Markers of social movement success: The case of Dominican citizenship after Resolution 12

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Markers of Social Movement Success: The Case of Dominican Citizenship after Resolution 12

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Abstract

Social movements are the basis for social change, started when a group challenges political authority and ending when its goals have finally been met. Social movement theory names many factors commonly found in social movements such as movement structure, leadership, framing, symbolic representation, resources, transnational activism, political opportunity, and media coverage, as well as many indicators of success including advocacy, public awareness, and policy change. It is vital to understand the indicators of success and their interplay within the movement to evaluate how a movement achieved success. This thesis seeks to examine these eight factors within the social movement MONDHA, or the Movimiento por los Derechos Humanos, la Paz, y la Justicia Global, located in the Dominican Republic. This social movement started to protest the implementation of Resolution 12, which has revoked the citizenship of a large group of Dominicans of Haitian descent. The factors were assessed through a semi-structured interview process with members of the movement in a weeklong fieldwork trip. Results indicate that while the organization has not achieved policy change, it was quite successful in meeting its interim goals, such as public awareness. The research also points to the varying influence of each factor on success. Some factors at once promoted interim goals and hindered policy change. More research must be done in order to study how these factors play out in different populations in order to make better assessments of future social movements.
Introduction

There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time when we fail to protest.

Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (December 11, 1986)

Change, effectively, starts with an individual or small group that is not satisfied with the current state of affairs. Protests and social movements seek to vocalize the injustice felt by their participants. When a large group of primarily Haitian-descendant Dominicans, who could not prove ancestry into the early 1900s, found themselves stateless after a resolution revoked their citizenship in 2007, change is exactly what they sought. Statelessness is the condition when “a person is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law,” according to “Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons” (What Is Statelessness). Many Dominicans affected by this resolution have not lived or experienced life anywhere else besides the Dominican. This loss of citizenship left many hopeless, without the means to live, but with a desire for social change. One group, called the Movimiento por los Derechos Humanos, la Paz, y la Justicia Global (MONDHA), sought to protest the resolution and gain the citizenship they had lost.

Existing literature names many factors that influence the outcomes of social movements including, movement structure, leadership, framing, symbolic representation, resources, transnational activism, political opportunity, and media coverage. This thesis seeks to examine these factors in relation to the Movimiento por los Derechos Humanos, la Paz, y la Justicia Global (MONDHA) in the Dominican Republic to assess whether and explain how this group’s campaign has achieved success. Due to MONDHA’s lack in financial resources I was skeptical whether I would see policy change. Before conducting interviews with members of MONDHA, I
adhered to the popular view that success is policy change, but after fieldwork in the Dominican Republic, I realized that a multitude of outcomes could represent success.

The literature deploys a wide variety of measures to define success; most commonly, policy change is used as a benchmark, but interim goals such as advocacy and affecting public discourse are part of success as well. Results from semi-structured interviews conducted in the Dominican Republic suggest that MONDHA enjoyed partial success in its interim goals, mostly due to membership and movement structure, but was not able to instill policy change. The greatest factors working against this goal were the unfavorable political opportunity structure and the frame of the movement.

Social movements, defined as “public contentious gatherings (that) are typically composed of political outsiders or non-elites who participate in symbolic demonstrations external to the headquarters of power” are the basis for social change (Lamb-Books 2016). Social movements are so important because “the future of democracy, of freedom, of justice, depends on the world’s or different parts of the world’s capacity to transform… into social movements” (Touraine 2002, 95). It is therefore essential to study social movements and reasons for their success; if factors for success can be better understood, social movements can become more effective.

The central question of this thesis will be to assess what makes a social movement successful. The thesis, first, seeks to explain existing social movement theory. Then, in order to evaluate success in the Movimiento por los Derechos Humanos, la Paz, y la Justicia Global (MONDHA), the aforementioned eight variables will be studied in their relation to MONDHA. This was assessed through fieldwork research done in the Dominican Republic, which is further explained in the methodology section. The findings are discussed in the results section, which
highlight the importance of the fluidity inherent in the eight indicators. Some of the very factors that helped the movement achieve interim success simultaneously hindered policy change. Finally, the results are summarized and a look into future research is given.

Almost ten years ago Resolution 12 was passed in the Dominican Republic, creating an atmosphere for social movements to thrive, and hopefully succeed. This law, as stated above, left many stateless and revoked access to identification cards, and with that access to healthcare, education, and the pursuit of a job for Dominicans of Haitian descent. It is vital to understand the history between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in order to explain the implementation of the law in Dominican society.
Background Information

Medias montañas, medias rios, y hasta la muerte compartida / Between them mountains, between them rivers, and even a shared death.

Manuel Rueda, Cantos de la frontera / Songs of the border

The history between the Dominican Republic and Haiti is a long, tumultuous one, marred with violence. The two countries share one island in the Caribbean called Hispaniola, but while the Dominican Republic prospered under Spanish rule, Haiti became a free nation out of a French slave colony. The different cultural upbringings and demographics of these two countries would become just one of the many points of contention in the shared landmass, all of which are important to understand, but one of the most important to this thesis being the idea of race and nationality. Understanding this point of contention will help explain how Resolution 12 passed and under what circumstances, thus eliciting the need for MONDHA to mobilize as a social movement to combat it.

Historical Background

The historical background between the Dominican Republic and Haiti is important to this story because it shapes the relationships between the countries in the present day. The differences in geography, cultural backgrounds, and histories have created separate identities and on-going tension between these countries. It is important to note how these countries developed independently from each other to fully understand the feelings Dominicans have for Haitians and vice versa. The race relations between the countries have fostered an atmosphere where a law revoking citizenship of Dominicans of Haitian descent could be passed and the need for a social
movement to protest this, necessary. The history is vital because it acts as a roadmap to the current state of affairs between the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

Taíno Indians first inhabited Hispaniola, the Caribbean island that both Haiti and the Dominican Republic call home, until Cristobal Colon eradicated them with his discovery and inhabitation of the island for Spain on December 5, 1492. During the beginnings of the colonial period, Spanish imperialistic interest waned in the Dominican Republic leaving the western half of the island free for French settlers to secure land for their own crown. French planters lived in relative peace with Dutch smugglers and pirates on the western side of the island and the growing numbers of Frenchmen being sent to the island to claim jurisdiction for the motherland improved this position. The western side of the country never fully lost its “frontier culture” by the time France claimed rights to the colony in 1665, naming it Saint Domingue (Garrigus 2006) (Henley 2010). During French rule, hundreds of thousands of African slaves were sent to the sugar, coffee, indigo, cocoa, and cotton plantations and in the late 18th century African slaves outnumbered their French counterparts more than 11 to 1 (Hispaniola 1965).

Under colonial rule the Spanish authorities in the Dominican Republic feared “the slow and steady of encroachment of French traders” from the west due to the establishment of a legitimate presence on the island (Matibag 2003, 42). To combat the advance of French persons on Spanish land, authorities moved hundreds of families, in the 1680s, from the Canary Islands to the border to act as a buffer. In addition to this “living boundary, colonial authorities took steps to tighten the security” at the border by installing troops of militiamen called cincuentenas (ibid, 44). These French and Spanish imperialistic conquests were subject to border skirmishes and scrutiny, which still continue today, even when in 1697 Spain formally ceded the western half of the island to France in the Peace of Ryswick (CIA World Factbook).
While the borders and owners of the island were debated and switched hands many times and constructions of separate identities were gradually forming from the very beginning of its history, it was Haiti’s independence that started to propel the two nations on distinct paths. Haiti won its independence through a slave revolt culminating in 1804. The invention of the Haitian state and its subsequent four constitutions were based on “black equality and freedom” (Gaffield 2007, 89). Article 14, in the constitutional version created in 1805, stated “all Haitians of color to be known henceforth by the generic name of blacks” (Matibag 2003, 86). Even furthering the idea of national identity based on race and color is Article 12, which states no white man is allowed to hold property and any property he had owned prior would be given up to national interests (ibid).

The race issue was again perpetuated and strengthened by Dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo during his long lasting regime in the Dominican Republic. During his 30 year rule, from the 1930s to the 1960s, Trujillo “used the power of the State to promote a whitened, Hispanicized image of Dominican identity that discounted and disparaged blackness and Haitianness” intent on creating a national race and identity that was wholly separate from their western neighbors (Wheeler 2015, 36). Trujillo’s crusade against the Haitians was two-fold with increased security on the border and an imposed “quota on the percentage of non-Dominican sugar workers that an estate could employ,” which culminated in a devastating massacre (Roorda 1996, 305). The massacre occurred on the second of October, 1937 after Trujillo visited the site of an “international highway being built along the border” months before in August and September (ibid). This trip highlighted the failures of Trujillo’s campaign to eradicate the Haitians on the Dominican side of the island due to their overwhelming presence in the border
towns. Thus he began a massacre, which ended in around 15,000 deaths of ethnic Haitians born and living in the Dominican Republic (Turits 2002, 590).

