Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau

Tracy Brown
Handicap International - France

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd

Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/1062

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Project Evaluation Report
March 2006

Bissau sans mines ni UXOs – Projet de renforcement des capacités locales d’action contre les mines et les UXOs en Guinée Bissau

(Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau)

A project of Handicap International – France
in partnership with the Bissau-Guinean NGO, HUMAID
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2006

Total Budget: €738,057
EuropeAid - European Commission: €600,000
(MAP/2004/095-744)
Handicap International – France: €138,057

Prepared by Tracy Brown
Independent Consultant contracted by Handicap International – France
tracycb@sympatico.ca
1. INTRODUCTION / BACKGROUND

The HI – HUMAID Project
With prior programming experience in Guinea-Bissau and significant Mine Action experience internationally, Handicap International – France (HI) was awarded €600,000 through EuropeAid’s Appeal 117489 / C / G / Multi (2003/04) toward a 15-month partnership project with the Bissau-Guinean NGO, Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID), entitled: Bissau sans mines ni UXOs – Projet de renforcement des capacites locales d’action contre les mines et les UXOs en Guinee Bissau, hereinafter referred to in English as Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau.¹ The EC contribution represented 81% of the total budget of €738,057.

The general objectives of the project, covering the period January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2006, were 1) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau and in so doing, 2) to reduce the threat of landmines and UXOs in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau, the capital of Guinea-Bissau (where 30% of the country’s population of approximately 1.6 million reside).

Specifically the project sought to strengthen local capacity for Mine Action in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) through budget support, technical assistance and accompaniment to HUMAID. The project was to benefit HUMAID’s 77 staff members (deminers, other field staff, administrative and management personnel), and indirectly, the population of Bissau whose livelihoods would improve as a result of the reduced threat from landmines and UXO. In the end, direct beneficiaries also included deminers of LUTCAM, the one other mine clearance NGO in Guinea Bissau whose deminers participated in HI-facilitated technical training, and the staff of the national Mine Action coordinating body, CAAMI, who benefited from on-the-ground technical expertise provided by HI advisors.

The Landmine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau’s landmine and UXO contamination can be traced to three conflicts:

- the war of Independence from Portugal (1963 to 1974), when landmines were used to defend Portuguese military installations, and were also laid around the military headquarters of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), and along the border with Guinea Conakry;
- the 1998/99 civil war affecting primarily the capital Bissau and surrounding areas, where the frontline extended 11 km through residential areas, cashew orchards and industrial infrastructure. Government forces comprised of mostly Senegalese and Guinea Conakry military reinforcements laid mines in a defensive measure against the Bissau-Guinean Junta which controlled the airport and access to the interior of the country. An estimated 190,000 people, or 54% of the population of Bissau, were said to be directly affected by this mine threat². Moreover, the frontline neighborhoods of Bissau were densely littered with thousands of UXOs, due in large

¹ The original project title was in French and a number of slightly different English and Portuguese translations have been used in project documents.
² Estimate of affected population taken from HUMAID’s fundraising appeal letter written by John Blacken (September 2005).
part to the explosion of a suburban armory during the war. As well, four areas in the south of the country are also known to have been mined during this conflict;
- and thirdly, the on-going low-level conflict in Senegal’s Casamance region between the Government of Senegal and the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) affecting the northern border zone of Guinea-Bissau.

From 2003 to mid 2004, 41 people were killed or injured by mines and UXOs in Guinea-Bissau bringing the total number of registered victims from 1963 to mid 2004 to 665. Of note is the fact that registered victims can be found in all regions of the country, with 35% in the north, 21% in the east, 19% in the south and 25% in Bissau town. Approximately 25% of all victims, including the most recent victims, have been the result of UXO incidents, highlighting the particular need to include EOD in capacity-building strategies and in clearance priorities.

**HUMAID and Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau**

HUMAID was founded in 2000 by a Canadian resident in Bissau, Elaine Grimson, and a small group of war veterans to address the imminent threat posed by mines and UXOs in the city of Bissau. Just days after HUMAID was created, Elaine Grimson died unexpectedly and the remaining founders of HUMAID asked John Blacken, a former US Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, also resident in Bissau, to lead the organization. With no initial funding, limited materials and equipment, and rudimentary techniques, HUMAID began identifying and marking mine and UXO contamination in Bissau, and clearing mines and UXO. Thus, was the start of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and ratified it in 2001, providing a legal impetus for Mine Action. And in 2001, the National Mine Action Coordination Centre (CAAMI) was established under the authority of the inter-ministerial National Commission for Humanitarian Demining (CNDH). The CAAMI is responsible for implementing the National Mine Action Program (PAAMI) which serves as the programmatic framework for Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.

Since its inception, UNDP has provided budget support, technical assistance and in-house expatriate advisors to the CAAMI.

In 2002, UNDP created LUTCAM as the operational arm of the CAAMI to carry out clearance tasks, ostensibly with a vision towards eventual semi-independence as a national NGO. It is not clear whether the decision by UNDP to create a new operational structure was intended to increase the operational capacity beyond just HUMAID hoping the necessary funding would materialize, or was a move to establish an alternative to HUMAID, knowing full-well there would be limited resources in the medium term to maintain two separate clearance organizations.

The coordination of clearance tasks was centralized in the CAAMI, though to-date no formal accreditation process for operational partners has been established. And lacking its own National Operating Standards, the CAAMI has referred to Mozambican and Angolan interpretations of the IMAS as a guide for the application of international standards in Guinea-Bissau.

---

4 HUMAID’s fundraising appeal letter written by John Blacken (September 2005).
Until 2003, when LUTCAM began operations, HUMAID was the lone operator in clearance activities in Guinea-Bissau. HUMAID had by then received donor support from the UK, Sweden, France, Germany, the US, and UNDP totaling some $1.27 million over four years. With this support HUMAID claims to have cleared 396,236 m², and removed 2,480 anti-personnel landmines, 53 anti-tank mines, 144 anti-boat mines, 13,719 large UXOs (> 12.77 mm) and 10,000 kg of spent bullets and other metals from the ground by the end of 2003 (refer to ANNEX F (b) – HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 2000-2005)⁶.

By 2004, the combined clearance capacity of HUMAID and LUTCAM had reached some 100 manual deminers with total production averaging 10,000 m² per month in Bissau⁷. LUTCAM was funded and managed by UNDP through the CAAMI, and HUMAID was operating as an independent NGO, with a 2004 annual budget of approximately $500,000 funded entirely by the German Government through Caritas, a Catholic relief organization.

In Bissau, 17 urban and peri-urban areas had been identified and marked by HUMAID and LUTCAM with an approximate size of 6.5 million m² - of which HUMAID claims to have cleared 511,530 m² by the end of 2004⁸. Although 21 additional areas in the interior of the country were known to be mined, including four areas linked to the 1998/99 conflict (though no impact or technical survey has to date been carried out to confirm the extent of the contamination), both LUTCAM and HUMAID have worked exclusively in Bissau. The CAAMI has made it clear that only after Bissau was completed would clearance activities move out into the rest of the country. Moreover, neither HUMAID nor LUTCAM have the logistical capacity to venture outside Bissau.

Until 2004, relations between the CAAMI and UNDP, on the one side, and HUMAID on the other, were characterized by high levels of tension and as a result national coordination was less effective⁹.

---

⁶ These figures are taken from HUMAID monthly reports to the CAAMI. Prior to 2003, HUMAID was registering only UXOs larger than 12.77 mm in the UXO count and all other metals removed in the category of Other Metals Removed (by kg). In 2003, The CAAMI instructed HUMAID to begin to count spent bullets and other small metal fragments from UXOs in the UXO count. Note also that there are some discrepancies in HUMAID’s production data from one document to another (as outlined in Annex E (b) – HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 2000-2005, and no verified / official figures available from HI or the CAAMI.

⁷ Figure taken from the Guinea-Bissau National Plan for the Completion Initiative 2005-2009, prepared by UNDP-Guinea-Bissau (May 2005).

⁸ Estimate of the total contamination in Bissau town and total area cleared by HUMAID taken from HUMAID documents.

⁹ HUMAID followed CAAMI directives begrudgingly, convinced they were being made to clear low-priority areas with relatively minor landmine and UXO contamination in an effort to discredit the organization vis-à-vis HUMAID’s donors and to build support for LUTCAM in an increasingly competitive funding environment. Though institutional relations between the CAAMI and HUMAID are considerably improved at present, due in part to HI’s efforts to promote more effective coordination, old resentments and distrust linger.
In 2004, the UNDP included Guinea-Bissau in its Completion Initiative – aimed at mobilizing donor support towards “finishing the job” in those countries with relatively small landmine / UXO contamination and where it should be possible - with targeted donor support - to definitively take care of the problem. Guinea-Bissau later produced its own National Plan for Completion (May 2005) dependent on the combined operational capacity of HUMAID and LUTCAM (or some variation of the equivalent).

Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau takes place in the challenging context of extreme poverty – with the country ranking as the 6th poorest in the world, massive debt, an economy heavily dependent on foreign aid, a lack of natural resources and infrastructure, and a high level of political instability. The overthrow of long-time President Joao “Nino” Vieira in 1999 was followed by a succession of governments. And, in August 2005, Nino Vieira was returned to power in a presidential election that promised to re-establish political stability in the country. The sacking of a rival Prime Minister and subsequent political in-fighting over the final months of 2005 have once again raised concerns of on-going instability. These factors, combined with low levels of state capacity and high levels of corruption have driven those few donors potentially interested in Guinea-Bissau to a stand-off position.

Project Justification
It was in this international and national context that HI envisioned an initiative to build HUMAID’s capacity in mine / UXO clearance to international standards, while also strengthening HUMAID’s organizational performance, in line with HI’s strategy to develop national capacities in Mine Action.

By 2004 HUMAID had come a long way from the rag-tag group of go-getter veterans who in 2000 began prodding for landmines and picking up rockets outside any known safety standards or acceptable practice. The organization had secured over a million US dollars to fund humanitarian clearance operations since 2000 without external accompaniment, had benefited from short-term training and technical assistance from Dutch, Australian and Mozambican trainers, and had acquired basic protective gear and clearance equipment. HUMAID followed the directives and priorities established by the CAAMI (however begrudgingly) and clearance operations were carried out without incident. The organization had established itself as a credible and committed player in Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.

HUMAID had undeniably progressed but most agreed there was more to be done to professionalize HUMAID’s clearance capacity as per IMAS10. HI was well-positioned to provide the kinds of technical and organizational supports required. As such HUMAID was the obvious, and arguably the most strategic choice of local partners for HI.

In granting HI 600,000 Euros for the project Building Local Mine Action Capacity in Guinea-Bissau, the EC responded to the well documented need for continued clearance operations in Guinea-Bissau towards Completion objectives, while at the same time reinforcing and professionalizing an already existing local operator in-line with its 2002-2004 Mine Action Strategy and the not yet written 2005-2007 Mine Action Strategy – the European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target.

10 Handicap International, CAAMI, and others all recognized that clearance practices prior to the HI partnership project were not in line with IMAS. HUMAID field staff concurred with this assessment.
The Partnership Agreement
HI worked with HUMAID in designing the project proposal for the EC and signed a formal Partnership Agreement with HUMAID as the framework for collaboration. The collaboration included budget support to HUMAID operations (salaries, equipment and operational costs), technical support, training and accompaniment in demining and EOD, and technical support, training and accompaniment in organizational / managerial areas (administration, finance, and logistics).

HI’s Human Resource Inputs
HI recruited a team of 2 technical advisors/trainers to train and accompany HUMAID intensively through the project – a demining / EOD specialist and an administrator / management trainer / advisor. The HI staffing was enhanced through the later addition of a third full-time technical advisor / trainer in community liaison (data collection / mapping) and MRE - not funded within the EC project budget. While the project team of 3 HI advisors / trainers had other responsibilities related to managing HI’s office and operations in Guinea-Bissau, they were otherwise engaged full-time in project activities.

Project Implementation
The project began in January 2005, and has proceeded as per the original proposal. There have been delays in implementation but few programming changes and only minor budget revisions not requiring formal amendments to the contract with the EC. Nonetheless, all programmatic and budgetary revisions have been documented in communications with the EC and in the project Interim Narrative Report submitted to the EC in October 2005.

