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PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT FORUMS

Who participates in multilateral disarmament meetings? Building on recent studies, this report investigates patterns of participation in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control forums. In addition to overall levels of participation, we look at two indicators in particular – the gender balance of meeting delegations and the development status of the states these diplomats represent. We also examine the link between those two indicators: to what extent gender balance of diplomatic forums is associated with the socioeconomic composition of the group.



Norwegian People's Aid

This report was prepared by Torbjørn Graff Hugo and Kjøl Egeland at the Norwegian Academy of International Law (NAIL), and edited by Grethe Østern. The authors would like to thank Elizabeth Minor and Allison Pytlak for valuable input to earlier drafts.

Cover photo: New Zealand's Disarmament Ambassador Dell Higgie, during the negotiating conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (credit: ICAN).

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Comments, clarifications, and corrections are welcome. Please contact Norwegian People's Aid at gretheo@npaid.org.

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Introduction

In this study, we analyse patterns of state participation at a selection of disarmament and non-proliferation forums in the period from 2015 to 2018. As part of this, we take a closer look at two particular aspects of participation, namely gender balance and development status. The aim of the report is to get one step closer to explaining why some states participate in most multilateral disarmament meetings and others don't, why some states send large delegations and others send small delegations, and why some delegations have a balanced mix of men and women while others are predominantly made up of men (or women).

Patterns of participation at multilateral meetings are important for several reasons. At its core, it is a question of democracy, and of ensuring that all states in the international system are able to engage in a meaningful way in multilateral decision-making. Secondly, participation rates are an expression of how well the international disarmament system functions. Forums with low participation rates will struggle to achieve global ownership, which is key to achieving progress on many issues. Broad, consistent and active involvement is a prerequisite if we are to strengthen the global security architecture, including on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It is an important element in creating the conditions and the environment for progress.

Patterns of participation can be seen as an expression of the functionality of the multilateral disarmament machinery as a whole and its respective elements. They can also indicate patterns of power and preponderances of interest, and assist in the analysis of policy positions. Insight into the levels of participation can thus inform views on how to oil that machinery and how to further develop it. More specifically, data on participation can tell us something about the relative importance that states attach to different disarmament forums (why do some forums have higher participation than others?). It can also point to reasons why states may be prevented from engaging in multilateral disarmament meetings in a meaningful way (which factors influence whether a state decides to participate?), and the force with which it participates (what determines the size and composition of a state's meeting delegation?).

From a development perspective, participation data can provide important feedback on how well efforts to develop capacity and promote involvement by developing states in multilateral processes are working. In a United Nations context, such efforts are

1 See Renata H. Delaqua, Kjølv Egeland and Torbjørn G. Hugo, "Still Behind the Curve", UNIDIR (2019); Heather Hurlbur et al., "The Consensual Straightjacket", *New America* (March 2019); Ann Towns and Birgitta Niklasson, "Gender, International Status, and Ambassador Appointments", *Foreign Policy Analysis* 13, no. 3 (2017); John Borrie et al., "Gender, Development and Nuclear Weapons", ILPI and UNIDIR (October 2016); Article 36, "Disarmament, development and patterns of marginalisation in international forums" (April 2016); Article 36, "Women and multilateral disarmament forums" (October 2015); Torbjørn G. Hugo and Kjølv Egeland, "Jumping the hurdles", ILPI (December 2014).

predicated on a belief in the need to prioritize human and economic development over military spending. As noted in the UN Charter, the “establishment and maintenance of international peace and security” should be achieved “with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources”.²

Participation data also present an opportunity to evaluate progress in efforts to promote equal representation between men and women in the multilateral system. Nearly two decades have passed since the adoption of the landmark Security Council resolution on women peace and security, which reaffirmed “the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building”, and stressed “the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security”.³ For many states, this remains a priority, yet most studies suggest that there is still a long way to go to achieve something close to gender parity in the area of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation.

We use data from official participant lists from the main meetings of seven different disarmament and non-proliferation forums in the period from 2015 to 2018. For each meeting, every individual representing a member state of the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies (197 in total) has been counted and catalogued. Where a person has been listed with the title Ms or equivalent (depending on language), the individual in question has been counted as a woman, and where the title Mr or equivalent has been used, the individual has been counted as a man. In cases of gender neutral (e.g. “Dr”, “Col” or “Brig”), the name of the person in question has been manually checked against online resources in order to determine whether the individual should be counted as a man or a woman.⁴ In the handful of cases where there has been doubt as to the sex of a given participant, the person in question has not been counted. The first individual listed under each state name has been marked as the ‘head of delegation’. In total, 13,696 individuals have been catalogued.

Note that for the purposes of this report, the term *participation* is used purely to indicate whether a person has been officially registered at a given meeting. It does not purport to say anything about the manner in which this person behaved during the meeting or the informal role that this person had in the delegation. Note also that in this study we only map the participation of delegations from members or observers of the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies, not those of international organizations or civil society. In later versions of this publication, the scope may be expanded to also cover these and other stakeholders, as well as to explore the concept of participation in further depth.⁵

The total of 24 meetings covered include four Meetings of States Parties (MSPs) to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC),⁶ one Review Conference (RevCon) and three MSPs to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), one RevCon and two Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), three conferences of states parties (CSPs) and one RevCon of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), three MSPs and one RevCon of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), four sessions of the UNGA First Committee (C1), and, finally, the negotiating conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017.⁷

We begin the report with a brief look at the overall participation rates across the 24 meetings in question. We then move on to consider the average gender balance of the participating delegations, and how this changed between 2015 and 2018. We then examine whether there are regional or sub-regional differences in these patterns, before we explore the link between gender balance and countries’ development. We end the report with a broader discussion about the participation of developing states in multilateral disarmament diplomacy.

2 Charter of the United Nations, Article 26.

3 United Nations document S/RES/1325 (2000).

4 We have not come across any cases where we have had reason to believe that a gender-neutral title has been used to deliberately indicate a non-binary gender identity.

5 This could, for instance, include mapping of whether an individual is present in the room, delivers statements, drafts text, leads informal talks, votes, or contributes to text negotiations.

6 The APMBC is the only one of the treaties mapped that did not have a review conference in the period studied. For reference, participation data from the 2014 review conference of the APMBC has also been collected, but this is not included in the graphs and comparisons. Data for the 2019 review conference was not yet available at the time of writing.


7 See Annex 1 for a full list of the meetings mapped in this report.

Overall participation in multilateral disarmament forums

At first glance, overall rates of participation in multilateral disarmament diplomacy appear to have remained relatively stable over the past few years. In 2015, a total of 102 states (including 10 observer states) attended the Meeting of States parties (MSP) to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). In 2018, three years later, the number had increased by only one, to 103 (see Figure 1).⁸ And for the CSPs of the CWC mapped in this study, the total number of registered states was exactly 134 for all three (though it was not the same 134 states that attended each time).

Under the surface, however, the picture is less uniform than it might first appear. For one, the total participation rates for most of the forums tend to fluctuate from year to year. Review conferences – which is where the most important decisions concerning regime implementation are usually made – tend to have higher participation rates than other MSPs. Nowhere is that difference greater than for the NPT: 164 states were registered for the RevCon in 2015 (including one observer, Israel), while only 111 states registered for the PrepCom in Geneva three years later.

Figure 1: Total number of registered states per meeting (2015–2018)



Secondly, for some forums the participation rates appear to be dropping, while for others they are increasing. The NPT is again a case in point, with the number of registered states seemingly falling continuously between 2015 and 2018. Yet Figure 1 tells only part of the story. When the review cycle of the NPT is viewed as a whole, the participation rates have in fact gone up since 2017. The 111 states registered for the PrepCom in 2018 was actually an increase of 3 states from the comparable meeting in 2013 (which had 108 registered states). And in 2019 (which is not included in this study) a total of 143 states registered for the PrepCom, which was up from 131 in 2014 (an increase of 12 states). This development disproves the warnings of many TPNW-sceptics; that the adoption of the TPNW in 2017 could lead to declining participation rates at NPT meetings.

