as shown in the table above, only 3% of the SHA released to date has been through technical survey). With more experience using the machine and dog assets, it may be possible to releasing more land faster and cheaper.

3. Greater incorporation of socio-economic analysis to ensure demining assets are focused on those areas that are likely to be used without delay to enhance the wellbeing of people in mine-affected communities.

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61 At the time of the mission, a further 36 km² of SHA in Tigray remained for re-survey. We understand this re-survey is now underway.

62 In a useful initiative, NPA has arranged for the Director General of EMAO to visit Cambodia to view demining operations in that large and technically sophisticated programme.

63 The current SOP only allow for Technical Survey undertaken by manual mine demining teams.
Productivity and cost-efficiency are important aspects of performance. However, experience from other mine action programmes shows that better targeting of demining assets on land that will yield the greatest socio-economic benefits without delay is often more important than operational efficiency in yielding good programme outcomes. This requires some way of incorporating socio-economic data into the system for setting task priorities.

Until now, task assignments have been based almost entirely on priorities established by the ERPMU and regional authorities in 2002. This has worked remarkably well until now, in part because the local administrative systems in Tigray work effectively and in part because the clear focus was on resettlement of large numbers of displaced people. A new approach to setting priorities will be required as EMAO redeploys assets away from the mine belt close to Eritrea, and into regions where local administration may not be as well established as Tigray. Any new approach will require a mechanism for incorporating socio-economic issues more explicitly into the decision-making process. NPA’s Task Impact Assessment (TIA) approach could be useful in this regard if it can be suitably adapted to Ethiopia’s governance structures (which may vary from one region to another). This is discussed in the next Chapter.

**OTHER POINTS**

Observations and discussions with demining personnel during the site visits in western Tigray suggest that mapping skills remain rudimentary. As well, mapping procedures need to document the use of assets and the clearance actually undertaken, which are not done adequately at the present time.

**Recommendation 2**

**EMAO should arrange upgraded training in mapping for (at least) company and platoon commanders, and surveyors.**

During our mission, concerns were expressed at procedures to investigate accidents that occur during EMAO clearance operations. IMAS 10.60 requires formal investigations to be conducted by an “appropriately qualified and experienced third party” for a number of defined situations (including “a demining accident resulting in injury or death”). It further requires the National Mine Action Authority, or organisation acting on its behalf, to disseminate the information on demining incidents.

In addition, the EMAO SOP and TSG require the completion of an IMSMA form with details of the accident to be completed and submitted to the IMSMA database. It appears that not all accident records are delivered to and recorded in IMSMA. More of a concern is the lack of third party expertise on the board of enquiry that are convened for such investigations.

**Recommendation 3**

**EMAO should ensure that all investigations of demining accidents are conducted in accordance with IMAS 10.60, and that all details of such accidents are recorded in IMSMA.**

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64 An excellent measure of overall performance is the ratio of benefits to costs. Enhancing productivity and cost-effectiveness raises this ratio by reducing costs, but the ratio can also be raised by targeting demining assets to land that delivers the greatest benefits to people.
Mine Risk Education (MRE)

Most MRE has been conducted by RaDO, which began with mass sensitization for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps. In mid-2000 RaDO converted to a community-based approach, training community volunteer representatives and establishing community task forces for MRE (which were subsequently absorbed into the RTFs established by the ERP). In 2001, RaDO introduced MRE in the schools, established MRE drama clubs in all schools, and initiated child-to-child component by training child survivors as instructors. In the same year, it expanded into three woredas in Afar, adapting its programme to the needs of pastoralists. During this period, RaDO also collected victim data, which showed a significant reduction in accidents following the end of the war.

Figure 7 – Victim statistics for Tigray: 1998-2004

In 2003, UNICEF introduced an MRE transition strategy, in which RaDO’s role was to build the capacities of the Office for Rehabilitation and Social Affairs (ORSA) in Tigray, and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness and Food Security Bureau (DPPFSB) in Afar to continue MRE and victim surveillance. RaDO’s MRE activities in Tigray and Afar ended in August 2005.

In late 2005, UNICEF commissioned RaDO to undertake a project to develop village profiles for 11 mine-affected communities in Tigray. At the time of the evaluation mission, RaDO had submitted a draft report.

EMAO also delivers MRE for communities in the vicinity of current demining operations.

UNMEE has also provided MRE in the areas bordering the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) established between Ethiopia and Eritrea (most of which lies in Eritrea).

In 2005, UNICEF commissioned an evaluation of the MRE programme in Tigray and Afar, which concluded it was one of the world’s better MRE programmes due to the

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65 RaDO maintained an office in Mekele, with coordinators at both the zonal and woreda levels, plus agents in the most affected tabias – 36 staff in all at the start, covering seven woredas and 44 tabias.
66 Most pastoralists are Muslim, so RaDO worked with imams, using mosques as well as schools.
67 This is now the Bureau for Labour and Social Affairs (BoLSA).
68 The evaluation team has not yet been able to obtain a copy.
efforts of RaDO and the community liaison work by EMAO, as well as the high level of social capital in the most heavily affected communities of Tigray. However, the evaluation concluded that:

- there is inadequate coordination at the national level, due in part to the fact that no organisation had a clear mandate to coordinate MRE;
- a continued MRE programme is warranted for Tigray, and there may well be a need for MRE elsewhere in the country, particularly Somali region. However, project management skills needed to be strengthened in both EMAO and (for Tigray) BoLSA, and a proper needs assessment is required for Somali Region;
- a sustainable surveillance system (complete victim data and periodic risk assessments) is required;
- greater attention should be given to emergency preparedness.

The MRE evaluation report provided a number of recommendations to address these weaknesses. Little appears to have been done to implement these recommendations, and the above conclusions still appear valid.

**Survivor Assistance**

A large number of organisations are involved in some aspect of victim assistance, but most of the programmes are small and are involved in disability assistance rather than landmine survivors *per se*. In 2004, Ethiopia was identified at the Nairobi Review Conference as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Ethiopia identified its survivor assistance objectives for the period 2005-2009 as:

- establishing a continuous surveillance system for accurate data collection;
- conducting a needs assessment of survivors;
- establishing or strengthening clinics and services for rehabilitation and psychosocial support for mine survivors and other war victims;
- establishing or strengthening vocational training centres;
- improving access to formal education and vocational training;
- developing a strategic plan for mine victim assistance, in cooperation with relevant agencies and organisations.

(LMM 2005)

The Evaluation Team did not review survivor assistance programmes in depth, but it appears that little progress has been made toward these objectives. In the meantime, Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) runs a small peer-to-peer programme that remains restricted to Addis Ababa. The ICRC supports the Ethiopian Red Cross in a modest programme for social and economic integration for landmine survivors in Tigray. In addition, the ICRC supports a number of government and private prosthetic and orthopaedic centres. The World Bank financed Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (the sister project to the ERP within the overall Emergency
Recovery Program) established a national rehabilitation centre and refurbished a number of regional physical rehabilitation centres.

Ethiopia has disability legislation but reportedly there is no mechanism to enforce the rights for disabled person established in the law. The Ethiopian Federation of Persons with Disabilities is an umbrella organisation of the five national disability associations. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) coordinates disability issues at the national level, while the bureaus do the same at the regional and woreda levels. MoLSA has been sending a representative to attend Meetings of States Parties to the Ottawa Treaty, but the Ministry is not represented on the EMAO Steering Board.

Stockpile Destruction
Ethiopia has not submitted its inventory of anti-personnel landmines in its possession as required by Article 7 of the APMBC (for Ethiopia, the due date was 28 November 2005). As well, it has not advised the States Parties of plans to complete the destruction all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control (Article 4 of the Convention specifies a State Party should complete stockpiled destruction as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party).

Participation in the Ottawa Process
Ethiopia was among the first cohort of countries to sign the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 3 December 1997; however, it did not ratify the Convention until 17 December 2004. It became a State Party on 1 June 2005.

The Government has not reported any steps taken to implement the treaty domestically, including penal sanctions, as required by Article 9 of the APMBC. As well, it has not submitted its initial transparency report required by Article 7 (originally due by 28 November 2005).

Ethiopia has been attending recent Meetings of States Parties.

Recommendation 4
The Board of EMAO should convene a meeting of representatives from the relevant ministries, including at least the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Health, Labour and Social Affairs, and Legal Affairs to review Ethiopia’s obligations with respect to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and to initiate a process to prepare its initial transparency report as required by Article 7 of the APMBC.
4. NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project

Until recently, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) did not have a Resident Representative in Ethiopia, but it has a long history of providing development support to Ethiopia, most recently through the support of micro-credit programmes of local NGOs, particularly in Tigray. NPA’s first involvement in Ethiopia’s mine action programme was as the implementation agency for the Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) from 2002-04. Following the completion of the ELIS, NPA and EMAO entered into discussions about a possible project in which NPA would support the capacity development efforts of EMAO, with a focus on mine detection dogs (MDD) and Technical Survey.

The project was agreed in mid-2005, and NPA initiated operations in October that year. By the end of 2005, NPA had established and furnished an office in Addis Ababa (shared by the NPA development programme) in close proximity to EMAO headquarters. Funding for the mine action project has been secured for 2005-06 from Norway (NOK 13,520,000 = c. $1.9 million), and Finland (€400,000 = c. $510,000). The project is due to run until the end of 2007, although the possibility exists for an extension.

It is important to emphasise that the project is clearly designed to enhance EMAO capacity, and not to establish NPA as an independent operation. Thus, EMAO will remain the only demining operator in Ethiopia, without the vexing task of coordinating a number of independent operators.

