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Causes of Third Party Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts

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Causes of Third Party Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts

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Dedication

To mom, dad, Sierra and Tyler for your constant support and encouragement.
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Abstract

Since the conclusion of World War II, the number of expansive interstate wars has decreased while devastating intrastate wars and conflicts have increased exponentially. The Cold War ushered in an era of international stability in the bipolar balance of power, but proxy wars, wars of succession and independence, genocide and civil war made the era anything but peaceful. These conflicts proved to be breeding grounds for third party military interventions, which increased simultaneously. In this thesis, I attempted to determine what factors encouraged third party states to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states in the post-World War II era. I conducted a mixed methods approach, incorporating statistical analyses and case studies to identify global and specific trends in intervention. The cross-national statistical analyses include logit and ordered probit analyses and support the role of threat to influence in the international system, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions of the crisis actor as significant factors to decision-making. On the other hand, the case studies focus on three cases of U.S. intervention (or lack of) across time. They are Lebanon from 1982-1984, Algeria in 1992 and Libya in 2011. The results of the case studies support factors such as threat to influence, media attention and previous successful interventions in the crisis state as causes of U.S. military intervention. Ultimately, I establish that the United States will pursue interventions for the sake of its national interests abroad.
Introduction

Iraq, Syria and Yemen are just a few states currently embroiled in violent internal conflicts attributed to civil war and insurgency. Foreign powers progressively internationalize such conflicts by deploying military capabilities to influence their outcome. Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United States are a handful of state actors that are partaking in military interventions for this very purpose. Understanding the motives of crisis actors in third party military interventions is fundamental to anticipating changes in threats and in preparing proper policy recommendations for outside and potential actors.

States are inherently rational actors that seek to maximize their relative power and security and maintain their national interests (Morgenthau in Williams 2014). Increasingly, this has involved the use of military force to intervene into the internal affairs of sovereign states that are embroiled in violent civil conflicts that are threatening the national interests of potential crisis actors (Shirkey 2012). Therefore, examination of the causes and interests leading a particular third party to intervene militarily is necessary to understand why these interventions are occurring.

Intrastate conflicts have replaced the pre-World War II trend of interstate engagements (conflicts between states). With the replace of the multipolar balance of power with a bipolar system post-World War II, Waltz (in Williams 2014) suggests that this system and balance of power are more stable and leads to less interstate conflicts than the previous arrangement. Furthermore, the zero-sum Cold War tactics including mutually assured destruction, actually encouraged peace between states to ensure survival in the age of nuclear destruction. While the international system has more stability, the increased sovereignty granted to former colonial possessions seeking self-determination has contributed to growing violent intrastate conflicts.
Intrastate engagements refer to conflicts within states, often between government forces and civilian factions, or civil wars. This can also include insurgency as we see in Iraq, genocide as was witnessed in Rwanda and other conflicts where violence largely affects civilian populations and emerges from domestic conditions such as wars of state-formation or succession (Williams 2014: 195). The origins of violent civil conflicts are just as subjective as their definition. While the process of state formation in the aftermath of colonialization is a clear cause, numerous other factors can contribute to these conflicts. The so-called “new wars” debate described by Williams (2014) suggests that in the post-World War II era there have been dramatic changes in the way we think about warfare and fighting wars. In particular, “the goals of combatants can be understood in the context of struggle between cosmopolitan and exclusivist identity groups” (Williams 2014: 200). That is to say that non-state actors are increasingly challenging the legitimacy of state organizations as they seek rights and influence that have traditionally been withheld.

The central question of this thesis will be to explain why states intervene in the internal conflicts of sovereign states in the post-World War II era. I am not explaining whether the intervention should have occurred, nor am I explaining the effectiveness of the intervention. I am only seeking to explore some of the causal factors that contributed to (or did not) the intervention.

For my purposes here, I use Regan’s 1998 definition of third party military intervention as “convention breaking military...activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country...with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces” (Regan 1998: 3). I expand upon this to include Kinsella and Thillemà’s (1995: 311) definition of overt military intervention (OMI) as “combat-ready military operations openly undertaken by a state's
regular military forces within a foreign territory. It includes operations by conventional ground combat units, commando and other small unit raids, aerial attacks, ground-based artillery and rocket attacks and naval bombardment.” Increasingly, Western states have relied on airpower, as the U.S. did in Libya, as the main military contribution because of its “quick and direct access to enemy leadership” (Williams 2014: 204; Merom 2012). Therefore, military intervention is not limited to combat troops but includes the entire military arsenal and assets.

Furthermore, in this analysis, I consider a third party as any outside state that intervenes into another state’s sovereign territory. I do not address intervention by international organizations (IGO’s) or non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), however, future and additional research, where the data are available, for the consideration of IGO’s and NGO’s as potential third parties should be undertaken. In addition, the conflicts in question will be intrastate, or conflicts within the borders of a sovereign state (Regan 1998). Conflicts that emerge from one state initiating conflict with another state on a government-to-government level are not considered.

I apply a mixed methods approach to this study of third party military intervention in intrastate conflict. The mixed methods approach allows for the best in-depth analysis where data are only available for some of the hypotheses and variables put forward, as is the case in this thesis. In my literature review, I establish and examine 14 hypotheses, examining 17 separate independent variables that influence the likelihood of intervention. I organize my hypotheses around the levels of analysis (Waltz in Williams 2014): the international or system level, the state or domestic level and the individual or group level of analysis.

Relying upon the International Crisis Behavior data set for the quantitative analyses, seven to nine of these variables are tested. These variables include gravity (or threat to influence
in the international system), power discrepancy, alliance capability, regime type, geographic proximity, societal unrest and economic conditions. I address my dependent variable in two ways statistically: one, logit analysis tests a binary dependent variable for whether intervention occurs; two, ordered probit analysis explores the odds of intervention as violence increases on a four-point scale. I also chose to conduct separate statistical analyses to account for overarching themes such as the Cold War and post-Cold War era, as well as the seemingly increasing number of interventions in the Middle East region since World War II (Kapteijns 2013; Finnemore 2003; Murdie and Peksen 2014; Bellamy 2008; Weiss 2014; Kathman 2010). I further expand upon the statistical results to include predicted probabilities to examine the effects of significant variables at their extreme values on the likelihood of intervention.

I supplement my statistical analyses with three qualitative case studies focusing on U.S. intervention in the Middle East in post-World War II crises. These case studies—Lebanon 1982-1984, Algeria 1992 and Libya 2011—build off the findings of the statistical analyses. Most importantly, they allow me to examine the additional independent variables that were not included in the data set. These variables are: number of borders to a conflict state, threat to natural resources or trade, refugee flows, ethnic or religious ties, media attention on the humanitarian crisis, humanitarian crisis ongoing in general, history of previous intervention and successes in the conflict state and leadership characteristics.

The case studies also focus solely on U.S. intervention. The United States, as the world’s most powerful actor, provides interesting insights into why a more powerful state may or may not intervene in less powerful states. Furthermore, the consistent use of the U.S. in the three studies allows for analysis of changing U.S. interests and dynamics across time. The Lebanon crisis occurred in the heightened rhetoric of the Cold War, Algeria occurred in the aftermath of
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the start of the “New World Order” and Libya occurred well past the end of the Cold War and in the post-9/11 era. However, because of the power and strength of the United States, the ability to apply these finding to other international interventions creates issues of external validity that I address in the conclusion chapter. The U.S. military interventions in Lebanon and Libya are fundamental in evaluating and comparing current events in the Middle East.

The results of these analyses suggests great statistical significance attributed to threats to international influence, power discrepancy between crisis state and crisis actor, alliance capability and economic conditions in the potential crisis actor. There is also statistical significance attributed to era, indicating that the post-Cold War era does involve a greater likelihood of military intervention. The case studies also suggest the importance of threats to international influence as well as media attention to humanitarian crises and a history of previous successful intervention in the crisis state.

The increasing frequency of third party military interventions in intrastate conflicts requires additional study and analysis of this phenomenon for foreign and defense policy considerations. In fact, nearly “60 percent of civil wars experience some level of outside involvement” and as such, these interventions should be studied more thoroughly (Shirkey 2012:2). Because of the increasing rise in interventions in civil wars, this subject is a crucial topic for understanding the conditions under which a state may involve itself in the internal affairs of a crisis state. This bolsters the fact that intrastate intervention is an understudied area with little extant research, relying largely upon literature regarding interstate interventions (Regan 1998). As such, this thesis fills a gap in the literature, offering mixed method research on the causes of third party military intervention in intrastate conflicts.
In the following chapters, I describe and analyze the existing literature on third party military interventions in intrastate conflicts and formulate hypotheses that reflect the factors that have the biggest impact on the decision to intervene. I then identify the methods I use to test my hypotheses, including the justification for a mixed methods approach, as well as describing the measures of my variables for both the statistical analyses and case studies. Statistical tests are carried out to test several of the available variables from the data set. I analyze and expand upon the resulting data through predicted probabilities in the analysis chapter. I complete my substantive work looking at three case studies on Lebanon, Algeria and Libya to gain a deeper understanding of the causes of military intervention. Finally, I summarize the results of the statistical analyses and case studies in the conclusion chapter, and I explore the consequences and uses of this research.
**Literature Review**

The goal of this chapter will be to examine the theories and explanations provided in a broad array of literature that suggest plausible causes of third party military intervention in intrastate conflict. I will begin by largely examining the cross-national factors that contribute to these types of interventions across the globe and time beginning with the onset of the Cold War (largely considered the 1948 Azerbaijan crisis) and concluding through the present. I will organize my hypotheses around three levels of political analysis: system/international, state and group/individual level variables. I test many of these variables in the statistical analysis that follows. It will then explore the impact of system polarity via the collapse of the Cold War era and the emergence of a modern international system. In addition to accounting for literature regarding Cold War and post-Cold War interventions, I will further explore the seemingly recent increase in intervention in the Middle East region, in particular by the United States. In order to understand these complex variables, I will specifically apply a three case study approach to U.S. intervention in the Middle East region across time. There, I will explore the results of my statistical analyses as well as attempt to account for variables not in the dataset.

Since the end of World War II, the number of major wars (interstate conflicts) has fallen drastically while the number of civil wars and intrastate conflicts has risen to unimaginined numbers (Shirkey 2012). Simultaneously, scholars have indicated an increase in the number of third party military interventions into these intrastate conflicts (Merom 2012; Pickering and Kisangani 2009). This is interesting as it conflicts with the tradition or norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign and sovereign states (Gent 2007). There are many theories as to why this has occurred and this thesis will explore the validity of these arguments as well as contribute to explaining under what condition or combination of conditions third parties decide
to intervene militarily. From the evaluation of the literature, I intend to provide an overarching, cross-national examination of third party military intervention, supplemented by nonrandom case studies to evaluate ongoing dynamics with the specific focus of U.S. military interventions in the Middle East.

I begin with the system or international level of analysis. There are seven variables I explore: balance of power, power discrepancy, alliance capability, geographic proximity and border count, natural resources and trade, refugee flows and ethnic ties. According to Singer (1961: 80), the international/system level “permits us to examine international relations in the whole.” This level explores causes of international actions and reactions through such variables as globalization (in the modern era), interdependence, international norms, differing power relations and many other factors that involve multiple international actors as a basis of decision-making.

One of the most widely discussed theories of intervention at the international level lies with the realist notion of power politics (Waltz 1967; Finnemore 2003; Shirkey 2012; Werner 2000; Saunders 2009). This theory largely focuses on the continuation (or in some cases disruption) of the international balance of power. That is, third parties intervene when they believe that they are challenged militarily on the international scene or when there is a threat to their perceived power due to some intrastate conflict, or alternatively, when military intervention provides a third party the opportunity to increase its international position. This notion of attachment to power, however, both contradicts and supports the realist ideal of rationality. A rational state may not intervene if it knew that it may suffer a possible severe loss even if their power status was threatened, but if the action is undertaken when certain losses may be appropriate or acceptable (i.e. loss of an ally, a certain number of military casualties, etc.) then
the action is perceived as rational. This suggests that the foreign policies of third parties are not solely rational, but are based on the understanding of relative power of the psyche of the decision makers as well.

Military intervention is frequently employed to promote and protect the international order (Finnemore 2003) and to maintain the status quo (Werner 2000). Extending upon this concept, Shirkey (2012) adds that great powers are more likely to intervene in conflict if another great power is already involved. This suggests that one power is trying to match the might of another through intervening militarily in an attempt to gain the greater influence in the conflict country and the world at large. However, this view may be challenged by the fact that some external regimes seek to upend the current balance of power by perhaps supporting a rebel faction in a civil conflict, if it means that that the potential third party will be better off in the international system. That said, a military intervention of behalf of a regime could be viewed as a threat to the balance of power in the international system. If the losses associated with military intervention to maintain the status quo were less than the possible gains, then third party military intervention would be more likely.

An excellent example of this is the intervention of Saudi Arabia into the 2015 civil conflict that erupted in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, largely considered the pillar of Sunni Islam in the Middle East, felt threatened by the rising influenced of Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen. Iran, considered the pillar of Shia Islam in the Middle East and a direct competitor of Saudi Arabia, largely supported these Houthi factions. Thus, Saudi Arabia intervened on behalf of the Sunni government of Yemen to counter the threat of Iran and Shia factions to the balance of power in the Middle East region.
**H1:** If an internal conflict presents an opportunity for an external actor to preserve or advance its own power status, it will be more likely to intervene in that conflict.

Similar to the role of power politics on the decision to intervene militarily, is the belief by third party actors that they have the greater capability and power compared to an adversary, and thus they have the greater opportunity to achieve their desired ends (Shirkey 2012; Parenti 2002). Capability and power typically refer to military capacity: the amount of and ability to recruit military members, ammunition and weapons and most importantly, the degree of damage or destruction inflicted through military means. As stated above, Shirkey (2012) believes that other powers intervene in an internal conflict when another power already has, in order to elevate its status relative to the other intervening state. This belief by the additional intervening power is based on its perception of its own capabilities as greater than that of another power. When a state has these concepts, it is more likely to intervene because the benefits far outweigh the costs. In its own calculations, it can achieve success without the burden of high costs.

Additionally, Parenti (2002) uses the United States as an example of third party intervention in the sense that the U.S. uses its extreme capabilities to intervene and support whomever it wants wherever in the world. The U.S. knows that it can afford to take the risk and will accept some minimal losses. What the literature lacks, however, is a consistent measure of capability with there being a significant difference between perceived and actual capability. These should be addressed as two separate variables; however, the feasibility of measuring perceived capability is unfavorable as the measurement may be biased based on what a state deems as capable.
H2: When there is a greater power discrepancy between a potential third party and a state in internal conflict, with the third party having the greater power, then there will be a greater probability of that third party intervening.

Another important concept circulated by scholars is the significance of alliances in the international system (Finnemore 2003; Shirkey 2012; Corbetta 2010; Idike and Agu 2014, Findley and Teo 2006). Fundamentally, allies expect parties to come to their aid in times of distress, especially when threatened militarily. Corbetta (2010: 63) quotes Smith as simply stating, “Alliances increase the probability of third party involvement in wars.” Findley and Teo (2006), further explain that alliances allow for coordination and communication among actors when deciding to intervene. While this may increase the odds of multilateral intervention if a decision can be reached, it can also decrease the odds of an intervention in the first place because more actors engaging in diplomatic talks tends to alleviate rash, unilateral or even multilateral decisions. Adding to this concept is the notion that an alliance with the state in conflict may encourage some sort of military intervention to ensure maintenance of interests. Alliances also extend to the involvement of intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s) in intrastate conflicts. Finnemore (2003: 137) argues that “since 1989...international organizations have been involved in almost all interventions,” because the twentieth century changed who intervenes in the sense that it is no longer legitimate (in the eyes of most of the international community) to intervene unilaterally, thus creating the need for an international, multilateral force instead.

However, as Shirkey (2012) points out, alliances can have a low reliability factor and international organizations are notoriously inconsistent in their decisions to intervene. There is no real legal binding requiring a state or organization to come to the aid of an ally, even if part of a defensive pact. Thus, the decision to intervene on the side of an ally depends entirely on the
third party’s perception of whether it will be successful or if the benefits would outweigh the costs. Furthermore, measuring alliances is tricky and can vary greatly. For example, there are numerous types of alliance pacts as Joyce and Braithwaite (2013) point out; they operationalize three types of alliances: defense, offense and neutrality in evaluating intervention obligation and decision. Additional literature focuses on which side of a conflict an alliance is formed, whether it is with the government or aligned with the rebel factions and how can one measure the feasibility of a rebel faction (Findley and Teo 2006).

**H3:** The greater the alliance capability (the strength of the intervening power’s greatest ally) the more likely that power is to intervene in an intrastate conflict.

The scholarly literature also devotes much emphasis to the role of geopolitics in the decision to intervene (Khosla 1999; Joyce and Braithwaite 2013; Shirkey 2012; Kathman 2010; Kathman 2011). Geopolitics explores the relationship between geographic proximity, national interests (i.e. natural resources) and the international system. Thus, the number of contiguous borders with neighboring countries, as well as the threat to regional trade and threat to natural resource access are major considerations undertaken by third parties in the decision to intervene.

According to Khosla (1999: 1143), “over one-half of all interventions are undertaken by states located in the region where the conflict occurs.” Khosla is pointing out that distance from the conflict area does matter significantly when weighing the costs of intervention. Joyce and Braithwaite (2013) further emphasize this point by explaining that the third parties that intervene based on geographical proximity do so under certain conditions. One condition is because of threats of spillover (a centralized conflict in one state moves beyond state borders to internationalize the conflict due to ethnic ties, military ambitions, etc.). That can further cause threats to internal stability (the possibility of internal factions imitating the demands of the
conflicting parties, or as Kathman (2010) puts it “civil war infection” as evident by 2011’s Arab uprisings). Another focus is that the costs of interventions in neighboring states are much lower than if intervening across the globe due to the shorter distance of military transport. A final condition put forth by Joyce and Braithwaite (2013) are threats to regional stability (an internal conflict transforming into a major interstate war among neighboring countries).

Additionally, the measurement of borders and geographic contiguity vary among scholars. For example, it is difficult to say that the United Nations has a set number of borders, when in reality it comprises nearly the entire international community. States, not IGO’s, share borders and therefore, the impact of NGO and IGO intervention cannot be measured using proximity (perhaps the impact of geographic proximity on NGO and IGO is eliminated by this very fact). Regan (1998) counts the number of borders a particular state has with another state to determine intervention likelihood. On the other hand, Joyce and Braithwaite (2003) simply measure a dichotomous variable for whether or not a state has a border with a country in conflict; it neglects the existence of any other borders and puts the focus on the conflict, not the third party. Regan’s (1998) analysis, however, on the impact of the number of borders on the number of interventions actually found that the number of shared borders reduces the probability of an outside intervention.

There is also a lack of literature on understanding how geographic formations (mountains, desert, rivers, etc.) along a countries border may affect interventions. For example, the border between India and China is extremely mountainous and cross-border raids have historically been negatively affected by this geography, whereas the generally similar terrain throughout China itself has frequently allowed easy control of its people throughout the centuries.
as the lack of geographic formations allows for easy and quick dissemination of information and government forces.

**H4a:** The closer a third party state is to a state embroiled in internal conflict, the more likely that third party is to intervene militarily.

**H4b:** The greater the number of borders a state has the greater the probability of that state intervening in a neighboring state embroiled in intrastate conflict.

Similar to the argument put forth by the geographic proximity theory, there are additional national interests such as trade and resource accessibility taken into consideration as well at the geopolitical and international level. These two factors identify well with the international concepts of globalization and interdependence that are critical concepts in foreign policy decision-making. Kathman (2010: 992) explicitly states, “Neighboring states…intervene to reduce the threat posed to their interests in the civil war state.” Disruption to trade is easier when a state is in internal conflict and goods must be shipped via a longer, more expensive route around the conflict or goods are confiscated, looted, or destroyed because of the conflict. Trade involving the distribution and sale of natural resources, especially non-renewable resources such as oil and natural gas, influences third parties to intervene as many states depend on these imports. States, regardless of regime type, have a rational self-interest outlook that causes them to carry out what is necessary to get what they need.

While these are important considerations to make, these issues are not enough to call for a full-scale military intervention, and parties may be more likely to pursue diplomatic (coercive diplomacy) and economic intervention means (i.e. economic sanctions). There are also ways to bypass conflict zones on land, via waterway and air (but again at a higher cost than direct and no-fly zones eliminate air transport). It is also difficult to measure the value of certain trade
goods and natural resources, as their value is dependent upon how much an external party values that item and to what lengths it would go to obtain that resource or trade good. Some parties can use alternatives, whereas others have no choice but to fight for what they need (U.S. does not need Libyan oil but Europe does).

**H5:** A third party state is more likely to intervene in an intrastate conflict when there are valuable natural resources and/or vital trade at risk of disruption due to ongoing conflict.

Another pressing threat caused by geopolitics is the threat of refugee flows resulting from and causing humanitarian disasters (Von Hippel and Clarke 1999). Third parties may intervene militarily to end an intrastate conflict in a neighboring state when the conflict has produced a large number of refugees fleeing into the neighboring states. Von Hippel and Clarke (1999) claim that refugee flows, as a result of an internal conflict, into neighboring states that are powerful and have the greater capability, results in a higher likelihood that the more capable power will intervene to end the flow of refugees. Refugees are expensive and it requires large funds and exceptional policymaking and organizational abilities to care for these people. Thus, third parties intervene militarily in an attempt to put an end to the civil conflict quicker in order to stop the flow of refugees to preserve their own domestic agendas. However, the humanitarian and economic aid given to countries that support refugees may be incentive enough to reject intervention and to continue to collect revenue.

**H6:** States that are the recipients of increasingly greater refugee flows from intrastate conflicts are more likely to intervene in that state.