8 The APMBC did not have a RevCon in the period studied. The last RevCon of the APMBC before the period studied was in Maputo in 2014, where the total number of registered states was 91.

Another forum where the total number of registered states dropped over the period studied is the CCM. From 92 states at the RevCon in 2015, to only 79 states at the MSP in 2018. But importantly, this includes observer states, and when these are taken out, the participation rates for the CCM actually increased (from 57 registered states parties in 2015 to 61 in 2018). This slow growth in participation rates took place in parallel with a slow but steady increase in the total number of states parties to the CCM (from 98 in 2015 to 105 in 2018).

As a share of the total number of states parties to the CCM, the number of registered states parties actually remained very stable throughout the period, at about 58 per cent. A similar pattern is observable for the BWC, though the corresponding share of registered states parties was higher than for the CCM (at around 65%). For the NPT, the share of registered states parties at the PrepCom in 2018 was 58 per cent, exactly the same as for the CCM. For the CWC, the share of registered states parties remained steady at 69% for the CSPs (2015–2017), and jumped to 79% at the RevCon in 2018.

For the APMBC and the UNGA C1, the participation rates appear to fluctuate more than for the other forums, without a clear direction upward or downward. This is particularly true for the UNGA C1. One explanation for this could of course be that interest in the UNGA C1 actually changes from year to year, but another possible reason is that the official lists of participation for the UNGA C1 are somewhat unreliable – more so than the other forums included in the study (except the TPNW negotiations, which took place under the auspices of the UNGA). This is because the UNGA is a standing forum of the UN, which means that states can (or believe they can) participate in the deliberations without formally registering. For the treaty-specific forums one could expect states to be more inclined to formally register, especially if the meeting takes place outside a permanent UN headquarter. With that in mind, it is somewhat unclear whether the fluctuation in the participation rates for UNGA C1, as seen in Figure 1, reflects variation (from year to year) in the actual presence of delegations in the room, or whether it indicates that a large number of states bypass (or disregard) the formal registration procedures.⁹

In sum, the overall rate of participation at multilateral disarmament meetings appears to be growing, albeit at an unsteady and relatively slow rate. And even if there are considerable differences between the forums in terms of the absolute number of registered states (from 79 states at the CCM meeting in 2018 to 182 states at the UNGA C1 in 2017), at none of the 24 meetings mapped did the share of registered members/parties drop below 50 per cent (as discussed later, the APMBC is the one that comes closest, with 82 out of 164 states parties attending the MSP in 2017). It is also worth noting that the CCM is the forum with by far the highest share of observers at the meetings of states parties (at the RevCon in 2015, 35 of the 92 registered states were observers, though this also includes signatory states and ratifying states for which the treaty had not yet come into force).

Overall participation rates are important, and allow us to compare forums and study trends, but they tell only one part of the story. They provide no information about what kind of states typically attend which kind of forums, whether certain regions of the world are better represented than others, or whether the number of developing states attending is going up or down. Nor does the overall participation rate offer any insight into the composition of the delegations that attend multilateral disarmament meetings, for instance with regard to gender balance.

9 One way of checking whether states attend meetings of the UNGA C1 without registering would be to compare the official participation lists to the voting records for those same years. The same also applies to other forums, including the TPNW, where some of the states that voted in favour of the adoption of the treaty were not registered for the negotiations. Another option could be to use speakers lists, though a number of states would likely be present even if they do not take the floor. This also raises questions about where to place the bar in terms of participation, however. Should a state be counted if it shows up for only one session, or would a higher threshold be required? It is also worth noting that the UNGA C1 covers a long list of topics, and some states might be more interested in certain aspects of the thematic debate than others. In practice, the room might be full during certain highly contentious debates, while attendance could drop when less pressing matters are discussed.

Gender balance in disarmament diplomacy

The participation of women in international disarmament diplomacy has steadily increased over the past decades. At the First Committee (C1) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1980, less than 5 per cent of the registered delegates were women (22 out of 504). By 2015, that share had risen to nearly 30 per cent (206 out of 693), which represents a ten-fold increase in the total number of female delegates. This is an impressive and important achievement. But at the same time, the share of women remains far from the 50 per cent parity mark, which means there is still a long way to go to achieve gender balance.¹⁰

Figure 2: Average share of women in select disarmament forums (2015–2018), by year




Figure 2 provides an illustration of the current state of affairs in terms of gender balance in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. The share of women per meeting is calculated as the average of the share for each delegation participating.¹¹ A first point to note about the data displayed in the above figure is that the average share of women across all meetings increased steadily during the period in question, from 27.7 per cent in 2015 to 32.7 per cent in 2018 (the numbers are rounded up in the graph). Four years is of course not a sufficient period of time to conclude anything decisively about long-term trends, yet the increase observed in this period is consistent with the growth trend seen over the past decades. As shown by Delaqua et. al., the share of women in official delegations rose steadily, and even slightly exponentially, for both the UNGA C1 and the NPT in the period from 1980 to 2015.¹² And while there is no guarantee that the share of women in disarmament diplomacy will continue to rise all along the same trajectory as seen in the past, the fact that the share of women in these disarmament forums has continued to increase in the period from 2015 to 2018 should be taken as a positive sign. So far, there is indication that the curves are flattening.

¹⁰ In this report, the term *gender balance* is used to describe an ideal level of numerical equality in the participation of men and women in multilateral disarmament meetings. It is based purely on the nationally determined titles that each individual is listed with in the official participant lists. Similarly, to the extent that the terms *male delegates* and *female delegates* are used, it is not intended to carry any social meaning beyond describing the titles with which the individual delegates are listed in the participant lists.


¹¹ When the total share of women at each meeting is calculated on the basis of all participating delegates (gender balance on aggregate per meeting), the share of women is slightly higher than when the share is calculated as average for each delegation. This is because large delegations skew the results. The reason for using the average per delegation rather than the aggregate share is that the principle of gender equality is presumed to have an element of congruence, meaning that gender balance is a goal both on aggregate level and on unit level. If, for instance, half the delegations were made up of only men, and the other half were made up of only women, the aggregate numbers would show gender parity, but on a delegation level there would be zero gender balance. The average per delegation is thus considered more relevant.

¹² Delaqua, Egeland and Hugo, UNIDIR (2019), p. 18.

Comparing forums

For most of the meetings mapped in this study, the average share of women per delegation fluctuates between 25 and 35 per cent (with some notable exceptions), which yields a total average of just above 30 per cent across all the meetings for the full period (2015–2018). Note that the shares vary as much between meetings of each forum as between the forums. And as illustrated by Figure 3, six of the seven forums all have averages (green bars) that are within three percentage points of each other (from 30 to 33 per cent). This is relevant because it means that the growth in the share of women in multilateral disarmament diplomacy is not pushed by one or two particular forums; it is a trend that can be observed across the board.

Figure 3: Average share of women in select disarmament forums (2015–2018), by forum



The one exception is the APMBC, with average shares of women per delegation of only 23 per cent. For some observers, this might come across as surprising: It has sometimes been hypothesised that diplomatic processes framed in “soft”, humanitarian terms, with the APMBC and CCM as the most frequently cited examples, are more likely to attract women than forums framed in “hard” national-security terms.¹³ We do not find support for that hypothesis here. There is in fact very little difference between the forums, except for the APMBC, which for some reason has much lower shares of women per delegation than the other forums.