4.1 Project Objectives

The project seeks to promote three developmental objectives:

1. To support and further strengthen national mine action capacities
2. To contribute to the reduction of mine and UXO accidents
3. To facilitate safe settlement and access to land for the target group

Specific output targets are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity building</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MDD capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 25 mine detection dogs accredited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 20 MDD handlers trained &amp; accredited (including support to technical survey)</td>
<td>At least 4 qualified as supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 1 fully-equipped MDD mobile base</td>
<td>At least 2 qualified as trainers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 1 fully equipped MDD training centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Technical Survey &amp; Task Impact Assessment (TIA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 6 task impact assessment (TIA) officers trained</td>
<td>One for each demining company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 15 technical surveyors trained (including implementation of MDD-assisted tech survey)</td>
<td>At least 3 qualified as Team Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At least 2 qualified as trainers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These outputs are then expected to (i) increase the amount of land made available for safe use by civilians through reduction of suspected hazards areas and clearance, (ii) enhance clearance operations through better task planning and site preparation by
Technical Survey teams, and (iii) improve the documentation and reporting of socio-economic benefits accruing from demining operations.

It appears the final project agreement represented some bargaining between EMAO and NPA. EMAO is enthusiastic about the MDD component. It believed the 2004 decision to contract the six ArmorGroup dogs was successful, but the ERPMU would not extend the contract and it is extremely unlikely that Ethiopia would use its own funds for MDD. EMAO also planned to enhance its Technical Survey capacity and establish Rapid Response Teams (RRT), and NPA’s offer of assistance fits into these plans. However, EMAO is less enthusiastic about the TIA concept. It only agreed to have it incorporated as part of the Technical Survey component, and with the limited role of informing decisions related to technical survey work, and documenting and reporting on socio-economic benefits; not as an input into the priority-setting process.

*Figure 8 – Organisation chart: NPA Mine Action–Ethiopia*

### 4.2 Mine Detection Dog (MDD) Component

**Start-up**

An expatriate MDD Coordinator was hired in late summer and, by mid-October 2005, a dog kennel and an operational-base camp were established in Gemhalo, western Tigray. The first batch of 15 dogs (eight from NPA’s Global Training Centre in Sarajevo and seven from Mozambique, where NPA is closing its demining...

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69 Conversely, NPA sees TIA as a mechanism for setting task priorities. In the case of Ethiopia, which has reasonably effective priority-setting mechanisms through local governments, NPA seems to have anticipated that TIA would supplement and improve these mechanisms. For example, in its interim report to the Norwegian MFA, NPA wrote that a key activity of the project would be the “Development of strategies and procedures to ensure that the programme will have high socio-economic impact and will target high impact minefields for clearance.”
programme) arrived in mid-October, followed by seven expatriate dog handlers/trainers seconded from the NPA Global Training Centre.

Eight of the dogs were accredited by mid-December and were deployed with expatriate handlers to work on clearance operations. The remaining seven dogs were utilised for training the first group of Ethiopian handlers (all EMAO employees) in mid-December. Six of these dogs, with local handlers, were deployed in March 2006 to demining operations, working initially under the supervision of two Bosnian handlers (the other expatriate handlers returned to Bosnia).

An NPA monitoring mission in January 2006 reported very favourably on the progress of the MDD component, including the fastest start-up of an MDD project in NPA’s history and higher rates of productivity than NPA had expected.70

NPA reports that the EMAO personnel assigned for training as dog handlers are very capable and well motivated. Some from the initial group will be selected for further training as supervisors. A second round of training for eight new handlers began during the Evaluation Team’s mission to Ethiopia.

NPA has established a kennel facility in Gemhalo for the MDD. This location allows them to support four demining companies. The kennels are surrounded by several hundred 10m x 10m blocks for training, and by 100 10 x 10m blocks that are used by EMAO for accreditation. Both the kennels and the dogs are well maintained. As well, NPA maintains a stock of basic veterinarian supplies for treatment of minor dog health problems, but the closest veterinarians specialised in canine health are in Addis Ababa.

Recommendation 5
NPA should ensure that some of the local MDD personnel receive para-veterinarian training, with a focus on canine health.

Recommendation 6
NPA should formalise contingency plans for dealing with a serious injury or illness of an MDD.

Accreditation
EMAO Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for MDD are still based on the ArmorGroup modus operandi for free-running dogs. NPA dog procedures are based on the use of short- and long-leashed dogs. However, in a MDD workshop held by NPA for EMAO personnel during the first week of October 2006, the NPA approach was accepted by EMAO as the standard methodology for MDD operations. The evaluation team views the NPA SOP as the de facto standard for EMAO dog operations, which should now be formalised.

Recommendation 7
EMAO should formally adopt a revised SOP for MDD operations, adapted from NPA procedures.

70 At 700-1000 m² per dog per day, these remain lower than the productivity achieved by ArmorGroup dogs (2000 m² per dog per day). NPA claims that its short-leash system results in higher quality (i.e. less likelihood of a missed device) than the free running or long-leash approaches.
MDD Training Centre

Activity is underway to establish a dog training centre at Entoto, a short distance from Addis Ababa. This centre will be collocated with an EMAO training centre, and will be more convenient for the training and transit/transfer of dogs. The centre is located at almost 3000m altitude and should provide ideal training conditions for the dogs.

This dog training centre component is running several months behind schedule due to various bureaucratic hurdles. At the time of the team’s mission, activity had just begun, but it appeared to be progressing well. We see no cause for concern.

4.3 Technical Survey Component

Start-up

The start-up of the Technical Survey component was scheduled to begin at the same time as the MDD component, but was delayed due to NPA’s inability to recruit a qualified Operations Manager. As an interim measure, NPA had its mine action programme director from Bosnia prepare an initial draft of an SOP for Technical Survey. He remained in Ethiopia to overlap with the newly recruited Operations Manager, who arrived in February 2006. Unfortunately, this individual has since been transferred. The replacement (a well-qualified and highly experienced Operations Manager from Bosnia) arrived a few weeks prior to the Evaluation Team’s mission.

Development of a New SOP

NPA have drafted a revised SOP for Technical Survey for consideration by EMAO. This would allow the use of MDD and/or machines to supplement manual deminers. The SOP was approved given interim approval by EMAO at the end of June 2006 and, following and NPA workshop for the management of EMAO in early October, EMAO agreed to proceed with trials based on the new SOP. NPA planned to deliver the first course for surveyors in November 2006, following which the new SOP would be field tested – a process that will likely lead to further modifications.

The new version of the SOP breaks down the process into two clear phases. Phase 1 is essentially a general survey process – the analysis of all available data (including Eritrean sketch maps) coupled with a visual inspection of the site. The outcome of this initial phase is the release of land that was recorded as suspect hazard area (i.e. from the HALO Trust survey or the ELIS), but which the data analysis and site inspection indicate is very unlikely to contain landmines or UXO. In Bosnia, this released land is termed Area without Obvious Risk (AWOR), and NPA has recommended the same terminology in the current SOP for EMAO.

Phase 2 of the Technical Survey process entails marking and recording the resulting minefield polygon. This polygon encompasses areas that are deemed very likely to contain mines (i.e. the ‘true’ minefield) plus a substantial safety margin. The new

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71 The huge expansion of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) mine action programme in Sudan in 2005, when over 50 international technical advisors were recruited, led to a shortage of well-qualified demining operations personnel with extensive international experience. Many other demining operators reported difficulty in recruiting adequately qualified and experienced personnel.

72 EMAO now simply reclassifies the land in its IMSMA records as ‘reduced’. Procedures for formal handover to the local community of this land that has been released without intrusive measures having been taken are, apparently, not worked-out. (NPA, Monitoring Report, January 2006, p. 8)
SOP refers to these as ‘high risk’ and ‘low risk’ areas respectively. NPA operations personnel have been recommending that EMAO adopt a risk management approach in which the low-risk areas would be further ‘investigated’ with machines, MDD, and/or manual deminers. For example, where the terrain is suitable, a machine might pass over the entire low-risk area, followed by MDD on a portion of the area. If no evidence of landmines or UXO is found, the low risk area would be reclassified as AWOR and released for civilian use.

The Evaluation Team understands that EMAO management has not yet accepted the recommendation to adopt a more aggressive risk management approach during the technical survey process. Such an approach does promise a significant reduction in costs per area of land released for civilian use. For example, in Bosnia, the intrusive ‘investigation’ of low-risk land by machines backed by MDD or manual deminers\(^73\) is only 40% to 60% the cost of full-clearance.

EMAO now possesses the range of assets needed to adopt a more aggressive risk management approach, but whether to do so depends critically on whether intrusive measures that fall short of full clearance reduce risk to an acceptable level.\(^74\) This relates not only to the performance capabilities of the machines, MDD, etc. in the range of conditions found in Ethiopia, but also on:

- the skill and experience of the technical surveyors in correctly categorising some land as low-risk,
- the knowledge local residents have about the likely boundaries of the SHA (e.g. from cultivation or previous accidents involving people or animals),
- the authority delegated to technical surveyors to make such a decision – and their willingness to assume this responsibility,
- the consequences should an accident occur on land that has been released following less than full-clearance operations.

There is also the question of the legal authority EMAO has to make a decision not to fully clear land that has been classified as suspect, and whether it or its personnel would be liable – even where all approved procedures were properly followed – should an accident occur.

It is appropriate to EMAO await further evidence that a more aggressive risk management approach is suitable for Ethiopia. However, it remains unclear to the Evaluation Team what amount of evidence would be required, and what complementary measures (e.g. strengthening the EMAO mandate) might need to be implemented before such a risk management approach could be adopted.

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\(^73\) This is actually termed technical survey in Bosnia, whereas the preliminary investigation and assessment (Phase 1 in the latest SOP for Technical Survey proposed by NPA for EMAO) is termed general survey.

\(^74\) Even full clearance to IMAS standards cannot eliminate risk entirely – for example, some mines or UXO may be buried too deeply to detect with available technology.
Task Impact Assessment (TIA)

TIA is the term NPA uses for its approach to the assessment of the likely socio-economic benefits that will stem from clearance tasks. In brief, it aims to document:

- the potential benefits from clearance
- the likely beneficiaries
- any problems or constraints that will prevent the target beneficiaries from using the freed land to its best potential, including:
  - land ownership disputes;
  - lack of complementary inputs (e.g. seeds for planting crops; livestock to graze the land);
  - whether clearance and land allocation can be completed in time for the planting season, arrival of pastoralists for grazing, etc.