A final international level variable is the existence of ethnic ties or shared histories and cultures of people across borders (Khosla 1999; Nome 2013; Shirkey 2012; Corbetta 2010; Svensson 2013). This phenomenon, however, is more closely associated with military
intervention on the part of smaller, developing states. These states are more prone to military intervention into ethnic based intrastate conflict because their borders are arbitrary creations from the colonial era often dissecting lines of ethnic affiliation across borders, while simultaneously creating conflict situations through the forced assimilation of very different populations into the same state (Khosla 1999). Nome (2013: 748) also explicitly states that “where ethnic groups have ties across state boundaries” there is a greater chance for intervention militarily. He also extends ethnic based conflicts to include conflicts with religious ties, because they are often interrelated and difficult to distinguish.

Further adding to the literature on ethnic ties and military intervention, Corbetta (2010) explains how these social constructs are the most significant determinant of intervention. For example, as mentioned above with the Saudi intervention in Yemen and the Iranian influence there, those states are intervening on behalf of their respective religious sects. When a particular ethnicity is in an armed struggle against some adversary within a single state’s border, similar ethnic groups in the surrounding territory (but from a different state) have a notion that it is necessary to help protect and defend the struggling group through armed intervention. This occurs through either governmental military support or through individual militia intervention. Regardless, a third party state or organization becomes involved in the internal strife of another state with the real possibility of further engagement in the conflict.

Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to account for all ethnic ties and crossties found throughout the world due to migration, immigration and false census records. Also, many studies attempting to explain third party military intervention in internal conflict weigh too heavily on dyad relations (analyzing the relationship between two distinct entities) involving the calculation of side-taking, but not fully grasping the influence of numerous external partners (Khosla 1999...
and Nome 2011). Furthermore, it may be significant to evaluate this relationship against the number of shared borders due to the above-mentioned decolonization and geopolitical struggles. Again, this study is attempting to identify any instance of a strong ethnic tie that causes a third party to intervene. It is not concerned with sides in the conflict just if it occurs and if it helps to explain why a third party might intervene militarily.

**H7**: A third party state is more likely to intervene in an intrastate conflict when there is a strong ethnic tie between an ethnic group in the warring country and a potential intervening state.

The state level of political analysis follows the international/systematic level and the following variables addressed at this level are humanitarian aid, records of previous interventions, regime type and domestic political, economic and social factors. This level of analysis concentrates on variables that are specific to the state or domestic level as opposed to international considerations.

Humanitarian crises in general have become the single most discussed cause for military intervention in the post-Cold War era (Kapteijns 2013; Finnemore 2003; Murdie and Peksen 2014; Bellamy 2008; Weiss 2014). Finnemore (2003: 53) defines military humanitarian intervention (MHI) as “deploying military forces across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from man-made violence.” Emerging in the last decade from MHI, has been the United Nations’ “Responsibility to Protect,” which in 2005 legitimized and legalized military intervention into humanitarian crises in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Bellamy 2008). The anticipation is that this resolution will make it quicker and easier to end violent repression of people encompassed by war. Third parties, states and especially IGO’s, often times face the need to intervene militarily in civil conflict due to pressure from interest groups, the media and citizens, all of whom believe there are moral
grounds for intervention to end the suffering of thousands and millions of people. Often referred to as the “CNN Effect,” the media has a tendency to direct national attention to humanitarian crises by airing emotional coverage of humanitarian disasters and deaths in the hopes of generating public appeal for policy action (Murdie and Pekson 2014). Within the last two decades, this “effect” has worked significantly.

H8a: Third parties are more likely to intervene in a state’s internal conflict during a humanitarian crisis, if there is increasing media attention and demand from the public.

Military intervention based on humanitarian grounds is a relatively new concept since the end of the Cold War. Finnemore (2003) bases this shift on the notion that the Cold War was centered on sovereignty, self-determination and the divide between East and West, where as current concerns appear to be on a more liberal, worldly and humanitarian level. Even in the post-Cold War era there is evidence, and the literature that suggests, that intervention on humanitarian grounds is simply an excuse for legitimacy when trying to achieve matters of more important national interest, such as regime change, access to resources, etc. (Parenti 2002; Idike and Agu 2014). There have even been claims that military intervention on humanitarian grounds is equivalent to a modern colonialism, where extraction and manipulation by a more powerful state is rampant (Finnemore 2003).

Furthermore, calls for humanitarian intervention have been very inconsistent, especially by the major parties (i.e. U.S., UK, France, Russia, Germany, etc.), adding to the claim that parties intervene on humanitarian grounds only when their interests are best met (Weiss 2014). That is, how does a third party calculate when enough humanitarian damage has occurred to intervene? Is it when interests are severely threatened or when the death toll exceeds a certain number? Besides humanitarian intervention as a moral obligation, it provides limited benefits to
the intervening party. Additionally, military intervention based on humanitarian grounds is largely undertaken by the combined efforts of the international community using IGO’s, rather than through unilateral decisions. As such, it is important for this study to analyze the reasons for humanitarian military intervention and threats to a party’s interests simultaneously to identify a comparison and verify that interests trump humanitarian crises. Unfortunately, evaluating that will be extremely difficult if not impossible for this reason.

**H8b:** Ultimately, third parties are less likely to intervene in a state’s internal conflict on humanitarian grounds alone.

With this in mind foreign policy decision-making deals with differing regime types. Koga (2011) expresses that there is a clear delineation between democratic and authoritarian-autocratic regime structures about when and where to intervene. Democracies and autocracies tend to have different conditions, as well as different decision-making structures (a democracy typically has to listen to a body of people (an electorate), whereas an autocracy can move forward with simply the decision of the leader and the support of the military), in relation to the decision to intervene militarily in an intrastate conflict. As such, Koga concluded that autocratic governments are generally more likely to intervene when there is something of extractable value (i.e. loot-able resources such as oil and diamonds) to be obtained, whereas democratic regimes are more likely to intervene when there is an ethnic tie on either side of the conflict or when there is a greater power discrepancy within the conflict but not when there are valuable loot-able resources (2011). Yet, these conclusions are not accurate in many scenarios. For instance, there is much intervention by autocratic states in support of ethnic tribal or religious groups in neighboring states, or there is also much desire from democratic states to increase or protect their access to
natural resources (i.e. oil) through intervention, a focal point of many regime strategies in the post-Cold War era.

**H9:** Because third parties are inherently self-interested, regime type will have little effect on the decision to intervene.

It is important to take into consideration the rate of previous success as well. Little literature addresses or recognizes the impact past failures or successes have on current capability. One such concept illustrating this point is the “Vietnam Syndrome;” Vietnam was a failure, in a sense, for U.S. foreign policy as it did not result in a victory and earned severe public backlash for continued U.S. participation in the effort. Today, there are comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam and a lack of lessons learned from the latter in deciding to intervene militarily. Additionally, the difficult U.S. intervention in Somalia haunted the Clinton Administration as it decided to avoid intervention in Rwanda (Kapteijns 2013). Furthermore, the ability to hurt an adversary is challenged when past interventions have not succeeded or were non-existent, because other parties are more likely to have achieved a higher (sometimes ignorant) self-confidence, per se, which has encouraged an increase in support and capability for the adversary (i.e. ISIL’s use of social media propaganda). Public support is crucial for sending troops abroad and since the 1983 Marine barrack bombings in Beirut, "national security doctrine has required that there be "some reasonable assurance" of public support before combat forces are committed abroad" (Burk 1999).

Conversely, when past interventions have succeeded, a party may be more likely to intervene for belief that it will succeed again. However, this can prove to be problematic for a state, because not every situation is the same and one does not want to reject intervention when it should have occurred, nor does one want to intervene under a false, prior self-confidence and
risk much greater losses than in the past. For example, the quick and successful U.S. intervention in Iraq during the Gulf War of the early 1990’s could arguably have been a positive consideration for U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003.

**H10:** If a potential third party has failed in previous interventions, then it is unlikely to intervene under similar conditions on a separate occasion; and if a potential third party has had success in previous interventions, then it is more likely to intervene under similar conditions on a separate occasion.

Diversionary techniques is a concept that is hard to measure but often used by leaders facing increasing domestic discontent. Leaders will encourage their state to intervene militarily in a crisis state in order to distract the populaces from the declining domestic conditions such as economic and social conditions (Keller and Foster 2012; Morgan and Bickers 1992). Keller and Foster (2012) argue that diversionary force is used by leaders in the hopes of rallying the country together and putting domestic differences aside and, if successful, can greatly reduce the perception of weak leadership. There, however, is a lack of empirical support attributed to this hypothesis and Morgan and Bickers (1992) argue that a revised definition of diversionary techniques should include the use of force only when there is strong discontent within the party of the leader and among those most influential to the political system. This nonetheless still supports the argument put forward that increases in economic and social unrest can lead to military action, regardless of which constituency one would be trying to influence.

**H11a:** Third parties that face increasing societal unrest may be more likely to intervene to distract from domestic difficulties.

**H11b:** Third parties that face declining economic conditions may be more likely to intervene to distract from domestic difficulties.
The final level of political analysis, the individual or group level, will address the hypothesis of leadership characteristics. In general, this level of analysis focuses on key leadership strategies and those individuals who make the ultimate decisions. It explores the role of political ideology, party characteristics and approval ratings.

Third parties are under great influence from their decision makers and those leaders’ psychological standpoints and beliefs. Dyson (2007) argues that when states face an intervention decision that is highly questionable, it is often the psyche, mentality and ideology of its leaders that will determine whether to intervene. This can help account for instances where very similar countries face an intervention decision in another country and yet one chose to intervene and one did not. Therefore, as Mowle (2003:563) explains, states will never fully be rational agents concerned solely with the dynamics of power politics, because foreign policy decision makers and leaders “must use judgment to make foreign policy decisions that affect their state.” Mowle further explains how these “judgments” about foreign policy decisions are actually a product of the structure of the system in which the advisors learned, such as universities and other government institutions. Therefore, the decisions of policy makers are partial to the system in which their beliefs were developed.

Keller and Foster (2012) and Chan (2012) discuss the use of diversionary techniques, especially foreign intervention crises, as ways of reverting domestic criticism away from the regime in power, as explained above for conditions of economic and social unrest. Foster and Keller found that leaders who had a greater belief in their ability to control outcomes were more likely to use military force, especially under domestic conditions of poor leadership approval or a low/falling GDP. Unfortunately, their model addresses only U.S. presidential leadership, not the
leaders of foreign nations under inherently different governing structures and varying party politics.

There is some recent research into the understanding of state leaders’ decisions on military intervention. Party alignment may be one method, as advocated by Mowle (2003) above, but it will never account for rogue actors or stresses associated with decision-making that may alter a player’s choice, nor will it account for states that do not have a multi-party electoral system. Furthermore, the educational and professional factors associated with attaining a political ideology are not the only variables that have an impact on a person’s psychological understanding of certain situations.

Mowle (2003) also delineates between realist and liberal policy structures as an indication of intervention decision. However, as criticized above, the dynamics of an organization, state and person are far more complicated than assigning decision-making to two very broad categories. In Mowle’s (2003) analysis, he simply codes his research to realist and liberal variables, which does not provide for any other possibilities or allow for variables that considered both or neither. He claims that most democracies (Western in particular) are more likely to pursue liberal initiatives due to a higher probability of involvement but not necessarily militarily, whereas realist policies are more likely to be undertaken when they are deemed necessary by the state (i.e. moments of economic decline, lack of guaranteed security, upcoming elections, etc.). Mowle’s analysis would thus benefit from an additional examination of regimes that are not just democratic but autocratic, totalitarian, etc. in order to form a clear delineation between policy worldviews.

**H12:** Third parties with leaders who are more hardline, realist, or “hawk-like” will be more likely to intervene militarily in intrastate conflicts.
Looking beyond the general categorization of system, state and individual levels of analysis, there are two overarching variables that tie the literature together: the rate of intervention in the Cold War era compared to the post-Cold War era and the rate of intervention in the Middle East region as opposed to other regions of the world. Humanitarian causes in the post-Cold War era have increased the occurrences of military interventions into civil conflicts (Kapteijns 2013; Finnemore 2003; Murdie and Peksen 2014; Bellamy 2008; Weiss 2014). The Cold War era was largely concerned with military action along ideological beliefs through proxy wars and wars of influence. The U.S. for example would intervene in a civil conflict to input its influence and to counter the threat of Soviet influence emerging, especially in cases where civil war was along political lines (i.e. communism or not). Thus with the collapse of the Cold War it would be feasibly to suggest that interventions would decrease as the struggle for ideological influence waned; however this does not appear to be the case and I will test to see whether or not the polarity of the international system affects the decision to intervene militarily. The issue with testing this variable is elapsed time. The Cold War era had 45 years of conflict to draw from whereas the Post-Cold War era has only 25 years of data to draw from.

**H13:** Interventions into intrastate conflicts are more likely to occur in the post-Cold War era than in the Cold War era.

In addition to the exploring system polarity, I will explore the impact of region on the decision to intervene militarily. In particular, I will focus on whether or not isolating the Middle East and North Africa region has an impact on the frequency of intervention. The Middle East (especially in recent years) has become a focal point of global military interventions and with this increased focus on the region I plan to explore what the addition of this regional distinction will have on the variables that lead to intervention. Since the Middle East contains some of the
world’s greatest oil reserves, the importance of the waterways and overland routes for oil delivery, suggests that the threat to access to natural resources may increase intervention in this area (Kathman 2010). Furthermore, with the collapse of the Cold War, ideological intervention is no longer a viable cause for intervention and thus other sources of contention must be identifiable to authorize intervention. Thus with the increasing international focus on this region of the world, it is necessary to evaluate the factors affecting decision-making to understand why the Middle East has witnessed increasing military interventions in civil conflicts. However, some argue that the risk to balance of power politics in the region has also encouraged a lack of intervention (i.e. Syria 2014, Algeria 1992).

H14: Third party military intervention is more likely to occur in the Middle East and North Africa region than in other parts of the world.

Summarizing the above theories, the literature examined is vast and varied. There is little consensus among scholars as to why third parties decide to intervene militarily in intrastate conflict. The lack of comprehensive analyses that include all of the variables explained above in addition to a focus on individual cases rather than comparisons with cross-national data accounts for this discrepancy (Nome 2013; Khosla 1999). Past scholars of this subject have a tendency to focus on one or two variables in varying types of analysis rather than test numerous variables against one another and simply applying these results to particular cases rather than an initial cross-national study. For example, Khosla (1999) analyzes the interventions in ethnic crises through only looking at the type of ethnic group and type of intervening power based on relative geography. He ignores other variables in his analysis that may contribute to his outcome more so than ethnicity or geographic location. Nome (2011:759) as well excludes multiple variables of significance or pays little attention to certain variables due to focusing only on “an essential
few,” which is detrimental in identifying cross-national patterns. Nome also focuses his research in a conflict-centric approach only, versus combing both the conflict and actor centric approaches that this paper will advocate. It is important to explore both of these types of variables to get a more holistic representation of the causes of third party military intervention into intrastate conflicts.

Additionally, there is little literature and statistical analyses that focus on intrastate interventions; most of the existing literature is attributed to looking at the causes of interstate intervention. Joyce and Braithwaite (2013) have a clear analysis regarding geopolitical variables, but through the analysis of interstate conflict intervention, not intrastate conflict. Numerous scholars have mentioned this lack of intrastate data and analysis, yet few if any have actually conducted a cross-national intrastate third party military intervention statistical and case study analysis of this phenomenon: that is the goal of this thesis. As such, the literature is relying largely on interstate research due to the similarity between intrastate and interstate conflict and the ultimate decision to intervene lies with the third party, not the nature of the conflict.

As a result, much of the literature argues that the causes of intervention vary based upon region and geopolitics; yet, few analyses have been carried out to test global occurrences in comparison to regional occurrences, especially in regions with a history of colonialism (Khosla 1999; Joyce and Braithwaite 2013; Shirkey 2012; Kathman 2010; Idike and Agu 2014; Svensson 2013; Kathman 2011). Furthermore, the literature delineates a clear divide between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era, with humanitarian concerns appearing to dominate post-Cold War studies (Kapteijns 2013; Finnemore 2003; Murdie and Peksen 2014; Parenti 2002; Bellamy 2008; Von Hippel and Clarke 1999; Svensson 2013).
What is clear, however, is that there has been a general trend pertaining to the study of power relations, geopolitical concerns, humanitarian responses and individual characteristics as four major overarching causes of military intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Thus, it is through an analysis of these variables, in addition to the many others mentioned above, that this thesis intends to identify the most probable causes for third party military intervention in intrastate conflict across broad eras and global reach.
Methodology

For this thesis, I am exploring the factors that encourage third party states to intervene militarily in ongoing civil conflicts in other states since World War II. In order to evaluate the impact of these variables, I follow a mixed-methods approach. Initially, I conduct quantitative analyses that evaluates a set of variables (threat to balance of power, power discrepancy, regime type, distance from a crisis location, alliance capability, societal unrest, economic conditions) to determine if there is a relationship between the established variables and third party military intervention, and I conclude with a qualitative case study analysis.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain my methods. I begin by explaining my choice of mixed-methods approach with statistical analyses and case studies. I then identify and describe the data set used for the large-N analysis (the International Crisis Behavior Data Set) and why I chose this source. Next, I explain the variables (both independent and dependent) from the data set included in my analysis to account for validity, reliability and feasibility. I justify the relationship between the hypotheses I identified in my literature review and the variables I have identified from the data set. I explain and address any concerns regarding validity, as well as lack of corresponding variables to my hypotheses provided by the data set. I then explain my reasoning for electing to do two additional statistical analyses: one for time period differentiation (Cold War and post-Cold War) and one for regional variation (the Middle East and the rest of the world). I conclude this chapter with an explanation of why I conduct additional case study research to better test my hypotheses where variables and data are unavailable and to put real examples to the statistical results to achieve a holistic understanding of third party military intervention.

Justification for Statistical Analysis
I conduct statistical analyses to test for causes of third party military intervention into intrastate conflicts at the cross-national level. The analysis begins with crises occurring between the 1945 Azerbaijan crisis (International Crisis Behavior Project, Brecher and Wilkenfield, 2010), which is often considered the first international crisis of the Cold War in the post-World War II era and the present day. Encompassing nearly 70 years of history, numerous third party military interventions occurred into the internal affairs of sovereign states engaged in civil conflicts, and as such, the large number of interventions that have occurred provide plenty of data to compile a sufficient large-N sample of cases for a statistical analysis (between 116 and 131 cases per variable). That is also to say that some countries intervene multiple times and others never have, thus this allows for evaluation of all instances regardless of frequency of intervention by a state. I am not evaluating the decision-making process of a particular isolated country in this statistical analysis (I will incorporate U.S. case studies for that purpose in separate chapters), but rather to identify general trends across the globe that might lead any third party state to intervene militarily.

Once general trends are established, I am able to compare the results of the cross-national statistical analyses with three U.S. case studies to compare one particular country’s decision-making process to the expected or general outcomes. This process of including case studies is much more beneficial in terms of knowledge gained and understanding of conflict as opposed to statistical analysis alone, because it allows for an individualized, specific approach that uses the context of a situation to evaluate a particular state’s foreign policy. Case studies also allow for evaluation of variables not registered in the dataset, as well as examples that are too recent to be included in the data set.
I do not rely solely on case studies largely for the above-mentioned reason: the knowledge gained from mixed methods is far greater than simply evaluating a particular state with no reference to global norms. Thus, the statistical analysis serves as a base-line measurement against which to evaluate the actions of individual cases. Additionally, there is too much variation between states and too many cases of intervention that a handful of case studies alone could not adequately address all the variables and hypotheses that I have deemed significant to third party military intervention. Each instance of military intervention has different contexts under which it occurs, so it is impossible to gain a general understanding of military intervention through statistical analysis or case studies alone. As such, it is the focus of this thesis to supplement the statistical analysis aspect of the equation with the use of case studies as reinforcement of or contradiction to the statistical findings.

The Data Set

The data set used for this thesis is from the “International Crisis Behavior Project, 1918-2007” (Brecher and Wilkenfield, 2010).¹ From this project, the specific dataset “Foreign Policy Crises” is used. This data set (referred to as ICB2) includes actor-level variables, which are variables that identify the actions and characteristics of the state that is intervening. Below, I address that some of my hypotheses are crisis-centric rather than actor-centric and how I have accounted for this discrepancy.

My reasoning for using this data set is associated with the broad data it accounts for, as well as for providing variables for roughly half of my hypotheses. Since I am looking into the reasons of why states intervene as third parties in ongoing intrastate conflicts, the “Foreign Policy Crisis” data set is appropriate because it identifies variables that are of common

¹ While the data set is titled to include the years 1918 to 1945 (years that are outside the scope of this thesis), I set the variable to ensure that the appropriate period is tested.
consideration to states when deciding to intervene. Additionally, the data set provides for a large number of conflicts, which allows for cross-national results.

Unfortunately, the ICB2 dataset does not include all of the data and variables that I would need to fully test all of my hypotheses. In fact, many of the variables that I argue to be most important in a state’s decision to intervene are absent from this dataset. In particular, variables relating to leadership psychology and a more flexible interpretation of balance of power are missing; however not all of the variables formulated from my hypotheses are necessary to test in the statistical analysis. I am looking for general global trends and the analysis can sacrifice some variables, though a more accurate analysis would include more of these variables. Half of the variables are tested through the statistical analysis to create a basic understanding of the causes of military intervention. I am addressing this issue of missing variables in the data set with case studies filling missing gaps and interpreting the interaction of the variables. For example, the ICB2 dataset is actor centric, whereas several of my hypothesis-derived variables are crisis centric, such as the existence of a humanitarian crisis and natural resources. In these instances, case studies evaluate each variable to highlight an instance where the variables did or did not influence decision-making. However, it will not be possible to statistically test for a relationship among these variables due to the lack of data.

