Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership I: Albania

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

GICHD

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Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership

Albania

Geneva, July 2012
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This report was written by Sharmala Naidoo, Advisor, Mine Action, security and Development, GICHD

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## Glossary of Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Albanian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Albania Mine Action Committee</td>
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<td>AMAE</td>
<td>Albanian Mine Action Executive</td>
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<td>AMMCO</td>
<td>Albania Mine and Munitions Coordination Office</td>
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<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
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<td>AXO</td>
<td>Abandoned Explosive Ordinance</td>
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<td>AVR</td>
<td>Armed Violence Reduction</td>
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<td>BAC</td>
<td>Battle Area Clearance</td>
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<td>CCM</td>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Cluster Munitions</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>Danish Church Aid</td>
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<td>DEX</td>
<td>Direct Execution</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordinance Disposal</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Swiss Demining Foundation</td>
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<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance</td>
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<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mine Risk Education</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NMAA</td>
<td>National Mine Action Authority</td>
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<td>OBOD</td>
<td>Open Burning and Open Detonation</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>QA</td>
<td>Quality Assurance</td>
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<td>Quality Control</td>
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<td>Quality Management</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordinance</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Albania’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination problem is a result of the 1999 Kosovo conflict. Armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) laid landmines along both sides of Albania’s border with Kosovo, in the north-eastern Kukës region.

The Albanian Mine Action Committee and the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) were established by the government in 1999. In 2002, the UNDP initiated a capacity building project to build mine action coordination and monitoring capacity.

By the end of 2007, AMAE was fully nationalised and, in November 2009, Albania declared the completion of its mine clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, several months ahead of schedule.

Albania is one of the few countries with a contamination problem that:
- established national structures to address the problem,
- harnessed international support to build its national capacity,
- developed and implemented realistic plans ahead of schedule with a team of national staff

Albania also made significant strides in putting in-place sustainable systems and structures for physical and medical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and for people with disabilities.

One of the main objectives of UNDP’s main goals in supporting Albania was the promotion of national ownership and the integration of the AMAE within government structures. This was not achieved however, and administratively, AMAE remained a UNDP Direct Execution project implementation unit for its duration.

In November 2009, Albania was declared free of mines and ERW. Following completion, AMAE phased-out most of its operations but did not formally close due to efforts to assess whether AMAE’s capacity could be used to support the clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) hotspot areas and the Government’s ammunition disposal programme.

In addition to its mine/ERW contamination problem, Albania has a problem with excess and unstable ammunition in military depots left from the former communist regime. Over the years, ammunition depot explosions have resulted in deaths, injuries and 

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1 This case study on Albania is part of a wider study undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the UN Mine Action Team on transitioning UN-managed and supported mine action programmes to national ownership. See the following link for more information: http://www.gichd.org/strategic-management/transitioning-mine-action-programmes-to-national-ownership/
displacement. In response to an accident that took place in Gërdec in 2008, the Government endorsed the demilitarisation\(^2\) of all hazardous ordnance by 2013. In 2010, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery undertook an assessment that provided guidance on AMAE transition options. The following year, the Government of Albania and the UNDP formally agreed to use AMAE (renamed the Albania Mine and Munitions Coordination Office – AMMCO) to monitor and coordinate the clearance of 19 hotspot areas across the country.

It took approximately one year for the Ministry of Defence and the UNDP to formally approve AMMCO’s mandate, and the question of national ownership and integration within the government persists. Continuing as a UNDP project implementation unit is not sustainable and AMMCO’s future is at risk as long as it depends on the support of the UNDP to sustain it.

Completion of the AMAE’s transition to AMMCO was also slow and beset by delays. Earlier guidance from the UNDP on programme closure, and the use of mine action capacity to support wider security-related programmes, could have better facilitated these transitions. Based on AMAE’s experiences, AMMCO needs to develop a clear strategy to address integration within the government, sustainability and closure.

\(^2\) Demilitarisation refers to “...the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose. Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are as critical to achieving the final result.” *South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices*, Issue Brief, No.1, November 2010, Small Arms Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR).
INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Albania is located in the Balkans region, and shares borders with Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece. Albania’s population is estimated at 3.15 million, and the country is ranked 70 out of 187 countries on the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index (HDI), just below the regional HDI average for Europe and Central Asia. High GDP growth rates in recent years have meant a reduction in poverty. However, significant regional and urban/rural disparities exist.

EXCESS AMMUNITION

Stores of ammunition in former military depots, left over from Albania’s former communist regime, pose a serious safety threat. In 1992, there were over 194,000 tonnes of ammunition in 955 storage depots across the country, in unstable and poorly maintained conditions.

Numerous depots exploded during the civil unrest in March 1997, and several minor explosions have taken place since. The largest and most serious explosion took place in Gërdec in March 2008, killing 27 people, injuring over 300, and resulting in the evacuation of over 4,000 residents. Following this (which coincided with Albania’s entry into NATO), the government prioritised ammunition disposal, and launched a national action plan on excess ammunition.

Today, according to the Albania Mines and Munitions Coordination Office, there are 19 UXO hotspot areas in the country. These are defined as ammunition depots or abandoned army camps where ammunition explosions have resulted in the areas being contaminated with UXO. The Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) has conducted surface clearance in some of these areas, but not according to international humanitarian standards, and UXO-related accidents have since occurred. According to estimates from the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE), there have been at least 699 abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) casualties, killing 109 people and injuring 590.

Approximately 90 per cent of Albania’s surplus ammunition is reportedly over 40 years old. Consequently, much of the ammunition has lost its physical and chemical properties, increasing the likelihood of unplanned explosions. Albania’s Ministry of Defence classifies at least half of all its ammunition depots to be at high risk of detonation, due to overstocking and the relocation of old stocks, posing a serious threat

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4 According to ALB-AID, this number was reduced to 63,000 tonnes, as of January 2011.
to public health and safety. Stockpile management and ammunition disposal therefore remain challenges.

In addition to the excess ammunition problem, the Ministry of Defence has estimated that, during the civil unrest in 1997, approximately 652,000 weapons of different calibres, 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition, 3.5 million hand grenades, 3,600 tonnes of explosive devices and one million mines were looted from military depots. Unofficial estimates are higher. The government has taken action to collect munitions and small arms and light weapons (SALW) looted from the ammunition depots, and to reduce surplus aging munitions.

**MINE/ERW CONTAMINATION**

Albania’s landmine and UXO problem stems from the 1999 Kosovo conflict, when the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) laid mines along both sides of Albania’s border with Kosovo, in its northeastern Kukës region. Cluster munitions strikes carried out by the FRY Armed Forces and NATO between April and June 1999 also contributed to the UXO problem.

Non-technical surveys carried out after the conflict identified approximately 15 km<sup>2</sup> of suspected hazardous areas along the Albanian/Kosovo border in the districts of Kukës, Has and Tropoje. A total of 39 villages and approximately 25,000 people were affected. Over 80 per cent of mine and ERW-related injuries occurred while people were engaged in livelihood activities, (eg agriculture, herding animals, collecting water). Mine/ERW contamination impeded the region’s socio-economic development and exacerbated its social and economic exclusion from the rest of the country.

On 29 February 2000, Albania ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and on 30 November 2009, the Government of Albania fulfilled its obligations under Article 5 of the APMBC to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in known mined areas, nine months ahead of schedule. Since 2000, through survey and clearance, Albania has released approximately 16 km<sup>2</sup> of land and destroyed:

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9 The process of destroying the surplus ammunition was an obligation for Albania to join NATO. Due to its efforts in this regard, Albanian became a NATO member in April 2009
- 12,452 antipersonnel mines
- 152 anti-vehicle mines
- 4,965 items of UXO

Between 1999 and 2009, national and international support for mine action was estimated at USD 31.7 million, including in-kind contributions from the government, in the form of explosives and emergency medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) services.\textsuperscript{12}
OVERVIEW OF THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

In 1999, the Ministry of Defence first established Albania’s national mine action programme, followed by an inter-ministerial Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC).

AMAC\textsuperscript{13} functions as Albania’s national mine action authority, overseeing policy-making, supervising the mine action programme and determining the overall direction of mine action. Until completion in November 2009, AMAC met regularly, oversaw the national mine action programme, and facilitated inter-ministerial coordination.\textsuperscript{14}

THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION EXECUTIVE (AMAE)

The Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) was established to implement, coordinate, and monitor the national mine action programme, and to serve as the national mine action centre. However, in March 2002, due to financial difficulties and a lack of expertise, the Albanian Government agreed that UNDP Albania would provide direct financial and technical assistance to AMAE, and that AMAC would play an advisory role. AMAE was then administered as a project unit through the UNDP direct execution (DEX) capacity building project.

AMAE’s main functions included:

- the development of national mine action standards;
- identifying, surveying, and marking areas contaminated by landmines and UXO through its mine/ERW operating partners;
- tasking mine action activities;
- collecting, collating, maintaining, and disseminating data on mines and UXO;
- investigating all mine-related incidents and ensuring that appropriate follow-up activities occurred;
- serving as a liaison and coordination body with national and international bodies; and accreditation and Quality Management.\textsuperscript{15}

THE ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES

In 1999, the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF), in association with CARE International, conducted the first general survey of mine/ERW contaminated areas.

\textsuperscript{13} Chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence, AMAC includes members from the Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs, Health, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Education and Economy. UNDP, UNICEF, ITF, donors and the Albanian Red Cross participate as observers.

\textsuperscript{14} Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) & Transition Plan, Final Report, UN Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, September 2010.

Since 2004, the AAF has contributed MEDEVAC support and explosive materials to the national mine action programme to destroy mines and UXO. It has also been involved in the destruction of anti-personnel landmine stockpiles through NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), and in clearing hotspot areas, though not in accordance with international standards, and UXO-related accidents have since occurred.

OTHER NATIONAL ACTORS
The Kukës hospital plays an important role in providing medical assistance to mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities.

With support from AMAE/AMMCO and the international community, the hospital has been operating a prosthetics workshop, and providing physiotherapy services that are unavailable in most parts of the country.

Also in Kukës, the Albanian non-governmental organisation ALB-AID (formerly the Victims of Mines and Weapons Association) provides risk education and assistance to victims of mine/ERW accidents and their families, and works on disability and risk education issues at a national level.

The Albanian Red Cross is also involved in risk education and data collection countrywide. With support from UNICEF, the Institute of Curricula and Studies (part of the Ministry of Education) developed materials for teachers and students on risks, which include information on mines/ERW and small arms and light weapons. These were piloted in the Kukës region.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
The main international actors that have been involved in the Albanian mine action programme include:

- Survey and clearance:
  - Danish Church Aid (DCA) - since 2004, DCA has been the sole NGO mine/ERW operator in Albania (see Section 2 for more information on DCA)
  - Swiss Demining Foundation (FSD)
  - Handicap International (HI)\(^{16}\)
  - RONCO
  - HELP

- Victim assistance (VA):
  - Slovenian Institute for Rehabilitation
  - UNDP

\(^{16}\) Handicap International planned to undertake clearance however following a training accident in 2004, they were forced to suspend operations and eventually leave Albania.
• ITF Slovenia
• HI
• ICRC/Special Fund for Disabled
• UNICEF

• Mine Risk Education (MRE):
  • ICRC
  • ITF
  • UNICEF

• Stockpile destruction:
  • NATO
  • NAMSA

EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

START UP (1999 – 2001)
Immediately after the Kosovo conflict, the AAF conducted rapid surface clearance in Kukës to reduce civilian casualties. The work, however, was not carried out in accordance with IMAS, and the area had to be re-cleared. The AAF also carried out a non-technical survey, which was further confirmed by CARE-funded independent surveys.\(^{18}\)

The government formed AMAC and AMAE in 1999, and international mine/ERW operators started conducting clearance operations in 2000, starting with RONCO and followed by HELP, DCA and FSD.

In September 2001, a UNDP assessment found that AMAE lacked capacity in key areas and that AMAC was barely functioning. The assessment found that the survey and clearance operations undertaken during this period were largely unrecorded and uncoordinated, with disappointing clearance rates, variable quality, and duplication.

Recommendations were as follows:

• for capacity development for AMAE and AMAC, particularly in regard to AMAE’s planning and management capacity and its ability to comply with IMAS and undertake quality assurance,\(^{19}\)
• a full technical survey,
• administrative support for AMAE,

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\(^{17}\) See Annex 1 for a timeline of key events.
• staff-training,
• information management support.


In April 2002, following a request from the Government of Albania, the UNDP initiated a capacity building project to build mine action coordination and monitoring capacity. With EC funding, a 21-month technical survey was carried out to obtain a more accurate assessment of the location of minefields and battle areas in the contaminated districts of Has, Tropoje and Kukës.

The project had two main objectives:

1) to conduct technical survey and clearance of mined and battle areas in Kukës; and
2) to provide technical and managerial training to national staff for the future establishment of a national demining organisation.

Initially, Handicap International (HI) got the contract for technical survey. However, in May 2004, during a HI training lecture, there was a serious accident with newly recruited deminers, resulting in two deaths and several injuries. HI suspended its activities and eventually left Albania.

DCA then won the technical survey and clearance contract and the project began in 2005. Capacity development of national staff was an important aspect of the project, with DCA aiming to hand responsibility for the planning, management, execution and supervision of the demining teams over to national staff eventually. As lack of funding had also forced FSD to leave the country, DCA became the sole mine/ERW operator working in Albania from 2004.

IMSMA was set up in 2000. In 2003, an IT advisor was recruited, database training was provided to all staff, and the use of IMSMA became a priority. An AMAE regional office was established in Kukës, including an integrated quality management section for quality control and quality assurance of all mine action operations.  

Albania developed its own national mine action standards based on IMAS soon after.

Albania’s first national mine action plan was developed for 2003-2005. It called for the phasing-in of government responsibility by 2004-2005, when it was expected that only low priority areas would remain.

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20 Prior to September 2002, no quality management system was in place.
COMPLETION IN SIGHT (2006 – 2009)
During this period, AMAE focused on completing the clearance of all known mined areas, as outlined in Article 5 of the APMBC.

UNDP support for completion, through the Completion Initiative, was vital, particularly in helping mobilise donor support. To strengthen national capacity, UNDP also continued to provide AMAE with advisors in technical and victim assistance, as well as in quality management. The victim assistance advisory position was terminated in 2006, and the chief technical advisor/project manager position the following year. From 2008 onwards, UNDP support for AMAE was primarily financial, mainly covering salaries and running costs, and by this point, all of AMAE’s managers and staff were nationals.