This report does not aspire to provide a comprehensive explanation for why the share of women at APMBC meetings might be lower than for other disarmament forums, but one issue that could be worth exploring is whether there is a link between the share of women per delegation and the location where meetings are held. In that regard, it is worth noting that the average share of women per delegation for the APMBC is pulled down several percentage points by the 2016 MSP in Santiago, Chile, at which the average share of women per delegation was only 15 per cent (see Figures 2 and 3). The three other meetings of the APMBC between 2015 and 2018 were held in Vienna and Geneva, and had average shares of 25, 26, and 27 per cent. In one way or another, the smaller share of women per delegation in Santiago could thus conceivably have something to do with travel distance. For instance, if the length and cost of travel to a given meeting is higher than usual, states might decide to send smaller delegations than usual. And if the delegations get small enough, especially if states only send one person to a meeting, the gender balance is


13 See e.g. Delaqua, Egeland and Hugo, UNIDIR (2019), p. 14.

likely to get skewed in favour of men. As previous research has shown, when states only send one delegate to attend a meeting, they are exceedingly likely to send a man.¹⁴

This hypothesis is partly confirmed by the data, and as Figure 4 shows, the Santiago meeting in 2016 did indeed have a considerably higher share of single-person delegations than most other meetings (26 per cent of delegations, compared to an average across the 24 meetings of 10 per cent). Moreover, these delegations were, as expected, made up of mostly men. In fact, among the 24 single-person delegations registered for the Santiago meeting there was only one woman, yielding an average share of 4.2 per cent women among the single-person delegations. For the rest of the 93 registered delegations (those with two or more individuals), the average share of women was 19.3 per cent, which means the single-person delegations pulled down the average share of women by nearly 4 percentage points.¹⁵ For comparison, at the MSP the year before (APMBC MSP 2015), which took place in Geneva, 10 per cent of the states were registered with single-person delegations, and among these, 2 out of 10 were women. At that meeting, the single-person delegations pulled down the average by only 0,6 per cent.

Also worth noting is that the meeting with by far the highest share of single-person delegations was the RevCon of the CCM in 2015, which took place in Dubrovnik, Croatia. But at that meeting, the share of women among the single-person delegations was over 23 per cent (9 out of 39 individuals), which pulled down the average share of women for the whole meeting by just 0.7 percentage points (the delegations with more than one person had an average share of women per delegation of 24.7 per cent).

Figure 4: Share of delegations being single-person




Across all 24 meetings, the average share of women among single-person delegations was actually as high as 26.9 per cent. That is still below the total average of 30.3 per cent women per delegation, but far higher than at the Santiago meeting. And as Figure 5 shows, the average share of women per single-person delegation varies greatly from meeting to meeting. At the UNGA First Committee in 2015, 3 out of 4 participants of single-person delegations were women (75 per cent), and at the MSP of the BWC in 2017, 7 out of 12 (58 per cent) were women. The abovementioned CCM RevCon in 2015 was just below average.

A high share of single-person delegations is thus not automatically associated with a low average share of women per delegation, though it is arguably one part of the explanation for why the share of women per delegation was unusually low at the Santiago-meeting. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Santiago meeting was the only one of the 24 meetings to be held outside

14 Ibid.

15 The delegations with two people had an average share of women of 14.6 per cent, while the share of women for the three-person delegations was 21.7 per cent. For the delegations with four or more people, the share of women was 21.8 per cent.

Figure 5: Distribution of women and men among single-person delegations



Europe or the United States. In fact, apart from the abovementioned Dubrovnik meeting, all the other meetings took place in one of the multilateral disarmament hubs, that is Vienna, The Hague, Geneva or New York (see Annex I). For meetings in these hubs, most states would presumably have drawn on personnel from their permanent missions in these cities when forming their delegations to meetings held there. States parties' delegations to Santiago and Dubrovnik meetings, on the other hand, will likely have been made up mostly of diplomats traveling from their states' capitol or, indeed, from one of the disarmament hubs. If so, that might explain why these two meetings had considerably higher shares of single-person delegations than the other 22 meetings (as seen in Figure 4).


This does not in itself provide sufficient confirmation of the fact that travel distance was a decisive factor in pulling down the average share of women per delegation at the Santiago meeting, but it does suggest that the travel distance hypothesis is worth exploring in further detail. One way of doing that is to check whether certain regions, notably those situated far away from Santiago, had unusually small delegations or unusually low shares of women.

Comparing regions

As can be seen in Figure 6, which uses the United Nations regional groups as categories, the average shares of women per delegation do differ considerably between the geographic regions of the world. Across the 24 meetings, the gap between the region with the most gender balance (Latin-America and the Caribbean) and the least gender balance (African Group) is a full 20 percentage points.¹⁶

In Figure 6, the average for the APMBC meetings is also included, as is the specific meeting in Santiago in 2016. The first thing to note about that figure is that the share of women per delegation is lower (by five percentage points or more) for all five UN regional groups at APMBC meetings compared to the average across all the 24 meetings. In both relative and absolute terms, the difference is largest for the African Group, which has an average share of women per delegation of only 9 per cent at APMBC meetings (compared to 20 per cent on average across all 24 meetings), but even for the Latin-America and Caribbean Group the share of women per delegation at APMBC meetings is 5 percentage points below the regional average for all 24 meetings. This suggests that the low average share of women at the APMBC meetings cannot be explained by one or more particular regions. The effect is visible across the board.

Figure 6: Average share of women per delegation by UN regional group



For the specific Santiago meeting in 2016, however, the picture is less uniform (grey bars). For the Eastern European Group (EEG) and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG), the share of women at the Santiago meeting was comparable to their APMBC average. For the three other groups, however, the share of women at the Santiago meeting was much lower than their APMBC average (and extremely low compared to their overall averages).

For the African Group, the average share of women per delegation in Santiago was only 3 per cent (2 out of 48 delegates; 24 out of 26 African delegations had no women at all). With 93 registered states, this pulled down the average share of women per delegation for the whole meeting (by as much as 4.7 percentage points). But so did the Asia-Pacific Group (by 2.2 percentage points), with an average of just 7 per cent women per delegation. The Latin-America and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC) did not pull down the average as such (the 19 per cent share of women was higher than the total average for the meeting of 15.3 per cent), but it was still less than half that group's average share of women across the 24 meetings (of 40 per cent women per delegation).¹⁷ This suggests that if travel distance is indeed a reason for the extra low share of women at the Santiago meeting, it is not necessarily travel distance from capitals that matters, but perhaps travel distance from disarmament hubs.

To summarize, the difference between the seven forums mapped in this study when it comes to gender balance is overall quite limited (all had average shares of women per delegation between 30 and 33 per cent). The one exception is the APMBC, with an average share of women per delegation across the four meetings mapped of only 23.3 per cent. This share was pulled down considerably (2.6 percentage points) by one particular meeting in Santiago in 2016, but even without that meeting, the average share of women at the APMBC meetings was just 26 per cent, which is noticeably lower than for any of the other forums.

A proper explanation for why this is the case requires further and more dedicated research, including a more qualitative examination of the participant lists. But one hypothesis that can be pulled from the Santiago case is that an already low share of women could drop even further if the meeting is held outside one of the permanent disarmament hubs, in part since that increases the likelihood that more states will send small delegations. Another finding in the discussion above is that with the exception of the Santiago meeting, the low share of women at the APMBC meetings is not directly attributable to particular regions. There


17 Only two of the GRULAC-states at the Santiago meeting had single-person delegations (Honduras and the Dominican Republic). Both those individuals were men.

are indeed large differences between the UN regional groups when it comes to gender balance, something the next section will explore in further detail, but these differences are visible across all the 24 meetings, which means they cannot explain why the APMBC would have lower shares of women than the other forums.

Comparing sub-regions

A difference of 20 percentage points between the regions with the highest and lowest share of women per delegation is a large gap. At the same time, the relatively broad regional groupings of the UN are likely to hide significant variation on a sub-regional level. To illustrate this, Figure 7 shows the average share of women per delegation across all 24 meetings, broken down by sub-regions.¹⁸ The total number of UN member states and observers in each category (N) is listed in parenthesis after the name of each sub-region.