**Current Events**

The race issue, while never completely dormant, has reared its head recently with the publication of Resolution 12. This legal document, passed in 2007, allowed the Civil Registry of the Dominican Republic to revoke or “provisionally suspend” the citizenship status of any Dominican who could not prove ancestry back to 1929, creating a situation of limbo for many Dominicans of Haitian descent. The Dominican Constitutional court continued to augment the crisis on September 23, 2013 with the passing of Sentence 168-13, which ordered the immediate revoking of documents of the affected persons. The affected population can be grouped into two sections; Group A are “Dominicans of Haitian descent, born in the Dominican Republic to Haitian parents from 1929 to 2010” (Centro Bono 2015). Group B are Dominicans in the same situation as those in Group A, but were never registered in the Dominican civil registry. The confiscation of identifying documents of affected persons in each group effectively left them stateless. Statelessness is the condition when “a person is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law,” according to “Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons” (What Is Statelessness). Stateless individuals are left without means to healthcare, education, and employment. The Resolution was initially created to control the influx of Haitians living in the Dominican and curb the Haitians immigrating into the country (Norton 2013). Many Dominicans affected by this resolution have not lived or experienced life anywhere else besides the Dominican. This loss of citizenship left many despondent, without the
means to live in a country they called home. This hopelessness propelled many to act out and protest against what they believed to be a human rights infraction.

In an event such as this, the opportunity for social contention, for ordinary people to voice their concerns and challenge authority, grows. Many movements have progressed in the Dominican Republic since the passing of Resolution 12 with varied resulting outcomes. In May 2014, President Danilo Medina passed a bill that would allow children of Haitian migrant workers the opportunity to naturalize if they had the paperwork, but the deportation process continued as routine for all others (Archibald 2014). International outcry from a “number of international human rights advocacy groups, such as Jesuit Refugee Services International, Refugees International, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)” have condemned the actions of the Dominican Republic illegal and discriminatory (Norton 2013). In response, the Dominican Congress passed a migration policy that allowed undocumented foreigners to apply for residency. The deadline for this lengthy process was set to be June 17, 2013, but many including the United States, believed this deadline to be unsatisfactory. Mark Toner, a spokesman for the State Department issued concern “that some people with a right to citizenship or residency might be swept up in the deportation process due to insufficient time and resources to obtain proper documentation” (Pineda 2015). Dominican officials allowed 289,000 people who had begun the process an extended stay up to two years but otherwise have returned to regularly enforcing Resolution 12’s deportation policy (ibid). This activity was again recognized by the US State Department in an August 2015 press statement urging the country to allow international organizations to observe the proceedings in order to insure safety and legality. The end of the statement offers a pledge from the United States to
continue monitoring changes in the policy set forth and to insure the protection of Dominican citizens (U.S. Department of State 2015).

The organizations within the Dominican Republic are partly responsible for bringing about the continual changes to the status of stateless individuals in the country. By protesting an issue and challenging the imposed status quo, small, incremental amendments have changed the political landscape. But how big of a role did the organizations play? And are these small changes enough to constitute social movement success? This paper seeks to examine the factors behind social movement success and/or failure in relation to the Dominican issue of citizenship and what it means for a social movement to be successful.
Literature Review

*Social movements are at once the symptoms and the instruments of progress. Ignore them and statesmanship is irrelevant; fail to use them and it is weak.*

_Walter Lippmann_

Contentious politics, “episodic, public, collective action” by ordinary people challenging elites and authorities, forms the basis of social movements (McAdam 2001, 5). A social movement is different by the addition of time. Contentious politics transforms into a social movement when actors “try to make lasting, large-scale, and significant changes in the texture of the society” (Zirakzadeh 2006, 4). Sidney Tarrow characterizes social movements as having four elements: “a collective challenge, a common purpose, social solidarity, and a sustained interaction” (1998, 4). A collective challenge is the public disruption of other’s activity through direct action. Social solidarity is defined as the deeper recognition of the common purpose and/or a feeling of identity with the issue. Lastly, sustained interaction is the important defining feature of a social movement; long-term collective action is what bridges the gap between contentious politics and social movements (ibid).

According to Marc Lichbach, a prominent social movement theorist, in order to understand social protest one must understand “the study of resistance (action) against authority (structure)” (1998, 402). Three distinctive frameworks to studying resistance to power emerge from rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist approaches. The rationalist form studies resistance through collective action, strategic choice, and “interaction problems of dissidents” (ibid, 404). The structuralist form studies the social structure and collective behavior of the movement, and lastly, the culturalist form seeks to reconcile the first two. Specifically the approach “analyzes the resource mobilization of the dissidents” (ibid). These three forms have since been adapted by
many leading social movement scholars into two more consolidated formats that Lichbach calls Synthetic Political Opportunity Theory (SPOT) and Collective Action Research Program (CARP).

The first approach that Lichbach mentions in his research is the Synthetic Political Opportunity Theory (SPOT), which focuses on structural concerns. Proponents emphasize how social movements’ emergence and subsequent prospects are driven by the political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural frames accessible to and engaged by mass actors. Political opportunities are defined as “political processes, institutions, and alignments, which therefore set the context for the strategic interaction of a movement with its allies and opponents in civil society and the state,” (ibid, 406). Mobilizing structures are how people mobilize and/or through what communities of society are goals being pursued, an example could be racial or class based. It is possible that these communities overlap in social movements. Lastly, cultural frames are “how a group use symbols, meanings, and discourse to explain their position and includes “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (ibid, 407).

The next approach Lichbach explains is the Collective Action Research Program (CARP), which is rational action based. Theorists of CARP study, observe, and collect data on collective action, with a stress on explaining the rarity of the phenomenon. Rationalist accounts of collective action have documented and sought to explain the Five Percent Rule, which states, “less than five percent of movement supporters will become actively involved in the cause” (ibid, 408). Collective action can be explained on two dimensions: deliberative and ontological. The deliberative dimension represents unplanned or planned social order and the ontological dimension exemplifies contingent or spontaneous order. The “two approaches to unplanned order
are market and community and the two approaches to planned order are contract and hierarchy. There are also two spontaneous approaches to social order (market and contract) and two contingent approaches to social order (community and hierarchy)” (ibid, 409). These approaches (combined into sets) represent the solutions to the collective action problem. One key element that is studied by CARP and is left out of SPOT is “whether group mobilization occurs by market, community, contract, or hierarchy” (ibid, 410).

Factors explaining social movement success can be separated broadly into two categories: actions taken within the movement itself and action taken outside of it. Meyer describes these categories as movements from the outside in and movements from the inside out. An outside in movement is defined as the “grievances, resources, and opportunities provided by forces outside the social movement,” while inside out movements are represented by the “self-conscious decisions and values of those within movements and their lives prior to and through social movement participation” (Meyer 2002, 12). These two camps interact with each other; the combination of factors creates a successful atmosphere for social movements, as argued by McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, and Mowery who state “that a model of movement success must consider not only the mobilization of the movements but the broad context in which those movements operate” (2001, 50). In order to research the forces propelling social movements I will use the same categories that Meyer uses – action from the inside out and action from the outside in- and start from the inside with how a movement is organized.

**Movement Structure**

How a movement is structured can influence the outcome and can even become predictors of goal achievement. Jurgen Willems and Marc Jegers articulate an explanatory model
that draws on two major characteristics of a social movement to arrive at a “four-fold classification system” (Willems and Jergus 2012). The first set of characteristics is the distinction between informal or formal relationships. A formal relationship is a partnership that fosters credibility and reduces uncertainty, for example, a contract between two parties. An informal relationship is spontaneous participation in an event. This type of relationship is less costly and more flexible. An example would be one-time participation in a demonstration (ibid).

The second set of characteristics is a hierarchical structure versus a lateral structure. A hierarchical structure is defined as one actor in a power position with subordinates under him/her. This type of structure creates a strong center, a division of tasks, and a distribution of information from top down. A lateral structure is symbolized by equal power shared amongst members. This structure is able to “better align actions and strategies toward each other” (ibid).

The four quadrants that make up the classification system are formal centralized, formal clustered, informal centralized, and informal clustered. A formal centralized movement seeks to “maintain and incrementally improve achievements” (ibid). A formal clustered movement brings together different actors and tactics that work towards one general goal. Informal centralized structures create a “sense of community towards central ideas” (ibid). Lastly, the informal clustered structure achieves abstract goals that are easy to identify with based on a collective identity and the flexibility and spontaneity of the movement. Although Willems and Jergus have mapped out these clear structures and goals, social movements are dynamic and always changing, therefore it is quite possible that a movement could switch in between this classification system, demonstrating two structures at once or a continual change from structure to structure.
Contrasting the specific mapped out structures of Willems and Jergers is a more continual model with broad levels of organization. These levels are expansive because social movements are influenced by large, macro level happenings like political opportunity and cultural change as well as micro level individual interests. The most examined level in this broader model is the “meso-level structures” that link the macro and micro levels together (Staggenborg 2002). The meso-level encompasses organizational bases where “ideological structured action” occurs; Staggenborg calls these communities (ibid, 126).