The basic aim is to ensure that expensive demining assets are assigned only to clear minefields where the potential benefits are likely to accrue to worthy beneficiaries without undue delay. NPA originally developed TIA in Angola during the late 1990s, where it was used to assess individual clearance tasks. It has since been adapted for use in other NPA programmes. It is most highly developed in the Sri Lanka programme, where it has evolved into a full ‘livelihoods analysis’ of mine-affected communities and is the principal tool used by NPA and district authorities to set mine action priorities.

Textbox 10 – The Livelihoods Approach

Livelihoods* analysis is a multi-sectoral, participatory approach developed to help understand and analyse the livelihoods of the poor, using the framework depicted below.

* A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for living. A livelihood is
Because landmines block or damage assets, the livelihoods approach (which also focuses on assets) is particularly well suited to the analysis of the negative impacts of landmine contamination and of the benefits arising from mine action.\textsuperscript{75} It also is well suited to the analysis of food security issues,\textsuperscript{76} which are so critical in Ethiopia, and there are numerous studies employing livelihoods analysis in Ethiopia (although none incorporating the issue of landmine contamination).

NPA brought-in their TIA advisor from Sri Lanka to adapt the system for Ethiopia and to train EMAO staff (principally, their community liaison/MRE personnel). However, the approach used in Sri Lanka requires wholesale adaptation to meet EMAO requirements, at least in the current stage of its demining programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NPA Programme – Sri Lanka</th>
<th>EMAO Programme – Ethiopia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIA teams operate independently of demining units.</td>
<td>Plans are for TIA capability to be incorporated into Technical Survey teams, which operate in close support of the demining companies to which each is attached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIA teams survey communities well in advance of demining, and the TIA findings are used to determine (i) where demining assets will be located in the coming season and (ii) which communities and specific tasks should be demined first.</td>
<td>In Ethiopia, the allocation of demining companies to woredas and the tabia/kebele priorities have been determined based on long-standing plans for the resettlement of displaced people and are set as contractual obligations of EMAO to the ERPMU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA has considerable scope in determining its work programme.</td>
<td>NPA is providing support to EMAO’s capacity development efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local governments have been disrupted by the civil war and vary significantly in capacity.</td>
<td>Local governments in Tigray Region function effectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued internal tension/conflict disrupt the delegation of authority to local governments.</td>
<td>Ethiopia in general, and Tigray in particular, are strongly promoting decentralisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued internal tension/conflict mean that local priorities may not be known or endorsed by senior levels of government.</td>
<td>The ERPMU and the Regional Governments established effective mechanisms for obtaining ‘bottom-up’ input, and local views are well-reflected in ERP plans.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NPA realised that the TIA model used in Sri Lanka would have to be adapted for use in Ethiopia. In particular, the Sri Lanka model would have duplicated processes that already exist within Ethiopia’s increasingly decentralised governance structure, which have been further supplemented by the Emergency Rehabilitation Program management system.

Decisions on local priorities should be determined by local decision-making processes whenever possible. Accordingly, NPA has shifted to an approach which will seek to fill gaps in the collection and analysis of socio-economic data as an input into priority-setting for demining activities. At the time of the mission, a second TIA advisor (also from NPA’s Sri Lanka programme) was working in cooperation with the Operations and the IMSMA sections in EMAO to document socio-economic data that has been collected for past demining tasks and through the current community liaison

\textsuperscript{75} It has recently been used with great success in a post-clearance survey of 25 communities in Yemen.

\textsuperscript{76} For example, livelihoods studies underpin the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS).
process so an assessment of what data or data analysis might be usefully added to enhance the process.

There do appear to be opportunities for improved sequencing of demining operations within the existing framework. These opportunities exist at the individual task level, where some fine-tuning might allow, for example, certain parcels to be cleared in time for planting that year by civilians from the local communities, or in closer coordination with other development initiatives (see textbox).

Textbox 11 – Deminers farming on cleared land in Gemhalo

During the site visits to Gemhalo in western Tigray, a member of the Evaluation Team observed that a significant area of demined land was being farmed by EMAO personnel based in that woreda. The explanation provided was that:

- the land in question had not be cleared to enable the resettlement of war-displaced people, but to allow the voluntary resettlement of people from densely-populated eastern Tigray as part of a regional government resettlement scheme to enhance food security;
- there are, as yet, no farmers from local communities who are awaiting access to this land; rather, the area traditionally has been used as seasonal grazing land by nomadic pastoralists;
- as the households from eastern Tigray had not yet been relocated to the west, local authorities allowed EMAO personnel to farm the land for this season.

* This area of Tigray has been designated as a ‘growth pole’ by the Regional Government.

As well, the EMAO personnel we met who had received the TIA training in August appeared to be enthusiastic about what they learned and eager to put at least some of the tools and concepts into practice. Thus there appears to be opportunities for applying TIA even within the existing framework for EMAO operations.

Recommendation 8

Within the current framework for EMAO operations, in which priorities are pre-established to the tabia/kebele level, NPA should consider adapting the simpler, task-specific TIA model used by NPA in Angola and Mozambique rather than the community livelihoods approach used in Sri Lanka.

The task-specific model allows a determination of the likely benefits that will stem from the clearance of a specific hazard and identification of the likely beneficiaries. It may also identify any problems that might prevent or constrain the best use of the freed assets, allowing early action to address those problems in anticipation of clearance, or a decision to delay the clearance until after the problems are resolved.

Recommendation 9

TIA needs to be adapted to reinforce the existing tabia/kebele development planning processes. NPA and its EMAO counterparts should plan to participate in the next round of annual planning workshops in each of the tabias within which demining is planned for 2007-08.

UNICEF has been working with the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFED) in Tigray on an Integrated Community Based Participatory Planning (ICBPP) project, designed to strengthen the annual planning process at the tabia level. As part of this project, it has developed a series of Field Guides for Focus Groups
covering a variety of issues (governance; infrastructure; women and children; water and sanitation; etc.).

**Recommendation 10**

NPA and its EMAO counterparts should meet with BoFED officials in Tigray to explore the opportunity of adapting TIA tools to prepare an additional Field Guide for a Focus Group that would cover mine action issues, based on the series of Field Guides already prepared with the support of UNICEF.

One potential benefit stemming from the introduction of TIA is the identification of needs or opportunities for complementary community development initiatives by other development actors operating in the vicinity of demining operations (currently Tigray). EMAO could be of great assistance in alerting development actors of the needs and opportunities for development assistance for mine affected communities.

**Recommendation 11**

NPA and its EMAO counterparts should undertake a mapping of other development actors (NGOs and donor-supported programmes) operating in Tigray and assess whether opportunities exist to attract complementary development support to mine affected communities.

The above recommendations relate to the current framework for EMAO operations. As noted elsewhere in this report, this framework will be changing significantly in the coming months and years. First, the ERP programme is drawing to a close, and EMAO will be shifting to a multi-donor environment in which its basic priorities are not specified as provisions in a contract. Second, in the coming years EMAO will be shifting its resources away from Tigray, where the local government structures are reasonably well-established, into other regions in which these structures may not operate as effectively or, at least, in the same fashion. Some research is warranted to prepare for this shift.

**Recommendation 12**

NPA and its EMAO counterparts should undertake a review of the development planning and management systems in place in Ethiopia, including future plans for decentralisation, to understand how to adapt the basic TIA approach in a manner that complements and reinforces local and regional government planning mechanisms.

Chapter 2 and Appendix 4 of this report provide an introduction to Ethiopia’s development planning and management systems, which can be used as a starting point.

### 4.4 The NPA-EMAO Partnership

It is clear that relations between NPA and EMAO were strained during the implementation of the Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey. Regardless, EMAO agreed to the new NPA project because (in the main):

- it wanted to add MDD capacity without having to pay for the dogs with local funds (which would have been politically unacceptable); and
- NPA was happy to play a role in supporting EMAO’s capacity development efforts, rather than establishing a separate operation.

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77 Copies of these were obtained by the Evaluation Team and left with NPA.
There have been further strains in the NPA-EMAO relationship since the current project began in October 2005. Some of these relate to frustrations over bureaucratic hurdles that took a significant amount of time to resolve (the protracted difficulties in obtaining duty-free access of vehicles for NPA being the prime example).

While good progress has been made, it is not assured that the relationship between NPA and EMAO will evolve into a healthy and productive partnership. The underlying basis for such a partnership continues to exist – NPA can offer support for EMAO capacity development in areas which EMAO views as priorities. But EMAO and NPA are yet to arrive at full agreement on some of the key project components. NPA believes that EMAO could and should incorporate risk reduction explicitly into the Technical Survey process, but EMAO managers have not yet agreed to do this. As well, NPA is still working on adaptations to its Task Impact Assessment approach, but some EMAO managers appear unconvinced that TIA is the way forward.

It is not necessary for two partners to see eye-to-eye on every issue – indeed, one should question the value-added of the partnership if this was the case. It is important however that partners have concrete mechanisms to work jointly on their common work programme, and to work through the problems and disagreements that inevitably arise.

**Recommendation 13**

**EMAO and NPA should institute a system of regular meetings between the EMAO Director General and NPA’s Mine Action Programme Manager to discuss their joint work programme, review progress, identify problems, and agree on steps to resolve these problems. Action minutes should be taken to document any changes to plans and the commitments made by either party.**

The UN MAAT also plays an important advisory role that overlaps some components of the project agreement between EMAO and NPA, and should be represented at these meetings as well.