In 2007, there was less than 2 km² of land requiring clearance remaining. A UNDP-commissioned evaluation considered it too late at this stage to spend time and energy trying to integrate AMAE into the Ministry of Defence. Given that completion was in sight and there was no clear plan in place to use mine action capacity for other purposes after completion, the evaluation recommended that AMAE instead focus its efforts on completing its clearance obligations and closing down. No further efforts were taken to integrate AMAE in government.

The March 2008 Gërdec ammunition depot explosions were a turning point for AMAE, who were asked by AMAC to contribute to the overall response to the explosions during the emergency phase. The AAF’s response indicated constraints in coordination and emergency explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). AMAE assisted by mobilising two DCA teams, with emergency clearance support from the German Government, and worked with ALB-AID and the ARC to deliver emergency risk education in affected communities.

Despite the fact that completion was clearly in sight, and that there was a clear need to use mine action capacity to support the clearance of UXO contamination in hotspot areas, no decision was taken by the Government of Albania at this point in time on the future role of AMAE.

In December 2008, AMAC, in cooperation with UNDP, presented a revised national mine action plan for completion in 2009–2010. The plan specified that AMAE would continue to coordinate and monitor mine action activities until March 2010, when it would shift to the EOD Response Section in the Ministry of Defence. In November 2009, the Government of Albania met its article 5 obligations, several months ahead of schedule – a significant achievement for the government, AMAE and its international supporters.

Box 1. Findings from evaluations
The 2007 UNDP evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme concluded that the

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23 See Box 1 for a brief summary of the main evaluation findings.
programme was comprehensive, well coordinated and well received by all key stakeholders. Donors interviewed by the Evaluation Team unanimously expressed that their funds were used efficiently and effectively. This was viewed as a worthy achievement, considering the complexity of managing a mine action programme, and the remoteness and poor infrastructure of the Kukës region, where the landmines are located. At that time, the programme had made steady progress, having cleared 87 per cent of the mined area, provided assistance to those injured by the mines, and educated the people in Kukës about the risks involved with landmines and other remnants of war.

In 2010, an internal assessment conducted by UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) concluded that AMAE had directly contributed to the success of the Government of Albania’s priorities and international commitments in relation to landmines and ERW, including cluster munitions. Key indicators of AMAE’s success included:

- “All known hazardous areas cleared before APMBT and CCM treaty deadlines.
- A systematic and effective risk education programme reducing the number of mine or cluster munitions casualties to zero since 2005.
- A consistent and effective focus on accident survivors and their long term rehabilitation.
- An established and effective relationship with the ministries of Labour and Social Affairs, and Health.
- Effective coordination structures promoting collaboration between implementing agents, government, donors and international actors.
- Established effective working relationships with local authorities and communities.
- Effective integrated approach undertaken combining clearance with community liaison, risk education and technical survey activities.
- Consistent and adequate funding has been achieved for the programme, and donors having indicated their high degree of confidence in AMAC and AMAE.
- Sound accreditation procedures, ensuring only competent organisations undertake mine clearance work.
- Effective quality management procedures and standards providing confidence in the quality of mine clearance work.
- Sound information management system with the potential to be adapted to demilitarisation and hotspot clearance.
- Effective planning mechanisms that enable time-bound targets and milestones to be set.
- The presence of committed, motivated, technically competent and knowledgeable staff within AMAE, who work without international technical advisors.
- A surplus of equipment ready to be deployed on future programmes.
- Through AMAC, an effective and trusted interministerial coordinating body, in
BEYOND COMPLETION (2010 TO PRESENT)

Completion, while a clear success, inevitably prompted renewed questions about the future role of AMAE. In late 2009, the Albanian Government and the UNDP began to discuss the option of using AMAE to address residual ERW contamination and surplus ammunition. An internal assessment conducted by the UNDP and carried out by specialists from the Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery (BCPR) in August 2010 argued that the closure of AMAE would be a loss to Albania’s development and disarmament communities, and to Albania’s capacity to address its residual mine/ERW threat and support mine/ERW survivors.

The focus of AMAE’s activities in 2010 and 2011 was on victim assistance, in particular on:

- emergency assistance and ongoing healthcare
- physical rehabilitation
- provision of prostheses
- social and psychological support
- socio-economic reintegration

These activities were carried out with national and international partners.

In November 2010, the ministries of Health and Defence, in association with AMAE, organised a national victim assistance workshop to assess progress in victim assistance and to develop a long term national plan in line with the Cartagena Action Plan. AMAE also provided support to the Government of Albania, which was the chair of the APMBC in 2011, and reported on progress under key disarmament-related conventions.

In March 2011, AMAE was renamed the Albania Mine and Munitions Coordination Office (AMMCO). This new name better reflected its new mandate of monitoring and coordinating unexploded ordnance hotspot clearance operations, alongside its existing mine/ERW reporting obligations under the APMBC, and its victim assistance role.

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During the second half of 2011, AMMCO focused its efforts on securing approval from the Ministry of Defence and UNDP to expand its mandate. On 1 November 2011, the UNDP and Albania’s Minister of Defence signed a Memorandum of Understanding that formally approved the mandate of AMMCO.\(^\text{27}\) Section 3 provides a more in-depth examination of the current context and the process that AMMCO initiated to address hotspot clearance, ammunition disposal and nation-wide survivor assistance.

**GENDER**

AMAE has always disaggregated data on victims by sex and age and used it for donor reports and when developing victim assistance and risk education programmes (eg, to better target vocational training and employment opportunities for survivors and their families). Gender equality and participation has also been a consideration when planning MRE, and establishing anti-mine committees in affected communities.

HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

UN SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

From the outset, the UNDP’s intent was to gradually shift management responsibilities for AMAE to the government.28

The UNDP covered AMAE’s running costs when it was first established in 1999, and, in 2001, carried out an assessment of mine action capacity and needs. This led, in 2002, to a two-year capacity project which sought to:

- provide support to AMAC and AMAE
- strengthen mine action information management
- develop a national mine action plan, including policies and guidelines
- develop integrated plans for MRE and risk reduction
- support mine clearance.29

UNDP support for mine action was framed as part of UNDP’s wider programming on democratic governance and human security in Albania. In the Kukës region, UNDP implemented weapons for development and local governance initiatives, and tried to promote synergy among the various projects, including local economic development, weapon collection30 and control, mine action, preservation of the environment and natural resource management. UNDP’s Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Programme and its Support to National Mine Action Programme were also components of its efforts to promote socio-economic recovery and development in the region.31

Between 2002 and 2006, UNDP provided technical advisors, equipment and funding for AMAE headquarters and its regional office in Kukës. It also provided technical assistance for:

- developing the mine action plan,
- managing the mine action programme,
- improving the mine action information management system,
- developing plans for MRE and risk reduction,
- supervising survey and clearance operations according to international mine action standards (IMAS).

In 2002, a UNDP chief technical advisor and an information advisor provided technical

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30 UNDP’s Weapons for Development approach, involving the promotion of voluntary surrender of small arms, became a flagship of UNDP assistance in Albania.

UNDP remains engaged in Kukës, currently implementing projects on tourism and environmental promotion, and cross border initiatives with Kosovo.
support to the AMAE. The following year, an operations advisor from the Swiss General Staff was seconded to AMAE, and by the end of 2003, there were four technical advisors. The number of international technical advisors peaked in 2005, when the UNDP appointed a quality management advisor.

Albania’s mine action programme was nationalised by the end of 2007, with national staff carrying out all aspects of the mine action programme. The sole exceptions were the expatriate programme manager for national clearance capacity and DCA’s Quality Management advisor.

As with all mine action programmes, the quality and effectiveness of technical advisors varies widely, and each advisor has their own skills and competencies. This was largely the case in Albania. Overall, UNDP support helped to strengthen AMAE’s professionalism, capacity and management. UNDP also played a crucial role in strengthening and building the capacities of state medical institutions at national and local levels. This was achieved through the provision of adequate technical support and training, and direct assistance in addressing the socio-economic needs of landmine/UXO survivors. UNDP also implemented development projects in Kukës, with particular attention to previously mine-affected villages, thus contributing to overall development in the area.

UNICEF was also involved in mine action for mine risk education and victim assistance. In 2004, UNICEF provided funding to the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Curricula and Studies for the development of teaching modules on mine/ERW contamination risks, for use in schools nationwide.

The materials were initially piloted in Kukës and, in 2009, the draft curricula were revised, to include threats from small arms and light weapons, which was framed as part of a wider range of risks. However, as of September 2011, the curriculum remains in draft format due to lack of funding for final revision, pilot testing and printing. The Institute of Curricula maintains it does not have the funds to finish the job. It would not require significant resources to finalise and print the curriculum however, and it has been in draft form for several years, indicating that the government does not see the project as a priority.

**UNDP Capacity development project**

AMAE developed into a professional and well-run mine action centre. Recognition of the professionalism of AMAE’s staff and their capacity to effectively manage the mine action programme was widely acknowledged. UNDP support for AMAE was critical in this, particularly in regard to funding, which enabled the AMAE Director to manage the programme and recruit and retain qualified and committed staff. A critical component of this success was due to the commitment and drive of AMAE’s Director.

The overall aim of the UNDP Capacity Development project was to establish
autonomous capacity in Albania, in order to coordinate and monitor mine action activities in accordance with international standards, with funding from several donors. The intention was for the mine action programme to be sustainable, self-sufficient, incorporated within the government and independently managed, with the following outcomes:

1. Strengthening of national capacity within the mine action programme.
2. Provision of technical support and training to AMAE staff.
3. Support for and overseeing of mine action activities, and monitoring of compliance with international and UN standards.\(^{32}\)

AMAE staff benefited from professional training arranged through the UNDP and ITF with Cranfield and James Madison universities, as well as on-the-job training and mentoring provided by UNDP technical advisors. It is clear that AMAE´s capacity improved substantially, to such an extent that the programme was nationalised by the end of 2007, and since then, UNDP support has been largely financial and administrative.

However, one of the main shortcomings of UNDP´s support was the inability to ensure that AMAE was incorporated within government structures, and receiving financial contributions from the national budget as originally envisioned. Since completion in November 2009, AMMCO remains a UNDP DEX project unit for administrative and financing purposes.

**UNDP Completion Initiative**

At the end of 2006, UNDP’s Capacity Building project was due to end. However, there were fears that AMAE would not be able to mobilise sufficient donor support to meet its clearance obligations on time.

Following discussions with the national mine action authorities, UNDP included Albania in its Completion Initiative. The purpose of the UNDP Completion Initiative was to accelerate mine action activities in countries where a concerted effort and a relatively modest investment of approximately USD 10 million would solve the landmine problem in a short timeframe (ie 3-5 years). At the same time, it tried to promote national ownership and ensure sustainable capacity was in place for clearance, survey and residual contamination problems that may arise beyond treaty deadlines.\(^{33}\)

With support from the Completion Initiative, the Government of Albania developed the Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion 2007-2010 in December 2006. The Completion Plan outlined two main strategic objectives:

1. Clear all known Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHA) by 2010.


2. All landmine/ERW survivors receive medical care and have access to assistance that leads to full integration into community life.

A memorandum of understanding signed between the government and UNDP in 2007 agreed that UNDP would continue to provide administrative and financial support to AMAE until the end of 2010.

In effect, the completion plan was Albania’s transition plan. It specified that, following the closure of the mine action programme in March 2010, the responsibility for mine action would be transferred from UNDP to the EOD Response Section in the Ministry of Defence. It also specified that mine action capacities would be integrated into existing civil protection/defence structures to address residual mine contamination threats, and into the AAF’s EOD response capacity.  

There was a small reference to the use of technical mine action capacity for EOD response and for possible UXO and ammunition destruction in other areas of the country. The plan referred to the transition to the national government and mentioned that the government was considering further in-kind support (e.g. premises for AMAE). According to the plan, by the end of 2010, the mine action programme would be closed.

Despite this, it also alluded to a possible shift in AMAE’s mandate and, in doing so, left the door open to a future beyond mine action. It specified that mine action capacity could be used more widely, in, for example:

- the destruction of ERW,
- provision of MRE,
- victim assistance support.

No clear guidance on how this transition should take place was provided, however.

The Completion Initiative was successful in packaging and communicating the Albanian programme’s achievements, developing a concrete plan for completion, and mobilising sufficient donor resources to achieve the plan’s objectives.

**UNDP Kukës Regional Development Initiative**

The Kukës region, located in the northeast of the country, is one of the poorest, with approximately 37 per cent of the population living below the poverty line.

In 2005, the UNDP implemented a three year development programme in Kukës. The Kukës Regional Development Initiative (KRDI) built on a previous local governance programme and an Area Based Development Framework for the region. Its purpose

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35 Andreas Sepp, From demining to area-based development in Albania, UNDP Development and Transition, 2 May 2011, http://www.developmentandtransition.net/article.35+M51a0d7fc288.0.html
was to provide sustainable livelihoods through rehabilitation and reconstruction of small community infrastructure. Communities affected by mines/ERW were prioritised, demonstrating an alignment between mine action and development priorities and programming.

**DANISH CHURCH AID**

In 2002, following the closure of its mine action operations in Kosovo, Danish Church Aid (DCA) transferred its equipment and staff to Albania. From 2004 onwards, DCA was the sole mine/ERW operator working in Albania with international funding.

DCA played a key role in developing national mine action capacity, to such an extent that on completion, apart from one expatriate staff member, all personnel were Albanian, including those responsible for operations and the supervision of survey/clearance teams. With funding from UNDP, the European Commission and the US Department of State, DCA trained and equipped six national demining teams, and administration and logistics staff. DCA also oversaw the managerial and financial aspects of the teams.

Albania’s 2006 national mine action plan for completion outlined how to deal with Albania’s remaining mine threat by 2010. It called for the development of National Clearance Capacity (NCC), which consisted of six demining teams, to replace DCA in the form of a national non-governmental organisation, when it left Albania. The completion plan envisaged that, after 2010, when Albania would meet its Article 5 obligations, the NCC would be integrated into the AAF’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity.

However, upon further consideration, DCA discontinued plans to establish the NCC. Given the small amount of contamination remaining and the bureaucratic challenges involved in trying to register the DCA teams as an Albanian NGO, DCA decided the effort would detract from plans to achieve completion by 2010. The 2007 UNDP evaluation also recommended against establishing NCC, as it would distract Albania from meeting its Article 5 obligations on schedule.