Figure 7: Average share of women per delegation by subregion




The sub-region with by far the highest share of women is Australia and New Zealand, with a total average of 63 per cent women per delegation. For New Zealand alone, the number is 79 per cent. Behind Australia and New Zealand, the Caribbean follows with 52 per cent women per delegation on average, before Northern Europe with 49 per cent, and Polynesia with 47 per cent. At the other end of the spectrum is Northern Africa, with an average across all 24 meetings of only 11 per cent. Central Asia is just above that, at 13 per cent women per delegation on average, followed by Middle Africa (14 per cent) and Western Africa (15 per cent).

18 The categorization of sub-regions is drawn from the Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use, as prepared by the Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretariat. Available from <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>.

History, culture and customs undoubtedly play a part in explaining these gender-balance patterns.¹⁹ Some cultures are more restrictive than others in terms of women's participation in the labour force, for instance.²⁰ But as previous studies have shown,²¹ socioeconomic factors such as income level, education, and life expectancy are likely to play a part as well (of course, cultural phenomena are, in part, products of underlying economic structures²²). These three factors (income level, education and life expectancy) are all included in the Human Development Index (HDI), which is updated annually by the UN Development Programme. In Figure 8, the data from the Figure 7 is sorted in ascending order, and average scores from the 2017 HDI have been added.²³

Figure 8: Gender balance and human development (HDI) by subregion



While far from explaining all the variation, Figure 8 illustrates a certain correlation between development status and the average share of women per delegation.²⁴ Several sub-regions deviate noticeably from the linear average, however. One example is the Caribbean, with an average share of women per delegation of 52 per cent, but with an HDI score of just 0.74. This HDI score is about the same as for Central America (0.76), South America (0.75) and Western Asia (0.76), but these three have average shares of women per delegation of 42, 33, and 22 per cent respectively. At the higher end of the HDI, there are also some outliers, including Western Europe (HDI score of 0.92, but with an average share of women per delegation of only 28 per cent).

19 For a discussion on this, see Delaqua, Egeland and Hugo, UNIDIR (2019).

20 For data on female labour force participation rates, see <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS>.

21 See e.g. John Borrie et al., ILPI and UNIDIR (October 2016).

22 See, for example, Angus S. Deaton, "Aging, Religion, and Health", Working Paper 15271, National Bureau of Economic Research (August 2009).

23 The HDI score is provided as a number between 0 and 1. For more details, including technical explanations about how the measure is calculated, see <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.


24 The correlation coefficient for the average shares of women per delegation (across all meetings) and the HDI-scores in the dataset is 0.4.

Delegation leadership

As mentioned above, Australia and New Zealand stands out as the sub-region with the highest share of women delegates. It also stands out as the sub-region with the highest share of meeting delegations headed by women.²⁵ Of the 24 meetings mapped in this study, New Zealand was registered for 23, and for as many as 20 of those meetings, the head of delegation was a woman. For Australia, the corresponding numbers were 22 (meetings) and 9 (delegations headed by women). For the two put together, this produces an average of 64 per cent where the head of delegation was a woman, which is almost exactly the same as the average share of women per delegation (63 per cent). That is not the case for any of the other sub-region.

As Figure 9 shows, for most sub-regions, the share of delegations headed by women was lower than the overall share of women in the delegations. One notable exception is Micronesia, where women were actually overrepresented as heads of delegation (Micronesia's delegations were made up, on average, of 35 per cent women, but 50 per cent of the delegations were led by women). For Northern America, Central Asia and Western Europe, women were also slightly overrepresented as heads of delegation (compared to the gender balance of their delegations, not the 50–50 parity mark). But these are exceptions to the general trend. Overall, the average share of delegations headed by women was 23.7 per cent, compared to an average share of women per delegation (per country) of 31.3 per cent.²⁶ On average, women were thus underrepresented as heads of delegation by nearly eight percentage points (compared to the overall share of women in the delegation) across the 24 meetings.

Figure 9: Average share of delegations headed by women by subregion



25 As noted above, the first name under each state in the participant lists is catalogued as head of delegation. What that role means in practice in terms of delegation leadership may vary from meeting to meeting and from country to country.

26 These average shares are calculated by producing average shares of women and heads of delegation across all 24 meetings for each country, and then calculating the average of those averages. This is why the total average share of women per delegation differs slightly from what was listed earlier in the report (30.3 per cent).

Measuring gender balance

What the case of Australia and New Zealand also illustrates is that average shares of women per delegation at times go far beyond the parity point of 50 per cent. This is particularly true for New Zealand, with its 79 per cent women per delegation average, and with as much as 87 per cent of the meeting delegations headed by women. If the principled objective is to strive for equal representation of men and women in international disarmament diplomacy, New Zealand's 79 per cent women rate is actually as far away from gender parity as Eastern Africa and Western Asia is in the other direction (22 per cent share of women per delegation on average).

The systemic implication of the New Zealand case (which is an outlier in the dataset) is of course limited, and it should not be seen as a problem that certain countries in practice serve to counterbalance the overall underrepresentation of women. But if the goal is to achieve something close to gender parity, then for the purpose of monitoring progress towards that goal, it would make sense to use a measure that ranks states according to how close they are to equal participation (50:50 ratio), rather than to simply calculate the share of women per delegation. If so, that would put Saint Kitts and Nevis, Norway, Venezuela, Cuba, Panama, Israel, and Montenegro on top of the list, all with less than one percentage point deviation from the 50 per cent mark.²⁷ At the bottom of that same list is Congo, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia, all without a single woman registered for any of the meetings attended. But also at the bottom is Belize, with 100 per cent women and not a single man registered (though only 4 delegates in total). See Annex II for a full overview of the gender balance score for each state.

Participation by developing states

As noted in the previous section, there appears to be a link between gender balance in delegations and the development status of the participating states. Overall, states with a higher score on the Human Development Index tend to have higher shares of women in their delegations. And while there is merit in studying the relationship between gender and development, the question of participation by developing countries in multilateral disarmament forums is worth investigating in its own right. It is a question of fairness and equal opportunities in the multilateral system.

The starting point is the notion that developing states are at a disadvantage in multilateral diplomacy due to restraints on resources and diplomatic personnel. Resource scarcity could force developing states to send small delegations – or no delegation at all. Or, along similar lines, if meetings occur in a diplomatic hub city like Geneva or New York where permanent mission staff are required to attend and participate in a broad spectrum of UN meetings and conferences occurring simultaneously, those with smaller staff are pressed to be in many places at one time. In such scenarios the capacity of developing states to participate actively in all items on the agenda is constrained, something that over time could result in a weakened link between the issues of disarmament and development—a link that is enshrined in Article 26 of the UN Charter.²⁸ Increased involvement by developing countries in discussions about disarmament should therefore be considered a prerequisite if we are to strengthen the global security architecture overall. The aim of this section is to identify patterns that may or may not fit with the assumption that economic development and participation in multilateral disarmament forums is positively correlated.

Developing states attendance

As mentioned above, scarcity of resources and trained personnel is thought to prevent many developing states from attending meetings they would otherwise have wanted to attend. Figure 10 confirms that this assumption is not completely unwarranted. The figure shows the average number of meetings attended (of the total of 24) by states in different levels of development. For simplicity, the figure employs the development categories of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (states eligible for Official Development Assistance, ODA), rather than the HDI.²⁹

27 The gender balance score is calculated on the basis of the average share of women per state, using the following formula: $GBAL = (((WSHARE - 0.5) \wedge 2) - 1) \wedge 2$, with GBAL being the gender balance value and WSHARE being the average share of women. This produces a variable that ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing zero balance (only men or only women), while the score 1 achieved at perfect gender parity (on average) in their delegations (equal share of men and women).

