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## **Explosive Ordnance Risk Education: Sector mapping and needs analysis**

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining  
*GICHD*

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# EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION

Sector mapping and needs analysis



The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) works towards reducing risks to communities stemming from explosive ordnance, with particular focus on mines, cluster munitions, other explosive remnants of war and ammunition storage. It does so by combining three distinct lines of service: field support focused on capacity development and advice, multilateral work focused on norms and standards, and research and development focused on cutting-edge solutions.

The GICHD is a core member of and serves as secretariat for the Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory Group (EORE AG). The Advisory Group draws on the expertise of over a dozen UN agencies, international organisations and international NGOs to provide overall guidance to the sector and identify ways to improve the integration, effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of EORE.

## **Acknowledgements**

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GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING  
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Sector Mapping and Needs Analysis  
GICHD, Geneva, November 2019  
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This report has been commissioned by the GICHD on behalf of the EORE AG to inform the development of an annual work plan for the AG. The analysis was conducted and report written by a team of external consultants. The GICHD facilitated a review process of the report by the members and observers of the EORE AG, on which basis the GICHD edited and finalised the report for publication. The views or opinions in the report result from this process and may not necessarily be considered representative of the GICHD.

The designation employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the GICHD concerning the legal status of any country, territory or armed group, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APMBC	Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
CPP	Conflict preparedness and protection
DCA	DanChurchAid
EO	Explosive ordnance
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	Explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
EWIPA	Explosive weapons in populated areas
FSD	Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GPC	Global protection cluster
HI	Humanity and Inclusion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross / Red Crescent
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
KAP[B]	Knowledge, attitudes, practices [and beliefs]
MA	Mine action
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MRE	Mine risk education
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NTS	Non-technical survey
RASB	Risk awareness and safer behaviour
RBM	Results-based management
RE	Risk education
SOP	Standard operating procedure

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The dramatic rise in the number of civilian casualties from explosive ordnance (EO) since 2013 has triggered a debate in the mine action (MA) sector about the effectiveness of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) (often shortened to risk education – RE). This rapid appraisal of EORE approaches, capacity, coordination and resources examines how the EORE sector is responding to new and emerging EO threats and violent operating environments to identify EORE good practices and potential needs. This report, based on document review and interviews with MA stakeholders conducted between mid-May and mid-June 2019, summarises the research findings:

### **Increase in number of EO casualties**

- The number of reported casualties from accidents with mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) rose from the lowest annual total of 3,353 in 2013 to the highest annual total of 9,437 in 2016.<sup>1</sup> Ongoing violent conflicts, the use of mines of an improvised nature and of explosive weapons in populated areas, and the displacement of civilian populations are thought to be largely responsible for the increase in casualties.

### **Lack of quality management, capacity and effective coordination for EORE**

- The mine action sector has established standards, procedures and guidelines for EORE that are widely accepted as good practice, although these are often outdated and not always translated into good practice implementation. There is space for improvement of quality management and capacity.
- The level of EORE expertise in mine action is difficult to assess but it seems to be insufficient. At the global level, the number of dedicated EORE staff has reduced. Most mine action organisations have focal points, and a few have dedicated technical experts at their headquarters to support EORE development and implementation and provide training to newly recruited staff. Organisations may also have in-country EORE focal points.
- Coordination among mine action actors and between its field-level implementation and its policy and strategic levels varies. Coordination between the mine action sector and other sectors is inconsistent and sometimes ineffective. Fragmented mandates, insecurity, and differences in operating permissions and in understandings of the importance of EORE on the ground among different actors, have exacerbated coordination difficulties.

### **Inadequate data and research to inform EORE**

- The quality of casualty and accident data, analysis and sharing is inconsistent and in some instances poor.
- Difficult operating contexts, lack of funding and capacity are hampering the development of the sector's ability to collect data and information about EORE needs and impact. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and impact assessments of EORE often provide only limited insights into its effectiveness.

### **Violent conflict a challenge for EORE**

- Mine action actors are increasingly operating in complex violent conflict environments so have had to adopt more rigorous conflict sensitivity and security procedures.

- Conflict environments have led to mine action organisations training staff to deliver EORE through Skype and WhatsApp and to remote management or monitoring of staff and partners. Measures have been introduced to provide quality control, although it is accepted that maintenance of standards is more difficult without direct implementation or oversight.
- The use of mines of an improvised nature, EO contamination of urban areas, and how and when to provide EORE to displaced populations, continue to pose a dilemma to stakeholders about how to support affected populations while ensuring that their interventions do no harm.

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<sup>1</sup> International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 2018

## KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

This report is an initial stocktake of the EORE sector and provides an overview of the current needs of the sector. Further discussion and research are needed to inform the development of EORE. The following recommendations are aimed at the Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory Group (EORE AG). It is believed that the Group could and should make a tangible contribution to improving EORE.

### Quality management

- Develop an evidence base and plan to improve overall quality, capacity and professionalism in the sector to address outstanding challenges, especially in relation to EORE in conflict settings; promote guiding principles, good practice approaches and implementation of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS); to strengthen qualitative and quantitative research skills; and agree on terminology and scope of EORE. The development of this plan should enable the EORE AG to identify priorities and to take action to address gaps. This might include, for example, establishing smaller working groups, commissioning further external research or engaging with other sectors such as health, education and protection to learn from their good practices.
- Address training needs, for instance by:
  - Increasing the number of UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) EORE courses offered annually, and hold them in different locations that are accessible to all relevant staff, including national staff;
  - As part of the UNICEF EORE course, dedicating time to qualitative and quantitative research methodologies drawing on the UNICEF-GICHD MRE guidebooks;
  - Determining whether an EORE online certification course would add value and, if so, agreeing how to proceed.
- Consider developing an online repository of key mine action EORE documents, guiding principles and good practice materials which can be accessed worldwide. Ensure that documents are properly categorised and archived and can easily be downloaded by those with poor Internet access.
- Provide more systematic opportunities for the sharing and discussion, as a sector, of examples of good practice and of new and innovative approaches, including digital communication and technology, and M&E and impact assessment methodologies.

### Policy and advocacy

- Develop an advocacy strategy to strengthen the knowledge of and the interest towards EORE among key stakeholders, decision makers and donors inside and outside the mine action (MA) sector.
- Strengthen understanding, knowledge of and investment in EORE beyond mine action actors by engaging with the broader protection sector and in the explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) discussion.
- Promote EORE at every States Parties meeting including at the upcoming 4<sup>th</sup> Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019, and continue to use side events as a tool to address key EORE challenges and to raise its profile.



- Advocate for the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action and the Global Protection Cluster to ensure that protection of civilians from EO, and EORE, are included in national development plans, humanitarian needs overviews, humanitarian response plans and regional response plans (this is a precondition for receiving funding in some instances).

### **Coordination and cooperation**

- Clarify roles and responsibilities among UN entities for EORE and strengthen human resources accordingly.
- Use existing coordination structures effectively and strengthen them where necessary.
- Establish mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of technical expertise on EORE to facilitate implementation at local and national levels and ensure consistency and information sharing at the regional level.

### **Data and reporting**

- Improve and standardise victim data and accident data collection at the country level to assist national mine action centres (NMAC) and operators in the design of future EORE programmes.
- Review how to demonstrate the global effectiveness of EORE, including its role in protection by recording activities, using M&E frameworks and identifying outcome indicators or qualitative methodologies to provide these insights. Explore whether Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) data can be aggregated to raise the profile and relevance of EORE and, if so, how.
- Use *Mine Action Review* and *Landmine Monitor* as tools to ensure global reporting and analysis of global EORE activities and progress.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Rationale

The number of civilians killed and injured annually by explosive ordnance has increased significantly since the lowest recorded rate in 2013. The increase is blamed on a number of factors including the growth in the use of mines of an improvised nature by non-state actors, ongoing complex conflicts with shifting front lines and multiple actors including transnational armed groups, contamination of urban areas with explosive ordnance and use of EWIPA, large-scale population displacement, the blurring of humanitarian and military space and lack of humanitarian access to civilians affected by conflict.

The rise in the number of casualties has triggered debate in the mine action sector about the effectiveness of mine action, including explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). Risk education is one of the five pillars of mine action but some in the sector are questioning whether it has been neglected. Consequently, the sector is undertaking a number of initiatives aimed at improving EORE to determine whether current practices and resources are an appropriate response to the new and emerging challenges. As such, this report was commissioned by the GICHD with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to address two key questions:

- What is the current status of EORE capacities, implementation and coordination, and what are the current expected needs?
- What do we know already about the effectiveness of EORE methods, tools and approaches and are there specific methods, tools and approaches that show particular promise for responding to current and emerging threats?

## 1.2 Approach and methodology

Research for the analysis was conducted between May and July 2019 by a team of external consultants through document review and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders to provide insights into EORE policy, strategy, coordination and implementation at the global, regional, national and local levels. To examine the emerging threats and challenges to the mine action sector and delivery of EORE, the research focuses on the issues identified during the document review and by respondents as the most pertinent. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in person and via Skype and, to gather a range of perspectives, included a variety of stakeholders from United Nations entities, research organisations, local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and national mine action authorities. This approach enables information to be triangulated and to provide analysis from the global to the local level.

The content of the report has been validated by the EORE AG. The EORE AG was launched in May 2019 to provide overall guidance and identify ways to improve the integration, effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of EORE within the mine action sector and beyond. It is co-chaired by UNICEF and a rotating NGO representative (currently the Mines Advisory Group – MAG) and counts over a dozen members.<sup>2</sup> Represented organisations were able to contribute to the validation process of the findings and recommendations through a virtual validation meeting held on 9 July 2019 and / or through written comments.

Overall, this report provides insights into the current effectiveness of EORE, the capacities to deliver EORE, and expected needs. It is not a comprehensive review or evaluation of the mine action sector's EORE management and programming; rather, it is an initial stocktake contributing to the sector's ongoing examination of risk education. Where time constraints have prevented the research necessary to reach firm conclusions, recommendations include areas that require further discussion or research. As this was designed to be a rapid assessment, the GICHD regrets that more respondents from local NGOs and national authorities could not be consulted. It is therefore strongly recommended that the inclusion of such actors be prioritised in future discussions and research.

### **1.3 Note on terminology**

This report uses the term explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), often shortened to risk education (RE), rather than the traditional mine action term, mine risk education (MRE). This is because the nature of explosive hazards is changing and is broader than landmines – although, in reality, MRE has usually included a range of explosive devices. However, it should be noted that many key mine action documents refer to MRE and many stakeholders continue to use the term risk education, or have developed their own terminology which they believe describes their risk education activities more accurately. For consistency reasons, use of the term EORE has been maintained throughout this report, including in reference to activities otherwise referred to as MRE / RE, with the exception of instances where other terminology is quoted from official documents, standards or policies.

