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## A Guide to the Oslo Action Plan and Provisional Results of 2020 Monitoring: Survey and Clearance

**Mine Action Review** 

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## A GUIDE TO **THE OSLO ACTION PLAN AND PROVISIONAL RESULTS OF 2020 MONITORING:** SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

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1 October 2020 (draft report of provisional 2020 results)

MINE ACTION REVIEW ADVISORY BOARD:







FUNDED BY THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SWISS FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:



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Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA

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## Introduction and States Parties Assessed

This Guide and provisional results of 2020 monitoring by Mine Action Review aim to support the measurable and accountable implementation of Article 5 of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. They do so by focusing on the Oslo Action Plan, adopted at the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019, describing how the Action Plan addresses survey and clearance, and explaining how progress in implementing those commitments in the Action Plan will be assessed. This Guide follows the Oslo Action Plan's approach by detailing commitments that apply specifically to survey and clearance operations in all affected States Parties, as well as general best practices in mine action that are cross-cutting in nature.

Mine Action Review's formal assessment of progress under the Oslo Action Plan will be published annually before each Meeting of the States Parties, through to the Convention's Fifth Review Conference in 2024. Our annual assessment will draw on research conducted for Mine Action Review's annual *Clearing the Mines* reports,<sup>1</sup> and will monitor 24 indicators from the Oslo Action Plan which are relevant to survey and clearance. These include selected indicators from Section II (best practices for implementing the Convention); Section V (survey and clearance of mined areas); Section VII (international cooperation and assistance); and Section IX (measures to ensure compliance). A summary table of the provisional 2020 baseline value results of Mine Action Review's Oslo Action Plan monitoring is in Annex 1.

Sources for the monitoring of progress according to the 24 indicators include official Convention reporting (Article 7 reports, and statements in both intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties); statements in the annual United Nations (UN) National Mine Action Directors meetings and other relevant fora; and information provided directly to Mine Action Review by national authorities, clearance operators, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other key stakeholders.

This report is offered in the spirit of openness and constructive dialogue, accountability, and measurability. Viewed alongside Mine Action Review's annual *Clearing the Mines* report, we hope it will enable the mine action community to determine what measures are needed to improve the rate of progress in Article 5 implementation in affected States Parties between now and the Fifth Review Conference. Successful national ownership of mine action programmes requires political engagement by both the affected nation and supporting states. It also often requires support from implementing partners, be it financial, technical, or strategic, as well as honest reflection on challenges to progress. Different actors can add value in different ways in supporting affected States Parties to achieve their Article 5 obligations efficiently and effectively. It is intended that Mine Action Review's constructive monitoring and analysis serve as a strategic tool in these endeavours.

The provisional assessment is based on information available to Mine Action Review as at 1 October 2020. A final version will be published following the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention on 16–20 November 2020. Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the results of the provisional assessment. Please email MineActionReview@npaid.org with any feedback and/or additional information for our consideration.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See: www.mineactionreview.org.

**States Parties Assessed:** For the purposes of this baseline assessment for Oslo Action Plan (OAP) indicators related to survey and clearance, Mine Action Review has generally assessed 29 of the 35 affected States Parties, namely: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),\* Ecuador, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger,\* Oman, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom (UK), Yemen, and Zimbabwe. A 36th State Party, Chile, which fulfilled its Article 5 obligations in February 2020, is not included in the assessment of affected States Parties (except with respect to the indicator under Action Item #20 on fulfilment of Article 5 obligations and Action Item #25 on declarations of completion).

**States Parties Not Assessed:** Argentina, Cyprus, and Palestine have not been assessed (except with respect to the indicator under Action Item #20 on fulfilment of Article 5 obligations), as they do not have control over remaining mined areas under their Article 5 obligations. States Parties Cameroon,\* Mali,\* and Nigeria,\* which have new mined areas as a result of new use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, and no new Article 5 deadline yet in place, have also not been assessed (except with respect to indicators under: Action Item #20 on fulfilment of Article 5 obligations; Action Item #21 on applying the provisions of the Convention to anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature; Action Item #26 on discovery of previously unknown mined areas).

<u>States Parties marked with an \* are those which had still to submit an Article 7 report in 2020 (covering 2019) as at 1 October 2020.</u>

Mine Action Review is an independent project supported by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and funded by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and NPA form Mine Action Review's Advisory Board. Any queries relating to our work should be emailed to <u>MineActionReview@npaid.org</u>.

# Oslo Action Plan Section II: Best Practices for Implementing the Convention

Since the entry into force of the Convention in 1999, the States Parties have identified best practices that are key to the successful implementation of the Convention's obligations. The following crosscutting issues apply to survey and clearance under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, as they do to other thematic issues (e.g. stockpile destruction, victim assistance). At the heart of the Convention is national ownership, which has been defined to include political will, the provision of funding, and an effective and efficient mine action programme.<sup>2</sup> Information management is critical to any mine action programme, informing work plans and multi-year strategic plans, while the adoption and revision of national standards promote efficient methodologies, safety, and security. A progressive approach to gender and diversity ensures the benefits of mine action are shared by all.

## National Ownership

**Action #1** Demonstrate high levels of national ownership,<sup>3</sup> including by integrating Convention implementation activities into national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, humanitarian response plans and national strategies for the inclusion of persons with disabilities as appropriate, and by making financial and other commitments to implementation.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The percentage of mine-affected States Parties that report making national financial commitments to the implementation of their [Article 5] obligations under the Convention.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have made a national financial contribution to Article 5 implementation in 2019 or 2020.

Baseline value result (2020): 90% [26 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC,\* Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger,\* Oman, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, Sri Lanka,\* South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe

States Parties that have not met the indicator: Eritrea,\* Somalia, and Yemen

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

Additional comments

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The States Parties have defined national ownership as entailing the following: "maintaining interest at a high level in fulfilling Convention obligations; empowering and providing relevant State entities with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out their obligations under the Convention; articulating the measures its State entities will undertake to implement relevant aspects of Convention in the most inclusive, efficient and expedient manner possible and plans to overcome any challenges that need to be addressed; and making a regular significant national financial commitment to the State's programmes to implement the Convention". <sup>3</sup> Ibid.

In some States Parties, such as **Chad**, **DRC**, and **Senegal**, national funding is provided towards the costs of the national mine action centre, but not towards anti-personnel survey or clearance operations.

#### Commentary

National ownership encompasses a wide-ranging set of activities that enable and support the implementation of the Convention's obligations. Support from central government and relevant regional authorities should be of both a financial and a political nature.

With respect to survey and clearance, there are two overarching institutions that the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) identify as being of critical importance: a national mine action authority<sup>4</sup> and a national mine action centre.<sup>5</sup> The national mine action authority is an interministerial body that should ensure a whole-of-government approach to mine action. It sets overall strategy and policy for the mine action programme and helps to ensure that national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, and humanitarian response plans duly reflect the impact of landmines and action to ensure their speedy removal and destruction.

The national mine action centre is an operational coordinating body that ensures that all mine action stakeholders follow national standards and procedures, are tasked according to appropriate priorities, and are monitored during their work. The national mine action centre will normally house and maintain the national mine action database, whether that be the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) or another system. While not a specified indicator in the Oslo Action Plan, the number of mine-affected States Parties having a functioning and effective mine action authority and mine action centre is also a good reflection of their commitment to national ownership, along with their national financial commitments.

## National Strategies and Work Plans

**Action #2** Develop evidence-based, costed and time-bound national strategies and work plans to fulfil and implement Convention obligations as soon as possible.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The percentage of mine-affected States Parties that report having evidence-based, costed, and time-bound national strategies and work plans in place.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have <u>either</u> a work plan <u>or</u> a strategy that is evidence-based, costed, and time-bound.

Baseline value result (2020): 69% [20 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC,\* Ecuador, Ethiopia, Oman, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> A national mine action authority should be supported by regional action, especially in federal or devolved systems or where jurisdiction over a territory is contested.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The national mine action centre may be supported and complemented by regional mine action centres.

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Chad, Eritrea,\* Iraq, Mauritania, Niger,\* Senegal,\* Somalia, and Ukraine

#### States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: Yemen

#### Additional comments

In **Somalia**, a National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 has been elaborated, but as at October 2020 had not been formally approved.

#### Commentary

Every mine-affected State Party should have an evidence-based, multi-year mine action strategic plan and a realistic annual work plan in place. A national mine action strategy is a multi-year plan that identifies goals for the mine action programme and strategic priorities for achieving them. Five years is a common time period for a strategic plan, though this period can legitimately differ (such as a consequence of a State's Article 5 deadline). As the Oslo Action Plan indicates, the national mine action strategic plan should also be evidence-based and costed, with its own in-built indicators to enable progress to be assessed.

Within the context and parameters of the national mine action strategy, a mine action work plan is typically an annual plan that sets detailed objectives for survey, clearance, information management, training, standardisation, and quality management (quality assurance and quality control). As is the case with the multi-year strategy, the annual work plan should be evidence-based and costed. Where, as often occurs, other forms of contamination exist, such as cluster munition remnants or other explosive remnants of war, work plans should ensure that synergies exist between mine clearance and battle area clearance capacities, priorities, and tasking.

### Gender and Diversity

**Action #3** Ensure that the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, boys and men are considered and inform all areas of Convention implementation and mine action programmes, in order to deliver an inclusive approach. Strive to remove barriers to full, equal and gender balanced participation in mine action and in Convention meetings.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The percentage of affected States Parties whose national work plans and strategies integrate gender and take the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into account.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties have <u>either</u> a work plan <u>or</u> a strategy that integrates gender and takes into account diverse needs.

Baseline value result (2020): 48% [14 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC,\* Iraq, Senegal,\* South Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** BiH, Chad, Eritrea,\* Mauritania, Niger,\* Peru, Serbia, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Oman, and Turkey

#### Commentary

It is increasingly understood that duly reflecting broader gender and diversity concerns in survey and clearance operations, as well as in the personnel staffing the mine action programme, can have a significant and positive impact on the overall effectiveness of the mine action programme. These concerns should be incorporated at policy and programmatic level and then implemented operationally. When women and members of ethnic minority communities are genuinely included in the mine action programme, the programme and broader society are also the beneficiaries.

While there has been considerable progress in promoting gender equality in mine action over the last few years, the same cannot yet be said for diversity. Minorities are often marginalised both in terms of clearance priorities and with respect to employment and participation in the mine action sector. There is no IMAS on gender or diversity. Every mine-affected State Party should ensure that gender and diversity needs, in particular of minorities, are effectively taken into account in the implementation of their mine action programme, including determination of clearance priorities and tasks.

## National Standards Reflecting IMAS

**Action #5** Keep national mine action standards up to date in accordance with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), adapt them to new challenges and employ best practices to ensure efficient and effective implementation.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The percentage of mine-affected States Parties that have updated their national standards to address new challenges and ensure the employment of best practices, taking into consideration the latest IMAS.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has focused our assessment on whether or not States Parties have updated national standards to allow for evidence-based land release through both survey and clearance.

Baseline value result (2020): 48% [14 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Angola, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Mauritania, Oman, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, and Ukraine

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Colombia, DRC,\* Niger,\* Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, and Yemen

#### Additional comments

In **Afghanistan**, The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) and the GICHD are due to review national land release standards and are expected to undertake revisions with a view to strengthening non-technical survey and increasing operational efficiency.