It is premature to determine whether continued involvement by NPA would be warranted once the current project finishes at the end of 2007. In building effective partnerships, nothing succeeds like success, so the completion of the current project to both party’s satisfaction will be a critical determinant. As well, the Evaluation Team understands that UNDP plans a transition in its support, and will make a staged withdrawal of the technical advisors now in place over the coming year. Given this, EMAO may encourage NPA to provide advisory services that (i) allow access to lessons learned in other mine action programmes and (ii) provide an extra degree of assurance to donors who may not have the technical capacity to assess EMAO’s capabilities and operations on their own.

Ultimately however, EMAO must determine its own capacity requirements and the support it needs to successfully develop those capacities. Capacity development plans should be derived from a national mine action strategy, a subject that we return to in the final chapter.
5. Conclusions and Additional Recommendations

The overall conclusions of the Evaluation Team are very positive. EMAO is a capable organisation. It has made excellent progress since its creation, and its demining operations compare favourably with those in other mine-affected countries. NPA assistance is well targeted, and NPA strategy to support the development of EMAO’s capacity is appropriate. While NPA has experienced some start-up problems, it has been able to manage these, in some cases with the intervention of EMAO. It seems likely that the project will achieve its principal objectives by the end of 2007.

**Ethiopia’s National Mine Action Programme**

**Institutional make-up**

The decree establishing EMAO as a statutory body gave it a mandate as a mine action operator providing demining and MRE services. There is no other legal instrument for mine action other than a loan agreement between the Federal Government and the World Bank for the ERP, which accords key responsibilities (setting clearance standards; quality assurance; certification of clearance) to the ERPMU. The ERP programme ended on 31 December 2006. While EMAO is viewed by most as the pre-eminent mine action organisation in Ethiopia, its legal authority is ambiguous in critical areas and it does not see its mandate covering all mine action pillars, such as stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the transparency obligations of a State Party. In short, the institutional make-up for mine action in Ethiopia is deficient.

EMAO management recognises this deficiency and has recommended in its corporate strategic plan (not yet adopted by the Government) that its mandate be enhanced to include responsibility and authority:

- for quality assurance and certification;
- for control, coordination, accreditation and licensing;
- as the national focal point for any mine-action related affairs; and
- to negotiate and sign contracts and donor grant agreements.

The Evaluation Team endorses EMAO’s recommendation as an interim measure, and with the following recommended additions:

**Recommendation 14**

In addition to the modifications recommended by EMAO in its corporate strategic plan, a new decree should:

- charge EMAO with the responsibility for preparing for approval by the Council of Ministers a national mine action strategy encompassing demining, MRE, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and the transparency obligations of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention;
- charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining the national mine action database, and for providing relevant mine action data to organisations responsible for the provision of development investments and the delivery of public services in mine-contaminated regions of Ethiopia;
- charge EMAO with the responsibility for maintaining a national registry of landmine victims and a national surveillance system for recording accidents from landmines and other explosive remnants of war;
• designate which ministries hold the lead responsibility for ensuring Ethiopia meets its various obligations as a State Party to the APMBC, including those for stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and transparency;
• provide for each of the lead ministries to be represented on the Board;
• designate the EMAO Board as the National Mine Action Authority.

The ending of the World Bank-financed ERP means that EMAO needs to give greater attention to resource mobilisation from multiple donors. A common feature in the institutional make-up of donor-dependent mine action programmes is a formal mechanism for periodic meetings with donors.

Recommendation 15

EMAO and its Board should formally establish, with the support of UNDP, a Donor Support Group for the national mine action programme, with semi-annual meetings chaired by the Chair of the EMAO Board or the representative from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED).78

Strategy and planning

In the period from 1995-1998, the ERP worked in support of infrastructure development programmes (roads, power lines, telecommunications facilities). Given the importance of infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion in Ethiopia, these specific demining activities undoubtedly led to significant socio-economic benefits. However, the evaluation team was unable to obtain data to quantify what proportion of the ERP’s work was in support of such projects, or what other demining was undertaken, so we are unable to compare benefits to costs.

Since the war with Eritrea, EMAO has worked principally as a contractor to the ERPMU in support of the Emergency Rehabilitation Program, focusing on Tigray and Afar. The available evidence from ERP’s own impact assessment indicates the ERP was successful in resettling the majority of the IDPs, and deportees/returnees, and that the demining component played a significant role in allowing resettlement and the resumption of sustainable livelihoods.

The ERP Impact Assessment report found that “With the exception along the Mereb River and T/Abiabo and L/Adiabo, it is learned that practically all the IDPs have returned to their original places and resumed normal livelihoods.” (p. 69) The authors also found that residents have been made aware of the areas not yet fully cleared.79 (p. 69)

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78 Annex II of the financing agreement for the €8 million specifies annual review meetings chaired by MoFED, plus semi-annual review meetings organised by EMAO with cooperation from MoFED and UNDP.
79 A Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice (KAP) survey commissioned by EMAO and UNICEF found 83% of those interviewed in Tigray and Afar had received information on landmines and UXO.
However, some of the planned benefits from demining have not accrued because military movements along the border have created fears (i) that new mines are being laid, (ii) of overnight incursions by Eritrean security personnel, and (iii) that open warfare will resume. In addition, all the minefield had not yet been cleared at the time of the study,\textsuperscript{80} while some residents remain unconvinced that demined areas are completely safe.

Regardless, the authors of the ERP impact assessment concluded that \textit{“the impact of the de-mining activities is commendable.”} (p. 70) They also concluded that \textit{“The experiences gained in successfully implementing the project, particularly the skills and experiences gained by the project staff at all levels…especially in mine clearance, have been remarkable and would remain to be useful in the future.”} (p. vii)

Thus, EMAO has been playing an important part in the strategy adopted by the Emergency Rehabilitation Program and, in this role, has made important contributions to Ethiopia’s development. EMAO has not to date, however, formulated a strategy for a national mine action programme (i.e. one that covers the country’s entire

\textsuperscript{80} The report is dated June 2006, but does not clearly state when the questionnaire survey, interviews, and focus group discussions took place. At least some of the data the authors obtained from the ERPMU was from September 2005.
contamination problem and all components of mine action). It has submitted to the government a draft strategy as called for by the Civil Service Reform Programme, but this appears to be a corporate development strategy for EMAO rather than a national mine action strategy. Regardless, the draft strategy does not appear to fully analyse and address a number of strategic issues which are on the horizon, including:

- the transition from World Bank loan financing to multi-donor grant financing;
- transition from a focus on war-affected areas along the Eritrean border to a nation-wide programme;
- shift from working on large minefields within a well-defined mine belt, to more varied and dispersed contamination problems, both large and small;
- the need to assess MRE requirements throughout the country and the challenge of meeting the needs identified;
- the need to address a range of Treaty obligations, including victim assistance, stockpile destruction, and transparency reporting.

Given the tensions between Ethiopia and neighbouring countries, and the instability in some of the neighbouring countries, some careful thought about disaster preparedness is also warranted.

In addition, now that additional financing from the World Bank ERP loan is unavailable, EMAO will need to make a new case for funding from the Federal Government – donors will not continue to support a programme when there is no evidence the country’s government deems it of sufficient importance to allocate a reasonable portion of its own funds. To successfully make this case, EMAO will need to show how mine action promotes the country’s development priorities, such as food security and the expansion of the infrastructure system to reach more rural people.

It is clear that the Director General of EMAO has thought about many of these issues. For example, he has plans to contact the governments of all regions that suffer from contamination to ask them for a preliminary ranking of priorities. However, it does not appear that the range of strategic issues have been analysed together in a systematic fashion to formulate a strategy for a national mine action programme.

**Recommendation 16**

**EMAO should initiate a strategic planning process, using its corporate strategy and the findings from the ELIS as a base, to examine the full range of strategic issues on the horizon and with a view to formulating a strategy for a national mine action programme.**

**EMAO Management**

EMAO’s Corporate Strategy clearly noted that one constraint is a very hierarchical structure and ‘top-heavy management.’ This corporate culture and style of management is consistent with the military background of most EMAO personnel, including its senior managers. While it often enhances control and efficiency, it places exceptional strains on a few key people. It also can result in unnecessary delays when

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81 Landmine contamination is not mentioned in the current PRSP, and we understand that EMAO has not engaged in the processes leading to the second-generation PRSP – the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).
those key people are absent. As well, a centralised management structure may be
effective when large-unit operations are concentrated in few sites, but will be less so
as units are dispersed more widely to address landmines and UXO throughout
Ethiopia.

**Recommendation 17**

*In preparation for the widening of the geographic scope of operations, EMAO should
initiate a careful process of delegating greater decision-making authority.*

**Priority-setting**

An effective priority-setting system for large-unit demining operations was put in
place for the Emergency Rehabilitation Programme, with the ERPMU and regional
governments establishing appropriate priorities based on the need to resettle large
numbers of displaced people, coupled with general survey data from EMAO.

The end of the ERP implies the need to update the priority-setting system based on
existing development planning processes at the regional, *woreda*, and *kebele* levels.
The TIA model used by NPA in Sri Lanka would largely duplicate these development
planning processes and therefore needs to be adapted – a fact recognised by both
EMAO and NPA. Once suitable adaptations are made however, TIA could provide
the set of tools EMAO will require to set priorities in a transparent fashion, balancing
local needs with national and regional development priorities. It could also be an
effective mechanism for documenting that cleared land is delivering significant socio-
economic benefits, bolstering the case for continued support from both donors and the
Federal Government.

Some groundwork should be done to assess the local planning processes in other
heavily contaminated regions to determine whether further adaptations to TIA will be
required in the future. This information should be fed into the strategic planning
process we have recommended above.

**Demining Operations**

**CLEARANCE**

EMAO now possesses a range of demining assets. Its manual demining units are
excellent. EMAO can also maintain this capacity through the delivery of refresher
training based on feedback from its QA teams. EMAO has purchased suitable
machines and maintains them well. MDD operations are undertaken effectively, and
MDD capacity is expanding with assistance from NPA.

EMAO’s company and platoon commanders and demining supervisors are skilled in
managing the individual demining assets (manual, machine, MDD) and are rapidly
gaining experience in the planning and implementation of integrated clearance
operations. Exposure to other national programmes which employ the demining
toolbox in an integrated fashion could accelerate the learning process.