Communities are, most often, social movement organizations (SMOs), but are not limited there; they can also be political parties or other institutions. Staggenborg argues, contrary to Willems and Jeregns, that these communities “likely look different in different cultures and political systems” and their “protest cycles, bases of constituent commitment, connections to other movement communities, extent of centralization, and extent of institutionalization vary” (ibid). Both studies do agree that movements are not static and do go through many changes throughout their course.

Communities alter individual commitment to movements but also the reverse works and activists at an individual level can shape the community structure as well (meso-micro connection). The meso-level also interacts with the macro level, exemplified when political opportunity can shift community behavior. Again this link works in reverse and the communities can also “exploit, and sometimes create, political opportunities and large-scale changes” (ibid, 138). Although basic research has been done on meso-level phenomena, more empirical research must be done to see how meso-level structures are related to activists’ perceptions (micro-level) on political opportunity (macro-level) (ibid).
Mobilization Strategies

Mobilization, according to Karl-Dieter Opp, “refers to activities of a movement organization or an individual actor to gain more control over goods that contribute to achieve the goals of the movement organization” (2009, 140). Mobilization encompasses, but is not limited to leadership, tactics, ideas, and alliances. Any social movement that can mobilize well will have a better chance of success (Meyer 2002). The mobilization tactics that will be covered in this paper are leadership, framing, culturally resonant symbols\(^1\), and resources. The first sub-topic in mobilization that I will research is leadership.

Leadership

Strong leadership is instrumental in the success of social movements. Leadership is “an important mechanism linking political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes, and outcomes” (Campbell 2005, 63). Tasks vital to a social movement such as the creation of collective symbols and ideas, projects, planning and strategizing, and organization require someone to suggest them (Johnson 2001). Therefore, social movement successes and failures “can be highly dependent on the qualities and commitment of the leadership cadre and the tactics they use” (Zald and Ash 1996, 338). One of these essential qualities, highlighting the importance of a leader, is the ability to find the conditions that will create change eventually making said change self-sustaining (Senge, Hamilton, and Kania 2015). Most of the scholarly research examines the importance of strong leadership in social movements through a series of case studies. Each case study offers up a characteristic that makes a successful leader and therefore opens up the possibility for a successful social movement. One conclusion drawn from studying

\(^1\) For all purposes this concept will be described as symbolic representation in this thesis.
the American women’s liberation movement in the late 1900’s is that “it is crucial that leaders be democratically chosen, acknowledged, valued, encouraged, supported- and held accountable” (Johnson 2001, 94). This ensures that the movement will have a strong backbone without having an overbearing, autocratic presence domineering over it.

Another crucial characteristic is the importance of a “conversational, persuasive leader attentive to the movement’s experience, always ready to follow in order to lead” (ibid, 115). This characteristic is best described as a self-emancipated leader. Self-emancipation requires a collective democratic leadership that can motivate a group or marginalized peoples to liberate themselves. This idea is represented through Martin Luther King’s struggle to achieve this type of leadership during the Civil Rights Movement (ibid). Dr. King sought to empower a group of oppressed people and in doing so became a vital participant in the movement as well as its’ figurehead and leader.

**Framing**

Framing an issue occurs when an issue is reformulated to fit a specific scheme of interpretation. This process is used to construct meaning and target certain audiences to act (Lelieveldt and Princen 2011). Snow et al describes frame articulation as “the connection or coordination of issues, events, experiences, and cultural items, so that they hang together in an integrated and meaningful fashion” (2013, 229). Many social movements use a specific type of frame, called a collective action frame in order to “inspire and legitimize the activities and campaigns” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). Collective action frames are still a way to redefine and give meaning to issues, but in addition, they are meant to mobilize the public.
Collective action framing defines frames in three ways: “diagnostic framing,” “prognostic framing,” and “motivational framing” (ibid, 615). Diagnostic framing seeks to identify or label the problem and who/what the problem was caused by. This part of the framing process places the blame. The next framing step, prognostic framing, is the plan that lays out the solution to the problem and the directions needed to solve it. Lastly, motivational framing is used to garner support and mobilize the directed audience to action. Benford and Snow propose that “the more inclusive and flexible collective action frames are, the more likely they are to function as or evolve into master frames” (2000, 618). Master frames are those that have a wide range and are culturally significant. A master frame has more power to mobilize, making these more successful than other frames.

A movement will also see more mobilization if there is credibility within the collective action frame and the salience of the issues in relation to the lives of the participants is high (ibid). Karl-Dieter Opp agrees, proposing that a movement with a high frame resonance will be more successful. Resonance refers to the solutions offered to the issue being protested and the solutions’ capability to evoke emotions (2009). John L. Campbell argues that in order for a movement to see success, the participants must “frame issues in ways that resonate with the ideologies, identities, and cultural understandings of supporters” (2005, 48). Social movement researchers credit this to be the reason why the US civil rights movement was framed as an “equal rights” movement. This general terminology insured that African Americans and Caucasian sympathizers alike would feel a sense of support and identity with the movement (ibid). A broad frame is desirable for mobilization success because it attracts a bigger audience willing to support the cause.
Symbolic Representation

A symbol is an object that represents an idea. Symbols can be used to represent a social movement and garner a feeling of solidarity and identity with the movement. Symbolic representation most often is a visual depiction. Revolutionary flags are a common example. Every countermovement utilized a differentiated flag to symbolize their moment. For example, the Spanish Republican flag was red, yellow, and purple striped as opposed to the slightly varied red, yellow, and red striped one that the nationalists used. In the United States, black armbands were a symbol that indicated protest against the Vietnam War. According to Tarrow, symbolic representation can be characterized two ways: long term and short term. Symbols in the long run can enter the conscious mind through consensus formation and mobilization. Consensus formation is the act of gathering information and consensus mobilization is a “deliberate attempt to spread the views of a social actor” (Tarrow 1998, 112). In the short run, symbols sway people by the changes made through collective action. Symbols are so far-reaching because “they are increased through use, rather than depleted” and because of the general abundance of a symbol; tough decisions about allocation do not have to be made (Scully and Creed 2005, 326). Research on symbolic representation is very descriptive and lacks explanations on whether the presence of a symbol in social movements has an effect on the outcome.

Resources

Resources are defined as “goods (i.e. everything that has utility), which individual or collective actors can control” (Opp 2009, 139). Resources for a social movement obviously include economic resources, but also human capital as well. The most commonly utilized resources in social movement mobilization have been listed as money, labor, legitimacy, and
facilities (as noted by McCarthy and Zald), whereas Freeman puts forth a helpful model that splits resources into two camps: tangible and intangible. Tangible resources are “money, facilities, and means of communication” which differentiate from intangible resources such as human capital, both skilled and unskilled (Jenkins 1983, 533). Material resources are an important factor in getting a social movement started. Work concentrated on goal achievement “is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1221). These employed resources can by volunteered labor, hired labor, or capital. With more money available to a social movement, organizational tasks, maintenance, and operational tasks become easier (ibid).

While it would seem that with more resources would come more success, there is not much theoretical research proving this. These resources can come from foundations and institutions outside the movement (such as a church). The capital can also, whether it is economic, human, or intellectual, come from members within the social movement. While social movements produce their own capital through members, social movements “elicit less resources… such as money and voluntary work from their members” as compared to other self-funded organizational groups such as religious based groups (Somma 2014, 237). This finding is corroborates the collective action dilemma and related Five Percent Rule: if all members will feel the benefit of the work of a few, there is no incentive to give time or money. This idea alludes to a subtle decrease in importance of resource mobilization while every movement needs resources to start this study suggests a greater force at work in social movement success.

**Transnational Activism**
The transition to outside in forces also marks the transition in scholarly literature. Most recently scholars have begun to research factors that influence social movements that fall outside the movement’s borders, valuing the importance of what happens externally equally to internal mobilization. Globalization has pushed the realm of action further and further from the home country, opening possibilities for international support. The first phenomena I will examine is transnational activism.

Social movements will often see more success if they have international backing. International backing can take on many forms such as monetary support or an additional realm that can be used by actors abroad and at home alike. International backing is not necessary but greatly increases the success of transnational activism. Transnational activism is a “gathering site of diverse actors, interests and agendas, straddling geographical and ideational boundaries in a notional network that is seen to exist above or beyond the state” (Gilson 2011, 289). It works and makes movements successful because it “multiplies the channels of access to the international system” while also making “international resources available to actors in domestic political and social struggles” (Keck 2014, 1). Transnational activism works through a transnational advocacy network, which is a voluntary system used to communicate and exchange information in a horizontal manner. Transnational advocacy networks create a new space for activism among actors separated by geographic boundaries or actors silenced in their own countries (Gilson 2011). Transnational advocacy networks have the most success and strength in situations where the domestic actors accusations are blocked or the actors do not have the same amount of political clout as the international organization. This is often the case in human rights issues (Tarrow 1998, 190). In Keck and Sikkink’s 2014 study, the Boomerang Pattern is often cited with human rights cases. This effect happens when domestic actors “bypass their state and
directly search out international allies to try and bring pressure on their states from the outside” (2014, 12).

Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are effective when they can frame debates, instigate change on either a domestic or international level, transform policy, garnering commitments from political actors and prompting behavior changes in the target country (ibid). A network can turn this effectiveness into success when the target country in question is “sensitive to the pressures” (ibid). When a country exhibits vulnerability it is easier to leverage them. There is also greater success for influence when these networks are resilient, exchange information often, and have a larger size (ibid).

Keck and Sikkink demonstrate the success of social movements under these qualifications using case studies. Case studies are most applicable in studying transnational advocacy networks because the relative novelty of the study. A case study is also very detailed and each aspect of a TAN can be studied in relation to the goal of the social movement it is backing. An example presented in Keck and Sikkink’s study is the militaristic presence of Argentina in the late 70’s. During this time the junta was repressive and “denied the legitimacy of international concern over human rights” (ibid, 106). The US and Europe became important destinations for domestic actors side-stepping their state to protest human rights abuses, which resulted in sanctions against Argentina, such as reduced military and economic aid. Argentina’s government, vulnerable to the outside pressures realized, in 1978, that their image must be amended in the eyes of the international community and to also receive the international support that it had lost.

**Political Opportunity**
American scholars first established what came to be known as political opportunity theory in the 1960s due to the high influx of social movements present during that time. The two most-widely known movements during this period were the Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Movement, which gave the research a structure focused on the political process (Tarrow 1998). Political opportunity for social movements is highly dependent on the political process because the movements “develop in a context defined by the state and the representation system, which afford opportunities for mobilization and set limits on the effectiveness of movement strategies” (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 7). Tarrow defines success to be contingent on four different dimensions, including “the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners, and [whether or not there are] political conflicts within and among elites” (ibid, 167).

A similar interpretation of political opportunity theory by Jenkins and Klandermans stresses the “formal institution structure, informal procedures with regard to challengers, and the configuration of power” of the state (1995, 168). The formal institution structure is what Tarrow describes as the degree of openness of political access. Formal institution structure can be broken down into many subcategories such as the degree of centralization of a state, separation of powers, public administration functionality, and lastly the degree of institutionalization of democratic procedures. States with more formal access are labeled as open states. Such a state would be decentralized, with a strong system of checks and balances, the lack of a coherent public administration, as well as prevailing democratic procedures (like referendums). These all constitute requirements for an open state because the formal points of access are multiplied. Jenkins et al argues that a weak state will be easier to mobilize (ibid).
While the political process is one factor that affects the political opportunity structure, a 2001 study by McCammon et al, explores the possibility of other important factors involved in a POS. A much broader definition for political opportunity is “when political circumstances shift such that political actors are willing to support policy change because they perceive the change will strengthen or preserve their own institutional positions” (2001, 50). This definition was adjusted to not only include polity-centered theories, but society-centered theories as well, such as race, gender, and economic status (ibid).

While there are many different factors that influence the political opportunity structure and a variance of theories, all “emphasize resources external to the group” (Tarrow 1998, 20). A political opportunity is something that exists outside of the movement. Tarrow states “unlike money or power, these can be taken advantage of by even weak or disorganized challengers” (1998, 20). While this is one way to view and research political opportunity structures, a study by John L. Campbell also states that political opportunities can be “driven by political authorities” as well as societal groups, or the social movement itself (2005, 47).

In just these four representations we can see the broad spectrum on different theories within the political opportunity model. Research has been so broad that scholars, Gamson and Meyer, caution, “the concept of political opportunity structure is in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (1996, 275). A study by Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (1999) is very critical of the theory stating that it “remains conceptually muddled insofar as political process theorists have been unable to reach agreement about the definitions of its basic concepts hindering the testing of theoretical propositions” (28). This is again exemplified in the models above: while Tarrow (1998) uses four description dimensions, Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) only have three, and both are slightly varied.
McCammon et al. (2001) add another set of dimensions by moving political opportunity into a society-centered model.

Scholars David Meyer and Debra Minkoff offer a more streamlined definition that seeks to explain how political opportunities affect mobilization, policy change, and organizational development. According to their research, two issues “cut across these dependent variable: (1) the effects of structural changes in opportunities as differentiated from effects of signals sent by the political system and (2) the relative weight of issue-specific versus general openings in the polity” (2004, 1464). Structural changes refer to the modification of political alignments and/or policies, while signals denote changes in the political environment. The aforementioned goal was to differentiate structural and signal changes, although they still appear similar. Their research concluded with a call for more examination to un-muddle the mass that has become political opportunity research.

**Media/Internet Coverage**

2011 marked an important year in social movement progression. This was a year where the concept of mobilization by Internet peaked in scholarly research (Turner). Media supports activism by communicating ideas and information about the movement, using “online tools to facilitate offline protest (called e-mobilization); using online tools to enable online participation, and using online tools to wholly organize movement efforts online” (Earl 2015, 39). Media coverage is important for the success of social movements because more coverage is related to a raised awareness of the issue (ibid). The media also opens new pathways to communicate and mobilize; the incredible ease of the spread of ideas through social media facilitates a massive exchange with a greater chance for participation. Internet activism is also able to unite different
people together without having to actually meet up. In this way, the media can support transnational advocacy networks by giving marginalized people the chance to speak out.

The most successful movements that organize Internet campaigns do this in conjunction with “offline mobilization” (Turner 2013, 380). This refers to the concept e-mobilization, the use of media as a space to coordinate offline mobilization events, such as protests. This relationship between online and offline mobilization has been improved through Internet advances such as social networks and blogs. These sites help in “communicating and coordinating public space campaigns” (ibid, 381). Activism is wholly changed because the destruction of barriers like time and space (DeLuca 2012). Social media allows the user to be anywhere at any time. A study by DeLuca et al observes the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States. Using traditional mass media, such as major television news channels and newspapers, the OWS movement was ignored and framed negatively, but “on the public screens of social media, OWS’s emergence was vibrant, its multiple manifestations much discussed, analyzed, celebrated, and attacked” (ibid, 500). Although as a whole, the OWS movement was not very successful, simply using new forms of social media gave the movement a new sphere to participate and mobilize in. Research on media coverage is inconclusive on the effects it has on the success of a movement, while some research supports social media’s role as a way to further circulate the movement’s agenda other research states social media “offers social movements even less control over their representation” (McCurdy 2012).
Methodology

“Rather than determining cause and effect, predicting, or describing the distribution of some attribute among a population, we might be interested in... understanding how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences.”

Sharan B. Merriam, 2009

Research Design and Case Selection

The purpose of this study is to assess and explain the success of the social movement Movimiento por los Derechos Humanos, la Paz, y la Justicia Global (MONDHA) in the wake of Resolution 12. I selected MONDHA because it is a well-known organization that has a history of working with and for underrepresented populations, but it also appears to stray from the literature’s understanding that financial resources are an inherent need to achieve success.

This thesis deploys a qualitative research design due to many factors including the small sample size, the flexible approach, and the importance of the context to draw conclusions. Qualitative research seeks to gather meaning from participants themselves rather than build a cause and effect model or create an analysis of the best-fit variables (Lapan 2012). Robert Yin defines case study research as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (1994, 18). A case study also presents itself as the best research design because of the small and specialized sample size. Quantitative research relies on large and representative samples to make valid inferences about the population, where as in qualitative research the researcher seeks to find “the most productive sample to answer the question” (Marshall 1996, 523). Qualitative research also “places more emphasis on the study of
phenomena from the perspective of insiders,” affording an in-depth analysis of causal claims (Lapan 2011, pg#).

I will assess the success of this organization through research gathered from individual, semi-structured interviews with members. The semi-structured interviews represent the flexibility inherent in qualitative research; because I will be interviewing people and observing them in their own environment, although there is little that can be controlled, external validity is heightened. Interviews will be the prime measure to draw conclusions about the success of MONDHA because success arguably defies quantification. The measure is subjective and depends on interpretations by others, namely members of MONDHA and the constituents that the organization helps.

Limitations of this study include my Spanish fluency level, mediation and translation from Creole, the duration of the study, and the single case study model. I have studied Spanish for eight consecutive years and would rate myself as fluent in speaking and writing, although there is always a possibility for misunderstandings due to accents and slang terms. Though this may be seen as a possible hindrance in my study, I am confident in my ability to present my questions in simpler language if the situation arises and was able to ask for clarification from my participants. MONDHA works mainly for Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent, therefore some of the Haitians that had not been in the country long or with lower levels of formal education, could not speak Spanish. This prompted the need for a translator to mediate responses from Spanish to Creole and back. While answers could have been lost in translation, there was no way to get around this unforeseen obstruction to some of the participant interviews, as I do not speak Creole. The duration of the study was just one week, but I believe data collection was not a problem because I researched one organization and there was a plan in place. Lastly, the
thesis is only studying one case, which can be seen as a limitation, although I believe there is still valuable information to be learned from just this single case; with each case study examined, a more comprehensive research arsenal is built with the hope that in the future better assessments can be made for social movements and their success.