The IMAS define explosive ordnance as including “mines, cluster munitions, unexploded ordnance, abandoned ordnance, booby traps [sic], other devices (as defined by CCW APII), [and] improvised explosive devices”.<sup>3</sup> There have been extensive discussions among mine action stakeholders regarding when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) fall within the scope of mine action. The fact is that IEDs are being used in ongoing conflicts and as such the decision to engage in activities to mitigate the threat posed by IEDs to civilians could potentially compromise the neutrality of humanitarian actors. It has been agreed that IEDs fall within mine action's response if IEDs meet “the definition of mines, booby-traps or other devices ...[and] when their clearance is undertaken for humanitarian purposes and in areas where active hostilities have EXPL<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Current core members are DCA, Danish Demining Group, FSD, GICHD, The HALO Trust, HI, International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition, MAG, NPA, UNDP, UNICEF and UNMAS. In addition, IOM and UNHCR are associate members, and ICRC participates as an observer.

<sup>3</sup> IMAS, 04.10, 3.99

<sup>4</sup> IMAS, 04.10, 3.99

## 2. EORE IMPLEMENTATION AT POLICY LEVEL

### 2.1 Implementation challenges

Respondents to this study consider EORE a highly relevant tool in most scenarios to protect civilians from explosive ordnance. Risk education is one of the five pillars of mine action defined in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and addressed specifically in the Maputo Action Plan. Yet despite its historically central role in MA, and widespread recognition among respondents of its importance, EORE has been neglected by the mine action sector for the last decade. EORE has received limited attention, resources and donor funding in recent years. The steady global decrease of mine victims and the fact that MA operators often have “mainstreamed” their EORE capacities into clearance, non-technical survey and / or community liaison teams are factors that the respondents mentioned as having contributed to this situation.

#### 2.1.1 A need for increased global leadership

There are numerous excellent examples of good and relevant EORE projects ongoing in a number of countries and organisations, and there are highly qualified and dedicated EORE experts within a number of organisations. Nevertheless, most, if not all, respondents agree that the MRE pillar of mine action has stagnated and seen limited progress and innovation, in comparison with the other mine action pillars. Few organisations shared having a policy or clear strategy related to their EORE work. An illustration of the change that has occurred is the development seen within UNICEF. UNICEF, as the global lead on EORE, had in September 2006, an estimated 12 full-time MA international specialists in the field, while in 2019 there are no full-time international MA experts in the field. At UNICEF HQ level there were three full-time MA internationals (and a number of MA consultants) in 2006, while there is one member of international staff in 2019 covering both MA and the emerging EWIPA agenda. This decrease of international expertise is, according to UNICEF, counterbalanced by an increase of MA capacity among national staff. EORE is now fully infused in child protection programming, therefore MA is no longer a distinct function within UNICEF despite its leading role in the sector.<sup>5</sup>

Global leadership from a technical perspective was also provided by the GICHD in the past. Up until 2010, it had an advisor working on EORE, ensuring continuous development within this pillar of mine action, but in more recent years this capacity was not sustained, reinforcing the leadership gap at the global level. However, in the new GICHD Strategy (2019-2022) it seems that the GICHD is committed to re-engaging on this subject. The intermediate outcome of the strategy states: “Risks from explosive ordnance are reduced through greater clarity on the extent of explosive hazards, more efficient hazard removal, and enhanced resilience to these hazards.” EORE is seen as integral to building the resilience of people and communities, and as such the GICHD has created two new positions fully dedicated to EORE.

#### 2.1.2 Weak information management and reporting

Another issue that significantly hampers the EORE community is the mine action sector’s limited ability to present accurate and reliable aggregated data on EO victims, accident-related data and risk education activities. A system like IMSMA Core has the capability to store and present the data, however the EORE community lacks commonly agreed standard definitions and in-country systems to systematically, consistently and transparently report these basic data. *Landmine Monitor* has had to stop tracking EORE activities due to lack of reliable data on activities and

outcomes from the field – another unfortunate sign that has strengthened the impression of EORE as a topic of the past. The *Landmine Monitor* still collects data on mine / ERW victims, but it depends on quality data from the field.

It is also unclear why no major concern has been formally raised within the framework of the two disarmament conventions, the APMBC and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), regarding the lack of and / or poor reporting on risk education, especially when risk education is explicitly mentioned as a treaty obligation.

Without reliable data it is difficult for States Parties, and others, to have a proper discussion about the needs, effects and relevance of EORE. Ultimately, this also hampers funding opportunities for EORE; as many of the respondents have pointed out, the effectiveness of EORE is difficult to measure. To find good indicators related to preventive actions (“counting something that has not happened”) is difficult, and a factor for the poor reporting.

### **2.1.3 More dedicated individuals are needed to lead the way**

Unlike the rest of mine action, the EORE pillar has a relatively high rate of turnover compared to other sectors and pillars of MA, resulting in the loss of expertise that could otherwise secure EORE development and innovation. When people with the necessary experience and authority do remain in the sector, the organisations that they represent do not always have the resources required to invest in developing the EORE pillar further. The consequences are particularly visible at the global and regional levels as they hamper coordination, cooperation, innovation and standardisation. EORE has been merged into most organisations’ M&E, non-technical survey (NTS), victim assistance (VA) and / or community liaison capacities (or as seen with UNICEF, into child protection). With a few exceptions, organisations do not have dedicated EORE resources at headquarters level anymore. The EORE community suffers, therefore, from a lack of strong and visible EORE champions that can lead the way to ensure evolution.

### **2.1.4 EORE as an integral part of the protection agenda**

Effective EORE, and in general the response to protection challenges, must be cross-sectorial. Complex and longer-lasting crises in an increasingly urban setting have strengthened the need for a wide range of protection measures, including EORE. In addition, a record number of people are forcefully displaced, over 70 million according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with different protection needs.<sup>6</sup> Protecting large groups of people as they flee, resettle or return is another major challenge for the EORE community. To protect civilians effectively from explosive ordnance, the MA sector has to engage with the wider protection community. For example, many of the traditional MA actors, as well as UN agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), have engaged in the EWIPA campaign. In 2018, Action on Armed Violence recorded 32,110 deaths and injuries from the use of explosive weapons around the world. As with previous years, civilians bore the burden of this explosive violence. Of those harmed, 70 percent were reported to be civilians – 22,342.<sup>7</sup> Landmines, cluster munition remnants and other ERW constituted only a third of these casualties.

The UN is strengthening its mine action protection agenda. The 2019-2023 UN Mine Action Strategy states: “MA is about protection of people and communities from the threat and impact of explosive ordnance”. EORE is addressed in one of three intermediate outcomes (“Ability of individuals, communities and national institutions to reduce the risk of EO is enhanced”), as well as under the strategic outcome one (“Protection of individuals and communities from the risks and socio-economic impacts of EO strengthened”, followed up with two EORE related outputs).

Questions have been raised as to whether more EORE resources are needed within the UN to meet these ambitious objectives.

A GICHD-UN Development Programme (UNDP) 2017 study titled *Leaving No One Behind: Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)* has also brought the MA community closer to the broader humanitarian and development sector in common efforts to achieve the 2030 SDGs. The study found that 12 of the 17 SDGs are “of direct relevance to mine action” and that mine action contributes to the achievement of 4 others. The report on the study further included guidance for policy and decision makers to mainstream mine action in broader sustainable development.

### **2.1.5 MA and EORE needs demystifying – breaking down the “silos”**

Despite the importance of the protection agenda for EORE, one non-mine action respondent stated that MA is not discussed at Global Protection Cluster (GPC) meetings or other high-level UN meetings because, “Every organisation is aware of the danger of EO to civilians and to their beneficiaries, but MA is seen as a very technical matter and a subject better left to the experts.” It seems that external actors have basic knowledge of mine action and its relevance, but do not understand how to (or have the will to) engage with the sector. If EORE is to be effective and included in overall plans, the sector has to be present and vocal at these strategic meetings and learn to interact with the broader protection sector.

The same message also applies within the mine action sector. There are a number of respondents that indicated that potentially there are “silos” or two distinct groups of experts within the MA sector: experts in clearance / explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and those engaged in VA, EORE and community liaison. To be able to utilise the EORE team to its full potential there has to be a close partnership and understanding among the two groups of experts. EORE is a vital part of operations and will require highly skilled and experienced persons to be effective.

### **2.1.6 The lack of aggregated EORE data**

The global reported casualty rate from mines / ERW has risen dramatically from the lowest recorded rate of 3,353 in 2013<sup>8</sup> to the highest recorded rates of 6,967 in 2015,<sup>9</sup> 9,437 in 2016 and 7,239 in 2017.<sup>10</sup> The sharp increase in casualties is attributed to the use of mines of an improvised nature (which were reported to account for 2,716 casualties in 2017) and ongoing violent conflict in several countries including Afghanistan and Syria (which accounted for over half the casualties in 2017).<sup>11</sup> It has long been known that men and boys form the majority of casualties – case in point, 84 percent of recorded child casualties in 2017 were boys. Other vulnerable groups include those who are displaced because they lack local knowledge about the EO threat, socio-economically vulnerable groups who are forced to take risks to survive, and children whose natural curiosity overrides caution.

Casualty figures and accident data are used by EORE providers to design and target their EORE activities to identify the most at-risk groups and prioritise the most severely affected areas. Ongoing conflict makes it highly challenging to collect accurate data and the sector widely believes that there is under reporting. Even in stable environments there can be under reporting because victims die alone in remote areas, poor infrastructure makes reporting difficult, or a lack of trust in the authorities results in a reluctance to report such incidents. Similarly, for security reasons, accidents among members of non-state armed groups are unlikely to be reported and military casualty numbers are not always publicised. Security concerns and reluctance to cooperate means that casualty data collected by mine action stakeholders is not always shared.

The lack of accurate and detailed data impedes the effective design of EORE interventions, but, in such situations, this is where EORE is often most needed. Its delivery is necessary for the development of accurate data which can be collected from affected populations once they are sensitised to the threat and apprised of the reporting mechanisms.

### **2.1.7 Innovation**

The MA sector is a fairly small and transparent sector, highly technical with rigorous procedures, systems and structures. People tend to stay in the MA sector for years, and regular meetings make it easy to get a good overview of the capacities of the sector.<sup>12</sup> Development of standards and methods occurs regularly in a fairly transparent and inclusive manner. However, this description is less true for the EORE community; here the picture is less clear and it is not obvious to see where the technical capacities of the EORE community are, how they are trained (capacity building) or how they work to develop EORE from a technical perspective (tools, methods).

That said, development occurs where there are resources and when the context requires innovation. Countries in conflict are the biggest financial recipients of EORE-related funding and it is here where innovation and competence on EORE are found. However, it seems that innovation and good practice remain in the organisations and in the programmes where these methods and tools are developed. As a recent study by the International Committee of the Red Cross / Red Crescent (ICRC) highlights on digital applications in EORE, there is a lot of “ad-hoc” innovation ongoing in the field among EORE operators in the field – innovation and good practices that should have been shared and discussed among practitioners for the benefit of the whole sector.<sup>13</sup>

### **2.1.8 The absence of dedicated funding for EORE – a changing situation?**

The above, slightly critical and discouraging description of the EORE pillar might now be proven wrong. The MA sector is witnessing a renewed focus on EORE, a pillar of mine action that has been neglected in recent years. The most obvious and notable reason for this renewed focus is donors’ growing awareness of the disturbing increase in global mine victim numbers. Norway, for instance, has outlined in its newly published humanitarian strategy document that “Norway will increase its focus on protection in situations of crisis and conflict. Special priority will be given to the protection of women, children and young people, as well as to the protection of civilians against mines and other explosives.”