**Colombia** is in the process of updating its national standards.

**Sri Lanka** has undertaken a review of its national standards, but had yet to adopt the revised standards.

Sudan is awaiting endorsement of its revised national standards.

Yemen planned to revise its national standards in 2020 with the support of GICHD and UNDP.

#### Commentary

The IMAS<sup>6</sup> have been developed to improve safety, efficiency and effectiveness in mine action and to promote a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action operations.<sup>7</sup> They constitute industry best practice for safe and effective mine action operations. Published and overseen by UNMAS with the support of other UN and mine action agencies (commercial and non-governmental organisations), national authorities and the GICHD, they set out in detail how survey and clearance operations should be designed, managed, and implemented. Particularly important are IMAS 02.10 on the establishment of a mine action programme; the glossary of mine action terms in IMAS 04.10; IMAS 07.11 on Land Release; the IMAS on technical and non-technical survey (08.20 and 08.10, respectively); and clearance requirements (09.10).

The IMAS are intended to be adapted to the national context in the form of national mine action standards (NMAS), so that programmes can take due account of local circumstances on issues such as clearance depth and training requirements. They are also updated regularly to take account of lessons learned in other programmes, as reflected in international best practice. The framework of standards is developed and maintained by an international Review Board that is chaired by UNMAS, supported by a dedicated secretariat based at the GICHD, and comprises experts from across the mine action sector. Executive oversight is provided by a director-level Steering Group composed of members from four UN agencies and the GICHD.

Accordingly, Action 5 of the Oslo Action Plan is emphasising the need for national programmes to be alert to changes that may be relevant for their own national standards. In each mine-affected State Party, the IMAS on survey and clearance should be formally reviewed, and if necessary updated, at least once every three years.

### Information Management

**Action #9** Establish and maintain a national information management system containing accurate and up-to-date data at the national level on the status of implementation. The design and implementation of information management systems will ensure that they are nationally owned, sustainable and take into account the need for data that can be accessed, managed and analysed post-completion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> At: https://www.mineactionstandards.org/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> IMAS 01.10: "Guide for the application of International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)", March 2018, at: bit.ly/3ktNlne, para. 5.

#### Action Plan Indicator

> The percentage of mine-affected States Parties that report having a sustainable national information management system in place.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties currently have a functioning mine action database.

Baseline value result (2020): 69% [20 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Eritrea,\* Niger,\* Senegal,\* and Ukraine

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Chad, DRC,\* Iraq, Oman, and Yemen

#### Additional comments

Several States Parties, such as **Cambodia** and **Sri Lanka**, have functional information management systems in place, but are still in the process of resolving historical data issues and/or strengthening or upgrading the systems.

**Iraq's** information management is dependent on iMMAP, which is funded by the United States and is not fully autonomous or self-sufficient.

**Ukraine** has two information management systems, one managed by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) and the other by the Ministry of Defence.

Yemen was in the process of upgrading its information management system to IMSMA Core.

#### Commentary

Information management is at the core of mine action. No mine action programme can be either efficient or effective (or indeed sustainable) if it is not supported by a national information management system that identifies accurately the location of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas and records (and disaggregates) details of cancellation by non-technical survey, reduction by technical survey, and release by clearance. Every mine-affected State Party should ensure the national mine action information management system is both accurate and up-to-date.

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has become the *de facto* standard database for mine action programmes. In 2019, of 35 affected States Parties with Article 5 obligations, 24 were using IMSMA. A State Party is, however, free to choose any system that is effective and which is maintained to ensure accuracy. A sustainable information management system is one that is nationally owned. It needs to be maintained not just throughout the implementation of Article 5 of the Convention but also afterwards as the risk of encountering residual contamination (or other forms of contamination) will often be significant.

# Oslo Action Plan Section V: Survey and Clearance of Mined Areas

In their introduction to Section V of the Oslo Action Plan, on Survey and Clearance of Mined, States Parties acknowledged the "considerable progress" made by affected States in addressing mined areas, but called for an increase in the pace of survey and clearance so that all Parties may meet their Article 5 obligations as soon as possible. In reiterating the ambition of completing their clearance obligations "to the fullest extent possible by 2025", they noted the challenge arising from new use of antipersonnel mines in recent conflicts, including those of an improvised nature.

## An Accurate Baseline of Contamination

**Action #18** States Parties that have not yet done so will identify the precise perimeter of mined areas, to the extent possible, and establish evidence-based, accurate baselines of contamination based on information collected from all relevant sources no later than by the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties in 2021.

#### Action Plan Indicators

The percentage of affected States Parties that have established an accurate and evidence-based contamination baseline no later than the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties in 2021 (and by each year thereafter if not all affected States Parties have done so by 19MSP).

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has made a provisional assessment on whether or not States Parties have established an accurate and evidence-based contamination baseline as at 18MSP. A full assessment of this indicator will only be possible in 2021 following 19MSP.

While many States Parties have established a baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination, in many instances the baseline is assessed not to be accurate or evidence-based and therefore does not meet the OAP indicator.

Baseline value result (2020): 10% [3 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

States Parties that have met the indicator: Angola, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC,\* Ecuador, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger,\* Oman, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### Additional comments

Some States Parties, such as **Afghanistan**, **Cambodia**, **Croatia**, and **South Sudan** have a reasonable baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination, but require further survey to more accurately delineate some mined areas.

To a varying extent, insecurity can sometimes prevent or hinder conflict-affected States Parties from accessing some mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. This was the case for: **Afghanistan**, **Chad**, **Colombia**, **DRC**, **Iraq**, **Niger**, **Senegal**, **Somalia**, **South Sudan**, **Sudan**, **Ukraine**, and **Yemen**. It also concerns **Cameroon**, **Mali**, and **Nigeria** which, as of 1 October 2020, had still to request a new Article 5 deadline to address new contamination.

The percentage of affected States Parties that report having established their baseline through inclusive consultations with women, girls, boys, and men.

Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

Baseline value result (2020): 48% [14 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC,\* Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Niger,\* Peru, Senegal,\* Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Chad, Ecuador, Mauritania, Oman, Serbia, Sri Lanka,\* and Tajikistan

#### Commentary

The national mine action information system cannot be accurate and up-to-date if it is not informed by a representative baseline of contamination nationwide. Mistakes in survey can exaggerate hugely the extent of the problem and lead to clearance resources being wasted on uncontaminated areas. High-quality survey can be achieved without excessive expenditure. An accurate baseline is, or should be, the starting point for all successful national mine action programmes, established through a combination of evidence-based non-technical and technical survey. In general, a high proportion of confirmed hazardous areas to suspected hazardous areas indicates a more reliable baseline.

The Oslo Action Plan calls for all mine-affected States Parties that have not yet done so to establish an accurate and evidence-based contamination baseline by November 2021. This includes anti-personnel mines of an in improvised nature, as reflected in Action Item 21 (see below). The Plan also refers to the quality of the baseline, recommending in particular that it be established by inclusive age- and gender-appropriate consultations at local level.

## A Plan for Completion

**Action #19** Develop evidence-based and costed national work plans, including projections of the number of areas and the amount of mined area to be addressed annually to achieve completion as soon as possible, and no later than their Article 5 deadline, to be presented at the Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties in 2020.

#### **Action Plan Indicator**

The percentage of affected States Parties presenting work plans for the implementation of Article 5 by the Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties (and MSPs thereafter if not all affected States Parties have done so by 18MSP).

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed whether or not States Parties had an annual or multi-year work plan in place as at 1 October 2020.

Baseline value result (2020): 69% [20 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC,\* Ecuador, Ethiopia, Oman, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Chad, Eritrea,\* Iraq, Niger,\* Somalia, Sri Lanka,\* Mauritania, Ukraine, and Yemen

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### Commentary

A multi-year strategic plan sets long-term goals for mine action, in particular with a view to fulfilling Article 5 obligations as soon as possible. This multi-year plan is then broken down into a series of annual work plans that detail which areas will be cleared within a calendar year. Both plans should be evidence-based and costed.

Of course, it is hoped that each mine-affected State Party will fulfil its survey and clearance obligations within its initial 10-year deadline. Unfortunately, that has so far proved to be the exception rather than the rule. At the least, every mine-affected State Party should have a realistic plan in place to fulfil its Article 5 obligations as soon as possible.

The plan should also reflect synergies with efforts to tackle other forms of contamination, Convention reporting obligations, and links to broader development.

## Updating of Work Plans

**Action #20** Annually update their national work plans based on new evidence and report on adjusted milestones in their Article 7 reports by 30 April each year, including information on the number of areas and amount of mined area to be addressed annually and on how priorities have been established.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The percentage of affected States Parties that have reported annual updates and adjusted milestones to their national work plans in their 30 April transparency reports.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment also takes into consideration new work plans submitted in 2020, including in Article 5 extension requests.

\*As at 1 October 2020, of the 29 States Parties assessed **DRC**, **Eritrea**, **Niger**, **Senegal**, and **Sri Lanka** had still to submit an Article 7 report in 2020 (covering 2019). **Cameroon**, **Mali**, and **Nigeria** had also still to submit an Article 7 report in 2020.

Baseline value result (2020): 62% [18 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Mauritania, Oman, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Cambodia, Chad, DRC,\* Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger,\* Somalia, Sri Lanka,\* Ukraine, and Yemen

#### States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

> The number of States Parties that have fulfilled their obligations under Article 5.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on the number of States Parties that have fulfilled their obligations under Article 5 since the start of the 18MSP presidency in 2019.

**Baseline value result (2020):** 1 State Party<sup>8</sup> to fulfil its Article 5 obligations since the start of the 18MSP presidency [out of 36 affected States Parties including Chile itself]

#### States Parties that have met the indicator: Chile

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, BiH, Cambodia, Cameroon,\* Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, DRC,\* Ecuador, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali,\* Mauritania, Niger,\* Nigeria,\* Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, Yemen, and Zimbabwe

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### Commentary

Article 7 transparency reports are an important source of information on the amount of mined area released through survey and clearance in the previous year, the amount of anti-personnel mine contamination remaining, and planned land release outputs to release it.

Often, however, Article 7 reports are not accurate. Annual survey and clearance data provided to Mine Action Review are often more accurate than are the annual data included in the Article 7 reports. This is, in part, due to the fact that where possible our researchers double check all of the information with that provided by the different clearance operators engaged in-country in survey and clearance.

Every mine-affected State Party should have an annual work plan to support implementation of its multi-year strategic plan for the fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations. On a regular basis (preferably annually), multi-year national mine action strategies will need to be reviewed to take account of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> While Chile was the only State Party to fulfil its treaty obligations in 2020, to date, a total of 32 States Parties have completed survey and clearance: Algeria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, France, The Gambia, Germany, <u>Greece</u>, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Malawi, <u>Montenegro</u>, Mozambique10, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, <u>Palau</u>, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zambia. States Parties underlined are not listed on the AMPBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU)'s list, "States Parties That Have Completed Article 5", at: bit.ly/30xgu9r, presumably because they did not officially report having mined areas under the APMBC and/or have not made a formal declaration of fulfilment of their clearance obligations under the Convention.

progress that is either quicker or slower than that originally envisaged. "Fail to plan: plan to fail" as the cliché has it. Accompanying annual work plans should be updated/elaborated annually. It may be that annual work plans are also updated during the course of the year to take account of changing circumstances, but this is more rarely done, at least in a formal manner. Article 7 transparency reports provide an excellent opportunity to provide adjusted milestones for planned survey and clearance outputs.