**Field Notes and Reflections**

I conducted research from Sunday, November 22nd to Friday, November 27th. During that week, I studied the organization Movimiento por los Derechos Humanos, la Paz, y la Justicia Global (MONDHA). MONDHA is headquartered in Santiago in the Dominican Republic. The organization was born ten years ago in 1995. Although the “dominant logic [of case studies] assumes that the responding individual is willing to report his/her own thinking process,” I understand that I am still an outsider and some information may be withheld or presented in a certain bias (Woodside 2010, 2). This can also result from my privilege. I interviewed members of an organization that works to support some of the most marginalized and vulnerable people in the country. My privilege comes from my freedom to leave; after I am done with fieldwork, I can return to my life in the United States. My skin color may also warrant a stereotype of privilege as many Dominicans think that all Americans are wealthy. That being said, because I have been to the Dominican Republic before, I am familiar with the culture. I feel more comfortable navigating cultural situations because I have experienced them before and am familiar with cultural norms. I have also taken all the necessary precautions to protect the marginalized population in this study should I need them. All names of the participants are changed when addressed in the thesis and no identifying information was collected during fieldwork.
Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable in this study is success. Success is a variable that is difficult to quantify. There can be many objectives a social movement pursues in order to achieve success. Goals of a social movement can be to change policy, make an impact, inform people, or affect public discourse, and all of these can be considered successes. In this way, success is a gradient; there is not one marker that proves success has been reached. Success can be hard to quantify because it falls on a continuum. Some goals of a social movement could take up to decades to achieve. Even so, one small achievement can be considered a success on the road to the greater goal. Outcomes of social movements have been studied broadly, but one of the most widely known classifications comes from Gamson in 1990. His typology defines four possible outcomes to a movement - full response, preemption, co-optation, and collapse (Guigni 1998, 383). This definition accounts for all types of outcomes so in 1993, Rochon and Mazmanian clarified Gamson’s outcomes into just those of success. Their model explains three factors that can account for movement success. Two of these factors come directly from Gamson, “new advantages” and “acceptance.” They are relabeled “policy changes” and “changes in the policy process” respectively in Rochon and Mazmanian’s study. They also add a third factor “changing social values” (1993, 77). While success is a subjective term, many scholars agree that because social movements respond to political action and challenge political authority and institutions, success must inherently have a political characteristic, whether that is provoking political change, changing policy directly, or “a transformation of the political structure” (ibid, 384).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Question(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement structure</td>
<td>How many members does the organization have?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regularly attending members?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any full time (paid) or all volunteers?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The eight independent variables that will be researched in order to gauge their influence on the social movement, MONDHA, are movement structure, leadership, framing, symbolic representation, resources, transnational activism, political opportunity, and media coverage. Those factors and participant interviews will then be analyzed to explain the successes and limitations of MONDHA. Movement structure and leadership within the organization will be analyzed through a series of logistical questions such as the size of the group, the amount of regularly attending members, the presence of leadership roles and how these are assumed, and the frequency of general meetings by the entire organization. Together these questions will offer insights as to whether there is a hierarchical structure and glean information on the function of a leader in their organization.

The symbolic representation, resources, and media coverage of the group can be studied through questions about funding, presence of an emblem or figure that defines the group as a whole, and exposure of the group and its efforts through any form of media. Transnational activism will be assessed through the possible relationships MONDHA has with both domestic
and/or international organizations and the level of coordination it has between them. Intergroup meetings and communication will judge level of coordination between the two organizations. Political opportunity structures will be examined through a series of questions about the electoral climate of the country and the timing of Resolution 12 and MONDHA’s work in concurrence with the legislative bodies of the country. The manifestation of framing is one that is difficult to see through questioning and will rather be assessed holistically through the consistent language and attitudes of participants during their whole interview process, and in the media as well.

**Participants and Data Collection**

After receiving IRB approval, a contact previously made in the Dominican Republic helped gather participants in leadership positions in MONDHA to start the research. From there, I used a snowball sample, where prior participants named other members suited to interview. Snowball sampling is most effective when studying hidden populations. Heckathron describes hidden populations as ones that are “small relative to the general population, geographically dispersed, and when population membership involves stigma or the group has networks that are difficult for outsiders to penetrate” (2011, 356). MONDHA can be understood as a hidden group because the populations the movement seeks to help are marginalized and stigmatized in the country. They are also geographically marginalized, with many living on the outskirts of town. MONDHA had an office in the city-center, but I spent most of my time researching outside of the office at various communities throughout the Santiago city limits.

From the outset, MONDHA resembled a typical organization, but upon arrival to the site it was explained to me that MONDHA was more of a movement. Rafael, a regularly participating member, clarified that the organization moved around to promulgate the message of
human rights and justice. The movement works to obtain nationality rights for every marginalized population, but because the Haitian population is most affected, MONDHA frequently works with them. The physical movement is the act of bringing these populations the knowledge of their inherent rights (Interview with Rafael). The few members who work in the office sought out communities in need of their help and created webs of support in that manner, each community with its own leader and structure. Many times throughout the trip I was in these communities interviewing both leaders and general members of MONDHA. A total of 17 people participated, 5 males and 12 females. Of the 17 participants, only 5 held leadership positions.

Data collection can take place in two different realms, cultural as well as individual. In this thesis I use both. Data collection at the cultural level refers to the procurement of information on the community, or in this case, organization studied. This type of information can be gathered at community events such as meetings and festivals, or news articles written about the community/organization and through interviewing. I primarily use archival research, “which involves using secondary data or library source data to help understand the history of a study site” and interviews (Lapan 2011).

Research on the individual level seeks to determine the beliefs and the variations in experience of the respondents. Researchers primarily gather this information through interviews (ibid). I used a semi-structured interview protocol, which assumes a dynamic relationship between the interviewer and the participant, where other topics are able to develop and emerge and “respondents are encouraged to expand on a response, or digress” (Davies 2008, 95). The interview questions (Table 1) focused on the eight independent variables listed above (movement structure, leadership, framing, symbolic representation, resources, transnational activism, political opportunity, and media coverage) to discern whether MONDHA had the necessary
factors for success. An additional set of questions was used for participants interviewed that had been helped by MONDHA, which is displayed below in Table 2.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Question(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>Are you familiar with the organization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived help to community</td>
<td>How does MONDHA help this community?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived challenges faced by organization</td>
<td>What are the biggest obstacles faced by the organization?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>In your opinion, has MONDHA been successful?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How would you define success? What is success to you?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although some interview participants were members, the organization’s structure and definition considered people who sought out MONDHA’s help as members, even if they did not attend meetings or were not familiar with organizational logistics. Questions in Table 2 reflect my adjustment to that reality, focusing on the visibility of the organization within the community and the participants’ perceptions of success. Qualitative research “takes an emic perspective, [which is a focus] on learning and understanding the perspectives of local residents and experts” (Lapan 2011). The interviews, which I audiotaped and transcribed, lasted about 20 minutes each and resulted in 3.73 hours of audiotape and 26 single-spaced, typed pages. The two sets of interview questions offer insights into varying understandings of success, providing a contrast between success according to the literature and success according to the affected community, while also illustrating a difference in the usefulness of endogenous and exogenous factors in different stages of success.
Results

“La meta más importante del trabajo del MONDHA es legalizar todos los haitianos y trabajan en sentido común que todos los ciudadanos haitianos se ha respetado y se ha educado / The most important goal of MONDHA is to legalize all Haitians and work together so that all Haitian citizens are respected and educated.”

Interview with Flora

Success has a wide range of definitions as discussed previously in the Methods chapter. In the Dominican Republic, MONDHA was confronted with many challenges and success took on many forms. There were a lot of interim goals, such as distribution of human rights information, education, and procurement of work visas and an overall goal of policy change. The results section of this paper will align closely with the structure of the literature review. First will be a discussion of the goals and successes of MONDHA with a broad look at the independent factors the literature related to success. Next will be a more detailed dialogue of each factor with a discussion of their purpose in helping MONDHA achieve their stated interim goals and the absence of these same factors on the implications of policy change. The thesis first lists the endogenous factors Meyer details in his research in relation to their appearance in MONDHA, which are split into seven sections: movement structure, membership, leadership, symbolic representation, resource mobilization, and framing. The thesis will then look to analyze the exogenous factors of a social movement and their manifestation in MONDHA. These variables are political opportunity, transnational activism, and media coverage. Lastly, the results will be synthesized to illustrate the successes and limitations of MONDHA. I found that membership and structure had the most impact on the success of MONDHA’s interim goals, while the severe lack of political opportunity was the major impediment to policy change success, even with the absence of most of the other factors in MONDHA.
Goals and Success

Based on the criteria raised by the literature, MONDHA would be characterized as unsuccessful. The factors that social movement theory uses to explain success are weakly present, if at all, in MONDHA. Table 3 outlines the independent factors studied within MONDHA, which will later be explained in detail.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Manifestation in MONDHA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endogenous factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Informal, clustered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>No official leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Representation</td>
<td>Present, but hardly used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Little to none present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational activism</td>
<td>One theoretical partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political opportunity</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media coverage</td>
<td>Small presence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In spite of the lack of conventionally recognized success factors in the MONDHA movement, there was a slight alteration in policy. An amnesty policy passed on May 21, 2014 made it easier and allotted more time for Dominican children with Haitian migrants as parents to finish their paperwork to become legal citizens as long as they are already in the civil registry. Although this can be seen as a partial success because policy was affected, Resolution 12 was not revoked or fundamentally changed. Success is characterized by many factors under social movement theory, but my a priori assumption coming into this research project was that the threshold for successful was nothing short of the annulment of Resolution 12. After completing
fieldwork I realized “success” could be attained in the absence of total victory; helping the people rendered stateless by Resolution 12’s effects also constitutes success. Indeed, the members of MONDHA had no doubts about the success of their movement.