It is also a fact that MA operators are now more often called upon to work in or close to armed conflicts, humanitarian crises and in complex stabilisation contexts (for example Libya, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Myanmar, etc.) than in the past. In many of these conflicts, EORE has become a natural entry point for MA actors – a central component of the initial response and, in some instances, the only possible activity. With it follows a realisation that clearance is not always the solution in a short- to medium-term perspective. There is a realisation or awareness in the sector that a broader and more holistic approach is required. It is obvious that complex humanitarian crises require an integrated approach and closer coordination between the various actors and initiatives, as seen in Syria.

The sector, in particular the EORE community, has a unique opportunity now to raise its profile and prove its relevance to the traditional MA community / donors, as well as to the protection sector. To be able to explore these potential new funding streams, the EORE sector needs to raise awareness among donors (a possible core task for the EORE AG) that EORE might be the best approach to protect civilians from explosive ordnance in an emergency phase, as a stand-

alone activity or as an integral part of a wider humanitarian response. It has been suggested that EORE needs to be included in humanitarian needs overviews (HNOs), UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children appeals, and subsequently in humanitarian response plans (HRPs). This will raise the visibility of mine action and can help organisations raise funds. According to a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) report, key donors such as DFID or ECHO are unlikely to fund humanitarian projects that are outside the HRP.<sup>14</sup> Being mentioned in the HRP can also help organisations to access humanitarian pooled funds, in particular country-based pooled funds and the Central Emergency Response Fund, according to the same report.

Another funding opportunity that has not been properly explored is States' obligations mentioned in the disarmament conventions. The VA community has been very active flagging States Parties' treaty obligations to address VA and thereby drawing funding and attention to VA. The EORE community has not used the treaties and the States Parties' obligations to promote risk education in the same way. Risk education is an integral part of the APMBC, both under Article 6 on international cooperation and assistance (Articles 6.3 and 6.7), but equally important under Article 7 on transparency measures. Article 7.1 states that every State Party shall report on "The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5." Similar language can be found in the CCM and in the CCW APII reporting requirements as well. The EORE AG could be the voice of the EORE community at informal and formal meetings of States Parties. Another opportunity for the EORE community to become more political and visible is to join the EWIPA campaign as described below.

Linked to the above, the MA sector has become more mature and most of the operators are slowly taking a more holistic approach to protection such as the Danish Demining Group in West Africa, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in Gaza / Syria and UNICEF in Yemen. These initiatives provide new funding opportunities outside the traditional MA funding stream. For example, NPA, as an implementing partner under the Norwegian Refugee Council in Myanmar, received funding from ECHO to teach EORE and survival skills derived from NPA's conflict preparedness and protection (CPP) to civilians affected by conflict.

## **2.2 Coordination**

Coordination implies that, under some kind of leadership and control, resources and activities are used as efficiently as possible in a pursuit of an overall agreed and known goal where the different actors have defined responsibilities or roles.

At operational level, the respondents see limited value in global EORE coordination. Effective coordination of country programmes occurs primarily at national level. However, during humanitarian crises or conflicts with large cross-border population movements, respondents welcome stronger regional coordination. This is especially true for EORE, as displaced populations are particularly vulnerable and often identified as a priority for EORE.

At technical level, global leadership is highly welcomed and, according to respondents, clearly needed. It is commonly agreed that, over the last decade, the sector has seen very limited coordinated efforts to develop and improve approaches, methods and tools. Developments occur within each and every organisation and mainly at country level, so institutional development is limited.



At policy level, opportunities to promote EORE in relevant global and regional decision-making forums are missed, according to the respondents. It is notable that EORE is absent from the traditional MA policy and advocacy arenas. Up until very recently, EORE has been seldom addressed at States Parties meetings nor at National Directors Meetings, partly because few, if any, EORE experts attend these meetings. Facts, statistics and updated aggregated information highlighting the results and needs of EORE is vital for good advocacy work. When the *Landmine Monitor* stopped collecting and reporting on EORE activities, the sector lost a global overview of ongoing EORE-related activities at an aggregated level, and, equally concerning is the lack of information about the needs for or effects of EORE. In combination with weak victim data, the situation is challenging for EORE advocacy work to reach the media, politicians and donors.

As mentioned in an UNMAS report, within the wider protection community EORE actors should lobby UN Resident Representatives, Humanitarian Coordinators, Protection Cluster Coordinators, Protection Cluster members, Humanitarian Country Teams and inter-cluster working groups to raise awareness of the impact of explosive ordnance and raise the profile of mine action in the Humanitarian Programme Cycle and with the humanitarian community.<sup>15</sup>

For EORE specifically it is difficult to find any single existing global or regional coordination mechanism that covers all the above needs for coordination. However, there are a number of useful arenas with the potential to improve cooperation, interaction and information sharing among EORE stakeholders. This section provides further details on some of these forums.

### **2.2.1 Meetings related to the APMBC and CCM frameworks**

Both these important disarmament treaties are tools that encourage cooperation and information sharing, including on EORE given its inclusion in both convention texts.<sup>16</sup> During a typical year, three meetings are held in the framework of these conventions: a Meeting of States Parties for each of the two treaties and an intersessional meeting for the APMBC. These meetings provide a useful arena, including through side events, where operators, national authorities and affected states can discuss topics of mutual interest, and as such they represent a unique opportunity to discuss the implementation of EORE under the conventions. States Parties have EORE reporting requirements, as stated in Article 7 of the CCM: “The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control”. The newly established EORE AG could take the advocacy / policy lead on behalf of the EORE sector in these meetings.

### **2.2.2 National Directors Meeting**

The International Meeting of Mine Action National Programme Directors and United Nations Advisers (NDM) in Geneva is another annual event that brings together all the mine action practitioners. It is an important forum where EORE could and should be discussed, as the agenda is based on inputs from the whole UN family and the rest of the MA community. The NDM is a technical meeting so UNMAS, UNICEF, the GICHD and the EORE AG could collectively ensure that relevant EORE technical challenges or innovations are presented and discussed at these meetings.

### **2.2.3 UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action**

The UN has established an Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action. It consists of twelve UN agencies: The Department of Peacekeeping Operations / UNMAS (Chair), OCHA, OHCHR, UNODA, FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, UN-Women, WFP and WHO, as well as UNIDIR and the World Bank in an observer capacity.

This is an internal UN coordination mechanism at strategic level. It is the responsibility of UNICEF and UNMAS to bring EORE to the table when useful / relevant.

#### **2.2.4 Global Protection Cluster (GPC)**

The mechanism to ensure that mine action engages with the wider protection sector is the GPC.<sup>17</sup> The GPC coordinates and provides global-level inter-agency policy advice and guidance on the implementation of the cluster approach to Protection Clusters in the field.

UNHCR is the Global Cluster Lead for Protection and, in this capacity, has the responsibility to lead and coordinate other United Nations agencies, inter-governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations participating within the GPC. The GPC is not an entity that coordinates MA or the EORE response on the ground. Few mine action actors who were interviewed cited the GPC as relevant to EORE; nevertheless, it seems to be a very useful arena to strengthen interaction with the wider protection sector as well as its core actors. It also has the potential to be a tool that can promote MA and EORE as a core activity and response in humanitarian response plans.

#### **2.2.5 The Global Protection Sub-Cluster: Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR)**

The GPC has established four sub-clusters with specific areas of responsibility: Child Protection (UNICEF); Gender-based Violence (UNFPA); Land, Housing and Property (NRC); and Mine Action which is co-chaired by UNMAS and Humanity and Inclusion (HI). The MA AoR is the main global coordination mechanism where EORE can be addressed; however, most of the respondents struggled to see benefits from the MA AoR's work at global level on the implementation of their EORE programmes. While most traditional MA actors are members of the MA AoR, few seem to be active participants. That said, it is perceived as a relevant arena for information sharing and less of a coordination body (as discussed in more depth below), and no respondents suggested establishing a new coordination mechanism at this level. It is the responsibility of the organisations represented at MA AoR meetings to promote EORE and to use the GPC mechanism to raise EORE considerations in broader discussions and response plans when relevant.

#### **2.2.6 Regional coordination**

Traditionally, the MA sector has limited experience of addressing an EO threat from a regional perspective. However, there are obvious reasons to strengthen regional and sub-regional coordination when addressing cross-border humanitarian crises, especially if the conflict leads to migration and / or spill-over of hostilities into neighbouring countries. In these instances, multiple countries face the same threat and challenges, and a regional response has the potential to significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the intervention.

UNHCR seems to be the natural body for a coordinated regional response when refugees are involved. However, at a technical level, the EORE community must establish its own mechanism under the cluster structure or potentially as a sub-EORE AG to ensure technical cooperation and sharing of experiences across borders.

#### **2.2.7 In-country coordination**

MA, including EORE, is first and foremost a national authority responsibility. In most countries with functional governmental structures, EORE is coordinated by the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA; usually an inter-ministerial board). EORE typically involves a number of

ministries, such as the Ministry of Education and Ministry of the Interior, and its EORE messaging and approach need the NMAA endorsement.

The day-to-day supervision and coordination of EORE is typically delegated by the NMAA to the national mine action centre (NMAC). The NMAC may accredit EORE operators, approve messaging and conduct quality assurance of the EORE actors' activities. Most NMACs require operators to report on their EORE activities, and countries like Afghanistan require all MA operators to undertake EORE activities within their area of operations.

Most actors find existing in-country coordination mechanisms to be appropriate. It is the NMAC and / or the operators' responsibility to promote and establish EORE working groups if needed, to improve quality and efficiency. In contrast to clearance (where the actors are relatively few and well known), in EORE there are normally a large variety of national actors and equally many different approaches to EORE. Therefore, EORE coordination at country level is seen as particularly important.

### **2.2.8 Sample case: the Syrian crisis**

The complexity and the political sensitivity of the Syrian crisis is a good illustration of the challenges with coordination and cooperation across borders. In December 2018, United Nations agencies and NGO partners released the latest Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) 2019-2020, a USD 5.5 billion plan designed to support national efforts to host refugees from Syria in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq to deal with the continued impact of the Syrian crisis. Co-led by UNHCR and UNDP, the 3RP offers a strategic, coordination, planning, advocacy and programming platform for humanitarian and development partners to respond to the Syrian crisis at the regional level and in host countries. It comprises one regional plan, with five stand-alone country chapters covering Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. EORE is not addressed in the 3RP documents so as to avoid being seen as promoting return, with the unfortunate consequence that limited actions have been taken to provide Syrian refugees with relevant EORE.

The 3RP, the whole of Syria approach, the GPC, the Mine Action Sub-Clusters (MASC) are all plans and mechanisms to ensure a holistic and coordinated response. Additionally, Durable Solutions Working Groups (DSWG) – which exist at both regional and national level, convened by UNHCR – promote greater coordination with respect to refugees specifically. UNICEF, UNMAS, UNDP, UNHCR and OCHA are all supporting MA and EORE, in addition to national authorities in refugee hosting countries and numerous international organisations, international and national NGOs, commercial actors and various military forces. The challenge in such a complex environment is to ensure clear oversight and understanding of who is doing what, where and under what mandate.