28 Article 26 of the UN Charter reads as follows: "In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

29 For the latest list of ODA recipients (and categories), see <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/da->

Figure 10: Average number of meetings attended by states in each ODA-category





Figure 11: Average number of meetings attended by size of GDP



On average, least developed and low income states (lumped together in this analysis) attended less than half (11.6) of the 24 meetings mapped, whereas developed states (not ODA recipients) on average attended almost four fifths (18.8) of the meetings. Interestingly, though, the lower middle income states had a higher participation rate (15.2 meetings on average) than the upper middle income states (14.1 on average).

There could be various reasons for this discrepancy, of course, and it is quite possible that the most reliable explanation has nothing to do with economic development. However, it is also possible that it does have to do with economic development, but that the ODA categories, which are mainly based on a GDP per capita calculation, do not properly capture the key mechanisms of the problem. For instance, the lower middle income category includes states such as India and Indonesia, both with trillion dollar economies. Nigeria, the Philippines, and Egypt are also in this category. Conversely, the upper middle income category includes states such as Belize, Dominica, and the Maldives, as well as a number of Pacific island states. It seems unreasonable to expect that India – with a population of more than a billion people, a foreign service of around 600 officers,³⁰ 160 foreign missions and posts, and a permanent mission in New York with 27 registered staff³¹ – would have less human and financial resources available to attend international disarmament meetings than Belize or Nauru (both listed as upper middle income countries by the OECD, based on GDP per capita). India's economy is about 1,400 times larger than that of Belize (in nominal GDP), and nearly 23,000 times larger than that of Nauru. Somehow, the total size of the economy also has to be taken into consideration.

In Figure 11, the states are categorized by total size of GDP instead of by ODA categories, which provides a clearer picture in terms of the link between participation rates and economic resources.³² On average, the largest economies (GDP above 500 Bn USD) were registered for 21.3 of the 24 meetings, while the smallest economies (GDP below 5 Bn USD) were only registered for

clist.htm.

30 Indian has more than 160 embassies around the world. For more information, see <https://www.mea.gov.in/indian-foreign-service.htm>.


31 See <https://protocol.un.org/dgacm/pls/site.nsf/BlueBook.xsp>.

32 The GDP data is from the World Bank, primarily for the year 2017. The following states are excluded from the calculation, due to missing or outdated values: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Holy See, Niue, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela. For an updated list of nominal GDP estimates, see <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd>.

6.5.³³ Every level of GDP has a higher attendance rate than the previous one. In other words, the larger the economy, the higher the attendance rate.

In Figure 12, the attendance rate is broken down by forum, but instead of using the average number of meetings attended as the basis for the calculation, it uses the average shares of states in each category that attended the meetings. The reason for using the average share of registered states in each category, rather than the average of meetings attended, is that the number of states parties (or members/eligible states) differs from forum to forum. The CCM, for instance, has only 106 states parties. And even though non-parties can (and do) attend CCM meetings as observers (see Figure 1), one would not expect all of them to do so. Comparing the number of registered states to the total number of states parties to each regime arguably represents a more accurate attendance rate. For the NPT, this means that DPRK, India, Israel and Pakistan are removed from the pool when the registration rate is calculated. The average share of registered states for each forum thus allows for more accurate comparison of the effect that economic development might have on participation rates in the different forums, notably because it accounts for the fact that some states decide not to participate for political reasons, rather than economic ones.

Figure 12: Average share of states registered for each forum by size of GDP



As an example, the first bar in the chart shows a 60 per cent attendance rate at the TPNW negotiations among states with very low GDP. This share is calculated by comparing the number of states with economies smaller than 5 Bn USD registered to that meeting (24) to the total number of UN member and observer states with economies smaller than 5 Bn USD (40). From 2015 to 2018, the number of states in the same category that were registered for the UNGA C1 ranged from 25 to 35, with an average of 29.5 states. When that average is compared to the total of 40 UN members states in that category, it yields an average registration share of 74 per cent for that forum (last bar in first cluster in Figure 12).

As Figure 12 shows, the change in calculation method does little to alter the overall pattern. For nearly all the forums, there is a

33 Note that these calculations do not consider whether or not a state is party to a particular treaty. In some cases, one could expect a correlation between development status and treaty adherence, but in other cases this skews the results. For instance, the reason why India and Pakistan do not attend NPT meetings is not a lack of resources.


clear positive correlation between the registration rates and GDP level.³⁴ The smallest economies have the lowest share of participation on average, and the largest economies have the highest. For the states with a very high GDP, the shares of registered states are close to 100 per cent for all forums. For the states with a very low GDP, the shares stretch from 5 per cent at APMBC meetings (on average) to 74 per cent at the UNGA C1.

The one clear exception is the TPNW, which shows a noticeable deviation from the pattern.³⁵ At the negotiation conference of the TPNW, it was the largest economies that had the lowest registration rates. Only 8 of the 23 UN member states in that category were registered for the meeting. But the explanation for these states' absence is hardly their development status. Instead, the limited participation by these states may be explained by the fact that a disproportionately large share of them rely on the potential use of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines and are not yet interested in banning nuclear weapons.

Delegation sizes

The number of states registered for different meetings is a key factor in evaluating patterns of participation in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. But in a development perspective, it is also relevant whether a delegation is large enough to engage actively on all matters under consideration. For many developing states with small delegations, this can be a considerable challenge, especially when meetings break into multiple working groups or informal discussions. Figure 13 illustrates this problem, and here as well, the trend is clear. The smallest economies send the smallest delegations, while the largest economies send the largest contingents of delegates. On average, across the 24 meetings, the delegations of the largest economies were more than three times the size of those with the smallest GDP.

Figure 13: Average size of delegations by size of GDP



34 The correlation coefficient for nominal GDP and HDI-scores in the dataset is just 0.19, but when the natural logarithm of GDP is used, which reduces the effect of outliers and extreme differences, the correlation coefficient jumps to 0.77.

35 Note that participation data for the TPNW covers only one conference, in New York in 2018, which limits the robustness of the findings. There is a good chance that the numbers for the TPNW will change considerably once the treaty enters into force, and especially if meetings of states parties are held outside UN disarmament hubs.


The state with by far the largest delegations on average was Russia. It was registered for 15 of the meetings, with a total of 371 delegates, which yields an average per meeting of just below 25. Number two on that list was the United States, with an average delegation size of 17.2 (326 delegates across 19 meetings). At the other end of the spectrum, 12 states had average delegation sizes of less than two people,³⁶ and 7 of these had low or very low total GDP (less than 20 Bn USD).

Overall meeting participation

Finally, Figure 14 displays the total number of states registered for each of the 24 meetings studied (number on top of each bar), as in Figure 1. But the figure also shows how these totals are distributed across the four ODA categories (numbers inside the bars). Overall, Figure 14 does not reveal any obvious pattern in terms of development status and forum preferences. The number of participating states in each ODA category are quite similar across all forums, and for the meetings where the total participation was at its highest (e.g. UNGA C1 in 2017), so too was the number for each ODA category. In that regard, it is worth noting that five of the top six meetings in terms of total participation all took place at the UN in New York—which is where most UN member states have permanent missions.

The one curious case in Figure 14 is the TPNW, where the combined share of developing states was a lot higher than usual (78 per cent compared to an average of 62 per cent). But as the figure shows, this was not because the number of developing states was particularly high. In absolute numbers, the participation rates for each category of ODA recipients at the TPNW negotiation was very similar to that of the NPT in 2015. The big difference was the number of developed states: while 57 developed states (not ODA recipients) were registered for the NPT in 2015, less than half of that (27) registered for the TPNW in 2017.