The Project Evaluation
An external final evaluation was planned and budgeted. HI has coordinated this evaluation in concert with the EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau. The Terms of Reference for the evaluation are attached as ANNEX A, but can be summarized as:

- To assess the degree to which the project objectives have been achieved, with particular attention to capacity-building methodologies, efficiency, relevance and sustainability;
- To provide HI with recommendations for effective project closure; and
- To provide HI with recommendations for future capacity-building projects.

This document represents the written synopsis of the evaluation. Subsequent sections present the Evaluation Methodology, an Overview of Project Commitments and Outputs To-Date, a Discussion of Findings & Lessons-Learned in Areas of Intervention, Other Management Considerations, an Assessment of the Project’s Relevance, an Assessment of Efficiency & Effectiveness, an Assessment of Sustainability & Impact, Conclusions & Lessons-Learned, and Recommendations. Attached to body of the report are six documents including detailed accounts of the Evaluation activities, individuals and documents consulted, HUMAID’s production data, and a combined Self-Assessment and External Assessment of HUMAID’s Organizational Performance.
2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The approach to this evaluative exercise was a mix of technocratic assessments of project outputs and more interpretative assessments of project processes toward desired outcomes. An effort was made to assess both the micro-workings of project implementation as well as the macro policy and partnership context in which the project was envisioned and played out. Documents were reviewed, interviews were conducted with key individuals one-on-one and in small groups, and training sessions, daily activities and partner interactions were observed over the course of 11 days in-country in February 2006. A detailed program of contacts and evaluation activities is attached as ANNEX B, the list of individuals consulted as ANNEX C, and documents reviewed as ANNEX D.

In evaluating organizational capacity-building aspects of the project, the Evaluator was informed by a number of structured “organizational self-assessment” tools developed and previously administered by HI with HUMAID as well as HI’s assessment of HUMAID’s organizational performance\(^\text{11}\).

In evaluating HUMAID’s technical capacity in Mine Action as per IMAS, the Evaluator referred to written tests used in the training courses conducted by HI’s Demining & EOD Technical Advisor and the expert opinion of HI. Observations as to HUMAID’s technical capacity were also received from the UNDP Chief Technical Advisor on Mine Action, and the Director of the CAAMI.

Methodological Considerations

- The evaluator is not a technical specialist in mine clearance and EOD, thus not qualified to independently assess the technical capacity of HUMAID in these activities (in a strictly technical sense), much less to evaluate the expertise / capacity of HI’s technical assistance. Moreover, the evaluation was carried out during a break in the mine / UXO clearance schedule of HUMAID and it was impossible to observe clearance work first-hand.

- It is expected that HI will provide its own evaluation of the technical capacity of HUMAID in mine / UXO clearance in final reporting on the project. While a certain degree of subjectivity and conflict of interest are inherent and unavoidable in this, the expert technical assessment of HI should be deemed by all parties to be valid.

- The evaluator originally proposed to bring all interlocutors in the project together in an evaluation workshop, but HI advised that this methodology might not be the most appropriate given existing dynamics between and among the key players. It is the opinion of the evaluator (with the benefit of hindsight) that a broader forum of stakeholders might or might not have been more productive, but for certain some form of facilitated reflection involving HI and HUMAID would have been helpful in working through partnership tensions towards more productive collaboration and

\(^{11}\text{Managerial Assessment – Administrative, Human Resources, Financial, Logistics (December 2005), compiled by Annabelle Djeribi, HI Administrator & Logistics Coordinator / Technical Advisor to HUMAID.}\)
synergy through the final weeks of the project, and in sousing out project achievements and lessons-learned.

- The technical and methodological limitations noted, the evaluator believes the inputs received were sufficient to address the primary objectives of the evaluation and the most pressing concerns of HI and HUMAID at this juncture in the life of the project.
3. OVERVIEW OF PROJECT COMMITMENTS & OUTPUTS TO-DATE

3.1 The Project Log Frame Revisited

General Objectives
1. To reduce the risk of landmines and UXOs in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau.
2. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.

Specific Objective
Local Mine Action capacity is strengthened in Guinea-Bissau as per International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Verifiable Indicators | Source and Means of Verification | Assumptions
---|---|---
1. HUMAID receives technical and administrative supports in the management of Mine Action as per IMAS and in coordination with CAAMI. | HUMAID’s Organigram. HUMAID’s activity reports. External evaluation. Test results from training courses. | Political stability in the country so as to permit project implementation. CAAMI supports Mine Action partners. |
2. Within 2 years HUMAID has the capacity to manage Mine Action projects as per IMAS. |

Expected Results

Verifiable Indicators | Source and Means of Verification | Assumptions
---|---|---
1. Local competencies to direct and manage mine clearance activities are developed (within HUMAID). **Preconditions:** HUMAID and HI sign a partnership agreement and the security situation in the country is remains stable. At least 3 HUMAID staff are trained in project management. At least 2 additional HUMAID staff are trained in bookkeeping and financial management. New information management tools are used by HUMAID. HUMAID develops Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and these are submitted to the CAAMI. | Activity reports. Training reports. External evaluation. HUMAID’s SOPs. | UNDP funds HUMAID’s participation in international training for mid and senior managers of HUMAID. CAAMI validates HUMAID’s SOPs. |

---

12 An English translation of the original project log frame in French is presented here.
### Expected Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Results</th>
<th>Verifiable Indicators</th>
<th>Source and Means of Verification</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2. More effective mine / UXO clearance in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau. | Independent adherence to IMAS.  
53 HUMAID deminers are trained.  
At least 10 HUMAID deminers are trained in EOD. | Activity reports.  
Internal HUMAID quality control reports.  
CAAMI quality control reports. | CAAMI’s assessment of HUMAID results and impact corresponds to that of HUMAID and the reality on the ground. |
| 3. Improved coordination between HUMAID and the CAAMI. | HUMAID submits regular and satisfactory reports to the CAAMI.  
CAAMI sends other trainees to participate in project training sessions.  
Space for collective analysis of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau. | The CAAMI is satisfied with HUMAID’s activity reports.  
The CAAMI is satisfied with HUMAID’s quality control reports. | HUMAID is accredited by the CAAMI. |

### Activities

**Activities for Result #1 - Local competencies to direct and manage mine clearance activities are developed (within HUMAID).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Recruit a Deputy Director for HUMAID.</td>
<td>The existence of potential English speaking candidates for the position of Deputy Director of HUMAID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Training or HUMAID in project management and fundraising.</td>
<td>UNDP funds mid-senior management training for Mine Action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Training or HUMAID in bookkeeping and financial management.</td>
<td>Approval of HUMAID’s SOPs by the CNDH and CAAMI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Establish administrative, financial and human resource systems within HUMAID.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Develop HUMAID’s Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Activities for Result # 2 – More effective mine / UXO clearance in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 HI Technical Advisor.</td>
<td>The GICHD carries out a training mission on IMSMA in Guinea-Bissau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD training materials.</td>
<td>The CAAMI supports and monitors the training being conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD operational materials.</td>
<td>ANDES participates in the training on MRE along with the HI PEPAM Dept. and assists in establishing the HUMAID Community Liaison team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine for clearing brush.</td>
<td>There are no serious dog illnesses in Guinea-Bissau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support mission by HI Logistics Dept.</td>
<td>The mechanical clearance machine is funded by a European donor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pick-up vehicle.</td>
<td>The CAAMI undertakes quality control of all clearance activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance materials and equipment.</td>
<td>Switzerland provides micro-charges for EOD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support from HI’s PEPAM Dept.</td>
<td>The Ministry of Transport facilitates the entry of project materials into the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 EOD staff from HUMAID.</td>
<td>The Ministry of Defense authorizes the storage of explosives for EOD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Community Liaison staff from HUMAID.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Activities for Result # 2 – More effective mine / UXO clearance in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau. |
| 2.1 Training in IMAS. |
| 2.2 Training sessions for HUMAID on survey techniques, data collection, MRE, EOD, use of mine detection dogs, and mechanical demining. |
| 2.3 Technical accompaniment and supervision in the field. |
| 2.4 Create and operationalize 2 EOD teams. |
| 2.5 Equip HUMAID with the necessary vehicles and materials for clearance activities. |
| 2.6 Train, equip and establish a Community Liaison team to facilitate clearance activities, carry out MRE and collect data on dangerous areas. |

### Activities for Result # 3 – Improved coordination between HUMAID and the CAAMI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 HI Technical Advisor.</td>
<td>The HUMAID reports to the CAAMI are found to be acceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAID staff.</td>
<td>The CAAMI organizes work sessions on national Mine Action Standards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Activities for Result # 3 – Improved coordination between HUMAID and the CAAMI. |
| 3.1 Improve the quantity and quality of reports submitted by HUMAID to the CAAMI in support of national data collection and coordination. |
| 3.2 Facilitate HUMAID’s participation in collective work on national Mine Action Standards. |
| 3.3 Include other Mine Action actors in technical training by / through the CAAMI. |
| 3.4 Contribute to a Landmine Impact study in close collaboration with other Mine Action actors in Guinea-Bissau. |
### 3.2 Activities & Outputs To-Date

**Activities for Result #1 - Local competencies to direct and manage mine clearance activities are developed within HUMAID.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned Activity</th>
<th>Carried Out</th>
<th>Importance in Achieving Desired Result 1-5 13 (1 = not very, 5 = very important)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Recruit a Deputy Director for HUMAID.</td>
<td>NO, but efforts made to encourage and assist HUMAID to re-structure internally towards the same objective. Changes in strategy were documented and communicated to the EC in the interim narrative report (Sept/05) and other correspondence.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Training for HUMAID in project management and fundraising.</td>
<td>YES, in part. 3 HUMAID staff trained. In May 2005, HI brought a resource person from Brussels (Alexandra Mege) to lead an intensive training workshop on fundraising and program development (May 30 – June 3, 2005). As a follow-up to the fundraising workshop, HI organized an exploratory fundraising trip with HUMAID to Dakar in October 2005 with the objective of meeting prospective donors. In November 2005, HI organized a week-long intensive training workshop on project methodology facilitated by a HI resource person from the regional office in Burkina Faso (Bartelomey Batieno). HUMAID did not send a senior staff person to the international Mine Action project management training course in Thailand in September/October 2005.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Training for HUMAID in bookkeeping and financial management.</td>
<td>YES, in part. 1 HUMAID staff accompanied. Formal training not required. Accompaniment provided in budget development, financial monitoring and reporting. HI also provided extensive hands-on financial management support in ensuring project accountability vis-à-vis the EC.</td>
<td>3/5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Note that this assessment of “importance” is that of the Evaluator. Some activities were seen to be essential to achieving the desired outcomes while other activities were assessed as less vital to achieving the desired outcomes. This scoring is not an assessment of the degree to which HI or the project was successful in carrying out the activities --- observations on this are included in subsequent sections of the report, but rather, an assessment of the degree to which the chosen activities were important to meeting the desired results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned Activity</th>
<th>Carried Out</th>
<th>Importance in Achieving Desired Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Establish administrative, financial and human resource systems within HUMAID.</td>
<td>YES, in part</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement established a Project Management Committee that met monthly to coordinate project activities and to provide a forum for HI’s technical assistance and accompaniment on administrative and managerial issues. HI’s strategy for organizational development included a participatory base-line assessment of the state of affairs in administration, finance, human resources and logistics and to compile an Organizational Assessment document that would set the stage for on-going technical assistance and organizational development. To this end HI organized and facilitated a series of 2-day workshops with HUMAID on related aspects such as the HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement, organizational structure and Organigram, job descriptions, etc, culminating in the presentation of the Organizational Assessment in late 2005.</td>
<td>Not because these systems are not important <em>per se</em> but because HUMAID had basic procedures in place prior to the project and was operational without external technical assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Develop HUMAID's Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Both HI and HUMAID recognize the importance of developing organizational SOPs for HUMAID. To date these SOPs have not been developed --- and remain a priority in the final weeks of the project. HI also noted the intention in the mid-term narrative report to the EC to provide support to the CAAMI in developing national operating standards as a locally adapted version of the IMAS. This work also has not been possible to date.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Activities for Result # 2 – More effective mine / UXO clearance in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned Activity</th>
<th>Carried Out</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Training in IMAS.</td>
<td>YES, 60 HUMAID field staff trained.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In early 2005, at the start of the project, the HI Technical Advisor assessed the competencies of 60 HUMAID deminers, group leaders, paramedics, supervisors, quality control monitors and Community Liaison workers during the regularly scheduled refresher training course. At this time it was deemed necessary to extend the refresher training by an additional two weeks (February 2-18, 2005). The training included both theoretical and practical elements. HI assessed competencies in written and practical tests. A second refresher training course for HUMAID deminers, group leaders, paramedics, supervisors, quality control monitors and paramedics was carried out in September / October 2005. The original proposal to introduce mine detection dogs was abandoned early in the project as simply not viable. Similarly, the plan to include mechanical clearance machinery was abandoned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides questions of technical appropriateness and suitability to the clearance terrain and tasks, there was no budget support for these activities within the project.