## Anti-Personnel Mines of an Improvised Nature

**Action #21** States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature will ensure that they apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination as they do for all other types of anti-personnel mines, including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 and disaggregate by types of mines when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7 obligations.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The number of [affected] States Parties that apply the provisions of the Convention to antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature (for the purpose of this indicator: survey, clear and report).

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review has assessed the following 13 States Parties it believes to have contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Yemen.

**Baseline value result (2020):** 2 States Parties [out of 13 affected States Parties assessed, including Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria]

States Parties that have met the indicator: Afghanistan and Colombia

States Parties that have not met the indicator: Cameroon,\* Mali,\* Nigeria,\* and Yemen

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Chad, Iraq, Niger,\* Somalia, Sri Lanka,\* Tajikistan, and Ukraine

#### **Additional comments**

In **Iraq** there has been a significant improvement in Article 7 reporting, but Iraq still refers to the catchall term "IEDs" in its reporting, rather than using the term anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature (which refers to victim-activated IEDs that meet the definition of an anti-personnel mine).

#### Commentary

All mines that fit the definition of Article 2(1) of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention must be cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 5 and reported upon in accordance with Article 7. It does not matter whether the mines were manufactured, artisanally produced, or home-made. Thus, Paragraph 6 of the Oslo Declaration, adopted at the final plenary meeting of the Fourth Review Conference on 29 November 2019, stipulates that States Parties "will continue and strengthen our efforts to stigmatise and end the use of these weapons banned under the Convention, including new use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, for which all the Convention's provisions apply." Every affected State Party with an improvised mine threat must include survey and clearance in the fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations and in its reporting on implementation.

## Reporting Consistent with IMAS

Action #22 Report in a manner consistent with IMAS by providing information on the remaining challenges, disaggregating by "suspected hazardous areas" and "confirmed hazardous areas" and their relative size, as well as by the type of contamination. Report on progress in accordance with the land release methodology employed (i.e. cancelled through non-technical survey, reduced through technical survey, or cleared through clearance).

#### Action Plan Indicators

The percentage of affected States Parties reporting on the remaining challenge and progress made in accordance with IMAS.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

Baseline value result (2020): 62% [18 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** BiH, Cambodia, DRC,\* Eritrea,\* Oman, Niger,\* Sri Lanka,\* Ukraine, UK, and Yemen

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: Chad

#### Additional comments

**BiH** reported on the remaining challenge in terms of "mine suspected areas" (MSAs), but not suspected and confirmed hazardous areas.

**Cambodia** disaggregated land release by methodology employed, but did not disaggregate mined areas by suspected and confirmed hazardous areas.

The **UK** reported on the remaining challenge and progress made, but did not disaggregate mined area reduced through technical survey from area released through clearance.

The percentage of affected States Parties providing survey and clearance data in Article 5 extension requests and Article 7 reports that disaggregates by type of contamination.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on Article 7 reports and Article 5 deadline extension requests submitted in 2020.

Baseline value result (2020): 79% [23 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Oman, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe

States Parties that have not met the indicator: Eritrea,\* Niger,\* Sri Lanka,\* Ukraine, and Yemen

#### States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: DRC\*

#### Additional comments

It is unclear from **DRC**'s reporting if anti-personnel mines are disaggregated from anti-vehicle mines.

**Iraq** disaggregates by type of contamination, but reports anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature as "IEDs" and does not confirm whether those data only include victim-activated IEDs that meet the definition of an anti-personnel mine.

#### Commentary

Common problems in reporting on progress in implementing Article 5 include an inability to distinguish a suspected hazardous area from a confirmed hazardous area. In the context of Article 5, a suspected hazardous area is an area where there is reasonable suspicion of contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of anti-personnel mines; and a confirmed hazardous area refers to an area where the presence of contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of anti-personnel mines. A confirmed hazardous area should be established by high-quality evidence-based non-technical survey, supplemented as necessary by technical survey.

Reporting must clearly disaggregate anti-personnel mined areas from areas with other types of explosive ordnance (e.g. anti-vehicle mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW)). Anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature should be reported as anti-personnel mines and not as IEDs [improvised explosive devices].

Land release output data should be clearly disaggregated by the land release methodology employed (i.e. cancelled through non-technical survey, reduced through technical survey, or released through clearance).

An initial survey of a large, previously unsurveyed area (even a district) that, it was thought, might contain contamination but which in fact does not, may not be reported as land release under IMAS.

## Accurate and Timely Extension Requests

**Action #23** States Parties submitting requests for extensions will ensure that these requests contain detailed, costed and multi-year work plans for the extension period and are developed through an inclusive process, in line with the decisions of the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties<sup>9</sup> and the recommendations endorsed by the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties in the paper "Reflections on the Article 5 Extensions Process".<sup>10</sup>

#### Action Plan Indicators

The percentage of extension requests that include detailed, costed, and multi-year work plans for the extension period.

Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.3, at: bit.ly/2Nlvksm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/4, at: bit.ly/36QGr4j.

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on Article 5 deadline extension requests submitted in 2020.

**Baseline value result (2020):** 63% [5 of 8 affected States Parties assessed whose Article 5 deadline extension request was submitted and considered in 2020. As at 1 October 2020, Eritrea had still to submit a request to extend its deadline.]

States Parties that have met the indicator: BiH, Colombia, DRC,\* Senegal,\* and South Sudan

States Parties that have not met the indicator: Mauritania, Niger,\* and Ukraine

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### Additional comments

As at 1 October 2020, **BiH**, **Colombia**, **DRC**, **Mauritania**, **Niger**, **Senegal**, **South Sudan**, and **Ukraine**, had submitted extension requests for consideration at 18MSP. **Eritrea** had still to submit a request to extend its deadline. **Cameroon**, **Mali**, and **Nigeria** had also still to request a new Article 5 deadline to address new contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature.

> The percentage of extension requests that are submitted in accordance with the process established by the States Parties.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on whether or not States Parties seeking Article 5 extensions in 2020 submitted their request no fewer than nine months before 18MSP.

**Baseline value result (2020):** 22% [2 of 9 affected States Parties assessed whose Article 5 deadline extension request was due to be submitted and considered in 2020. This includes Eritrea, which as at 1 October 2020, had still to submit a request to extend its deadline.]

States Parties that have met the indicator: Colombia and South Sudan

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** BiH , DRC,\* Eritrea,\* Mauritania, Niger,\* Senegal,\* and Ukraine

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### **Additional comments**

**Niger** submitted the first draft of its Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2020; **BiH**, **Senegal**, **Mauritania**, and **Ukraine** in June 2020; and DRC in September 2020; all less than 9 months prior to 18MSP.

As at 1 October 2020, Eritrea had still to submit a request to extend its deadline.

#### Commentary

Every mine-affected State Party that submits an extension request should ensure that it is accurate and contains data that are internally consistent. According to the procedure agreed by States Parties for the submission of Article 5 extension requests, any request should be submitted at the latest by the end of March in the year within which a meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference is being asked to consider it. The request should be detailed, setting out the expected costs and where the funding is coming from to meet those costs.

This gives States Parties the opportunity to review the request carefully and seek clarification from the requesting State Party on any points that are unclear. One of the main problems in requests is that the data they contain are either not consistent with the State's other reporting or they are contradicted by other data presented elsewhere in the same extension request.

## Declarations of Completion

**Action #25** States Parties who complete their clearance obligations will continue the best practice of submitting voluntary declarations of completion and give due consideration to the paper "Reflections and understandings on the implementation and completion of Article 5 mine clearance obligations"<sup>11</sup> in that regard.

#### Action Plan Indicators

The percentage of States Parties that have completed their Article 5 obligations and that submit voluntary declarations of completion.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on those States Parties that have fulfilled their Article 5 obligations since the start of the 18MSP presidency.

**Baseline value result (2020):** 100% [1 of 1 affected States Parties to fulfil its Article 5 obligations since the start of the 18MSP presidency]

States Parties that have met the indicator: Chile

States Parties that have not met the indicator: N/A

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### Commentary

Every mine-affected State Party that completes survey and clearance of all mined areas containing anti-personnel mines should submit a declaration of completion that reflects fulfilment of all clearance obligations. But a mine-affected State Party should only declare fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations when it is convinced that it has done so. Premature declaration of completion may lead subsequently to compliance concerns, as was the case in the past with Jordan and Mozambique, for example.

To have duly fulfilled their Article 5 obligations, a State Party must have made every effort to identify all mined areas suspected or confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines and then to have released all of those areas by an appropriate combination of non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance.

## **Residual Demining Capacity**

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.17/2018/10, at: bit.ly/2tdtmDM.

Action #26 Ensure that national strategies and work plans for completion make provisions for a sustainable national capacity to address previously unknown mined areas, including newly mined areas discovered following completion. In addressing these areas, they will consider the commitments made at the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties as contained in the paper "Proposed rational response to States Parties discovering previously unknown mined areas after deadlines have passed".<sup>12</sup>

#### Action Plan Indicators

> The percentage of affected States Parties that include provisions for addressing previously unknown mined areas in their national strategies and/or completion plans.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

Baseline value result (2020): 34% [10 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Oman, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Thailand, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** BiH, Chad, DRC,\* Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger,\* Senegal,\* Serbia, South Sudan, and Ukraine

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Colombia, Iraq, Ecuador, Peru, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen

#### Additional comments

While several States Parties, such as **Iraq**, **Turkey**, and **Ukraine** have national clearance capacity (for example in the Armed Forces or Civil Defence), they have not stated publicly in their national strategies or completion plans how previously unknown mined areas (i.e. residual contamination) will be addressed.

The percentage of affected States Parties that report having put in place sustainable national capacities to address the discovery of previously unknown mined areas.

Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

Baseline value result (2020): 24% [7 of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Ecuador, Oman, Peru, Thailand, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger,\* Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Colombia, DRC,\* Iraq, Turkey, and Yemen

Additional comments

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/7, at: bit.ly/2QMODwU.

As noted above, while many States Parties have national capacity capable of addressing anti-personnel mines (for example Armed Forces, Civil Projection, or Police), this on its own is insufficient to meet this indicator. There should be an agreed plan in place specifying which national entity is responsible for addressing residual contamination, under which circumstances, and which ensures provision is made for long-term access to the national information management database.

The percentage of States Parties that discover previously unknown mined areas, including newly mined areas, that apply the decision of the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment concerns States Parties that discover newly mined areas after fulfilment of their respective Article 5 obligations.

Baseline value result (2020): 0% [0 of 3 affected States Parties assessed]

States Parties that have met the indicator: N/A

States Parties that have not met the indicator: Cameroon,\* Mali,\* and Nigeria\*

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### Additional comments

In addition, **Burkina Faso** may also have anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature on areas under its jurisdiction or control.

#### Commentary

Even if a State Party has duly fulfilled its Article 5 obligations, individual mines and small mined areas may not have been discovered and reported during survey. If previously unknown mined areas are later encountered, they must be accurately reported through Convention mechanisms and released. (There may also be new contamination resulting from armed conflict, such as occurred in Ukraine.) This means that a State must prepare for a sustainable demining capacity to address such areas even when it believes that its demining is done. This is the residual demining capacity. Such capacity may exist within the armed forces, the police, or civil defence organisations (or other competent departments or services). It could potentially be part of a cooperation agreement with a neighbouring country. It is also important to maintain the national mine action information database for this purpose.