**TECHNICAL SURVEY**

EMAO’s technical survey teams have developed the capacity for land release based
on data analysis and site investigations, and are skilled in marking a minefield
polygon in preparation for clearance. Their mapping skills need upgrading. Risk management approaches need to be tested with NPA assistance and a decision made on whether to formally embrace a risk management approach within the technical survey process.

**Responsive Operations**

Adequate mechanisms do not yet exist to respond to requests for small scale clearance operations from communities that are distant from a demining company. The proposed Rapid Response Teams (RRT) will be an important addition to EMAO capacities to reduce the risks posed by landmines and other ERW.

The absence of a nationwide victim surveillance system means that EMAO does not have adequate information for determining where RRT should be located or for proactive response to a change in the pattern of accidents (e.g. a spike in accidents due to tampering).

**MRE**

EMAO continues to provide effective MRE services in communities in the vicinity of demining operations. Some of the MRE services established by RaDO continue (e.g. through teachers and school-based clubs), but no longer in a systematic fashion. BoLSA (in Tigray) and DPPFSB (in Afar) have not assumed responsibility for ongoing provision of MRE in their regions. No MRE services are available to the majority of mine-affected communities in Ethiopia.

A number of people registered criticisms with some of the specific findings and recommendations of the 2005 evaluation of Ethiopia’s MRE programme. On balance however, the conclusions presented in that evaluation report seem valid, and the recommendations should be reviewed, modified where necessary, and incorporated into the strategic planning process.

**Other Treaty Obligations**

**Stockpile Destruction**

Ethiopia has not submitted information on its stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines, as required by the APMBC.

**Victim Assistance**

Modest victim assistance programmes are supported by LSN, ICRC (through the ERC), and others. No national needs assessment has been conducted and no national plan for victim assistance has been adopted. No national registry and surveillance system has been established. The MoLSA is responsible for programmes to assist the disabled, and has attended recent Meetings of States Parties to the APMBC, but it is not represented on the EMAO Board.

**Reporting**

Ethiopia has not yet submitted its transparency report as specified in Article 7 of the APMBC.
**NPA Humanitarian Mine Action Project**

**Project identification and design**

The philosophy underlying the project (i.e. support to EMAO’s capacity development efforts rather than establish an independent demining operation) is the correct one for Ethiopia. As well, the objectives established for the NPA project are relevant for Ethiopia.

The outputs planned are appropriate to EMAO’s needs, but more investigation during the design phase may have revealed some differences in understanding concerning the appropriate model envisaged for the Technical Survey/TIA component.

The MDD are meeting an important capacity requirement, and complement EMAO’s other demining assets. The SOP drafted for Technical Survey promises significant performance enhancements if the risk management approach is ultimately adopted, but further evidence is required from field tests of the SOP. The TIA model needs to be simplified to one that complements rather than overlaps with the established development planning systems in Ethiopia.

**Project implementation**

**MDD COMPONENT**

The MDD component has achieved most of its very ambitious start-up objectives and is now operating effectively. Personnel assigned by EMAO to the MDD component are capable and well-motivated. The training provided by NPA has been effective, and the MDD teams are achieving productivity rates higher than in other NPA-supported programmes. The construction of the Entoto training facility started late but is now underway and making good progress.

**TECHNICAL SURVEY**

This component is behind schedule due to the difficulty in recruiting a suitably qualified operations manager who could work well with EMAO counterparts MAAT personnel. NPA has taken appropriate ‘work-around’ measures to develop a new SOP for technical survey. Training of the first five Technical Survey Teams was about to start shortly after the end of the evaluation mission, following which the field testing of the SOP will begin. Validation of the risk management approach incorporated into the SOP would allow significant cost-efficiency enhancements for the demining programme.

**TASK IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

The TIA model needs to be simplified to one that complements rather than overlaps with established development planning systems in Ethiopia. Work is underway to do this.

**Evolution of the partnership with EMAO**

NPA and EMAO seem to be overcoming any initial mistrust of one another stemming from the tense relationship between EMAO and the NPA team that implemented the ELIS. NPA seems highly motivated to foster the partnership with EMAO, and has taken useful steps to ensure EMAO’s managers have the opportunity to benefit from
experienced garnered from other programmes (including managers from their Angola, BiH, and Croatia programmes in the January 2006 monitoring mission to Ethiopia; arranging for a mission by the EMAO Director General to Cambodia in 2006). Earlier assistance from EMAO to overcome various bureaucratic hurdles faced by international NGOs in Ethiopia would certainly help NPA and could accelerate progress on the project, to the benefit of both NPA and EMAO.

The EMAO-NPA working relationship, and the likelihood of completing the current project to everyone’s satisfaction, would be helped by regular meetings between the two (which we have recommended elsewhere in the report). The UN MAAT should also be represented at most of these meetings.

Progress of the development of a national strategy for mine action (recommended above) would provide the best basis for determining whether additional capacity development assistance from NPA will be warranted after 2007.
Appendix 1 – Terms of Reference

Background:

Ethiopia suffers from extensive contamination from landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) due to a series of internal and international armed conflicts, including:

- the Italian invasion (1935-1936),
- the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-1978),
- the border war with Sudan (1980),
- internal conflict (1975-1991), and

The Ethiopian Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) undertaken from 2001–04 found more than 1.9 million people living in a total of 1,492 mine-affected communities. Ten of the 11 regions are affected to some degree, but the bulk of the contamination is in Afar, Somalia, and Tigray.

The ELIS also recorded 16,616 casualties, more than half of which were killed. Landmine Monitor has reported about 30 casualties per annum in recent years, but this is widely recognized as a partial accounting as systems are not in place to collect casualty data on a systematic basis, in part because the regions are responsible for health issues under the constitution.

The war with Eritrea resulted in significant contamination of Tigray region and, to a lesser extent, Afar and left approximately 364,000 people displaced. Following that war, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) established the Mine Action Supervisory Board as the National Authority (with representatives of the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, finance, and transport and communication) and the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) as the implementing agency.

Initial funding came principally via the World Bank-financed Emergency Recovery Project. Perhaps because of the World Bank funding, Ethiopia received relatively modest funding from traditional mine action donors until this year, when – following Ethiopia’s accession to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT) in mid-2005 – the EC announced a grant of €8 million (approximately US$10 million) over three years for demining in Tigray and Afar. Grants from other donor countries has been in the range of $2.5 million per annum in recent years.

In August 2005, EMAO submitted a draft strategic plan for mine action to the Office of the Prime Minister, but this has not yet been formally adopted. The goal of the

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82 According to Landmine Monitor, there are unconfirmed reports of continued small scale mine laying due to banditry and fighting among warlords.
83 In 2006 Ethiopia requested the UN endorse the ELIS, but this has not yet been done.
84 Council of Ministers Regulation No. 70/2001.
85 Ethiopia had signed in December 1997, but did not ratify for seven years.
86 Part of this grant is channelled to EMAO through UNDP.
strategy is to make “Ethiopia safe for the people to be able to live free from the threat of landmines and explosive devices,” while specific objectives are to:

- develop a fully national, sustainable mine action program;
- increase its operational capacity and productivity for the clearance of contaminated land in the north (Tigray and Afar);
- determine the entire mine action needs of Ethiopia, and develop a strategy that identifies the appropriate level of resources in a prioritized manner, within a reasonable timeframe;
- mobilize the necessary resources to achieve the national mine action standards;
- strengthen its capacity to manage, coordinate, and regulate mine action, in particular humanitarian clearance and mine risk education; and,
- assist in victim assistance through the development of an information database on mine/UXO casualties, and through collaboration with the relevant agencies and organizations, where appropriate.

In 2005, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) initiated a $4.4 million project to work with EMAO on demining, and specifically to enhance capacities in the areas of mine detection dogs (MDD) and technical survey. The project is designed to continue through the end of 2007, but which time NPA plans to have provided EMAO with:

- 25 MDD, as well 20 trained handlers, of whom three will be qualified as supervisors and two as MDD instructors;
- three technical survey teams, which will also be trained in Task Impact Assessment (TIA) techniques so they can assess the socio-economic impacts likely to accrue from possible clearance tasks.

The NPA Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) project provided for a mid-term review. Following informal discussions, NPA wrote the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in June 2006, requesting the GICHD conduct a review to “explore the effectiveness of NPA HMA program and the impact of our activities.” In addition, NPA asked that the evaluation “provide input regarding possible ways forward for further program development and improvement.”

Because of this interest in program development, and because NPA’s core objective is to enhance EMAO capacity to reduce landmine accidents and facilitate safe settlement and land access for beneficiary groups, it made most sense to examine the NPA project within the context of the overall national programme. Accordingly, GICHD and NPA initiated discussions with EMAO and, subsequently, the three organizations agreed to combine a broader review of the national mine action programme with the mid-term evaluation of NPA’s project. Thus, the exercise is designed both to satisfy donor requirements and to contribute to EMAO’s strategic analysis and planning for mine action in Ethiopia.

**Scope and focus of the exercise:**

The evaluation and review will examine:

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87 Letter from Adam Combs, NPA Mine Action Adviser, dated 26 June 2006.
• The assistance provided by NPA to support the development of EMAO capacities in MDD and technical survey (incorporating task impact assessment);
• The effect of NPA assistance on EMAO’s capacity to plan and manage integrated demining operations using MDD, machines, and manual demining teams;
• The role EMAO plays within Ethiopia’s national mine action effort; and
• The contribution of the national mine action programme toward Ethiopia’s development, and efforts made to enhance the alignment between mine action and development priorities.