As reported by HI to the EC in the interim narrative report, HI decided to focus training on manual demining and EOD.

### 2.2 Training

**sessions for HUMAID on survey techniques, data collection, MRE, EOD, use of mine detection dogs, and mechanical demining.**

In part.

In addition to training in MRE provided by the HI Community Liaison Technical Advisor, HI sent a MRE specialist from HI headquarters (Sophie Bonichon) in August 2005 to train the HUMAID Community Liaison team in MRE and community liaison and to provide technical support to developing a Community Liaison Strategy and work plan for 2005.

After long procurement delays, HI acquired GPS devices and compasses for training in survey techniques and mapping which was carried out in January/February 2006.

As noted above, mine detection dogs and mechanical demining were removed from the plan.

### 2.3 Technical accompaniment and supervision in the field.

**YES**

HI provided regular accompaniment and supervision to HUMAID deminers on-the-job.

Early in the project, HI also attended weekly technical coordination meetings held by HUMAID.

### 2.4 Create and operationalize 2 EOD teams.

**In part**

There were delays in implementing EOD training. The first training session was held August 8-19, 2005 with 10 HUMAID deminers, 10 LUTCAM deminers and 2 CAAMI participants. HUMAID and LUTCAM deminers were selected for the course using a written test developed by HI. The top 10 participated. CAAMI provided the training room and meals but was not able to secure the necessary explosives for the practical training.

The practical EOD training was only carried out in February 2006.

The plan was to form an EOD team of 6 people in HUMAID and another within LUTCAM. These teams have not yet been operationalized.

### 2.5 Equip HUMAID with the necessary vehicles and materials for clearance activities.

**YES**

Some changes were made to the original plan for procurement, and these changes were documented and communicated to the EC. No changes required formal amendments to the contractual agreement with the EC.

Most procurement orders were processed by June 2005, but requests for exceptions to the rules of origin requirements resulted in long delays in procurement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes/In Part</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>In part. In addition to training in MRE provided by the HI Community Liaison Technical Advisor, HI sent a MRE specialist from HI headquarters (Sophie Bonichon) in August 2005 to train the HUMAID Community Liaison team in MRE and community liaison and to provide technical support to developing a Community Liaison Strategy and work plan for 2005. After long procurement delays, HI acquired GPS devices and compasses for training in survey techniques and mapping which was carried out in January/February 2006. As noted above, mine detection dogs and mechanical demining were removed from the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>YES HI provided regular accompaniment and supervision to HUMAID deminers on-the-job. Early in the project, HI also attended weekly technical coordination meetings held by HUMAID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>In part There were delays in implementing EOD training. The first training session was held August 8-19, 2005 with 10 HUMAID deminers, 10 LUTCAM deminers and 2 CAAMI participants. HUMAID and LUTCAM deminers were selected for the course using a written test developed by HI. The top 10 participated. CAAMI provided the training room and meals but was not able to secure the necessary explosives for the practical training. The practical EOD training was only carried out in February 2006. The plan was to form an EOD team of 6 people in HUMAID and another within LUTCAM. These teams have not yet been operationalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>YES Some changes were made to the original plan for procurement, and these changes were documented and communicated to the EC. No changes required formal amendments to the contractual agreement with the EC. Most procurement orders were processed by June 2005, but requests for exceptions to the rules of origin requirements resulted in long delays in procurement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>HUMAID had a supply of basic materials and equipment to continue operations prior to and through most of the project period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Activity</td>
<td>Carried Out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Train, equip and establish a Community Liaison team to facilitate clearance activities, carry out MRE and collect data on dangerous areas.</td>
<td>YES / NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YES, 5 HUMAID staff trained. HI brought in a 3rd Technical Advisor position outside the project budget who worked to support the HUMAID Community Liaison team provide information to communities on clearance activities, collect data on dangerous areas (primarily UXO contamination) and educate the public to reduce the threat of mine / UXO incidents. The HI Technical Advisor developed job descriptions for the CL team, evaluated the competencies of existing team members, recommended restructuring the team, coordinated the recruitment of new CL staff, developed a training plan, and trained the team in participatory techniques (June 14, 2005), PEPAM (July 7/8, 2005), data collection and mapping (July/August, 2005). As noted, in August 2005 a PEPAM specialist from HI France carried out a 2-week training course on MRE and community mapping, and assisted in developing a community liaison strategy for HUMAID.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Activities for Result # 3 – Improved coordination between HUMAID and the CAAMI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>YES / NO</th>
<th>Importance in Achieving Desired Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Improve the quantity and quality of reports submitted by HUMAID to the CAAMI in support of national data collection and coordination.</td>
<td>YES, in part</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through the life of the project HUMAID submitted monthly reports to the CAAMI. Some improvements in the quality of the reports were noted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Facilitate HUMAID’s participation in collective work on national Mine Action Standards.</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was to be done in early 2006 but has not happened.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Include other Mine Action actors in technical training by / through the CAAMI.</td>
<td>YES – with EOD training</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI took the position that “each demining NGO carries out demining training independently” such that manual demining training facilitated by HI was carried out only with HUMAID. EOD training was coordinated through the CAAMI and participants were selected from both HUMAID and LUTCAM. CAAMI Quality Control Monitors were also asked to participate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Contribute to a Landmine Impact study in close collaboration with other Mine Action actors in Guinea-Bissau.</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This activity depends on the CAAMI, and it is not clear to what degree HI or HUMAID could have contributed or participated within the budgetary and programmatic confines of the project had an Impact Survey been implemented during the life of the project. Given the project focus on Bissau where the clearance tasks were/are delineated, this activity would seem to fall outside the scope of the project.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS & LESSONS-LEARNED IN AREAS OF INTERVENTION

4.1 Organizational Capacity-Building

Overview

- HI fulfilled its contractual obligations to provide administrative, financial and logistical training and accompaniment to HUMAID as per the proposal submitted to, and funded by the EC.

- Three HI technical advisors provided full-time capacity-building support to HUMAID, over and above the two advisors originally envisioned and funded within the project budget. While only one of the three advisors was dedicated to administrative and managerial training and accompaniment on a regular basis, the third full-time staff person represents a significant additional investment by HI toward completion of project objectives.

- The project budget covered HUMAID salaries and operational costs for 2005. Outside the project budget, HI partially funded HUMAID salaries for the final three months of the project - January to March 2006. This additional budgetary support to HUMAID is critical in that it allowed HUMAID to remain operational and project activities to continue through the life of the project.

- HI’s organizational capacity-building strategy included: 1) administrative, financial and logistical accompaniment, 2) facilitating a series of workshops on organizational development themes, 3) compiling an Organizational Assessment document, 4) providing external HI resource people for week-long intensive training workshops on project management and fundraising, and 5) international training in Mine Action Project Management for a HUMAID senior manager. Except for the failure of HUMAID to participate in international management training, all other components of the organizational capacity-building strategy proceeded as planned.

- HI’s training and accompaniment of HUMAID resulted in improved administrative systems, information systems, logistics, budget monitoring and reporting.
The potential results of the capacity-building strategy were not fully realized due to a number of factors including: HUMAID’s resistance to change; HUMAID’s limited engagement with HI towards organizational development objectives; HI’s technocratic approach to training and accompaniment; the lack of strategic leadership within HUMAID and the lack of strategic engagement by HI to address HUMAID’s strategic needs; HI’s steadfast determination to stick with the plan; limited human resources; and limited time.

The 15-month project timeframe was too short to achieve the desired capacity-building results.

Both HI and HUMAID found the dual role of the HI Administrator / Technical Advisor as an advisor/trainer and as a financial controller/manager to be uncomfortable and a hindrance to capacity-building objectives. HI believed that the two functions were methodologically incompatible and needed to be separated in different positions.

It was important for HI to avoid *doing* the work for HUMAID. Instead of working together *with* HUMAID, HI set themselves apart as advisors and trainers. HUMAID was instructed and then regularly failed to execute as instructed. HI monitored and documented HUMAID’s lack of progress. Had HI spent more time working together with HUMAID, mentoring by example and providing on-the-job accompaniment, there probably would have been greater synergy toward project objectives.

If the implicit objective of HUMAID’s capacity-building was to ensure organizational survival (and by extension a sustainable local Mine Action capacity), then developing strategic leadership within HUMAID and supporting HUMAID in occupying ‘political’ space as the preeminent mine clearance NGO in Guinea-Bissau should have been a priority for HI. Developing strategic leadership would have required a different approach by HI in organizational training and accompaniment.

Most of HI’s capacity-building strategy was technically sound and well-executed at a micro-level but did not resonate with HUMAID or address HUMAID’s strategic priorities. It needed to be OK for HI to change course mid-way and to adapt the capacity-building strategy and work plan in accordance with what was working and not working with HUMAID and contributing to the desired results.

If at the end of the project HUMAID finds itself without funding to continue and little ‘political’ support to continue, one has to question whether all the technically good administrative and managerial training really mattered. In this light, the HUMAID Directors’ limited engagement in the project and resistance to most capacity-building aspects is not constructive, but *is* understandable.

(For an overview of HUMAID’s organizational performance, See ANNEX F – HUMAID Organizational Assessment)
Capacity-Building Approach & Priorities

- HUMAID’s Director did not consider administrative and managerial accompaniment necessary, evidenced by HUMAID’s history of securing funds and producing results, and therefore did not foster an environment in which the HUMAID staff proactively engaged with HI towards organizational development objectives. Although the Partnership Agreement signed between HI and HUMAID outlined collaboration in capacity-building activities, the fundamental difference in perception and priorities guaranteed tension.

- Given the low-level tension and obvious passive resistance by HUMAID to managerial supports HI needed to bring the HUMAID leadership to the table to hash-out a shared vision and to jointly determine where to focus energies. In the end, this may have led to a different capacity-building work-plan more closely aligned with HUMAID priorities and strategic interests, which in turn would have resulted in a higher degree of engagement on the part of HUMAID. This is not to say, critical administrative, finance, logistics and human resource supports should have all been ignored, but that the investment of time and energy should have principally been focused on strategic work serving HUMAID’s medium-term interests.

- HI identified the need to strengthen strategic leadership within HUMAID, but in practice, focused training and accompaniment more on managerial skills and administrative systems rather than positioning HUMAID for medium-term sustainability in Mine Action.

- HI did organize a fundraising / profile-raising trip with HUMAID to Dakar, Senegal in October 2005. The trip did not result in any concrete funding opportunities for HUMAID, which HI attributes to HUMAID’s lack of preparation (poor documentation and presentation), as much as the general lack of donor interest in Guinea-Bissau. HI expressed frustration with HUMAID’s lack of follow-through given all the supports that HI did give to HUMAID in preparation for the trip (assistance in developing a concept note with budget and donor-briefing). The Director of HUMAID, on the other hand, does not acknowledge any shortcomings on HUMAID’s part, and questions the value-added of HI in fundraising. Objectively, one can observe that, indeed, HUMAID was not well-prepared and did not present well. The organization did not and still does not have an updated brochure, marketing materials or targeted concept papers. While one can appreciate HI’s stance as an advisor vs “do-er”, in this instance, more direct collaboration and channeling of HI’s technical assistance and supports to the marketing of HUMAID would have been strategic.

- The Organizational Assessment of HUMAID was a big job for HI, resulting in an impressive comprehensive organizational review. The Assessment identified HUMAID’s strengths and weaknesses in administration, finance, logistics and human resources and outlined in great detail what still needs to be done for HUMAID to improve. In the context of a 15-month project with no on-going funding secured, the investment in what could be seen to be a long “to-do list for HUMAID” just as their funding dries up, could be questioned. The Assessment was well-done, however it is questionable as to whether this substantial investment of time and energy contribute in equal measure to HUMAID’s organizational sustainability, and by extension, to a more efficient and effective Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.
- The Organizational Assessment could, in fact, be used by HUMAID to leverage funding if HI was to assist HUMAID in formatting and packaging the Assessment with this objective in mind.