## **Innovation and Efficiency**

**Action #27** Take appropriate steps to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of survey and clearance, including by promoting the research, application and sharing of innovative technological means to this effect.

#### Action Plan Indicator

> The number of States Parties that report promoting research, application, and sharing of innovative technological means.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on information we are aware of. This is not to say that other States Parties have not promoted research, application, and sharing of innovative technological means.

Baseline value result (2020): 6 States Parties [out of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

States Parties that have met the indicator: Afghanistan, BiH, Croatia, Peru, South Sudan, and UK

States Parties that have not met the indicator: N/A

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC,\* Ecuador, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger,\* Oman, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe

#### Additional comments

In **Afghanistan**, DMAC has worked closely with The HALO Trust in developing survey and clearance specifically for mines of an improvised nature.

In **BiH**, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (colloquially called drones) were used by NPA and the national mine action centre (BHMAC) for non-technical survey during the country-wide assessment of mined areas.

**Croatia** hosts an international symposium annually, during which innovations in mine action are shared.

Peru reported that the possibility of using drones with hyperthermal cameras is being explored.

**South Sudan** reported that in 2019 it developed capacity to deploy Ground Penetrating Radar dual sensor detectors.

The **UK** had to devise innovative procedural solutions to deal with the mechanical processing of very large volumes of sand, during its clearance operations in the Falkland Islands.

#### Commentary

The mine action sector has proved itself adept at innovating to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The use of remote sensing technology such as unmanned aerial systems, animal detection systems, and mechanical techniques to identify mined areas, and the development of dual-sensor mine detectors that use ground-penetrating radar to reduce false positive signals, are just a few examples of where innovation and technology have benefitted the sector as a whole. This readiness to embrace new techniques and approaches is one that must be sustained for as long as there is contamination to address. Every mine-affected State Party that achieves significant efficiency gains through innovation should share its experiences with the other States Parties.

# Oslo Action Plan Section VIII: International Cooperation and Assistance

In their introduction to Section VIII of the Oslo Action Plan, on International Cooperation and Assistance, States Parties stressed that enhanced cooperation can support implementation of

Convention obligations as soon as possible. This applies to survey and clearance, as it does to other thematic areas.

## Seeking Assistance

Action #43 States Parties seeking assistance will develop resource mobilisation plans and use all mechanisms within the Convention to disseminate information on challenges and requirements for assistance, including through their annual Article 7 transparency reports and by taking advantage of the individualised approach. States Parties will share the outcomes of the individualised approach with the wider mine action community in order to maximise its impact.

#### Action Plan Indicators

The number of States Parties requiring support that provide information on progress, challenges and requirements for assistance in Article 7 reports and Convention meetings.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on 27 affected States Parties assessed, which require financial support, and excludes **Oman** and the **UK** which are entirely nationally funded.

**Baseline value result (2020):** 17 States Parties [out of 27 affected States Parties assessed requiring financial support]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, DRC,\* Eritrea,\* Niger,\* Senegal,\* Somalia, Sri Lanka,\* and Ukraine

States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

The number of States Parties that have taken advantage of the individualised approach and that report having received follow-up and/or increased support to meet the needs identified.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

As at October 2020, the following 11 States Parties had taken advantage of the individualised approach: Angola (2018), Cambodia (2019), Croatia (2016), Niger (2020), Serbia (2018), Sri Lanka (2018), Sudan (2018), Somalia (2018), Zimbabwe (2017 and 2018), Ecuador (2019), and Tajikistan (2019).

**Baseline value result (2020):** 1 State Party [out of 11 affected States Parties assessed, that have taken advantage of the individualised approach]

States Parties that have met the indicator: Sudan

States Parties that have not met the indicator: N/A

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Ecuador, Niger,\* Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka,\* Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe

#### Commentary

Few States have the necessary resources to address their mine contamination on their own. The collaborative approach to implementing Article 5 obligations is one that has stood the Convention in good stead. Donors have been remarkably generous in supporting mine survey and clearance while mine action agencies can also give invaluable technical advice to address particular challenges. The onus, however, is on the mine-affected State Party to identify its needs for international assistance and to facilitate the receipt of that assistance. In recent years, individualised country-specific approaches have enabled a focus on the concerns and challenges of a particular State Party, thereby benefitting all concerned.

### National Coordination and Dialogue

**Action #44** States Parties will strengthen national coordination including by ensuring regular dialogue with national and international stakeholders on progress, challenges and support for implementation of their obligations under the Convention. They will consider, where relevant, establishing an appropriate national platform for regular dialogue among all stakeholders.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The number of States Parties that have an in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders that meets on a regular basis.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

Baseline value result (2020): 8 States Parties [out of 29 affected States Parties assessed]

**States Parties that have met the indicator:** Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, UK, and Zimbabwe

**States Parties that have not met the indicator:** Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC,\* Iraq, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka,\* and Thailand

**States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met:** Ecuador, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger,\* Oman, Peru, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen

#### Additional comments

In Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Oman, and Peru only national government entities are engaged in Article 5 implementation.

In several States Parties, such as **Iraq** and **Somalia**, national authorities convene regular meetings with clearance operators, but these do not include other stakeholders, such as donors.

While Mine Action sub-clusters exist in some affected States Parties, these are UN led and are not considered in and of themselves to have met this criteria.

Commentary

In addition to the overall coordination function performed by the national mine action centre, a mineaffected State Party should seek to establish a national platform that enables open and regular dialogue among all relevant stakeholders. Allowing all mine action actors to share their ideas and concerns in an informal and collaborative setting can help improve coordination of Article 5 implementation and demonstrate strong national ownership and political commitment to completion.

There are few programmes that would not benefit from a national platform and, more broadly, the cooperation and consultation that they involve and engender.

## Oslo Action Plan Section IX: Measures to Ensure Compliance

The States Parties remain committed to ensuring compliance with the obligations of the Convention in order to reach its objectives.

### Compliance in Reporting

**Action #49** Any State Party implementing obligations in particular under <u>Article 5<sup>13</sup></u> that has not submitted an Article 7 report detailing progress in implementing these obligations each year will provide in close cooperation with the ISU an annual update on the status of implementation in line with Article 7 and will provide information to all States Parties in the most expeditious, comprehensive and transparent manner possible. If no information on implementing the relevant obligations for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned in close cooperation with the relevant Committee.

#### Action Plan Indicator

The percentage of States Parties that are implementing obligations under <u>Article 5<sup>14</sup></u> and that have not submitted an Article 7 report detailing progress in implementing these obligations in the last two years, that provide updates to all States Parties in Article 7 reports and during meetings of the States Parties.

#### Baseline results (provisional) for 2020

For the purposes of establishing the OAP baseline value for this indicator, Mine Action Review's assessment is based on those States Parties that have not submitted Article 7 reports in 2018 and 2019.

**Baseline value result (2020):** 0% [0 of 1 affected State Party that had not submitted previously submitted Article 7 reports in 2017 and 2018. In addition, Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria had not submitted Article 7 reports in 2018, 2019, or 2020]

States Parties that have met the indicator: N/A

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Action #49 of the Oslo Action Plan also references Article 4 and retaining or transferring mines in line with Article 3, but for purposes of monitoring Mine Action Review has focused solely on Article 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The indicator in the Oslo Action Plan also references Article 4 and retaining mines in line with Article 3.1, but for purposes of monitoring Mine Action Review has focused solely on Article 5.

#### States Parties that have not met the indicator: Eritrea\*

#### States Parties for which it is unclear or unknown if the indicator has been met: N/A

#### Additional comments

In addition, **Cameroon**, **Mali**, and **Nigeria**, which had still to request a new Article 5 deadline to address new contamination from anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, did not submit Article 7 reports in 2018 and 2019, and as at 1 October 2020 had still to submit an Article 7 report in 2020.

#### Commentary

Annual reports on contamination and progress in land release are obligatory for every mine-affected State Party to the Convention under its Article 7. The Oslo Action Plan justly sees the failure by a State Party to comply with this obligation as a serious challenge to implementation.

## Annex 1: Provisional 2020 Assessment of Implementation of Oslo Action Plan Action Items Related to Survey and Clearance

Table 1 below details the provisional baseline results of Mine Action Review's assessment of Oslo Action Plan (OAP) Action Items related to survey and clearance. The provisional assessment is based on information available to Mine Action Review, as at 1 October 2020, and will be finalised following the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), on 16-20 November 2020. Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the results of the provisional assessment. Please email <u>MineActionReview@npaid.org</u> with any feedback or additional information for Mine Action Review's consideration.

**States Parties Assessed:** For the purposes of Mine Action Review's assessment to establish the baseline for OAP indicators related to survey and clearance, for the majority of indicators Mine Action Review has assessed 29 of the 35 affected States Parties, namely: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),\* Ecuador, Eritrea,\* Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger,\* Oman, Peru, Senegal,\* Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,\* Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom (UK), Yemen, and Zimbabwe. A 36<sup>th</sup> State Party, Chile, which fulfilled its Article 5 obligations in February 2020, is not included in the assessment of affected States Parties (except with respect to the indicator under Action Item #20 on fulfilment of Article 5 obligations and Action Item #25 on declarations of completion).

**States Parties Not Assessed:** Argentina, Cyprus, and Palestine have not been assessed (except with respect to the indicator under Action Item #20 on fulfilment of Article 5 obligations), as they do not have control over remaining mined areas under their Article 5 obligations. States Parties Cameroon,\* Mali,\* and Nigeria,\* which have new mined areas as a result of new use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, and no new Article 5 deadline yet in place, have also not been assessed (except with respect to the indicator under Action Item #20 on fulfilment of Article 5 obligations; the indicator under Action Item #21 on applying the provisions of the Convention to anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature; and the indicator under Action Item #26 on discovery of previously unknown mined areas).

States Parties marked with an \* are those which had still to submit an Article 7 report in 2020 (covering 2019) as at 1 October 2020.