It would be nearly impossible to find any existing dataset that identifies all of the variables identified through my hypotheses in my literature review. This highlights a fact that I mentioned earlier: a lack of existing research associated with a cross-national, quantitative research design for third party military interventions (Regan 1998). Most research that exists is associated with a particular state or actor, or a much narrower period. This leaves open another
door for future research to be undertaken: the need for a cross-national dataset for third party intervention that looks at a plethora of reasons why countries choose intervention.

*The Variables*

I identify 14 factors that I find to be the most significant causes of third party military intervention in intrastate conflicts. It would be ideal to compile a statistical test of all of these variables, but as I have mentioned before, the data or compilation of the data is not readily available. As such, I have identified seven variables from the ICB2 data set that are valid enough to evaluate six of my hypotheses. The seven variables selected allow me to conduct a basic statistical analysis to explore general trends in military intervention, while also allowing me to evaluate the accuracy of the results through incorporating case studies to supplement the results.

Little readily available data provides for cross-national information regarding intervention in *intrastate* conflicts. I will account for this issue in the statistical analysis through identifying cases of intrastate conflict in the ICB2 dataset. There is no identifying variable for intrastate conflict participation, thus I have assessed each actor’s intervention occurrence and decided whether or not that actor was intervening in an internal crisis based on the initiating conflict and the parties involved in that conflict. That is, if internal actors initiated a crisis, then that crisis is open for potential intervention and selected as a case for analysis. I then eliminated the actors who were themselves the initiators of the crisis in order to have only intervening powers accounted for in the data set. I understand that the validity of the case selection is not precis; however, until there is a valid data set that accounts for intrastate conflict, this method will have to be sufficient. The combined generalization of the intervention situation in the
statistical analysis and the use of relevant case studies shall be sufficient in highlighting the internal nature of the crisis to the intervention decision.

For the dependent variable, I use “Intensity of Violence.” This variable takes into account a previously established variable in the dataset, “Crisis Management II: Principal Technique,” in such that it expands on actors that have been associated with the use of violence as the “primary crisis management technique” to indicate the “intensity of that violence.” It is valued on an increasing scale of severity with 1) no violence, 2) minor clashes, 3) serious clashes and 4) full-scale war. I create a dichotomous variable so that one value is equal to no violence and minor clashes and is set to equal to 0 and the second value encompasses serious clashes and full-scale war is set equal to 1. I combine no clashed and minor clashes, because according to Regan (1998) the military intervention should be “convention breaking” to be considered an intervention. Minor clashes, therefore, do not qualify as convention breaking and is grouped with no intervention. Hence, I am looking for the effect the variables I discuss below have on whether or not military intervention occurs at a level consistent with military risk.

Additionally, I use a supplemental dependent variable test to see the effects of the intensity of violence on an ordinal scale. This will test to see if the chances of military intervention produce greater or lesser degrees of military violence as opposed to the dichotomous measure of if military force is used or not. Therefore, using the original coding for the dependent variable, I will test for changes in intervention as military force increase from no violence to minor clashes to serious clashes to full-scale war.

Hypothesis 1 provides the first corresponding variable: If an internal conflict presents an opportunity for an external actor to preserve or advance its own power status, it will be more likely to intervene in that conflict. This hypothesis relates to the variable “Gravity” from the
ICB2 data set. The definition of this variable is “the object of gravest threat at any time during the crisis, as perceived by the principal decision makers of the crisis actor.” Valued on a scale of zero through seven for values that are nominal in character, the value of interest for this analysis will be value four: Threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem. This includes threats of declining power, isolation and stoppage of aid. I will test for this variable by recoding the variable so that one equals value four (threat to influence) and zero equals all other values.

This variable and value closely relate to my hypothesis. Since I am looking for the influence of threats to power in relation to military intervention, this value is especially significant and particularly applicable to this hypothesis. However, there is some concern over the definition of “gravity” including “at any time during the crisis.” For my purposes I am looking at those aspects of the decision-making process that lead to or reject military intervention as the initial method of intervention, not as an occurrence that is realized once intervention has already been undertaken for some previous reason or method. Furthermore, this variable will not be able to fully test the established hypothesis, in the sense that the variable is focusing on the first part: the threat to the current balance of power; it is not designed to test for intervention to disrupt the international balance of power for increased third party power.

The second hypothesis and variable pairing is Hypothesis 2: the greater the power discrepancy between the potential intervening state and the state in conflict, the greater the likelihood of third party intervening if it has the greater power. The variable measuring this hypothesis is “Power Discrepancy.” This variable is measured on a ratio scale through the computation of a “power score” for each actor and adversary that compiles data from six other
scores that are totaled together including population size, GNP, size of territory, alliance
capability, military expenditure and nuclear capability.

“Power discrepancy” is relevant for this analysis because it aligns nearly perfectly for
testing the effect of differences in power as a factor of intervention. Most importantly, the
calculation for this variable is “immediately prior to the crisis actor’s major response.” This is
essential for testing the reasons that cause the initial intervention.

The third hypothesis evaluated through statistical analysis is Hypothesis 3: *the greater
alliance potential a third party has, the more likely it is to intervene in an intrastate conflict*. The
variable I pull from the ICB2 dataset to evaluate this hypothesis is “Alliance Capability.” This
variable details the “type of alliance pattern” of the potential intervenor. It is valued on a four
step ordinal scale that is as follows: 1) non-aligned or neutral, 2) informal alliance with
superpower or great power, 3) formal alliance with superpower or great power and 4) alliance
leader-superpower or great power.

This variable was chosen for the analysis to give some understanding to the alliance
situation prior to the start of the initial conflict and during the decision-making process of
whether to intervene. Unfortunately, this variable is extremely limited in its understanding of
individual alliance configurations. It largely focuses on the alliances between actors and
superpowers or great powers and completely ignores the influence of regional power alliances or
proximity alliances that are vital for obtaining a complete understanding of the roles of alliances
in the decision to intervene. However, I will acknowledge the importance of these superpower
and great power alliances, especially during the Cold War and high profile international crises.
Yet, they (major alliances) are not the whole picture and as such, alliances considered ‘more
minor,’ though extremely important, would need additional study. Furthermore, this variable is
largely only valid for a cross-national study and not for U.S. comparisons (such as those I undertake in the case studies), because of its endogenous nature of relating to the United States.

The fourth hypothesis evaluated is Hypothesis 4a: *the closer (geographically) a potential third party intervener is to a conflict area, the more likely it is for that state to intervene.* The variable representing this hypothesis is: “Distance of Crisis from Location of Crisis.” This variable measures on an ordinal scale to include the following values: 1) home territory, 2) sub-region, 3) same continent and 4) elsewhere.

I use this variable because it fits nicely with my hypothesis in the testing of distance from the conflict area. However, I would have preferred to have more specific ‘areas’ or distances to test. For example, this dataset would benefit from including perhaps an interval scale of increasing distances, which would be more appropriate. For example, Libya is in Africa, whereas France is in Europe; according to this scale, they would be at value 4 for distance when in reality they are only separated by the Mediterranean. It is also possible to classify the two as being in a similar Mediterranean sub-region, but the ambiguity of “sub-region” leaves much to debate. In this case, it would be more meaningful to evaluate based off actual numerical distances versus area categorizations. I also would have liked to see a variable to measure the other part of hypothesis 4: part b that emphasizes the number of contiguous borders held by a potential intervener.

The fifth hypothesis I establish that has a relatatable variable is Hypothesis 9: *the type of regime a state has will be insignificant in determining whether to intervene (except in cases of humanitarian intervention).* For this hypothesis, the corresponding variable from the data set that best exhibits the focus of the hypothesis is titled: “Political Regime of Crisis Actor.” This variable is defined as differentiating between democratic, authoritarian, civil and military
regimes with the regime type measured being that of the intervening state, not of the state in crisis. They divide into the following values: 1) democratic regime, 2) civil authoritarian regime, 3) military-direct rule, 4) military-indirect rule and 5) military dual authority. Democratic regimes include following qualities: “competitive elections, pluralist representation in the legislature, several autonomous centers of authority in the political system, competitive [political] parties and a free press” (Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfield. 2010). Authoritarian regimes lack at least three of the democratic characteristics listed above.

I recode this measure for a dichotomous variable since there is no ordering to the above categories. I will indicate a democratic regime as one, and zero will indicate all other regime types that are authoritarian in the values. I will be unable to test regime type and humanitarian crisis simultaneously due to lack of a humanitarian variable (it is a crisis-centric variable), thus I can expect my result regarding my hypothesis to be incomplete. I will address this discrepancy in further detail in the analysis chapter that follows.

The sixth hypothesis relates to two variables found in Hypothesis 11b: third parties that face declining political support, increasing societal unrest and/or declining economic conditions may be more likely to intervene to distract from domestic difficulties. The two variables of this hypothesis are “Societal Unrest” and “Economic Status of Actor.” These variables in particular help to account for specific domestic considerations that regimes must make when deciding whether to intervene. First, “Societal Unrest” measures the level of discontent in a society ranging from terrorism and riots to protests and demonstrations. It is measured on an ordinal scale for which the levels are: 1) significant increase during the period preceding the crisis, 2) normal level preceding the period, 3) significant decrease preceding the crisis and 4) newly-independent state, government in exile. The second variable associated with the hypothesis
“Economic Status of Actor” is also measured on a nominal scale with similar values. This variable measures a combination of factors that include unemployment, inflation, consumer goods shortage, food prices, labor disruption and the cost of living in the state considering the action. It codes as follows: 1) increase in economic problems, 2) normal economic situation, 3) decrease in economic problems and 4) newly-independent state.

The significance of these of variables lies in their measurement immediately preceding the occurrence of the crisis. For this reason, these variables allow for a measure of some of the domestic conditions that may influence public opinion and ultimately regime decision-making. However, these variables are more likely to have a bigger impact on the public opinion and decision-making of democratic regimes that rely on popular support for the continuation of their administration. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, are not accountable to the public and are more capable and willing to suppress negative public opinion and ignore social and economic problems. These are concerns also needing to be addressed in relation to political leader psychology for which no corresponding variables exist in this data set.

An additional variable has been created to measure Hypothesis 13: interventions into intrastate conflicts are more likely in the post-Cold War era. I individually coded each case to reflect if the intervention occurred during the Cold War or in the post-Cold War era. Zero indicates Cold War (Azerbaijan to Yugoslavia) and one indicates post-Cold War. I designate the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the post-Cold War era with the 1991 crisis in Yugoslavia. While this variable will be unable to identify the increasing trend of military interventions in civil conflict, it is useful in analyzing the extent to which polarity affects decision-making. This is particularly useful in case study and qualitative analyses.
The final variable for the statistical analysis is the “Geographic Location of Crisis Actor.” I recoded this variable to reflect Hypothesis 14: *interventions in the Middle East and North Africa region are more likely than in other regions.* The recoded variable is defined as one equal to the Middle East and North Africa and zero as equal to every other geographic region. Again, this variable is used to identify if there are any trends in Middle East and North Africa interventions. That is, if crises in this particular region are given greater consideration or the same consideration as crises in other parts of the world when deciding whether to intervene. A critique of this variable and hypothesis, however, is that the ability to project power to the Middle East is largely a privilege of the great and super power nations and is thus not very reflective of interventions in general.

*Types of Statistical Analyses*

Numerous statistical analyses use different methodologies and compare outcomes. I first begin with the basic presentation of descriptive statistics to include case number, mean and standard deviation for the dependent variable and each independent variable, including the variables for era and region. This table (Table 1 in “Analysis”) allows us to view a general understanding of the data prior to the regression analyses. Furthermore, I break down the dependent variable to show both the binary and the four-point outcomes, displaying frequency and percentage of all intervening crises.

First, I test the data through a logit analysis. A logit analysis is used in the case of a dichotomous dependent variable (no or minor violence versus serious clashes and full-scale war). Since my dependent variable in this test is whether violence (as intervention) occurred and my independent variables are a mixture of continuous and categorical variables, the logit analysis is most appropriate measure to use given the measure of my dependent variable.
Once I have tested the initial seven variables in the logit analysis, I then conduct three additional logit analysis tests: one including era, one including region and one including both era and region. These tests explore my final two hypotheses that predict the significance of the post-Cold War era on increasing interventions, as well as for increasing intervention in the Middle East and North Africa region. I include these variables in separate analyses, as opposed to including them in the initial analysis with the seven other variables, because these two variables involve testing narrower global eras and trends. Furthermore, these two variables especially, are factors that I am interested in understanding their effect on the predictability of intervention.

Additionally, I conduct an ordered probit analysis to account for the four-point dependent variable. An ordered probit analysis investigates relationships between variables and an ordinal dependent variable. The purpose of this test is to predict whether there is a difference in the relationship as violence increases, as opposed to solely the occurrence of violence (as tested in the logit analysis) in military intervention in relation to the seven independent variables. Since this test is additional and outside the scope of the central thesis question, its results are for comparison purposes and as a possible area for additional or further research. I also repeat the above-mentioned process of accounting for era, region and both era and region in this ordered probit analysis.

Furthermore, the ordered probit and logit analyses are expanded to predict the likelihood of interventions when significant independent variables are manipulated to predict their outcome. Using the Clarify program for STATA, I take the independent variables that registered as significant in the ordered probit and logit regression analyses (excluding the additional era and region variables), set all other variables to their mean and run them at their 10\textsuperscript{th} percentile and
90th percentile values in order to predict the outcome of those values on the likelihood of military intervention and violence.

The combination of various statistical analyses provides increased internal validity for my research results. The ability to replicate results across tests is crucial for better understanding both the research question and the implications of the results. Furthermore, predicting probabilities of intervention from the data has significant policy implications.

*Justification for and Selection of Case Studies*

I include three case studies in addition to the quantitative analyses to investigate the role these hypotheses have in intervention decision-making. I focus on the evolution of a single country’s decision-making across three pivotal time eras. This is extremely beneficial to understanding the relationship between variables. By keeping the country of study constant, I am able to depict how the changing nature of the international/system, state and individual levels potentially affect whether that country intervenes. Additionally, I limit the geographic scope of these interventions to a single region the Middle East. Similar to the keeping of the intervening country in study constant, I am to explore the evolution of policy in that particular region, a factor significant in analyzing potential policy initiatives for the future.

The intervening country of study is the United States. The United States is currently the world’s sole super power and was one of only two super powers of the Cold War era. The United States is often identified with interventions due to its extreme capabilities, and thus, is most likely to have the greatest impact on world affairs. Furthermore, interventions conducted by the United States are hard to quantify in a statistical analysis, because it is so often the point of comparison (i.e. alliance capability) or its capabilities are so much greater than all others (i.e. power discrepancy; geographic proximity). This can contribute to the outlier effect in the
statistical analysis, where one exponentially greater outlier skews the data to affect reliability and significance. Even if the United States is not considering a variable significantly (because it already knows its overwhelming capability), that variable will measure significant when quantified in the statistical analysis (i.e. the significance of power discrepancy or alliance capability). However, this is also indicative of the fact that as a great power with great capabilities the United States may be more likely to intervene as it pleases. Accordingly, to understand reasons of U.S. intervention, independent case study analysis is a better way to examine U.S. decision-making.

Essential to understanding U.S. intervention decision-making is evaluating the influence of the Cold War era, the “New World Order” or post-Cold War era of the early 1990’s and the decidedly post-Cold War or modern post-9/11 era. Each era was significantly affected by system polarity and changing threats to the balance of power. The Cold War era challenged the U.S.’ commitment to anti-communism in the face of an aggressive Soviet Union. The “New World Order” era of President Bush following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence, inducted the United States as the sole global hegemonic power, essentially challenged by no other nation, yet supposedly committing itself to global democracy and human rights. Finally, the post-Cold War or modern era situates the United States at the crossroads of declining international prestige and of rising international challengers, altering the way the United States perceives, identifies and deals with threats to it global hegemonic order.

As for the regional Middle East and North Africa focus, the United States has clearly showed increased interest in the region in the wake of the Gulf War of the early 1990’s and especially in the post-9/11 war on terror. In particular, U.S. relations with Arab regimes have altered significantly in the 70 years since the close of World War II; issues of democracy, human
rights and natural resources are of particular interest to the study of U.S. involvement in the Middle East.

The first case study I analyze is the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1982. In this scenario, the United States took a biased stance in the Lebanese civil war, after entering the country under the auspices of the peacekeeping Multinational Force. The Lebanon crisis occurred at the height of renewed Cold War rhetoric as elaborated by the conservative President Reagan. Additionally, the United States had a history of intervention in Lebanon, which allows for an interesting comparison and analysis.

The second case study analyzed is a case of U.S. non-intervention. It is necessary for this thesis to include a study of non-intervention because when identifying the causes of intervention one must be able to eliminate variables that occur at all or most occasions and essentially focus of the variables that make the difference in the decision to intervene. For this study, I analyze the U.S. non-intervention in Algeria between 1988 and 1992. During this time, President Bush announced what he called a “New World Order” that would be free from communism and that would specifically focus of democracy promotion. In Algeria, a military coup and cancelled democratic elections erupted into a bloody decade-long civil war, to which the United States did not intervene (and in fact ignored all together) despite its calls for democracy and humanitarian interventions elsewhere. As such, the case of Algeria allows for an examination of why the United States picks and chooses where and where it will not intervene.

The third and final case study will be an analysis of the 2011 U.S. military intervention in Libya’s civil war. This very recent experience occurred at a time of a declining and worsening U.S. prestige in the Middle East and a time at which its regional influence was significantly lacking. This study also allows for a discussion of the post-Cold War phenomenon of
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in humanitarian crises and to its effectiveness (or lack thereof) in maintaining military neutrality.

While none of these three case studies is available in the ICB data set, they still provide a good qualitative understanding of the variables and hypotheses. For the variables in the ICB data set that are qualitative in nature, I do not depart much from the original coding for the case studies. Where the coding criteria were not obvious and it would be difficult to replicate (i.e. power discrepancy), I recode the variables. Nevertheless, I am confident that my measures of the key concepts are sufficiently valid even though the coding criteria varies from the ICB data set.

In all, these three case studies provide a decent understanding of the U.S. presence in the Middle East and North Africa region. They are significant in understanding U.S. interests, reasoning and decision-making processes. They contribute greatly to the general understanding of third party military intervention in civil conflicts.

**Measuring Variables in the Case Studies**

In addition to the variables used in the statistical analyses above, the cases studies incorporate the additional seven hypotheses and nine corresponding independent variables. These are number of borders to a state in conflict, threat to natural resources and trade, refugee flows, ethnic or religious ties, media attention and humanitarian crisis, history of previous intervention in conflict state and political leadership characteristics. All of these variables, including the seven defined in the statistical analysis, are measured similarly to the coding in the ICB data set.

**Gravity.** The “gravity” variable refers to the gravity of threat to one’s influence or power in the international system. I hypothesize that if there is a threat to a state’s influence in the international system as caused by an intrastate conflict elsewhere, then that state is more likely to
intervene in the conflict to influence the outcome for its national interest. For the qualitative case studies, this variable measures dichotomously: yes or no for the presence of a threat to influence by the ongoing conflict. Because this variable is dichotomous in the statistical analysis as zero or one, a yes/no measure is also relevant for these case studies.

*Power discrepancy.* My hypothesis regarding power discrepancy suggests that when there is a large difference in power between involved parties, intervention by a third party state is more likely. In the case of intrastate conflicts and interventions, this will refer to the difference in power between the potential third party and the actor in the conflict with whom the intervening state will be combating. I measure this variable on an ordinal scale with low suggesting no or minimal differences in power between potential combatants (i.e. the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), moderate suggesting that there are some important differences in power, but there is no overwhelming military domination inherent (i.e. Russia and China) and high suggesting that there are extreme differences in power between potential adversaries indicating a greater potential for intervention by the stronger force (i.e. the U.S. and Vietnam).

*Alliance capability.* If a potential intervening state has an ally that is relatively more powerful and influential, then that state is more likely to intervene in a crisis state. In the ICB data set, this variable measures on four-point ordinal scale, so for my purposes here, I will follow this reasoning for measurement, but qualitatively. Low indicates a crisis actor that is non-aligned or neutral, low-moderate indicates an informal alliance with a super power or great power, moderate-high indicates a formal alliance with a super power or great power and high indicates alliance leader or a super power or great power.

*Geographic proximity.* Geographic proximity or distance of crisis actor from location of crisis suggests that the closer a potential crisis actor is to a crisis state, the more likely the
potential crisis actor is to intervene militarily. The ICB data set measures this variable on a four-point ordinal scale ranging from home territory to elsewhere for the location of the crisis and I will measure this variable in a similar method qualitatively. Low indicates that the crisis actor is elsewhere or on a different continent from the crisis state, low-moderate indicates that the crisis actor is on the same continent as the crisis state, moderate-high suggests that the crisis actor is located in the same sub-region as the crisis state and high indicates that the crisis actor is located directly near the state in crisis.

Number of borders to a state in conflict. I hypothesize that a greater number of contiguous borders with a country in conflict will lead to a greater chance of the bordering country intervening militarily. This variable is relatively easy to measure as it counts the borders the country in question has in relation to countries in conflict. I follow the logic used by Regan (1999) in which he counts the number of borders a country has in order to calculate intervention potential. Therefore, my scale is numeric and is equal to the number of borders a state has with a country in conflict. For example, Turkey shares a border with both Syria and Iraq and is more inclined to intervene in the conflict with the Islamic State there.

Threat to natural resources or trade. I hypothesize that when a country in conflict is threatening access to valuable natural resources such as oil, or access to important trade routes such as in the Persian Gulf, then third party military intervention is significantly more likely (Kathman 2010). In this case, the scale used is a simple yes/no-dichotomous measure. No, would indicate little to no threat to valuable natural resources or trade to the crisis actor. Yes would indicate that there is a significant threat to the crisis actor’s access to natural resources or trade. An example of this would be if a civil conflict erupted in Saudi Arabia that threatened
large flows of oil onto the world markets. This is very much a potential target for insurgents throughout the Middle East who target oil infrastructure.