The EORE AG can potentially assist in identifying gaps and clarifying and advising on the roles and responsibilities for EORE of the various actors involved in the Syria response, to maximise the effectiveness of existing coordination mechanisms (without creating duplicate or parallel structures). For example, under the joint leadership of UNDP, the Lebanese Mine Action Center, UNICEF and the GICHD, a first regional EORE workshop was held in Lebanon in April 2019 to initiate a more coordinated response to the Syrian crisis from an EORE perspective. UNHCR committed to follow up this initiative by convening an ad-hoc EORE technical working group under the regional DSWG to develop common EORE messages, frameworks and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the Syrian refugee population.

### 2.2.8 Role of the EORE AG

As described above, the sector has many coordination mechanisms to address the challenges related to EORE. However, the EORE AG has the potential to fill some of the gaps and improve coordination and cooperation in a number of areas. The following is what the respondents want from the newly established EORE AG:

- Not a talking shop but a platform where ideas and good practices can be exchanged and solutions to challenges explored that address problems at the implementation level, as well as at the levels of policymaking and strategy development;
- To raise the profile of EORE by representing EORE and the sector at a high level to States Parties of the APMBC and CCM, UN member states, mine-affected states and donors;
- To raise the profile of EORE among the Global Protection Cluster and ensure EORE is integrated into regional response plans and humanitarian response plans; and
- To enable stakeholders to identify synergies and complementarities to facilitate coordination at the implementation level.

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<sup>5</sup> Figures provided by Hugues Laurence, UNICEF, via email

<sup>6</sup> UNHCR, 2019

<sup>7</sup> AOA, 2019: 3

<sup>8</sup> ICBL-CMC, 2016

<sup>9</sup> ICBL-CMC, 2017

<sup>10</sup> ICBL-CMC, 2018

<sup>11</sup> ICBL-CMC, 2018

<sup>12</sup> Meetings of States Parties to the CCM and APMBC (and Intersessional Meetings), National Directors Meeting, etc.

<sup>13</sup> Sørensen with Walton, 2018

<sup>14</sup> Marzi, Abdo and Bishara, 2018

<sup>15</sup> Marzi, Abdo and Bishara 2018

<sup>16</sup> Art. 4 of the CCM and Art. 6 of the APMBC

<sup>17</sup> [www.globalprotectioncluster.org](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org)

## 3. IMPLEMENTING EORE

Risk education has been developed over the last three decades, and there are standards and approaches that are widely considered to be appropriate and effective, so these are not discussed in detail. Instead, the following sections focus on the issues that the document review or respondents identified as the most critical to current operations, particularly in conflict-affected countries.

### 3.1 Standards, capacity and delivering quality

#### 3.1.1 IMAS and guidelines

There is an IMAS (12.10) for mine risk education which respondents consider appropriate.<sup>18</sup> IMAS 12.10 was reviewed and updated in 2018 to include EORE language and EORE for IEDs. At the time of writing (June 2019) IMAS 12.10 is in the final stages of editing before being published.

In response to the increasing IED threat, a first version of a technical note has been developed for risk education for IEDs.<sup>19</sup> The key issues raised are the possibility that provision of RE for IEDs puts humanitarian actors and those in receipt of RE at risk when IEDs are being used in ongoing conflict. Those providing RE may be seen as allying themselves against the groups using IEDs, and those in receipt of RE may also be assumed to be taking sides or revealing the location of devices which groups consider their property and to be an important resource in their conflict. The technical note stresses the importance of conflict sensitivity and to 'do no harm', although the definition of do no harm seems narrow and inappropriate within the content of the technical note.

Another issue raised by the technical note is the difficulty in developing appropriate messaging for explosive ordnance assembled from everyday objects. It suggests focusing on promoting safer behaviour and observation to identify whether anything seems out of place. Although all respondents agreed that the messages are not necessarily substantially different for IEDs from other EO, there was a feeling that the sector has not yet found the right wording or images. The technical note contains some guideline questions for the gathering of information needed to analyse the context and nature of the EO threat. This IMAS note is still in development and the extensive consultation and review processes should help to produce standards that inform EORE responses to mines of an improvised nature.

To supplement the IMAS RE standards, UNICEF and the GICHD have developed a series of guidebooks.<sup>20</sup> Although published in 2005, much of the content is still useful, guiding the reader through the entire project cycle management for RE, its different aspects and approaches including a variety of research methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, for assessing need, monitoring progress and assessing impact. The guides are not prescriptive and provide the processes and tools for developing good quality RE programmes. It is beyond the time available for this report to assess them in detail, but they could be reissued without changes to the content in a more user-friendly online format. Currently, all 12 guides appear in one document of over 750 pages which is difficult to navigate. The guides are available individually on a website but this has proved difficult to find. The 12 guides consist of:

1. An Introduction to Mine Risk Education
2. Data Collection and Needs Assessment

3. Planning
4. Public Information Dissemination
5. Education and Training
6. Community Mine Action Liaison
7. Monitoring
8. Evaluation
9. Emergency Mine Risk Education
10. Coordination
11. The Collected IMAS on Mine Risk Education
12. Glossary of Terms and Resources

In 2009, UNICEF and the GICHD also produced training modules for these guidebooks intended to be used by those with previous training experience. They are generic so have to be adapted to specific contexts and provide ideas for activities. They include:

- Needs Assessment for Risk Education (for use with guidebook 2)
- Planning for Risk Education (for use with guidebook 3)
- Communication for Risk Education (for use with guidebooks 4 and 5)
- Community Liaison (for use with guidebook 6)
- Monitoring Risk Education (for use with guidebook 7)
- Emergency Mine Risk Education (for use with guidebook 8)
- Coordination of Risk Education (for use with guidebook 10)

IMAS 12.10 is used by national mine action authorities as the basis for National Mine Action Standards on RE. The international NGOs that shared relevant documents have comprehensive guidelines and SOPs for EORE that have either been recently revised or are being revised. EORE is usually integrated with community liaison and other aspects of mine action, and this is reflected in NGO guidelines and SOPs.

### **3.1.2 Quality management**

An IMAS has also been developed for quality management in mine action which includes mine risk education. This IMAS advocates for evidence-based decision-making and lists the standards and processes for each pillar of mine action throughout the project cycle. The IMAS serves as a useful checklist to determine whether an organisation has a quality management culture and identifies areas for improvement.<sup>21</sup> However, it is insufficient to improve the quality management of EORE and would have to be supplemented with other materials or technical support if organisations identified gaps in their quality management.

### **3.1.3 Guiding principles**

In addition to international standards, mine action is also implemented according to guiding principles. Organisations and programmes can adopt many different guiding principles depending on their operating context and objectives. Below are those that are fundamental and constant to mine action.

## **Humanitarian principles**

The humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality underpin mine action. To reinforce these principles within an organisation's culture and practices, mine action actors can voluntarily follow the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS). CHS sets out nine commitments which humanitarian organisations make to crisis-affected populations along with criteria to assess adherence to these commitments, with the objective of improving quality and accountability.<sup>22</sup>

## **Gender and diversity**

Mine action programmes must consider and meet the needs of different gender and diverse groups – including persons with disabilities and different ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds. The UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes include principles for designing and delivering gender-sensitive RE.<sup>23</sup> Consultation of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and related documentation provide insights into mine action's RE obligations to these groups. Context analysis and consultations with relevant stakeholders provide insights into the demographic composition of the population to be included in the provision of EORE to inform its design and implementation.

## **Do no harm and conflict sensitivity**

An organisation pursues the guiding principles to 'do no harm' and is conflict sensitive when it understands its operating context and the potential interactions between its activities and its operating context, so that it can avoid exacerbating the conflict, putting its own staff and the participant population at risk, and maximise the positive impacts of its activities.<sup>24</sup> Mine action and EORE should always be conducted in a conflict-sensitive manner because, although there may not be visible violent conflict or widespread conflict, there could be latent or localised conflict. Mine action organisations are reporting that, because of their current operating environments and the fact that some are providing EORE on IEDs or are clearing mines of an improvised nature, the need to be conflict sensitive is greater than before.

### **3.1.4 Capacity**

It has not been possible to determine the EORE capacity of the mine action sector in terms of numbers of EORE staff, their level of expertise and experience and geographical coverage. All mine action stakeholders seem to have some EORE capacity, and many mine action NGOs implement EORE through dedicated teams and / or multiskilled teams that undertake other aspects of mine action including community liaison, data collection, NTS and EOD. Most international NGOs seem to have a focal point, and a few have dedicated advisors at their headquarters or regional office to provide additional support and a lead for EORE in country. Some respondents felt that their organisations lacked EORE expertise, citing lack of funding. The numbers of staff delivering EORE was also often considered too small, particularly in areas of ongoing conflict and large amounts of contamination. UN entities and the ICRC, in cooperation with national societies, also provide EORE, whilst international organisations often partner with local NGOs with EORE capacity. EORE may also be provided by the police, security services, schoolteachers, religious leaders and volunteers, with the support of the national mine action authorities and various ministries such as health, education and social affairs.

### **3.1.5 Qualifications and training**

There are no specific qualifications required for EORE staff and, until UNICEF developed a course in 2017, there were no specific EORE qualifications available for EORE. In the past, many among

the international mine action staff taught themselves EORE. Today, most international NGOs seem to have developed their own training packages and provide EORE training to their own staff. Some international NGOs have dedicated EORE training, while others include EORE as part of broader initial training when joining the organisation. The extent of the training and level of internal expertise varies among the international NGOs, and some felt that their organisation's internal expertise could be improved. The management and development of risk education in country depends on the individual organisation. Some have dedicated EORE staff; others have staff that combine EORE with other responsibilities.

Most organisations say that they have written EORE standards, guidelines and training and, in some cases, these were shared as part of this study. These documents appear to be comprehensive and cover the key components of EORE, good practices and guiding principles. The scope of the documents depends on the approach each organisation adopts for EORE and the role it plays in their programming.

Training is provided to in-country staff on the specific methodologies to be used for particular projects and locations. Training usually takes place over several days and some of the training manuals recommend refresher training. EORE teams are accredited by the national authorities in some but not all countries before deploying.

UNICEF has been offering, on an annual basis, the courses Effective Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (formerly known as Effective Mine Risk Education) since 2017 and Integrated Mine Action since 2016, which have been well received. Anecdotal evidence from respondents suggests that participants are generally positive about the courses and find them useful, and feedback collected after the Effective MRE workshop in 2018 was good, with average numerical ratings from the 21 participants ranging from 7.7 to over 9 out of 10 for the various elements of the workshop.<sup>25</sup> Participants have different expertise and expectations from the workshops so not all elements are universally relevant or useful. It might be difficult to revise the workshops to please everyone.