Table 1: Baseline Value Results of the Provisional 2020 Assessment of implementation of OAP Action Items related to Survey and Clearance of Anti-Personnel Mines

| Thematic Issue        | Action Item  | Indicator  | Baseline value<br>(2020)                                 | States Parties<br>that have met<br>the indicator   | States Parties<br>that have not<br>met the<br>indicator | States<br>Parties for<br>which it is<br>unclear or<br>unknown if<br>the<br>indicator<br>has been<br>met | Additional Comments<br>and Information  |
|-----------------------|--|--|--|--|---|---|---|
|                       |  | slo Action Plan Section II: Be   |  | plementing the O   | Convention  |   |   |
| National<br>Ownership | Action #1: Demonstrate<br>high levels of national<br>ownership, <sup>15</sup> including by<br>integrating Convention<br>implementation activities<br>into national development<br>plans, poverty reduction<br>strategies, humanitarian<br>response plans and<br>national strategies for the<br>inclusion of persons with<br>disabilities as appropriate,<br>and by making financial<br>and other commitments to<br>implementation. | The percentage of mine-<br>affected States Parties that<br>report making national<br>financial commitments to<br>the implementation of<br>their [Article 5] obligations<br>under the Convention. | 90% [26 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed] | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Chad<br>Colombia<br>Croatia<br>DRC*<br>Ecuador<br>Ethiopia<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Oman<br>Peru<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>Sri Lanka*<br>South Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Tajikistan | Eritrea*<br>Somalia<br>Yemen                            |   | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review has assessed<br>whether or not States<br>Parties have made a<br>national financial<br>contribution to Article<br>5 implementation in<br>2019 or 2020.<br>In some States Parties,<br>such as <b>Chad</b> , <b>DRC</b> ,<br>and <b>Senegal</b> , national<br>funding is provided<br>towards the costs of<br>the national mine<br>action centre, but not<br>towards anti- |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The States Parties have defined national ownership as entailing the following: "maintaining interest at a high level in fulfilling Convention obligations; empowering and providing relevant State entities with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out their obligations under the Convention; articulating the measures its State entities will undertake to implement relevant aspects of Convention in the most inclusive, efficient and expedient manner possible and plans to overcome any challenges that need to be addressed; and making a regular significant national financial commitment to the State's programmes to implement the Convention".

|  |   |   |  | Thailand<br>Turkey<br>UK<br>Ukraine<br>Zimbabwe  |  |                            | personnel survey or clearance operations.  |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|----------------------------|--|
| National<br>Strategies and<br>Work Plans | Action #2: Develop<br>evidence-based, costed<br>and time-bound national<br>strategies and work plans<br>to fulfil and implement<br>Convention obligations as<br>soon as possible. | The percentage of mine-<br>affected States Parties that<br>report having evidence-<br>based, costed, and time-<br>bound national strategies<br>and work plans in place. | 69% [20 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed] | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Colombia<br>Croatia<br>DRC*<br>Ecuador<br>Ethiopia<br>Oman<br>Peru<br>Serbia<br>South Sudan<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Thailand<br>Turkey<br>UK<br>Zimbabwe | Chad<br>Eritrea*<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Senegal*<br>Somalia<br>Ukraine | Yemen                      | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review has assessed<br>whether or not States<br>Parties have <u>either</u> a<br>work plan <u>or</u> a strategy<br>that is evidence-<br>based, costed, and<br>time-bound.<br>In <b>Somalia</b> a National<br>Mine Action Strategic<br>Plan 2018–2020 has<br>been elaborated, but<br>as at October 2020<br>had yet to be formally<br>approved. |
| Gender and<br>Diversity                  | Action #3: Ensure that the different needs and  | The percentage of affected<br>States Parties whose  | 48% [14 of 29<br>affected                                | Afghanistan<br>Angola  | BiH<br>Chad  | Croatia<br>Ecuador         | For the purposes of establishing the OAP   |
|  | perspectives of women,<br>girls, boys and men are<br>considered and inform all<br>areas of Convention<br>implementation and mine  | national work plans and<br>strategies integrate gender<br>and take the diverse needs<br>and experiences of people   | States Parties<br>assessed]                              | Cambodia<br>Colombia<br>DRC*<br>Iraq<br>Senegal*   | Eritrea*<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Peru<br>Serbia                                 | Ethiopia<br>Oman<br>Turkey | baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review has assessed<br>whether or not States<br>Parties have <u>either</u> a  |

|  | action programmes, in<br>order to deliver an inclusive<br>approach. Strive to remove<br>barriers to full, equal and<br>gender balanced<br>participation in mine<br>action and in Convention<br>meetings.  | in affected communities<br>into account.  |  | South Sudan<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Thailand<br>UK<br>Zimbabwe  | Somalia<br>Ukraine<br>Yemen  |  | work plan <u>or</u> a strategy<br>that integrates gender<br>and takes into account<br>diverse needs.  |
|--|---|---|--|---|--|--|---|
| National<br>Standards<br>Reflecting IMAS | Action #5: Keep national<br>mine action standards up<br>to date in accordance with<br>the latest International<br>Mine Action Standards<br>(IMAS), adapt them to new<br>challenges and employ<br>best practices to ensure<br>efficient and effective<br>implementation. | The percentage of mine-<br>affected States Parties that<br>have updated their<br>national standards to<br>address new challenges<br>and ensure the<br>employment of best<br>practices, taking into<br>consideration the latest<br>IMAS. | 48% [14 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed] | Afghanistan<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Chad<br>Croatia<br>Ecuador<br>Iraq<br>Peru<br>South Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Thailand<br>Turkey<br>UK<br>Zimbabwe | Angola<br>Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Mauritania<br>Oman<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>Somalia<br>Ukraine | Colombia<br>DRC*<br>Niger*<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Sudan<br>Yemen | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review has focused<br>our assessment on<br>whether or not States<br>Parties have updated<br>national standards to<br>allow for evidence-<br>based land release<br>through both survey<br>and clearance.<br>In <b>Afghanistan</b> , The<br>Directorate of Mine<br>Action Coordination<br>(DMAC) and the<br>GICHD are due to<br>review national land<br>release standards and<br>are expected to<br>undertake revisions<br>with a view to<br>strengthening non-<br>technical survey and |

|                           |   |  |  |  |                                |  | increasing operational<br>efficiency.<br><b>Colombia</b> is in the<br>process of updating its   |
|---------------------------|---|--|--|--|--------------------------------|--|---|
|                           |   |  |  |  |                                |  | national standards.<br><b>Sri Lanka</b> undertook a<br>review of its NMAS,<br>but had yet to adopt<br>the revised standards.  |
|                           |   |  |  |  |                                |  | <b>Sudan</b> is awaiting<br>endorsement of its<br>revised national<br>standards.  |
|                           |   |  |  |  |                                |  | <b>Yemen</b> planned to<br>revise its national<br>mine action standards<br>in 2020 with the<br>support of GICHD and<br>UNDP.  |
| Information<br>Management | Action #9: Establish and<br>maintain a national<br>information management<br>system containing<br>accurate and up-to-date<br>data at the national level<br>on the status of<br>implementation. The<br>design and<br>implementation of<br>information management | The percentage of mine-<br>affected States Parties that<br>report having a sustainable<br>national information<br>management system in<br>place. | 69% [20 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed] | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Colombia<br>Croatia<br>Ecuador<br>Ethiopia<br>Mauritania<br>Peru<br>Serbia | Eritrea*<br>Niger*<br>Senegal* | Chad<br>DRC*<br>Iraq<br>Oman<br>Ukraine<br>Yemen | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review has assessed<br>whether or not States<br>Parties currently have<br>a functioning mine<br>action database.<br>Several States Parties, |
|                           | systems will ensure that  |  |  | Somalia  |                                |  | such as <b>Cambodia</b> and   |

|                            |                            |              |                 | ГГ          |                            |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------------------|
| they are nationally owned, |                            |              | South Sudan     |             | Sri Lanka, have            |
| sustainable and take into  |                            |              | Sri Lanka*      |             | functional information     |
| account the need for data  |                            |              | Sudan           |             | management systems         |
| that can be accessed,      |                            |              | Tajikistan      |             | in place, but are still in |
| managed and analysed       |                            |              | Thailand        |             | the process of             |
| post-completion.           |                            |              | Turkey          |             | resolving historical       |
|                            |                            |              | Zimbabwe        |             | data issues and/or         |
|                            |                            |              | UK              |             | strengthening or           |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | upgrading the              |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | systems.                   |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | ,                          |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | Iraq's information         |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | management is              |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | dependent on iMMAP         |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | which is funded by the     |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | US and is not fully        |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | autonomous or self-        |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | sufficient.                |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | suncient.                  |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | <b>Ukraine</b> has two     |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | information                |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | management systems,        |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             |                            |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | one managed by SESU        |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | and the other by the       |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | MoD.                       |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             |                            |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | Yemen was in the           |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | process of upgrading       |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | its information            |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | management system          |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             | to IMSMA Core.             |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             |                            |
|                            |                            |              |                 |             |                            |
|                            | Oslo Action Plan Section   |              | arance of Mined |             |                            |
| Action #18: States Parties | The percentage of affected | 10% [3 of 29 | Angola          | Afghanistan | For the purposes of        |
| that have not yet done so  | States Parties that have   | affected     | UK              | BiH         | establishing the OAP       |