*Refugee flows.* I anticipate that large flows of refugees onto a potential crisis actor’s territory, increases the likelihood of the recipient state intervening in the conflict to stop the flow of refugees (Von Hippel and Clarke 1999). Measuring the flow of refugees is largely contingent upon geographic proximity and the number of borders to conflict zones. It will also be measured on the dichotomous yes/no scale. A no will indicate the lack of a significant refugee presence entering the territory of the potential crisis actor. A yes will indicate that there is a high presence of refugees entering a country. An example of this is the Syrian civil war where millions of refugees are fleeing to Turkey and Europe, but the United States and other states at a relatively far distance away are not experiencing the large migrations.

*Ethnic or religious ties.* Ethnic or religious ties to a state or party in conflict may encourage third party military intervention (Nome 2013; Corbetta 2010). This is an extremely difficult variable to measure as it is largely contingent upon historical relationships and precedents. This variable will be measured on a yes/no scale with yes suggesting there is some ethnic or religious tie that contributed to intervention and no suggesting that there are no ties to ethnic or religion by the crisis actor in the crisis state. Religious ties are evident throughout the Middle East such as when countries align with Saudi Arabia, the preeminent Sunni power, or with Iran the holder of Shia power. No relationship or ties exist when countries tend not to dictate policy based on ethnic cleavages.

*Media attention on humanitarian crisis.* I hypothesized that media attention paid to humanitarian crises unfolding in conflict states is a cause of third party military intervention, or “military humanitarian intervention (MHI)” (Kapteijns 2013:421; Finnemore 2003; Murdie and
Durun 2014). This suggests that the media plays a major role in influencing public opinion in favor of these sorts of interventions. This yes/no scale will reflect whether U.S. mass media directed attention to the unfolding crises. Yes indicates media attention such as is the case of the U.S. mass media focusing heavily on the humanitarian crisis in Syria; whereas a no is representative of significantly less attention being paid to the contemporaneous humanitarian crisis unfolding in Yemen.

*Humanitarian crisis ongoing.* I further expand the above hypothesis of media attention contributing to military intervention in civil conflicts to say that humanitarian crises in general do not encourage intervention or are insignificant in the decision-making process because states are typically more concerned with national interests (Weiss 2014; Parenti 2002; Idike and Agu 2014). To measure this variable, I simply code yes or no for the presence of a humanitarian crisis. In the three case studies I have selected, it is relatively easy to establish the existence of a humanitarian crisis, as civilians are the main victims on the conflict. Furthermore, civil conflicts or wars in general, create unprecedented humanitarian catastrophes and are easy to identify. It is difficult to assign a number of deaths or injuries to dictate a violent civil conflict. This number is completely subjective for the parties involved, as well as for potential intervening states.

*Regime type.* I hypothesize that regime type of the potential crisis actor will have little or no effect on the state’s decision to intervene or not, because states are inherently self-interested. In the ICB data set, I recoded this variable for the statistical analyses to reflect a dichotomous variable measuring democratic or authoritarian. I apply this same coding for the qualitative case studies, differentiating between regime type of the crisis actor as democratic or authoritarian (Koga 2011).
**History of previous intervention in crisis state.** The hypothesis surrounding the history of previous interventions in the crisis state by the potential crisis actors suggests that a successful history of intervention in that state encourages future interventions. It also suggests that a failed previous intervention would discourage intervention in a future conflict (Kapteijns 2013). Therefore, in addition to measuring this variable as yes or no for the presence of a previous intervention, it also accounts for the success of that intervention (or none, if there was no previous intervention) on a dichotomous success/failure measurement. This is evident in the U.S. invasions of Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The 1991 invasion was largely successful and achieved the mission, whereas the 2003 invasion created a nightmare for U.S. preeminence in the region and largely failed to achieve a definitive victory and sets up an interesting situation for the U.S. fight against the Islamic State starting in 2014.

**Economic and social conditions.** Economic and social conditions of the potential crisis actor are hypothesized as follows: as economic and/or social conditions in the potential crisis actor decrease (i.e. increase in economic problems/increase in societal unrest), then the potential crisis actor is more likely to intervene militarily abroad in order to distract and divert public attention from domestic concerns (Keller and Foster 2012). For economic conditions, the statistical analysis uses the variable economic status of actor in the ICB data set, which codes the variable on a four-point scale. The variable is a compilation measure of cost of living, unemployment, inflation, food prices, labor disruption and consumer goods shortages. For my purposes here, I code the variable on a three-point scale with low indicating decrease in economic problems, moderate indicating normal economic conditions and high indicating increase in economic problems. I remove the measure for newly independent state because in the data set there are no states/crisis actors identified as such. For social conditions, the quantitative
analysis uses the ICB variable societal unrest on a four-point measure. This variable is a compilation measure of assassinations, terrorism, general strikes, demonstrations and riots. I use the same scale and measure for societal unrest as was used for the economic conditions described above: low indicates significant decrease in unrest preceding the crisis, moderate indicates normal societal conditions and high indicates significant increases in societal unrest. Here, I also eliminate the measure for newly-independent state to maintain consistency.

*Political affiliation and leadership style/characteristics.* I hypothesize that U.S. presidents who are more hardline or take a “hawk” stance on international issues are more likely to intervene militarily. This measures by assessing political affiliation and leadership style (Dyson 2007; Mowle 2003). Political affiliation and leadership style is a categorical variable that, for the United States, is Republican or Democrat for affiliation and realist or liberal for style. Republican and realist typically align with the hardline or hawk characterization, whereas Democrat and liberal typically reflect the more pacifist approach. Furthermore, a numerical evaluation of the President’s approval rating, as recorded in Gallup polls, just before U.S. intervention is measured as a consideration of public belief that the President is doing a good job.
Analysis

As discussed in the “Methods” chapter, statistical analyses identify general, overarching trends into the causes of third-party military intervention. I conducted multiple statistical analyses in order to gain a greater understanding of the relationship between variables and hypotheses using the ICB data set. My dependent variable is the Severity (or Intensity) of Violence which is tested against seven independent variables to measure the likelihood of military intervention. I test for this dependent variable in two ways: first, on a dichotomous scale to evaluate if the occurrence of violent, military intervention is related to the established independent variables and second on an ordinal scale to determine whether an increase in violence is associated with certain independent variables. The independent variables of the intervening actor that I examine are as follows: economic status of actor, societal unrest, gravity of the perceived threat, regime type, alliance capability, power discrepancy and distance from location of crisis. Additionally, I conduct tests that account for the variables of era (Cold War/post-Cold War) and region (the Middle East and North Africa).

I first describe the data and variables using descriptive statistics. Then I will explain the results of the logit analysis, followed by the addition of the “era” and “regime” variables for an added analysis. At this point, I also include the Clarify results for the logit analysis for predicted probabilities. I then conduct an ordered probit analysis on the four-point dependent variable to explore that outcome, as well as replicating the additions of era and region. I conclude with the addition of Clarify results to the ordered probit analysis.

Descriptive Statistics

Below is a chart representing the descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent variables:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Cases (N)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Interpreting the Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severity of Violence</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1=no violence 2=minor clashes 3=major clashes 4=full-scale war</td>
<td>1.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1=home territory 2=sub-region 3=same continent 4=elsewhere</td>
<td>1.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>21.32</td>
<td>The greater the number the greater the power discrepancy</td>
<td>50.745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>1=democracy 0=authoritarian</td>
<td>1.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1=non-aligned 2=informal alliance 3=formal alliance 4=allyiance leader</td>
<td>1.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status of Actor</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1=increasing problems 2=normal 3=decreasing problems 4=newly-independent state</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1=increasing problems 2=normal 3=decreasing problems 4=newly-independent state</td>
<td>0.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.6031</td>
<td>0=no threat to influence 1=threat to influence</td>
<td>0.4911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era (Cold War/post-Cold War)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>0=Cold War 1=post-Cold War</td>
<td>0.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Middle East)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0=not MENA 1=MENA</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are a sufficient number of cases to conduct a statistical analysis, with a maximum case number of 131 and a minimum number of 116. The means are also significant to explaining.
the tendencies of the data. That is, it is the average of all the cases in the data set. For example, a mean of 2.31 for severity of violence (the dependent variable) indicates that the average severity of violence in case of intrastate conflicts is minor clashes.

There are several interesting occurrences in the data. First, when I isolate the dependent variable (intensity of violence) and examine its descriptive statistics we find that 50.4 percent of the cases faced no violence or minor clashes, which I designate as a “0” in my logit analysis, compared to 49.6 percent of cases designated as serious clashes or full-scale war by “1.” As such, the cases that I selected in the data set are roughly equal for their occurrence of military intervention with just over half at no or minor military intervention and just under half having military intervention. This allows for better understanding of some of the reasons behind military intervention as opposed to non-military intervention.

**Table 2: Dependent Variable Frequency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity of Violence</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Violence (0)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Clashes (0)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Clashes (1)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Scale War (1)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, it is interesting to note that when examining the descriptive statistics of regime type of the actor state, roughly half of the cases compiled are from democratic states at 47.3 percent and indicated by the recoding “1” in the statistical analyses and about half are authoritarian in nature at 52.7 percent and indicated by recoding to “0” in the statistical analyses. This also ensures a variety of regimes tested in the analysis, rather than a skewed data set with a large percentage more of democratic or of authoritarian cases.

**Table 3: Regime Type Frequency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian (0)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic (1)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Logit Analysis

The data analysis begins with the logit results, the true measure of my hypothesis. This test measured the intensity of violence (dependent variable) on a dichotomous scale with “1” representing “serious clashes” and “full-scale war” and with “0” representing “no violence” and “minor clashes.” This is the true measure of my hypotheses because I hypothesized on a dichotomous level of “yes/no” military intervention. In the logit analysis, we see that gravity of the threat to international position, economic conditions, alliance capability and power discrepancy are all significant for violent intervention as indicated by the asterisks.

Table 4: Logit Analysis Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>0.913</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>-0.617</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.350</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=<0.05; **=<0.01

The independent variable of “gravity,” which is a dichotomous measure of whether or not there is a threat to the influence of the crisis actor in the international system, has a p-value of 0.056 (it is close enough to the 0.05 two-tailed significance level to discuss as significant). Furthermore, the positive direction of the “gravity” coefficient suggests that as gravity of the threat increases from zero to one, there is an increase in the likelihood of intervention. Since this
variable is significant and it is positive, it supports my hypothesis that the threat to influence of a crisis actor in the international system is a predictor of military intervention.

Next, the independent variable for “economic conditions” measures a composite score of the economy for the crisis actor in an inverse direction, that is, higher numbers indicate greater economic stability. As such, the p-value of 0.018, in conjunction with a positive coefficient suggests that as the economy improves or stabilizes, military intervention is more likely to occur. This finding actually contradicts my hypothesis that as economic conditions deteriorate, military intervention would be more likely. I will discuss in detail in my conclusion chapter as to why this may have been the case.

The third significant variable is “alliance capability” with a p-value of 0.04. In this case, the coefficient indicates a negative relationship between alliances and military intervention. It suggests that weak alliance capability is a greater indicator of military intervention, not the reverse. This finding is another contradiction to my hypotheses. I hypothesized that heightened alliance capability would lead to an increase in likelihood of military intervention. I will also discuss in the conclusion chapter why this finding may have emerged.

Finally, the independent variable measuring “power discrepancy” has a p-value of 0.028. It also tested with a positive coefficient suggesting that increases in power discrepancy lead to increases in military intervention. This finding does corroborate with my hypothesis that increasing power discrepancy is a major factor in third party military intervention.

Accounting for era. It is necessary to look into whether or not Cold War/post-Cold War era tendencies will cause different statistical results in the logit analysis. As detailed in my literature review above, I find theoretical evidence that indicates a change in intervention occurrence with the cessation of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.
(Kapteijns 2013; Finnemore 2003; Murdie and Peksen 2014; Parenti 2002; Bellamy 2008; Von Hippel and Clarke 1999; Svensson 2013). Yet, I highlighted the occurrence of humanitarian crises as a major factor in military intervention, a variable that is not accounted for in this data set.

**Table 5: Logit Results Accounting for Era**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>0.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>1.113</td>
<td>0.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>0.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>-0.472</td>
<td>0.021*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era</td>
<td>1.612</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=<0.05; **=<0.01

When the logit analysis accounts for “era” or the division between Cold War and post-Cold War, gravity of threat, economic conditions and alliance capability all maintain their directionality and significance as measured in the original test. Interestingly, power discrepancy loses significance as its p-value is equal to 0.179. Furthermore, era itself has a significant p-value of 0.011, as well as a positive coefficient. This indicates that the change from Cold War to post-Cold War era does account for some greater likelihood of third party military intervention.
This finding is of particular interest. It is in direct support if my hypothesis that the new era ushered in a period of increasing intervention in intrastate conflicts. This also supports the claim that in the post-Cold War era military action shifted from interstate conflicts to intrastate interventions (Shirkey 2012; Merom 2012; Pickering and Kisangani 2009). Unfortunately, I cannot statistically test this finding in conjunction with the occurrence of a humanitarian crisis. This would have further supported my suggestion that humanitarian crises in the post-Cold-War era justified these interventions.

Accounting for Region: Middle East and North Africa (MENA). I also account for region, looking specifically at the Middle East and North Africa. It is interesting to look at the history of military intervention while accounting for the Middle East region, because global attention to the Middle East has increased over focuses elsewhere (Kathman 2010).

Table 6: Logit Results Accounting for Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>0.970</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.016*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>-0.635</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.033*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (MENA)</td>
<td>-0.367</td>
<td>0.501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=<0.05; **=<0.01

63
With the addition of “region,” or the geographic distinction between the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the rest of the world, into the statistical analysis (without accounting for era) I once again find gravity, economic conditions, alliance capability and power discrepancy to have significant p-values below 0.05. Region itself, however, does not test significant with a p-value of 0.501. Therefore, these results would contradict my hypothesis predicting that the MENA region would account for a greater likelihood of third party military intervention in civil conflicts.

**Accounting for Era and Region.** I conclude my analysis of the logit results by introducing both era and region into the statistical analysis simultaneously. The inclusion of both of these variables provides a comprehensive overview of my binary dependent variable.

*Table 7: Logit Results Accounting for Era and Region*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>0.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>0.021*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capacity</td>
<td>-0.481</td>
<td>0.020*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.347</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era</td>
<td>1.589</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = <0.05; ** = <0.01
Gravity, economic conditions, alliance capability and era have significant p-values below 0.05 when accounting for both era and region in the logit analysis. Interestingly, these same results (as regards significance and direction, not values) were evident from the logit analysis discussion of solely the addition of era as an independent variable. This would suggest that even despite the addition of an independent variable accounting for region, the significant variable in determining the likelihood of third party military intervention in intrastate conflict is era. For the logit analysis, era is clearly an important variable to consider when analyzing causes of intervention.

*Predicted Probabilities.* Predicted probabilities, using the Clarify program for STATA, predict the values of the dependent variable when the independent variables manipulated to reflect their 90th percentile and 10th percentile values. This analysis is significant to anticipating actions made by states and in policy implications, discussed in the concluding chapter. Each independent variable in the logit analysis is initially set to its mean before one significant variable is manipulated in each test. The results of the predicted probabilities tests for gravity, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic status through the logit analysis of the binary dependent variable are below:

*Table 8: Gravity Predicted Probabilities—Logit Results*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gravity-10th Percentile</th>
<th>Gravity-90th Percentile</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Violence/Minor Clashes</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Clashes/Full-scale War</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For gravity, a 0.600 in the no violence/minor clashes category for the 10th percentile indicates that there is a 60% probability of no or minor violence when gravity is low. That also indicates that there is a 40% probability of major clashes or full-scale war when gravity is in the 10th percentile. At the 90th percentile, there is a 38.2% probability of no or minor violence and a 61.8% probability of major clashes or full-scale war when gravity is in the 90th percentile. The positive change between the 10th and 90th percentiles of 0.218 or 21.8% in the major clashes or full-scale war row indicates that as gravity increases the likelihood of intervention increases by 21.8%.
Looking at alliance capability, there is a positive change of 40.9% for no or minor violence as the alliance capability increases from the 10\textsuperscript{th} percentile at 23.8% to the 90\textsuperscript{th} percentile at 64.7%. This means that as the alliance capability of a potential third party increases, nonintervention is 40.9% more likely. Alternatively, as major clashes/full-scale war increases from the 10\textsuperscript{th} percentile at 76.2% to the 90\textsuperscript{th} percentile at 35.3% there is a negative 40.9% chance of intervention, meaning that a potential third party is 40.9% less likely to intervene as alliance capability increases to the 90\textsuperscript{th} percentile.

I only discuss the results of the gravity and alliance capabilities predicted probabilities tests, but the results for power discrepancy and economic status are similarly interpreted. My hypotheses for gravity (as the threat to influence in the international system increases, intervention increases) and power discrepancy (that an increase in power discrepancy between adversaries increases the likelihood of intervention) were upheld by the results of the predicted probabilities analyses. My hypotheses regarding alliance capability (the stronger the greatest ally of a nation the more likely the violence/intervention) and economic status of the actor (increasing economic difficulties encourages violence and intervention to divert from domestic politics) were not upheld by the predicted probabilities of the binary dependent variable.

Ordered Probit Analysis

I use an additional ordered probit analysis to explore the four-point dependent variable on a scale of one to four with one indicating no violence, two indicating minor clashes, three indicating major clashes and four indicating full-scale war. Interestingly in the ordered probit analysis, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions of the crisis actor maintain significance; however, gravity does not register as significant as its p-value rises to 0.123.
In addition to significance, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions each have directionality consistent with the logit analysis results above. Power discrepancy is significant in a positive direction, so that as power discrepancy increases so too does instances of intervention. Economic conditions are also significant in a positive direction, indicating that for economic conditions of the potential intervening state, maintenance of the status quo or increases in positive economic conditions is consistent with intervention. Alliance capability is significant in a negative direction. For alliance capability this means that, a greater alliance member actually decreases the instance of intervention, rejecting my hypothesis.

*Table 12: Ordered Probit Analysis Results for Increasing Levels of Violence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.201</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Accounting for era.* Continuing the format used above for the logit analysis results, I once again take era and region into account in an additional set of analyses. I take the results of the ordered probit analysis and apply era first, then region and then both era and region to see the
dynamics of the Cold War/post-Cold War divide, as well as for regional focus in the Middle East and North Africa.

Table 13: Order Probit Results Accounting for Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=<0.05; **=<0.01

The results from the era ordered probit analysis are interesting and different from their counterpart in the logit analysis. Here, only economic conditions of the crisis actor and alliance capability have significant p-values below 0.05, in fact, their p-values are even more significant at 0.003 and 0.007 respectively. Furthermore, both of these results would suggest opposite intervention patterns than what I predicted for my binary dependent variable and hypotheses. The positive directionality of economic conditions indicates that the better the economic conditions in a potential third party, the more incidences of intervention or the greater degree of violence used in terms of this four-point dependent variable. The negative directionality of alliance capability suggests that the stronger the ally one has, the less likely intervention has been
or the less severe the violence has been. In this analysis, era did not have a significant p-value as it did in the logit analysis; however its p-value of 0.7 is very close to the 0.5 threshold, suggesting that the two varying dependent variables do make a difference in analyzing factors leading to third-party military intervention in intrastate conflicts, but that additional studies may eliminate this discrepancy.

**Accounting for region.** I add region to this ordered probit analysis for comparison to the logit analysis results above. I am exploring the effects of including a variable that identifies a conflict/intervention as occurring in the MENA region and analyzing the results that that variable has on the significance of the primary independent variables as based on the four-point dependent variable in the ordered probit analysis.

**Table 14: Order Probit Results Accounting for Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.013*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>0.442</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=<0.05; **=<0.01
The inclusion of the region variable in the ordered probit analysis produces similar results to the above logit analysis. Economic conditions, alliance capability and power discrepancy are significant with at least a p-value below 0.05 and the same directionality as in all other analyses conducted (positive for economic conditions and power discrepancy and negative for alliance capability). In this case, however, gravity loses its significance with a p-value of 0.098. Furthermore, region itself did not test statistically significant in this test as well. This suggests that internal crises in the Middle East and North Africa region are not a significant indicator of third party military intervention.

*Accounting for era and region.* Both region and era are tested in the ordered probit analysis for comparison to the above analyses as well as to comparison to the logit analysis.

*Table 15: Order Probit Results Accounting for Era and Region*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Era</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>0.619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*=<0.05; **=<0.01
As expected, economic conditions and alliance capability are significant with p-values well below 0.01 and gravity, with a p-value of 0.059 is close enough to a value of 0.05 that it is likely to some influence on the dependent variable. Directionality of the significant variables is constant, as it has been through each analysis. Interestingly, in the logit analysis accounting for era and region together, era had a significant p-value of 0.013 with a positive relationship. In this ordered probit analysis, however, era is not significant in this combined analysis with region, nor was it significant in the independent analysis accounting for era. Again, this suggests that there are implications for intervention based on the binary or the four-point dependent variable. Era is a significant factor in intervention occurrence when the scale is no violence/minor clashes in one category and major clashes/full-scale war in a second category.

**Predicted Probabilities.** The independent variables are each set to their mean, except for the variable whose values I am altering. The three significant variables for predicted probabilities are power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic status.

*Table 16: Power Discrepancy Predicted Probabilities—Order Probit Results*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Power Discrepancy-10th Percentile</th>
<th>Power Discrepancy-90th Percentile</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Violence</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Clashes</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Clashes</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-scale War</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17: Alliance Capability Predicted Probabilities—Ordered Probit Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alliance Capability-10th Percentile</th>
<th>Alliance Capability-90th Percentile</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Violence</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Clashes</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Clashes</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-scale War</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Economic Status Predicted Probabilities—Ordered Probit Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic Status-10th Percentile</th>
<th>Economic Status-90th Percentile</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Violence</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>-0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Clashes</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Clashes</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-scale War</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The predicted probabilities above depict the likelihood of intervention at each step in the dependent variable when the value of the independent variable is set to the 10th and 90th percentiles. For example, when we look at the variable power discrepancy, 0.385 in the 10th percentile column for no violence indicates that when the value of power discrepancy is at the 10th percentile, then there is a 38.5% probability of no violence on behalf of a potential third party in a particular conflict and when looking at the 90th percentile for no violence, there is a 27.4% probability of no violence. The change column indicates the change in probability when increasing from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile. Therefore, for power discrepancy, a
change of -0.111 indicates that there is an 11.1% decrease in the probability of no violence (or an increase in violence) as power discrepancy increases from the 10th to the 90th percentile.