Members wholeheartedly believed the actions of MONDHA were successful. Of the 14 participants interviewed about the movement’s successes and limitations, 10 stated in their opinion MONDHA has been successful, 2 said no, and 2 did not have an answer corresponding to yes or no. Moreover, out of 9 participants asked that were helped by MONDHA, all 9 said organizations like MONDHA are important. MONDHA is effective because “MONDHA es como el ojo, como el abogado que nos ayuda, que nos defiende contra los maltratos/MONDHA watches over us, like our lawyer that helps us and protects us against the discrimination,” stated Lola, a member from a community group in the Santiago city limits (Interview with Lola/Interview 8).²

The interviews made clear that the organization helped a lot of migrant Haitians get papers. Papers could either mean identification documents, a visa, or passport. This confused me because they are in the country illegally. Rafael explained that the organization helped the parents get identification so their Dominican-born children could get registered. Before registering their kids, these Haitian parents will need to pass through immigration and when migrant Haitian parents have papers there will less likely be a problem securing identification for their children. Interviews with both Rafael and Jose outlined deportation problems as one of the main reasons MONDHA helps Haitians secure visas. MONDHA focuses on helping Haitians get papers because the government will often times deport one of the parents, which leaves one parent struggling to work and support her DR-born kids, frequently compelling that parent to

² Translation by author
return to Haiti with her children. In some rare cases, I learned about both parents being deported and the children staying in the house alone to be raised by an older sibling or a neighbor (Interviews with Jose and Rafael).

Besides migrant Haitians, and by consequence their children, many Dominican-born Haitians living marginally are affected by Resolution 12 and the sequential laws as well. This topic was mentioned earlier under political opportunity. Many of the affected Dominicans live in bateyes, a word originally meaning the “cement-block barracks” the Haitian sugarcane workers stayed in on the plantation that now symbolizes the poor communities where many still live (Wucker 1999). The workers came legally contracted by the Dominican government to the country to work in the sugarcane plantations in abundance during the Trujillo regime. Many workers stayed in the country to find continuing work in agriculture, starting families in the process. Due to the “turgid Dominican bureaucracy, difficult transportation, and ignorance of the importance of documents, most cane cutters do not register births with the authorities” (ibid). Generations continuing this practice have augmented the stateless population in the country. The affected still do not have paperwork because of the lack of proximity and access in conjunction with the new laws preventing it.

Another affected population is those who cannot read or write. The literacy rate in the Dominican Republic is 91.8 percent compared to Haiti’s 60.7 percent rate (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). Braceros, who are the Haitian farm hands that work on the sugar plantations, living in the batey are estimated to be even less likely to be able to read than the average Haitian (Wucker 1999). This presents a problem with obtaining paperwork – if the affected population cannot read or write they will not be able to start the forms necessary to procure documents. In an interview with Maria Jesus she explains that MONDHA is “la cabeza de nosotros que piensan
para nosotros, que trabaja para que nosotros tenga una mejor vida y sobrevivan en el país/MONDHA is the head that thinks for us, that works for us so we can have a better life and survive in this country” (Interview with Maria Jesus). Part of MONDHA’s success is attributed to the classes they provide to help Haitians and Dominicans learn to read and write.

Social movement theory exists in a grey area – to achieve success in this case, it is necessary to work towards the retribution of citizenship rights, but also to serve and promote the human rights of the stateless population in the interim. It was vital, and still is important, to help the Haitians navigate the systems in place hindering their access to citizenship. An interview with an active figure defined success as maintaining a good line of communication, participating in politics, and proposing new goals to be able to help and work for the affected community – especially those who do not have papers (Interview with Jose).

The success of MONDHA was not based solely on policy change, but on other goals such as advocating for people’s rights, spreading necessary information to the most marginalized populations, and helping Haitians and Dominicans alike in a case-by-case manner, whether that meant accompanying a Haitian to the consulate to get a passport or being a legal accessory for a Dominican who is pleading their case in court. These goals will further be analyzed as a more detailed look is given to the independent variables studied in this thesis.

Movement Structure

There is not one particular movement structure associated with the success of a social movement because movements often switch from model to model during the course of the movement’s lifetime or are a combination of more than one type. Literature affirms that many social movements take on either a bureaucratic or a decentralized form and while a centralized
form gives a movement tactical decision making power, decentralized movements have not
waned; therefore may be more effective than previously thought (Jenkins 1983).

MONDHA’s movement structure most closely represents the informal, clustered
structure outlined by Willems and Jergers. This structure seeks “overall and abstract goals that
are straightforward to identify with based on a emergence of collective identity” (2012, 72). The
collective identity exemplified in MONDHA was shaped from the creation of Resolution 12 and
Sentence 168-13. Both laws formed groups discriminated against based on ancestry. The deeply
entrenched divide that separates Dominicans from Dominicans of Haitian descent creates a
united front with common goals.

MONDHA has three offices, two in Santiago and one in Puerto Plata. This simply means
that there are buildings in all of these locations. Each office has its own president, vice president,
secretary, and portavoz. A portavoz is a representative and spokesperson for the office. The
movement then works as an outreach organization where members from the three offices seek
out areas in need of MONDHA’s help, which in turn create community bases each with its own
set of local leadership. Each outreach group has anywhere from 25-60 people actively involved
(Interview with Rafael).

This flat structure devoid of any serious bureaucratic constructions is adequate for
MONDHA. The lack of a centralized structure in no way inhibits the organization, but seems to
prove helpful. The grassroots type of structure gives MONDHA the ability to reach a wide
audience and send messages to marginalized populations in the countryside and because each
community base has local leadership, the relationships forged are more personal and carry more
weight. The structure can be one factor associated with the success of MONDHA. The lack of
bureaucratic structures eliminates unnecessary procedures and gives more freedom to the
movement to do what they think will work in each context. The absence of centralization also allows different sections of the movement to act independently with the shared goal in mind. Although this movement structure is well suited to MONDHA’s interim goals, the lack of a centralized structure seems to be a hindrance for policy change, as none has been seen since the aforementioned amnesty bill. This is because policy is made in the cities where legislative bodies and the elite members of the political system are located. A more formalized structure based out of MONDHA’s offices in the city would be the presence needed to influence and put pressure on the legislative bodies.

Membership

Membership becomes more important in the prediction of success in a social movement than the structure. Membership falls under mobilization strategies; membership in an organization is a resource, also known as human capital and mobilizing human capital is reflected in participation. Van Stekelenburg et al. explain that “formal organization membership emerges as a strong predictor of participation” and because social movements are contingent on participation, membership is a key factor in the success of a movement (2013, 205). Literature on mobilization does not clearly point to the number of members that affects the amount of success a movement has, but does support that not all members in a movement equally participate and it is important to note the difference between adherents and activists (McAdam 2001). Most literature mentions the necessity and presence of resource mobilization in social movements.

The total number of members of MONDHA is estimated at 3,300 and the majority is Haitian-born. As mentioned in the methodology section, this number represents people actively participating and/or community members that have been helped by the organization, but Rafael
explains in an interview that at a national level, there are many more participants, at least 9,200 have been affiliated with the movement at a basic level since 2010 (Interview with Rafael). These affiliates are from bateyes, Evangelical, Episcopalian, and Catholic churches, workers in construction and agriculture, and salespeople and shop owners (ibid). Members are not paid a regular salary. The movement has mini projects such as hiring lawyers to represent Dominican citizens who have been unfairly labeled as Haitian-born, helping Haitian residents get papers and identification, or simply holding writing classes for the Haitians migrants so they can begin applying for residency. The lead person in these projects might be paid for the few months the project is in existence, but that is the extent of retribution for serving in the movement (ibid).