**HUMAID’s Management Capacity**

- HI considered the recruitment of a Deputy Director and the re-organization of existing human resources within HUMAID to be critical to developing management and leadership capacity within the organization. The Director of HUMAID rejected the planned recruitment of a new Deputy, preferring to strengthen the capacity of the existing senior management team. The Head of Operations, with a grade nine education, who had been the *de facto* Deputy formally assumed this role within HUMAID.

- HI worked closely with the Deputy Director to build his management capacity and an intensive 6-month English course was provided in the hope he would acquire the language skills necessary to access international training, work with project documentation and inter-face with international donors. To date, the language classes have not been particularly successful.

- HI experienced resistance on the part of the HUMAID Director to developing Bissau-Guinean leadership within HUMAID.

- It was assumed that UNDP would fund the participation of a HUMAID delegate to the international Mine Action Management training course organized by Cranfield University. UNDP did offer to subsidize HUMAID’s participation in the course held in Thailand in September / October 2005, but much to the dismay of HI, HUMAID did not participate in the course. The need for management training was simply not prioritized by HUMAID’s Director who does not acknowledge the significance of the lost training opportunity. Members of HUMAID’s senior management team, on the other hand, did lament the lost opportunity.

**HI Accompaniment**

- The decision by HI to maintain a separate office rather than have the technical advisors be based within HUMAID has arguments for and against. In retrospect, it may have been more effective to have established counterpart / mentoring roles in-house within HUMAID. The accompaniment would have been more fluid and there would have been more “working together” rather than accompaniment as an activity in and of itself separate from the productive work day-to-day. Given the short timeframe for the project, working together in the same physical space day-to-day may have also moved things forward at a quicker pace.

- HI required that HUMAID submit written requests for the kinds of technical assistance and training that could have been undertaken in a more informal, day-to-day fashion had HI advisors been working in the same physical space. For example, the need for tutoring in Excel was identified early in the project but has not happened because HI is still waiting for HUMAID’s written request for this training.
This anecdotal example serves to highlight how differences in communication styles and ways of working hindered progress. Given HUMAID’s ‘ways of working’, accompaniment ‘as a process rather than an event’ may have been more productive.

- The Partnership Agreement established a Project Management Committee that met monthly and served as a forum to coordinate project activities and to facilitate communications between HI and HUMAID and internally within HUMAID. HUMAID insisted that internal communications were never an issue, but there is ample evidence to suggest this is not the case and that the Project Management Committee helped to alleviate some of the communication deficits.

- Had HI technical advisors been based in HUMAID’s office, many of the operational issues dealt with in the monthly Project Management Committee meetings would have likely been coordinated in day-to-day contacts, and other periodic meetings of the Technical and Administrative staff. The Management meetings could have then been used to address more strategic matters.

**The Workshops**

- HUMAID insisted that the HI workshop approach was “textbook training” and “not so helpful”; that “HI was not responsive to HUMAID’s input” in terms of training priorities and approaches; that scheduling was determined by HI and inflexible; and that HI was too directive. One can observe that the workshop methodology and content was largely pre-packaged by HI and participation was limited to filling in the blanks. On the other hand, HI repeatedly changed the dates of workshops to facilitate HUMAID’s participation and actively solicited HUMAID’s input and feedback on training modules. HI also developed preparatory materials, documented the workshops and produced follow-up documents (in English).

- HI further brought in additional resource people from headquarters and the West Africa regional office for two 5-day workshops on project management and fundraising. The pedagogic materials produced for these workshops were excellent and the workshops were positively evaluated by the HUMAID participants - except for the concern that the intensive full-time nature of the training did not permit HUMAID managers to attend to day-to-day operational demands.

- Despite, HI’s best efforts to provide quality training opportunities, The workshops came to be regarded by the HUMAID leadership as interruptions in the work-plan. As a result HUMAID did not engage in the workshops in a strategic way, opting instead to minimally participate, filling in the blanks as directed.

**Budget Support & Financial Management**

- HI facilitated a participatory process with HUMAID to revisit and revise the project budget at the start of the project as some time had passed since the original budget
was developed. HI communicated all line item changes to the EC (though none required formal amendments to the HI-EC contract\textsuperscript{14}).

- Budget support to HUMAID averaged €38,747 per month over 2005 of which approximately 75% was personnel costs covering the 77 HUMAID staff. HUMAID had negotiated substantial salary support at what is most likely an unsustainable level. HUMAID deminers were paid considerably more than their counterparts in LUTCAM\textsuperscript{15}. The discrepancies in salaries between HUMAID and LUTCAM led the CAAMI to work on an updated national salary scale in an effort to standardize salaries.

- As of January 2006, the EC budget for HUMAID salaries was fully expended and HI offered to cover partial salary costs to the end of the project. In effect the reduced funds forced a strategic discussion on salaries but the HUMAID leadership has not fully grappled with the issue. The salary of the Director, in particular, presents many questions that HUMAID has avoided and may not effectively address unless / until the governing body of the organization is brought into the discussion.

- The budget support for HUMAID was detailed and restricted. Every expenditure required pre-approval by HI. HI directly administered the budget and documented any changes to approved expenditures, even as small as €15, in formal amendments to the HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement. This level of budgetary control was justified by the level of detail in the original budget proposal to the EC and by HI’s direct procurement of project materials and the need to avoid over-lap and confusion.

- Final detailed reporting on expenditures was not available at the time of the Evaluation, but interim reporting would suggest that the project budget has been fully expended and tightly controlled as per approved line items.

- The project budget included minimal office and running costs for both HUMAID and HI. The difference for HUMAID, however, was that they had no other sources of funding to complement the project budget, while HI did. Apparently, no efforts were made by HUMAID and/or HI during the year to secure additional funding for HUMAID’s running costs.

- The HUMAID Finance Manager is relatively well-qualified and experienced. Formal training in bookkeeping was not necessary. HI did, however, provide regular accompaniment and supervision to HUMAID’s Finance Manager, introducing improvements in systems and procedures.

\textsuperscript{14}As reported by HI. It was beyond the scope of the Evaluation to verify financial details.

\textsuperscript{15}In 2000 the CAAMI negotiated a salary scale for HUMAID, presumably to facilitate short-term UNDP budget support. HUMAID presented a proposal with very high salaries but settled on a salary scale more in line with national realities. At the time deminers were paid $250. By 2004, HUMAID deminers were being paid approx. €300 in local currency (200,000 CFA) while LUTCAM deminers were making approx. €200 (132,000 CFA). Salary differentials for senior field staff and management staff were even more pronounced. The HUMAID Director’s salary is higher than some Country Director positions for large international Mine Action NGOs.
From the donor perspective, the project budget was very well-managed. However one could question whether HI’s budgetary controls allowed HUMAID to develop capacity in budget management or donor reporting.

**Procurement & Logistics**

- The project budget included close to €100,000 for Materials and Equipment, of which some €65,000 were earmarked for demining materials and equipment for HUMAID. Most of these materials and equipment had to be procured internationally.

- International procurement was administered by HI. Local procurement carried out by HUMAID was closely monitored. As noted previously, HI documented all approved expenditures in formal amendments to the HI-HUMAID Partnership Agreement.

- Requests for exceptions to the EC rules of origin requirements resulted in lengthy delays in procurement. The bulk of project materials and equipment were delivered to HUMAID during the external evaluation in the last month of the project. The EC in Guinea-Bissau acknowledged that these delays in processing approvals for exceptions were a constraint to project implementation.

- HUMAID stated that they did not have the information on the international suppliers and were not involved in procurement handled by HI. This calls into question whether HUMAID was strengthened in its capacity to procure independently after the project. The objectives of efficiency and effectiveness might outweigh capacity-building objectives and therefore justify HI’s handling of international procurement. However, the long delays meant that neither capacity-building nor efficiency objectives were met.

- HI worked with HUMAID to improve internal logistics systems and procedures and identified the need for a dedicated Logistics Officer. Given limited funding, HUMAID was unable to recruit a new Logistics Officer and did not consider it enough of a priority to re-structure other positions to ensure a dedicated position.

- Given HUMAID’s operational capacity, the internal logistics somehow functioned / function. That said, one could observe the need for on-going technical support and accompaniment. Inventory documents are incomplete and without dates, store rooms are completely unorganized and systematic stock controls are just being introduced.

**HUMAID’s Organizational Structure**

- HI identified HUMAID’s organizational structure as a problem and considerable time and energy was invested in assisting HUMAID re-structure, develop an new Organigram and update job descriptions. HUMAID staff commented that it helped to have greater clarity on roles and responsibilities. The HUMAID Director, however, felt the work was unnecessary as “everyone knows what their job is” and “we just changed the titles, but everything is the same”.

Governance

- HUMAID has a Board of Directors (Mesa da Assembleia) of some repute, including an ex-President, judge, President of the Electoral Commission, etc. Unfortunately, this governing body appears to exist on paper only. Though comments were made by the Director of the CAAMI to the effect that influential people are actively backing HUMAID, HI could not observe any practical (or political) benefits to HUMAID as a result of its well-connected Board of Directors. Through the life of the project, the Board has not met and HI has had no contact with Board members.

- Given the strategic challenges in Mine Action in Guinea Bissau and the critical moment in HUMAID’s organizational development (and survival), re-establishing a functional governing body should have been a priority in HI’s support to HUMAID.

Communication

- HI was systematic in documenting the terms of the HI-HUMAID partnership, all communications between HI and HUMAID, all project-related decisions, and all project activities. The paper-work produced by HI was impressive.

- The HI technical advisors were able to communicate effectively in French, English and Portuguese.

- HUMAID noted that there was a lack of “real dialogue” and that HI was sensitive to criticism and questioning of the capacity-building process. On the other hand, HI was continually frustrated by HUMAID’s lack of responsiveness and professionalism.

- HI’s communication style, favoring written documentation over informal dialogue and discussion, seemed to be at odds with HUMAID’s less-structured communication style. The Evaluator was left with the impression that the HI-HUMAID collaboration would have been more effective if the partners had just talked more, had lunch together, strategized together, disagreed and hashed things out on a regular basis -- the kinds of communicating that can not be done through written memos.

- The organizational capacity-building documentation and all financial documentation for the project was mostly in English. This might have limited HI’s objective of strengthening Bissau-Guinean leadership within HUMAID as, in particular, the Deputy Director was not able to work effectively in English.
### 4.2 Technical Training & Accompaniment (Demining / EOD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training in IMAS &amp; Manual Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Accompaniment &amp; Field Supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAID’s Operational Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overview**

- The technical components of the project included 1) training in manual demining and IMAS, 2) day-to-day accompaniment and supervision of clearance tasks carried out by HUMAID, 3) data collection and mapping techniques, and 4) EOD training with HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI.

- The technical components of the project were relatively well-understood and well-received by HUMAID. Unlike managerial supports that met with some resistance, technical supports in demining and EOD were welcomed. The HUMAID leadership voiced concerns about reduced productivity as a result of training, but for the most part, HUMAID constructively engaged with HI towards technical outcomes.

- The presence of a full-time demining / EOD expert in the country provided an important human resource to HUMAID, to the CAAMI, and to a lesser extent to LUTCAM.

- The HI demining / EOD expert also served as the HI Project Manager. This double work-load was noted as a limitation on both fronts. The two roles did not present the same challenges as those experienced by the HI Administrator and Technical Advisor to HUMAID on managerial issues who struggled with the incompatibilities of the trainer/controller roles, but there were challenges nonetheless.

- The degree to which HUMAID and the CAAMI took full advantage of the HI Technical Trainer / Advisor for maximum value-added could be questioned. The delays in establishing the basic conditions for EOD training, not moving ahead with adapting national Mine Action Standards, delays in developing Standing Operating Procedures for HUMAID...are some examples of the HI human resource not being used to full advantage.

**Training in IMAS & Manual Demining**

- At the start of the project in January 2005 the HI Technical Advisor decided to extend the demining “refresher” training underway by an additional two weeks to
address a number of immediate safety and technical concerns. At the time, HI assessed the need for technical training and field supervision as “urgent”.