Following completion in November 2009, DCA implemented a re-training and re-integration pilot project for the 80 technical and 30 support staff left without employment.36

Throughout 2011 and 2012, DCA was sub-contracted by Sterling International to remain in Albania and clear UXO hotspots, based on the tasks issued by AMMCO. Thirty-five national staff and one expatriate are employed, as well as two teams of six operators, one team leader and two medics. DCA’s teams began identifying and collecting UXO in

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36 DCA hired a consultant to undertake a needs assessment and to assess the job market in Kukës. DCA personnel were allowed to select the type of training they wanted. However, on hindsight, DCA indicated that some consideration should have been given to strengthening EOD capacity to deal with residual mine, ERW and AXO contamination. Interview with Anthony Connell, DCA Programme Manager, Tirana, September 2011.
hotspot areas in November 2011. The transport of the items to disposal areas or their on-site destruction was supported by the AAF’s EOD teams. See Section 3 for more information.

One concern about DCA’s involvement in UXO hotspot clearance relates to the EOD training of its demining teams, which is not at the required level for hotspot/battle area clearance (BAC). DCA has provided some refresher BAC training for the teams, but it will need to strengthen their EOD capacity to proceed with hotspot clearance.

In September 2011, DCA submitted a proposal for additional funding to the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), to cover the costs of a new international EOD advisor to accompany the clearance teams. New funding in 2012 may make this possible.

DONOR FUNDING
Donor funding steadily increased - peaking in 2005 - as the scale and nature of the contamination problem became clearer, and AMAE’s capacity to monitor and coordinate operations improved.

Albania’s main donors for mine action have been the US Department of State, the European Union, UNDP and several others. A significant amount of this funding was channelled through the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF). The UNDP’s Completion Initiative, along with ITF support, helped Albania mobilise sufficient resources from the international community to meet its clearance obligations several months ahead of schedule – a significant achievement.

The ICRC also supported training for mine action staff in the areas of prosthetics and EOD, and the ITF played a critical role, particularly in support of the development of AMAE’s capacity. The ITF:

- provided training for national staff on quality assurance, quality control and GIS systems;
- provided equipment for AMAE’s office in Tirana;
- helped fund the establishment of the regional office in Kukës.

These complemented UNDP’s core funding, which provided for staff salaries and running costs.

The European Union support was also instrumental in ensuring UNDP support to AMAE,

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37 An order from the MoD regulates the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in hotspot clearance and enables AMMCO to coordinate clearance operations and to ensure DCA teams receive MEDEVAC and communications support.

38 Other donors included ICRC, UNICEF, UNDP, Germany, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Canada, Czech Republic, Sweden, France, Norway and Denmark.
not only in terms of running costs but also in terms of logistical support and mine clearance capacity development.

Graph 1. Summary of contributions: 2000–2010 (USD)

Source: Landmine Monitor
CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

ALBANIA MINE AND MUNITIONS COORDINATION OFFICE (AMMCO): MINE ACTION CAPACITY IN SUPPORT OF DEMILITARISATION

ALBANIA’S DEMILITARISATION PROGRAMME

In January 2012, approximately 26,000 tonnes of excess stockpiled ammunition awaited disposal in Albania. Contamination is widespread in the country, due to:

- aging ammunition stockpiles,
- insecure and improperly managed weapons and ammunition storage depots,
- a series of ammunition depot explosions,
- looting of weapons and ammunition by civilians.

Nineteen sites have been identified as UXO hotspot areas requiring subsurface clearance. AMMCO’s preliminary assessments of these areas indicate that the extent of the contamination and the risk to surrounding communities remains high. Some emergency clearance was carried out by AAF in these areas, but not to international standards, and UXO-related accidents occurred after clearance. AMMCO estimates that hotspot clearance will continue beyond 2013, although all high priority areas should be cleared by then. Open burning and open detonation (OBOD) of ammunition is currently being carried out by the government in factories in Mjekes, Gramsh and Polican.

In 2009, the Prime Minister Sali Berisha announced the demilitarisation of all hazardous ordnance. He endorsed an action plan, known as “The Action Plan for the Elimination of the Excess Ammunition in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”. The plan outlines a wide programme of activities that focuses on destroying surplus ammunition by 2013, and reducing the number of ammunition depots located close to civilian communities.

The plan refers to five methods of surplus disposal:
- industrial disposal,
- disposal by burning,
- open detonation in demolition sites,

39 Source: AMMCO, February 2012.
41 Demilitarisation refers to “…the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose. Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are as critical to achieving the final result.” South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices”, Issue Brief, No.1, November 2010, Small Arms Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR).
• shooting, and
• sale or donation.\textsuperscript{43}

Given limited government capacity and resources, the plan relies heavily on external technical assistance and support. At present, the government has only been able to mobilise 30 per cent of the funding needed.

Albania is now a NATO member, so it can no longer benefit from demilitarisation support through the NATO Partnership for Peace modality. Donors have been reluctant to channel support directly to the Albanian military, and donor meetings that took place in Brussels in December 2010 and in Tirana in October 2011 were met with a lukewarm response.

This is also the reason why the Albanian Government requested that the UNDP make use of the country’s already developed mine action capacity, and that other mine action partners contribute to the demilitarisation programme. The government expects this to help mobilise the much needed resources for the demilitarisation programme.

**AMMCO’S MANDATE**

The UNDP’s BCPR conducted an internal assessment in 2010 to determine whether AMAE, as the national mine action coordination body, could use its skills and experience to support the Ministry of Defence with the implementation of the Action Plan on excess ammunition. The September 2010 assessment report strongly supported this transition based on the clear need for monitoring and coordination of the safe disposal of ammunition stockpiles and the survey and clearance of hotspot areas.\textsuperscript{44} AMAE was renamed AMMCO, reflecting its new role and mandate, and on 1 November 2011, the Government of Albania and the UNDP formally agreed to use AMMCO to monitor and coordinate the clearance of the 19 hotspot areas across the country. Depending on AMMCO’s success, the Government may also use AMMCO to support wider ammunition disposal efforts.

AMMCO is responsible for the accreditation, coordination, monitoring and certification of the hotspot clearance operators. In January 2012, it was also agreed that AMMCO would be responsible for Quality Management for clearance operations in Gërdec. Up till this point, surface clearance had been undertaken by AAF and a commercial operator known as EOD Solutions, but had not been subject to external quality control.

AMMCO is specifically responsible for:

• Coordinating and monitoring hotspot clearance, risk education and victim

\textsuperscript{43} South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices\textsuperscript{44}, Issue Brief, No.1, November 2010, Small Arms Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR).

\textsuperscript{44} Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) & Transition Plan, Final Report, UN Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, September 2010.
assistance.
• Reviewing existing standards on safety, quality assurance and quality control, community liaison, operations, accreditation and risk education for ammunition disposal and hotspot clearance and upgrading them to international standards
• Developing a standard package for eventual accreditation of private contractors seeking to operate open burning and open detonation (OBOD) ranges and hotspot areas.
• Conducting a detailed technical assessment of the remaining hotspots.
• Developing a plan for clearing all hotspot areas based on the assessment.
• Adopting mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of hotspots clearance in assigned locations.
• Developing adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local communities in hotspot areas.
• Expanding Albania’s existing victim assistance programme to include ERW survivors for possible assistance schemes.
• Establishing a national database for mines/abandoned ammunition victims throughout Albania.
• Resource mobilisation and liaison with government, in particular the Ministry of Defence.

AMMCO capacity
AMMCO, like AMAE, remains a UNDP DEX project implementation unit. There are no plans in place to integrate AMMCO within the Ministry of Defence or any other government structure or ministry. This is despite the acknowledgment of AMMCO, UNDP and others that AMMCO should, in theory, be part of the government.

In reality, if AMMCO were integrated into the Ministry of Defence, given the context in Albania, there is a likelihood that AMMCO’s capacity would dissipate, due to:

• the risk of losing experienced staff due to reduced pay and benefits,
• the command structure within the Ministry of Defence,
• limited capacity within the Ministry of Defence,
• competing political demands.

Funding and Staff
AMMCO’s projected annual budget for 2012 was USD 400,000. The UNDP Country Office supported AMMCO salaries and running costs until the end of May 2012, and UNDP BCPR has pledged a further USD 95,000 thereafter. AMMCO has also initiated negotiations with the EU for long term funding for both monitoring and hotspot clearance operations.

AMMCO presently consists of:
• a director,
• three quality management monitors,
• specialists in mine action, risk education, victim assistance, socio-economic reintegration and IMSMA,
• administrative staff.

A community liaison officer, an operations officer and, possibly, a public information officer may also be recruited.

Given its inter-ministerial composition, the Albanian Mine Action Committee will continue to oversee hotspot clearance. This will complement the board that oversees the government’s demilitarisation programme, which is currently represented only by AAF and the Ministry of Defence.

**AMMCO activities to date**

So far, AMMCO has assessed 16 of the 19 hotspot areas, and has drafted a standard operating procedure for QA and QC for hotspot clearance. The remaining hotspot assessments are underway, and the Quality Management team is conducting QA/QC of DCA’s clearance teams, preparing standards and monitoring templates.

In association with the Albanian Armed Forces and the main implementing partners, AMMCO has developed a national UXO clearance plan, which is currently awaiting approval from the Minister of Defence. AMMCO will also be involved in the certification of clearance operations in Gërdec and will conduct technical assessments of the four demolition ranges that have been closed. AMMCO has started assessing the first demolition range.

In association with the ICRC, AMMCO intends to train EOD operators in the AAF in first aid, and has provided the AAF with three ambulances to date. AMMCO also ensures that MEDEVAC services are available for DCA and AAF teams in three areas.

The Government of Albania has contributed the following to support UXO hotspot clearance:

• Storage of ammunition collected in UXO hotspot areas in designated AAF depots.
• Transport of ammunition to the approved demolition ranges with AAF vehicles.
• Disposal of ammunition in the demolition ranges by EOD experts from the AAF Logistics Brigade.
• In-situ destruction of ammunition and components found in the UXO hotspot areas that are considered too dangerous to transport.
• Standby medical evacuation support by helicopter through the AAF45.

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45 AMMCO. UXO Hotspot Clearance in Albania, RASR Meeting 24-25 April 2012, Durres- Albania
Victim Assistance

There is a national prosthetic and orthotic centre in the capital city Tirana. However, it is badly managed, and not accessible to persons with disabilities. The centre needs to be relocated and its managerial capacities further upgraded. AMMCO is working closely with the wider disability sector in Albania on the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and intends to:

- conduct a detailed assessment of the physical, medical and socio-economic conditions of victims injured in abandoned ammunitions accidents, and
- try to replicate the model of the Kukës prosthetic and orthotics workshop in other regions of Albania.

AMMCO has conducted socio-economic impact assessments for each of the hotspots, including:

- an assessment of the socio-economic situation of the area surrounding the UXO hotspots
- risk education, community liaison and victim assistance needs,
- identification of UXO survivors and their medical and socio-economic needs.⁴⁶

Information management

There are approximately 90,000 persons with disabilities in Albania, but the government lacks full data on this.

The GICHD’s Information Management Section is assisting AMMCO adapt IMSMA⁴⁸ so that, in addition to covering mine action, it also covers hotspot clearance and ammunition disposal. AMMCO intends to migrate all its information on mine victims into IMSMA⁴⁸ and then include the 699 AXO casualties in the database. Discussions are also underway to provide the Kukës Regional Council (the first region to digitalise its cadastral records) with IMSMA⁴⁸, in order to facilitate regional development planning, eg land ownership, road development and mapping, identification of mineral resources, tourist sites and footpaths etc.

One future possibility is to market IMSMA⁴⁸, with assistance from GICHD, as a tool for the wider disability sector, for example, in tracking needs and publishing available services for all people with disabilities in the country.

⁴⁶ See Annex 9 for a sample socio-economic assessment report.
TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP IN THE MINE ACTION CONTEXT

National ownership of a mine action programme is generally reflected through the following:

- A high level of interest and leadership in fulfilling clearance, risk education and victim assistance obligations.
- An empowered mine action authority that is provided with the necessary human, financial and material capacity.
- Efforts made to obtain a clear understanding of the extent of mine/ERW contamination.
- A clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5 implementation challenge, or a commitment to promptly gain understanding.
- A realistic but ambitious plan to complete the implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible.
- Stable and significant national financial support for the mine action programme.
- Integration of mine action structures within national and regional government structures.
- Integration of mine action in relevant development strategies, plans and budgets.\(^{47}\)

In Albania, progress towards national ownership of the mine action programme has been mixed. One of the main objectives of the UNDP Capacity Building project was to have the Albanian government assume full responsibility for the management of the mine action programme.\(^{48}\) However, the UNDP BCPR assessment noted:

"An important, but largely unfulfilled, promise of the UNDP project was to create a sustainable, self-sufficient national mine action capacity, one that is incorporated within the national government and managerially independent of UNDP. While the project has

\(^{47}\) According to the Cartagena Summit: “The States Parties have come to recognise that strong national ownership is essential for ensuring that cooperation can flourish. Mine-affected States Parties themselves have remarked that national ownership in the clearance of anti-personnel mines and other explosive hazards implies, inter alia, the following five components: (i) high level interest and leadership in fulfilling mine clearance obligations; (ii) a national authority empowered and provided with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out its responsibilities; (iii) a clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5 implementation challenge or a commitment to promptly acquire such understanding; (iv) a realistic but not unambitious plan to complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible and; (v) a regular significant national financial commitment to the State’s own humanitarian demining programme. It has been noted that, while the existence of these components will not guarantee that resources will flow in response to needs, demonstrating national ownership makes it significantly more likely that cooperation will flourish between those with needs and those in a position to provide assistance.”

made remarkable achievements in terms of the technical capacity of AMAE, it has done relatively little to incorporate these capacities as a national institution. As previously noted, there are no laws that establish AMAE as a legal entity in Albania. Even though AMAE has attained a high degree of technical competence and autonomy, it relies on UNDP for its operational continuity.”

UNDP capacity building support for AMAE continued until September 2007 when the chief technical advisor left and, from that point onwards, UNDP support was largely financial, with some administrative assistance. However, to date, AMMCO remains a UNDP project implementation unit and is not part of a government structure. Therefore, the process of transitioning mine action to national ownership did not take place, at least if national ownership is narrowly defined as the government taking lead responsibility for establishing a national mine action structure or integrating the mine action structure in national and regional government structures.