Figure 14: Number of states from each ODA category registered for each meeting



36 These were the Central African Republic, Eritrea, Iceland, Mali, Mauritania, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, South Sudan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The fact that Iceland is on this list, with a GDP per capita of more than 70 000 USD, illustrates one of the drawbacks of using total GDP size as a development indicator. The lack of participation by small developed states is not necessarily comparable to the lack of participation by developing states with large populations and low GDP per capita. For future work on this topic, it would be worth considering an alternative measure of development that is better adjusted to the task, and more closely linked to the underlying mechanisms of the problem.

Conclusion

The purpose of this report has been to investigate patterns of states' participation and representation in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy. These patterns are important to track because they provide key information about the extent to which all states in the international system are able to engage in a meaningful way in multilateral decision-making. They provide an indication of the extent of global ownership to the issues. Moreover, patterns of participation are an expression of how well the international disarmament system functions.

By following participation over time, we can also identify trends, which in turn can help focus resources and energy where it is most needed. If some forums have better gender balance than others, lessons could be learned and best practices exchanged. It is also possible to check whether efforts aimed at promoting higher participation by developing states is bearing fruits, and indeed whether these are focusing on the right target constituencies. In this study, we have not looked specifically at such efforts, but that may be a focus in later editions of this report, including a study of the effect of sponsorship programmes and the type and level of engagement within delegations.

One key conclusion of the report is that overall participation rates in multilateral disarmament diplomacy appear to have remained relatively stable over the past few years, though there are signs of a gradual increase in some forums, for instance the BWC. Even for the CCM, which has had a drop in the total number of registered states over the period studied, the number of registered states parties has actually increased, mirroring the overall growth in states parties to that treaty. On the whole, the forum with the highest share of registered states parties/members was the UNGA C1 (87 per cent on average), followed by the CWC (72 per cent), NPT (68 per cent) and the BWC (66 per cent). At the lower end of the spectrum is the TPNW (64 per cent), the CCM (59 per cent) and the APMBC (54 per cent of states parties registered on average).

With regards to gender balance, we find that the average share of women per delegation at international disarmament meetings increased steadily between 2015 and 2018, to about 33 per cent across all the forums mapped (see Figure 2). However, we find that there are considerable differences between the seven forums reviewed. The forum with the highest share of women in 2018, and also with the sharpest increase since 2015, was the CWC. The forum with the lowest share of women was the APMBC, with 27 per cent women in 2018, but with an average of only 23 per cent across the period. Moreover, the low share of women at APMBC meetings, in relative terms, was consistent across all the UN regional groups, and while certain hypotheses were explored, finding a robust explanation for the low share of women at APMBC meetings requires additional research. It might also be worth exploring why the CWC went through such a sharp increase in the share of women per delegation over the period (see Figure 3).

We further find that there is some correlation between states' socio-economic development and the gender balance of the delegations they send to disarmament meetings. At the same time, the picture is by no means clear, and certain sub-regions deviate considerably from the overall trend. With a view to better understanding the policies and measures that most effectively promote gender balance in international diplomacy, it would be worth looking into these patterns in further detail.

Finally, we find that there is a clear link between the socio-economic development of a given state and the extent to which that state is represented at disarmament meetings. On average, the states with very low GDP (less than 5 Bn USD) were registered for only 29 per cent of the meetings to which they were parties/members, while states with very high GDP (more than 500 Bn USD) were registered for 95 per cent of the meetings (see Figure 12). But the link is not linear, and it is not only a question about per capita income. Certain developing states with large economies (but categorized as developing states due to low levels of GDP per capita) have very high attendance rates at international meetings, and they also tend to send sizeable delegations. The challenge of finding human and financial resources to attend international disarmament meetings is much more pressing for the smallest developing states, where low GDP per capita is combined with a small population.

ANNEX 1 – List of meetings mapped

Short name	Description	Year	Total registered states	Total delegates	Average delegation size	Average share of women per delegation	Delegations led by women	Share of delegations led by women	Host State	City
TPNW negotiations 2017	Negotiating Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	2017	125	598	4.78	29.7%	19	15.4%	USA	New York
APMBC MSP 2015	Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	2015	102	399	3.91	25.7%	20	21.7%	Switzerland	Geneva
APMBC MSP 2016	Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	2016	93	290	3.12	15.4%	9	10.7%	Chile	Santiago
APMBC MSP 2017	Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	2017	95	366	3.85	24.8%	20	24.4%	Austria	Vienna
APMBC MSP 2018	Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention	2018	103	448	4.35	27.3%	23	24.7%	Switzerland	Geneva
CCM RC 2015	Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions	2015	92	224	2.43	24.0%	18	31.6%	Croatia	Dubrovnik
CCM MSP 2016	Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions	2016	86	303	3.52	32.8%	29	48.3%	Switzerland	Geneva
CCM MSP 2017	Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions	2017	82	288	3.51	30.9%	23	39.0%	Switzerland	Geneva
CCM MSP 2018	Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions	2018	79	273	3.46	32.3%	22	36.1%	Switzerland	Geneva
NPT 2015	Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	2015	164	1.226	7.48	27.5%	32	19.6%	USA	New York
NPT 2017	Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	2017	114	741	6.50	33.4%	23	20.2%	Austria	Vienna
NPT 2018	Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	2018	111	603	5.43	32.4%	23	20.7%	Switzerland	Geneva
CWC CSP 2015	Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention	2015	134	670	5.00	27.7%	31	23.3%	Netherlands	The Hague
CWC CSP 2016	Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention	2016	134	666	4.97	30.4%	30	22.6%	Netherlands	The Hague
CWC CSP 2017	Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention	2017	134	671	5.01	33.7%	36	27.1%	Netherlands	The Hague
CWC RC 2018	Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention	2018	154	812	5.27	37.6%	47	30.7%	Netherlands	The Hague
BWC MSP 2015	Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	2015	116	500	4.31	28.7%	24	21.6%	Switzerland	Geneva
BWC RevCon 2016	Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	2016	130	725	5.58	32.1%	31	25.0%	Switzerland	Geneva
BWC MSP 2017	Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	2017	120	533	4.44	35.4%	32	27.6%	Switzerland	Geneva
BWC MSP 2018	Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	2018	122	529	4.34	33.8%	31	26.7%	Switzerland	Geneva
UNGA C1 2015	First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly	2015	152	693	4.56	32.2%	39	26.0%	USA	New York
UNGA C1 2016	First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly	2016	177	809	4.57	32.5%	41	23.4%	USA	New York
UNGA C1 2017	First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly	2017	182	820	4.51	33.4%	46	25.6%	USA	New York
UNGA C1 2018	First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly	2018	168	782	4.65	32.6%	44	26.3%	USA	New York
AVERAGE			122	573	4.56	30.2%	28.2	25.7%		
TOTAL			2.969	13.969						

ANNEX 2 – Full list of states with delegation details

(The list includes all member and observer states of the United Nations, plus Niue and Cook Islands)