The Effective EORE course runs for nine days and is aimed at mine action officials and practitioners from mine-affected countries, and officials from mine action agencies in donor countries. It is certified by UNICEF and the Swiss Armed Forces and is compliant with IMAS and UN results-based management (RBM) standards. The course covers the multiple roles of EORE, as well as how to plan, implement, and monitor and evaluate EORE. To date, 49 people have attended the course which has focused on raising the quality of EORE among UN entities, international NGOs and the ICRC. The number of places available is relatively small, and respondents believed it would be beneficial to increase the number of places available and the number of times each year the course is offered. Respondents suggested opening the course to implementing partners and running them in different locations to facilitate logistics and visa access.

The five-day Integrated Mine Action course, although not specifically focused on EORE, is important to understanding how the different aspects of mine action, including EORE, complement each other. The workshop aims to promote the practical and strategic linkages between EORE and the other pillars of mine action.

In the absence of widely available qualifications, certification or standard training for EORE, it has been suggested that an online training course could be developed. Respondents were cautious about this suggestion, fearing that it could become either a meaningless tick-box exercise or



overly prescriptive guidelines resulting in a loss of innovation and ability to tailor EORE to a specific context. However, some respondents thought that online training would be useful if it helps to raise standards by offering a grounding in the skills necessary to design and deliver effective EORE, including guiding principles and research methodologies. The proposed online certification course requires further discussion within the EORE AG.

### **3.1.6 International Mine Risk Education Working Group**

The International Mine Risk Education Working Group consists of around 350 members and is managed by UNICEF. Members can exchange and disseminate information via email about emerging issues in risk education, events, research and good practice. Membership is open to UN and non-UN staff and acts as a digital forum for debate and information sharing among its members as well as providing an opportunity for members to request help. There is no hierarchy and it offers equal access to national and international staff.

### **3.1.7 Conclusions**

EORE is provided by a range of international and national organisations, regulated through standards at international and national levels and guided by agreed operating procedures among mine action stakeholders and within individual organisations. Documentation to inform the effective development and implementation of EORE exists. However, it is unclear whether all organisations conducting EORE possess the expertise or human resources to translate written standards into good practice implementation. In other words, there is a lack of quality management in EORE. One respondent stated that, unless there are dedicated staff with the relevant expertise to take responsibility for EORE, and the time to understand the standards and guidelines and manage EORE implementation accordingly, there will not be effective high-quality EORE. Overall, respondents seem to feel that appropriate standards and guidelines exist at least at a global level; the challenge is to translate these to the national level and to secure funding and relevant capacity for effective EORE training and quality management within the sector.

## **3.2 Methods, tools and approaches**

The objective of risk education is to reduce the “risk of death and injury” from EO by “raising awareness and promoting safe behaviour...to recreate an environment where economic and social development can occur free from the constraints imposed by contamination”.<sup>26</sup> EORE is delivered in various formats through direct presentations and participatory methods, media campaigns, and, in recent years, through social media and digital communication. EORE is implemented directly by the mine action sector or indirectly by partnering with local NGOs, recruiting community-based volunteers and integrating EORE into school curricula. Organisations with extensive EO clearance capacity see EORE as essential to the effectiveness of their overall operations and rarely conduct EORE in isolation. Exceptions to this might include emergency situations, contexts where other mine action activities are restricted, or in preparation for establishing their organisation in a new country or area. Organisations with broader humanitarian and development objectives often regard EORE as part of protection and promoting safer behaviour or resilience to hazards. Such organisations were more likely to have stand-alone EORE activities or EORE activities integrated with other safety training such as first aid.

In addition to reducing the risk of death and injury, EORE is important for the successful execution of other mine action activities because it provides a legitimate entry point to communities and helps to establish trust and build relationships. The combination of trust and sensitisation to the threats posed by EO improves reporting of contamination and the sector’s understanding of how

the population is affected by the contamination. This information facilitates the planning and prioritisation of survey and clearance, and prioritisation and design of EORE, to ensure it reaches and is appropriate to the most at-risk groups. EORE also helps to identify why civilians are vulnerable to explosive ordnance. It can be because they lack appropriate knowledge about contaminated areas or safe behaviour, which is something that EORE can address, or because individuals are forced to adopt unsafe behaviour to survive and access resources in contaminated areas, or because recovery of metals and explosives from explosive ordnance provides a livelihood. In these latter cases, the solutions may be beyond the scope of the mine action sector, but the information can be shared to inform the focus and design of interventions by other sectors to help reduce the impact of the contamination.

Below is a brief overview of some EORE approaches, highlighting contextual issues and some more detailed discussions of some of the innovations and good practices identified through the literature review and discussions with respondents.

### **3.2.1 Team composition**

There is no standard composition for teams delivering EORE among affected populations. EORE performs different roles for different organisations in different contexts so team composition is adapted accordingly. EORE is often integrated into multiskilled teams that perform community liaison, NTS or EOD tasks. Gender balance is important, as are teams comprising individuals from appropriate ethnic, religious or other demographic groups to ensure that teams are appropriate, credible and can access and communicate with affected populations without causing tensions and be accepted. In Libya, DanChurchAid (DCA) has two all-female teams who were previously teachers or university staff. They can access women and men and are good at communicating with all age groups because of their professional backgrounds. In Afghanistan, to achieve a gender balance, community liaison and EORE teams often comprise male and female relatives because it is socially acceptable for them to work and travel together. These mixed teams can access men and women in affected communities.

### **3.2.2 Delivery of EORE: opportunities and key moments**

EORE is delivered directly through presentations to affected populations through local meetings, door-to-door visits and schools, and indirectly through a variety of printed materials, radio and television broadcasts and, more recently, to a limited extent, through social media. Training is provided to teachers, volunteers and community focal points as well as implementing partners so that they are able to deliver EORE. Despite the multitude of methods and the fact that large numbers can be reached through mass leafleting and media campaigns, the mine action sector generally prefers direct face-to-face presentations as a means of delivering EORE. This is because the interaction between the person or team delivering EORE, and the participants, enables misconceptions to be corrected and to determine how well the messages are understood. It also facilitates community liaison and other aspects of mine action.

It is important to identify a suitable time and place for the delivery of EORE sessions which is convenient for the intended participants. Logistical challenges and security concerns can make this difficult as EORE teams might be restricted to certain areas or be limited in the time they can spend outside a secure area. It is important to ensure that all at-risk members of the population can attend. For example, agricultural workers spend most of their time labouring so they can be difficult to locate, and women and girls, because of traditional attitudes in many contexts and responsibilities for the home and family, can be restricted in their ability to attend EORE sessions.

It is generally thought that, as women are usually the primary caregivers, they have more opportunity to ensure that their children have the relevant information about EO contamination.

Opportunities and key moments have to be identified for delivering EORE and it is necessary to be innovative. Use of remote messaging might be necessary. In Syria, for example, EORE posters have been pasted to water tankers and EORE has been integrated within internally displaced person (IDP) reception centres, within food / non-food item packages and within gender-based violence, child protection and education programming. In several countries, EORE teams visit health clinics and provide information to parents (it is usually mothers) and children while they are waiting, or EORE is provided during immunisation programmes. In Iraq, this approach was found to be ineffective, which demonstrates the need to tailor responses to the context and monitor interventions to determine whether they are appropriate. In Syria, UNICEF is cooperating with the Ministry of Health, which has access to all the Governorates, to provide EORE at its clinics. Returnees travelling home on buses can be given EORE during the journey. Their attention is focused, and they are receiving the information at the appropriate time. In Ukraine, those queuing to cross into the east of the country are given EORE.

### **3.2.3 Materials and messaging**

EORE should be designed to be appropriate to the needs and potential exposure to threats of different demographic groups because gender, age, ethnicity, cultural practices and socio-economic status affect how people interact with explosive ordnance. Messages and images should be clear and unambiguous. Materials have to be transportable, produced to the appropriate size to be visible to the audience and be robust. All materials should be field tested and, in the forthcoming revised IMAS 12.10, field testing will be mandatory. Standardised EORE materials can be useful because coordination is easier as methods and delivery are the same. Other benefits of standardisation include cost savings from economies of scale when producing materials, strengthened quality control, unity under a common identity for the sector, and increased space for organisations to support each other and share resources. Although having standard EORE approaches and materials has benefits, it is important to adapt EORE to the local context. In Northern Syria, DCA explained that it produced a leaflet for EORE with the same text but with people dressed in different clothing, appropriate for the different populations living in Kurdish, Sunni, and IS-controlled areas.

In Colombia, the mine action sector has developed criteria for EORE materials which include using pictures that show EO in the environment in which people would find them and ensuring that all materials are attractive, persuasive, relevant, socially acceptable and understandable. Such an approach, whereby criteria to guide interventions are agreed, helps to ensure a high-quality and standard approach without being overly prescriptive, so that materials can still be tailored to the context.

Materials should also be age appropriate. Animations, colouring activities and puppet shows are often used for younger children. Games are considered a useful approach for children because they enable misconceptions to be corrected and re-enforce learning. Social media is considered an appropriate tool for teenagers and young adults, although further research is needed, and presentations, radio messaging, video clips and television dramas are all used to reach various age groups. The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), responding to local suggestions in Ukraine, supported the development of EORE for children under five. Although the organisation suspects that it would be difficult to replicate the exact methods and approach which were driven by the tradition that mothers volunteer in kindergartens and that kindergarten teachers were accustomed to engaging in role play and fancy dress, FSD believes, based on that experience,

that it is possible to deliver effective EORE to children under five. It would be interesting to learn more about this experience and examine whether EORE for young children is possible elsewhere and whether it is of benefit.

### **3.2.4 Rapid roll-out and emergency risk education**

Sometimes, emergency risk education is needed. These campaigns often need to be launched quickly without extensive research to understand the nature of the risk. They are based on assumptions of the contamination and the groups at risk, and the focus is on saving lives. To implement EORE as quickly and as extensively as possible in government-controlled areas of Syria, numerous opportunities are being used. The Ministries of Education, Health, Social Affairs and Religion are actively involved. The Ministry of Education has mainstreamed EORE into the curriculum which is used in all state schools, religious schools and schools for Palestinian refugees. Mosques, churches, religious leaders and professionals with psychosocial training and experience have all been mobilised to provide and support EORE. UNICEF, in cooperation with ministries, UN entities and local NGOs, has developed various EORE materials including a brief document for returnees and IDPs. It contains key EORE messages as well as information about the use of mines of an improvised nature and other IEDs in urban settings.

As yet, the extent of the contamination is unknown so the assumption is that people will be travelling through contaminated areas or returning to contaminated areas and therefore need EORE. Respondents suggest that, to date, there has been little information, or possibly no sharing of information, about the flow of refugees and IDPs so distributing the information to the right people is challenging. EORE providers in Syria do not know if returnees received EORE in the locations to which they were displaced. However, initiatives are being developed among multiple national and international stakeholders to improve coordination and information sharing, including the EORE technical working group being convened under the durable solutions working group as described on page 17.<sup>27</sup>

### **3.2.5 Cooperation**

Different organisations have different areas of expertise. In Libya, DCA and The HALO Trust have pooled funding and expertise to complement each other's operations and avoid duplication. DCA has an established presence in Libya and experience in conducting community liaison. HALO is initiating mechanical clearance of urban areas which involves the removal and sifting of rubble to find and destroy EO. Although these urban areas are contaminated, they are occupied, so DCA is liaising with the local population to explain the planned HALO operations and raise awareness about the need for civilians to clear the area while these operations are in progress. The clearance is potentially sensitive because property owners are expecting compensation from the Libyan authorities for loss of and damage to property. The community liaison involves reassuring people that the clearance of the rubble and making it safe will not jeopardise any compensation claims.