Scope of the evaluation

Textbox – Organisations active in Mine Risk Education (MRE)

Working with the Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO – a local NGO), UNICEF has supported Mine Risk Education (MRE) for mine affected communities in Tigray (since 1999) and Afar (since 2001). In 2005, responsibilities in Tigray were transferred to the Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs (BoLSA). Also in 2005:

• UNHCR engaged RaDO to provide MRE to Sudanese refugees prior to their repatriation; and
• UNMAS, at the request of UNICEF, provided a train-the-trainers workshop on landmines and UXO
• EMAO community liaison teams provide MRE in conjunction with demining operations.

In addition, UNICEF and RaDO initiated a pilot village profile project in 11 villages along the border with Eritrea to discuss the communities’ mine action challenges in a development context and to collect data on casualties and survivor assistance needs.

Textbox – Survivor Assistance

At the Nairobi Review Conference, Ethiopia was identified as one of 24 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors. A year later at the 6th Meeting of States Parties, Ethiopia announced some objectives for the period 2005-09, including:

• establishing a continuous surveillance system for accurate data collection;
• conducting a needs assessment of survivors;
• making medical treatment available by informing people about the existing services;
• improving access to physical rehabilitation, psycho-social support and economic re-
integration by establishing or strengthening clinics and services;
• updating, developing and enforcing laws protecting the rights of people with disabilities,
including mine survivors; and
• developing a strategic plan for mine victim assistance in cooperation with relevant
agencies and organizations.

Purposes and Objectives:

While the evaluation/review will promote accountability – (i) of NPA to both the
Royal Norwegian MFA (RNMFA) and EMAO, and (ii) of EMAO both to national
authorities and other agencies providing financial support – the emphasis will be on
learning by generating lessons from:

• NPA experience in implementing its project
• EMAO experience in planning and implementing integrated demining operations
• EMAO and mine action partner experiences in aligning mine action with
development priorities

The evaluation and review will also recommend further performance improvements
based on these lessons learned.

Audiences and Intended Uses:

While the evaluation/review will be commissioned by NPA as per its grant agreement
with the RNMFA, the main report is intended for a wider group of stakeholders,
including:

• the EMAO management team;
• NPA managers (in Ethiopia and in Oslo);
• other agencies providing financial support to Ethiopia’s mine action programme;
• development management personnel at the national and regional levels;
• other development agencies whose work programmes are affected by landmine
and UXO contamination.

The report should provide recommendations for performance improvements at the
following levels:

1. NPA project
2. Integrated demining programme
3. National mine action programme
4. Links between mine action and development.

GICHD shall facilitate a stakeholder workshop in Ethiopia to review the evaluation
findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and to foster a consensus on how to
implement the recommendations.

Specific Issues and Questions:
NPA PROJECT\textsuperscript{89}  

- Is a fruitful partnership evolving between NPA and EMAO?  
  - Does EMAO see NPA assistance to be well-targeted?  
  - Does EMAO see NPA as a flexible and supportive partner?  
  - Is there convergence in terms of EMAO & NPA views on how the partnership might evolve in the future?  
- Are the outputs planned for the NPA project appropriate to the needs of EMAO and the national mine action programme?  
- Have the planned outputs of the NPA project\textsuperscript{90} been achieved, or are they likely to be achieved by the end of 2007?  
- Are the demining assets provided or supported by NPA working safely and efficiently?  

INTEGRATED DEMINING OPERATIONS\textsuperscript{91}  

- Are the findings of technical survey/task impact assessment being used effectively when establishing task priorities and demining plans?  
- Are the demining assets provided or supported by NPA being used effectively within demining operations?  
- Are there further enhancements to demining assets, SOPs, policies, etc. that could significantly enhance the efficiency or effectiveness of the demining programme?  

ROLE OF EMAO WITHIN THE NATIONAL DEMINING PROGRAMME\textsuperscript{92}  

- Is the institutional make-up (legal & regulatory framework plus the key organs) of Ethiopia’s mine action programme appropriate to the country’s requirements?  
- Is EMAO effective in discharging its responsibilities?  
- Does the national mine action strategy identify appropriate initiatives for further performance improvements for the national programme and for EMAO itself, and has reasonable progress been made in implementing those initiatives?  

LINKING MINE ACTION AND DEVELOPMENT\textsuperscript{93}  

- Is mine action appropriately reflected in Ethiopia’s development frameworks, plans, and programmes?  
- Has EMAO/mine action officials engaged in the process to formulate the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP)?  
- Are EMAO and other mine action actors effective in aligning mine action with development priorities?  
  - are development priorities explicitly considered when formulating annual plans and setting task priorities?  

\textsuperscript{89} See also Annex B for a checklist of specific technical and operational issues.  
\textsuperscript{90} See Annex A.  
\textsuperscript{91} See also Annex B for a checklist of specific technical and operational issues.  
\textsuperscript{92} See also Annex B for a checklist of more specific issues/questions.  
\textsuperscript{93} See also Annex B for a checklist of more specific issues/questions.
• Does the Government of Ethiopia demonstrate ownership of the country’s mine contamination problem? To what degree does the Government…
  o exercise its rights to (i) set priorities and the strategies for achieving these and (ii) seek and establish partnerships to support the national mine action programme?
  o meet its responsibilities to invest appropriate levels of resources in sustaining the programme and making it more productive?
  o meet its treaty obligations?

  o are mine action personnel in regular contact with development authorities at the national and regional levels?
  o is joint planning conducted by EMAO and development planners at the sector or regional levels?
  o are potential development benefits and indicators specified within annual plans and task plans, and does the monitoring system track these indicators?
  o are development benefits accruing from mine action activities reported regularly to the Government and to donors?
### Annex A – Planned outputs for NPA Project

#### Capacity building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. MDD capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>25 mine detection dogs accredited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>20 MDD handlers trained &amp; accredited (including support to technical survey) At least 4 qualified as supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1 fully-equipped MDD mobile base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1 fully equipped MDD training centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Operational output targets

| 2. Technical Survey & Task Impact Assessment (TIA) |  |
| 2.1  | 6 TIA surveyors trained |
| 2.2  | 15 technical surveyors trained (including implementation of MDD-assisted tech survey) At least 3 qualified as Team Leaders |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational output targets</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 MDD confirmed &amp; verified land</td>
<td>(m²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Reporting planned socio-economic benefits</td>
<td>No. of communities reported on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Suspect areas reduced through tech survey</td>
<td>(m²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Task plans prepared by tech surveyors</td>
<td>No. of tasks plans?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Minefield marking by tech surveyors</td>
<td>No. of tasks marked?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B – Checklist of Specific Issues

NPA Project

Mine Detection Dogs

MDD Operations:

- Is NPA’s MDD SOP in accordance with IMAS?
  - Have the training and transfer of competence from NPA instructors to national handlers been according to NPA’s SOP and IMAS?
  - Was the accreditation of handlers and of MDD carried out in accordance with NPA’s SOP and IMAS?
  - Are the training and kennel facilities built and managed according to NPA and IMAS standards?
  - Is the operational MDD work conducted by NPA/EMAO according to NPA’s SOP and IMAS?
- Can NPA further increase MDD productivity and cost efficiency while remaining IMAS compliant?
- Can NPA improve in how it transfers competence from NPA instructors to local personnel?
- Is the NPA MDD project proceeding according to agreed project documents, timeline and outputs?
- Can the NPA MDD component deliver the output targets set-out in the project plan according to schedule?
- Do EMAO and NPA agree on the MDD methodologies and standards that are appropriate to Ethiopia’s requirements?
- Is the MDD capacity established within EMAO likely to be sustained?

MDD Training Area

- Is the Entoto Training Centre likely to fulfil the purposes for which it is being constructed?
- Are the current plans for the centre cost efficient?
- Is the Training Centre likely to be sustainable following hand-over to EMAO?

Technical Survey (TS)

- Is the (proposed) NPA TS SOP in accordance with IMAS?
- In what ways can the SOP be changed to promote more land being released through additional or improved risk assessment/risk reduction activities?
- To what extent does EMAO endorse the need for Task Impact Assessment (TIA)?
- To what extent has EMAO incorporated TIA data gathering and analysis into its planning and priority-setting?
- In what ways are NPA trained and monitored TS teams utilizing information from the Ethiopia Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS)?
• Can ELIS data be more fully or differently used to promote better TS priority-setting and increased land release?

**Integrated Demining Operations**

• Is the mechanical ground preparation conducted by Bozena flail teams according to EMAO SOP and IMAS?
• Are EMAO manual operations (training and implementation) according to EMAO SOP and IMAS?
• Are EMAO Quality Assurance Teams adequately trained and able to assess the various demining capacities according to relevant standards?
• Can EMAO operational planning be improved to promote better MDD productivity?
• Are there other possibilities for improving the productivity of integrated operations?
• Are there obstacles to further productivity improvements?

**Role of EMAO within the National Demining Programme**

• Do the various organisations involved in mine action in Ethiopia operate as efficient, goal-sharing partners?
• What forums are in place to promote information sharing (e.g. on new mine action technologies and developments) and coordination (operators, donors, etc.)?
• Does the EMAO command and control structure promote joint operational feedback, problem solving, and strategising for improvement?
• Does EMAO have a test and licensing regime in place to consistently ensure that all MDD and handlers operating in Ethiopia have the required skills?