- HUMAID deminers were assessed in written and practical tests. The average score on the written test was 13/20. Of the 47 written tests only 12 (25%) scored 12 or more out of 20. Of the 25 (51%) who scored under 10/20, 13 (27%) could not do the test at all because of illiteracy.

- Of the 38 HUMAID deminers, 26 (68%) were born before 1960 and 5 (13%) before 1950. There is a definite correlation between age and literacy. 31 of 38 (82%) have less than a 6th grade education and are functionally illiterate. Some are unable to even write their name. A particular challenge for technical training in HUMAID’s case is the fact that the Field Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor are both among the older war veterans and functionally illiterate. This challenging training context was further complicated by language --- the dominant common language is Creole and not all demining staff speaks or writes Portuguese.

- The HI Technical Advisor had to adapt training materials and methodologies to counter these language and literacy barriers.

- Communication issues related to language and literacy were not assessed as problematic by HUMAID. For the most part training was conducted in Portuguese (although audio-visual materials were provided in English, French and Portuguese) and efforts were made to include translation into Creole when necessary and verbal testing for those deminers unable to read and write.

- The basic deminer training courses facilitated by the HI Technical Advisor introduced new techniques as per IMAS. HUMAID deminers noted three areas in which they had adopted new and improved techniques: 1) kneeling instead of standing, 2) security spacing and marking, and 3) the timing of rotations.

- Although the Director of HUMAID downplayed the importance of new techniques, the deminers themselves welcomed the training saying “we feel safer now” and “we learned a lot with HI” and “the project should continue”. HUMAID field staff also commented that “we used to spend a lot of money on clearance supplies” but the HI Technical Advisor “helped us use materials more efficiently”.

- HUMAID deminers, team leaders and field supervisors appear well-versed in IMAS (noting that the application of this knowledge could not be observed first-hand during the Evaluation).

- The CAAMI and UNDP CTA observed that HUMAID’s technical capacity and adherence to IMAS significantly improved with HI technical training and accompaniment.

- HUMAID believes it has the capacity to operate independently in manual demining in line with IMAS. A final assessment of technical capacity should be included in HI’s final reporting on the project, but it would seem there is some confidence in HUMAID’s capacity to carry out standard mine clearance operations independently.
with periodic refresher training and systematic quality assurance both internally and by the CAAMI.

Technical Accompaniment & Field Supervision

- Day-to-day accompaniment and supervision of clearance tasks carried out by the HI Technical Advisor was welcomed and valued by HUMAID’s field staff.

- Given the learning challenges among a diverse group of deminers, many functionally illiterate with limited Portuguese (the Field Supervisors among these), continuous on-the-ground supervision by HI assured the systematization of improved practices introduced in training sessions.

- HUMAID was supported in improving its storage of explosives for EOD, and warehousing demining materials and equipment.

- HI also worked with HUMAID to establish proper procedures for medical support to demining operations as per IMAS. HUMAID had two ambulances prior to the project but project support ensured they were properly equipped and that Paramedics received refresher training.

- As per CAAMI directives, HUMAID worked on three clearance tasks during 2005: Enterramento, Bor and Plaque 1. A total of 60,140 m2 were cleared. HI monitored field operations on a regular basis.

- At some point HI made a decision to not participate in the HUMAID Technical Meetings, prioritizing instead the Project Management Committee meetings.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Training

- EOD training was considered by all players as a major contribution of the project.

- After months of delay due to complications in securing explosives through the CAAMI for practical demonstrations, the first phase of theoretical training got underway in August 2005. The explosives never materialized and the practical training was postponed until February 2006. When the practical training finally did take place in February 2006, there were problems even at that point in securing the availability of the promised explosives through the CAAMI. HUMAID’s operational stock of explosives was used at the last minute to avoid aborting the training in the eleventh hour of the project.

- Given that the EOD training was identified as a national Mine Action priority, and the project provided in-country EOD expertise for only a limited period of time, one has to call into question either CAAMI’s support for the project or influence vis-à-vis the government and military. At the end of the day the delays in securing explosives to carry out the training as a precursor to EOD operations represented a lost opportunity for Guinea-Bissau.
One could also question whether HI was proactive and/or political enough in securing the conditions to move forward with the much needed training.

The strategy for EOD was to select the “best and brightest” deminers from HUMAID and LUTCAM to be trained and subsequently to form two EOD teams. Each organization identified 15 deminers to be tested and the top 10 from each organization was selected to participate. The average score on the selection test for the top 20 candidates was 12/20. The majority of the top scorers were the younger/newer demining recruits.

The Director of LUTCAM and two Quality Control Monitors from the CAAMI also participated in the EOD training. It would have been appropriate for the HUMAID Field Supervisor to also participate in the training but his illiteracy precluded this option.

From August 8-15, 2005 the HI Technical Advisor facilitated 40 hours of EOD theoretical training covering: IMAS, battlefield contamination, explosives theory, safety measures, submunitions, ammunitions, grenades, artillery, rockets, and bombs. PowerPoints with extensive visual aids were used in the training.

HI tested the trainees during the course to measure their progress. The first testing produced low scores averaging 7.4/20. Final tests showed an average of 11.2/20 for HUMAID trainees, 10.3/20 for LUTCAM trainees and 10.75/20 for the CAAMI trainees. HUMAID’s highest score was 12.75/20.

For the EOD refresher theory and practical training held in February 2006, 12 of the best trainees from the August course were selected to participate, six each from LUTCAM and HUMAID. The training was once again held in the CAAMI training room, but CAAMI personnel did not participate. In terms of general support from the CAAMI for the EOD training, the UNDP CTA did comment that the CAAMI was not able to provide lunches for the second phase of the EOD training in February 2006 as they had done for the first session in August 2005, due to budgetary restrictions.

Presumably the HI Technical Advisor will evaluate all EOD trainees and make recommendations to HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI as to who should be selected to form permanent EOD teams.

HI and the UNDP CTA have indicated that EOD requires technical supervision. Given the fast approaching end-date for the project and the departure of the HI EOD expert it is not clear how and when the EOD work will continue.
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)

- The project proposal identified the need for HUMAID to produce Standing Operating Procedures in line with IMAS (and/or National Operating Procedures if they existed)\(^{16}\).

- All parties agree that the SOPs were/are a priority. HI and HUMAID lamented the fact that work on the SOPs had not begun to-date. HUMAID identified the SOPs as the priority for collaboration with HI in the final weeks of the project.

HUMAID’s Operational Capacity

- HUMAID believes it has the capacity to operate independently in manual demining in line with IMAS. A final assessment of technical capacity should be included in HI’s final reporting on the project, but it would seem there is confidence in HUMAID’s capacity to carry out standard mine clearance operations independently with periodic refresher training and systematic quality assurance both internally and by the CAAMI.

Quality Control

- Most of the area cleared by HUMAID before and during the project period has not yet been verified by the CAAMI Quality Control Monitors. Very little quality control seems to have been carried out during 2005. HUMAID lamented the slow pace of follow-up on the part of the CAAMI. It is not clear whether this was a problem related to CAAMI’s capacity, coordination or priorities.

4.3 Community Liaison & Mine Risk Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUMAID’s Community Liaison Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Risk Education (MRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Collection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overview

- The project proposal included training in Community Liaison (CL) and MRE. It is not clear how these activities would have been implemented without the addition of a third technical advisor outside the project budget.

- The project proposal also made reference to HI and HUMAID contributing to an impact survey initiative but did not specify exactly how, or include budget allocations for training and technical assistance in this area.

---

\(^{16}\) IMAS Standard 09.30 on EOD established that “demining organizations with an integral EOD capability must prepare SOPs for neutralization and disarming procedures which are appropriate to the UXO threat and are consistent with accepted international EOD practice.”
The addition of a third Technical Advisor in Community Liaison to the HI project team in April 2005 enabled the development of community liaison, data collection, mapping, and MRE capacity within HUMAID.

Data collection and training in survey techniques were supported by the HUMAID leadership but project interventions in other aspects of community liaison and MRE were not well understood nor considered a priority.

The CAAMI Director and the UNDP CTA did not appear to have a good sense of the CL and MRE work being developed and carried out by HUMAID with HI technical assistance.

**HUMAID’s Community Liaison Team**

- The HI Technical Advisor in Community Liaison assessed the capacities of the existing CL team in HUMAID and based on this assessment recommended a restructuring of the team and the recruitment of new staff.

- HI developed the terms of reference for CL staff and coordinated recruitment. With a 4-person team in place, HI developed a training plan integrating elements of MRE, data collection and IMSMA, mapping techniques, and reporting on ‘dangerous areas’. The objectives of the CL team were to educate communities to prevent mine/UXO incidents, to provide information to communities on clearance activities, and to collect data on mine/UXO contamination. The CL team was provided with educational tools, basic materials and vests.

- The work-plan for the CL team was further developed with technical support from HI’s Lyon-based MRE specialist during her field mission to Guinea-Bissau in August 2005.

- The place of the CL team within HUMAID’s organizational structure resulted in weak supervision and limited involvement by HUMAID’s senior managers in the CL work. In the absence of hands-on supervision, HI’s Technical Advisor for Community Liaison effectively assumed a coordination function vis-à-vis the CL team. A more formal counterpart and mentoring arrangement with the HUMAID staff person responsible for the CL team would have increased the chances of the work continuing at the end of the project.

- Better internal communication within HUMAID and between HI and HUMAID as to the work of the CL team would have facilitated a higher level of organizational ‘ownership’ for the work. To a certain extent, the lack of support for CL and MRE activities on the part of the HUMAID leadership resulted from poor communication and information-sharing.
Mine Risk Education

- HUMAID’s MRE is linked to clearance activities and a responsibility of the CL team. It was not expected that HUMAID would develop a comprehensive MRE strategy de-linked from its clearance work.

- The project proposal indicated that ANDES, a previous partner NGO of HI in Guinea-Bissau, would be enlisted to train and mentor HUMAID staff. For a number of reasons ANDES was never involved in project activities.

- HI developed training curricula for MRE and carried out three training courses with the HUMAID CL team in June, July and August 2005. These courses were well-received by the CL team but were not mentioned in HUMAID’s monthly reports to the CAAMI.

- The HI MRE Specialist from Lyon provided two full days of training in MRE in August 2005.

- Albeit limited in scope, the MRE carried out by HUMAID as part of the community liaison work over the course of the project might be the only MRE undertaken in Guinea-Bissau during 2005.

- Given project investments in training, program coordination and accompaniment in this area it would be a lost opportunity if HUMAID was to remain out of the MRE loop. While it remains a responsibility of HUMAID to pursue this engagement in MRE, it behooves HI to ensure there is some form of facilitated discussion so as to delineate HUMAID’s current MRE capacities and future directions. Current work on national MRE strategies coordinated by the CAAMI (with UNDP support) provides an important opportunity for HUMAID to contribute its experience and participate in program development, further enhancing the impact of the project.

- HUMAID submitted completed IMSMA forms on MRE activities to the CAAMI.

Data Collection

- In January and February 2005 HUMAID staff was trained in IMSMA by the CAAMI and visiting specialists from the GICHD. Members of the CL team were not among the HUMAID staff trained.

- HI worked with the CL team to identify ‘dangerous areas’ and to complete IMSMA forms. IMSMA forms identifying and mapping the location of UXO were regularly submitted by HUMAID to the CAAMI over 2005. No IMSMA reports have been produced by the CAAMI indicating that this data has been used in determining clearance priorities. The UNDP CTA has advised HUMAID that the latest version of IMSMA with greater capacity to process UXO data is forthcoming.

- In September 2005, HI trained the CL team in the use of a compass, establishing coordinates, using the GPS, and mapping. This same training was later given to HUMAID field supervisors, group leaders and quality control monitors in February 2006.
The HUMAID leadership recognizes the importance of data collection but has not ensured effective supervision and integration of the CL team in clearance activities.

### 4.4 Clearance & Threat Reduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clearance Objectives</th>
<th>HUMAID’s Productivity</th>
<th>HUMAID’s Contribution in Comparative Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Clearance Objectives**

- A central objective of the project was to reduce the threat of landmines and UXO to the population of Bissau. To this end, budget support was provided to HUMAID for clearance operations including marking and MRE, mine clearance and UXO disposal.