While respondents for this report all agree that EORE should be of a high quality, they did not necessarily believe that all organisations should have high EORE capacity in all locations. Rather, respondents advocated for more effective cooperation so that organisations could benefit from each other's expertise and avoid wasting or duplicating resources, or developing capacity for a certain mine action pillar merely to tick a box.

### **3.2.6 Digital communication**

Although the mine action sector uses technology for many aspects of its work, much of the sector remains unsure about the effectiveness of digital communications and social media as a means

of providing EORE. A study conducted on behalf of the ICRC examined various digital methods of delivering EORE but did not draw firm conclusions about any of the individual methods. However, the conclusions of the overall report highlighted important lessons learned as well as ongoing reservations, many of which were echoed by respondents for this report.

Digital communication has proved a cost-effective and easy way of producing and transporting EORE materials, enabling EORE teams to travel to remote and difficult-to-access areas with a range of materials to use for their presentations. Social media is thought to be an effective way of targeting young people but not older populations, and to be effective as a way of maintaining communication and following up on face-to-face communication. However, social media is not considered effective as a stand-alone communication tool as it is necessary to establish trust with a population for EORE to be effective; this is particularly important in unstable and insecure environments. It has also been reported that the use of social media has led to people turning down the opportunity to attend face-to-face EORE sessions because they have already seen the messages on social media. The use of digital devices in insecure areas or areas of ongoing conflict can be prohibited by armed actors. Respondents reported that, in some areas, devices have been confiscated and staff has been threatened. Such actions also prevent the use of GPS for NTS so simplified surveys, known as contamination impact surveys, have been conducted instead. Similarly, although it is possible to report contamination to the authorities through social media, it is difficult to verify the reports. The cost of creating applications can be time consuming and expensive so securing the initial funding can be difficult. Some respondents remained unconvinced that applications are an efficient means of delivering EORE, and others argue that it is difficult to measure their impact.

The mine action sector reports that WhatsApp and Facebook have been used successfully in situations of ongoing conflict and restricted mobility to maintain regular communications and disseminate information quickly about contamination and EO incidents. It is also thought that such approaches could help to improve cross-sectoral information sharing, but it is unclear whether this is currently happening. Undoubtedly, the mine action sector and the delivery of EORE can benefit from the use of digital communication, but more research and / or discussion is needed to determine the most effective uses for this technology.

### **3.2.7 Risk awareness and safer behaviour**

The ICRC implements EORE as part of its broader Risk Awareness and Safer Behaviour (RASB) initiatives.<sup>28</sup> RASB is a risk management approach that aims to increase awareness and facilitate safer behaviour for ICRC staff and those living in weapon-contaminated environments. It is designed to be complementary and linked with other interventions, such as those promoting economic security or to improve water and habitation. RASB is based on the recognition that raising awareness and communicating safer behaviour have limited impact when people are forced to take risks on a regular basis, for example, to collect water from contaminated areas. In this instance, microloans or repairs to restore or improve water systems might be more effective interventions than EORE alone. RASB messaging is developed in each country for that country, and implementation is often through national Red Cross or Red Crescent societies. The ICRC has a broad mandate and range of expertise so it can adopt an integrated, multi-disciplinary approach. Such an approach is unlikely to be feasible for most mine action organisations to undertake on their own, but information collected during their own research and activities could be shared to inform interventions by other sectors.

Data collection and the analysis of information to understand a context are important aspects of RASB. Issues around data protection and ICRC procedures often make it difficult for data to be shared, but information about casualties from EO might be shared in some contexts.

### **3.2.8 Conflict preparedness and protection**

NPA, and more recently UNMAS, like the ICRC, are adopting a broader approach to EORE by incorporating it into CPP although securing funding has been a challenge, as CPP is not a well-known concept. CPP is intended to be implemented before and during conflicts to mitigate the effect of explosive weapons and armed conflict and enable civilians to protect themselves more effectively. The design is based on knowledge, attitudes, practices [and beliefs] (KAP[B]) surveys and tailored to the context. In Gaza, CCP includes training on safer behaviour during an attack, first aid, evacuation, and preparedness, the latter of which includes securing the widows of homes to prevent shattered glass causing injuries and the purchase and storage of emergency supplies.

A growing number of MA actors have expressed an interest in CPP and adopting a broader approach to strengthen resilience to hazards. As yet, no external evaluations have been conducted but the findings could provide useful insights for the sector of alternative ways to provide EORE.

### **3.2.9 Sustainability and exit strategies**

There is no consensus on how long or in what way EORE should continue among populations that live with contamination in the long term or in areas that have been declared mine-impact free. Some respondents argue that EORE should continue because the threat remains and, even when clearance is complete, there is a residual threat. Other respondents wonder whether long-term messaging remains effective. However, all agree that it is necessary to build national capacity and sustainability. For example, EORE can be incorporated into civil protection, as in the Balkans, or into public health. In Sri Lanka, developing sustainability has included integrating EORE into the school curriculum, using the already-established village development committees to monitor EO risk in low priority areas and supporting village mine action committees in highly impacted areas. Data is available to inform planning for mine action because, in addition to IMSMA, an injury surveillance system has been established in the country, primarily to monitor road traffic accidents. The authorities agreed to include screening for EO incidents and, to date, the system is working well and is sustainable. It also shows that EO accident rates in Sri Lanka are low – in 2018 there were no accidents. It is possible that there will be little funding for mine action including EORE in Sri Lanka in the future, so these measures are part of a process to ensure sustainable capacity and data collection to manage EO contamination.

### **3.2.10 Conclusions**

There are standard good practices approaches to EORE that have been developed and honed over 30 years, and there are new and innovative approaches using digital communications or mainstreaming EORE into protection or broader initiatives to promote resilience to hazards. There are examples of the sector responding to difficult operating environments through maximising cooperation and coordination. The approaches, tools and methods depend on the individual organisation, operating contexts and the objectives of their EORE – is it solely to promote safer behaviour or is it to promote safer behaviour and in addition inform other mine action activities? Either objective is legitimate, but the aim must be to provide EORE that is appropriate to the context and of the highest quality possible.

### **3.3 Challenges**

In recent years, mine action organisations find themselves operating in increasingly violent environments with unclear conflict dynamics. As a consequence, staff have limited mobility and are often confined to the office. This has forced organisations to adopt remote management and monitoring approaches and to deliver EORE indirectly. Operating in a conflict-sensitive manner and having a thorough understanding of the context have become imperative. Simultaneously, daily life for civilians has become more difficult and potentially dangerous. Some of the main challenges are discussed below.

#### **3.3.1 Remote training, monitoring and management**

All international organisations contacted for this report expressed a preference for being present in country and in the same location as the teams delivering EORE, and some stated a preference for employing EORE staff directly rather than training an implementing partner. This is because the more immediate and easier the oversight, the better the quality of EORE can be assured and improved when necessary. Direct management of EORE, whether through their own staff or implementing partners, means that EORE is better integrated into and more likely to contribute to other mine action activities. However, organisations must adapt to their context, and insecurity and ongoing conflict have made remote training, management and / or monitoring necessary in some circumstances to ensure the delivery of EORE. The consensus is that, while not ideal, EORE conducted remotely is better than no EORE at all.

In challenging environments, it is necessary to be flexible and to adapt. NPA reports that, for the three countries where it is delivering CPP, it has adopted three different approaches in these three different parts of the world; in one it is recruiting its own staff, in another it is working through an implementing partner with whom it is co-located and, in a third, it remotely monitors a partner which operates in an area it cannot access.

In Northwest Syria, international NGOs support local partners remotely to provide EORE, as well as other activities such as accident and victim data and forms of contamination surveys. Training has been delivered remotely via Skype and WhatsApp. This is a difficult approach for the trainers and course participants because of the lack of interaction and it is difficult for the trainer to assess whether the training is progressing well. Poor Internet connections, power cuts and renewed outbreaks of fighting mean that the training can take several days longer than planned. In Yemen, where travel is difficult, a cascade approach to EORE training has been adopted, where training of trainers is conducted several times, with relatively new recruits being responsible for training others.

Adopting remote approaches risks a loss of quality – particularly because in hard-to-access areas the threat is likely to be not as well understood and messages may not be correctly tailored to the context – but numerous techniques are being employed in an effort to maintain quality. In addition to the usual reporting on the numbers of EORE sessions held and the age and gender of the participants disaggregated, these include filming the sessions and sharing them for comment internally and with partners. HALO has employed two implementing partners in Syria so that one can act as a third-party monitor of the other. DCA is developing guidelines for remote monitoring and believes that a focus on providing rigorous training with plenty of opportunities to participate and practice is the way to ensure high-quality delivery of EORE through teams that cannot easily be monitored or contacted. The CHS emphasis on the need to be self-critical and encourage continuous learning is quoted as a means to promote a culture of learning among staff. Regular

communication between the office and the field helps to re-enforce the importance of EORE and encourage staff who are remotely monitored to maintain high standards.

### **3.3.2 Mines of an improvised nature**

Whether the MA sector should be involved in tackling the threat posed by mines of an improvised nature has been the subject of extensive debate. Some countries, such as Libya, have introduced an IED disposal policy which mandates the Libyan authorities to deal with all IEDs. NGOs do not clear IEDs in Libya and have been discouraged from providing RE for IEDs.

Afghanistan has adopted a different approach and in October 2018 issued a policy for clearance of abandoned improvised mines (AIMs). In March the following year it issued the Afghanistan National Mine Action Standards for clearing AIMs. An improvised mine in Afghanistan is defined as one that is victim operated and operates in a similar way to a conventional mine. Clearance of AIMs in Afghanistan is sensitive because they are used by parties actively engaged in conflict and the mine action sector must maintain its neutrality to be able to protect its humanitarian credentials. Therefore, both documents stress that MA actors must adhere to humanitarian principles, steer clear of counter-IED operations, ensure that any AIMs cleared are in areas free from conflict and obtain consent from the local population before beginning their activities. According to the Afghanistan Mine Action Standards (AMAS), teams deployed as part of AIM operations must have the capacity to support RE for improvised mines as well as other EO.

Opinion is divided about whether RE has evolved sufficiently to effectively address the threats posed by improvised mines. Many believe that the basic messages are the same but are unsure that the timing, targeting and descriptions of the danger signs to recognise the presence of mines of an improvised nature are fully effective. Good practices for how the sector and affected countries should respond to contamination from improvised mines are evolving and likely to differ from one context to another depending on what types of interventions are deemed most appropriate.

### **3.3.3 Urban environments**

The extent of the contamination of urban dwellings in heavily-affected countries such as Libya, Syria and Yemen is not yet established, and displaced populations are too large to be prevented from returning home. Mine action has been conducted in urban areas in the past, for example in Kabul, but, until relatively recently, the sector has been more accustomed to working in rural environments.