| AnAccurate<br>baselinewill identify the precise<br>perimeter of mined areas,<br>contaminationestablished areas,<br>contamination baseline and<br>establish evidence-based,<br>contamination baseline of<br>accurate baselines of<br>information collected from<br>all relevant sources no later<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.ZimbabweCambodia<br>Chad<br>Colombiabaseline value for<br>indicator, Mine Ac<br>ColombiaNote<br>contaminationParties in 2021 (and by<br>each year threafter if not<br>all affected States Parties<br>have done so by 19MSP).Parties in 2021 (and by<br>each year threafter if not<br>all affected States Parties<br>have done so by 19MSP).DRC*<br>Ecuador<br>Eritrea*Baseline value for<br>indicator, Mine Ac<br>ColombiaMeeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.Parties of bit States<br>Parties in 2021.Parties of bit States<br>Parties in 2021.Parties of bit States<br>PartiesEritrea*<br>EthiopiaParties<br>established<br>accurateNiger*<br>South Sudan<br>South Sudan<br>South Sudan<br>South Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>TajikistanBaseline value f   |
|---|
| Contaminationto the extent possible, and<br>establish evidence-based,<br>accurate baselines of<br>contamination based on<br>information collected from<br>all relevants sources no later<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.ColombiaReview has mad<br>provisional<br>assessment<br>Ecuador<br>Eritrea*Review has mad<br>provisional<br>assessment<br>EcuadorNeeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.Parties in 2021 (and by<br>each year thereafter if not<br>all relevants ources no later<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.Iraq<br>accurate<br>MauritaniaReview has mad<br>provisional<br>assessment<br>Ecuador<br>UnantianiaParties in 2021.all affected States Parties<br>have done so by 19MSP).Iraq<br>Niger*<br>Contamination<br>Doman<br>Senegal*<br>South Sudancontamination<br>econtamination<br>baseline as at 18M<br>Peru<br>South SudanParties in 2021.Niger*<br>South Sudancontamination<br>of anti-persoi<br>Turkey<br>Winile many St<br>Sri Lanka*Parties in 2<br>Parties in amaj instances<br>to baseline as assess<br>of on to be accurate<br>this indicator will<br>South Sudan   |
| accurate baselines of<br>contamination based on<br>information collected from<br>all relevant sources no later<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.Meeting of the States<br>Parties Parties<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.DRC*<br>Ecuador<br>Eritrea*<br>Hauritania<br>Oman<br>Senegal*assessment<br>ecuber<br>evidence-based<br>Niger*<br>South Sudan<br>SudanParties in 2021.A full assessment<br>evidence-based<br>Niger*<br>South Sudan<br>SudanParties in 2021.A full assessment<br>evidence-based<br>Niger*<br>South Sudan<br>SudanVhile many St<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>to to be accurate<br>Ukraine<br>Ukraine<br>to to be accurateWhile many St<br>South Sudan<br>Sudan   |
| contamination based on<br>information collected from<br>all relevant sources no later<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.Parties in 2021 (and by<br>each year thereafter if not<br>all offected States Parties<br>have done so by 19MSP).Ecuador<br>Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Oman<br>Peru<br>Senegal*<br>South Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<   |
| information collected from<br>all relevant sources no later<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.each year thereafter if not<br>all affected States Parties<br>have done so by 19MSP).Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Oman<br>Senegal*<br>Senegal*<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>While many St<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>Tajikistan<br>thailand<br>than any instances<br>parties in any instances<br>those accurateParties<br>established<br>accurate<br>established<br>accurate<br>established<br>accurate<br>established<br>accurate<br>senegal*<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>While many St<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Tajikistan<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>thailand<br>t  |
| all relevant sources no later<br>than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.  |
| than by the Nineteenth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.have done so by 19MSP).Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Mauritania<br>Oman<br>Serbia<br>Serbiaaccurate<br>evidence-based<br>contamination<br>   |
| Meeting of the States<br>Parties in 2021.Mauritaniaevidence-based<br>contaminationOmanbaseline as at 18M<br>OmanPeruA full assessment<br>Senegal*Serbiabe possible in 2<br>Somaliabe possible in 2<br>SomaliaBellowing 19MSP.<br>South SudanSudanWhile many St<br>SriLanka*PartiesSidanSouth SudanSudanWhile many St<br>TajikistanTajikistanestablished a base<br>Thailandof<br>anti-persou<br>TurkeyUkrainein many instances<br>Yemenyemenbaseline is asset<br>not to be accuratenot to be accurate  |
| Parties in 2021.       Niger*       contamination         Oman       baseline as at 18N       Peru       A full assessment         Senegal*       this indicator will       Serbia       be possible in 2         Somalia       following 19MSP.       South Sudan       While many St         Sri       Lanka*       Parties       Parties         Tajikistan       established a base       Tailistand       of anti-perso         Turkey       mine contamination       Wistances       Yemen       baseline is asses         Yemen       baseline is asses       not to be accurate       Yemen       baseline is asses   |
| Oman       baseline as at 18M         Peru       A full assessment         Senegal*       this indicator will of Serbia         Somalia       following 19MSP.         South Sudan       Sudan         Sudan       While many St         Sri       Lanka*       Parties         Tajikistan       established a base         Thailand       of       anti-person         Turkey       mine contaminate         Ukraine       in many instances         Yemen       baseline is asses         not to be accurate  |
| Peru A full assessment<br>Senegal* this indicator will of<br>Serbia be possible in 2<br>Somalia following 19MSP.<br>South Sudan While many St<br>Sudan While many St<br>Sri Lanka* Parties fr<br>Tajikistan established a base<br>Thailand of anti-person<br>Turkey mine contaminat<br>Ukraine in many instances<br>Yemen baseline is asses<br>not to be accurate   |
| Senegal* this indicator will a Serbia be possible in 2<br>Somalia following 19MSP.<br>South Sudan While many St<br>Sri Lanka* Parties for<br>Tajikistan established a base<br>Thailand of anti-person<br>Turkey mine contaminat<br>Ukraine in many instances<br>Yemen baseline is asses<br>not to be accurate   |
| Serbia be possible in 2<br>Somalia following 19MSP.<br>South Sudan While many St<br>Sudan Antaria Parties for<br>Tajikistan established a base<br>Thailand of anti-person<br>Turkey mine contaminat<br>Ukraine in many instances<br>Yemen baseline is asses<br>not to be accurate   |
| Somalia       following 19MSP.         South Sudan       South Sudan         Sudan       While many St.         Sri       Lanka*         Tajikistan       established a base         Thailand       of         Ukraine       mine contaminat         In many instances       Yemen         Baseline is asses       not to be accurate   |
| South Sudan       While many St.         Sudan       While many St.         Sri       Lanka*       Parties         Tajikistan       established a base         Thailand       of anti-person         Turkey       mine contaminat         Ukraine       in many instances         Yemen       baseline is asses         not to be accurate  |
| Sudan       While many Stands         Sri       Lanka*       Parties       Parties         Tajikistan       established a base         Thailand       of       anti-person         Turkey       mine contaminat         Ukraine       in many instances         Yemen       baseline is asses         not to be accurate  |
| Sri       Lanka*       Parties       H         Tajikistan       established a base       Thailand       of       anti-person         Turkey       mine       contaminat       Ukraine       in       many instances         Yemen       baseline       is asses       not to be accurate  |
| Image: stable in the stable               |
| Image: state of the state o |
| Turkey     mine containat       Ukraine     in many instances       Yemen     baseline is asses       not to be accurate  |
| Ukraine     in many instances       Yemen     baseline is assess       not to be accurate   |
| Yemen baseline is assess<br>not to be accurate  |
| not to be accurate  |
|   |
|   |
| evidence-based  |
| therefore does  |
| meet the  |
| indicator.  |
| Some States Par   |
| such as Afghanis  |
| Cambodia, Croa  |
| and South Sudan   |
| a reasonable idea   |
| their baseline of a   |

|   |                                |   |  |   | personnel mine<br>contamination, but<br>still require further<br>survey to more<br>accurately delineate<br>some mined areas.  |
|---|--------------------------------|---|--|---|---|
|   |                                |   |  |   | To a varying extent,<br>insecurity can<br>sometimes prevent or<br>hinder conflict-<br>affected affected<br>States Parties from<br>accessing some mined<br>areas under their<br>jurisdiction or control.<br>This was currently the<br>case for: Afghanistan,<br>Chad, Colombia, DRC,<br>Iraq, Niger, Senegal,<br>Somalia, South Sudan,<br>Sudan, Ukraine, and<br>Yemen. It also<br>concerns Cameroon,<br>Mali, and Nigeria<br>which, as of 1 October<br>2020, had still to<br>request a new Article<br>5 deadline to address<br>new contamination. |
| The percentage of affecte<br>States Parties that repor<br>having established the<br>baseline through inclusiv | t affected<br>r States Parties | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Croatia | Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Niger*<br>Peru<br>Senegal* | Chad<br>Ecuador<br>Mauritania<br>Oman<br>Serbia |   |

| Upc<br>Voi  | Contraction Contra |   |
|---|--|---|
| Updating<br>Work Plans  | A Plan<br>Completion   |   |
| of.   | ្ទ័  |   |
| Action #20: Annually<br>update their national work<br>plans based on new<br>evidence and report on<br>adjusted milestones in                    | <b>Action #19:</b> Develop<br>evidence-based and costed<br>national work plans,<br>including projections of the<br>number of areas and the<br>amount of mined area to<br>be addressed annually to<br>achieve completion as soon<br>as possible, and no later<br>than their Article 5<br>deadline, to be presented<br>at the Eighteenth Meeting<br>of the States Parties in<br>2020.  |   |
| The percentage of affected<br>States Parties that have<br>reported annual updates<br>and adjusted milestones to<br>their national work plans in | The percentage of affected<br>States Parties presenting<br>work plans for the<br>implementation of Article 5<br>by the Eighteenth Meeting<br>of the States Parties (and<br>MSPs thereafter and by<br>each year thereafter if not<br>all affected States Parties<br>have done so by 18MSP).   | consultations with women,<br>girls, boys, and men.  |
| 62% [18 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed]  | 69% [20 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed]   |   |
| Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Colombia<br>Croatia   | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Colombia<br>Croatia<br>DRC*<br>Ecuador<br>Ethiopia<br>Oman<br>Peru<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>South Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Thailand<br>Turkey<br>UK<br>Zimbabwe  | Colombia<br>DRC*<br>Iraq<br>South Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Thailand<br>Turkey<br>UK<br>UK<br>Zimbabwe |
| Cambodia<br>Chad<br>DRC*<br>Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia  | Chad<br>Eritrea*<br>Iraq<br>Niger*<br>Somalia<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Mauritania<br>Ukraine<br>Yemen<br>Yemen   | Somalia<br>Ukraine<br>Yemen   |
|   |  | Sri Lanka*<br>Tajikistan  |
| For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review's assessment                         | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review has assessed<br>whether or not States<br>Parties had an annual<br>or multi-year work<br>plan in place as at 1<br>October 2020.<br>October 2020.   |   |

| their Article 7 reports by 30 |                             |                             | Ecuador     | Iraq        | also takes into         |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| April each year, including    | reports.                    |                             | Mauritania  | Niger*      | consideration new       |
| information on the number     |                             |                             | Oman        | Somalia     | work plans submitted    |
| of areas and amount of        |                             |                             | Peru        | Sri Lanka*  | in 2020, including in   |
| mined area to be              |                             |                             | Senegal*    | Ukraine     | Article 5 extension     |
| addressed annually and on     |                             |                             | Serbia      | Yemen       | requests.               |
| how priorities have been      |                             |                             | South Sudan |             |                         |
| established.                  |                             |                             | Sudan       |             | *As at 1 October, of    |
|                               |                             |                             | Tajikistan  |             | the 29 States Parties   |
|                               |                             |                             | Thailand    |             | assessed, DRC,          |
|                               |                             |                             | Turkey      |             | Eritrea, Niger,         |
|                               |                             |                             | UK          |             | Senegal, and Sri Lanka  |
|                               |                             |                             | Zimbabwe    |             | had yet to submit an    |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             | Article 7 report in     |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             | 2020 (covering 2019).   |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             | In addition,            |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             | Cameroon, Mali, and     |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             | Nigeria had also yet to |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             | submit an Article 7     |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             | report in 2020.         |
|                               |                             |                             |             |             |                         |
|                               | The number of States        | 1 State Party <sup>16</sup> | Chile       | Afghanistan | For the purposes of     |
|                               | Parties that have fulfilled | to fulfil its               |             | Angola      | establishing the OAP    |
|                               | their obligations under     | Article 5                   |             | Argentina   | baseline value for this |
|                               | Article 5.                  | obligations                 |             | BiH         | indicator, Mine Action  |
|                               |                             | since the start             |             | Cambodia    | Review's assessment     |
|                               |                             | of the 18MSP                |             | Cameroon*   | is based on the         |
|                               |                             | presidency                  |             | Chad        | number of States        |
|                               |                             | [out of 36                  |             | Colombia    | Parties that have       |
|                               |                             | affected                    |             | Croatia     | fulfilled their         |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> While Chile was the only State Party to fulfil its treaty obligations in 2020, to date, a total of 32 States Parties have completed survey and clearance: Algeria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Chile, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, France, The Gambia, Germany, <u>Greece</u>, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Jordan, Malawi, <u>Montenegro</u>, Mozambique10, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, <u>Palau</u>, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zambia. States Parties underlined are not listed on the AMPBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU)'s list, "States Parties That Have Completed Article 5", at: bit.ly/30xgu9r, presumably because they did not officially report having mined areas under the APMBC and/or have not made a formal declaration of fulfilment of their clearance obligations under the Convention.