- At the time the project was conceived it was expected that clearance in Bissau could be completed by 2005. As such, the project sought to complete clearance in Bissau. This goal was not realistic. That said, further progress could have been made toward this goal had EOD training and subsequent EOD operations proceeded as planned.

**HUMAID’s Productivity**

- Except for periods of time when the HUMAID field staff was in training, HUMAID maintained clearance operations on tasks assigned by the CAAMI.

- As noted, HUMAID worked on three areas in 2005 in Bissau: Bor, Enterramento and Plaque 1. A total of 60,140 m² was cleared.  

- Based on a contingent of 38 HUMAID deminers (supported by 21 additional field staff, 4 community liaison staff and 13 administrative staff), the clearance output per deminer averaged 1,583 m² in 2005. With approximately 8 months of normal operations, the productivity per deminer was roughly 198 m² per month or 10 m² per day based on full-time operations. The cost per m² is difficult to ascertain given the investment in capacity-building and considerable time and human resources spent in training activities. A very rough cost calculation taking the total direct project costs divided by metres cleared gives a cost of approximately €7.38 per m².

- The Director of HUMAID voiced concerns that the partnership with HI interfered with HUMAID’s productivity. A comparison of HUMAID’s results in 2004 and 2005 or an

---

17 As reported in HUMAID’s monthly reports to the CAAMI. See ANNEX E (a and b) – HUMAID’s Results 2000-2005.
At the same time, HUMAID’s capacity for humanitarian demining as per IMAS was significantly increased. With the increasing attention to quality and security in Mine Action, HI assessed HUMAID’s productivity as acceptable.

HUMAID’s Contribution in Comparative Perspective

- The project supported roughly 50% of clearance operations in Guinea-Bissau in 2005.
- Production data from LUTCAM was not available for comparison purposes.

4.5 National Mine Action Coordination

Overview

- HUMAID’s engagement in national coordination and working relations with the CAAMI notably improved as a result of the project and HI accompaniment.
- HUMAID’s ‘weight’ in Mine Action and ability to influence the direction of national strategies and priorities does not seem to have increased as a result of the partnership with HI.
- HI appears to have underestimated the importance of proactive strategic engagement at the national level, both for HUMAID and for HI to achieve its own objectives for training and technical assistance.

Working Relations between HUMAID and the CAAMI

- HUMAID noted that “HI helped a lot to improve relations with the CAAMI”. The new UNDP CTA for Mine Action was also given credit for bringing people together and promoting constructive working relations. The combined effect of HI’s facilitation
and a new UNDP CTA marked the beginning of a new era in CAAMI-HUMAID relations.

**Reporting**

- The project sought to improve national coordination of Mine Action, primarily by improving HUMAID’s reporting to the CAAMI. During the project HUMAID submitted monthly reports to the CAAMI on clearance activities. Presumably the CAAMI has entered this data in the IMSMA and has compiled detailed reporting for verification. No such reports were available for review.

- The inclusion of information from and about the Community Liaison team improved the quality of the reports to the CAAMI, though they remained limited in their scope (i.e. primarily reporting on quantifiable outputs with little analysis, discussion of constraints, or lessons-learned).

- As noted HUMAID submitted complete IMSMA forms on ‘dangerous areas’ and MRE activities to the CAAMI, but it is not clear whether this data has been entered into the database by the CAAMI.

**National Mine Action Standards**

- The CAAMI has not yet worked on a national adaptation of the IMAS. In the meantime, Angolan and Mozambican interpretations have served as a reference point.

- Not taking advantage of the HI demining / EOD specialist to provide technical support to this task was a lost opportunity for the CAAMI.

**Accreditation**

- To date no formal accreditation process for Mine Action operators has been introduced by the CAAMI. Neither HUMAID nor LUTCAM are formally accredited as per international norms. The absence of formal accreditation has not affected operations or the outcome of the project as clearance activities have not been delayed as a result. However HUMAID, as an independent partner in Mine Action, remains vulnerable without this accreditation.

- HI does not appear to have advocated vis-à-vis the CAAMI to ensure the accreditation of HUMAID within the project period.

**National Coordination of EOD Training**

- HI coordinated with the CAAMI to train LUTCAM deminers and CAAMI Quality Control Monitors in EOD along with HUMAID deminers. The CAAMI also provided logistical supports and meals during the first phase of the training. This coordination
ensured value-added and the best application of HI’s technical assistance and expertise to national objectives.

- The delays in securing explosives for the practical EOD training resulted in repeated postponements of the training and significant time lost in a short project. In the end, the training was not finished in time for HI to accompany the creation of EOD teams within HUMAID and LUTCAM or to supervise actual EOD operations.

- The fact that the CAAMI did not provide explosives for the practical training, even after the practical training was delayed until the final month of the project, is an indication that the CAAMI must be very weak in its capacity to support operations. At the same time it is not clear whether HI proactively engaged with the CAAMI and the Bissau-Guinean military to ensure availability of the explosives.

**Future Clearance Operations**

- Beyond the HI project, the future of clearance operations in Guinea-Bissau is uncertain. Although the National Plan for Completion written in May 2005 affirms the need for the combined operational capacity of LUTCAM and HUMAID to achieve ‘completion’ by 2009, the current funding context would indicate there is little chance of sufficient funding to maintain two separate clearance NGOs.

- In this context, the CAAMI (and UNDP) should have facilitated some sort of open discussion on fundable models for clearance in 2006 and beyond. HI should have assisted HUMAID in engaging strategically in this process.

- Informally the CAAMI has indicated its preference for centralized funding of clearance operations through the CAAMI. In this scenario, HUMAID’s future is doubtful ----unless there was some sort of merger with LUTCAM. There has been no facilitated discussion of the possible scenarios.

- Given HUMAID’s vulnerability at the end of the HI project, it is surprising that HI did not assist HUMAID to occupy more ‘political space’ in Mine Action and to advocate vis-à-vis the CAAMI and UNDP on behalf of HUMAID.
5. OTHER MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5.1 Budget & Financial Considerations

- A slightly revised project budget was tightly controlled and fully expended in compliance with EC financial and procurement restrictions.\(^{18}\)

- HI’s office and personnel costs (€163,363) represented only 24% of the total direct costs in the project budget, and perhaps as little as 20% of HI’s total real costs. In the end, HI subsidized its own office and personnel costs well beyond the EC project budget. A third full-time Technical Advisor and costs associated with maintaining an HI office in Bissau are cases in point.

- HI’s financial contribution to the project far surpassed the €138,057 contractual commitment.

- As HI had no other programmatic activities in the country besides the project all additional investments by HI contributed directly or indirectly to the project.

- The project budget only covered HUMAID’s salaries until December 2005, and HI further subsidized these personnel costs for the final three months of the project.

- Some 76% of direct costs were allocated to HUMAID, of which 69% was personnel costs. The budget included only 12 months of salary for HUMAID and HI further subsidized HUMAID’s personnel costs for the period January to March 2006, over and above the project budget.\(^{19}\)

- Overall, HI’s financial contribution to the project expanded the total expenditure well beyond the budget of €738,057, with HI’s share far exceeding the contractual commitment of 19%.

- HUMAID’s direct costs averaged approximately €43,000 per month in 2005. HI’s additional funding support for HUMAID the first three months of 2006 is considerably less than that provided in the project budget and HUMAID was forced to reduce salaries and terminate contracts.

- The project budget included very little organizational costs for either HI or HUMAID. The budget line for consumables was particularly under-funded and was a source of on-going tension between HUMAID and HI.

- A detailed financial analysis of the project was beyond the scope of the Evaluation.

\(^{18}\) Information provided by HI, but not verified. Financial analysis was outside the scope of the Evaluation.

\(^{19}\) HI’s additional funding for HUMAID January to March 2006 totals €67,560.
5.2 HI Staffing

- HI assembled a strong technical team in Bissau. The Director of the CAAMI concurred that the HI project staff was “the best HI team ever”.

- The combined technical expertise of the HI staff was comprehensive and relevant to HUMAID’s needs and project objectives. Notwithstanding some incompatibilities in communication styles and methodological approaches, HI staff was systematic and skilled in training.

- The language skills of all three HI staff were strong.

- The dual responsibilities of the HI staff vis-à-vis HUMAID and in project and office management limited the staff’s ability to engage in project activities. In particular, the combined Project Manager / Demining & EOD Trainer/Advisor position limited the possible technical interventions in demining and EOD.

- In an ideal world, HI would have also separated the Administrator position and the Management Advisor/Trainer position into two separate positions.

- Given the strategic challenges faced by HUMAID it would have been beneficial if there had been HI expertise in organizational and program development, strategic planning, and policy advocacy, and someone who would have constantly linked the technical work to strategic objectives and re-framed the set-backs so as to continue to build momentum and synergy toward desired results. HI did not engage with HUMAID on issues of strategic leadership or with the CAAMI on issues of strategic directions in Mine Action -- the very issues that will determine the project’s sustainability and impact.

5.3 EC Visibility

- As per Article 6 of the EC General Conditions for External Actions regarding Visibility, project documents all carried the EC logo. HI ensured that HUMAID facilities, uniforms and project materials also carried the EC logo.

- A formal project inauguration ceremony was coordinated with the EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau.
6. ASSESSING THE PROJECT’S RELEVANCE

6.1 Relevance to International Mine Action Policy & Practice

KEY QUESTIONS
Did the EC / HI / HUMAID project correspond to current priorities in international Mine Action?
Did the project promote International Mine Action Standards and best practice?
Did the project further the Completion Initiative by contributing to “finishing the job” in Guinea-Bissau?
Did the project strengthen national ownership and capacity?
Did the project reduce reliance on international donors and external technical assistance?

Did the EC / HI / HUMAID project correspond to current priorities in international Mine Action? Did the project promote IMAS and best practice?

In reducing the threat of landmines and UXO while building national capacities, and improving national coordination through the CAAMI, the EC funded HI partnership project with HUMAID is clearly situated within and subsumed under global Mine Action policy and practice, and is a positive contribution to the collective effort to deal with mine / UXO threat in line with Mine Ban Treaty obligations, donor - and particularly EC priorities.

Of note are the following developments in international Mine Action policy and practice, all of which point to the relevance of the project:


- Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty which states that State Parties must destroy mines that have already been laid in mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, “as soon as possible but not later than ten years” after ratifying the Convention. Guinea-Bissau ratified the Convention in 2001.

- Article 6 of the Treaty which outlines the need for international cooperation and assistance in mine action, stating that “each state in a position to do so shall provide assistance” for Mine Action programs.

- The global response and momentum in Mine Action towards Treaty obligations and the desired end state (be that mine-free, zero victim, or threat-free).
The UNDP-led Completion Initiative to ensure countries with relatively smaller landmine / UXO problems are given sufficient support to “finish the job”, understood as 1) clearing all high and medium impact areas of mines and ERW and 2) building a residual capacity so that countries can address remaining problems with little or no assistance from the international community. Guinea-Bissau is included in the Completion Initiative.

The EC Mine Action 2002-2004 Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programming outlining 2 priority areas: 1) reducing the threat and 2) increasing local capacity for efficient and effective programming, with particular mention of “management capacity”.

The European Roadmap towards a Zero Victim Target – the EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-Annual Indicative Programming 2005-2007 envisioning a world free from the threat of anti-personnel landmines and UXOs in which all “mine affected countries themselves are able to take full control of their mine/UXO problems”. The EC strategy seeks to define the problem as a finite one whereby programming moves toward the desired end-state. The specific focus on the need to increase efficiency and effectiveness in mine action emphasizes local capacity-building.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) developed as an operational framework for all Mine Action,

With the specific focus on technical training, developing Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), and improved quality control, the project sought to promote and extend the application of international standards in Guinea-Bissau.

Building on their extensive international experience in Mine Action, including integrated, developmental and capacity-building approaches to Mine Action, HI positioned the project to promote best practice through the integration of Community Liaison and MRE in clearance activities.

Did the project further the Completion Initiative by contributing to “finishing the job” in Guinea-Bissau?

By funding approximately 50% of the clearance capacity in Guinea-Bissau in 2005 the project has contributed to Completion objectives. The focus on training and quality control in clearance did result, however, in fewer square meters cleared over 2005 than in previous years. The objective of “finishing” Bissau was not attainable in the time-span of the project and is expected to take another year – or so- of operations\textsuperscript{20}.