Furthermore, the value of 0.212 in the 90th percentile for full-scale war under power discrepancy indicates that when the variable is set at the 90th percentile value then there is a 21.2% probability of full-scale war on behalf of the potential third party in a particular conflict. However, at the 10th percentile for power discrepancy and full-scale war there is 13.4% probability of full-scale war. The positive 0.078 change from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile indicates that there is a 7.8% increase in the probability of full-scale war as power discrepancy increases from the 10th to the 90th percentile.

My hypothesis regarding power discrepancy (that an increase in power discrepancy between adversaries increases the likelihood of violence/intervention) is supported by the predicted probabilities. Conversely, my hypotheses regarding alliance capability (the stronger the greatest ally of a nation the more likely the violence/intervention) and economic status of the actor (increasing economic difficulties encourages violence and intervention to divert from domestic politics) were not upheld by the predicted probabilities.
Case Study: Lebanon, 1982-1984

The United States’ intervention in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 is characterized by numerous international, state and individual level variables that encouraged America to abandon neutrality and act on behalf on the Lebanese Armed Forces. Of these variables, mass media attention on the humanitarian crisis unfolding and the successful 1958 American invasion of Lebanon are the most important factors encouraging the U.S. intervention. Furthermore, U.S. interests in the region especially pertaining to its alliance with Israel was an important consideration for decision makers, but does not neatly fit into any of my established hypotheses (except perhaps threat to the U.S. balance of power in the region).

By September 1982 the United States had deployed 2,000 troops to Beirut, Lebanon as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) serving as peacekeepers in the midst of a Lebanese civil war (Martin 2006). Despite American troops serving as part of an international peacekeeping force, by the end of 1982, the United States had effectively given up its neutral, peacekeeping position in its training and funding and military support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) (Malone et.al. 1986). In this section, I will explore the factors and variables behind why the United States abandoned its neutral position in relation to my hypotheses, as well as compare to the results of the statistical analysis. I will begin with the general context of the Lebanese Civil War leading up to the U.S. intervention as well as previous U.S. involvement in the country.

Overview of U.S. Involvement in the Lebanon Conflict

Lebanon gained its independence from France on January 1, 1944. Its borders were, like many other post-colonial nations, created from the ambitions, desires and interests of its colonial power, France. Especially significant in defining the future of Lebanon was the creation of its constitution. Using census numbers from 1932, the 1943 National Covenant distributed
parliamentary seats at a ratio of six Christians for every five Muslims, designed to reflect the ethnic distribution of the country at the time. A sectarian political system was established that allocated positions based on religious affiliation. Based on this system, the president would be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim. This established an unsustainable system in which the Shia community specifically were underrepresented as the composition of the population changed (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 213).

Lebanon first descended into a major civil conflict following the July 1958 toppling of the pro-Western regime in Baghdad and the fear that the violence would flow into Lebanon. This was precipitated by the 1956 Suez crisis that had initiated fear among Western and pro-Western nations of the Arab world that Nasser in Egypt and the Soviet Union were gaining greater influence in the region at the expense of western power. As such, the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 established U.S. interests in the region to counter the growing influence of the Soviet Union. From this U.S. declaration, Eisenhower had the tools necessary to intervene at the request of the Lebanese president in 1958 (Brands 1987). This intervention has important consequences when the United States faces the decision to intervene in Lebanon in 1982.

It was in 1975 that a longer, more deadly and consequential civil war erupted in Lebanon that would entangle the country in 15 years of violence, several international occupations and another request for U.S. assistance (Malone et.al. 1986). In April of 1975, Phalangist gunmen attacked a bus of Palestinian passengers as it travelled through a Christian neighborhood, killing 27. The Phalangists were a Lebanese Christian party whose militia and policies largely targeted Palestinians and rejected the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on Lebanese territory. This was in response to a supposed-Palestinian attempt to murder Phalange party leader Pierre
Gemayel earlier in the day. The following day Beirut was embroiled in violent conflict between Palestinian militiamen and Phalangist fighters. Throughout the following days, weeks and months, the country divided into the renewed general conflict between Christians and Muslims over representation and power sharing that had been evident since Lebanon’s creation, as well as largely over support for pro-Palestinian groups and the role of the PLO in Lebanon. More specifically, those desiring a return to status quo became the Lebanese Front, comprised mostly of Maronite Christians (including the Phalangists) who wished to maintain their majority in parliament and expel the PLO from Lebanon. On the other hand was the Lebanese National Movement, seeking to upend the status quo and comprised largely of leftist militias and guerrilla movements, including the Palestinian militias. Most significantly, though, was the emerging split within the Lebanese Army along the sectarian lines of the conflict (Kelly 1996).

By mid-1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon under the auspices of restoring peace, but with the ambition of curbing the Palestinian threat to the Christian militias in Beirut. Syria wanted to curb the influence of the PLO in the region as a whole (later they would align with the emergent Shia political forces). Hafez al-Assad had become President of Syria in 1971 and his Alawite sect of Islam opposed the Sunni Palestinians. Israel joined the Lebanese civil war with its first invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978. While Israel handed over this territory shortly after the invasion, it did so to the Southern Lebanon Army, a mainly Christian militia serving as an Israeli proxy force. Israel, however, did not remain out of the conflict for long. In June of 1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in response to the assassination attempt by a Palestinian group of the Israeli ambassador to Britain (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 380-383).

Following the inauguration of Lebanon’s President Amine Gemayel in September 1982, the Multinational Force of peacekeepers regrouped in Beirut in support of this new government.
The Americans hoped that this MNF would stabilize the country, allow the Lebanese government to reassert itself and help to create a strong national army; the United States planned to remain in Lebanon until the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from the country. While the United States wanted to maintain its credibility to its Arab allies, it had to be careful to remain neutral and in a peace-promoting position, especially as regarded its relationship with Israel. With this, the United States failed (Malone et.al. 1986).

According to Malone, Miller and Robben (1986) there were four points of contention that exposed the bias of the American position in favor of the Christian, pro-Israeli government and resulted in the United States moving beyond its self-dense parameters. First was the training of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the military factions that had remained loyal to the government. Here, the United States falsely assumed that all parties recognized the legitimacy of the Gemayel government and beginning in January 1983 the Americans were training and funding the LAF as “an ally” (Malone et al 1986: 426). The United States wanted to ensure the survival of the Gemayel government. Secondly, the U.S. Navy gunfire in defense of American Marines under fire was provocative, because naval artillery defies impartiality, as it is not an equal return of fire. Third, U.S. reconnaissance flights in the wake of several Marines killed in action, was threatening to the opposition, as it prepared for the need to call in carrier strikes. This was another example of the United States preparing for an unequal return of fire. And finally, “on 19 September 1983 the United States used military force in direct support of the Lebanese Armed Forces” to prevent the town of Suq al-Gharb from falling to the militia forces (Malone et al1986: 427). This city was a strategic and tactical location to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the United States; its continued control by pro-government forces would strengthen
the United States’ diplomatic negotiating capabilities with both Syria and Israel, as well as the militia forces.

With the United States in direct support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and in effect the Lebanese government, it terminated its neutrality and engaged in an act of third party military intervention into the affairs of a country in civil war. Some of the important reasons why the United States abandoned its neutrality are below. I will not follow the variables in order of significance, but rather in an order reflecting the organization of the above literature review (except for the variable for era that I address first).

*Relationship between Hypotheses and Variables*

*Era and Cold War dynamics.* Perhaps surprisingly, despite occurring during the heightened rhetoric of Reagan’s Cold War policy, there seems to be little evidence supporting Cold War dynamics producing a threat to the balance of power in the U.S.’ Lebanon intervention. Unlike the 1958 intervention, the Soviet Union and the United States were not competing (at least as critically) for influence in Lebanon. It was the emerging dynamic of U.S. support for a pro-Israeli, and in turn pro-American, government in Lebanon that spurred the U.S. into action. Thus with the United States’ support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United States sought to maintain the status quo and prevent a threat to the balance of power in the Middle East. The United States perceived a largely Muslim government in Lebanon as a threat to U.S. interests in the region, especially to Israel (Kelly 1996).

*Gravity or threat to influence in the international system.* I hypothesized that the existence of a threat to the balance of power would encourage a third party military intervention when the possibility of a new regime coming to power would challenge the existing balance of power through new alliances and aggressive international policies. This variable is significant in
the statistical analysis based on threat to survival of the state/regime (gravity of the threat) and it appears have also been important in the U.S. decision to intervene in Lebanon, although not to the extent of threat to the survival of the United States (Malone et.al. 1986; Kelly 1996). However, I do not find that this factor was as influential in the U.S.’ decision to intervene as it had been in the 1958 intervention, because Cold War dynamics of zero-sum politics were not as significant and other variables (explained below) were more influential to Washington’s decision makers. Nonetheless, threat to U.S. influence in the region was a significant consideration for the Reagan administration.

*Power discrepancy.* In reference to power discrepancy, there is no doubt that the United States had the upper hand, both militarily and diplomatically. The Lebanese Armed Forces had been severely degraded by ethnic splintering and the emerging militias lacked cohesive organization and ambitions. Furthermore, the United States had air and naval assets that it freely deployed to defend its ground marines to little retaliation by militia forces. Had the United States had the desire to commit fully to ground operations on the side of the LAF, it could have easily out-manned the militia forces with firepower and technical support. As such, the United States felt it had the necessary power advantage to support the LAF in a limited military intervention in September of 1983. However, the scale of the actual U.S. intervention in Lebanon might reflect continuing fears of another Vietnam situation in which the greater power discrepancy is limited by the nature of the conflict (i.e. guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency). This fear could further be evident in the immediate retreat following the devastating bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (Burk 1999).

As expected, the statistical analysis depicted the power discrepancy variable as significant in military interventions. In this scenario, my hypothesis dictating that the greater the
power discrepancy between the country in civil conflict and the potential intervening country the greater the likelihood of military intervention on behalf of the third party, was proven. The large gap between U.S. power and Lebanese militia power allowed the Americans to pursue a confident course of military intervention on behalf of the LAF. I do not believe this variable to be a substantial indicator of U.S. intervention decision-making in this context. The United States understood that its only main contender was the Soviet Union (which was noticeably absent from this conflict) and it would be willing to accept minimal losses (Malone et.al. 1986).

Alliance capability. Alliance capability in this scenario is in favor of the United States. This variable follows as the strength of one’s greatest ally, with the United States ranked as the number one ally in the world to have. Therefore, the United States in turn has the greatest alliance capability to intervene in the Lebanese conflict. The statistical analysis established that alliance capability was a significant variable in cross-national interventions since World War II, in the sense that greater alliance capability decreases the chances of intervention. While it is clearly evident in the U.S.’ decision-making, it is almost irrelevant as the variable was established in relation to the United States as the supreme ally. I will discuss the validity of this variable in relation to the United States in the concluding chapter. This may explain that while the other Multinational Force nations of France, Italy and eventually the United Kingdom maintained neutral positions and did not intervene despite having alliances with the United States; the significance of holding a higher alliance capability was not the determining factor in U.S. intervention (Malone et.al. 1986).

I did predict that the greater the alliance capability the greater the likelihood of military intervention. This is quite evidently clear in this scenario; however, like the breakdown of power discrepancy above, the United States understood that it was in fact the greatest ally and thus it
could afford to intervene unilaterally, accepting minimal losses along the way. As such, I also conclude that while this variable was significant in America’s decision to intervene, it was not a primary determining cause of U.S. unilateral action on behalf of the LAF.

The above three variables (threat to the balance of power/gravity of threat, power discrepancy and alliance capability) all tested as significant in the cross-national statistical analysis of seven variables. Although significant in the decision to intervene, I do not believe that power discrepancy and alliance capability were the most influential factors in the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Lebanon’s civil war, because the United States held the upper hand worldwide and understood that it did. Threat to the influence of the United States, however, was a significant variable in anticipating the U.S. intervention. As such, it is necessary to consider both the other factors that did not test significant in the analysis and the factors for which variables did not exist in the data set to test statistically to identify the decision-making factors of the United States in regards to the Lebanon conflict.

Geographic proximity. I hypothesized that geographic proximity (or distance of crisis actor from crisis location) would be significant in the sense that the closer a country is to a conflict or the more borders a country shares with a conflict country the more likely it is to intervene. This did not register as significant in the statistical analysis, nor was it noteworthy in the Lebanon intervention. The United States has the greatest military capabilities that allow it to project its power anywhere around the world in a significantly shorter amount of time than most other countries, largely due to military bases all over the globe. Even looking at previous U.S. military conflicts (e.g. Korea, Vietnam, etc.), it is willing and able to conduct military operations around the world. Thus, the importance of proximity is little in the Lebanon crisis due to the
advanced technological and military capabilities of the United States. The United States also lacks hostile borders and especially so to the Middle East states.

*Threat to access to natural resources and trade.* In the globalized world, access to trade routes and natural resources has become an important condition of armed conflicts. I hypothesized that if a country in civil conflict is threatening the flow of natural resources or trade routes, then a third party would be more likely to intervene to protect its national interests, especially if that third party is dependent upon that specific good, resource, or trade route. In the Lebanon case, however, the need for the U.S. to protect its interests in natural resources is not significant because Lebanon lacks valuable natural resources such as oil, which many of its Arab counterparts have in abundance and which the U.S. would have an important desire to protect. As such, the United States did not intervene militarily in Lebanon on the grounds of protecting its access to natural resources.

*Refugee flows.* Similar to Lebanon’s lack of natural resources of significance to the United States, the U.S. also lacked a flow of refugees onto its territory from the Lebanon conflict. I suggested that an increase in the flow of refugees from one country in conflict into a nearby country would increase the chances of the third party receiving the refugees or faced with the possibility of receiving refugees would intervene militarily in the conflict to put an end to the violence causing the refugee flows. This is different from a third party intervening on humanitarian grounds to stop suffering in general. This hypothesis relates to the above factor of geographic proximity because refugees tend to relocate to the closest peaceful country. Because the United States lacked a refugee flow directly onto its territory, the significance of refugee flows in contributing its decision to intervene in Lebanon is small.
Ethnic or religious ties. A tricky hypothesis to prove is the link in ethnic ties between the United States and Lebanon. I hypothesized that when an ethnic link exists between the potential third party and one of the factions embroiled in conflict, then the third party is more likely to intervene on behalf of the related ethnic faction. Because I include religion in the definition of ethnicity, it is plausible to say that the largely Christian U.S., led by the conservative President Reagan and his administration, intervened on behalf of the mostly Christian Lebanese Armed Forces that supported the continuation of the Christian majority parliamentary rules. It is argued also in favor of America’s ties to Israel and of protecting Israel from Muslim militias (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 383-4). This, however, is a false dichotomy.

While the United States continues to declare itself as a secular government, it is all too clear that Christianity has played a part in foreign policy decision-making since its founding. It is hard to ignore the role of religion in government and despite attempts by the United States to appear neutral in the Lebanon crisis, it was evident that it supported the status quo, but it cannot be proven that religion was a determining factor. Moreover, the U.S. was compelled to protect the interest of Israel, whose fears of PLO access to the West Bank would cause instability in the country and whose Phalangist allies carried out mass atrocities to prevent Muslim infiltration (Cleveland and Bunton 2013: 383). Therefore, I believe that that the religious tie between United States and the LAF had very little impact on the decision to intervene on behalf of the LAF.

Media attention and humanitarian crisis. The United States first arrived in Beirut under the umbrellas of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention as part of the Multinational Force (MNF). It appeared to the public as humanitarian relief in a brutal civil war with the ambition of stabilizing the country to allow Lebanon to reassert itself (Martin 2006 and Malone et al 1986).
Yet the United States quickly lost its humanitarian, peacekeeping mission and sided with the Lebanese Armed Forces. I hypothesized that a country would intervene militarily in a humanitarian crisis when there is increased media attention and increasing demand from the international community. I extend this hypothesis further to state that intervention on humanitarian grounds alone is unlikely and is more likely to be used as justification for intervention on grounds of more pressing national interest.

That said, the media covering the Lebanese civil war was active and easily available prior to the U.S. intervention in 1982 and once the conflict was under way, 71% of American respondents supported the intervention (Martin 2006: 607). The media coverage no doubt had some impact on the United States’ decision to join in the peacekeeping force; however, humanitarian causes do not account for the United States dropping its neutrality position and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces in 1983. Ultimately, the U.S. intervention on behalf of the LAF was an intervention not to support a humanitarian ceasefire, but to ensure the survival of the pro-Western Lebanese government and to demonstrate continued American commitment to Lebanon, as well as to ensure its commitment to Israeli interests. In fact, media reported 96 stories of military battles, compared to only 15 stories on humanitarian efforts (Martin 2006: 607).

*Regime type.* I identify regime type as a variable of limited significance in the decision of a third party to intervene militarily. I suggest that all regimes are inherently self-interested and that ultimately a nation will undertake those actions that are in its best interest. America is a democracy and the power to declare war is a power delegated to Congress in an attempt to provide the American people with a greater say and accountability; however, as history has shown, the power to send troops anywhere in the world is one of presidential authority with few
limitations (the War Powers Act is one limitation). The ability of American troops to tangle themselves up far away from the American homeland is easy and even when public pressure has turned against U.S. involvement; it is often at a point of no return. One way regime type may influence an intervention decision is when democracies face elections: leaders do not want to be portrayed as war-hungry and often decline to intervene or decline to vote for intervention if an election is upcoming to avoid removal from office (Mowle 2003). The year 1982 was not a major election campaign and Reagan had only been in office for just over a year before the initial troop deployment, eliminating the significance of elections and ultimately regime type, in the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Lebanon. Another possible relationship between regime type and intervention would be democracy promotion, but this is still often times an excuse for interventions to pursue national interests.

The evidence indicates that the most important factors in the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Lebanon are in the following paragraphs: success in previous intervention, U.S. domestic considerations and U.S. leadership qualities.

*Previous U.S. interventions in the crisis country.* The success or failure of previous interventions has a great impact on the psyche and rationality of decision makers. I hypothesized that previous successes in a country would encourage the third party to intervene again or that previous failures may dissuade a third party from making another intervention attempt. The 1958 Lebanon intervention undertaken by the United States greatly impacted its decision to intervene in Lebanon again in 1982 (Kelly 1996). The 1958 intervention was considered a success by the United States; it prevented the fall of Lebanon into communism and preserved the pro-American government in Beirut. More importantly though, the U.S. intervention into Lebanon in 1958 set a precedent that America was committed to its Arab allies and that
implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, establishing interests in the Middle East, was not a bluff but a real possibility with real military actions to provide support when called upon (Brands Jr. 1987).

Because of the precedent set in 1958, the United States risked losing its credibility in the Middle East. A loss of credibility would provide an opening for some other power to fill (the United States, of course, feared this would be filled by the Soviet Union or radical Islamists) and that would not be acceptable in a region surrounded by enemies (Syria, Iraq, Iran). This also provides a link to the abovementioned gravity or threat to influence variable. Since the United States had succeeded in supporting the pro-Western government in 1958, it surely believed that it could once again succeed. This need to maintain credibility based on previous precedent was extremely important in the 1982 intervention decision (Kelly 1996).

**Domestic conditions: economic and social.** Furthermore at the state level, U.S. domestic conditions leading up to and during the escalation of involvement are important considerations to evaluate. In specific, I anticipated that decreases in economic performance and conditions, as well as increases in societal unrest, would encourage governments to intervene, into the domestic affairs of sovereign nations, as a method of distraction from domestic conditions (Keller and Foster 2012). In the immediate prelude to U.S. forces deployed to Lebanon as part of the Multinational Force, America was struggling economically to overcome a major economic recession attributed to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the ensuing changes in oil prices. High levels of unemployment, increasing deficit spending and major investment in the defense industry contributed to an unbalanced, and at times, unstable U.S. economy (Ostry 1984). Socially and politically, the United States had only recently emerged from the Vietnam era protests against the government and was war weary; there were fears of another Vietnam
unfolding somewhere in the world. Additionally, the 1980 election ushered in a new era of social conservatism, calling for a smaller government and reduced taxes. All of these factors would suggest a lack of U.S. involvement in the conflict, because the statistical analysis indicates that worsening economic conditions deter military actions. However, if diversionary techniques were indeed employed then a diversionary intervention could have been plausible.

Because the U.S. economy was dragging and because of disproportionate increases in defense spending in relation to taxes, domestic conditions could be a reason for intervention. The key to this understanding is the belief at the time that the defense buildup and increases defense spending helped to lift the economy out of recession and gradually reduce unemployment (“The 1980’s”). Because of U.S. increases in defense spending, attributed to the Reagan administration, decision makers in the United States perceived intervention as a fruitful option if it alleviated the recession and increase economic well-being, except that the U.S intervention in Lebanon was low intensity and short lived. However, the intervention cannot weigh heavily on diversionary policy; it is more likely that it was the leadership of Reagan than the economic decline that encouraged action.

U.S. leadership variables. Finally, even more important to this domestic condition equation is the role of the individual leader of the United States in defining domestic policy at the time the decision to intervene was established. Ronald Reagan became president in January 1981, bringing with him conservative values and Republican goals. Reagan campaigned with promises to increase military funding in order to counter the threat of the Soviet Union and its communist proxies. The era of détente with the Soviet Union of the previous decade ended and Reagan increased his strong, anti-communist rhetoric. Reagan needed to make up for the previous administrations failures such as Vietnam and Iran, and he went about reestablishing
American strength through hawkish military policies and covert action in places such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan (Jentleson 2010).