The 2007 evaluation of the Albanian mine action programme dismissed plans for the relocation of AMAE within the Ministry of Defence, which was unreceptive to the idea. The evaluation team’s assessment reflected that at the time:

- The draft bill to incorporate AMAE within the Ministry of Defence was not high on the list of legislative priorities.
- When the mine action programme ended, AMAE lacked a clearly defined mission and purpose.
- Lower Ministry of Defence staff salaries could prompt AMAE employees to seek employment elsewhere.
- A move to the Ministry of Defence could jeopardise international support.
- Focusing on relocating within the Ministry of Defence could result in a loss of focus on finishing the clearance job by the end of 2009 with only 2 km² left to clear.

The integration of AMAE within government structures may not have been critical when the focus was on completion and when a future beyond mine action was not foreseen.

However, now that AMAE expanded its mandate and became AMMCO, its status as a UNDP project implementation unit remains an issue. This point was also emphasised in BCPR’s assessment report:

“It is essential that a programme to incorporate AMAE as an Albanian institution with an official mandate from the Ministry of Defence is undertaken in parallel, to ensure the sustainability of the organisation and the legitimacy of AMAE to carry out a government

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Apart from the issue of the integration of mine action structures in government, the government demonstrated political commitment to resolve the mine/ERW contamination problem, through:

- Support for AMAE and AMAC. The government relied on the UNDP to manage AMAE, which it regarded as the de facto national mine action centre.
- The Chairman of AMAC was active in supporting national advocacy and resource mobilisation efforts.
- Active involvement of senior Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials.
- The development of a clear and realistic plan to achieve its Article 5 APMBC clearance obligations.
- Stable in-kind contributions (provision of explosives and MEDEVAC services and contribution to victim assistance capacities).
- Development of national mine action standards.
- Integration of mine action in regional development strategies and initiatives.
- APMBC implementation legislation enacted in 2006.

In relation to other countries in the region however, national ownership of the mine action programme is weak. Over the years, it is the UNDP that has kept AMAE/AMMCO operating. Initially, having UNDP manage AMAE as a project was convenient for the government and the donors, particularly given the political and economic context at the time and the relatively small size of the mine action programme. It also enabled AMAE to get on with its work and not be hampered by internal Ministry of Defence politics and bureaucracy.

From the perspective of the UNDP and the international community, UNDP support helped Albania meet its mine clearance obligations, and is now helping Albania address the problem of UXO contamination resulting from unplanned ammunition explosions. However, continued UNDP support may have delayed or inhibited the Albanian Government from demonstrating meaningful ownership.

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53 In the context of development assistance, this situation is known as the Samaritan’s Dilemma, where an actor, the Samaritan, confronts situations in which other actors are in serious need of help and they need to choose between helping and not helping. The recipient on the other hand has to decide how much effort they will make to help them in this case. If the Samaritan extends help and the recipient exerts high effort, the Samaritan will benefit substantially as will the recipient. But from the recipient’s perspective, they could be even better off if they expend minimal effort. Samaritans are faced with the problem that their dominant strategy is always to extend help. They are better off with this action no matter what the recipient does. However, once the recipient understands that this is the dominant strategy for the Samaritan, the recipient’s best response is to expend minimal effort. If the situation is repeated, the donor may be creating a situation where the recipient loses skill and motivation over time. It is the recipient whose
At what point should the UNDP either place conditions on future assistance or discontinue support altogether and encourage the Government of Albania to take full responsibility for AMMCO?

**VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND MINE RISK EDUCATION**

**Victim Assistance**

According to the Cartagena Action Plan, national ownership in relation to victim assistance consists of:

- High level commitment from the government to address the rights and needs of people with disabilities.
- An empowered national coordination mechanism equipped with sufficient capacity.
- A clear plan and legislation to address the rights and needs of people with disabilities.
- Commitment and capacity to implement the plan and legislation, and provide services.
- A national focal point for disability issues.$^{54}$

Significant progress with victim assistance was made in Albania. Through AMAE’s efforts, the government leveraged the APMBC to provide support to survivors and enhance rehabilitation services more widely for all people with disabilities.

Through its Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (PMR) project, AMAE developed a sustainable national response to the PMR needs of mine/ERW survivors and people with disabilities. Albania’s first ever regional prosthetic workshop and physiotherapy centre was established at the Kukës regional hospital in 2006 and, apart from the first year, the hospital has been able to cover the salaries and maintenance costs of the facilities, which now serve people from Kukës and wider Albania. Although AMMCO continues to help the workshop obtain essential materials from outside Albania, the continued operation of the workshop and physiotherapy centre and the inclusion of operating costs within the hospital budget are clear indications of ownership.

Albania has a national strategy and legislation on disability, although its enforcement remains a problem, as does the level of funding for disability programming. With support from the UNDP, Albania has drafted a new law on disability to ensure compliance with the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD), which it signed in December 2009 but has not yet ratified.

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$^{54}$ See Annex 3 for Recommendations from the Cartagena Action Plan on National Ownership and Victim Assistance
The Ministries of Health and Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities lack the capacity to take on AMAE/AMMCO’s coordination function for victim assistance or for providing financial support and mobilising donor support. Given its limited capacity and resources for disability issues in general, the government has relied largely on AMAE to act as the national focal point for victim assistance, and AMMCO will continue to fulfil this role if funding permits.

Risk education
Albania does not have a committed focal point within the Ministry of Education or other relevant government institutions for risk education. AMAE has played this role and, while there is an effective rapid response risk education network, now coordinated by AMMCO and implemented through ALB-AID and the Albanian Red Cross, this operates outside government structures.

A mine risk education (MRE) curriculum, developed by the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Curricula and Studies, was introduced in schools in Kukës as a pilot, and there were plans to adopt the curriculum in areas where ERW and AXO contamination remained. However, despite efforts on the part of AMAE and UNICEF to support the development of educational materials on mine/ERW contamination and small arms and light weapons, and to have the material integrated within primary and secondary school curricula, the materials remain untested and in draft form. Although UNICEF provided funding to the Institute of Curricula and Studies in 2004, the Institute maintains it does not have the funding to finalise the materials, reflecting a lack of government ownership.
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSITION

In mine action, transition refers to the process through which the UN reduces its support as the host country develops greater national programme management capabilities. In some countries, the transition process is marked by specific phases, for example:

- the development and implementation of a transition plan,
- joint management of the programme,
- the handover and monitoring of the programme.

In Albania, two forms of transition are evident:

1) Completion of mine clearance and phasing down\textsuperscript{55} of the mine action programme.
2) Using mine action capacity to support armed violence reduction.\textsuperscript{56}

PHASING DOWN THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

Albania’s Completion Plan, published in December 2006, signalled that completion of clearance would be achieved by August 2010 and that the mine action programme would either be:

1. Closed down, with mine action capacity transferred to EOD response capacity within the Ministry of Defence and restructured as a humanitarian mine action section; or else
2. Mine action capacity would be used to address wider security issues.

By the end of 2007, AMAE’s last UN technical advisor had left and UNDP support consisted mainly of funding and administrative services. While AMAE remained a UNDP project implementation unit, it was now managed and staffed with a fully nationalised team. It remained unclear whether AMAE would have a role following completion. The UNDP evaluation in 2007 therefore recommended that AMAE develop a plan to guide the closure of the mine action programme. A specific plan to close the programme was not developed, in part because AMAE and its partners ITF and DCA were considering expanding its mandate after completion. It was difficult for AMAE to push the issue further within the government, due largely to its status as a UNDP project unit.

Also, it was not in the interests of AMAE personnel to push the issue. Strategic guidance and support from the UNDP at this point in time on programme closure and/or transition options would have been useful. However, the UNDP was focused on completion of clearance and all issues related to demilitarisation, including excess

\textsuperscript{55} Phasing down in this context refers to the reduction of project activities in preparation for closure
\textsuperscript{56} Armed violence, according to the OECD DAC is “...the intentional use of force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives, against a person, group, community or state, that undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable development”. This definition applies to both armed violence perpetrated in both armed conflict and non-conflict settings, and the instruments of armed violence include small arms and light weapons, ammunition, conventional military equipment, ERW and UXO.
ammunition and UXO hotspots, were viewed by Albania’s military and the Ministry of Defence as their strict domain.

The Gërdec ammunition depot explosions in 2008 illustrated how coordination and technical expertise were needed to address the problem of excess ammunition and AXO contamination in hotspot areas. Based on this, why didn’t the Albanian Government and the UNDP make a concrete decision about widening AMAE’s mandate?

In the absence of a clear decision about its future, AMAE began to phase down its operations in 2010 in preparation for closure by:

- Donating some equipment to the AAF and transferring some equipment, including vehicles, to DCA for use in hotspot clearance, based on donor’s agreement\(^{57}\).
- Closing the regional office in Kukës in December 2010.
- Terminating the employment contracts of non-essential staff.
- Making plans to hand over the IMSMA database to the archives section in the Ministry of Defence.

While AMAE waited for the government’s and the UNDP’s confirmation about its post-completion mandate, core AMAE personnel were retained and the AMAE office in Tirana continued to report on key disarmament-related treaty commitments, to coordinate victim assistance and to provide support to the Albanian Government, which had assumed the Presidency of the APMBC.

During this period, AMAE’s director spent significant time discussing how mine action capacity could contribute to the national demilitarisation programme and the action plan on excess ammunition with the Ministry of Defence, the UNDP Country Office, donors and other stakeholders. These discussions and a clear decision by the government should have been made well in advance of completion. With a clear decision on its future and an official mandate, AMAE would have been able to develop a clear transition plan with key partners for UXO hotspot clearance and mobilise the requisite international support well in advance.

**USING MINE ACTION CAPACITY TO SUPPORT DEMILITARISATION**

Albania’s 2006 Completion Plan stated:

“...In 2005 alone, there were 21 casualties from AXO throughout Albania. Since 2000, there have been 94 casualties as a result of AXO and, what is most relevant is that the trend is increasing. In this perspective, it can be considered that the capacities and methods already developed and currently used in the Kukës Province for the mine problem can be used for other areas of the country to deal with the remaining ERW threat.”

\(^{57}\) For example, according to US Department of State regulations, equipment purchased with US government funds could not be donated to the Albanian military.
While, on one hand, the plan provided clarity in regard to the remaining area being cleared, and gave a clear date for completion, it also clearly signalled that there was scope to use mine action capacity to address AXO/ammunition issues in Albania.

Prior to the March 2008 Gërdec ammunition depot explosions, no concrete discussions had taken place about using AMAE and/or mine action capacity in Albania to address wider security threats. In 2005, AMAE, with UNDP support, had carried out a countrywide data collection project of mine and AXO survivors, and was considering continuing and expanding its victim assistance programme after completion.

Although the problem of excess ammunition and the risks associated with unsafe storage in military depots were known prior to Gërdec, ammunition disposal and safe storage were regarded as strictly military issues. The widespread use and availability of small arms and light weapons in Albania was also well known.58 Despite this, no explicit efforts were made by the government or the UNDP to link AMAE and mine action more generally to wider armed violence reduction initiatives.

The UNDP, and more broadly, the international community could have mobilised efforts to make a strong case to the Ministry of Defence for using mine action capacity to support these activities, but failed to do so.

Gërdec was a turning point, and AMAE’s involvement in the response to the accident planted the seed for further discussions between AMAE, the UNDP, and eventually the Ministry of Defence – particularly given that there were further ammunition depot-related accidents following Gërdec. The involvement of AMAE, DCA, ALB-AID and ARC in the emergency response raised awareness within the government and among donors of the lack of coordination and EOD capacity within the AAF.

However, AMAE needed the support of Government, in particular the Ministry of Defence, to approve its expanded mandate, as well as confirmation of financial support from UNDP. AMAE lacked the political clout to advance these discussions on its own. While the UNDP was well positioned to push the government to clarify the future of AMAE, the focus of UNDP support in 2008 and 2009 was on assisting the government to complete its mine clearance obligations. The UNDP refrained from pushing the government to ensure that progress, on completion, was not jeopardised.

Furthermore, based on the findings of the 2007 evaluation, the government and the UNDP agreed to continue with the existing modalities. However, while the UNDP focused on supporting completion, it could have also, in parallel, pushed for clarity and a decision from the government on the future role of AMAE which would not have jeopardised progress on completion.

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58 The UNDP had a small arms and light weapons programme, which included a component on Weapons for Development, which was included the Kukës region.
Eventually UNDP BCPR responded to requests for support from AMAE and sent a team in mid-2010 to conduct an internal assessment of AMAE’s capacity to support ammunition disposal and hotspot clearance. The assessment team strongly supported a wider mandate for AMAE and provided AMAE with strategic options for achieving this transition. However, this advice came almost one full year after completion.59

Following the BCPR assessment mission, AMAE prepared a concept note outlining the rationale for using mine action capacity to support hotspot clearance and ammunition disposal.60 This was developed by AMAE and the UNDP Country Office, and was shared with the Ministry of Defence through the Chairman of AMAC and with the main mine action partners. It provided background on:

the main achievements of the mine action programme;

- AMAE’s potential future role with regards to hotspot clearance and ammunition disposal
- mine/ERW victim assistance
- risk education and community liaison
- institutional support
- AMAE’s main strengths

In early 2011, following the concept note, AMAE developed a brief implementation plan on the AMAE transition to hotspot clearance and ammunition disposal.61

The transition implementation plan recognises that AMAE’s mine action capacities;

“...along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course of the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarisation efforts including the hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Abandoned Unexploded Ordnance (AXO).”62

The plan outlines the scope for AMAE’s engagement, along with milestones/next steps to be undertaken by the UNDP to expand AMAE’s mandate. Specific milestones mentioned in the plan included AMAE integration with the Demilitarisation Programme and Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE. The transition implementation plan also includes revised Terms of Reference for core AMAE staff.

59 BCPR did not have the funds to support AMAE beyond March 2010. However, the UNDP Country Office was able to use leftover EU funds to keep AMAE operating until the end of 2010 (normal funding came to end in March 2010) and, in 2011, was able to support AMMCO with funds obtained through the One UN Fund.
60 AMAE. Concept Note: Albanian Mine Action Programme Transition, 2010.
61 AMAE. Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the hotspot clearance and ammunition destruction programme, 2011. See Annex 7 for a copy of the transition implementation plan.
62 AMAE, Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance and Ammunition Destruction Programme, 2011, p.1
However, the transition plan does not outline specific objectives, anticipated outputs and outcomes, or address the issues of AMMCO integration in government, phasing down of AMMCO operations or eventual closure.  