\textsuperscript{20} Exact estimates are not available. Based on the tasks remaining and the current clearance capacity, it is unlikely Bissau could be completed before the end of 2006. Critical factors include funding for HUMAID and LUTCAM, but also technical assistance and material conditions to carry out EOD.
Did the project strengthen national ownership and capacity? Did the project reduce reliance on international donors and external technical assistance?

Capacity-building was both the main strategy of the project and an objective unto itself such that HUMAID, and by extension - Guinea-Bissau would be better equipped to address the mine / UXO problems without long-term reliance on external assistance. Indeed, national capacities were strengthened and the need for external technical assistance reduced, though not eliminated. The total reliance on external funding continues.

6.2 Relevance in the National Context

**KEY QUESTIONS**

Was the project strategic in furthering national Mine Action priorities?
Was the project strategic in its capacity-building objectives? i.e. did the choice of HUMAID as a partner make sense?

**Was the project strategic in furthering national Mine Action priorities?**

National Mine Action priorities included the elimination of the mine / UXO threat in Bissau, survey to determine the exact nature of the contamination in the interior of the country, and completion of these clearance tasks by 2009. Given the particular problem presented by UXOs, the development of national EOD capacities was identified as a priority. It is expected that local operators will carry out all clearance tasks 21.

The HI-HUMAID partnership project - which provided budgetary and technical support to HUMAID to complete clearance in Bissau as per international standards, to develop EOD capacity in the country, and to strengthen the organizational capacity of HUMAID to function independently of external accompaniment, was, in every respect, strategic in furthering national priorities.

The project also contributed indirectly to peace-building and national reconciliation through its constructive engagement with war veterans from both sides of recent conflicts, bridging gulfs in understanding among the various actors in the Mine Action sector, reducing the threat to civilian populations from mines and UXOs, and securing enhanced livelihoods for war veteran deminers.

**Was the project strategic in its capacity-building objectives? i.e. did the choice of HUMAID as a partner make sense?**

As no international Mine Action NGOs were present in Guinea-Bissau, strengthening local operational capacity was a given. The dilemma in project design related to the nature of this local capacity and the choice of partner.

---

In Guinea-Bissau there were two concurrent operational strategies: 1) creating and developing an operational arm of the national Mine Action authority (CAAMI), eventually evolving into a quasi-independent national NGO, the strategy favored by UNDP (i.e. LUTCAM), and 2) strengthening the capacity of a pre-existing independent local NGO as a partner of the CAAMI (i.e. HUMAID) – the strategy favored by HI.

One could find good arguments for and against both strategies to build local operational capacity, but most agree that in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, with its short to medium term mine / UXO problem (albeit with some unknowns given the lack of survey data outside the capital of Bissau) and limited donor engagement, that it is unlikely there will be sufficient on-going funding to maintain two autonomous clearance organizations. That said, the National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 speaks of clearance of all known mined areas and remaining UXOs in Guinea-Bissau by 2008, depending on available funding, using national capacity in program delivery. And, to achieve this goal the CAAMI and UNDP have stated that Guinea-Bissau needs the combined operational capacity of both HUMAID and LUTCAM, or its equivalent.

Given that UNDP was exclusively supporting LUTCAM both financially and with technical assistance and accompaniment, (leaving little room for additional partnerships with LUTCAM), it was logical for HI to establish a partnership with HUMAID. One could argue that support for HUMAID was the most strategic choice of partners given HUMAID’s pre-existing organizational coherence, commitment to humanitarian demining and proven operational capacity.

22 And a large school of thought suggesting that, given the finite and in many cases, short-term, nature of the mine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau, the objective of Local Operational Capacity should not be the focus at all but rather efficiency and effectiveness in whatever form. Roughly interpreted, efficiency and effectiveness, is oft equated with bringing in the readily available and equipped international expertise to get the job done as quickly and qualitatively as possible. In this case Mine Action is understood primarily as a humanitarian endeavor de-linked from longer-term development processes and the associated principles of local ownership, participation, and empowerment. The experience on the ground has led HI staff to question whether capacity-building objectives might run counter to efficiency and effectiveness objectives and have intimated that it probably would have been more efficient and effective for HI to establish an operational capacity in Guinea-Bissau, using local personnel from the ranks of HUMAID and LUTCAM, than to build the organizational and operational capacity of these local NGOs. At the same time donor and policy attention has focused on strengthening local capacity in Mine Action – to the point where locally driven, coordinated and executed initiatives now constitute best practice in Mine Action. EC Mine Action Strategies have emphasized Local Capacity as both a vehicle towards the desired outcomes and an outcome, in and of itself.

23 UNDP’s decision to create a second clearance organization entirely dependent on the CAAMI and UNDP instead of building on or co-opting what already existed, i.e. HUMAID, does not appear, in retrospect to be very strategic. While there may have been extenuating factors related to personalities and local politics that seemed to justify the move at the time, the end result has been inefficiencies in the use of limited donor resources and external technical assistance.

24 Upon establishing the CAAMI in 2001, it was stated that Guinea-Bissau could be mine-free by 2003. Later this projection was extended to 2005 for the capital Bissau and 2006 for the country – the projection used in some measure to justify the EC funded HI initiative aimed at clearing Bissau over the January 2005 to March 2006 timeframe. Current projections are one more year to complete Bissau – to the end of 2006, depending on EOD capacity and funding, and 3-5 years for the whole country.
7. ASSESSING EFFICIENCY & EFFECTIVENESS

KEY QUESTIONS

Did HI do the job right while doing the right job?
Did the project reduce the threat of mines and UXO efficiently and effectively?
Do the clearance outputs justify the project costs?
Did the project strengthen local capacity for Mine Action efficiently and effectively?

Does HUMAID’s organizational performance justify the project costs?
Is HUMAID more efficient and effective as a result of the partnership with HI?

Did HI do the job right while doing the right job?
Overall HI can be said to have done the job right ---- for the most part, and therefore fulfilled efficiency objectives. However the assessment of whether HI did the right job is open to debate. In demining and EOD training HI was widely regarded as having done the right job --- albeit after considerable delays. In much of the organizational capacity-building work HI did a good job but arguably did not do the right job. As noted, HI recognized early in the project that HUMAID was not fully on track but did not allow themselves the flexibility to change course. The result was a disproportionate investment in time, energy and material resources in short-term interventions with limited results and no sustainability. Thus the project was mostly efficient, but less effective than it might have been.

Did the project reduce the threat of mines and UXO efficiently and effectively?
In the case of Bissau, clearing all suspected contamination in the short-term with existing operational capacity is a viable objective and a national imperative. Prioritizing clearance is further justified by the nature of the contamination in highly populated urban and peri-urban areas. Marking and MRE are inadequate. The mines and UXO must be cleared.

Although budget support to HUMAID ensured continued clearance operations through most of 2005, the project prioritized capacity-building first and foremost. The project did not pursue efficiency in mine / UXO clearance, per se. Rather, the project set out to strengthen local capacity as per IMAS. Quality clearance (effectiveness) was considered more important than production targets (efficiency).

HUMAID’s lower than usual clearance results for 2005 should be assessed in this light.

HI technical assistance and on-the-ground accompaniment of HUMAID’s clearance operations resulted in greater efficiency in the use of materials and equipment, and in manual clearance techniques.
Of note is the fact that HUMAID had a pre-existing operational capacity, infrastructure, vehicles, basic equipment and materials. The project budget reinforced the equipment and materials but essentially, built upon and brought value-added to prior investments. In this context the EC / HI investment in HUMAID’s clearance capacity was a very efficient and effective use of resources.

Significant delays in EOD training and the postponement of EOD operations limited the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the project in reducing the UXO threat.

As foot-noted in a previous section of this report, many have argued that given the finite and short-term nature of the mine / UXO problem in Guinea-Bissau, the objective of efficiency should outweigh the importance of local operational capacity. And, the frustrations of capacity-building for local capacity led HI staff to ponder the possibilities had HI established an operational presence and contracted local deminers instead of partnering with HUMAID. No doubt, an HI operation would have resulted in greater efficiencies but at the cost of reducing or eliminating local capacity.

Do the clearance outputs justify the project costs?

As previously noted, HUMAID expended €464,964 in 2005 and cleared a total of 60,140 m² with a contingent of 38 deminers, 21 additional field personnel, 4 community liaison staff and 13 administrative staff.

Dividing the total meters cleared by HUMAID’s direct costs gives a very rough cost calculation of €7.73 per m². Calculating in total project costs including HI technical assistance would substantially increase the cost per m² cleared. Given HUMAID’s relatively low productivity in 2005 (as measured in m²) compared to previous years and the intensive project investments, it could be concluded from an efficiency perspective that clearance outputs do not justify project costs.

But, it must be reiterated that capacity-building and effective clearance as per IMAS took precedence over productivity measured in meters cleared.

Did the project strengthen local capacity for Mine Action efficiently and effectively?

Other than HI personnel costs, which are relatively low for expatriate technical advisors, the project budget incorporated few material investments in organizational and technical capacity-building. In this respect the project worked toward strengthening local capacity in Mine Action in a low-cost and efficient manner.

In reality HI substantially subsidized its own operational costs. For example, the decision to maintain a separate office in Bissau, however modest, rather than having the HI technical advisors work out of HUMAID’s office. Even so, costs remained relatively low. The main investment was in personnel.

---

25 Final reporting on expenditures may vary slightly from the figures quoted in this report.

26 Refer to ANNEX E (a and b) for HUMAID’s Cumulative Results 2000-2005.
The organizational capacity-building strategies implemented by HI varied in their effectiveness. Administrative, financial and logistical accompaniment served project management purposes but did not result in greater ownership by HUMAID in improving systems and procedures. Periodic workshops with HI on organizational development themes were not well-received by HUMAID’s leadership and did not seem to contribute to broader objectives. Bringing in external resource people for intensive special workshops was positively evaluated but the time away from “productive work” resented.

Overall HI approached capacity-building with HUMAID as a training event (the workshop model) rather than a process of working together (the on-the-job accompaniment model). This proved to be a less effective approach with HUMAID. There was limited synergy, too much down-time between ‘events’ (as HI waited for HUMAID to finish assignments), and lost opportunities to move forward together.

The tensions around methodology were less pronounced with technical training in demining and EOD but language and literacy challenges would seem to point to on-the-job training being the more effective strategy for training than workshops and formal classroom learning.

Including LUTCAM deminers and CAAMI Quality Control staff in EOD training was an efficient approach.

**Does HUMAID’s organizational performance justify the project costs?**

Is HUMAID more efficient and effective as a result of the partnership with HI?

(Additional observations on HUMAID’s organizational performance can be found in Annex F – HUMAID Organizational Assessment.)

HUMAID’s pre-existing organizational capacity justified the HI partnership and EC funding. HUMAID was worth investing in. The degree to which HUMAID’s organizational performance improved through the life of the project thereby justifying project costs is open to interpretation. HI has documented HUMAID’s numerous organizational achievements in 2005 in administration, finance, human resources and logistics, and HI’s support role. In clearance activities HUMAID deminers stated that HUMAID is much more efficient now due to HI’s training and technical accompaniment. The field staff of HUMAID is well-versed in IMAS and practice has improved. In this respect, clearance is now more effective. In technical work and in internal operations, HUMAID has shown improved organizational performance. But do these improvements justify the investments a) on their own merits? and b) if HUMAID does not survive beyond the project?

Organizational capacity-building is a medium-term process not easily force-fit into short-term projects. In the short-term, one could argue that HUMAID’s effectiveness should be measured in relation to political clout and the ability to secure on-going funding for operations. From this perspective, HUMAID has not noticeably progressed during the project.
8. ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY & IMPACT

The sustainability and impact of the project will depend on whether HUMAID continues to work, which is largely dependent on funding. As the project approaches its end-date, HUMAID has not secured on-going funding and there does not appear to be a survival strategy in place. HI has not engaged proactively with HUMAID on this issue (for example, by assisting HUMAID with program development, public relations, politicking, developing and marketing its fundraising strategy beyond 2005). Moreover HI’s position on HUMAID’s future is unclear.