Consequently, Reagan’s highly militarized rhetoric and hawkish stance indicate that he would be more open to military intervention in advancement of the national interest. Because other, much larger scale, interventions were taking place under the Reagan administration, party alignment should not be over-relied on in assessing the Lebanon intervention. I hypothesized that this hawkish position will encourage leaders with these characteristics to intervene military because they believe they have the need to intervene and they believe that they will be successful (in the sense that they see no failure for themselves due to false perceptions) (Keller and Foster 2012). In addition, Reagan’s approval rating just prior to the intervention was a stable 42 percent, suggesting he had significant popular support and would not need to worry as much about domestic discontent (Gallup).

Conclusion

It is a combination of variables that led to the United States abandoning its peacekeeping position and to side with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the pro-Israeli factions. Interestingly, those variables that tested statistically significant at the cross-national level appear to have had little effect on the United States intervening. Except for threat to influence, power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions most likely had little impact on the decision to intervene. Instead a history of previous successful intervention, including the very successful and precedent setting 1958 intervention in Lebanon, as well as domestic considerations influenced by the politically hawkish party in power in the United States, that contributed to the American invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Case Study: Algeria, 1992

The U.S. reaction to the Algerian cancellation of the democratic process and ensuing civil war is an interesting example of U.S. non-intervention in the Middle East at the end of the Cold War and the start of the “New World Order” (Fettweis 2005). Many variables in this scenario are similar to the situation in the Lebanon study and the Libya study that I discuss in the next chapter. These include the existence of a humanitarian crisis and difficult domestic conditions for the United States. However, as I will show, the Algeria conflict has several major factors that are missing that would have encouraged the United States to intervene such as media attention and a history in the country. Perhaps most significant to this U.S. decision is the fact that the actions carried out by the Algerian military establishment maintained U.S. interests in Algeria and the region.

On January 11, 1992, the Algerian armed forces reversed four year of democratic progress and reforms by canceling the second round of national elections and forcing the resignation of Algeria’s authoritarian president. The United States, in an era of a “new world order,” decided not to uphold the democratic process in Algeria that it supported throughout the rest of the world. By maintaining an unbiased opinion of whether the United States should have intervened, this study will analyze why the United States did not intervene in the Algerian coup and ensuing civil war. What was different about the Algerian situation for America? I will apply the same formula as the Lebanon intervention to compare actions in Algeria with hypotheses conducted at the cross-national level.

Overview of U.S. Involvement in the Algeria Crisis

Like most other modern nations in the Middle East, Algeria is a former colonial territory, only gaining its independence from France in 1962 following a bloody and lengthy war of
independence. From the war for independence emerged the National Liberation Front (FLN), the main rebel political faction in the aftermath of independence. The FLN took after many of its contemporary political parties and autocratic regimes in the region such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in the sense that the FLN was comprised of left wing, socialist nationalists who created one party rule throughout Algeria (Fettweis 2005).

The exportation of oil and natural gas served as the lifeline of the Algerian economy. It allowed the FLN to invest in industrialization and provide some social welfare programs that supported and legitimized the one party rule (Entelis 2011). In the early 1980’s, however, the price of oil plummeted and the Algerian economy suffered immensely from a lack of funds to continue to support its welfare and investment programs. By this point, Algeria already had one of the highest birth rates in the region and the largest population of citizens under the age of 30. Unemployment jumped from an already high 11% to nearly 25% in the 1980s (Entelis 2011). These social demographics, coupled with the dramatic decline in oil prices and mismanagement of government funds contributed to increasing social unrest.

By 1988, the unrest in society boiled over into what has been termed “the events,” in which the Algerian people rioted and protested against the authoritarian Algerian regime, resulting in a violent government response to the demonstrations (Entelis 2011). The people of Algeria were demanding social, economic and political reforms in an effort to democratize and liberalize the country. The protestors were largely influenced by the successful democratic transitions in Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. In what is referred to as the first incidence of democratization in the Middle East (two decades prior to the Arab Uprisings) the Algerian president conformed to the demands of the people and began instituting national reforms in an effort to bring peace and quell the protesters (Fettweis 2005).
On February 23, 1989, the Algerian people voted in a national referendum in support of a national constitution. The constitution provided for local and national elections, freedom of speech and press, as well as for the unrestricted creation and participation of political parties in these elections (Entelis 2011). The key to these reforms was first, the 1990 municipal elections and second, the two round parliamentary elections instituted in 1991 and 1992 for the creation of a national assembly.

With the newly earned freedom to organize political parties, the people of Algeria established dozens of political parties reflecting all aspects of the political spectrum. The FLN maintained itself as a viable political party, however, because of high disenchantment with the current regime, an increasingly influential force, religion, found itself in the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS was described as “a militant fundamentalist group whose leaders oppose constitutional rule” by supporters of the status quo and of the military regime, not by everyday Algerians (Ibrahim 1991). Because the people of Algeria had been so restricted under the FLN prior to 1988, people often sought refuge within the religious establishment. For even in secular Algeria, the religious establishment was still rarely questioned for its positions.

In May 1990, local and municipal elections occurred throughout Algeria. To the surprise of the FLN and other secular, authoritarian regimes in the region, FIS won over 55% of the municipal and gubernatorial votes and earned itself over 800 local government office positions, twice as many votes as the FLN (Ibrahim 1991).

The first round of parliamentary elections occurred in December 1991, already after several delays in the process from the government in Algiers. Once again, the FLN was shocked when the results surfaced and FIS won nearly 80% of seats available in the first round. Because of issues in the allocation of seats to districts, the FIS achieved less than 50% of the vote but
managed to earn nearly all the seats available (Tahi 1992). Algeria was faced with “the first open challenge in free voting by Islamic fundamentalists to a secular Arab government” in history (Ibrahim 1991).

However, not all Algerians were interested in electing an Islamic fundamentalist group into power. After the results of the first round elections in December, huge crowds of protesters in favor of a secular regime and in favor of electing alternative candidates took to the streets demanding the people not vote for the FIS, and signaling possible support for intervention in the electoral process (Entelis 2011). They would never get a chance to go to the polls in the second round. On January 11, 1992, the Algerian army intervened. It cancelled the second round of parliamentary elections scheduled for January 16, cancelled the results of the first round that had been held in December, and the leaders of the Algerian Army forced President Chaldi Bendjedid to abolish the National Assembly created by the constitution and forced him from office (Tahi 1992). The Army then operated and controlled the country under the auspices of the High Council of State, a group of military officers who replaced the Algerian president and National Assembly and led by Algerian war hero Mohamed Boudiaf (Fettweis 2005). Furthermore, the High Council believed that it was operating constitutionally as certain parts of the constitution called for a temporary governing body in the event of the dismissal of the National Assembly and the resignation of the president simultaneously, however, this was largely open to interpretation.

The Algerian people were furious at the interruption of their democratic process. Despite fears that had the FIS obtained a two-third majority in the National Assembly, they would have been able to amend the Algerian constitution, many Algerians still felt that they had the right to elect whomever they wanted and to trust in the democratic process. This was especially the case
in the outpour of support against the FIS following the first round results (Tahi 1992). The Algerian people called on the international community and the United States in particular to defend their right to democracy and free elections. The response they received was one of support for the Algerian coup and for denouncing the Islamic fundamentalists. Shortly thereafter, fueled by the return of “Afghan-Arabs” who had returned to Algeria from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan for Islamic causes, fighting and chaos erupted in the streets of Algeria (Fettweis 2005).

For the next 10 years, the Islamist fighters, as well as supporters of a secular government, and the government forces would battle each other in a devastating civil war in which nearly 200,000 people would perish for the sake of a democratic process (Entelis 2011). The international community would do nothing to intervene on behalf of causes as highly regarded as democracy and humanitarian crisis, and more importantly the United States would turn a blind eye on the “first major challenge to President Bush’s” New World Order (Fettweis 2005: 1).

Below is a recount of how the United States came to decide on a policy of non-intervention in the Algerian coup and civil war, at a time when the United States promised to uphold its ideals throughout the developing world.

**Relationship between Hypotheses and Variables**

*Era and the “New World Order.”* The coup and ensuing civil war in Algeria occurred right at the transition between the end of the Cold War and the creation of the “New World Order.” This was a time where the influence of the former Soviet Union was the weakest and the power and prestige of the United States as the world’s sole super power was greatest. Thus, the role of Cold War dynamics is small in the U.S. decision-making process for one of the first times
in nearly 50 years. The role of direct Soviet influence is eliminated from the U.S. decision to not intervene in the Algerian crisis.

*Gravity or threat to influence.* There is in fact another threat to the balance of power in the Middle East that has a more prominent influence on the U.S. decision-making process. The role of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East was extremely significant in the 1980’s and 1990’s. The United States was in direct support of such regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. At the same time was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism that arose from the Iranian revolution in 1979, a force that was historically hostile to the interests of the United States and was partially funding the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria (Tahi 1992). The United States would not risk another hostile fundamentalist or extremist government coming to power in the Middle East. When we look at my hypothesis of threat to the balance of power encouraging third party military intervention when a host country is threatened with changing internal political dynamics that threaten to change or influence the international order, we can see that the possibility of Islamic fundamentalists coming to power in Algeria might encourage the United States to intervene military on behalf of maintaining U.S. allies in the region (Fettweis 2005). However, the need for the United States to intervene in the electoral process disappeared when the Algerian military overthrew the government in Algiers and cancelled the democratic process.

It is also interesting to note the response of the other secular, authoritarian regimes in the region. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and others were relieved by the Algerian army’s cancellation of elections and their hold on power. These countries were also dealing with the increasing influence of Islamic fundamentalist parties and groups that threatened their legitimacy and control (Fettweis 2005). Thus, these groups supported and financed the efforts of the Algerian army to maintain their hold on power through the coup and the ensuing civil war.
The maintaining of an authoritarian regime in Algeria was in the interest of the United States for maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East. The United States was already dealing with troublesome regimes in the region such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Ayatollah in Iran. Furthermore, as a colonial power of France, Algeria fell within the French sphere of influence in North Africa (Fettweis 2005). Thus, the United States could take a neutral position in the conflict, by delegating the initial response to France and still getting what it wanted in Algeria. Perhaps if the civil war was not going in favor of the Algerian military, but favored a victory on behalf of the opposition, then the United States may have been more inclined to send military support to the Algerian army, but that is purely speculation. The role of the balance of power in the Middle East may be the most significant factor in the United States’ decision for nonintervention in the Algerian crisis, because the actions of the Algerian military reflected the national interests of the United States in the region and allowed the United States to take an inactive role in the crisis.

At the cross-national level, this factor, identified as “gravity,” or threat to the influence of the crisis actor in the international system, tested statistically significant for third party military intervention in relation to the threat felt by the potential third party to its influence in the international system. This indicates that this was a probable consideration for U.S. military intervention in Algeria; however, as I have explained above, the role of the Algerian military in the crisis nullified the reasoning for U.S. intervention (Fettweis 2005). Therefore, it is technically correct to say that the role of gravity in the Algerian crisis was substantial for U.S. action, but because the Algerian army maintained authoritarianism, the United States did not have reason to intervene on behalf of the balance of power in the region.
**Power discrepancy.** The role of power discrepancy in the Algerian crisis would suggest a relationship between intervention and the variable. Once again, as in Lebanon, the United States clearly had the upper hand militarily. In fact, with the collapse of the Soviet Union at the same time, the United States especially had the upper hand as the only remaining super power and maintaining a monopoly of force. However, the United States does not intervene in the Algerian crisis as might be expected.

Related to other U.S. regional concerns and their impact on U.S. power discrepancy, the United States had many of its forces deployed to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf War (Agredano 2015). Therefore, many of the forces needed for a possible military intervention in Algeria were tied up in other areas of the Middle East. Additionally, the Algerians were already receiving support from the other Arab authoritarian regimes, who were ready and able to intervene on behalf of the Algerian military in the civil war if needed. Therefore, while the United States maintained its sizeable military advantage over the Algerian militias, it did not intervene militarily in the Algerian crisis because it was not necessary; nor, was there a request for U.S. military power from the Algerian leadership. While this variable proved significant at the cross-national level, the evidence does not support it as a definitive explanation in the Algerian crisis. As I mentioned in the Lebanon study, the United States already understood its position of power superiority in the world and this variable would most likely take minimal to moderate consideration by U.S. policy makers at the time. Thus, power discrepancy can be an enabling factor, but one that is insufficient in explaining intervention without adequate motivation and reasoning.

**Alliance capability.** The alliance capability of the United States far outweighs the alliance capability of any other party involved in the conflict. I anticipated that the greater the alliance
capability the greater the chance of military intervention, and the cross-national statistical analysis supported this claim as significant, but rejected the directionality, suggesting that greater alliance capability decreases intervention. The United States does not follow the expected intervention, suggesting the lack of importance for alliance capability. Alliance capability is not a good variable for determining U.S. military intervention.

Alliance capability as defined by the strength of one’s greatest ally is usually attributed to the United States for the same reasons as power discrepancy, in the post-Cold War era. This was evident in the military intervention in Lebanon, the lack of intervention in Algeria and it will be evident in the U.S. intervention in Libya in 2011. The United States is simply the base for which all other countries gain their alliance capability rating and thus its significance in individual crises is not an ideal measure of whether or not the U.S. will intervene militarily (the validity of this will be discussed in the conclusion).

As I mentioned in the Lebanese case study previously, the variables threat to the balance of power, power discrepancy and alliance capability all tested significant in the cross-national statistical analysis. Similar to the Lebanese crisis on this variable, threat to the balance of power or the gravity of threat is significant in the Algerian crisis; however, it is significant for U.S. non-intervention. The United States was not going to intervene on behalf of the democratic process because of the supposed threat posed to the United States by the rise of Islamic fundamentalist regimes and because the Algerian military indirectly carried out the U.S. national interest (Fettweis 2005). Similarly though, both power discrepancy and alliance capability proved to be insignificant and contingent factors to U.S. decision-making.

*Geographic proximity.* Scholars consider geographic proximity as very significant in interventions, especially in land-locked developing countries (Khosla 1999; Joyce and
Braithwaite 2013; Shirkey 2012; Kathman 2010; Kathman 2011). I have hypothesized that the closer a third party is to a conflict location, and the greater the number of shared borders, the greater the likelihood of military intervention. Similar to the conclusions from the hypotheses regarding power discrepancy and alliance capability, the role of geographic proximity for the United States is insignificant. As the world’s greatest power at the time of the Algerian crisis, the United States had the ability to project its power to all corners of the globe, with its long-range bombers, stockpile of ICBMs and aircraft carriers. The United States, however, did not take advantage of this power tool in the Algerian crisis, as it had in so many previous interventions (Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, etc.). I believe this is because its forces were already deployed to another area of the Middle East—the Gulf.

While the U.S. has the ability to project its military power all over the world, it still must recognize the limits of deploying multiple large contingencies of forces to multiple areas of interest at the same time. The United States saw the threat faced from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a greater or better use of military force (Fettweis 2005). Furthermore, the U.S. military lacks a significant launching base for international intervention from North Africa. At least in Lebanon the United States had access to bases in the Gulf and friendly regimes, much closer in proximity to Lebanon than to Algeria (although the use of U.S. naval air carries in the Mediterranean could have provided a suitable alternative). Some U.S. forces were already operating in Lebanon as part of a Multi-National Force before abandoning their neutrality and siding with the Lebanese Armed Forces; the U.S. had no such forces or previous establishment in Algeria.

*Threat to access to natural resources and trade.* Unlike Lebanon, Algeria had significant reserves of oil and natural gas that contributed to the global oil economy. With my hypothesis
supporting intervention in favor of maintaining access to oil and access to free and safe trade, it would be plausible to suggest U.S. intervention on behalf of keeping oil reserves from Algeria flowing into the oil market. However, we have to look deeper into the regional dynamics and economic dependence of U.S. oil consumption. The United States favored keeping oil reserves under the control of friendly regimes, at the most those regimes that maintained an authoritarian hold on power. As was evident from the fallout of the Iranian revolution and the oil embargos on the Iranian Islamic fundamentalist regime and the rise in oil prices, the United States would want to keep access to oil from the hands of Islamic fundamentalists (Fettweis 2005). Thus, the United States might have intervened on behalf of the Algerian military to maintain the flow of oil.

However, U.S. imports of Algerian oil were low in comparison to U.S. imports of oil from the other Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes in the lead up to the coup. There was a sharp decline in U.S. oil imports from Algeria from over 600 thousand barrels of oil per day in 1978 to under 100 thousand barrels of oil per day by 1990 and even less oil per day throughout the Algerian civil war (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2015). Algerian oil and access to Algerian oil was not valued as highly as oil from similar countries. Therefore, the significance of Algerian oil in the U.S. decision-making process is little because the lack of U.S. necessity of Algerian oil deterred the U.S. from intervening militarily.

Refugee flows. As is evident in most cases of international conflicts involving the United States, it lacks a flow of refugees onto its territory, purely by the fact that it is geographically isolated from most conflict zones (Mexico’s drug refugees may be an exception, as well as Haitian and Cuban refugees). Just as in the Lebanon crisis, my hypothesis accounting for an increased likelihood of military intervention when a neighboring country in civil war has caused
refugee flows into the potential third party country is insignificant for the U.S. decision-making in Algeria. Refugees arriving in the United States take a significantly longer time to reach the mainland than to flee to neighboring countries.

*Ethnic or religious tie.* Similar to the situation in Lebanon, the United States is in a conflict of minor religious significance. The role of ethnicity and religion in the justification of third party military interventions is widely cited throughout the literature as an important factor (Khosla 1999; Nome 2013; Shirkey 2012; Corbetta 2010; Svensson 2013). In Algeria, the United States faced the rise of Islamic fundamentalists countering a secular authoritarian government, whereas in Lebanon it sided with the largely Christian Lebanese Armed Forces. The United States saw the ferocity and rhetoric that accompanied the Iranian Revolution ten years previously would not denounce the actions of the Algerian military coup because the United States would not risk another hostile Islamic regime coming to power in the Middle East (Fettweis 2005).

Yet the significance of this claim is greatly challenged because the United States did not intervene on behalf of the Algerian army during the lengthy civil war; it also never intervened on behalf of the secular forces in Iran during their revolution, even after Americans were taken hostage. Algeria’s military was largely secularized and the Islamists lacked any real organized challenge to the Algerian military (Fettweis 2005; Entelis 2011). Therefore, this suggests that because the forces in Algeria were so dominant over the Islamists (as opposed to the opposite in Iran), the United States saw it sufficient to allow the Algerians to maintain the situation for themselves, with the reality that the Islamists would not surpass the secular regime. Unsurprisingly then, Iran was one of the only nations to denounce the coup and demand the return of the elections (Fettweis 2005).
The following three variables (humanitarian crisis, media coverage and regime type) are very interesting to look at in the Algerian crisis. These are three of the factors that the United States held to high regards and cited as the reason for many interventions in international crises elsewhere (Fettweis 2005). Until this point, most of the variables I have explored have sought to explain why the United States may have been in support of the Algerian army coup. These three variables seek to explain why the United States may have aligned with the opposition. As we know, the United States did not intervene nor did it show any support for the Islamist faction despite these very important concerns.

**Media attention and humanitarian crisis.** There is no doubt that a large-scale humanitarian crisis was under way throughout the Algerian civil war. Nearly 200,000 lives were lost and over “7,000 Algerians ‘disappeared’ while in the custody of Algerian authorities” in the ten years of conflict (Entelis 2011). The Algerian state of emergency lasted for nearly 20 years, until new protests in the region erupted and demanded changes in 2011, and Islamist supporters were detained, sentenced to prison and revoked of their rights (Entelis 2011). Furthermore, the Algerian army tactic of “out terrorizing the terrorists” resulted in further humanitarian crisis (Entelis 2011). I hypothesized that a humanitarian crisis is largely a reason for intervention as a cover for ulterior motives, except for cases where media attention and public demand is high. The United States ignored the disaster unfolding in Algeria, but intervened in other such conflict states with minimal national interests such as Somalia and Yugoslavia. In the Algeria case, expectations of a U.S. humanitarian intervention to end the humanitarian crisis existed, or for the United States to enter into a peacekeeping operation as it had done in Lebanon the decade before.

As I mentioned above, the role of the media and public demand is crucial when a third party considers intervening in a civil conflict. The media has a tendency to exploit humanitarian
crises to elicit viewer and reader compassion for international causes and encourage government responses (Murdie and Peksen 2014; Finnemore 2003). The media was hugely significant in the U.S. decision to intervene in Lebanon, and in places such as Somalia, Sudan, Bosnia, etc. However, the U.S. media coverage of the Algerian crisis was nearly nonexistent. There was a lack of public opinion and public concern because the American people had little knowledge or understanding of the conflict in Algeria. This lack of media attention and ensuing lack of public opinion, suggests that President Bush had the freedom to assume any position on the coup and not risk domestic backlash (Fettweis 2005). This is in stark contrast to the U.S. response to the September 1991 coup in Haiti (just a few months prior to Algeria’s coup) in which the media thoroughly covered the crisis and the U.S. immediately and fiercely denounced the Haitian coup (Fettweis 2005). Thus, the civil war in Algeria and lack of U.S. response and intervention suggests that the role of the media in understanding and spreading awareness of humanitarian disasters is important in a country’s decision to intervene militarily, but it is no guarantee of action.