State	Total meetings attended	Total number of delegates	Average size of meeting delegations	Total number of women in delegations	Average share of women per delegation	Gender balance score	Delegations headed by women	Share of meeting delegations headed by women
Afghanistan	20	61	3.1	5	6.3%	0.06	3	15.0 %
Albania	18	43	2.4	23	57.6%	0.95	17	94.4 %
Algeria	19	136	7.2	13	11.0%	0.15	3	15.8 %
Andorra	13	31	2.4	28	92.3%	0.08	12	92.3 %
Angola	22	117	5.3	18	14.4%	0.24	6	27.3 %
Antigua and Barbuda	7	15	2.1	7	58.3%	0.95	3	42.9 %
Argentina	23	123	5.3	29	22.7%	0.49	1	4.3 %
Armenia	14	40	2.9	14	35.1%	0.83	5	35.7 %
Australia	22	145	6.6	66	45.9%	0.99	9	40.9 %
Austria	24	182	7.6	38	18.9%	0.38	5	20.8 %
Azerbaijan	18	45	2.5	7	11.8%	0.17	0	0.0 %
Bahamas	6	27	4.5	21	81.9%	0.35	2	33.3 %
Bahrain	13	54	4.2	17	39.4%	0.91	6	46.2 %
Bangladesh	13	45	3.5	3	4.6%	0.03	0	0.0 %
Barbados	7	19	2.7	10	52.4%	1.00	2	28.6 %
Belarus	18	72	4.0	6	6.6%	0.06	1	5.6 %
Belgium	23	100	4.3	19	16.7%	0.31	4	17.4 %
Belize	2	4	2.0	4	100.0%	-	2	100.0 %
Benin	11	43	3.9	5	12.0%	0.18	0	0.0 %
Bhutan	14	35	2.5	15	39.3%	0.91	7	50.0 %
Bolivia	13	37	2.8	7	21.8%	0.46	2	15.4 %
Bosnia and Herzegovina	22	64	2.9	23	40.4%	0.93	15	68.2 %
Botswana	19	69	3.6	21	31.3%	0.74	4	21.1 %
Brazil	20	174	8.7	24	13.2%	0.21	3	15.0 %
Brunei	12	35	2.9	14	39.6%	0.92	2	16.7 %
Bulgaria	21	73	3.5	37	48.5%	1.00	8	38.1 %
Burkina Faso	16	68	4.3	14	16.7%	0.31	4	25.0 %
Burundi	13	27	2.1	4	17.9%	0.35	4	30.8 %
Cabo Verde	4	8	2.0	3	33.3%	0.79	0	0.0 %
Cambodia	10	65	6.5	7	6.8%	0.06	0	0.0 %
Cameroon	17	54	3.2	10	15.0%	0.26	4	23.5 %
Canada	23	144	6.3	71	46.6%	0.99	20	87.0 %
Central African Republic	6	8	1.3	1	5.6%	0.04	0	0.0 %
Chad	9	21	2.3	1	2.8%	0.01	0	0.0 %
Chile	24	140	5.8	45	31.6%	0.75	11	45.8 %
China	23	261	11.3	59	22.7%	0.49	0	0.0 %
Colombia	24	108	4.5	47	48.2%	1.00	15	62.5 %
Comoros	3	8	2.7	4	36.1%	0.85	1	33.3 %
Congo	8	23	2.9	0	0.0%	-	0	0.0 %
Cook Islands	0	0	.	0	.	.	0	.
Costa Rica	23	90	3.9	54	57.1%	0.96	11	47.8 %
Côte d'Ivoire	18	59	3.3	5	6.4%	0.06	0	0.0 %
Croatia	23	99	4.3	55	62.2%	0.88	16	69.6 %
Cuba	19	88	4.6	47	50.7%	1.00	7	36.8 %
Cyprus	23	77	3.3	34	41.4%	0.94	0	0.0 %
Czechia	23	118	5.1	25	19.5%	0.40	7	30.4 %
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	4	16	4.0	0	0.0%	-	0	0.0 %
Democratic Republic of the Congo	16	50	3.1	11	10.7%	0.15	3	18.8 %

State	Total meetings attended	Total number of delegates	Average size of meeting delegations	Total number of women in delegations	Average share of women per delegation	Gender balance score	Delegations headed by women	Share of meeting delegations headed by women
Denmark	12	47	3.9	17	43.3%	0.96	5	41.7 %
Djibouti	9	25	2.8	8	25.9%	0.59	1	11.1 %
Dominica	0	0	.	0	.	.	0	.
Dominican Republic	20	71	3.6	23	29.6%	0.69	3	15.0 %
Ecuador	23	77	3.3	21	25.5%	0.58	6	26.1 %
Egypt	9	52	5.8	1	1.2%	0.00	0	0.0 %
El Salvador	21	59	2.8	14	22.7%	0.49	3	14.3 %
Equatorial Guinea	1	4	4.0	1	25.0%	0.56	0	0.0 %
Eritrea	6	10	1.7	3	38.9%	0.90	2	33.3 %
Estonia	18	74	4.1	45	60.7%	0.91	2	11.1 %
Eswatini	9	19	2.1	2	8.3%	0.09	0	0.0 %
Ethiopia	16	53	3.3	11	16.1%	0.29	1	6.3 %
Fiji	13	37	2.8	9	23.1%	0.50	0	0.0 %
Finland	23	162	7.0	93	60.7%	0.91	16	69.6 %
France	21	228	10.9	84	36.5%	0.86	9	42.9 %
Gabon	7	42	6.0	18	55.2%	0.98	3	42.9 %
Gambia	12	38	3.2	7	19.1%	0.38	2	16.7 %
Georgia	15	45	3.0	16	37.2%	0.87	2	13.3 %
Germany	22	229	10.4	70	25.9%	0.59	11	50.0 %
Ghana	17	103	6.1	19	17.9%	0.34	6	35.3 %
Greece	20	73	3.7	26	34.9%	0.83	14	70.0 %
Grenada	6	18	3.0	14	77.8%	0.48	5	83.3 %
Guatemala	21	69	3.3	41	62.5%	0.88	11	52.4 %
Guinea	10	21	2.1	2	8.3%	0.09	1	10.0 %
Guinea-Bissau	3	8	2.7	2	19.4%	0.39	0	0.0 %
Guyana	8	20	2.5	7	33.3%	0.79	0	0.0 %
Haiti	8	20	2.5	5	21.9%	0.47	0	0.0 %
Holy See	23	102	4.4	10	7.4%	0.07	0	0.0 %
Honduras	17	52	3.1	27	45.0%	0.98	6	35.3 %
Hungary	22	98	4.5	33	34.7%	0.82	13	59.1 %
Iceland	12	21	1.8	4	10.4%	0.14	0	0.0 %
India	16	79	4.9	19	27.2%	0.63	1	6.3 %
Indonesia	20	166	8.3	32	16.5%	0.30	0	0.0 %
Iran	16	136	8.5	4	2.3%	0.01	0	0.0 %
Iraq	24	186	7.8	22	12.2%	0.18	0	0.0 %
Ireland	24	157	6.5	84	56.3%	0.97	10	41.7 %
Israel	13	88	6.8	41	50.9%	1.00	3	23.1 %
Italy	23	115	5.0	42	36.8%	0.87	1	4.3 %
Jamaica	10	35	3.5	23	70.0%	0.71	4	40.0 %
Japan	23	333	14.5	77	23.5%	0.52	0	0.0 %
Jordan	18	70	3.9	14	20.8%	0.44	7	38.9 %
Kazakhstan	20	116	5.8	16	12.5%	0.19	4	20.0 %
Kenya	20	91	4.6	30	28.7%	0.67	3	15.0 %
Kiribati	3	7	2.3	4	41.7%	0.95	0	0.0 %
Kuwait	19	71	3.7	21	36.8%	0.87	4	21.1 %
Kyrgyzstan	8	23	2.9	5	23.3%	0.51	3	37.5 %
Lao People's Democratic Republic	21	92	4.4	19	22.5%	0.49	1	4.8 %
Latvia	18	52	2.9	32	63.5%	0.86	7	38.9 %
Lebanon	23	75	3.3	32	45.9%	0.99	7	30.4 %
Lesotho	8	27	3.4	10	34.2%	0.81	0	0.0 %
Liberia	9	18	2.0	6	33.3%	0.79	3	33.3 %
Libya	15	42	2.8	1	3.3%	0.02	0	0.0 %
Liechtenstein	9	31	3.4	8	24.8%	0.56	0	0.0 %