**Linking Mine Action and Development**

• Do mine action and development planners have the information needed to identify areas where development and mine action can be linked?
• What mechanisms are in place (or could be put in place) to promote development-related activities following or in conjunction with demining operations?
## Appendix 2 – Itinerary & Persons Met

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ADDIS ABABA</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saturday, 14 October – Arrival (Lardner &amp; Paterson)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monday, 16 October</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA Mine Action Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP MAAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Norwegian Embassy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tuesday, 17 October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP MAAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA Mine Action Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMAO</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wednesday, 18 October</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thursday, 19 October</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERPMU, MoFED</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFED</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forum for Social Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chr. Michelsen Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAO</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Friday, 20 October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP MAAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tuesday, 24 October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landmine Survivors Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wednesday, 25 October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Roads Authority</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Monday, 30 October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAO</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tuesday, 31 October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Royal Norwegian Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RaDO</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wednesday, 1 November</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAO (advanced debriefing)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Thursday, 2 November</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Debriefing at EMAO</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>ELSEWHERE</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wednesday, 18 October – Flight to Gemhalo (Lardner)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA, Gemhalo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMAO, Gemhalo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Day</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Thursday, 26 October</strong> – Flight to Mekele (Paterson &amp; Seyoum)</td>
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<td><strong>Friday, 27 October</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Saturday, 28 October</strong> – Site visits in Fatsi, Zala Ambessa, Doha, &amp; return to Mekele</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sunday, 29 October</strong> – Flight to Addis Ababa (Paterson &amp; Seyoum)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3 – Mine Action Programme Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Highlights</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>Italian invasion &amp; UXO contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>Ogaden War with Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Border war with Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-90</td>
<td>Internal conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) begins with US assistance to non-combatant Army demining unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-98</td>
<td>EDP runs with 2, then 3 army companies in Somali, North, &amp; Central Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ethiopia signs the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The World Bank, then UNICEF, begin funding RaDO for MRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Dangerous area survey by HALO Trust starts (October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Bank loan for Emergency Recovery Project (ERP) signed (December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>EMAO established (February)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. assistance via RONCO (retrain &amp; partially equip) 2 companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN MAAT established</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HALO Trust Dangerous area survey completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Demining priorities determined by the ERP &amp; Tigray &amp; Afar governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EMAO receives 1”demining contract from ERPMU</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ELIS field surveys begin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3””demining company trained</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>EMAO initiates community liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>UNICEF &amp; RaDO begins transition of responsibility for MRE to Regional Govts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>ELIS completed (but not submitted for certification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cranfield provides assistance for strategic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4””demining company trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 mechanical &amp; 6 MDDs introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EMAO QA operations start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ethiopia ratifies the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty (December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Technical survey starts in Somali region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>RaDO undertakes village profiling study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>EMAO requests UNMAS to certify ELIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>EMAO submits draft National Mine Action Strategy 2006/07-2011/12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 – Development Management in Ethiopia

1 Constitutional Arrangements

A new Constitution was adopted in December 1994, establishing a bicameral legislature (the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of Federation, with the later dealing largely with intergovernmental affairs). The Federal executive consists of a President and a Prime Minister who heads the Council of Ministers. The Council carries out the functions assigned to the Federal Government (monetary policy, foreign relations, defence, etc.) and designs national policies providing guidance to lower levels of government/administration (see textbox). In addition to implementing policies with nation-wide benefits, central ministries support their regional counterparts by undertaking research, collecting data, and providing technical assistance and advice. The Federal Supreme Court has the highest judicial power and is the court of final appeal for regional cases.

Textbox 12 – Administrative structure in Ethiopia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethiopia has five levels of public administration, with the Federal Government as the top tier.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region is the second tier. There are nine regional governments and two special city administrations (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The third tier is the zone. This structure is not assigned power in the Constitution, and serves an administrative coordinating function. There are 66 zones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woreda is the fourth tier in the structure, and is elected. The average population of a woreda is about 100,000. Currently, there are over 525 woredas, but more are being created through a woreda restructuring process now underway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The lowest tier in the administrative structure is the kebele (in urban areas) or Peasant/Farmer/Pastoralist Association Area (in rural areas), with various regional names such as tabia in Tigray, which typically covers 5-10 small communities/villages. There are about 15,000 kebele.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There may be another structure below the kebele, such as the kushet in Tigray at the village level. There are an estimated 150,000 villages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next three levels of government (zones are administrative structures and not governments) have more or less the same structure: a legislative body, a court system, and a number of sector administrative units that constitute the executive branch.

2 Decentralisation

Recognising Ethiopia’s ethnic and socio-economic diversity, the current government has been strongly committed to decentralisation, instituting the first wave in the mid-1990s by transferring expenditure responsibilities to the regions. This was followed

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94 The Preamble of the Constitution starts with “We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia...” A 1991 Proclamation that establishes national regional self-government recognizes 63 different ethnic groups, 48 of which are large enough to be able to establish their own self-government structures at the woreda level, the fourth tier of the government, or above.

95 Public servants were also transferred. The largest region (Oromiya) estimated it needed 88,000 staff excluding the health and education sectors.
in 2002 by a second wave in which many regional expenditure responsibilities were transferred to woredas – a reform piloted in the four regions, including Tigray.\textsuperscript{96}

As a result, local governments now have the primary responsibility for basic service delivery, including education, health, agriculture extension, water, and local roads, as well as for food security and social safety nets. The sub-national share of consolidated government expenditure grew from a quarter in 1999/00 to a third by 2002/03. However, 85\% of government revenues are collected by the federal government, leaving a large fiscal mismatch between revenues and expenditure mandates.

To address this asymmetry, the federal government provides significant unconditional grants to the regions, which finance three-quarters of sub-national spending.\textsuperscript{97} The relative allocations to various regions are determined by a formula incorporating variables for regional population (55\% weight in 2003/04), percentage of residents living under the poverty line (10\%), a development index that measures public services provision such as student-teacher ratios (20\%), and a revenue effort index calculated as the ratio of own revenue to recurrent spending (15\%). Regions then use a simplified version of the same formula to determine woreda allocations.\textsuperscript{98} The effect of this formula – heavily weighted by population – is that more developed regions with larger numbers of schools, health clinics, etc. per capita may not receive sufficient funds to cover their recurrent spending obligations.

The ‘offset’ is an important feature in the current system for unconditional grants. Basically, if the Federal Government is aware of aid funds flowing directly to a regional government, it offsets (i.e. deducts) 100\% of that amount from the unconditional grant to that region. This is a strong disincentive for a Regional Government to seek aid directly from donors, as the unconditional grant will be reduced by an equal amount, without an allowance even to cover the transaction costs of negotiating the grant and reporting to the donor.

Apparently, foreign aid given to NGOs for their projects in a region are not captured by this system, so no offsets in the unconditional grants are made by the Federal Government.

Aid flowing through a programme administered by the Federal Government which is spent primarily in one or two regions (such as the Emergency Rehabilitation Program and the demining programme of EMAO) is not offset.

Regional governments can decide whether to apply the offset system when calculating their grants to woredas. Tigray does not offset.

**Regional governments**
The regions have significant power under the Constitution, and can establish an administration for self-government and democratic rule, enact a state constitution and other laws, formulate and implement economic, social, and development policies and
strategies, administer land and other natural resources, collect taxes not reserved for the Federal Government, and maintain security forces.

The elected Regional Council adopts regional legislation and approves the budget and development strategy. Members of the Regional Council appoint from among themselves an Executive Committee that oversees day-to-day administration. The Council also appoints a President to perform the executive functions, and a set of Bureau Heads who act as the regional equivalent of ministers. The number of Bureaus and their division of responsibilities may vary among regions. All regions have Finance and Economic Development Bureaus, and sector bureaus in priority areas such as Agriculture, Education, Health, and Roads. Functioning as regional ministries, bureaus prepare short- and long-term action plans in keeping with central government targets. Regions also have their own civil services, although pay and conditions of services are aligned with the Federal Civil Service. Regional supreme courts oversee the interpretation of regional constitutions and the application of regional laws.

Zonal administration and Woreda governments
The structure of sub-regional government varies, as each region is given the right to adjust its institutions to suit its needs. Zones are mentioned in the Constitution as structures for "administrative convenience." Zonal administration consists of a set of counterparts to the Regional Bureaus, which aggregate information coming from a number of woredas. In most regions, zonal administration is appointed by the regional government.

Constitutionally, the woreda, the lowest level of elected, full-time government (covering roughly 100,000 people) is the most important unit of sub-national government. Woredas consist of an elected council, a president chosen from among the council, and a set of sectoral offices. In most cases, these sectoral offices serve as implementing agencies and contact points with the communities rather than as development policy planners.

Within woredas, communities organize themselves into kebele (in urban areas) or peasant associations. Kebele usually have an elected leader and a small council, but these officers are not part of the paid, full-time government structure.

3 Elements of Economic Management

Public expenditure management
While many national mine action programmes are financed almost entirely by donors, national governments in mine-affected countries must eventually allocate their own resources to sustain the programme. To ease the transition, very poor countries such as Ethiopia may decide to take loans from the World Bank or the regional development banks (the African Development Bank in the case of Ethiopia), which they can obtain at highly concessional rates.

The Tigray Regional Council has just recently adopted its first Five-Year Development Plan, which will provide the framework for multi-year planning by woredas and by the sectoral bureaus. Woreda and sector plans will be ‘rolling’ (i.e. updated every year).
Mine action officials and advisors need to understand public expenditure management – and particularly budget management – to secure government funds for mine action. As governments in most mine-affected countries face extremely tight budget constraints, it is unlikely they will be able to find adequate resources from their own sources to sustain the essential components of a mine action programme in the short-term (one or two years). Loans from development banks also take years to put in place. Thus, mine action officials and advisors should start the process of obtaining government funding\textsuperscript{100} years in advance, even when donor funding seems secure in the medium term.