On 1 November 2011, almost two years after completion, the Ministry of Defence and the UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding that officially approved AMMCO’s new mandate (see Annex 5). The memorandum of understanding also confirmed in-kind contributions for hotspot clearance from the government in the form of explosives and MEDEVAC services for the clearance organisation’s teams. Completion of this transition has been slow and has met with delays as a result of difficulties getting Ministry of Defence approval, despite an official request from the Ministry of Defence to UNDP and its partners to use Albania’s mine action capacity to support the demilitarisation programme. The delay in getting Ministry of Defence approval partly reflected initial resistance to AMMCO’s involvement in ammunition disposal.

The Completion Initiative was successful in helping Albania access the resources needed to finish the job, but UNDP support at that time did not fully consider the wider role of AMAE. Even though completion was in sight by the end of 2006, little had been done by the UNDP to plan for the closure of AMAE or the expansion of its mandate. These discussions should have been anticipated and planned for well in advance as part of a well-conceived transition plan. Instead, little consideration was given on the potential to use mine action capacity to address a wider range of threats. Although the need for this form of assessment was highlighted in the 2007 UNDP evaluation, nothing took place until 2010, when the BCPR assessment took place and a transition plan was developed. The UNDP came through with funding for a reduced level of AMAE/AMMCO operating costs in 2011 and 2012, based on requests from the Ministry of Defence to use mine action capacity to support the demilitarisation programme.

A more detailed plan to guide the closure of the mine action programme and its transition to AMMCO developed in association with key stakeholders (UNDP, Ministry of Defence, donors), could have helped clarify the different options regarding AMAE’s future (eg closure vs AMMCO) at an earlier juncture, and the steps required to realise the transition. It could have also put pressure on the government and the UNDP to formally support the transition without jeopardising progress on completion.

Based on AMAE’s experiences, AMMCO should develop a detailed plan which addresses the issues of integration in government, phasing down operations and eventual closure.

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63 See Annex 11 for a copy of the transition implementation plan.

64 “A more technical assessment is required along with a thorough assessment of how AMAE as a mine action coordination body can transfer its skills and experience to the Ministry of Defence to assist in these issues, if this is what the government of Albania desires.” Evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, GICHD for UNDP, August 2007, p.36
KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

**INDIVIDUALS MATTER:** AMAE was fortunate to have a director who worked, with UNDP support, to recruit and retain a professional and committed team, draw upon the experience of international technical advisors and mobilise donor support. This resulted in a successful and well-respected mine action programme. His vision and drive, and the commitment and professionalism of his team, played key roles in AMAE’s transition to AMMCO.

**NATIONAL OWNERSHIP:** National ownership in mine action is a complex issue. What degree of national ownership is required? Should the mine action programme be integrated in government structures and run by a government body, even in countries with relatively small contamination problems?

In the context of Albania, it could be argued that the government had sufficient ownership to meet its Article 5 obligations. Having the UNDP manage AMAE was useful, as it helped safeguard mine action resources and capacity. In a context where weak governance and limited capacity are realities, the potential negative consequences of having AMAE based within the Ministry of Defence seemed to outweigh the positive, ie:

- AMAE would have been viewed as a government programme instead of a UNDP initiative.
- It may have prompted the government to increase its financial commitment to mine action.
- However, AMAE would have to operate under the MoD chain of command and be subject to greater turnover of staff, weak management and lack of capacity within the MoD. The risk of a diversion of resources for other Ministry of Defence priorities would have increased.
- It is likely that AMAE’s staff would have either left or risked being replaced.

**NATIONAL OWNERSHIP CAN TAKE MANY FORMS:** Ownership should not be defined simply as integration in government structures, although this is an important component. Albania is one of the few countries that had a contamination problem, established national structures to address the problem, harnessed international support to build its national capacity, developed realistic plans, and got the job done ahead of time and with a fully national team. Albania also made significant strides in putting in place sustainable systems and structures for physical and medical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and, more generally, for people with disabilities. AMAE remained a UNDP project implementation unit but it received sufficient government support and commitment to enable it to achieve all that it did.
• **INTEGRATION IN GOVERNMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY:** With the closure of the mine action programme and the transition of AMAE to AMMCO, the questions of national ownership and integration into the government remain. AMMCO’s future is at risk as long as it depends on the support of the UNDP and its partners for funding. A more sustainable solution is required; one that requires AMMCO to transition itself into government, be it as an independent government entity or as a unit within a department, despite the risks this may entail. Ultimately, if the government values AMMCO’s expertise, it will take the necessary means to secure its sustainability and effectiveness. AMMCO needs to develop a clear strategy that clarifies integration options, phasing down of operations and eventual closure.

• **PLANNING FOR CLOSURE:** At a certain point, it is important to start thinking about completion and closing down the programme. Phasing down operations should be based on a clear plan. For example, consider:

  o What will happen to the equipment and vehicles, taking into consideration the different donor regulations? What should be considered when closing regional offices, when terminating staff employment contracts, organising re-training and benefits? Who will take over the mine action database?
  o In regard to re-training and the re-integration needs of deminers, if there is a need to use mine action capacity to support armed violence reduction initiatives, then consider offering deminers the opportunity of technical training to contribute to these wider strategic programmes (e.g., EOD).
  o Are there actors beyond mine action, who could use and benefit from IMSMA? For example, consider sharing IMSMA with local and regional authorities to support development planning.

• **PLANNING FOR TRANSITION:** In the Albanian context, two main transitions took place – the closure of the mine action programme and the transition of AMAE to AMMCO, and the use of mine action capacity to support wider security issues. Neither took place according to well-developed transition plans, and both took place in a context of uncertainty about AMAE’s future. A clear transition plan, developed in consultation with key stakeholders can:

  o help provide clarity regarding various scenarios and the steps required to realise each
  o mobilise government and donor support
  o provide staff with greater clarity on their futures

• **UNDP SUPPORT FOR COMPLETION AND TRANSITION:** With support from the UNDP Completion Initiative, the capacity of AMAE was strengthened to the extent that by the end of 2007, the programme was nationalised, donor support remained, and completion of Albania’s Article 5 APMBC clearance obligations was

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65 See Annex 8 for a summary of DCA’s lessons learned from its pilot re-training and re-integration project.
met ahead of schedule – significant achievements. The Completion Initiative highlighted the need for a programme evaluation which, in 2007, recommended the need for a detailed plan to phase out the mine action programme. The Completion Initiative should have also included clearer guidance on programme exit and closure, or use of mine action capacity to support AVR programming. The UNDP BCPR internal assessment undertaken in 2010 provided useful strategic guidance to AMAE and the UNDP. However, it should have been conducted well in advance of completion to provide sufficient time for assessing the context, investigating different options and reflecting these in transition planning.

- **USING MINE ACTION CAPACITY TO SUPPORT ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION:** In some countries, mine action capacity can and should support wider programmes that focus on armed violence reduction (AVR) (peace building; small arms collection and destruction; ammunition disposal; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; physical security and stockpile management; community safety, etc). In Albania, there was a clear need for the capacity and expertise that had developed through the national mine action programme, and it was logical to make use of it, particularly after the closure of the mine action programme. Using mine action capacity to support AVR requires forward thinking, vision, and outreach. Conducting an assessment of the wider context can help identify opportunities and entry points.

**Box 2. Extract - Lessons learned in Albania by ITF, DCA and AMAE**

1. It is crucial for all stakeholders, national authorities and mine action centres, operators and donors to have a commonly defined vision and goal. Furthermore, results are to be assessed and discussed jointly as well as presented on regular basis.

2. National ‘ownership’ (of the programme) is very important for successful completion of clearance operations. When planning for national capacity building, the time framework, full commitment, clear benchmarks and sustainable funding need to be clearly defined from the start of the process.

3. Unlike some programmes, which close-down because of lack of funding or poor quality and/or insufficient programme value, the Albanian Mine Action Programme terminated only when the job was completed and Albania could be declared ‘mine free’. Nevertheless, even after this point there is a need for residual capacity dealing with potential EOD-calls, as well as for the structure that would be able coordinate this capacity.

4. The IMSMA database must be finalised before closing of the clearance operations as well as transferred to the most appropriate ministry or entity so that it can be readily available if information from the database is needed. This step should ideally be defined well in advance.

5. All staff should be informed of closure plans from the beginning and in a transparent manner. Staff should also be informed of any plans beyond clearance completion, if applicable.

6. During the last phases, operations must remain tightly controlled and monitored to prevent any

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66 International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, DCA and AMAE, Demining Albania, November 2009, p.19-20
7. Close liaison among the local Mine Action authority, operators and donors should be maintained to ensure a common understanding of the clearance process and progress. Equally (if not more) important is the communication and liaison with local communities. The communities need to be kept informed throughout the clearance operations as well as during the close-down phases. The need for the post clearance impact survey is of immense importance also to ensure that the land cleared and handed-over is indeed used thus proving the local population gained confidence and trusts the clearance efforts and operations executed.

8. Based on realistic planning, the concrete figures substantiated by results must be transparently and constantly presented to donors. This ensures continuous donor interest and re-affirms their belief in the joint vision for the mine (and cluster munitions) free Albania.

9. Advocacy efforts are crucial to ensure that focus is maintained on the remaining problem during the last years of clearance. If focus wavers there is always a threat that donors will slowly loose interest and shift their priority focus to other areas or regions, at a point when the contamination reduction is moving into the final stages.

10. Transparency of the use of donor funds through actual results achieved must be constantly fulfilled at all phases of a mine action programme.
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## ANNEX 1 – TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
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</table>
| 1999 | • Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC) founded  
      • AMAC establishes the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE)  
      • Survey undertaken by AAF and consultants commissioned by CARE International |
| 2000 | • Albania ratifies APMBC (February)  
      • RONCO begins demining operations under guidance of AMAC (June) |
| 2001 | • Stockpile destruction commences through NATO Partnership for Peace initiative (January)  
      • UNDP assessment of mine action in Albania (September) |
| 2002 | • UNDP Capacity Building project starts  
      • Stockpile destruction complete (April)  
      • National mine action planning workshop (June)  
      • National Mine Action Plan developed for 2003-2005  
      • DCA starts operations in Albania following the closure of its Kosovo programme |
| 2003 | • Swiss Operations Advisor starts (May) |
| 2004 | • UN provides Operations Advisor, CTA and UN volunteer for victim assistance  
      • FSD leaves due to lack of funding (March)  
      • HI leaves after fatal accident during training session in Kukës, leaving DCA as sole operator in Albania (May) |
| 2005 | • UNDP Technical Survey Project  
      • Rapid Rural Appraisal conducted by UNDP and AMAE in affected districts of Kukës |
| 2006 | • Revision of National Mine Action Strategy (August)  
| 2007 | • National Mine Action Legislation is adopted (June)  
      • UNDP Evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme; Evaluation finds that AMAE and UNDP did not make significant progress in obtaining commitment from the Government of Albania to integrate AMAE (August)  
      • AMAE Capacity Building completed and reduced international expertise (UNDP CTA/Programme Manager departs)  
      • Plans to establish National Clearance Capacity abandoned |
| 2008 | • Gërdec Ammunition depot explosion (March), AMAE and DCA involvement in rapid response, clearance and support to survivors; a turning point for AMAE  
| 2009 | • Albania completes APMBC Article 5 obligations, nine months ahead of scheduled deadline (November)  
      • Government announces Action Plan to deal with the problem of excess ammunition, however no decision taken on the future of AMAE |
| 2010 | • UNDP Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive and Transition Plan recommends the use of AMAE capacity to support wider demilitarisation, in particular involvement in monitoring and coordinating the clearance of UXO contamination resulting from unplanned ammunition depot explosions (September)  
      • Still no decision taken by the Government on the future of AMAE |
| 2011 | • Ministry of Defence and UNDP sign Memorandum of Understanding on 1 November which officially widens mandate of AMAE (renamed Albania Mines and Munitions Coordination Office - AMMCO) as coordination body for hotspots clearance  
      • AMMCO secures funding from UNDP Country Office until April 2012 |
| 2012 | • AMMCO secures UNDP BCPR pledge for funding beyond May 2012  
      • AMMCO initiates negotiations with the European Union on longer term funding |
- AMMCO remains UNDP project implementation unit; no decision taken by Government on integration of AMMCO in government

### ANNEX 2 – PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jonuz Kola</td>
<td>ALB-AID (formerly VMA)</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arian Starova</td>
<td>AMAC</td>
<td>Deputy Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arben Braha</td>
<td>AMAE</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliana Buzi</td>
<td>AMAE</td>
<td>Mine Action Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veri Dogianji</td>
<td>AMAE</td>
<td>Victim Assistance Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blerta Cani</td>
<td>ARDF</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Connell</td>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefano Calabreta</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Former UNDP CTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halil Radogoshi</td>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Systems Support Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry Brinkert</td>
<td>GICHD ISU</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramdeep Mtharu</td>
<td>GICHD ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edlira Sina and Dr. Tidita Abhurrahmani</td>
<td>Institute of Development of Education (formerly Institute of Curricula)</td>
<td>Specialist and Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregor Sancanin</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabina Beber Boltjančić</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Head of Department for International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emin Ferati and Leze Korbi and Fadil Shehu</td>
<td>Kukës Hospital</td>
<td>Director and staff from the Prosthetic workshop and Physiotherapy centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arben Kotobelli</td>
<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>Project Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eva Veble</td>
<td>NPA (formerly DCA)</td>
<td>Former DCA Mine Action Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shefqet Bruka</td>
<td>Regional Council, Kukës</td>
<td>Former Regional Councillor and AMAE QM Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franz Baer</td>
<td>Swiss Government</td>
<td>AMAE/AMMCO Operations Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanie Reimer</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Former Victim Assistance Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Malkaj</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP Cluster Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuben McCarthy</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Previously with UNDP BCPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murph McCloy</td>
<td>US Department of State</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
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ANNEX 3 - DEFINING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP IN THE MINE CLEARANCE CONTEXT

Cartagena Summit:
“The States Parties have come to recognise that strong national ownership is essential for ensuring that cooperation can flourish. Mine-affected States Parties themselves have remarked that national ownership in the clearance of anti-personnel mines and other explosive hazards implies, inter alia, the following five components:
(i) high level interest and leadership in fulfilling mine clearance obligations,
(ii) a national authority empowered and provided with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out its responsibilities,
(iii) a clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5 implementation challenge or a commitment to promptly acquire such an understanding,
(iv) a realistic but not unambitious plan to complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible and,
(v) a regular significant national financial commitment to the State’s own humanitarian demining programme.
It has been noted that, while the existence of these components will not guarantee that resources will flow in response to needs, demonstrating national ownership makes it significantly more likely that cooperation will flourish between those with needs and those in a position to provide assistance.”