Regime type. America is a democracy and the greatest one in the world. It has come to be relied upon and expected to intervene on behalf of other democracies and other democratic process throughout the world when challenged by undemocratic forces. President Bush said in his New World Order speech that America must show “consistent support for democracy, pluralism and freedom around the world” (Fettweis 2005: 1). Yet, the United States did not intervene on behalf of democracy in Algeria. For the United States, democracy was “too risky to be attempted” in the Arab world (Fettweis 2005: 13). This directly supports my hypothesis that because all states are inherently self-interested, regime type has little effect on the decision to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of another state. The United States continues to choose
which conflicts it will intervene in, regardless of operating under the auspices of democratic support. Thus, as I mentioned above, the lack of national and international attention to the Algerian crisis gave the United States increased flexibility to respond to the coup and civil war without risk of domestic and democratic repercussions.

*Previous U.S. intervention in the crisis state.* The next state-level consideration to evaluate is the rate of previous success or failure of interventions in a particular country (Kapteijns 2013). The reason this variable is insignificant in the U.S. response to the Algerian crisis is that it lacked any previous interventions in Algeria. Algeria has long been considered under the sphere of influence of France and thus the United States stood to the side in most previous conflicts involving Algeria, including the bloody war of independence from France (Fettweis 2005). There was no precedent set by the United States that the administration felt it needed to uphold in the Algerian civil war and could allow the actions taken by the Algerian military to stand. What the United States had at risk was a loss of credibility with democratic movements across the Middle East: the advocates of democracy sided with the Islamic Salvation Front to counter the military government. One enduring consequence is that by 2007 the Islamic Salvation Army (the military wing of FIS) had become the terrorist organization Armed Islamic Group which merged with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Entelis 2011).

*Domestic conditions: economic and social.* Understanding and identifying U.S. domestic conditions at the time of and just before a crisis are crucial to understanding decision-making. These variables are some of the most important considerations the United States undertook when deciding not to intervene in the Algerian coup. George H.W. Bush took over the presidency from Ronald Reagan in 1989 and inherited an economy that was in massive debt. President Bush campaigned on the platform of promising to not raise taxes for the American people, but
Reagan’s economic mismanagement forced Bush to increase taxes, infuriating many in the American public (Agredano 2015). Furthermore, the United States was invested financially and militarily in the Gulf War of 1990-1991.

Because of U.S. commitments to other conflicts the Middle East, it could not afford to commit its forces to another regional conflict without massively increasing national debt. Furthermore, 1992 was an election year for the United States and the economy was an important issue of the election. President Bush had already increased taxes against his party platform and risked losing the election to the Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton (Agredano 2015). Therefore, President Bush did not want to commit troops to another Middle East crisis it could not afford, especially in the midst of an election campaign. This is in contrast to the diversionary techniques concept for which I hypothesized this variable. In particular, I anticipated that military intervention would serve to distract the American population from declining domestic conditions; this does not seem to be the case in Algeria (Keller and Foster 2012)

*U.S. leadership variables.* Finally, the role of President Bush in the U.S. decision-making process is significant, as I touched on in the above description of the economy. Bush was a Republican; however, he lacked the hawkish rhetoric that accompanied Reagan’s interventionist policies. Bush took office right at the conclusion of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and as such did not need to advocate great policy advancements for the sake of defeating communism. President Bush, instead, put forth his New World Order to support democracy and liberal ideas across the globe (Fettweis 2005). Rather than standing by democratic ideals as advocated, Bush supported authoritarian regimes across the globe and refused to intervene in the humanitarian disaster in Algeria for the sake of preserving national interests—a concept supported by realism. Furthermore, Bush entered office on the verge of economic catastrophe
and was immediately at odds with his Republican Party supporters for his raising of taxes and increased government spending. Despite having a presidential approval rating similar to Reagan’s of 46 percent, these policies ultimately lost him the election of 1992 (Gallup). There was never any mention of the Algerian crisis in his memoirs, reflecting the lack attention to Algeria.

Bill Clinton became U.S. President in January of 1993. He inherited a damaged economy and civil unrest across the globe. Clinton also inherited and upheld the U.S. decision of non-intervention in the Algerian civil war, despite a year of bloodshed and violence in the country. Clinton instead focused U.S. foreign policy on the crises in Somalia, Bosnia and Yugoslavia, all of which involved huge humanitarian disasters much like in Algeria (Agredano 2015).

Conclusion

The lack of U.S. intervention in the Algerian coup and civil war involves a number of factors. The United States was not in a position economically to commit troops to a country with little vital interests to the United States, when committed to other conflicts abroad. Furthermore, when looking at the interests of the United States and the balance of power in the Middle East, they favored the actions taken by the Algerian military in the coup and the organization, secularization and power of the Algerian military over the Islamists. This severely reduced the need for the United States to intervene on behalf of the military. The United States would not intervene when another party secures its interests. Additionally, despite President Bush’s calls for a New World Order and democratic promotion, it is evident that the interests of the United States and the protection of democratic ideals were not compatible in the Middle East, encouraging the United States to not intervene on behalf of democracy, but to maintain its own national self-interest.
Case Study: Libya, 2011

Once again, I begin my analysis with an overview of U.S. relations with Libya. I look at the international variables affecting U.S. decision-making at the time of the Libyan crisis followed by the state and individual level variables. Long after the close of the Cold War and the establishment of the supposed New World Order that engulfed the conflicts in Lebanon and Algeria, the world facing the United States in 2011 was vastly different from previous decades. In the post-9/11 world, America was leading the global fight against terrorism and despotism, while struggling to reform its image in the Arab world after the disastrous intervention in Iraq in 2003.

Relations between the United States and Libya were tense and at times non-existent for nearly 30 years, despite the lack of any real vital strategic U.S. interests in Libya (Kissinger and Baker 2011). The culmination of 30 years of Libyan dictatorial rule by President Muammar Gaddafi ended after six months of U.S. and coalition airstrikes succeeded in removing him from power. The lingering question behind this U.S. military intervention into the internal conflict in Libya is why the United States would have intervened militarily when many factors indicating a lack interest suggested non-intervention. In particular, when compared with the contemporary crises in Syria or Yemen in which there was no U.S. military intervention.

Overview of U.S. Intervention in Libyan Crisis

Libya gained its independence from Italy in 1947 and from colonial French and British oversight in 1951 to the control of a corrupt Libyan monarchy. Throughout the nearly two decades after independence, Libya and the United States experienced friendly relations as America operated an airbase on the coast and the American oil company Esso thrived on profitable Libyan oil (Zoubir 2002). Even following the 1969 coup by the young Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi, the United States remained optimistic about continuing positive relations with Libya.

Gaddafi came to power as a staunch nationalist and anti-communist, suggesting to the United States an opportunity to align with another strong, authoritarian power in the Middle East as the United States had done with Nasser’s Egypt (Zoubir 2002). However, relations began to sour between the United States and Libya in the early 1970s when Gaddafi partially nationalized the oil industry, causing the United States to lose profits and access to Libyan oil. Gaddafi also opposed the U.S. position on the Israel-Palestine issue, strongly supporting Palestinian national rights. Furthermore, Gaddafi moved politically and militarily closer to the Soviet Union (despite its anti-communist posture), causing increased resentment from the United States and a sense of untrustworthiness (Zoubir 2002).

During the height of Cold War rhetoric under Reagan, the United States severed diplomatic ties with Libya. Gaddafi had become a state sponsor of terrorism and his interests were in direct competition with, and hostile to, the interests of the United States. In 1981, the United States expelled Libyan diplomats and proceeded to shoot down two Soviet-made Libyan jets in the Mediterranean, an occurrence that happened again in 1989. In 1982, Reagan imposed an oil embargo on imports of Libyan oil and banned U.S. technology trade with Libya, a cornerstone of Libyan oil production (Zoubir 2002). The height of the Reagan era campaign against the Gaddafi regime occurred in 1986, when the United States severed economic relations and imposed economic sanctions on Libya. These actions culminated with unilateral U.S. airstrikes on Tripoli, Libya in an attempt to eliminate Gaddafi from power in response to the Libyan bombing of a West Berlin nightclub frequented by American troops (Martin 2006).
Throughout the 1990’s the United States concerned itself with an international campaign to isolate and sanction Libya, especially in the aftermath of the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland, carried out by Libyan terrorists (Zoubir 2002). However, unable to convince the international community to accept the continued campaign against Gaddafi, the United States restored some diplomatic contact with Libya in 1999. By 2002, some of the U.S. economic sanctions on Libya lifted as it accepted responsibility for its terrorist support and abandoned its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (Gelvin 2012). This, however, did not discuss the egregious human rights abuses undertaken by Gaddafi to include the mass incarceration and murder of thousands of his own citizens.

By early 2011, the Middle East and North Africa were witnessing the next great democratic movement as repressed citizens from Morocco to Iraq stood up in protest of authoritarian and ineffective governments. In Libya, Gaddafi’s megalomania had created a sense of paranoia throughout his country for decades. There was no bureaucracy and no national military in order to prevent threats to his power. The people, inspired by other transcending regional events, organized their own Libyan “Day of Rage” (after a similar protest in Egypt) to take place on February 17, 2011. However, on February 15th, the Gaddafi regime arrested civil rights lawyer Fathi Terbil who represented the families of the ‘disappeared’ prisoners of Abu Salim prison, prisoners who Gaddafi had slaughtered (Gelvin 2012).

Ensuing protests took the eastern city of Benghazi by storm as thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to protest the actions of the Gaddafi regime. By the time the planned “Day of Rage” arrived, over six thousand protesters were in the streets of Benghazi, imitating the scenes from Tunis and Tahrir Square in Tunisia and Egypt respectively (Gelvin 2012). Whereas in those countries the protests remained largely peaceful and the military and
police forces respected the actions of the protestors, Gaddafi ordered his conglomerate of security services and organizations to open fire on the thousands of protestors.

Gaddafi’s decision to eliminate the protestors threw Libya into a violent civil war, exacerbating already tense tribal relations, dividing the country into pro-Gaddafi and pro-change factions. The action of little restraint carried out by the militarized forces created a massive humanitarian crisis as innocent civilians died. Gaddafi’s threat to exterminate all the protests from the city of Benghazi was holding true (Zifcak 2012).

The response by the international community was swift and immense. By February 26, the United Nations issued resolution 1970 condemning the actions of the Gaddafi regime. The Gulf Cooperation Council, the Security Council of the League of Arab States, the Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union all joined the United Nations in condemning the actions of the Gaddafi regime against the Libyan citizens (Zifcak 2012). Libya’s Ambassador to the United Nations defected and called on the international community to recognize the Libyan Interim Council as the legitimate Libyan government. Finally, the passing of resolution 1973 on March 17th, 2011 condemned the failure of the Libyan regime to comply with resolution 1970, created a Libyan no-fly zone, and “for the first time, authorized coercive military intervention in a sovereign state without the consent of the state’s governing authorities” (Zifcak 2012: 64).

While the United Nations authorized the use of “all necessary measures” to protect the Libyan people, it was still the ultimate decision of the United States on whether it would participate in the intervention and to what extent (Zifcak 2012: 64). The United States was authorized to send its warplanes to Libya to prevent the murder of innocent civilians, but ultimately acted to remove a threatening authoritarian regime. Thus, the real question here is
why the United States intervened under the auspices of humanitarian aid with a multinational and multilateral coalition, yet aligned itself with the Libyan resistance in the aim of eliminating Gaddafi from power.

Relationship between Hypotheses and Variables

Era and post-Cold War dynamics. The United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) led multilateral intervention in Libya occurred 20 years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The United States emerged as the sole super power in the immediate aftermath; however, U.S. hegemony was in decline as global powers such as China, India, Brazil and Russia rise. In the Middle East, the rise of Saudi Arabia and Iran as influential actors is challenging the role of the United States in the region. Furthermore, the Arab Uprisings of early 2011 questioned U.S. motives in the region and challenged its support for democratic movements for fear they bring to power hostile regimes. Therefore, in the post-Cold War era, the increasing focus on humanitarian interventions and multilateral actions placed the United States in an uncomfortable position of mismatched interests and increasing international pressures, especially to power in the region following the 2003 Iraq invasion (Obama 2009; Kissinger and Baker 2011; Finnemore 2003).

Gravity or threat to influence. The threat to the influence (gravity variable) of the United States in Libya caused by the civil conflict is not immediately clear; the United States had regional interest at stake in supporting the removal of Gadhafi. In Libya, there were no vital strategic interests of the United States (Gelvin 2012). The United States and Libya had long been at odds with each other, there was little American investment in the country, little oil exportation and little support from Libya on regional matters. Thus, as far as the United States was concerned, there should have been little expectation of intervention in Libya, because it
lacked interest in the country in relation to commitments in other Arab states. Furthermore, Gaddafi himself was unstable and isolated by his Arab neighbors, and the reality of a huge power shift occurring with the collapse of Gaddafi or with the maintenance of his regime was unlikely (Gelvin 2012).

What was significant for the United States in deciding to pursue the removal of Gaddafi was the possible emergence of a regime friendly to the United States. This suggests that the United States intervened militarily in Libya in an attempt to reinforce a rebel contingency that could ultimately have proved useful to the U.S. in its continued effort to combat terrorism and provide stability to the region. Furthermore, the U.S. intervention in Libya was an American attempt to improve its own prestige through the support of a democratic movement and protection of human rights in order to repair the American image and once again tilt the balance of power in the Middle East in favor of the United States (Gelvin 2012). The United States needed to demonstrate its will and ability to use force in the Middle East and that it still, at least for some, supported democracy and human rights in the Middle East. Libya was one of the few locations that America had little significant interests at stake, and thus the military intervention in Libya was not much more than a show of American power to demonstrate to regional powers and allies that the U.S. was still a powerful force in the Middle East (Gelvin 2012). At the time, the United States foresaw no risks or threats to the balance of power in the region with the fall of the Gaddafi regime, but much to gain from the perception of an American intervention supporting social progress. This may be one of the sole reasons for the decision made by President Obama to intervene militarily in the Libyan civil war.

*Power discrepancy.* As we saw in Lebanon and Algeria, the United States clearly and undoubtedly had the greater power discrepancy in comparison with Libya. Libya was fractured,
its military nonexistent and tribal factions provided the only real security apparatus for either side of the Libyan civil war (Gelvin 2012). Because this variable is so obviously in favor of the United States in an intervention scenario, power discrepancy is an insignificant measure and indecisive variable for measuring the likelihood of military intervention in Libya. Once again, however, as was evident in Lebanon, the extent of the U.S. intervention reflects some restraint on behalf of President Obama. The United States was still engulfed in its Afghanistan campaign and had only recently withdrawn from Iraq, thus a war-weary public decreased the significance of American capability abroad.

Alliance capability. The alliance capability variable results in much the same manner as power discrepancy. Because the variable in measured in relation to the power of the United States the operability of this variable is minor. Additionally, the military intervention was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council and largely carried by the NATO countries, thus the United States was also supported internationally with allies that allowed it to risk fewer resources but still achieve its mission in Libya. Despite the significance of this variable (as well as the power discrepancy variable) at the cross-national level, alliance capability is not a major measure and is largely trivial in the U.S. decision-making process without taking other conditions into account (discussed in the conclusion chapter). Interestingly, as the statistical analysis suggests that greater alliance capabilities reduce intervention, the Libyan case rejects that finding by the presence of a large multinational coalition, as well as UN approval. The role of multinational efforts are not addressed in this study, but research would benefit from an analysis of this factor in decision-making.

Geographic proximity. Like the situation in Algeria, the United States faced a conflict in Libya much farther away from its permanent military. However, the United States is the premier
military power in the world and has the ability to project its power to every corner of the globe on very little notice. Additionally, for the Libyan crisis, aircraft carriers were easily positioned in the Mediterranean off the coast of Libya to provide a stable launching point for U.S. operations there (Cleveland and Bunton 2013). Furthermore, this was not a unilateral intervention and the United States could count on its much more geographically proximate allies in Europe for support. Thus, once again, the power and reach of the United States compensated for the lack of geographic proximity of the Libyan conflict.

**Threat to access to natural resources and trade.** If the year were 1970, then the impact of oil and access to Libyan oil would have been the most important concern for the U.S. decision-making process. However, the year was 2011 and the U.S. reliance on Libyan oil had been eliminated, reduced to only 0.6% of U.S. oil imports at the time of the crisis (Gelvin 2012). This is due to years of U.S.-Libyan animosity and years of economic sanctions and oil embargos that allowed the United States to find other, more friendly and reliable sources of oil in the Middle East. I will return to the issue of oil in relation to European imports of Libyan oil and the possible effects on the U.S. domestic economy below as a consideration in the intervention. However, overall, U.S. imports of Libyan oil were not significant enough to encourage the United States to intervene militarily.

**Refugee flows.** The issue of refugee flows into the United States was again non-existent, as the United States’ geographic isolation did not allow for significant flows of Libyan refugees to enter the country without first crossing into Europe. In order for this variable to be relevant, the refugees would need to provide a direct threat to the stability of the host country (as in Jordan or Turkey in previous and ongoing conflicts) (Von Hippel and Clark 1999). This is not the case
with the United States and the Libyan civil war and as such, this variable is insignificant in the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in Libya to oust Ghaddafi.

*Ethnic and religious ties.* Ethnic and religious ties are an interesting variable to look at in the Libyan conflict, especially in reference to the two previously discussed conflicts in Lebanon and Algeria. In Lebanon, the United States intervened on behalf of the largely Christian and Pro-Israeli Lebanese Armed Force and in Algeria, the United States refused to intervene on behalf of democracy for fear of the rise of another hostile Islamic fundamentalist regime coming to power. Religion appears to serve an even smaller role in the Libyan crisis, despite the very real possibility of Islamic fundamentalists seeking power (there were even indications that al-Qaeda was operating on behalf of some rebel factions in Libya, the same rebels the U.S. was supporting (Gelvin 2012)). This is because of the very fractured and non-aligned rebel movements competing throughout Libya. There was no unified Islamist or religious force actively seeking to obtain power in the post-Gaddafi era, at least none known at the time of the intervention. Thus, the risk of a religiously motivated, hostile force coming to power in the aftermath of Gaddafi was not on the radar of the American decision makers.

*Media attention and humanitarian crisis.* The United Nations Security Council’s authorization for the use of force to prevent further humanitarian crisis was a direct implementation of the 2005 UN resolution “responsibility to protect” (Cleveland and Bunton 2013). Under this doctrine, member states have the authority to vote on the use of all necessary means to prevent the indiscriminate killing and slaughter of civilians. When the UN voted on the use of force to prevent the crisis in Libya from worsening, it anticipated that forces and objectives were to remain neutral and focus solely on preventing humanitarian disaster.
However, as I hypothesized above, the influence of the media and international organizations was crucial (Kapteijns 2013; Finnemore 2003; Murdie and Peksen 2014; Bellamy 2008; Weiss 2014). Unlike some previous humanitarian crises in past decades, the force of globalization changed the way ordinary people learned and witnessed current events. The media played an extraordinary role in highlighting the disaster unfolding in Libya and relaying the crisis back to western sympathizers. In fact, as the United States entered the humanitarian battle in March 2011, there was a 47% approval rating for the strikes (Jones 2011). The United States entered the crisis under the auspices of humanitarian support and the American people supported the mission.

I hypothesized that in the post-Cold War era, the use of humanitarian crisis preconditions as an excuse for intervention on behalf of a particular force or side or for the desire to pursue national interests in said country has become one of the leading causes of humanitarian military interventions (Parenti 2002; Idike and Agu 2014; Finnemore 2003). This is exactly what happened in Libya and explains why the United States intervened on supposed humanitarian grounds. From the very beginning of the U.S.’ military intervention, “regime change hidden behind a humanitarian façade” was the obvious American goal (Gelvin 2012: 89). Airstrikes went from protecting all civilians from indiscriminate killing by either government forces or rebel factions, to directly targeting government positions and infrastructure, as well as targeted attacks against Gaddafi himself and his family.

By the time the airstrikes were well underway and the goals of the United States mission in Libya became clear. About 85% of the American people believed that the United States should continue the mission until Gaddafi was removed from power, effectively legitimizing the actions of the United States in Libya in the both the eyes of the people and the eyes of the
American leaders (Jones 2011). American history shows that the record of accomplishment of the United States in supporting democratic movements and eliminating despots has not been the most consistent; even the contemporaneous examples in Syria and Yemen illustrate that the United States picks and chooses when and where it intervenes militarily.

*Regime type.* The American democratic system is no different from any other regime in its degree of self-interest in international conflicts. It is especially evident in this Libyan example with the lack of neutrality the United States exhibited in its ultimate goal of removing the Gaddafí regime and improving the American image in the Middle East. The American public supported this inherent American self-interest through nationally conducted public opinion polls in favor of removing the Gaddafí regime (Jones 2011). Furthermore, the United States’ lack of intervention in Syria at the same time is indicative of it pursuing its self-interests, despite commitments to democracy and humanitarian relief. The Syria case is also a good example of the United States considering the difficulties of a Syrian intervention, such as its alliances with Iran and Russia.

Once again, as was the case in the intervention in Lebanon (and to an extent explaining the nonintervention in Algeria), the influence of previous interventions, U.S. domestic conditions, and the individual leadership characteristics of President Barack Obama combine to provide the most convincing explanations of U.S. military intervention in Libya.

*Previous U.S. intervention in the crisis state.* Similar to the situation that unfolded in Lebanon, the United States had a history of previous successful military interventions in Libya. I mentioned in my initial overview of U.S.-Libyan relations that the United States intervened militarily in 1981, 1986 and 1989 with airstrikes targeting Libyan military aircraft and government positions. In particular, the 1986 U.S. unilateral airstrikes on Gaddafí’s compounds
and infrastructure in Tripoli illustrated the United States’ desire to eliminate the regime. Public opinion suggested that the 1986 airstrikes were “popularly regarded as successful” (Martin 2006: 612). This suggests that the United States’ history of success in Libya would encourage it to attempt further interventions. Furthermore, when the United States is protected under the auspices of humanitarian intervention it can more freely pursue its national agenda in Libya, as what happened in 2011.

*Domestic conditions: economic and social.* The role of United States domestic conditions in the decision to use American military force to remove the Gaddafi regime from power under the auspices of a humanitarian military intervention is key to understanding the decision-making process. I believe that the role of distraction politics was very influential to the United States intervening in Libya. The U.S. economy was still reeling from a major economic recession and was in the midst of an election season. The American public image in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq fiasco also needed to be repaired (Kissinger and Baker 2011).