A contributing factor to MONDHA’s success is their membership, which boasts a strong number of active participants and affiliates. A central mission of MONDHA is to provide information about civil and human rights to the marginalized Dominicans affected and try to help as many people they can on a case-to-case basis. Their ability to fulfill that mission is primarily based on the effort of their members. It may seem that a wealth of members will not add to social movement success unless members are predominantly lawyers or own forms of transportation, a dedicated base of people provides strength and legitimacy. Those factors are especially relevant for serving the population, which requires a grassroots membership to reach the rural areas and create a line of communication where there is not one. In the case of policy change, however, more prestigious and privileged membership would be an asset, since these members would have had access to the system. Prominent members would have been better able to navigate and make a change in the elitist political sphere.

**Leadership**
In addition to movement structure and membership, leadership constitutes an endogenous factors explaining social movement success. The literature on leadership’s influence on social movements is not as prevalent as literature on defining characteristics and types of leadership, but this is not to say leadership does not play an important role in the success of a social movement. Morris and Staggenborg defined leaders as “strategic decision-makers who inspire and organize others to participate in social movements” (2004, 171). As noted above, participation is important for success, therefore it would seem logical that some type of leader would be necessary for a social movement. This is because leaders coordinate efforts, organize meetings and protests, and mobilize the people within a movement.

There is no official leader of MONDHA. One member ostensibly in a leadership role remarked, “we have nothing similar to a boss here. I am not the boss! The only thing I am is an active person within the movement.” He further explained that there are around 540 national members of the organization that have influence, facilitate, and manage internal operations (Interview with Rafael). Besides having active membership, as stated above, there is an executive body consisting of a president, vice president, secretary, and portavoz in each community. While there is no leader, there seems to be a hierarchy within the community executive boards, with those in the city having more visibility and popularity. This was exemplified in an interview with Rosa, a member of MONDHA in the outer city limits of Santiago. While her branch did not operate in Santiago she was able to clearly remark that a major obstacle to the movement was the fact that the president of the Santiago branch was Haitian (Interview with Rosa).

The lack of a clear leader does not seem to hinder MONDHA in its pursuit of interim goals; its work helping community members on a case-by-case basis does not seem to necessitate
strong leadership. While I was in the Dominican Republic there was no event or protest that required coordinated communication from a leader. While leadership is often correlated with social movement success, MONDHA does not need a leader to coordinate efforts or manage the movement for the goals and actions it pursues. Rather, its leaderless approach facilitates broader participation while enhancing the responsiveness of the organization to its members’ needs. I therefore conclude that the lack of a centralized leader has not undermined the interim success of MONDHA. Lack of a strong leader may hinder the success for policy change because no organized attacks against the political system can be made, without coordination, a show of force is lost, weakening the objectives of the movement.

**Symbolic Representation**

Few studies have offered empirical evidence on the effect culturally resonant symbols have on the success of an organization. Symbols can help mobilization efforts when they are “culturally resonant” in order to create a spark and a sense of solidarity in people’s minds (Tarrow 1998). Literature often links symbols with the framing process (Pickerill 2009). Both are related to the way a movement perceives their cause and the way they want to display that cause to the general public.

While the use of culturally resonant symbols is widely recognized when present in social movements, current research lacks concrete evidence on the weight of their role in movement success. MONDHA’s symbol contains human hands cradling a dove, the world, and a scale with
the full name of the organization under it: “Movimiento Por Los Derechos Humanos, La Paz, y La Justicia Global.” The dove is a sign of peace and the scale a representation of justice, while the world represents the global spectrum, in which these ideas should operate. The photo above was taken from the wall of the Santiago office.

This symbol is not widely used but is meaningful to the members of the organization. Because it is not widely circulated, it seems to act as a gentle reminder of the values that MONDHA intends to uphold, but because its influence on the general movement is so small, I believe it has no bearing on the success on the interim goals of the movement or for policy change. Extant literature does not agree that symbolic representation is a necessary condition for success, so it seems as though this is not an important factor for MONDHA and also cannot be labeled as a limiting factor either.

**Resource Mobilization**

Although scholarly research acknowledges that success may be possible without ample resources, it is incontrovertible that more resources facilitate internal movement tasks such as operating costs and maintenance. McCarthy and Zald note that resources are an integral part of social conflict engagement and the aggregation of resources requires some organization (1977). Resource mobilization is linked to the structural logistics of a social movement, such as leadership, membership, and the configuration. The interconnectedness of these variables lends at least minimal importance to resource mobilization in social movement success.

MONDHA has virtually no capital. Depending on the community you volunteer from there may be a small fee to pay to become a member, but this money gets funneled back into the organization to help members get identification or to fund projects that the movement
implements. One member remarked that each member had to pay five pesos before each weekly meeting (Interview with Adela). There are no other funding sources associated with MONDHA. While MONDHA does not have financial resources, they do have human resources. There are many knowledgeable members working to spread information to the affected, marginalized populations.

Mobilization can be seen as a factor of success for MONDHA. While the movement does not have any financial resources, they are rich in human capital. The presence of human capital or members in the organization helps proliferate MONDHA’s goals and facilitates their assistance. MONDHA’s help is grounded in legal counsel, accessory to legal proceedings, and accompaniment to governmental institutions, such as an embassy or consulate. As stated by several interview participants, MONDHA’s success is largely substantiated by their ability to avail such legal and institutional assistance, which is made possible by their dedicated members. But resource mobilization can also be seen as a hindrance on interim success. Although MONDHA has achieved relative success operating on the little funding present within the movement, additional funding would make basic functioning tasks easier to accomplish, such as renting buses to bring families into the city to register their children in the civil registry.

**Framing**

Framing an issue is a way to present a specific pattern of interpretation. Framing gives a deeper meaning to the subject and works to resonate with identity or ideology or evoke emotions. Framing, depending on its purpose, often works for or against politics of identity. More specifically, “the politics of identity involves the complex production and naturalization of social hierarchies [while] identity politics refers to mobilizations by the marginalized to consent
imposed identities and unwarranted constraints on freedom” (Hawkesworth 2012, 117). The politics of identity in the Dominican Republic is shown through explicit state policies that marginalize people of Haitian descent, and results in persistent racist and discriminatory attitudes towards Haitians. Such discrimination has provoked the emergence of identity politics to fight against the marginalization of Haitian-descendant populations, in turn framing the citizenship issue through the lens of a lack of justice and hostile environment fostered by racial discrimination.

Although the racial discrimination felt by many Dominicans of Haitian descent and Haitians alike in the country constitutes a viable frame for the movement, its manifestation was sometimes difficult to perceive. Interviews with community members often shed light on racism and helped the frame become more apparent within MONDHA. MONDHA’s symbol also hints at the frame: it calls for universal human rights and global justice. As a rallying slogan, it would make sense that the movement’s members do not believe human rights and/or global justice has been achieved, which subtly plays at the notion of racial discrimination in the country.
LAPOP (2014)³ polled 1,520 Dominicans on the theme of discrimination in the country. As displayed in Chart 1, when asked if they believe discrimination is present, 17.8 percent strongly believed it was and 24.3 strongly believed it was not. These numbers are comparable, but what is surprising is the number of Dominicans who do not think discrimination is a problem in the country. This is because racism has been socialized and institutionalized in daily life and is often times seen as a norm. Chart 2 shows the attitudes of Dominicans about Haitian citizenship. Participants were asked whether they believe children of Haitian migrants have a right to citizenship or not, again the answers are almost evenly divided between strongly agree and strongly disagree.

Success, either interim or policy goals, cannot be attributed to framing because MONDHA’s frame is largely ignored in Dominican society. Even further, their frame can be seen as a limitation to success because it does not illicit the message the organization wants it to. Frames are used as a call to action, but if the frame does not spark the correct emotion in its audience the effect will be useless. Even as MONDHA frames their movement in a way that reveals the country’s harsh discriminatory realities, racial inequities have been socialized for decades and thus remain normalized; racialization has marked “certain children as inferior, foreign, or unassimilable from birth, [which] constitutes group membership in the very process of differentiation” (Hawkesworth 2012, 133). This makes the undoing of politics of identity, which directly relates to the citizenship bills in this case, an extreme challenge, one that will take the efforts of more than just one movement (such as MONDHA) and over the course of more than just a couple of years.

³ I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.
Transnational Activism

This section marks the transition from endogenous factors to exogenous factors, the first being transnational activism. Transnational activism is an advocacy network that supersedes the movement’s natural borders. Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are more likely to appear when the social movement is not given the chance to raise awareness or participate in campaigns because of blocked channels. This often happens in human rights cases. TANs, therefore, are most successful when non-state actors, such as a large group of people or an organization, need to bypass their own government in order to be heard (Keck et al 2014).

The citizenship issue in the Dominican Republic has seen international support from the European Union, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This support is described as moral leverage by Keck et al, meaning these organizations all tried to change government practices “by holding their behavior up to international scrutiny” (ibid, 201). While none of these organizations are in direct collaboration with MONDHA, they were all present in the country responding to the human rights violation in the wake of Resolution 12. MONDHA has one international partnership with a church in Massachusetts, but their relationship is more symbolic. Rafael, a MONDHA representative, states there is also a network of domestic organizations in the country collaborating together (Interview with Rafael).