|                               |                              |                            | States Parties  |                         | Cyprus             |                | obligations under         |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
|                               |                              |                            | including Chile |                         | DRC*               |                | Article 5 since the start |
|                               |                              |                            | itself]         |                         | Ecuador            |                | of the 18MSP              |
|                               |                              |                            | itsenj          |                         | Eritrea*           |                | presidency in 2019.       |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Ethiopia           |                | presidency in 2019.       |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Irag               |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Mali*              |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Mauritania         |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Niger*             |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Nigeria*           |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | •                  |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Oman<br>Palestine  |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         |                    |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Peru<br>Seneral*   |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Senegal*           |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Serbia             |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Somalia            |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | South Sudan        |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Sri Lanka*         |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Sudan              |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Tajikistan         |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Thailand           |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Turkey             |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Ukraine            |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | UK                 |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Yemen              |                |                           |
|                               |                              |                            |                 |                         | Zimbabwe           |                |                           |
| Anti Denseny -!               | Antion #31. Chatas Douting   | The number of [rfft1]      | 2 Chatter       | Afabaaistax             |                    | Chad           | For the number of         |
| Anti-Personnel<br>Mines of an | Action #21: States Parties   | The number of [affected]   | 2 States        | Afghanistan<br>Colombia | Cameroon*<br>Mali* | Chad           | For the purposes of       |
|                               | affected by anti-personnel   | States Parties that apply  | Parties [out of | Colombia                | -                  | lraq<br>Nizar* | establishing the OAP      |
| Improvised                    | mines of an improvised       | the provisions of the      | 13 affected     |                         | Nigeria*           | Niger*         | baseline value for this   |
| Nature                        | nature will ensure that      | Convention to anti-        | States Parties  |                         | Yemen              | Somalia        | indicator, Mine Action    |
|                               | they apply all provisions    | personnel mines of an      | assessed,       |                         |                    | Sri Lanka*     | Review has assessed       |
|                               | and obligations under the    | improvised nature (for the | including       |                         |                    | Tajikistan     | the following 13 States   |
|                               | Convention to such           | purpose of this indicator: | Cameroon,       |                         |                    | Ukraine        | Parties it believes to    |
|                               | contamination as they do     | survey, clear and report). | Mali, and       |                         |                    |                | have contamination        |
|                               | for all other types of anti- |                            | Nigeria]        |                         |                    |                | from anti-personnel       |

|                                      | personnel mines, including<br>during survey and<br>clearance in fulfilment of<br>Article 5 and disaggregate<br>by types of mines when<br>reporting in fulfilment of<br>Article 7 obligations.  |   |  |   |   |      | mines of an<br>improvised nature:<br>Afghanistan,<br>Cameroon, Chad,<br>Colombia, Iraq, Mali,<br>Niger, Nigeria,<br>Somalia, Sri Lanka,<br>Tajikistan, Ukraine,<br>and Yemen.  |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|--|---|---|------|--|
|                                      |  |   |  |   |   |      | In <b>Iraq</b> there has been<br>a big improvement in<br>Article 7 reporting, but<br>Iraq still refers to the<br>catch-all term "IEDs"<br>in its reporting, rather<br>than using anti-<br>personnel mines of an<br>improvised nature<br>(which refers to<br>victim-activated IEDs<br>that meet the |
| Reporting<br>Consistent with<br>IMAS | Action #22: Report in a<br>manner consistent with<br>IMAS by providing<br>information on the<br>remaining challenges,<br>disaggregating by<br>"suspected hazardous<br>areas" and "confirmed<br>hazardous areas" and their<br>relative size, as well as by<br>the type of contamination.<br>Report on progress in<br>accordance with the land | The percentage of affected<br>States Parties reporting on<br>the remaining challenge<br>and progress made in<br>accordance with IMAS. | 62% [18 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed] | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>Colombia<br>Croatia<br>Ecuador<br>Ethiopia<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Peru<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>Somalia<br>South Sudan | BiH<br>Cambodia<br>DRC*<br>Eritrea*<br>Oman<br>Niger*<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Ukraine<br>UK<br>Yemen | Chad | definition of a mine).<br><b>BiH</b> reported on the<br>remaining challenge in<br>terms of "mine<br>suspected areas"<br>(MSAs), but not SHAs<br>and CHAs.<br><b>Cambodia</b><br>disaggregated land<br>release by<br>methodology<br>employed, but did not<br>disaggregate mined                     |

| release methodology<br>employed (i.e. cancelled<br>through non-technical<br>survey, reduced through<br>technical survey, or cleared<br>through clearance). |  |  | Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Thailand<br>Turkey<br>Zimbabwe   |  |      | areas into SHA and<br>CHA.<br>The <b>UK</b> reported on<br>the remaining<br>challenge and<br>progress made, but<br>did not disaggregate<br>mined area reduced<br>through technical<br>survey from area<br>released through<br>clearance.   |
|--|--|--|---|--|------|--|
|  | The percentage of affected<br>States Parties providing<br>survey and clearance data<br>in Article 5 extension<br>requests and Article 7<br>reports that disaggregates<br>by type of contamination. | 79% [23 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed] | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Chad<br>Colombia<br>Croatia<br>Ecuador<br>Ethiopia<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Oman<br>Peru<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>Somalia<br>South Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Thailand<br>Turkey<br>UK | Eritrea*<br>Niger*<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Ukraine<br>Yemen | DRC* | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review's assessment<br>is based on Article 7<br>reports and Article 5<br>deadline extension<br>requests submitted in<br>2020.<br>It is unclear from<br>DRC's reporting if anti-<br>personnel mines are<br>disaggregated from<br>anti-vehicle mines.<br>Iraq disaggregates by<br>type of<br>contamination, but<br>reports anti-personnel<br>mines of an |

|   |   |   |  | Zimbabwe   |                                 | improvised nature as<br>"IEDs" and does not<br>confirm that this data<br>only includes victim-<br>activated IEDs that<br>meet the definition of<br>an anti-personnel<br>mine.   |
|---|---|---|--|--|---------------------------------|---|
| Accurate and<br>Timely<br>Extension<br>Requests | Action #23: States Parties<br>submitting requests for<br>extensions will ensure that<br>these requests contain<br>detailed, costed and multi-<br>year work plans for the<br>extension period and are<br>developed through an<br>inclusive process, in line<br>with the decisions of the<br>Seventh Meeting of the<br>States Parties <sup>17</sup> and the<br>recommendations<br>endorsed by the Twelfth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties in the paper<br>«Reflections on the Article<br>5 Extensions Process". <sup>18</sup> | The percentage of<br>extension requests that<br>include detailed, costed,<br>and multi-year work plans<br>for the extension period. | 63% [5 of 8<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed<br>whose Article<br>5 deadline<br>extension<br>request was<br>submitted and<br>considered in<br>2020. As at 1<br>October,<br><b>Eritrea</b> had<br>still to submit<br>a request to<br>extend its<br>deadline.] | BiH<br>Colombia<br>DRC*<br>Senegal*<br>South Sudan | Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Ukraine | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review's assessment<br>is based on Article 5<br>deadline extension<br>requests submitted in<br>2020.<br>As at 1 October 2020,<br><b>BiH, Colombia, DRC,</b><br><b>Mauritania, Niger,</b><br><b>Senegal, South Sudan</b> ,<br>and <b>Ukraine</b> , had<br>submitted extension<br>requests for<br>consideration at<br>18MSP. <b>Eritrea</b> had<br>still to submit a<br>request to extend its<br>deadline. <b>Cameroon</b> ,<br><b>Mali</b> , and <b>Nigeria</b> had<br>also still to request a |

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.3, at: bit.ly/3d7HbGg.
 <sup>18</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/4, at: bit.ly/3jzi7KK.

| The percentage of<br>extension requests that are | 22% [2 of 9<br>affected  | Colombia<br>South Sudan | BiH<br>DRC*                   | new Article 5 deadline<br>to address new<br>contamination from<br>anti-personnel mines<br>of an improvised<br>nature.<br>For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP   |
|--|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| submitted in accordance<br>with the process      | States Parties assessed  |                         | Eritrea*<br>Mauritania        | baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action  |
| established by the States<br>Parties.            | whose Article<br>5 deadline<br>extension<br>request was<br>due to be<br>submitted and<br>considered in<br>2020. This<br>includes<br>Eritrea, which<br>as at 1<br>October, had<br>still to submit<br>a request to<br>extend its<br>deadline.] |                         | Niger*<br>Senegal*<br>Ukraine | Review's assessment<br>is based on whether or<br>not States Parties<br>seeking Article 5<br>extensions in 2020<br>submitted their<br>request no fewer than<br>nine months before<br>18MSP.<br>Niger submitted the<br>first draft of its Article<br>5 deadline extension<br>request in May 2020;<br>BiH, Senegal,<br>Mauritania, and<br>Ukraine in June 2020;<br>and DRC in September<br>2020; all less then 9<br>months prior to<br>18MSP. |
|  |  |                         |                               | As at 1 October 2020,<br><b>Eritrea</b> had still to   |

|                                  |  |   |   |   |   |   | submit a request to extend its deadline.  |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Declarations of<br>Completion    | Action #25: States Parties<br>who complete their<br>clearance obligations will<br>continue the best practice<br>of submitting voluntary<br>declarations of completion<br>and give due consideration<br>to the paper "Reflections<br>and understandings on the<br>implementation and<br>completion of Article 5<br>mine clearance<br>obligations" <sup>19</sup> in that<br>regard.  | The percentage of States<br>Parties that have<br>completed their Article 5<br>obligations and that<br>submit voluntary<br>declarations of completion.                                   | 100% [1 of 1<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>to fulfil its<br>Article 5<br>obligations<br>since the start<br>of the 18MSP<br>presidency] | Chile   |   |   | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review's assessment<br>is based on those<br>States Parties that<br>have fulfilled their<br>Article 5 obligations<br>since the start of the<br>18MSP presidency.   |
| Residual<br>Demining<br>Capacity | Action #26: Ensure that<br>national strategies and<br>work plans for completion<br>make provisions for a<br>sustainable national<br>capacity to address<br>previously unknown mined<br>areas, including newly<br>mined areas discovered<br>following completion. In<br>addressing these areas,<br>they will consider the<br>commitments made at the<br>Twelfth Meeting of the<br>States Parties as contained<br>in the paper "Proposed | The percentage of affected<br>States Parties that include<br>provisions for addressing<br>previously unknown mined<br>areas in their national<br>strategies and/or<br>completion plans. | 34% [10 of 29<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed]  | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>Cambodia<br>Croatia<br>Oman<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Sudan<br>Thailand<br>UK<br>Zimbabwe | BiH<br>Chad<br>DRC*<br>Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>South Sudan<br>Ukraine | Colombia<br>Iraq<br>Ecuador<br>Peru<br>Somalia<br>Tajikistan<br>Turkey<br>Yemen | While several States<br>Parties, such as Iraq,<br>Turkey, and Ukraine<br>have national<br>clearance capacity (for<br>example in the Armed<br>Forces or Civil<br>Defence), they have<br>not stated publicly in<br>their national<br>strategies or<br>completion plans how<br>previously unknown<br>mined areas (i.e.<br>residual |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.17/2018/10, at: bit.ly/2tdtmDM.

| having put in place<br>sustainable national<br>capacities to address the<br>discovery of previously<br>unknown mined areas. | rational response to States<br>Parties discovering<br>previously unknown mined<br>areas after deadlines have<br>passed". <sup>20</sup> | The percentage of affected  | 24% [7 of 29               | Afghanistan                               | Angola  | Colombia               | contamination) will be<br>addressed.<br>As noted above, while   |
|---|--|---|----------------------------|---|---|------------------------|---|
| management  |  | States Parties that report<br>having put in place<br>sustainable national<br>capacities to address the<br>discovery of previously | affected<br>States Parties | Ecuador<br>Oman<br>Peru<br>Thailand<br>UK | BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Chad<br>Croatia<br>Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>Somalia<br>South Sudan<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Sudan<br>Tajikistan | DRC*<br>Iraq<br>Turkey | many States Parties<br>have national capacity<br>capable of addressing<br>anti-personnel mines<br>(for example Armed<br>Forces, Civil<br>Projection, or Police),<br>this on its own is<br>insufficient to meet<br>this indicator. There<br>should be an agreed<br>plan in place<br>specifying which<br>national entity is<br>responsible for<br>addressing residual<br>contamination, under<br>which circumstances,<br>and which ensures<br>provision is made for<br>long-term access to<br>the national<br>information |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Convention doc. APLC/MSP.12/2012/7, at: bit.ly/34NE9U7.