**Textbox 13 – Funding mine action in Ethiopia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethiopia has had an unusual pattern of funding for mine action to date. After receiving training and equipment support via the U.S. Ministry of Defense, the government financed the operations of the Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP) for over two years. Following the war with Eritrea, the government obtained a World Bank loan that financed the bulk of demining for five years. Starting in 2007, most of the funds will be coming from donor grants.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is the precise opposite of the pattern seen in most poor countries, which begin with donor grants, then start using loan funds for demining in support of reconstruction and development projects, and (presumably, as few countries have made this transition fully) eventually finance mine action from their own sources of revenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although Ethiopia’s pattern has been reversed, and donor funding will enable EMAO to complete the bulk of the demining, it will again need to get funds through the government budget to complete demining its known minefields and address the residual risk.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BUDGET MANAGEMENT**

Sound public expenditure management follows an annual cycle: (i) planning, (ii) execution, (iii) monitoring and reporting, (iv) audit and evaluation, which informs future cycles. The budget is the key instrument, indicating how a government allocates financial resources to various priorities and serving as the principal (although, often, inadequate) mechanism by which the legislature can hold the executive to account.\textsuperscript{101}

The Ethiopian Fiscal Year follows the Ethiopian Calendar running from (in our calendar) 8 July to 7 July the following year.\textsuperscript{102} However, budget planning should begin in January to give time for work planning by the government departments and the regional governments.\textsuperscript{103} Budget planning in Ethiopia has been complicated due to:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Many mine-affected countries have access to three main sources of funds they can allocate through their budgets: (i) own source revenue (taxes, fees, sales of assets, etc.); (ii) loans (particularly external loans from the development banks); and, increasingly (iii) direct budget support from donor grants.
\item In the vast majority of countries, the legislature must pass the budget, and in most countries, the legislature receives the annual report on government financial statements from the Supreme Audit Authority (e.g. Auditor General). Recently, an Auditor General in Ethiopia was sacked for critical comments concerning the expenditure reporting by the regions.
\item The Ethiopian Calendar year 1999 began in July 2006.
\item The budget planning phase usually entails (i) projecting revenues for the coming year; (ii) issuing a call for budget proposals (the ‘budget circular’) to government departments, often with targets (preliminary allocations) for each, (iii) negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and the other departments, (iv) cabinet decision, and (v) legislative approval.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
• delays in reporting of prior year expenditures by sub-national governments (in part because they perform most functions manually). This limits the ability of policy makers to understand the relationship between spending on programmes and socio-economic outcomes (e.g. how much money is required to raise school enrolment levels to the target levels).

• incomplete and late reporting by donors on the destination and sector composition of grant-financed project spending. This is critical as aid averages about 35% of consolidated government expenditures. Again, the absence of full and timely reporting from donors limits the ability of national policy makers to understand the relationship between programme spending and socio-economic outcomes.

As a result, there often are wide variances between actual and budgeted expenditures, particularly in the regions (which suffer in part because the Federal Government has not been able to adhere to its budget calendar, and advises regions of the amount of their unconditional grants too late for the regions or the woreda to do their own budget planning adequately). Regardless, budget execution has been relatively disciplined, with low levels of corruption relative to many other countries in the region, and no significant expenditure arrears (i.e. unpaid bills).

**EXPENDITURE PLANNING OVER THE MEDIUM-TERM**

A budget should be the financial reflection of the government’s plans for coming year, but all too often budget planners are prisoners of past decisions – programmes can’t be cut to reallocate resources to higher priorities because programme staff and beneficiaries would fight the cuts. Thus, drastic changes often are not politically feasible, and changes have to be planned over the medium term. This means that – in most countries – mine action officials and advisors will need to work for years to secure adequate financing from the government to sustain the national mine action programme. Typically, they will need first to get some amount – usually inadequate – in the annual budget for mine action, while building the case for increased support over the medium term. In Ethiopia’s case, this means working with officials from the ministry responsible for mine action (currently, the Ministry of Federal Affairs) to ensure the requirements for mine action are reflected in two instruments – a Macro Economic and Fiscal Framework (MEFF) and the Public Expenditure Program (PEP) – which are being introduced as part of the country’s expenditure planning reform.

The MEFF provides a three-year forecast of fiscal aggregates (e.g. total revenues and total expenditures) while the PEP outlines planned expenditures over the coming three years by sector. Reportedly, progress has been achieved in both efforts, and the PEP is being introduced at the regional government level. The PEP will then be a key tool for costing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP – see the next section).

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104 In Tigray, a financial management information system was installed two years ago. Efforts are underway to install the same system in the 46 woredas, but many have problems with electrical power and/or personnel – only 13 are up and running.

105 Last year however, the Regional Governments were given preliminary estimates for their grants in February, and learned the exact amount in April-May, so improvements are being made.
Development planning and management

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The Government of Ethiopia seeks to promote rapid, broad-based, and equitable growth, and has decided to adopt a market-led strategy. Because the vast majority of Ethiopians live in rural areas, equitable growth must be based on rural development. This will require massive investments in physical capital (roads, telecommunications, and public services actually reaching rural communities) and human capital (so people are able to take advantage of market-based opportunities). As development planners in Addis Ababa cannot know in detail what rural communities most need, the Federal Government has adopted a strong decentralisation programme which (in tandem to market-led growth and human capital development) is intended to empower the poor and expand the choices and control that people have over their lives.

These strategic elements are reflected in the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP) – Ethiopia’s initial PRSP.

Textbox 14 – The 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The SDPRP outlined the fundamental development objective of the government as the building of a free-market economy which would enable:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• rapid economic development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• reduced dependence on food aid; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the poor to be the main beneficiaries from economic growth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To promote this objective, the strategy rested on four pillars:

1. Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI), which emphasized food security and, because demand-growth from Ethiopia’s relatively small urban population would be modest, envisaged rapid growth in agricultural exports;
2. Justice system and civil service reform,
3. Decentralization and empowerment, and

Neither landmine contamination or mine action is mentioned in the SDPRP.

The Government has been working on a ‘second generation’ PRSP, called the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) to run until 2011, but this has not yet been released.

Coordination with other development actors

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

Ethiopia has traditionally received about half the aid per capita than other sub-Saharan African countries (this based more to the fact that the country was never truly colonised and its large population than on need).\(^{106}\) During the 1970s and 1980s, much of the aid that was received was for humanitarian assistance rather than development investment. Aid flows began to pick-up in the mid-1990s, falling temporarily during the war with Eritrea, then rising again. In recent years, Ethiopia has received about $15-$20 per capita (still lower than the SSA average), although

\(^{106}\) Many studies have shown that, on average, former colonies and small countries receive more aid per capita.
much of this still flows through NGO networks rather than official channels. Economic modelling suggests that aid flows would have to triple by 2015 if Ethiopia is to meet its MDGs.

Ethiopia has also been one of the pilot countries for work on Harmonization and Alignment of donor practices, and has made significant progress towards coordinating assistance and harmonizing ODA flows. Until the 2005 elections, the donor community had been supportive, forming a Donor Assistance Group (DAG) co-chaired by the Government and the World Bank, and shifting more funds into programme and budget support. In November 2005, the DAG issued a joint statement stating donor agreement to: (i) move away from direct budget support in favour of alternative instruments that would provide greater oversight of poverty reducing expenditures and promote increased accountability; (ii) reduce aid over time if governance does not improve; and (iii) focus on new governance programs.

**NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOs)**

The government recognises that NGOs are involved in the core poverty oriented sectors such as agriculture, health, education, water, rural roads and other rural development activities. The government believes that NGOs are involved in around 1200 projects, with health, agriculture and rural development as the major sectors. The government tries to coordinate the work of the NGOs in the context of its Poverty Reduction Strategy (the SDPRP, soon to be replaced by the PASDEP), with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA) responsible for this down to the *woreda* level. In Tigray for example, the DPP Bureau monitors about 25 NGOs (three or four of these are international). They have regional coordination meetings annually, and semi-annually organise joint monitoring missions of NGO activities, with all sector bureaus involved.

**4 Disaster Management & Related Issues**

DPPC also takes the lead role in coordinating the emergency responses to disasters. In Tigray, in the past five years, the DPP Bureau has also assumed responsibility for ‘resettlements’ such as the voluntary resettlements from the overcrowded highlands in Eastern Tigray to the lower areas in Western Tigray. This is important for mine action as the bulk of EMAO demining resources are now based in the Kefta Humera *woreda* in Western Tigray, to clear land for resettlements.

**Textbox 15 – Possible future conflict in Humera**

Growing pressure on land and other natural resources has been leading to conflicts between pastoralists and farmers throughout much of Africa, including Ethiopia. In many cases, governments promote voluntary resettlement of farmers onto grazing lands traditionally used by pastoralists. This promises to raise total food production and reduce food insecurity, because nomadic herders typically use the land for only a few months in a year. However, if the pastoralists have no alternative options for grazing livestock in those months, their

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107 The expected outcomes of harmonisation were (i) enhanced aid delivery targeting the poor; (ii) strengthened government capacity, increased service delivery, and broad-based ownership; (iii) development cooperation aligned with the SDPRP, with a larger share as direct budget support; and (iv) improved DAG-Government partnership structure and policy dialogue. (DAG, 2002)

108 In Tigray, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), which used to be an arm of the TPLF but is now officially an NGO, is also extremely important in the implementation of relief operations.
livelihoods may become unviable. Often the solution proposed by governments is to encourage the pastoralists to settle and convert to crop farming – an option many pastoral communities find unacceptable.

A number of groups have been working on dispute resolution measures to protect pastoralist livelihoods. In Somali region, the government has adopted policies to protect nomadic communities. In Tigray however, the Evaluation Team understands the Regional Government has not adopted such policies.

EMAO currently has many of its assets in Humera, demining land traditionally used by pastoralists on which the government of Tigray is planning to resettle farmers. While this is in keeping with Ethiopia’s and Tigray’s food security policies, there is potential for future conflict unless measures are taken to protect the livelihoods of the pastoralist communities.
## Appendix 5 – Expenditure Assignments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Government</th>
<th>Expenditure assignments</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Justice and internal security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Macro stabilisation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• International trade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Currency and banking</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Immigration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National interest capital projects</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Shared, federal &amp; regions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vocational &amp; preparatory schools</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Airlines &amp; railways</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Police</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regional</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Secondary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• District &amp; referral hospitals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nursing schools</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Water supply</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional &amp; zonal roads</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Regional police</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Maintenance of irrigation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintenance of small-scale water supply projects &amp; energy programs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agricultural planning</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Shared regional &amp; woreda</strong></td>
<td>Small-scale capital projects</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Woreda</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Primary education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Basic health care</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agricultural extension</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Veterinary clinics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Land use administration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Water development, wells construction &amp; maintenance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Local police</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local roads</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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