The lack of clarity on the nature of HUMAID’s role in Mine Action vis-à-vis the CAAMI and LUTCAM and within the CAAMI’s strategic vision is a glaring strategic challenge. HI has not worked with HUMAID to build its profile as an independent NGO and partner of the CAAMI (as one strategy), nor does there appear to have been open discussions with HUMAID about possible mergers with LUTCAM or other scenarios to somehow bring HUMAID’s clearance capacity into the CAAMI-fold (as another strategy). Given comments from the Director of the CAAMI that HUMAID will “probably have to fold”, and behind the scenes strategizing by UNDP regarding possibly “contracting” HUMAID deminers to maintain operations, the urgency of addressing HUMAID’s organizational future is evident.

If HUMAID as an independent Mine Action NGO continues, the impact of the EC / HI investments in capacity-building will be significant and measurable. If HUMAID deminers trained by HI continue to work in demining and EOD operations in any organizational structure or configuration, the impact will be measurable but less significant. And, in this scenario, much of the EC / HI investment in capacity-building will have been for naught.
9. CONCLUSIONS

Project Implementation & Contractual Obligations
- The project was executed and managed by HI in accordance with EC contractual obligations. The original financial and programmatic commitments were fulfilled with few exceptions and all changes were formally communicated to the EC.

- The project budget was insufficient to cover all costs necessary to fulfill programmatic obligations.

- Project implementation would have been difficult without the third full-time technical advisor added to the HI staff team in Bissau.

Project Relevance
- The project was well-conceived in line with international Mine Action policy & practice and the evolving national Mine Action strategies and operational priorities.

- The project built on pre-existing local capacities and the organizational strengths of both the lead international partner – HI, and the local partner, HUMAID.

- The decision to partner with HUMAID was strategic - though not without its inherent challenges, both at the partnership level and in positioning HUMAID (and the HI and EC investments in Mine Action) for medium-term sustainability and impact.

- By funding HUMAID’s clearance operations and providing the necessary training and technical accompaniment to ensure adherence to IMAS, the project reduced the threat of mines and UXOs to the civilian population in the urban and peri-urban areas of Bissau.

- HI provided relevant technical training and supports to HUMAID in demining, EOD, community liaison, MRE and survey techniques.

- The technical training and organizational supports in administration, finance, logistics, and human resources served project management purposes but were less critical for HUMAID. Other kinds of organizational supports would have been more relevant. The focus on administrative systems rather than setting the stage for the continuity of HUMAID’s work stands out as a major short-coming of HI.

- The project was an important investment in Guinea-Bissau’s Completion Initiative, and brought additional human and material resources to the benefit of national priorities.

- The project contributed indirectly to peace-building and national reconciliation through its constructive engagement with war veterans from both sides of recent
conflicts, reducing the threat to civilian populations from mines and UXOs, and securing enhanced livelihoods for war veteran deminers.

**Partnership & Capacity-Building**

- The partnership between HI and HUMAID was a good idea but was complicated by organizational cultures, personalities, ways of working, and communication styles.

- HI and HUMAID lacked a shared vision for HUMAID’s future, and this was manifest in differences in priorities.

- HUMAID wanted funds to carry out clearance operations. HI wanted HUMAID to follow IMAS, re-structure and professionalize administrative systems. What HUMAID most needed was to develop strategic leadership, develop programming, produce marketing materials, and engage strategically with the CAAMI, UNDP, donors and others to build profile, ‘political’ support and a funding base.

- Significant language and literacy challenges were successfully managed by HI.

- Technical capacity-building in demining and EOD was evaluated by HUMAID, the CAAMI and other external observers as successful.

**Efficiency & Effectiveness**

- Given its pre-existing organizational coherence and operational capacity, funding HUMAID to carry out clearance activities was an efficient and effective use of EC and HI resources to reduce the threat of mines and UXO in Bissau.

**HUMAID**

“HUMAID emerged at the right moment, with a high level of legitimacy and credibility in the community, and rode the wave of Mine Action without ever having to perform at a high level. On this wave, HUMAID was able to establish an infrastructural base and secure operational funding with relatively high salaries. Now that the Mine Action wave has subsided and HUMAID is left swimming around a very small and very crowded pool with the plug pulled out, funding won’t come so easily. In this new context, HUMAID must have a clear vision, market a service and itself, demonstrate a high level of professionalism and technical capacity, forge strategic alliances, and get political.”

**Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau**

- The survival of HUMAID is good for Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau.

- In the coming period HUMAID’s survival is intrinsically linked to national Mine Action priorities and strategies established by the CAAMI with UNDP support.

---

27 The Evaluators concluding comments in the HUMAID Organizational Assessment – ANNEX F.
In not proactively engaging in national policy and program development with the CAAMI and UNDP over the years and most notably over the recent project period, HUMAID has lost an opportunity to influence strategic directions and secure its future in Mine Action. HI bears some responsibility for this situation.

The National Plan for Completion 2005-2009 will require HUMAID’s clearance capacity or its equivalent over the medium-term. Support for HUMAID makes more sense than any existing alternatives.

HUMAID’s survival will determine whether the EC / HI investments will result in sustainable local capacity-building toward completion objectives or will be relegated in history as a short-lived one-off contribution to humanitarian demining.
10. LESSONS-LEARNED

Local Capacity-Building in Mine Action

- Mine Action is political. Funding for Mine Action is competitive. It is not enough to quietly go about one’s work. Strategic engagement in national coordination structures, and with key donors and advisors to Mine Action is essential for national NGOs to secure a place in Mine Action.

- Investments in local capacity should correspond to Mine Action objectives and strategies over the medium-term, or seek to influence these objectives and strategies in a proactive manner.

- Building clearance capacity separate from an organizational sustainability and funding strategy is not very strategic. Why build capacity if it will never be used?

- Highly developed organizational models may not be necessary for successful Mine Action. In Guinea-Bissau, both HUMAID and LUTCAM began operations with limited organizational capacity. In the early days, HUMAID had very little organizational capacity with impressive clearance results. Today LUTCAM has no independent organizational capacity and yet still manages clearance operations (with UNDP support).

Capacity-Building through Partnership

- Both organizational partners should share the same vision of organizational development.

- It is important to not get caught up in bureaucratic details and risk losing sight of the broader goals.

- Partnership is an imperfect relationship. Informal and regular communications are essential to build consensus on strategies, priorities, methodologies and mechanisms for mutual accountability.

- Written documentation is not enough. It is important to take the time to solicit feedback and talk through decisions.

- Methodologies should be adapted to the organizational culture. The experience with HUMAID demonstrates that more fluid, in-house, on-the-job accompaniment is more effective than periodic training workshops and the “textbook” approach. Accompaniment as a process rather than an event has proven to be more effective in most cases.

- On-the-job mentoring and accompaniment is the best way to develop leadership skills.
- Normally 1-year capacity-building projects should be avoided. When this is unavoidable, project objectives should be realistic and strategic.

- Unless an organization can pay salaries and operational costs, nothing else will be important. Training and organizational development within a context of organizational uncertainty and funding insecurity is always challenging.

- Projects should build on what already exists and avoid superimposing new structures and processes. New structures and processes should be created only when they are absolutely necessary. The objective should be to minimize bureaucracy without jeopardizing accountability.

- Training schedules should be flexible and oriented to partner needs. Staff involved in managing operations should not be expected to train full-time without back-up management strategies in place.

- The control and monitoring function in project management should be separate from the accompaniment and technical assistance functions. i.e. these tasks should be in two different job descriptions so as to avoid incompatible power dynamics in day-to-day accompaniment.
11. RECOMMENDATIONS

11.1 Recommendations to HI

Project Closure

- HI should facilitate a process with HUMAID to produce Standing Operating Procedures in line with IMAS. If time does not permit a finished product, HI should at least set out a process and provide guidance to HUMAID as to how to approach the task independently.

- HI should support HUMAID in securing CAAMI accreditation for HUMAID.

- HI should produce a written assessment of EOD capacity post-training with specific recommendations to HUMAID, LUTCAM and the CAAMI as to the establishment of EOD teams and on-going national EOD capacity. In recommending individuals for EOD assignments, HI should advise HUMAID as to the short-term repercussions for manual demining capacity (assuming the “best and brightest” will be deemed most appropriate for EOD) and suggest strategies to alleviate any short-term reduction in demining capacity.

- HI should document its expert opinion as to the external technical training and accompaniment required to finish EOD tasks in the city of Bissau. The expert assessment of HI should be a pre-requisite for any future investment in EOD.

- Given the likelihood of an impact survey in Guinea-Bissau in the near future, HI should coordinate with HUMAID to ensure the CAAMI is fully aware of HUMAID’s current and potential capacity to contribute to such an initiative.

- HI should work with the HUMAID leadership to document HUMAID’s involvement in MRE and current organizational capacities so as to facilitate HUMAID linking into national program development in MRE through the CAAMI and related fundraising.

- HI should orient the Community Liaison Team of HUMAID, in coordination with HUMAID’s leadership and the CAAMI, to ensure all contaminated areas in Bissau are adequately marked, with particular attention to the Paiol given its proximity to HUMAID’s Annex and the extent of the UXO contamination. The rationale for this would be 1) as a risk-reduction priority, 2) because HUMAID appears to have a good stock of marking posts piled up in their Annex, and 3) to increase visibility of the remaining contamination in Bissau and HUMAID’s presence on-the-ground. Securing funding in a climate of scarce resources and competing operators usually has political and politicking dimensions and HUMAID would be well-served by any measures which increase its visibility and utility.

- As a final visibility initiative, HI should work closely with the HUMAID leadership to organize a PR campaign in Guinea-Bissau targeting the Government, UN, donors, embassies, private sector and the media. Ideally, HUMAID should have an updated brochure outlining accomplishments and some sort of “Info Pack” including photos, and the cost break-down for different types of interventions. At the very least, it
should be possible for HUMAID to produce an updated Info Sheet and organize a
demonstration demolition aimed to increase visibility and position HUMAID to
fundraise. HI’s strategic and technical accompaniment in these efforts would be
crucial.

- HI should format and package HUMAID’s organizational Assessment so that it can
  be used by HUMAID externally to leverage funding.

- HI should provide whatever support is required to ensure HUMAID deals with the
  personnel contracts for 2006 and any outstanding liabilities from 2005. Though it is
  entirely HUMAID’s legal responsibility, it would be important to avoid conflusao and
  negative perceptions which would surely arise with unpaid salaries or indemnities
  following an EC / HI project. Perceptions would become distorted….and HI would
  carry moral responsibility in the eyes of many.

- HI should accompany HUMAID in the process of securing continued personnel
  insurance through the end of project.

Future Project Development

- HI should explore opportunities to partner with HUMAID or to channel funds to
  HUMAID to continue operations.

- Any organizational supports to HUMAID should focus on strategic leadership and
  program development.

- HI should challenge the current thinking within the CAAMI and UNDP which favours
  LUTCAM’s organizational survival over HUMAID. In the likely event funding is
  insufficient to maintain two clearance organizations, some form of amalgamation
  should be explored. Barring this scenario, HI should advocate for HUMAID based
  on proven organizational and operational capacity.

- HI should seek out funding to provide additional EOD training and supervision to
  EOD operations.

- HI should pursue participation in an impact or technical survey initiative in Guinea-
  Bissau.
11.2 Recommendations to the EC

Project Closure

- The EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau should encourage the State Secretary for Veterans Affairs to call a meeting of the National Humanitarian Demining Commission (CNHD) to review the state of affairs in mine / UXO clearance in Bissau, to present national priorities, and to lay out the work plan for 2006/07. Given the EC’s significant investment in Mine Action in 2005/06, it would be an important opportunity to showcase EC’s contributions while at the same time raising the profile of Mine Action in Guinea-Bissau with Government, donors, the UN and media. Increased attention to Mine Action would, in turn, be a first step in finding a way to “finish the job”, despite limited funds, competing priorities and donor fatigue.

- The EC Delegation in Guinea-Bissau should support HI and HUMAID by participating in a final visibility event to wrap-up the project.

Future Program Development

- The EC should explore avenues to fund EOD operations in Guinea-Bissau.
## ANNEXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANNEX</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Evaluation Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Evaluation Program of Meetings &amp; Contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Individuals Consulted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Documents Consulted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>HUMAID Results in 2005 &amp; Cumulative Summary since 2000 \ (Evaluator’s compilation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>HUMAID Organizational Assessment \ (Evaluator’s assessment)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>