From November 2018 MAG began implementing an adapted community liaison approach in contaminated urban environments in Syria to work in areas that have not been surveyed and where there are no National Mine Action Standards. The affected neighbourhoods are divided into manageable areas, and community liaison teams deploy systematically along safe routes initially meeting with key members of the community and sensitising the community to MAG's presence and activities. The teams conduct EORE and NTS household surveys for all occupied buildings as well as undertaking accident and victim reporting, protection referrals and housing, land and property verifications. Following NTS, other survey and clearance activities are completed as necessary until neighbourhoods can be released back to the community. The teams maintain their community liaison activities as required throughout operations.<sup>29</sup>

Updates on this approach will help to inform the sector's response to EO contamination in urban areas.



### **3.3.4 Displaced, migrant and nomadic populations**

Migrant and nomadic populations are considered vulnerable to EO because they travel through areas and are potentially unaware of contamination. They may be undocumented and prefer to evade the authorities so avoid official border crossings and well-used routes. Groups fleeing conflict are often displaced multiple times so risk entering contaminated areas multiple times. The mobility of these groups, as well as their accommodation provision, also makes it difficult to ensure that they receive EORE. Refugees may not be accommodated in large camps but settle among the host community, as is the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey. In Lebanon, Syrian refugees are dispersed throughout the country, sometimes in small unofficial settlements which the Lebanese authorities argue are insecure and therefore the delivery of EORE is unsafe.

Local knowledge and information about seasonal migration and popular migration routes can help to target risk education for those at risk among migrant and nomadic groups. However, mobile populations can be marginalised and difficult to reach in situations of chronic crisis and ongoing conflict. For example, in Libya it is thought that hundreds of thousands of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa travel to the country in search of work to pay for passage to Europe. These groups are used as casual labour, often in the heavily bombed urban areas to clear rubble which is riddled with explosive ordnance. The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) prefers EORE to be delivered formally and in formal settings, to enable it to monitor the quality of EORE. It has been critical in the past of organisations claiming large numbers of beneficiaries through large-scale public events and leafleting. This approach facilitates quality control but may unintentionally exclude groups from EORE without formal links to, for example, schools, workplaces or humanitarian and development actors. The lack of information about migrant groups and difficulty in accessing them means that they are thought to be at risk, although no official data exists. It was not possible to establish for this report whether, when victim data is recorded, the status of the person as a migrant, IDP, refugee or returnee is noted.

### **3.3.5 Appropriate EORE timing and messaging**

Determining the right time to provide EORE to Syrian refugees in Lebanon has provoked a debate among various actors. Some organisations believe that providing EORE too early creates the impression that it is safe for Syrians to return home or that, if they do not return immediately, they will have forgotten the EORE messages by the time they return. Others fear that providing EORE and drawing attention to EO contamination might inadvertently discourage Syrians from returning.

EORE has to be relevant to the risk. In Lebanon the threat to the urban populations from EO has been from legacy minefields and ERW which has informed the design of EORE being delivered to Syrians in Lebanon. In Syria, urban areas are heavily contaminated with a range of EO so simply translating EORE messages from one context to another may be inappropriate. Limited data is available to determine which type of EO are responsible for the most casualties in Syria.

### **3.3.6 Sea mines**

According to the mine action sector, sea mines used off the coast of Yemen are endangering the lives and livelihoods of fishermen. The mine action sector in Yemen wants to provide EORE to the fishing population but has been unable to source any pre-existing material and is unsure where to ask for advice about how to develop these materials. (Initially, requests for resources and advice could be circulated to the International MRE Working Group.)

### **3.3.7 Reporting contamination**

EORE is often used as a means of sensitising populations to the presence of contamination and providing them with contact information to report the presence of EO. The sector has found that in areas of ongoing conflict, asking populations to report contamination can pose a threat to the civilian population and the sector. In some countries with an operational national mine action centre, reporting has been routed through a third non-government party because of fears that calls made directly to government entities are intended to lure government employees into an ambush. In Afghanistan, “[c]ivilians who have reported the presence of improvised mines, tried to clear them themselves or whose animals have accidentally detonated them, have been threatened and attacked by anti-government elements (AGE) for ‘wasting’ the improvised mines intended for government actors”. Confidential hotlines can protect civilians reporting contamination and it is possible that community leaders have access to conflict parties and the mine action sector to negotiate clearance.<sup>30</sup>

### **3.3.8 Funding and advocacy**

Where possible, the mine action sector embeds EORE within its mine action programmes so that it complements and contributes to other aspects of mine action. Consequently, funding proposals often include EORE components. However, several implementers reported that EORE is often one of the first elements to be cut or dropped when proposal costs need to be reduced. Several respondents stated that it is easier to secure funding for clearance because it is regarded by some as higher profile and with more tangible results. Some respondents thought that EORE and mine action are often misunderstood as military-type interventions focused on clearance, and that broader mine action activities and protection elements are overlooked; therefore, the sector tends to attract donors focused on security, stabilisation and post-conflict recovery rather than those concerned with protection.

In recent years, some donors have started to stipulate that EORE should be integrated into the mine action activities that they are funding. This is a positive step that needs to be reinforced through strengthening of donor capacities to assess the quality of proposed EORE interventions – and to ensure that priority is placed on achieving behaviour change (rather than on visibility and extensive coverage).

### **3.3.9 Conclusions**

There are a number of challenges to EORE design and implementation that are yet to be satisfactorily resolved. Greater discussion and sharing of good practices among EORE implementors might help to identify or develop appropriate responses. Lobbying, advocacy and coordination at a higher level and with other sectors would also help to address some of these issues. The EORE AG could help to raise the profile of these issues and mobilise support among the appropriate actors.

## **3.4 Understanding the needs for and effectiveness of EORE: monitoring, evaluation and assessment**

Baselines, context analysis, casualty data, monitoring, evaluation and impact assessments are important for evidence-based planning, to understand the effectiveness of interventions and to maintain accountability. However, lack of accurate casualty data, funding restrictions, hostile environments and methodological limitations all pose challenges to collecting information that enables operators to assess the effectiveness of their EORE. The situation is particularly

problematic for measuring behaviour change, the long-term aim of EORE, because sustained behaviour change takes place over an extended period of time. Retention of EORE is important to inform behaviour change in the long term, however, annual funding cycles limit the time horizon for assessments of EORE to that funding cycle. Furthermore, measuring behaviour change is likely to require more complex and composite methodologies and analysis that are beyond what is usually funded and outside of standard mine action practices.

### **3.4.1 Context analysis**

Understanding the context is fundamental to developing effective EORE. Without accurate casualty data that can be analysed to prioritise geographical areas and demographic groups for EORE, the sector has a limited ability to conduct needs analyses and to plan its interventions. It also lacks baseline data without further research.

### **3.4.2 Knowledge, attitudes, practices [and beliefs] surveys**

KAP[B] surveys are typically used as a baseline for EORE.<sup>31</sup> They help to show how populations behave around EO and why. This information is used to tailor EORE to the local context. Often, the KAP[B] is repeated at the end of the project cycle to provide an endline and the difference in responses analysed to assess the effectiveness of the EORE. KAP[B] surveys provide an insight but have their limitations and are relatively expensive. Some KAP[B] surveys assume that behaviour change is linear, which is rarely the case as various factors unrelated to risk education and EO contamination influence the way people behave. If not properly designed, it is possible that populations that are surveyed several times using KAP[B] surveys learn what the enumerators want to hear, so provide answers to please rather than answers that are true. Different organisations often use different KAP[B] surveys so there are limited opportunities for comparison and analysis across surveys. Adopting a standardised format in a country or region would help to share the cost and provide comparable data for analysis.

To derive the most from KAP[B] surveys, responses from multiple questions should be analysed together, but sometimes responses to individual questions are examined in isolation which means the survey is not being used to capture as complex a picture or as in depth an understanding as it might. In some instances, there is no analysis at all, merely a description of the responses to each question and sometimes no comparison between the baseline and endline surveys. Such surveys and their reports provide no insights. To avoid wasting time and resources on surveys that provide little useful analysis, HI's 2009 guidelines recommend that a specialist in data collection and analysis, with the appropriate methodological background, is engaged to design and manage a KAP[B] survey.

### **3.4.3 Monitoring and evaluation**

Monitoring and evaluation frameworks that use indicators are usually linked to project proposals and, despite the name, tend to focus on monitoring rather than evaluation. The indicators are generally designed for countable outputs and outcomes such as the numbers attending EORE sessions, fluctuations in the EO incident rate and numbers of EO reported to the relevant authorities. EORE sessions often begin with a pre-test and end with a post-test conducted among a percentage of the participants to determine how much participants have understood. These provide a rapid way to assess whether the EORE has been effectively delivered and designed, and help to inform improvements. However, these post-tests occur immediately after EORE delivery, so it is unknown how much information participants retain over a longer period of time and how much they are likely to put into practice. Some practitioners undertake retention surveys, usually 3-6 months after the EORE session.

Fluctuations in rates of EO casualties cannot necessarily be linked directly to the effectiveness of EORE as, for example, forced migration or changes in livelihood activities can result in people behaving differently around EO, regardless of their knowledge of the EO, or receipt of risk education. The number of reported casualties may increase after EORE because there is an increased understanding among the affected population that this information is important. Reports of EO are often used as proxy indicators and EORE teams themselves can be actively involved in collecting information about contamination. For example, in Cambodia between August 2017 and December 2018, over 70,000 people received EORE and, as a result, EORE participants reported nearly 11,000 items of ERW and some 50 anti-personnel mines to the EORE teams. The information was passed to the EOD teams for controlled demolition. Although some of the reported contamination included ordnance caches, the figure demonstrates the success of EORE in helping the mine action sector identify and destroy EO.<sup>32</sup> However, as noted above, in areas of ongoing conflict, local populations can be wary of reporting contamination, particularly mines of an improvised nature, because they fear reprisals from those who laid them. Consequently, reports of EO are not necessarily a universally appropriate indicator for effective EORE.

In an effort to identify trends and to monitor its own programmes to see whether there are gaps, or if additional support is needed, HALO analyses the monitoring data collected by its country programmes at the global level.

#### **3.4.4 Results-based management**

RBM is popular among donors and is widely used in the UN system. It is promoted as an approach through the UNICEF EORE and Integrated Mine Action courses. RBM is intended to improve strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, and accountability. It is also possible to harmonise the contributions of multiple organisations towards the same results. However, some critics argue that RBM emphasises the importance of what is measurable using tangible, unambiguous indicators, thereby oversimplifying complex processes and often focusing on short-term results. Defenders of RBM would argue that these criticisms are a consequence of a failure of application, which is too rigid and not combined with qualitative measures of impact.<sup>33</sup>

#### **3.4.5 Analysing the impact of EORE and measuring behaviour change**

Lack of funding overall and the short-term nature of existing funding are the main reasons operators give for being unable to undertake assessments of the longer-term impact of EORE. Endline surveys and post EORE training retention surveys are most likely to be conducted up to a maximum of three to six months following delivery, if at all. If organisations are operating in the same area for several years, such longer-term assessments are possible. Several organisations stated that donors seldom ask for impact assessments of EORE. FSD reported that, as far as it was aware, for the first time in its history it had been specifically asked and provided multi-year funding by a donor to conduct a socio-economic impact study of its mine action programme, including EORE. Other organisations supplement monitoring data with case studies in an effort to capture the more complex impacts of EORE. To measure behaviour change specifically, as part of the UK Department for International Development Global Mine Action Programme 2 grant, HALO, MAG and NPA are piloting a methodology using focus group discussions (FDGs) among affected populations before EORE starts, and again three to six months after EORE has been delivered. The results will be shared in the future.