The U.S. economy was struggling to recover from the housing market collapse of 2008 and the ensuing economic recession. There was high unemployment, low housing values, tax increases, service cuts and increasing budget deficits (“The Economy in 2011” 2011). Some theorize that the U.S. intervention in Libya may relate to the financial crisis, because despite not having oil interests directly in Libya, Americas European allies and consumers have significant oil investments of up to 10% in Libya (Peek 2011; Gelvin 2012). If Gaddafi were to make true on his threats to bomb Libyan oil fields, eliminating significant flows of oil out of the country, then oil prices would rise significantly for Europeans who depend on Libyan oil (Gelvin 2012). This would worsen the European economy, which was already struggling to recover from the global economic downturn, and decrease the ability of Europeans to purchase American goods,
in turn leading to a worsening of the U.S. economic crisis (Peek 2011). Thus, the U.S. could plausibly have intervened to prevent a worsening economic crisis in Europe and at home.

This is a very interesting assessment of the U.S. economic situation in early 2011; however, it is fails to take into account the reality of the risk for Gaddafi if he were actually to bomb his oil fields. He would face increased economic pressures and resentment at home, as well as severely decreased funds to support his reign of terror against his civilians. However, this reasoning would be convincing in gaining support from the American public as an excuse for intervention as the people were in need of better economic conditions and encouraging growth.

*U.S. leadership variables.* Furthermore, it is interesting that the United States, under the leadership of a liberal president, would commit to military involvement in the midst of an ongoing reelection campaign. However, when we examine the influence of the humanitarian nightmare unfolding in Libya, President Obama’s action justify liberal intervention on behalf of civilian populations. I note in my assessment of the Lebanon intervention that as elections approach, leaders facing reelection often desire to not commit military force for fear of backlash at home and abroad (Mowle 2003). However, Obama maintained a stable approval rating just before the U.S. intervention of 48 percent. This could also justify the intervention during an election season (Gallup).

In his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama advocated for the morality and legality of “just wars” (Obama 2009). He suggested, “That force can be justified on humanitarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That is why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep
the peace” (Obama 2009). Once again we see the use of “humanitarian grounds” as reasoning for military intervention and yet, the actions of President Obama and his predecessors have been reflective not of humanitarian concerns, but of national interests.

Many consider President Obama a vanguard of democracy and human rights promotion throughout the developing world. Thus, when the Arab Uprisings emerged in late 2010 and early 2011, stability in the region deteriorated and President Obama faced a dilemma of supporting these democratic campaigns or supporting stability in the region. Libya was an opportunity where the United States had the international authority and little to risk in a military intervention to show the support for democracy and human rights, while simultaneously pursuing American interests.

Conclusion

This brings me back to the central question: why did the United States abandon humanitarian neutrality and target the Gaddafi regime with military intervention when it had no real strategic interests in Libya? The answer is that Libya, at the time, was the easy solution to demonstrating American commitments to the Middle East (Gelvin 2012). Gaddafi had committed grave humanitarian tragedies, but so had Assad in Syria. What is different here is Gaddafi was military weak and fractured; Syria and Assad were not. Gaddafi was unpopular at home and abroad for his megalomania and outlandish behavior; Assad had important military connections to Russia, a UNSC veto holder, and Iran, a regional power. The international community isolated Gaddafi; Assad had important connection to Russia and Iran. Military intervention in Libya was supported by the United Nations Security Council as well as the Arab League; in Syria the fear of a humanitarian intervention being abused as a means for regime change created fear in Russia and China (Kissinger and Baker 2011; Zifcak 2012). Thus, the
U.S. intervention in Libya does not follow the logical trends for military intervention in intrastate conflict, but it does provide an interesting account of the current state of American politics and interests in the Middle East and show how desperate American leaders were to reestablish a positive, credible image in the region.

The intervention in Libya was pivotal to U.S. power in the region. American policy in the region was shattered and upended with the Arab uprisings and the world was waiting to see how it would respond. Decades of support for corrupt and authoritarian leaders in the region ended with public demands for democracy and human rights and the United States would either stand in the way or allow the changes to occur. Despite the U.S. intervening in Libya, American hypocrisy was exacerbated by the lack of intervention in Syria and Yemen and the continued support of other authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states (Gelvin 2012). The intervention to uphold American commitments to the region backfired with multiple civil wars and continued American contradictions.
Conclusion

The statistical analyses and case study chapters provide interesting results to the research question examining the causes of third party military intervention in intrastate conflict. My mixed-methods approach yielded mixed results that both support and reject my hypotheses. Below are several tables that indicate the results of my analyses. The first is a summary of data from the statistical analyses; it includes the ordered probit analysis and logistic regression analysis conducted, as well as each independent variable in the data set that corresponds to a hypothesis. Within the table there are rows depicting the p-values and coefficients for each variable and each test. I omit the tables accounting for era and region. The final three tables describe the coding for my three case studies based on the coding described in the methodology chapter. It is subdivided into international/system, state and group/individual level variables as construed in my research.

The two statistical analyses depict that three of the seven tested independent variables were significant indicators of violence/intervention for both the four-point and binary dependent variables—power discrepancy, alliance capability and economic conditions. In the logit analysis power discrepancy suggests that as its value increases, the chances of intervention increase; alliance capability suggests that as it is greater, intervention increases; economic conditions suggests that improving domestic economies increase chances of intervention. Gravity was not significant in the ordered probit analysis, but in the logistic regression analysis, it was significant and indicates that a threat to influence encourages intervention. Since the logistic regression analysis is the true measure of my research question of whether or not intervention occurs, as opposed to the level at which it occurs, it is fair to say that four of my variables were significant in explaining intervention; however two of the four results rejected my established hypotheses.
These results poorly align with the results of the case studies examined. In those cases, only gravity or threat to the balance of power/influence appeared as important to the U.S. decision-making process at the international level of analysis. Alliance capability and power discrepancy were not overly significant factors for the United States. Rather, several of the variables that were not tested statistically were of importance and significance for the United States in addition to gravity: humanitarian crisis as illustrated in the mass media and history of previous successful intervention in the conflict state.

Table 19: Summary of Statistical Analyses Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Statistical Analyses Results</th>
<th>Ordered Probit Analysis</th>
<th>Logistic Regression Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gravity</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Capability</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td>-0.617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location to Crisis Actor</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.201</td>
<td>-0.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Unrest</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p-value in gray, coefficients in white

*Significant to the 0.05 significance level

**Significant to the 0.01 significance level

Table 20: Summary of Case Study Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International/System Level Variables</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

123
For the significant statistical results, gravity and power discrepancy supported my hypotheses, whereas my hypotheses for alliance capability and economic conditions were
rejected. I predicted a positive relationship for all four variables (because economic conditions is
coded differently, I anticipated a negative relationship). My hypothesis for gravity suggested
that if there were an increasing threat to a state’s influence or balance of power, then there would
be an increased likelihood of military intervention on behalf of the potential third party (Waltz
1967; Finnemore 2003; Shirkey 2012; Werner 2000; Saunders 2009). The positive direction of
the coefficient for the logistic regression analysis suggests that an increase from there not being a
threat to influence to there being a threat to influence in the international system indicates there
is a shift from no violence/minor clashes to major clashes/full-scale war. This result is in support
of my hypothesis since I consider the use of violence on the dichotomous scale to be
synonymous with intervention. However, this variable was not significant in the ordered probit
analysis accounting for the four-point dependent variable.

The same relationship is true for power discrepancy. I predicted that as the difference in
power between a potential third party and a state in conflict increases, then so too do the chances
of military intervention (Shirkey 2012; Parenti 2002). Again, a positive coefficient for power
discrepancy indicates a positive relationship, supporting my established hypothesis.

The third statistically significant variable is alliance capability, which tested negatively.
This indicates that as a potential third party increases its alliance capability, there is a decrease in
the likelihood of intervention. Since I predicted a positive relationship (when alliance capability
increases, intervention increases), this result contradicts and fails to support my hypothesis.

There are several possible explanations for this finding. One possible explanation for this
finding is the increase in the involvement of international organizations that reduce the need of
state-to-state alliances for intervention (Finnemore 2003). Since international organizations such
as the UN and NATO are unaccounted for as potential intervening actors and as potential allies,
the data lack an important factor in alliance capability. The United States, considered the strongest ally in the data set, may not be a reliable ally in interventions, as compared to the UN and NATO, especially in cases of humanitarian concerns. This also produces a second explanation: increased activity by international organizations and intergovernmental organizations has increased mediation and diplomatic channels for conflict resolution (Findley and Teo 2006). Increased channels of communication allow tensions to be alleviated prior to intervention. Furthermore, the strongest ally of a potential intervening state (as defined by the dataset used in the analysis) may encourage de-escalation and non-intervention.

Economic status of the crisis actor showed a positive relationship, which contradicts my hypothesis. I hypothesized that as economic conditions worsened, leaders would employ diversionary techniques (i.e. intervention) to distract from the economic conditions of their domestic economy. Because the variable is coded in reverse, (where 1 is increase in economic problems and 3 is decrease in economic problems), the positive coefficient indicates that intervention is actually more likely as economic conditions are normal or improving, rejecting my hypothesis.

This result is not unexpected. Leaders may be particularly cautious about using force when the economy is bad because it might appear that they have political motives. In addition, it may be that a weak economy discourages military intervention because intervention may be costly and could further harm the economy, whereas a booming economy may provide a cushion for leaders to believe they can pay for a costly intervention. Previous literature and research have shown that it is incredibly difficult to measure the use of diversionary techniques in times of economic downfall and that statistical tests have often indicated a lack of significance for negative economic conditions in the decision to intervene (Keller and Foster 2012, Morgan and
This could be the result of the high political risk that leaders undertake by employing diversionary techniques. The anticipated public backlash associated with having one’s motives discovered could deter a leader from using diversionary methods (Keller and Foster 2012). The fault with this conclusion, however, is that this is really only applicable to regimes that are fully accountable to their entire electorates (i.e. the United States and other democracies). That is not to say that authoritarian and non-democratic regimes do not face the risk of domestic upheaval or the risk of regime dissolution. Rather, because these regimes lack accountability, they would have little incentive to hide their actions through diversionary tactics or to behave differently than they would have without the possibility of intervention (Morgan and Bickers 1992).

It is also necessary to address those variables that were insignificant in the statistical analysis—distance of crisis actor from crisis location (proximity or location to crisis actor), regime type and societal unrest. While many scholars (and myself) anticipated a relationship between geographic proximity and military intervention, the statistical analysis did not support those expectations (Khosla 1999; Joyce and Braithwaite 2013; Kathman 2010). Rather, it argues that despite the increase in close proximity civil conflict interventions, those undertaken by world powers (e.g. U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K., France, etc.) cancel out the significance of geographic proximity statistically. However, that is not to say that for smaller, landlocked countries with limited capabilities that geographic proximity is not important; it is more important to these countries than it is to highly capable and advanced countries who are able to project military power across the globe. Furthermore, Regan’s (1998) analysis supported this finding by suggesting little relationship between proximity and military action.
I hypothesized that regime type would be an insignificant factor in the occurrence of third party military interventions in intrastate conflicts because states are inherently self-interested, regardless of if they are democratic or authoritarian. In fact, Koga (2011) argued that while democratic and authoritarian regimes may intervene for different reasoning, they both nonetheless intervene when their interests are at stake. While the statistical analysis supports the lack of significance for regime type, it is difficult to say that my hypothesis is supported based on self-interested regimes or because of faults with the analysis or measurement.

Finally, the level of societal unrest as measured in the statistical analysis was also insignificant in understanding the causes of third party military intervention. I hypothesized that increasing societal unrest would lead to a greater chance of intervention as leaders use diversionary techniques to distract from the deteriorating domestic conditions (Keller and Foster 2012; Chan 2012). For many of the same reasons denouncing economic factors, so too can social factors be eliminated from the analysis: the public backlash associated with having one’s true motives discovered could deter a leader from diversionary methods. In addition, leaders may be more concerned with quelling the societal unrest to preserve their political status, rather than risk an intervention that could further hurt the government’s position. As such, societal unrest may not be a good indicator of whether a state will intervene in an intrastate conflict.

For the results of the case study analysis, the research indicates several significant variables in the U.S. decision to intervene militarily in civil conflicts in the Middle East (Kathman 2010). Interestingly, gravity is the only variable to support my hypothesis in both the statistical analysis and in the case studies, as well as the only variable to be salient at the international level for the case studies. In both Lebanon and Libya, the threat to the United States’ influence in the Middle East was exacerbated by violent civil conflicts in these states.
The United States risked losing credibility in Lebanon as well as the possibilities of an Islamist faction coming to power and threatening its neighbor and ally Israel if it did not support the Lebanese Armed Forces (Malone et. al. 1986). In Libya, the U.S. image in the region suffered from the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite having few significant national interests in Libya, the United States intervened to show that it could still support democratic movements as it pleased and that it was still a major power in the region (Kissinger and Baker 2011). Conversely, in Algeria, where the United States did not intervene, it had little at risk from the violent conflict and the cancellation of elections, because American interests aligned with the actions of the military regime in place in Algeria and it did not need to intervene (Fettweis 2005). The Algerian military was essentially carrying out the interests of the United States in preventing the rise of Islamist in Algeria.

At the state level, there are two variables that the research indicates to be significant to decision-making: humanitarian crisis as illustrated in the mass media and a successful history of previous intervention in the conflict state. Both align with my hypotheses predicting positive relationships. The media played a significant role in the U.S. decision to intervene in Lebanon and Libya. In both cases, the U.S. media paid particularly close attention to the situations unfolding in each country and broadcast that information to the American public (Martin 2006; Jones 2011). This increased attention to the atrocities unfolding and increased public demands for U.S. action. On the other hand, the bloody and lengthy civil war and cancelled election in Algeria received limited media attention and the American populace was uninformed of the events unfolding in Algeria and could not sufficiently demand action. Therefore, the U.S. mass media plays a significant part in shaping American public opinion on world events and consequently on whether or not it will employ military force. American leaders are held
accountable for their actions to the public through regular elections. Of course, there is the public backlash that occurs when U.S. military operations do not go according to plan, and this factor contributes to the high significance U.S. leaders give to media attention.

The other significant state level variable, history of successful intervention in the conflict state, is extremely evident in the research (Zoubir 2002; Kelly 1996). In both Lebanon and Libya, the United States had intervened in previous years, for similar reasons. In Lebanon in 1958, the United States secured the pro-Israeli government and successfully intervened in the Lebanese civil war. In Libya, throughout the decades leading up to 2011, the United States conducted numerous successful airstrikes against the Gaddafi regime. In Algeria, however, the United States had no previous intervention in the country and limited interests in doing so as France took the lead in Algeria’s affairs. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that the history of successful interventions in Lebanon and Libya by the United States encouraged leaders to undertake these interventions and deterred it from intervening in Algeria.

It is interesting to compare the results of the statistical analyses and the qualitative, case-study analyses as we find very different results. At the cross-national level, the international level of analysis variables (gravity, alliance capability and power discrepancy) are the only consistently significant variables. At the U.S. level, there is a mixture of significant variable levels (gravity at the international level, the media and previous interventions at the state level). This brings about the question of external validity in using the United States as an appropriate case study. The United States is the sole hegemonic power and has the greatest capability of any nation; therefore, the reliability of generalizing the findings of the case studies to other third-parties can be challenged by the uniqueness of the position of the United States in the international system. The United States, however, still provides a good opportunity to evaluate
the relationship between variables. Moreover, discussion of third party interventions must speak to the role of global hegemon regardless of its prospects for generalizability. Future research however, might benefit from exploring non-U.S. case studies alongside a cross-national study. The research could also be undertaken to control for cases of U.S. intervention, seeing as America tends to undertake numerous interventions and because of its super power status.

This research could benefit from several changes and modifications to the existing variables. First, a clear variable for military intervention would be ideal. The current variable used, severity/intensity of violence, does a sufficient job of indicating military action on behalf of a third party, but it does not clearly delineate between intervention and nonintervention, ultimately influencing the validity of my overall results. Furthermore, the creation of a variable to represent whether a conflict is a civil or international conflict would eliminate bias in the selection of potential cases for the statistical analysis, especially when there is uncertainty such as in cases of conflicts for independence or insurgencies. In addition, it would be interesting to recode the variable for era and include a third option for the post-9/11 world, in addition to Cold War and post-Cold War. The September 11 attacks and ensuing U.S. and global campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq greatly challenged American power and prestige abroad and severely limited U.S. capabilities for future interventions. However, sufficient time has probably yet to pass, limiting the number of available cases to analyze.

As for improving faults and gaps in the research, there are several changes to take into consideration. For one, the use of additional variables or hypotheses to test further the causes of third party military intervention is a possibility. One example of this might be taking into consideration whether an intervention is multilateral or unilateral. We saw in the Libyan case study that the United States was part of a coalition of nations that partook in airstrikes and, that
for the most part, abandoned neutrality for the sake of eliminating the Gaddafi regime. Conversely, in Lebanon, the United States was the sole actor of the Multi-National Force to abandon its neutrality in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Perhaps an additional variable accounting for the number of intervening states in a particular conflict would influence one’s decision to intervene or not. While alliance capability measures the strength of one’s greatest ally, it does not address the effectiveness or reliability of that ally in the event of unilateral or multilateral interventions.

A second example of a future consideration concerns feasibility of intervention as power discrepancy is related to localized conditions in the conflict state. For example, the intervention in Libya was more feasible than an intervention in Syria because of the nature of the conflict: Assad still has a significant amount of support domestically and internationally, whereas Libya was isolated and lacked popular support. Furthermore, just because the United States may be considered to have the greater capability and power discrepancy, it does not mean that it will intervene in every scenario. Issues of terrain, geography and military capabilities of potential third party adversaries (other countries that might be allied with the country in crisis or potentially intervening in the crisis; i.e. Russia in Syria) all affect the feasibility of military intervention and are not adequately addressed in this study.

A third variable for future consideration improves upon my variable accounting for previous intervention in the same state in which intervention is once again considered. This variable could be expanded to focus on interventions that are more recent in general or to a history of intervention in a particular region, not just confined to an experience in a particular state. For President Bush, his decision not to intervene in Algeria was more than likely influenced by his recent experience in Iraq and Kuwait (Agredano 2015). It would be interesting
to see the impact of interventions in other parts of the world that are contemporaneous with the studied interventions, such as to take into consideration Reagan’s actions in Latin America during his presidency in conjunction with his Middle East policy.

More so, there is an overall need for increased research into military interventions in civil conflicts. This is an increasingly significant phenomenon in global politics, but is poorly researched beyond individual case studies (Merom 2012; Pickering and Kisangani 2009; Shirkey 2012). There are numerous cross-national studies of intervention in interstate conflicts; however, the literature and analyses devoted to intrastate conflicts is minimal. In particular, there is a lack of unified data compiling civil conflicts for research purposes.

The need for better research and data on military interventions in intrastate conflicts has important real-world and policy implications for decision makers. The ability of policy makers to predict the probability of interventions allows for planned responses and contingency planning. For example, if we know that the chances of intervention by a third party state in the form of major violence and war are 81.7% more likely (see Table 11) when a state’s economic conditions are improving, then in the event of a civil conflict it is plausible to suggest military intervention may occur. That is to say that if as a result of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal the Iranian economy improves through unfrozen assets and increased oil exportation, and the civil conflict in Yemen continues (in which Iran is already covertly involved in), then it is plausible to suggest that the Iranian military may be more likely to overtly intervene as a result of increased economic activity improving Iran’s intervention capability (in conjunction with other factors of course). Thus, the United States and Saudi Arabia could plan a potential response (economic, diplomatic, or military) in the event that Iran does intervene in Yemen though overt military
means (a real concern of conservative U.S. policy makers advocating rejection of the nuclear deal).

A major aspect of U.S., or any nation’s, foreign and defense policy includes this very aspect: planning for future confrontations and challenges to national interests abroad. In terms of intervention potential, in general actors with a power advantage, loose alliance capability, with improving economic conditions and third party actors who face a significant threat to their position in the international system are at an increased likelihood of military intervention. For the United States, while a major threat to influence is a significant contributor to military intervention, the influence of the media and history of interventions in the conflict state are all significant decision-making factors for U.S. third party military intervention.

The media culture of the United States is vibrant and crucial to shaping American public opinion. The role of newscasts and video in illustrating civil conflicts abroad contributes to the U.S.’ demands for action and political accountability. The Algeria study clearly demonstrates that a humanitarian crisis unfolding in a violent civil conflict is not a guarantee of intervention on humanitarian grounds, but rather interventions in humanitarian crisis in this context are contingent upon the focus of the crisis in the U.S. media. Both Lebanon and Libya had extensive foreign and domestic media coverage and significant public opinion favoring U.S. actions; the Algerian crisis was largely ignored by the U.S. media.

U.S. intervention in the Middle East was also largely contingent upon the history of intervention in a particular country. As I mentioned above, this area of emphasis could benefit from additional focus on previous U.S. interventions in general, such as the blowbacks from Vietnam and Iraq. Here, however, we see a consistent indication of the influence of past interventions (or lack thereof) in Lebanon, Algeria and Libya. Algeria and Libya had both
experienced previous U.S. interventions, all of which were considered successful by the United States, whereas Algeria never before experienced U.S. intervention and would not experience it.

America’s position in the world as the global hegemon will continue for some time; however, as nations such as China and Russia challenge the global predominance of the United States, decision makers will have to adjust to changing global dynamics. It is inevitable that as other countries rise on both a regional and global scale the influence of the United States will wane. Ultimately, as this thesis has demonstrated, the United States will not hesitate to exercise its influence over civil conflicts in which its interests are threatened, especially when that threat is posed by actors hostile to America.

Bibliography