Action 16 of the Cartagena Action Plan recommends that States Parties:
Take full national ownership of their Article 5 obligations by developing, implementing and regularly reviewing national mine action strategies and associated policies, plans, budget policies and legal frameworks, and inform the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies on their implementation.

At the June 2010 meetings of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Standing Committees, it was proposed that “national ownership in relation to victim assistance could comprise the following six elements:
a) a high level commitment to addressing the rights and needs of mine victims and other persons with disabilities
b) a national coordination mechanism empowered and provided with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out its responsibilities
c) a comprehensive plan and legislation to address the rights and needs of persons with disabilities including mine victims
d) a regular, significant commitment to implement the policy, plan and legislation and to provide services
e) capacity to implement the policy, plan and legislation or steps taken to acquire the resources necessary to build this capacity
f) a national focal entity for disability-related issues

ANNEX 4 – SUMMARY OF TRANSITION-RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 2007 UNDP EVALUATION

The following is brief summary of the key findings, recommendations and lessons learned identified in UNDP’s 2007 evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, which relate specifically to the issues of national ownership, transition, capacity development and programme closure.

• Develop a comprehensive detailed plan for the phase-out of the programme.

• Capacity development is more than training staff and establishing standards for the technical implementation of a program. Technical capacity and institutional capacity are very different and require different plans, approaches and skills. Management, including financial and institutional capacity development is equally important and more critical for the long term sustainability of the organisation or institution. It is good management that gains donor confidence more than technical capacity.

• National capacity development takes time, patience, commitment and sustainable funding.

• It is not essential to establish a national mine action centre for every programme. The size of the landmine problem, including its overall impact on the country and not just the region or regions where the landmines are located, should be factors in determining the structure and management of the programme. For example, if it takes three years for a national mine action centre to achieve a level where it is capable to manage the problem, and the remaining landmine problem requires just another three years, is it worth the time, effort and risk to establish the mine action centre as an autonomous agency to finish the job? At what point does striving towards a point when international advisors can be decreased or phased out become a distraction to finishing the job? At what point should the national government be held to ensuring the security of its people and required to take ownership of the mine action programme?

• Real government ownership of mine action and the affects of landmines will be demonstrated through long term sustainable support for landmine survivors through government structures, policies and new laws affecting people with disabilities.

• Long term capacity development and government ownership should be planned for during the emergency phase of a program. This may require a two-prong approach with different staff: one to implement the emergency phase and the other to plan for the long term stabilisation of the program with government ownership being the primary focus.

• Closing down a programme is the most difficult task of all. It is not easy and it is usually painful as staff morale plummets in such situations. Unlike some programs that close because donors stopped funding them or the program was of poor quality and value, the Albanian Mine Action Program can stand tall and leave knowing they did the job and made Albania mine free, and reduced new accidents and victims to zero and the programme closed because it was successful. Still, like a start up, closing a program needs a strategy and a plan.

• The database must be finalised before closing and it must be transferred to the most appropriate ministry or entity. One criterion for identifying a location for the database would be future ease of access.
• The programme can close out in phases and the close out plan should include tasks, dates and persons responsible.
ANNEX 5 - MOU BETWEEN UNDP AND MOD

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

&

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

FOR

BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALBANIAN UXO HOTSPOTS CLEARANCE AND AMMUNITION DISPOSAL PROGRAMME
This Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") is entered into by the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP"), a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an intergovernmental organization established by its Member States and the Albanian Ministry of Defence, UNDP and Ministry of Defence are hereinafter jointly referred to as the "Parties".

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION, the ratification by the Albanian Parliament, of the Ottawa Convention on “The Ban of Use, Storage, Production and Transfer of the anti-personnel mines and their destruction”, Law nr. 8547 date 11.11.1999 and the official request of the Minister of Defence, dated 6 December 2010 to UNDP for supporting the Government Demilitarization Programme and Hotspots Clearance in Albania.

WHEREAS, UNDP serves in many respects as the operational arm of the United Nations at the country level and works with partners in numerous countries to promote sustainable development, eradication of poverty, advancement of women, good governance and the rule of law.

WHEREAS, UNDP represented by Country Office is interested in enhancing its development activities in promoting human security.

WHEREAS, the Parties share similar missions and wish to cooperate in areas of mutual concern to enhance the effectiveness of their development efforts;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties agree to cooperate as follows:

Article I
Purpose

The purpose of this MOU is to provide a framework of cooperation and facilitate collaboration between the Parties, on a non-exclusive basis, in supporting the Government Demilitarization Programme and Hotspots Clearance in Albania based on the following:

Article II
Areas of Cooperation

Contribution of UNDP

Subject to availability of funding, the UNDP undertakes to contribute to the implementation of the UXO Hotspots Clearance and Demilitarization Programme in Albania in the following areas:

a. Support the Ministry of Defence through the Albanian Mine and Ammunition Coordination Office (AMMCO) to coordinate and monitor the UXO Hotspots Clearance operations in Albania.

b. Provide seed funding for the preparation and initiation of AMMCO activities.

c. Provide technical support through AMMCO in developing a humanitarian framework and standards for hotspots clearance and ammunition disposal.
d. Support the Demilitarization and Hotspots Clearance Programme by providing several equipment procured with funding from the European Union Delegation and other donors in framework of the Mine Action Programme.

e. Conduct the technical assessments of all declared ammunition hotspots throughout Albania and prepare an Action Plan for clearance.

**Contribution of the Albanian Government**

The Ministry of Defence undertakes to contribute to the implementation of the UXO Hotspots Clearance Programme in Albania in the following areas:

a. The Ministry of Defence through an order of the Chief of General Staff makes available the storages for the unexploded ammunition and their components collected during the clearance of hotspots. In addition, the Ministry of Defence through its EOD Specialists of the AMF Centre in the Logistics Brigade makes the disposal of such ammunition in the demolition ranges as designated by law.

b. Medical Evacuation service in the form of helicopter support by the Ministry of Defence, in case of accidents during UXO clearance or disposal operations in areas where the evacuation by vehicle of the injured requires a longer time than that determined by the International Humanitarian Standards.

**Operational procedures**

With regard to point (a) of Contribution of the Albanian Government, Article II above, the parties are responsible for the following:

- Storage of the ammunition collected in the hotspots will be made in the Armed Forces depots, designated for this purpose. Their transport to the approved demolition ranges will be made with vehicles of the Armed Forces.

- The disposal of such ammunition in the demolition ranges is made by the EOD experts of the AMF Centre in the Logistics Brigade;

- Disposal of the ammunition and their components, found by the clearance company in the hotspots but which are considered dangerous for transport, will be made by the EOD experts and the specialists of the clearance company, according to safety standards.

In regards to point (b) Contribution of the Albanian Government Article II above, the medical evacuation by helicopter will be provided by the Ministry of Defense upon request of the Albanian Mine and Ammunition Coordination Office (AMMCO).

- A separate document between the Air Forces Command and the Albanian Mine and Ammunition Coordination Office (AMMCO) will determine all technical details of this coordination.

The total value of contributions provided for in points (a), (b) of Contribution of the Albanian Government Article II above will be estimated by the Ministry of Defense and reported by the Albanian Mine and Ammunition Coordination Office (AMMCO) and UNDP as a contribution of the Albanian Government to the Demilitarization Programme.
Article III
Consultation and Exchange of Information

3.1 The Parties shall, on a regular basis, keep each other informed of and consult on matters of common interest, which in their opinion are likely to lead to mutual collaboration.

3.2 Consultation and exchange of information and documents under this Article shall be without prejudice to arrangements, which may be required to safeguard the confidential and restricted character of certain information and documents. Such arrangements will survive the termination of this MOU and of any agreements signed by the parties within the scope of this collaboration.

3.3 The Parties shall, at such intervals as deemed appropriate, convene meetings to review the progress of activities being carried out under the present MOU and to plan future activities.

3.4 The Parties may invite each other to send observers to meetings or conferences convened by them or under their auspices in which, in the opinion of either party, the other may have an interest. Invitations shall be subject to the procedures applicable to such meetings or conferences.

Article IV
Implementation of the MOU

4.1 In order to implement the specific activities envisioned hereunder, the Parties shall conclude cost-sharing contracts in accordance with the applicable UNDP regulations, rules and procedures, which shall specify the costs or expenses relating to the activity and how they are to be borne by the Parties. The cost-sharing contracts shall also include a provision incorporating by reference the MOU, which is applicable to the cost-sharing contracts and the projects/programmes financed therefrom.

4.2 It is understood that all activities will be carried out on the basis of a project document agreed between UNDP and the Ministry of Defence, and in accordance with the applicable UNDP regulations, rules and directives.

4.3 The costs of public relations activities relating to the partnership, that are not otherwise addressed by a specific cost-sharing contract concluded hereunder, will be the responsibility of Ministry of Defence.

4.4 Neither Party shall be an agent, representative or joint partner of the other Party. Neither Party shall enter into any contract or commitment on behalf of the other Party and shall be solely responsible for making all payments to and on behalf of its own account, as provided under this MOU and under cost-sharing contracts concluded hereunder.

4.5 Each Party shall be responsible for its acts and omissions in connection with this MOU and its implementation.
Article V
Visibility

The parties recognize that the cooperative arrangements should be publicized and therefore agree to acknowledge the role and contribution of each organization in all public information documentation relating to instances of such cooperation and use each organization's name and emblem in documentation related to the cooperation in accordance with the current policies of each organization and subject to prior written approval of each party.

Article VI
Term, Termination, Amendment

6.1 The proposed cooperation under this MOU is will commence on the date of its signature by both parties and is effective until 31 December 2013 (deadline set by the government for the completion of the Demilitarization Programme), unless terminated earlier by either party upon two months notice in writing to the other party. The Parties may agree to extend this MOU in writing for subsequent periods.

6.2 In the event of termination of the MOU, any cost-sharing contract, and any project document concluded pursuant to this MOU, may also be terminated in accordance with the termination provision contained in this memorandum. In such case, the Parties shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the activities carried out under the MOU, the cost-sharing contracts, and project document are brought to a prompt and orderly conclusion.

6.3 This MOU may be amended only by mutual written agreement of the Parties.

Article VII
Notices and Addresses

Any notice or request required or permitted to be given or made under this MOU shall be in writing. Such notice or request shall be deemed to have been duly given or made when it shall have been delivered by hand, certified mail, overnight courier, telex, or cable to the party to which it is required to be given or made at the address specified below or such other address as shall be hereafter notified.

For the Ministry of Defence

Arben IMAMI
Minister of Defence

For the UNDP Country Office

Zineb Touimi-Benjelloun
UN Resident Coordinator & UNDP Resident Representative
United Nations Development Programme in Albania
Article VIII
Miscellaneous

This MOU and the project document comprise the complete understanding of the Parties in respect of the subject matter in this MOU. Failure by either Party to enforce a provision of this MOU shall not constitute a waiver of that or any other provision of this MOU. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of this MOU shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision of the MOU.

Article IX
Entry into Force

This Memorandum is signed in Tirana on 01/11/2011, in two original copies, respectively in English and in Albanian language.

Signed for the
Ministry of Defence
Arben IMAMI

Signed for the
United Nations Development Programme
UN Resident Coordinator &
UNDP Resident Representative
Zineb Toumi-Benjelloun

01/11/2011
Date
01/11/2011
Date
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Country: Albania
Project Document

**Project Title:**
Coordination and monitoring of humanitarian mine action; UXO hotspot clearance in Albania – Albanian Mine Action and Ammunition Disposal - AMAD

**UNDP Outcome(s):**
Regional and local development strategies implemented with full participation of communities

Regional socio-economic growth increased through implementation of fiscal decentralization, private sector development, community participation and improved service delivery

Improvement in ammunition disposal standards, coordination and monitoring of hotspot clearance and CBOO disposal areas, community participation and expanded EAWAAO survivor assistance in particular to women, for enabling social re-integration and community cohesion

**Expected Output(s):**
(Those that will result from the project)

**Executing Entity:**
Albanian Mine and Munitions Coordinating Office – AMMCO (ex-AMME)

**Implementing Agencies:**
UNDP Albania

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**Brief Description:**
The present programme responds to the emerging priority of the Government of Albania on EAWAAO hotspot clearance and obsolete ammunition stockpile disposal. The proposed approach derives from the experience and national capacities built during almost a decade of implementation of the Albanian humanitarian mine action programme, led by UNDP. The main components of the present programme relate to upgrading disposal standards to international level, enhancing the demobilization framework to include civil community safety awareness and participation elements and broadening the current mine victim assistance scheme developed for the northeast to target all EAWAAO hotspots in Albania. The programme will also continue to provide technical assistance to the Government of Albania in complying with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention obligations, including any required expertise to successfully accomplish the rolling Presidency tasks to the Ninth Conference of Parties of the APMBT during 2011.

The programme has received seed funding from UNDP and will require partnerships and mobilization of additional resources for extending activities in 2012 and 2013, the government deadline for completing the disposal.

**Programme Period:** 2011-2013

**Total resources required:** 1,130,710 USD

**Total allocated resources:**
- Regular (UNDP) 284,620 USD
- Other:
  - Donor 124,020 USD
  - Government 160,000 USD

**Unfunded budget:** 539,060 USD

**In-kind Contributions (est.):** 260,000 USD

**Agreed by (Government):** [Signature]

**Agreed by (UNDP):** [Signature]
ANNEX 7 – AMAE TO AMMCO TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (EXTRACT)

Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance & Ammunition Destruction Programme

The Kosovo armed conflict of 1999 contributed to the land contamination of about 120 sq km along the Albanian northeast border with mines and cluster munitions.