|                              |  | The percentage of States<br>Parties that discover<br>previously unknown mined<br>areas, including newly<br>mined areas, that apply the<br>decision of the Twelfth<br>Meeting of the States<br>Parties. | 0% [0 of 3<br>affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed]                     |  | Cameroon*<br>Mali*<br>Nigeria* |  | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review's assessment<br>concerns States<br>Parties that discover<br>newly mined areas<br>after fulfilment of<br>their respective Article<br>5 obligations.<br>In addition, <b>Burkina</b><br><b>Faso</b> may also have<br>anti-personnel mines<br>of an improvised<br>nature on areas under<br>its jurisdiction or<br>control. |
|------------------------------|--|--|---|--|--------------------------------|--|---|
| Innovation and<br>Efficiency | Action #27: Take<br>appropriate steps to<br>improve the effectiveness<br>and efficiency of survey<br>and clearance, including by<br>promoting the research,<br>application and sharing of<br>innovative technological<br>means to this effect. | The number of States<br>Parties that report<br>promoting research,<br>application, and sharing of<br>innovative technological<br>means.  | 6 States<br>Parties [out of<br>29 affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed] | Afghanistan<br>BiH<br>Croatia<br>Peru<br>South Sudan<br>UK |                                | Angola<br>Cambodia<br>Chad<br>Colombia<br>DRC*<br>Ecuador<br>Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Oman<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>Somalia<br>Sri Lanka* | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review's assessment<br>is based on<br>information we are<br>aware of. This is not to<br>say that other States<br>Parties have not<br>promoted research,<br>application, and<br>sharing of innovative<br>technological means.  |

|  |  |  | Sudan      | In Afghanistan, DMAC     |
|--|--|--|------------|--------------------------|
|  |  |  | Tajikistan | has worked closely       |
|  |  |  | Thailand   | with The HALO Trust in   |
|  |  |  | Turkey     | developing survey and    |
|  |  |  | Ukraine    | clearance of mines of    |
|  |  |  | Yemen      | an improvised nature.    |
|  |  |  | Zimbabwe   |                          |
|  |  |  |            | In <b>BiH</b> , unmanned |
|  |  |  |            | aerial vehicles (UAVs)   |
|  |  |  |            | (colloquially called     |
|  |  |  |            | drones) were used by     |
|  |  |  |            | NPA and the BHMAC        |
|  |  |  |            | for non-technical        |
|  |  |  |            | survey during the        |
|  |  |  |            | country-wide             |
|  |  |  |            | assessment of mined      |
|  |  |  |            | areas.                   |
|  |  |  |            |                          |
|  |  |  |            | Croatia hosts an         |
|  |  |  |            | international            |
|  |  |  |            | symposium annually,      |
|  |  |  |            | during which             |
|  |  |  |            | innovations in mine      |
|  |  |  |            | action are shared.       |
|  |  |  |            |                          |
|  |  |  |            | Peru reported that the   |
|  |  |  |            | possibility of using     |
|  |  |  |            | drones with              |
|  |  |  |            | hyperthermal cameras     |
|  |  |  |            | is being explored.       |
|  |  |  |            |                          |
|  |  |  |            | South Sudan reported     |
|  |  |  |            | that in 2019 it          |
|  |  |  |            | developed capacity to    |
|  |  |  |            | deploy Ground            |

|   | Seeking<br>Assistance  |  |   |
|---|--|--|---|
|   | Action #43: States Parties<br>seeking assistance will<br>develop resource<br>mobilisation plans and use<br>all mechanisms within the<br>Convention to disseminate<br>information on challenges<br>and requirements for<br>assistance, including<br>through their annual<br>Article 7 transparency<br>reports and by taking<br>advantage of the<br>individualised approach.<br>States Parties will share the<br>outcomes of the<br>individualised approach<br>with the wider mine action<br>community in order to<br>maximise its impact. | _  |   |
| The number of States<br>Parties that have taken | The number of States<br>Parties requiring support<br>that provide information<br>on progress, challenges<br>and requirements for<br>assistance in Article 7<br>reports and Convention<br>meetings.<br>meetings.  | Oslo Action Plan Section VIII: International Cooperation a |   |
| 1 State Party<br>[out of 11                     | 17 States<br>Parties [out of<br>27 affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed<br>requiring<br>financial<br>support]<br>support]  | : International Co   |   |
| Sudan   | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>Chad<br>Colombia<br>Ecuador<br>Ethiopia<br>Iraq<br>Mauritania<br>Peru<br>Serbia<br>South Sudan<br>Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>Thailand<br>Turkey<br>Yemen<br>Zimbabwe  | operation and A  |   |
|   | BiH<br>Cambodia<br>Croatia<br>DRC*<br>Eritrea*<br>Senegal*<br>Somalia<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Ukraine   | nd Assistance  |   |
| Angola<br>Cambodia                              |  |  |   |
| As at October 2020,<br>the following 11 States  | For the purposes of<br>establishing the OAP<br>baseline value for this<br>indicator, Mine Action<br>Review's assessment<br>is based on 27 affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed, which<br>require financial<br>support, and excludes<br><b>Oman</b> and the <b>UK</b><br>which are entirely<br>nationally funded.   |  | Penetrating Radar<br>dual sensor detectors.<br>The <b>UK</b> had to devise<br>innovative procedural<br>solutions to deal with<br>the mechanical<br>processing of very<br>large volumes of sand,<br>during its clearance<br>operations in the<br>Falkland Islands. |

|  |   | advantage of the<br>individualised approach<br>and that report having<br>received follow-up and/or<br>increased support to meet<br>the needs identified. | affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed, that<br>have taken<br>advantage of<br>the<br>individualised<br>approach] |   |  | Croatia<br>Ecuador<br>Niger*<br>Serbia<br>Somalia<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Tajikistan<br>Zimbabwe                      | Parties had taken<br>advantage of the<br>individualised<br>approach to-date:<br>Angola (2018)<br>Cambodia (2019)<br>Croatia (2016)<br>Niger (2020)<br>Serbia (2018)<br>Sri Lanka (2018)<br>Sudan (2018)<br>Sudan (2018)<br>Somalia (2018)<br>Zimbabwe (2017 and<br>2018)<br>Ecuador (2019)<br>Tajikistan (2019)   |
|--|---|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| National<br>Coordination<br>and Dialogue | Action #44: States Parties<br>will strengthen national<br>coordination including by<br>ensuring regular dialogue<br>with national and<br>international stakeholders<br>on progress, challenges<br>and support for<br>implementation of their<br>obligations under the<br>Convention. They will<br>consider, where relevant,<br>establishing an<br>appropriate national<br>platform for regular<br>dialogue among all<br>stakeholders. | The number of States<br>Parties that have an in-<br>country platform for<br>dialogue among all<br>stakeholders that meets on<br>a regular basis.         | 8 States<br>Parties [out of<br>29 affected<br>States Parties<br>assessed]  | Afghanistan<br>Angola<br>BiH<br>Cambodia<br>South Sudan<br>Tajikistan<br>UK<br>Zimbabwe | Chad<br>Colombia<br>Croatia<br>DRC*<br>Iraq<br>Senegal*<br>Serbia<br>Somalia<br>Sri Lanka*<br>Thailand | Ecuador<br>Eritrea*<br>Ethiopia<br>Mauritania<br>Niger*<br>Oman<br>Peru<br>Sudan<br>Turkey<br>Ukraine<br>Yemen | In Ecuador, Eritrea,<br>Ethiopia, Mauritania,<br>Niger, Oman, and<br>Peru only national<br>government entities<br>are engaged in Article<br>5 implementation.<br>In several States<br>Parties, such as Iraq<br>and Somalia, national<br>authorities convene<br>regular meetings with<br>clearance operators,<br>but these do not<br>include other<br>stakeholders, such as<br>donors. |

|  |  |  |                        |  |          |  | While Mine Action<br>sub-clusters exist in<br>some affected States<br>Parties, these are UN<br>led and are not<br>considered in and of<br>themselves to have<br>met this criteria. |  |  |
|--|--|--|------------------------|--|----------|--|--|--|--|
| Oslo Action Plan Section IX: Measures to ensure compliance |  |  |                        |  |          |  |  |  |  |
| Compliance in  | Action #49: Any State                            | The percentage of States                                   | 0% [0 of 1             |  | Eritrea* |  | For the purposes of  |  |  |
| Reporting  | Party implementing                               | Parties that are   | affected State         |  |          |  | establishing the OAP   |  |  |
|  | obligations in particular                        | implementing obligations                                   | Party that had         |  |          |  | baseline value for this  |  |  |
|  | <u>under Article 5<sup>21</sup></u> that has     | under Article 5 <sup>22</sup> and that                     | not submitted          |  |          |  | indicator, Mine Action   |  |  |
|  | not submitted an Article 7                       | have not submitted an                                      | previously             |  |          |  | Review's assessment  |  |  |
|  | report detailing progress in                     | Article 7 report detailing                                 | submitted              |  |          |  | is based on those  |  |  |
|  | implementing these                               | progress in implementing                                   | Article 7              |  |          |  | States Parties that  |  |  |
|  | obligations each year will                       | these obligations in the last                              | reports in             |  |          |  | have not submitted   |  |  |
|  | provide in close                                 | two years, that provide                                    | 2017 and 2018. In      |  |          |  | Article 7 reports in   |  |  |
|  | cooperation with the ISU                         | updates to all States                                      |                        |  |          |  | 2018 and 2019.   |  |  |
|  | an annual update on the status of implementation | Parties in Article 7 reports<br>and during meetings of the | addition,              |  |          |  | In addition,   |  |  |
|  | in line with Article 7 and                       | States Parties.  | Cameroon,<br>Mali, and |  |          |  | Cameroon, Mali, and  |  |  |
|  | will provide information to                      | States Fullies.  | Nigeria had            |  |          |  | Nigeria, which had still   |  |  |
|  | all States Parties in the                        |  | not submitted          |  |          |  | to request a new   |  |  |
|  | most expeditious,                                |  | Article 7              |  |          |  | Article 5 deadline to  |  |  |
|  | comprehensive and                                |  | reports in             |  |          |  | address new  |  |  |
|  | transparent manner                               |  | 2018, 2019, or         |  |          |  | contamination from   |  |  |
|  | possible. If no information                      |  | 2020]                  |  |          |  | anti-personnel mines   |  |  |
|  | on implementing the                              |  | =,                     |  |          |  | of an improvised   |  |  |
|  | relevant obligations for                         |  |                        |  |          |  | nature, did not submit   |  |  |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Action #49 of the Oslo Action Plan also references Article 4 and retaining or transferring mines in line with Article 3, but for purposes of monitoring Mine Action Review has focused solely on Article 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> The indicator in the Oslo Action Plan also references Article 4 and retaining mines in line with Article 3.1, but for purposes of monitoring Mine Action Review has focused solely on Article 5.

| two consecutive years is     |  |  | Article 7 reports in  |
|------------------------------|--|--|-----------------------|
| provided, the President will |  |  | 2018 and 2019, and as |
| assist and engage with the   |  |  | at 1 October 2020 had |
| States Parties concerned in  |  |  | still to submit an    |
| close cooperation with the   |  |  | Article 7 report in   |
| relevant Committee.          |  |  | 2020.                 |
|                              |  |  |                       |

States Parties marked with an \* those which had still to submit an Article 7 report in 2020 (covering 2019) as at 1 October 2020.