State	Total meetings attended	Total number of delegates	Average size of meeting delegations	Total number of women in delegations	Average share of women per delegation	Gender balance score	Delegations headed by women	Share of meeting delegations headed by women
Lithuania	21	63	3.0	34	52.8%	0.99	4	19.0 %
Luxembourg	21	82	3.9	20	25.2%	0.57	3	14.3 %
Madagascar	12	36	3.0	20	54.2%	0.99	3	25.0 %
Malawi	10	27	2.7	2	5.0%	0.04	0	0.0 %
Malaysia	17	82	4.8	34	36.6%	0.86	0	0.0 %
Maldives	5	15	3.0	8	66.7%	0.79	4	80.0 %
Mali	8	14	1.8	5	33.3%	0.79	3	37.5 %
Malta	17	42	2.5	10	23.4%	0.52	3	17.6 %
Marshall Islands	3	15	5.0	7	45.0%	0.98	2	66.7 %
Mauritania	15	22	1.5	1	6.7%	0.06	1	6.7 %
Mauritius	12	33	2.8	6	13.8%	0.23	0	0.0 %
Mexico	24	126	5.3	40	31.3%	0.74	6	25.0 %
Micronesia	2	7	3.5	2	29.2%	0.68	1	50.0 %
Monaco	11	29	2.6	18	57.7%	0.95	8	72.7 %
Mongolia	14	41	2.9	15	34.5%	0.82	2	14.3 %
Montenegro	17	35	2.1	16	49.0%	1.00	5	29.4 %
Morocco	23	113	4.9	20	12.6%	0.19	1	4.3 %
Mozambique	17	58	3.4	8	12.0%	0.18	3	17.6 %
Myanmar	19	70	3.7	20	28.3%	0.66	0	0.0 %
Namibia	17	75	4.4	33	45.0%	0.98	8	47.1 %
Nauru	3	12	4.0	7	58.9%	0.94	3	100.0 %
Nepal	15	62	4.1	8	12.7%	0.20	0	0.0 %
Netherlands	24	184	7.7	66	38.4%	0.90	1	4.2 %
New Zealand	23	89	3.9	61	78.7%	0.45	20	87.0 %
Nicaragua	19	46	2.4	18	34.6%	0.82	4	21.1 %
Niger	17	52	3.1	14	24.0%	0.53	8	47.1 %
Nigeria	20	136	6.8	24	16.7%	0.31	1	5.0 %
Niue	0	0	.	0	.	.	0	.
North Macedonia	19	50	2.6	24	46.9%	0.99	2	10.5 %
Norway	22	140	6.4	64	50.0%	1.00	3	13.6 %
Oman	23	67	2.9	9	15.4%	0.27	3	13.0 %
Pakistan	16	79	4.9	15	18.9%	0.38	6	37.5 %
Palau	6	11	1.8	4	30.6%	0.72	2	33.3 %
Panama	24	69	2.9	37	50.8%	1.00	10	41.7 %
Papua New Guinea	7	22	3.1	0	0.0%	-	0	0.0 %
Paraguay	12	27	2.3	4	15.3%	0.27	0	0.0 %
Peru	24	91	3.8	19	22.4%	0.48	6	25.0 %
Philippines	23	136	5.9	77	54.5%	0.98	8	34.8 %
Poland	20	140	7.0	36	26.9%	0.62	2	10.0 %
Portugal	18	74	4.1	20	28.3%	0.66	4	22.2 %
Qatar	23	126	5.5	27	20.8%	0.43	5	21.7 %
Republic of Korea	17	188	11.1	82	41.9%	0.95	0	0.0 %
Republic of Moldova	16	47	2.9	19	38.2%	0.89	2	12.5 %
Romania	18	59	3.3	21	28.0%	0.65	2	11.1 %
Russian Federation	15	371	24.7	89	23.5%	0.52	0	0.0 %
Rwanda	4	8	2.0	0	0.0%	-	0	0.0 %
Saint Kitts and Nevis	4	4	1.0	2	50.0%	1.00	2	50.0 %
Saint Lucia	6	13	2.2	9	68.1%	0.76	3	50.0 %
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	5	10	2.0	5	46.7%	0.99	3	60.0 %
Samoa	6	27	4.5	16	60.6%	0.91	0	0.0 %
San Marino	14	31	2.2	13	39.3%	0.91	1	7.1 %
Sao Tome and Principe	3	3	1.0	0	0.0%	-	0	0.0 %
Saudi Arabia	20	150	7.5	4	3.4%	0.02	0	0.0 %
Senegal	20	78	3.9	12	16.0%	0.29	1	5.0 %

State	Total meetings attended	Total number of delegates	Average size of meeting delegations	Total number of women in delegations	Average share of women per delegation	Gender balance score	Delegations headed by women	Share of meeting delegations headed by women
Serbia	23	67	2.9	18	25.0%	0.56	2	8.7 %
Seychelles	7	11	1.6	6	69.0%	0.73	4	57.1 %
Sierra Leone	3	14	4.7	1	5.6%	0.04	0	0.0 %
Singapore	19	73	3.8	27	31.1%	0.73	4	21.1 %
Slovakia	23	122	5.3	24	14.4%	0.24	0	0.0 %
Slovenia	23	80	3.5	41	52.8%	0.99	6	26.1 %
Solomon Islands	5	10	2.0	5	43.3%	0.96	1	20.0 %
Somalia	5	14	2.8	0	0.0%	-	0	0.0 %
South Africa	23	155	6.7	68	44.6%	0.98	8	34.8 %
South Sudan	8	10	1.3	2	18.8%	0.37	1	12.5 %
Spain	23	119	5.2	16	11.5%	0.16	1	4.3 %
Sri Lanka	24	84	3.5	38	45.9%	0.99	3	12.5 %
State of Palestine	15	39	2.6	12	20.6%	0.43	1	6.7 %
Sudan	24	88	3.7	5	3.7%	0.02	2	8.3 %
Suriname	7	23	3.3	13	61.9%	0.89	3	42.9 %
Sweden	23	170	7.4	60	31.1%	0.73	10	43.5 %
Switzerland	24	186	7.8	48	25.7%	0.58	15	62.5 %
Syrian Arab Republic	17	71	4.2	2	1.4%	0.00	0	0.0 %
Tajikistan	9	18	2.0	2	11.1%	0.16	1	11.1 %
Thailand	22	163	7.4	73	45.6%	0.98	3	13.6 %
Timor-Leste	6	15	2.5	7	52.8%	0.99	6	100.0 %
Togo	13	31	2.4	2	10.3%	0.14	1	7.7 %
Tonga	6	15	2.5	4	22.2%	0.48	0	0.0 %
Trinidad and Tobago	13	41	3.2	30	69.6%	0.72	7	53.8 %
Tunisia	19	41	2.2	10	25.4%	0.58	0	0.0 %
Turkey	23	123	5.3	28	20.6%	0.43	4	17.4 %
Turkmenistan	4	4	1.0	1	25.0%	0.56	1	25.0 %
Tuvalu	4	10	2.5	7	81.3%	0.37	3	75.0 %
Uganda	20	73	3.7	17	24.3%	0.54	0	0.0 %
Ukraine	19	126	6.6	20	13.6%	0.22	0	0.0 %
United Arab Emirates	18	148	8.2	23	13.8%	0.23	3	16.7 %
United Kingdom	23	233	10.1	88	40.6%	0.93	2	8.7 %
United Republic of Tanzania	16	47	2.9	13	34.6%	0.82	6	37.5 %
United States of America	19	326	17.2	143	42.2%	0.95	4	21.1 %
Uruguay	14	44	3.1	25	57.9%	0.95	1	7.1 %
Uzbekistan	8	14	1.8	1	6.3%	0.05	0	0.0 %
Vanuatu	5	16	3.2	6	31.7%	0.75	0	0.0 %
Venezuela	19	81	4.3	39	49.7%	1.00	4	21.1 %
Viet Nam	17	60	3.5	20	31.5%	0.75	9	52.9 %
Yemen	19	51	2.7	5	6.3%	0.06	2	10.5 %
Zambia	20	87	4.4	32	37.0%	0.87	10	50.0 %
Zimbabwe	19	71	3.7	12	15.8%	0.28	1	5.3 %



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