The Government and the donor community have swiftly responded to this situation by backing the establishment and consolidation of adequate responsible institutional structure, Albanian Mine Action Executive- AMAE, capable of coordinating and monitoring a comprehensive humanitarian mine action programme in line with UN international standards.

The Government of Albania recognizes the crucial role that the United Nations Development Programme, with the support of the international community, has played to the successful implementation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, leading to remarkable achievements in mine clearance, victim assistance and mine risk education. It is mainly due to this support that Albania could proudly declare the country free of landmines and cluster munitions in November 2009, fulfilling in anticipation an important international commitment on demilitarization. In particular, we highly appreciate UNDP’s support in the development of sustainable capacities of the Albanian Mine Action Executive - AMAE through direct financial and technical assistance. UNDP Albania has played a lead role in developing and sustaining the above structure as well as in securing resources and partnerships and guiding the humanitarian demining programme progress until its successful end.

AMAE’s role has been critical for such an achievement, with a unique contribution to coordination and monitoring, adoption of quality assurance and quality management in the implementation of internationally recognized mine action standards as well as an exemplary partnership and resource mobilization strategy. These capacities along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course of the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarization efforts including the hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Abounded Unexploded Ordnance (AXO).

During its existence, AMAE has also established a broad international network and built the confidence through transparent reporting and effective coordination, established sound accreditation procedures and operated as a reliable national accreditation body for Mine Action, and also set up, with the support of GICHD, a unique information management system which has been already adapted to demilitarisation and hotspot clearance programmes.

In recognizing AMAE’s built capacities and experience to date, we believe that such capacities are very relevant and valuable to our current demilitarization priorities. As we are already aware, one of Albania’s current challenges is the disposal of a large stockpile of aging weapons and ammunition in possession of the Albanian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence has outlined a Plan of Action for Elimination of Excess Ammunition in the AAF with the aim to utilize national capacities to dispose of all surplus ammunition by 2013. Furthermore, the hot-spots contaminated with abandoned unexploded ammunition are identified as an additional threat, until these are cleared in compliance with relevant international standards.
To this purpose, in order to make the best use of AMAE’s technical expertise, equipment and infrastructure established with valuable donors’ funding and UNDP’s support, I would like to express our willing to engage this professional structure to contribute through a similar institutional arrangement and role, inclusive of its know-how in mine victim assistance and risk education/community liaison activities, in the area of hotspots clearance and ammunition disposal, so as to help ensure that these components are brought up and carried out in accordance with the International Humanitarian Standards.

Based on this experience, the strategic support and contribution to the ammunition stockpile destruction would contain the following components/tasks:

1. Review existing safety and quality standards for ammunition disposal and hotspots clearance and upgrade them to international standards
2. Develop an accreditation standard package for eventual private contractors seeking to operate OBOD ranges and hotspot areas;
3. Conduct a detailed technical assessment of the hotspots contaminated areas in order to prepare the relevant clearance plans;
4. Adopt mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of OBOD activities and hotspots clearance in assigned locations;
5. Develop adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local communities;
6. Expand existing mine action victim assistance programme to include and benefit nationwide ERW survivors for possible assistance schemes;
7. Establish a national database for mines/abandoned ammunition victims survivors throughout Albania;
8. Contribute in resource mobilization for ammunition stockpile destruction and hotspots clearance through furthering partnerships as well as by introducing best practice experiences through UN’s global network;
9. Support the Albania Government to fulfil its annual transparency reporting obligations under the various related Conventions;
10. Support the Albania Government to fulfil its Presidency role at the Tenth Meetings of States Parties to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention;

Milestones & Immediate next Steps

The following milestones indicate the next steps to be undertaken by UNDP CO for the involvement of AMAE in the national demilitarization plan along with extending its mandate in mine action during this extension period:

Milestone 1: AMAE Integration with Demilitarisation Programme
- UN Country Team meeting to discuss programme and collaboration.
- Donor meeting including the EC delegation to gauge interest and raise support for AMAE engagement in Demilitarisation Programme.
- Inclusion of AMAE in Demilitarization Committee of the MOD.
- Expand mandate of AMAC (or merge with National SALW Commission) in support of Demilitarization as inter-ministerial liaison body and support to Demilitarization Committee.
- Extend Government MOU with UNDP in mine action and revise to include Demilitarization.
- Draft PRODOC for signature with government and UNDP.
- Inclusion of Demilitarization in CPAP, UNDAF, and One UN Programme to promote human security and development.

Milestone 2: Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE.
- AMAE training in EOD, ammunition transportation and demolition, IMSMA V (MySQL).
- Follow up offers of in-kind assistance by Swiss government and others.
- Recruitment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Ammunition Specialist.
- New staff TOR to include EOD/ammunition, especially for QA officers
- Redeploy AMAE Kukës (IMSMA & equipments) to Tirana during the extension period.
✓ Activation of IMSMA V and development of Ammunition Module.
✓ Develop work plan and strategic goals for OBOD, hot-spots, standards development and quality management.
✓ Revise Community Liaison strategy, standards and procedures.
✓ Revise Risk Education messages, strategy, standards and procedures.
✓ Develop national OBOD and EOD accreditation and licensing standards, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.
✓ Develop national ammunition transportation and demolition standards, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.
✓ Develop QA/QC operating procedures, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.
ANNEX 8 - DCA’S LESSONS LEARNED FROM ITS PILOT RE-TRAINING AND RE-INTEGRATION PROJECT

The following are some of the key lessons learned by DCA from its pilot re-training and re-integration project implemented in Albania in 201069:

• There is a need to have an international specialist supervise a re-integration project, who must work full time on the project to ensure hands-on management in a continuous manner and smooth cooperation between all project stakeholders – both internal and external

• Planning with the target group needs to start 12 months prior to the close down of a program to ensure smooth transition between full-time employment and a sustainable re-integration effort

• Liaison with the key stakeholders should commence 9-12 months prior to the close down to ensure their needs are fully met

• It should be explored to combine generic skills training for the whole target group (e.g. household financial management, basic accounting) with an individualised, demand driven re-training program

• In order to ensure the timely availability of re-training courses to target group members, the initial re-training questionnaire should only include courses which are already on offer by a qualified re-training provider

• A demand drive re-training process should always be coupled with realistic employment prospects, supporting hands-on skills development and supplementary income generation potential within a relatively short timeframe

ANNEX 9 – SAMPLE TECHNICAL HOTSPOT ASSESSMENT

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF HOTSPOTS IN ALBANIA

Hotspot: Gjeroven (Berat)

Date of Assessment: 20 July 2011
Assessors: Arben Braha Director AMMCO
Franz Baer Senior Technical Advisor AMMCO/UNDP
AMMCO QA/QC Team

Geographical Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRID RP (Reference Point)</th>
<th>N APGD 447</th>
<th>F 19°55 962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRID RP Location</td>
<td>Gate to former AAF facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Height above Sea Level</td>
<td>120 m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Confirmed Hazard Area (CHA) Size</td>
<td>12,000 m². Area needs urgent attention and clearance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Suspected Hazard area (SHA) Must be determined with BAC Technical Survey (Sampling method)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used GPS</td>
<td>GPS GARMIN 62st</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point of Contact (POC)</td>
<td>Mr. Guri Velican, head of village, 060 320 16 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearest Village/Town</td>
<td>Gjeroven</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Berat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment¹</td>
<td>☐ low risk ☐ medium risk ☐ high risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio economic impact</td>
<td>☐ low ☐ medium ☐ high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority²</td>
<td>☐ low ☐ medium ☐ high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Cannot be determined at this stage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian victims related to the hotspot (as far known)</td>
<td>1 fatality, 5 injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map No</td>
<td>K-34-112-D-d (1:25'000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markings/Signification</td>
<td>No markings, place is freely accessible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

The area is very close to inhabited buildings and farming houses. The remains of the basements of the former Explosive Store Houses (ESH) are still well visible and accessible. At the time of the assessment, metal scrap collectors were encountered.
A lot of ammunition is scattered over a specific area and the mixed type of ammunition, fired projectiles (UXO) and density of the contamination leads to the assumption that considerable amounts of collected ammunition was dumped here.
Corroded, highly sensitive hand grenade fuses are scattered too over this area which makes the area not safe to enter.

The collection of scrap metal through civilians should stop immediately otherwise serious accidents are matter of luck and time. Metal scrap for selling is brought to the village and Berat town.

¹ Risk assessment is done by AMMCO and concerns only explosive containing items
² Priority setting is the task of the Albanian authorities and should be done after all hotspots assessments in Albania are concluded by respecting the risk assessment, socio economic impact and the political interests of the concerned hotspot areas.
1. History of the Hotspot
   During the uprising in Albania 1997, and on the 18 April 1997 there were a number of explosions on this ASS which resulted in the complete destruction of three ESH and created a UXO contamination of the surrounding area. The AAF surface cleared the area in 1999. The area is still contaminated with scattered ammunition; some are deep in the soft soil, making clearance a dangerous and time intensive job. Today, the ASS is abandoned and no signalization or marking are indicating a residual risk. Some former destroyed AAF buildings within the hotspot are used as hay stores or animal stables.

2. Description of the location
   The hotspot area lies close to the village Gjeroven and is located approx. 5.2 km from the Berat town centre. The area can be reached by driving from the Berat town centre direction west and crossing the bridge to pass the village Velabish. Following the road direction south leads to the village Gjeroven. The former ASS can be reached easily with a 4 WD car.

3. Access to the Hotspot
   The hotspot area can easily and safely be reached by 4 wheel drive cars. It is recommended to park the cars only on the road and to walk up to the destroyed ESH.

4. Establishing Admin Area
   There is enough suitable space and abandoned buildings to establish an admin area for the clearance of the hotspot.

5. Local Infrastructure
   The town Berat can provide accommodation, food and fuel supply.

6. Type of soil and vegetation
   The terrain is rocky and partially covered with impenetrable bushes, high grass and small trees. There are patches of soft soil too.

7. Live Ammunition found during assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition Type found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small arms ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenades &amp; fuzes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar 60/82/120 mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectiles fused/ unfuzed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Other Hazards
   No other specific hazards than explosive containing items may be present in the SHA, in unknown numbers.

9. Contamination level (samples randomly taken over the contaminated area)
   No samples were taken to determine the metal contamination level because the metal contamination is visibly high.
10. **Type of Clearance and Clearance requirements**
   The area needs urgent clearance of the CHA and afterwards an instrument assisted BAC of the SHA. A full excavation of parts of the hotspot area will be partially needed. Vegetation needs to be cut to provide access for operators.
   
   Permanent markings should be put on all access points to the former hotspot, making the civilians aware of the residual threat.

11. **MEDEVAC**
   MEDEVAC by road is possible to the nearest hospital in Berat.

12. **Clearance difficulties of the Gjroven hotspot**
   - steep hill sides, rocky terrain, rubble, iron containing minerals
   - parts of hardly accessible vegetation
   - presumably ammunition dumps, deep in the earth (full excavation)

13. **Other contamination than ammunition**
   There is no other known contamination than ammunition and explosive containing items.

14. **Beneficiaries**
   It’s obvious that the region of Gjroven is prosperous and new buildings construction can be observed close to the former hotspot. The land is well cultivated and it’s a matter of time until the hotspot area will be used permanently by civilians, is it for house construction, cattle grazing, cultivation or other activities.

15. **Infrastructure projects in planning after clearance**
   At the time of writing this report, more details about any investments are unknown to the assessment team.
ANNEX 10 – SAMPLE HOTSPOT SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT REPORT

SOCIO- ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF HOTSPOTS

Hotspot: Ura e Gjadrit/Mali i Rrezume (Shkoder)

Date of Assessment: 27 October 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Data</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Shkoder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Vau i Dejes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commune</td>
<td>Vig-Mnele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Mali i Rrezume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point of Contact</td>
<td>Mr. Mark Ngoci ; + 355 68 34 53 544 (head of Quarter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Sander Nikolli; 355 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Pjeter Lleshi ; +355 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic impact</td>
<td>Low Medium High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries</td>
<td>Direct: 380 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect : 2,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of casualties (Injured, Dead)</td>
<td>6 injured and two dead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Situation

Mali i Rrezume village is part of the Vig - Mnele Commune in the region of Shkoder. The distance from Vau i Dejes is around 5 kilometer and the road is new and in good condition. The village has around 380 inhabitants. There is no health post and medical personnel in the village.

The army depots have been located At Mali i Rrezume village where several types of ammunition had been stored. During the uprising in Albania in 1997, civilians looted the ammunition storage site of the village Mali i Rrezume. There were a number of explosions in 1997 at this army depot, which resulted in the complete destruction of the site and created a UXO contamination of the surrounding area. The AAF made a surface clearance of the area. Today the site contains still unexploded ordnance and remnants of ammunition, posing a real threat to local inhabitants. There is also a demolition pit within the area that needs to be cleared from any remnants of ammunition.

The hotspot area lies close to Gjadri riverbed. The area can be reached by driving through the town of Vau Dejes (Puka road) and then following direction Hajmeli and crossing the bridge of the river Gjadri. In the back of these basements lies a steep hill and another dirty road leads to a well visible stone quarry. This quarry is located well within the hazardous area. On the opposite site of these three basements, there is another basement, backed by a small hill.

In April 1997, there was an explosion in the army depots in Mali i Rrezume village. There have been accidents in the village in 1997; six injured people and two fatalities. Based on the filed
visits and contacts with local inhabitants and officials, not all the injured people are reported and registered in AMMCO database.

The Albanian Armed Forces conducted clearance during 1998-1999 within the areas of the military compound and the surrounding areas.

The locals confirmed that while digging in their land, they occasionally find items spread from the explosion. In addition, explosions are heard in case of fire in the surrounding areas of the army depots. Local inhabitants are currently searching for scrap metal in the army depots.

It is important to mention that there are no warnings signs or any billboard to just keep local inhabitants aware of the danger present in the zone.

The main incomes and employment opportunities in the village are from cultivating the land and animal husbandry. Emigration is common too. The arable field used by the inhabitants is considerable and the local inhabitants are trying to make use of every section of land in their possession. They are cultivating: maize, corn, etc and grazing the animals. The majority of the arable fields are accessed by irrigation water.

2. Further action and steps recommended

**2.1 Risk Education/Community Liaison:**

- Due to the very serious threat at this hotspot, a billboard with Risk Education messages should be installed immediately. Visible and accurate marking should be done

- Media materials should be produced and distributed to local people.