The public health sector uses behaviour change theories to design, implement and measure the effectiveness of its activities and it may provide some useful insights for the mine action sector.

The ICRC has adapted a behaviour change model for its interventions to promote safer behaviour around weapons contamination.<sup>34</sup>

### **3.4.6 Cost-benefit analysis**

In Lebanon, a cost-benefit analysis of mine action was undertaken over several months in 2018. It attempts to calculate the cost of all mine action activities, including risk education, and the monetary impact of those interventions over a 30-year period from 1998 to 2027. In Lebanon, as is common in many countries affected by EO, there is a lack of basic data such as the size of the population, so many figures in this cost-benefit analysis are estimated. The authors claim to have been conservative with estimates so that the calculated benefits are realistic and possibly lower than they might be in reality. It is difficult for the reader to judge, as limited information about the methodology and the basic figures used in the calculations is provided. The analysis concludes that for every USD spent on mine action in Lebanon, the return is USD 4.15. For MRE, the authors estimate the percentage of additional accidents that would have occurred had MRE not been provided. The estimates vary between 5 and 40 percent depending on the context,<sup>35</sup> and in total from 1998 to 2027 it is estimated that MRE will have saved the population almost USD 11 million.<sup>36</sup> It should be noted that the authors assume that the impact of MRE reduces over time.

### **3.4.7 EORE participant numbers**

There are agreed approaches to calculating how many people have received EORE such as those described by HALO, MAG and NPA in their guidance on standardising beneficiary definitions.<sup>37</sup> These organisations have decided to focus on reporting those in direct receipt of comprehensive EORE through presentations and participatory approaches delivered face-to-face. According to the standards, the number of indirect recipients of EORE may be estimated, but the calculation of these numbers should be transparent. The numbers of those receiving training to deliver EORE should be calculated separately. It is difficult to avoid multiple counting of beneficiaries – as EORE is a preventative action, it is good to participate in multiple EORE sessions over time. To address this issue, some programmes assess the number of persons receiving EORE for the first time as ‘first-time-recipients’ which shows good targeting initially and over time the need to scale down and redesign EORE approaches.

UNICEF has decided that its target EORE participant numbers will be defined by a percentage of the at-risk population. Therefore, 80 percent of the at-risk population should be reached, by either direct (face-to-face) or indirect (media campaigns) EORE. Its M&E mechanism disaggregates both types of EORE, by age, sex and disability. This is a minimum target for all of UNICEF’s country programmes and will be used as a minimum benchmark in its 2020 Core Commitments for Children in emergencies.

Despite such guidelines, there are claims from the sector that the numbers receiving EORE are often overestimated, particularly those reached through indirect methods. Attempts, such as those undertaken for monitoring the implementation of the UN Mine Action Strategy, to aggregate EORE participants at the global level, have proved difficult because of the lack of standardisation in calculation methodologies. These attempts also revealed that large numbers were being reported at single training sessions when the recommended number is around 20 or 25, to ensure that individuals can participate and the quality of EORE can be maintained. Some in-county respondents felt that EORE participant numbers had been inflated in the past which had damaged the sector’s reputation and led to tighter controls by some national authorities.

Following the development of the latest UN Mine Action Strategy in 2018, it was agreed that the M&E approach needed to be enhanced to capture data on UN-funded outputs, and to contextualise results better using both quantitative and qualitative research. For EORE, UNMAS is developing minimum data standards as part of its implementation of IMSMA Core through its partnership with the GICHD. However, there is no common approach for contextualising the EORE data. For example, what percentage of a country's population or what percentage of the affected population do EORE beneficiary numbers represent? There do not seem to be standard calculations across organisations for targets to determine what percentage of an affected population should receive EORE, or standard approaches to understand knowledge acquisition through EORE. The lack of data and of comparable data means that there is not a proper global overview of EORE and it is not possible to make any judgement on its quality, or whether it is reaching enough of the affected population.

Another point raised is that those attending EORE sessions are usually referred to as beneficiaries, which suggests that they are passive recipients and assumes that they benefit from EORE. Such assumptions can bias reporting about the impact of EORE and use of other terms should therefore be considered.

### **3.4.8 Conclusions**

The lack of accurate casualty data limits the ability of the sector to plan effective EORE interventions based on needs. Currently, the sector relies heavily on quantitative methodologies to assess EORE and tends to focus on outputs rather than outcomes or impact. The UNICEF-GICHD guidebooks recommend using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies and suggest that rapid rural appraisal and participatory rural appraisal techniques are appropriate for community level research, and suitable for use in unstable and insecure environments. The guidebooks provide information on research design and implementation. Use of qualitative research would provide a deeper understanding of the operating context and of the impact of interventions to complement quantitative methodologies which provide breadth.

To improve monitoring, evaluation and impact assessments of EORE, more resources need to be planned at the design stage and made available to fund teams to undertake more extensive research and data collection, to improve the methodology and build the research skills of staff. The sector should note the very real challenges of conducting research in some contexts. Research is time consuming and costly, so it is necessary to achieve a balance between delivering EORE effectively and undertaking enough research at the appropriate level of rigour to inform programming and improve EORE. The team working on the monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the UN Mine Action Strategy might be able to provide some useful insights into the difficulties of aggregating mine action data, including EORE data, at the global level.

The results of research and examples of successful methodologies should also be shared within the sector. Opportunities to share data and research capacity among the various mine action stakeholders should be explored.

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<sup>18</sup> IMAS, 12.10

<sup>19</sup> IMAS 12.10/01 Technical Note

<sup>20</sup> UNICEF and GICHD 2005

<sup>21</sup> IMAS 07.12

<sup>22</sup> CHS, 2014

<sup>23</sup> UN, 2010

<sup>24</sup> Adapted from Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012

<sup>25</sup> Course evaluation shared by UNICEF

<sup>26</sup> IMAS, 12.10, 4.1

<sup>27</sup> Stakeholders agreed coordinated action and information sharing at a workshop held in Lebanon 10-11 April 2019

<sup>28</sup> ICRC, 2019

<sup>29</sup> MAG, n.d.

<sup>30</sup> Roberts, 2018

<sup>31</sup> For example, see HI, 2009 and UNICEF-GICHD MRE Manual 2

<sup>32</sup> Email exchange among UNICEF staff, 22-31 May 2019

<sup>33</sup> Simister with Garbutt (2017); UNDG, 2011

<sup>34</sup> ICRC, 2019: 52

<sup>35</sup> For the early days of mine action it is estimated that there would have been 20 percent more accidents. Around the 2006 war an additional 40 percent of accidents would have occurred. Today and in the future the estimate is 10 and then 5 percent additional accidents without MRE

<sup>36</sup> Hamade and Srour, 2019: 67

<sup>37</sup> HALO, MAG, NPA, 2016

## APPENDIX 1: Documents consulted

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## APPENDIX 2: Respondents

Date	Name	Position	Organisation
23 May 2019	Elke Hottentot	Co-chair MA AoR	HI
24 May 2019	Sebastian Kasack	Co-Chair EORE AG	MAG
24 May 2019	Mark Hiznay	Dir. of Arms Division	HRW
24 May 2019	Lauren Burrows	Focal Point EORE	HALO Trust
26 May 2019	Sebastian Kasack	Senior Community Liaison Advisor	MAG
27 May 2019	Rasmus Sandvoll Weschke	CPP Advisor	NPA
28 May 2019	Henrik Rydberg, via e-mail	IMSMA/Information Management Advisor	GICHD
28 May 2019	Mihlar Mohammed Abdul Malik	Focal Point, Sri Lanka	UNICEF
28 May 2019	Aisha Saeed	Chair	Yemeni Mine Awareness Association
28 May 2019	Colin Bent	Programme Manager CPP	NPA
29 May 2019	Saeed Hawari	RE Trainer/Coordinator, Northwestern Syria	Shafak Organisation
29 May 2019	Olaf Joergensen	Development and Mine Action Specialist	UNDP
29 May 2019	Matthew Wilson	Head of Operations	FSD
29 May 2019	Bridget Forster	Programme Manager, Jerusalem	UNMAS
29 May 2019	Rory Logan	Secretary IMAS Review Board	GICHD
29 May 2019	Paul Heslop	Chief of Programmes	UNMAS
29 May 2019	Abdullah Alkhasawneh	RE lead, deputy PM	HALO Trust
29 May 2019	Christelle Loupforest	Global Coordinator, Mine Action Area of Responsibility	UNMAS
30 May 2019	Mohammed Bandora	Syria	MAG
30 May 2019	Hugues Laurence	MA Focal Point/Child Protection Specialist	UNICEF
30 May 2019	Jenny Reeves	Lebanon	DCA
30 May 2019	Matthew Wilson	Head of Operations	FSD
31 May 2019	Ingrid Schøyen	MA Advisor	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3 June 2019	Lucy Pinches	Project Manager/Researcher	Mine Action Review
3 June 2019	Olivia Selbie	Monitoring and Evaluation	UNMAS
3 June 2019	Louis Maresca	Advisor, Weapons Contamination Unit	ICRC

Date	Name	Position	Organisation
4 June 2019	Richard Boutler	PM South Sudan	UNMAS
4 June 2019	Mette Krarup Andersen	Programme Support Coordinator	DCA
4 June 2019	Richard MacCormac	Director	DDG
6 June 2019	Camille Wallen	Head of Policy	HALO Trust
7 June 2019	Steve Robinson	Yemen	UNDP
7 June 2019	Yitna Getachew	Senior Protection Officer, Dept. of Operations & Emergencies	IOM
7 June 2019	Liam Chivers	PM Libya	HALO Trust
10 June 2019	Lama Shabani	Child Protection Officer, Syria	UNICEF
10 June 2019	Graeme Ogilvy	Programme Manager, Libya	DCA
10 June 2019	Mikael Bold	Technical Director	MAG
10 June 2019	Olivier Cottray	Head, Information Management Div.	GICHD
10 June 2019	Belinda Goslin	Director	Risors Ltd.
11 June 2019	Adnan Telfah	Head of RE/VA dept.	NCDR/Jordan
11 June 2019	Mohammad Ashraf Safi	MIS Officer	Department for Mine Action Coordination, Afghanistan
12 June 2019	Laurie Druelle	Global RE Advisor	HI
13 June 2019	Gilles Delecourt	Programme Manager, Syria	UNMAS
19 June 2019	Reuben McCarthy	Regional Manager, Weapons Contamination	ICRC
24 June 2019	Pehr Lodhammar	Programme Manager, Iraq	UNMAS
24 June 2019	Celine Cheng	EORE Project Manager, Iraq	UNMAS

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