Post Clearance Inspection: How Much is Enough? by Gasser  [ from page 4 ]

2. To be more precise: the maximum confidence of 10 percent sampling is 10 percent, but would be less if the original and inspection detection methods are correlated. In an honest lottery there is no correlation between successive results. This is simplified in the main text to improve clarity.
3. IMAS 09.20 Annex B, section B.3.1.
4. Paragraph 2: Specified Quality Limit is 0.35% for calculations. This is the “maximum fraction of contaminated land” after clearance. Annex B, section B.3.4.
5. In the equation: p is the maximum fraction of land still contaminated after clearance, which should be zero according to IMAS 09.10 and not 0.35%.
6. d is the maximum number of non-conforming items found during inspection before rejecting the clearance, which should also be zero according to IMAS 09.20.

Preparing for Humanitarian Demining in Post-conflict Colombia by Case  [ from page 7 ]


The Case for a National Assessment on Landmine Contamination through NTS in Colombia by Parra and Bonnet  [ from page 13 ]


Healing and Reconciliation for Survivors of War in North Central Colombia by Macauley  [ from page 16 ]


Mine Action in Myanmar by Fasth and Simon  [ from page 20 ]

3. Projects conducted by MSWRR with the support of UNICEF and DanChurchAid.
5. Internal data collected by DRC/DDG.

Implementing Culturally-Sensitive Risk Education in Somalia by Jones and Breili  [ from page 26 ]

5. Online survey response of the Deputy Country Director of the...
Child-to-Child, Mine Risk Education by Horsley [from page 31]


7. PSW is a methodology that was developed by the Danish Demining Group (DDG), the specialist mine action unit of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). The approach aims to raise awareness amongst key community members (elders, religious leaders, local government officials, representatives from women groups and youth) of the dangers related to ERW that individuals have collected and stored in their homes. ERW held in private stockpiles, a common practice throughout Somalia and Somaliland, represent a threat to safety and security and is a problem that cannot easily be removed; it must be mitigated through consensual interventions stressing awareness raising, advocacy and RE. DDG has identified that awareness raising should be conducted as part of an approach to community safety integrated with other development agencies to provide full chain assistance to target populations. After the workshop, families with ERW in their homes are encouraged to inform the agency, which will immediately visit the house with an EOD team to safely remove items from the house and destroy them. To date PSW has proven a successful approach.


9. Non-scholarized children are children that receive their education through a madrasa as opposed to an education received at a government-established school or private school.


11. Afgooye, Garbaharey, Baidoa, Hudur, South Galkayo, Bulo-burti, Burhakaba, Dhusamareb, Wajid, Beledweyne, Yeed, El Barde and El Wak.


Child-to-Child, Mine Risk Education by Horsley [from page 31]


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Counting the Uncountable: Measuring the Benefits of MRE by Keeley [from page 35]


Influence of Mine Risk Education on Explosive Ordnance Disposal in Quang Tri by Ngo and Nguyen [from page 39]


MRE Certification Courses – Sri Lanka, Mali and Tajikistan by Kasack [from page 44]


2. UNICEF provides in-country support, but to date, does not offer basic or advanced MRE courses. SWEDEC at some point provided MRE courses but stopped; so did GICHD upon request. Major INGOs that engage in MRE/Community Liaison such as HI, MAG, DCA, DDG, etc., have their own in-house training or provide training on-the-job.


Democratic Republic of the Congo’s National Landmines Contamination Survey by Simon and Thoma [from page 48]

1. A slightly different methodology was also used at that time called General Mine Action Survey. However, for the sake of clarity, this article only refers to GMAA.

2. DRC’s total surface is 2.35 million sq km (907,340 sq mi)—approximately two-thirds of the size of Western Europe.

3. The survey methodology complied with non-technical survey 08.10 and land release 07.11.

4. MAG, HI, NPA, DCA.


Unplanned Explosions of Munition Stockpiles by Rutherford and Williams [from page 52]


Observations on Cluster Strike Patterns in Laos by Evans [from page 58]


5. Comptroller General of the United States. “Review of BLU-63/B Bomblet Program: Department of the Air Force.” 14 Jan 1971: 8. “The tests showed that, for similar release conditions, the BLU-63/B had a lower dud rate (fuse-nonfunction rate), produced dispersal patterns which were similar but more evenly distributed than those of the BLU-26/B, and tended to break apart on ground impact at dispenser-opening altitudes below approximately 1,000 feet.”

6. Comptroller General of the United States. “Review Of BLU-63/B Bomblet Program. Department of the Air Force.” 14 Jan 1971: 10. “ADTC’s conclusion was determined by the fact that BLU-26/Bs fall over a somewhat wider area than do BLU-63/Bs when dropped from the same altitude.”

7. IMAS Technical Note 09.30/06 “Clearance of Cluster Munitions Based on Experience in Lebanon.”


10. Available upon request