- Community meetings/liaison activities, collection of information from locals for the presence of ammunition in the area.

**2.2 Victim Assistance:**

- An in depth and detailed assessment should be made with survivors and their families, to identify and address their needs.

- Since the clearance company (DCA) will conduct clearance operations in the hotspot, the emergency and surgical capacities at Regional Hospital (either Lezha or Shkodra) need to be examined.

- Fill in the IMSMA form for any not reported incidents.
ANNEX 11 – AMAE TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance & Ammunition Destruction Programme

The Kosovo armed conflict of 1999 contributed to the land contamination of about 120 sq km along the Albanian northeast border with mines and cluster munitions. The Government and the donor community have swiftly responded to this situation by backing the establishment and consolidation of adequate responsible institutional structure, Albanian Mine Action Executive- AMAE, capable of coordinating and monitoring a comprehensive humanitarian mine action programme in line with UN international standards.

The Government of Albania recognizes the crucial role that the United Nations Development Programme, with the support of the international community, has played to the successful implementation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, leading to remarkable achievements in mine clearance, victim assistance and mine risk education. It is mainly due to this support that Albania could proudly declare the country free of landmines and cluster munitions in November 2009, fulfilling in anticipation an important international commitment on demilitarization. In particular, we highly appreciate UNDP’s support in the development of sustainable capacities of the Albanian Mine Action Executive - AMAE through direct financial and technical assistance. UNDP Albania has played a lead role in developing and sustaining the above structure as well as in securing resources and partnerships and guiding the humanitarian demining programme progress until its successful end.

AMAE’s role has been critical for such an achievement, with a unique contribution to coordination and monitoring, adoption of quality assurance and quality management in the implementation of internationally recognized mine action standards as well as an exemplary partnership and resource mobilization strategy. These capacities along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course of the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarization efforts including the hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Abounded Unexploded Ordnance (AXO).

During its existence, AMAE has also established a broad international network and built the confidence through transparent reporting and effective coordination, established sound accreditation procedures and operated as a reliable national accreditation body for Mine Action, and also set up, with the support of GICHD, a unique information management system which has been already adapted to demilitarisation and hotspot clearance programmes.

In recognizing AMAE’s built capacities and experience to date, we believe that such capacities are very relevant and valuable to our current demilitarization priorities. As we are already aware, one of Albania’s current challenges is the disposal of a large stockpile of aging weapons and ammunition in possession of the Albanian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence has outlined a Plan of Action for Elimination of Excess Ammunition in the AAF with the aim to utilize national capacities to dispose of all surplus ammunition by 2013. Furthermore, the hot-spots contaminated with abandoned unexploded ammunition are identified as an additional threat, until these are cleared in compliance with relevant international standards.

To this purpose, in order to make the best use of AMAE’s technical expertise, equipment and infrastructure established with valuable donors’ funding and UNDP’s support, I would like to express our
willing to engage this professional structure to contribute through a similar institutional arrangement and role, inclusive of its know-how in mine victim assistance and risk education/community liaison activities, in the area of hotspots clearance and ammunition disposal, so as to help ensure that these components are brought up and carried out in accordance with the International Humanitarian Standards. Based on this experience, the strategic support and contribution to the ammunition stockpile destruction would contain the following components/tasks:

1. Review existing safety and quality standards for ammunition disposal and hotspots clearance and upgrade them to international standards
2. Develop an accreditation standard package for eventual private contractors seeking to operate OBOD ranges and hotspot areas;
3. Conduct a detailed technical assessment of the hotspots contaminated areas in order to prepare the relevant clearance plans;
4. Adopt mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of OBOD activities and hotspots clearance in assigned locations;
5. Develop adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local communities;
6. Expand existing mine action victim assistance programme to include and benefit nationwide ERW survivors for possible assistance schemes;
7. Establish a national database for mines/ abandoned ammunition victims survivors throughout Albania;
8. Contribute in resource mobilization for ammunition stockpile destruction and hotspots clearance through furthering partnerships as well as by introducing best practice experiences through UN’s global network;
9. Support the Albania Government to fulfill its annual transparency reporting obligations under the various related Conventions;
10. Support the Albania Government to fulfill its Presidency role at the Tenth Meetings of States Parties to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention;

**Milestones & Immediate next Steps**
The following milestones indicate the next steps to be undertaken by UNDP CO for the involvement of AMAE in the national demilitarization plan along with extending its mandate in mine action during this extensions period:

**Milestone 1: AMAE Integration with Demilitarisation Programme**
- UN Country Team meeting to discuss programme and collaboration.
- Donor meeting including the EC delegation to gauge interest and raise support for AMAE engagement in Demilitarisation Programme.
- Inclusion of AMAE in Demilitarization Committee of the MOD.
- Expand mandate of AMAC (or merge with National SALW Commission) in support of Demilitarization as interministerial liaison body and support to Demilitarization Committee.
- Extend Government MOU with UNDP in mine action and revise to include Demilitarization.
- Draft PRODOC for signature with government and UNDP.
- Inclusion of Demilitarization in CPAP, UNDAF, and One UN Programme to promote human security and development.

**Milestone 2: Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE.**
- AMAE training in EOD, ammunition transportation and demolition, IMSMA V (MySQL).
- Follow up offers of in-kind assistance by Swiss government and others.
- Recruitment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Ammunition Specialist.
- New staff TOR to include EOD/ammunition, especially for QA officers
- Redeploy AMAE Kukes (IMSMA & equipments) to Tirana during the extension period.
• Activation of IMSMA V and development of Ammunition Module.
• Develop work plan and strategic goals for OBOD, hot-spots, standards development and quality management.
• Revise Community Liaison strategy, standards and procedures.
• Revise Risk Education messages, strategy, standards and procedures.
• Develop national OBOD and EOD accreditation and licensing standards, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.
• Develop national ammunition transportation and demolition standards, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.
• Develop QA/QC operating procedures, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.

In view of the above, an extension until the end of February 2011 would be beneficial to a proper conclusion and/or transition of this programme to most effectively benefit current country priorities.

In mine time we are finalizing the project proposal in order to obtain the bridge funds from UNDP BCPR (100,000 USD) were UNDP CO contribution is foreseen as the cost share to this project.
In consideration of the above reasons, we would appreciate receiving your concurrence and approval of such a request for extension.

Key Staff Terms of Reference

1. National Director and Project Manager
The AMAE Director is responsible to the AMAC Chairman for the execution of the following duties:
• Advise AMAC on International policy and assist in the formulation of a National Action Plan;
• Assist with and compile clearance and OBOD priorities and present them to AMAC for confirmation;
• Provide the secretariat for AMAC;
• Responsible for the formulation and execution of strategic and operational plans for AMAE.
• Co-ordinate and control all ERW/AXO clearance and OBOD Programme in Albania through the AMAE;
• Manage the AMAE in respect of all matters including personnel, information, planning, operations, standards, training, logistics and finances;
• Maintain the ERW/AXO information database on a daily basis;
• Compile monthly reports on ERW/AXO Action and reports on all visits regarding ERW/AXO Action activities for distribution to AMAC, UNDP and other interested parties;
• Provide accurate information to the press and media in consultation with AMAC;
• Provide advice, planning and relevant training to the AMAE personnel regarding ERW/AXO Action, RE, Victim Assistance, quality management and ERW/AXO surveys;
• Ensure through AMAE the quality management of all ERW/AXO Action in Albania;
• Liaison with the international community, local communities and all authorities regarding ERW/AXO Action;

The AMAE Manager will make no policy decision without consulting with UNDP CO and AMAC;

2. Programme Specialist
The Programme Specialist is responsible to the AMAE Director for the execution of the following duties:
• Provide support and advice in the establishment of reliable mechanisms for ensuring that ERW/AXO related information are processed through appropriate channels and eventually received by the AMAE IMSMA database.
• Drafting several plans, and related documents as required to support AMAE activities;
• Ensure all the necessary data for AMAE Management during the preparation of briefing documents for the resource mobilization;
• Collect and consolidate monthly reports on separate activities of the AMAE and the implementing partners;
• Prepare progress reports, briefings and presentations for various donors as required;
• Prepare the annual plans and reports for the Programme;
• Collect data and draft the report for the Albanian Government as required under Article 7 of the AP Mine Ban, Cluster Munitions and CCW Conventions;
• Support the AMAE Director in preparing the periodic reviews of the National Mine Action Portfolio (Victim Assistance/Risk Education and post clearance activities) and Ammunition destruction, Hotspot Clearance programmes;
• Support in preparing various project proposals for submission by AMAE to various international donors;
• Prepare briefing materials on the Programme as required by Government for participation/contribution to eventual international meetings/events.

3. Victim Assistance & Risk Education Coordinator
The Victim Assistance & Risk Education Coordinator is responsible to the AMAE Director for the execution of the following duties:
• The VA and RE Coordinator is an active member of the AMAE and coordinates and monitors all RE and VA activities conducted under this programme and implementing partners in Albania;
• Liaise and coordinate with other agencies, local authorities, and organizations for RE and VA activities in order to encourage synergies and avoid any overlap of project ideas;
• Provide regular updates to the RE and VA strategies for Albania;
• Contribute to the preparation of the National Standards and SOPs for the RE and VA components;
• Coordinate all RE and VA activities in Albania;
• Maintain a database of all Risk Education and Victim Assistance activities conducted in Albania by all agencies;
• Based on IMAS, provide appropriate guidance and standards for Risk Education and VA in Albania to implementing partners and coordinate their activities (ICRC, UNICEF, ITF, UNDP, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, MoLSAEO, National Trauma Center (and NPOC), Regional Hospitals, HI, ALB-AID and Albanian Red Cross);
• Participate in the monthly Coordination meetings and present a monthly summary of RE and VA activities;
• Ensure RE and VA organizations provide regular reports on their activities to the AMAE;
• Do advocacy and resource mobilization for RE and VA projects;
• Collect data and draft the report for the Albanian Government as required under respective articles of the AP Mine Ban, Cluster Munitions and CCW Conventions, in relation to the Victim Assistance.

4. IMSMA Specialist
The IMSMA Specialist is responsible to the Operations Officer for the execution of the following duties:
• Assist the establishment of the IMSMA capability and formulate a work plan for data gathering, entering, collation and dissemination of ERW/AXO & EOD information;
• Liaise with other agencies and NGOs regarding ERW/AXO clearance & EOD information and regularly update partner organizations in IMSMA and GIS matters;
• Prepare data, statistics and graphics to support reporting and recording requirements of AMAE, the Albanian Government, donors, and other clients with mine action related information;
• Assist in preparing task dossiers for all survey and clearance & EOD tasks in Albania;
• Secure and control the software in the AMAE Office;
• Adminstrate the IMSMA database/GIS component for the AMAE Office, including data entry, mapping, data quality and database back-up;
• Receive all system related reports and enter them into the IMSMA system along with preparing appropriate hard copy files;
• Generate reports, data sets, etc required to produce task dossiers for ERW/AXO clearance agencies as directed by operations;

5. Admin/Finance Assistant
Under the direct supervision AMAE Executive Director, the Admin/Finance Assistant will administer and execute processes and transactions ensuring high quality and accuracy of work. She will work in close collaboration with the UNDP CO to exchange information and ensure consistent service delivery. She will be responsible for project operational support in the area of Finance, Human Resources & Administration.

- Human Resources
  • monitor and keep record the attendance of project staff and annual leave, prepare the relevant monthly and annually attendance reports;
  • provide human resources services for benefits administration and social insurance, including preparation of the Requests for Contract for project staff and follow up for PO approval;
  • TA preparation for project staff, keep record in Atlas and follow up for PO approval;
  • Arrange appointments and assist in making travel arrangements;
  • Assist in the recruitment procedures processes, checking the conformity with the AMAE/UNDP rules and procedures;

- Finance
  • Prepare Request for Payments and ensure the supporting documents are available and in accordance with AMAE/UNDP rules;
  • Follow all financial and administration requirements for the recording and registering of all financial transactions as required by AMAE/UNDP regulations;
  • Prepare the draft of budget revision for the approval from AMAE Director and assist in the budgetary control;
  • Participate in drafting the new project work plan and reports;
  • Assist in preparing quarterly and annual work plans and budgets;
  • Prepare progress financial reports to be submitted to UNDP and donors;

- Administrative and Logistics
  • Prepare and assist in the preparation of relevant procurement procedures for goods and consultancy services, prepare bidding papers in accordance with UNDP requirements, including RFP, RFQ, Vacancy Announcement, Contract, arrange project procurement actions within the thresholds, monitor and process the data in Atlas for procurement (enter requisitions and follow up the payments);
  • Maintain a stock control and supply system for all office consumable items;
  • Ensure and make arrangements for the regular service and maintenance of all AMAE/UNDP vehicles. Certify work done, carry out quality check and control all relevant documentation including logbook and vehicle history files for all AMAE vehicles;
  • Ensure all logistical aspects of the AMAE Office are satisfied including the proper functioning of office utilities (e.g. electricity, water supply, etc.) and liaise with the landlord on all issues;
  • Control and secure all equipment of the AMAE Office are operational;
  • Maintain AMAE/UNDP Inventory records and report regularly to the AMAE Director & UNDP CO;
  • Maintain administration systems including a register and filing system for all incoming and outgoing correspondence at the AMAE Office;
  • Ensure fuel replenishment requisitions, vouchers and consumption;

6. AMAE Professional Driver
The Driver is responsible to the AMAE Administrative Officer for the execution of the duties contained in this TOR.
  • He will take direction from AMAE Director as required.
• Collects and delivers mail, pouches and other communications from and to government agencies, UN agencies and other institutions.

• Drives the office vehicle for the transport of authorized personnel and delivery and collection of mail, document and other items.

• Responsible for day to day and preventative maintenance of all AMAE vehicles and generators, checks oil, water, battery, brakes tires and perform minor repairs and arranges other repairs and ensures that the vehicle is kept clean.

• Advises on servicing schedule of all AMAE vehicles and generators and report any major faults.

• Logs all official trips, daily mileage, fuel consumption, oil changes, greasing, etc.

• Ensures that the steps required by the rules and regulations are taken in case of involvement in an accident.

• Any other tasks as requested by the Director AMAE or the Chief Technical Advisor.

• Perform all duties as directed in UNDP/AMAE rules and regulations.
ANNEX 12 – MAP OF UXO HOTSPOT CLEARANCE