It would seem that transnational activism would be vital in this movement because the government is not providing adequate channels for the resolution of the problem, but MONDHA has thus far not utilized such networks. Although MONDHA remains unconnected from TANs, international organizations were at work in the country. This, I argue, stems from the stated
primary, or interim, goals of MONDHA; there was not a great need for transnational advocacy because their mission was to spread information and individually help the affected populations. MONDHA representatives are better able to navigate the culture and be a present support for the marginalized in comparison to transnational actors. It is possible MONDHA, and the issue at large is just receiving international support and this support has not yet grown into a transnational network. In order to see sustainable change, the network needs to be established where there is equal communication between the domestic and the internationals organizations. In this way the transnational advocacy network becomes a local group working on an international front; there needs to be a desire on the international side to help advocate and support the local group on their terms as well as an effort from the local group to make concessions to the larger international group. So, it is also possible that the local organization, in this case MONDHA, is not seeking out international support.

**Political Opportunity**

Political opportunity is a dimension of the political environment that can either “enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization” (Meyer et al 2004, 1457). When the political opportunity structure (POS) is more open there exists a greater chance for movement emergence; conversely, closed POSs make it harder for a movement to mobilize and grow. Similarly, the degree of political alignments and the stability of the political elite in the country also provide contingencies on success. Political opportunity structures seem inherently political, but research on POSs also includes society-centered theories. This means that the political structure may support economic, gender, and/or race policies if the political actors perceive the change will broaden support for their position (McCammon 2001).
Political opportunity in the Dominican Republic is diminished because of the affected population. Many victims of Resolution 12 are sugarcane workers who live in bateyes. These workers were originally Haitian that were contracted to work in the Dominican Republic throughout the 20th century. Bateyes are typically rural and are some of the poorest areas in the Dominican Republic. These conditions combined are able to produce the extreme marginalization that affects the population living there. Members of bateyes normally do not have access to vote, mobilize, or rally support (Interview with Rafael). If constituents are not able to vote, there is no pressure put on the existing political system. When protests do occur they are often in front of the Junta Central Electoral, a government building that monitors elections. MONDHA takes advantage of emblematic dates, specifically December 10 (International Day for Human Rights) and December 18 (International Day for Migrants) to

![Chart 3](image)

**Confidence in the political parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence in the political parties</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
protest and rally in front of the Senate, embassies, and the President’s house as well (ibid).

The four main political parties in the Dominican Republic are the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the National Progressive Front, and the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC). The PLD has been the ruling party in the Dominican Republic since 2004 and currently holds the majority of seats in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies; congressional elections are held every four years (CIA World Factbook). The PLD also won the majority of the Congress in 2006 and 2010, with 22 or 31 seats respectively in the Senate and 96 or 101 in the Chamber of Deputies (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). Congress is the lawmaking body in the country where a simple majority connotes approval of a bill, so it can be inferred that the PLD majorities in both bodies of Congress did not hinder the ratification of Resolution 12 and Sentence 168-13.

Data from LAPOP (2014) suggest that Dominicans do not feel that the government is a main concern. Data from 1,520 respondents showed only 0.4 percent believed politicians were the biggest problem in the country. Although when we look at confidence in the political parties, 37 percent of respondents had no confidence. This finding is interesting because the Dominican Liberation Party has been in power for 12 years.

After analyzing data from the field and the previous data set, the current political opportunity structure is not propitious for MONDHA’s success in policy change. While the political atmosphere does not hinder interim goals from being carried out, it certainly impedes policy change from happening. The political climate is controlled by the PLD and has been since 2004 and while the population of the Dominican Republic has a lack of faith in their political parties, they do not perceive the government to be the biggest problem in the country. We can therefore conclude that the current climate does not offer much opportunity for mobilization and
completely destroys the hope for policy change because voting Dominican citizens do not see a need for a change in their government and, consequently, will not act as the catalyst to spur the changes that will bring about new policy.

**Media Coverage**

Media coverage is the last independent variable this thesis analyzes. While media coverage can provide another avenue to campaign and spread awareness, it is also unpredictable and its use in social movements can also hinder success. Catherine Corrigall-Brown states that while organizations can control the frames they use, “to some degree, SMOs are [also] at the mercy of media decision makers, especially television, newspaper, and Internet news editors, who select what to cover” (2016, 73).

In order to evaluate the role media played in MONDHA, further analysis on how the media portray the issue and the duration of the issue in the media is necessary. A member in the Santiago office could not elaborate on any specific instances of media coverage the group has had, but did say that there is national coverage on the issue and that issues covering immigrants and violations always garner attention in the press. The subject is widely presented in US news sites, but never in direct conjunction with MONDHA. MONDHA has a Facebook page and a website, but both contain very little information and neither is updated.

In the Dominican Republic, “ownership of TV channels, radio stations and newspapers is concentrated in a few economically or politically powerful hands” (BBC 2012). Due to this, many media outlets face political pressure to censor in order to protect the representations and interests of the elite. The Freedom of the Press score for the country is 42 on a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 being the most free and 100 being the least free. Freedom House estimates that around
“50 percent of the population used the Internet during 2014, and there were no reports of government restrictions on access” (Freedom House 2016). But this means there are still 50 percent of people who do not have access. This corresponds with the LAPOP data where 67 percent of respondents noted they did not have Internet in their homes, while contrastingly 94.5 percent responded to having a television in their home (2014). This suggests that many more people are receiving their news from the TV, rather than Internet news sources.

The lack of access to media outlets in the country for half the population combined with the large representation of state-owned media and MONDHA’s small presence on social media proves that media coverage is not the factor most prominent in helping MONDHA succeed in their member service. In addition, just this year the Freedom House adjusted the Dominican Republic’s overall freedom score from a 2 to a 3, which is a decline, because of the “decreased space for independent media” (ibid). Media outlets do not seem to have a large influence on MONDHA’s interim success. While a sizeable portion of Dominicans own a TV, news that is broadcasted through this media is censored by the powerful few who own it. This suggests that the TV is not a reliable source to obtain the relevant information Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent need. Even further, a MONDHA representative stated that violations against the affected population garner more attention in the press and due to the marginalized locations of most of the population access to newspapers is limited.

Conclusion

With the majority of participants acknowledging MONDHA’s success and the overwhelming unanimous support for organizations, we can conclude that MONDHA has enjoyed several successes. Of the factors social movement theory names as important,
membership and/or human resources and structure, both endogenous factors, proved to be the most influential in substantiating MONDHA’s success. This is because of the interim goals of the movement. Primarily, they sought to spread information to the least-connected members of society to advise them of their basic human rights. MONDHA also seeks to help people on a case-by-case basis. Both of these can be done with a dedicated base of members and a structure that allows the freedom to act in whatever way seems fitting for the system they are working in. Policy change was not something achieved by MONDHA during their protests up to date. It is possible that policy change is a success that takes longer to achieve than some of the interim goals of a social movement, but the lack of sweeping policy changes could also be due to the absence of a political opportunity in the Dominican Republic. There has been stagnation in the party system and an overall lack of enthusiasm for change in the government, as well as an entrenched, normalized system of racial discrimination against the Haitians. It is possible to conclude that some factors are better suited to help the achievement of interim goals, while some are more inherently apt to induce policy change.
**Conclusion**

“Major social movements eventually fade into the landscape not because they have been diminished but because they have become a permanent part of our perceptions and experience.”

*Freda Adler*

Social movement theory names eight factors that are present in most social movements, movement structure, leadership, symbolic representation, framing, transnational activism, political opportunity, media coverage, and resource mobilization, which is split into membership and resources in this thesis. The factors are divided into endogenous and exogenous factors. Success, the dependent variable in this thesis, is measured on two scales, interim and long-term goals. Interim goals for MONDHA included raising awareness in the public and supporting the affected population; social movement theory measures long-term success as a change in policy. Interim goals have been achieved within MONDHA, while policy change has not been implemented. Results of this thesis suggest that factors may at once help interim goals and hinder policy change (see Table 4).

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Manifestation in MONDHA</th>
<th>Helped interim goals</th>
<th>Hindered policy change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Endogenous factors</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Informal, clustered</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Large, rural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>No official leader</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Representation</td>
<td>Present, but hardly used</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Little to none present</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Exogenous factors</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational activism</td>
<td>One theoretical partnership</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political opportunity</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media coverage</td>
<td>Small presence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results suggest that half of the endogenous factors - structure, membership, and leadership - were influential in providing success for MONDHA’s interim goals, but hindered MONDHA’s overall goal of policy change. This dichotomy is attributed to the different populations each goal is focused on. MONDHA’s interim goals focused on the marginalized, rural populations by spreading awareness and administering help on a case-by-case basis. Policy change happens at the center of a political system and involves elite members within the system. Therefore, these factors and their manifestation in MONDHA were well suited to achieve interim success but could not transition into helpful indicators of policy change. The framing and resource factors hindered both interim goals and policy change. Framing could not help either goal because the frame did not resonate in the population. MONDHA framed their movement around the racial discrimination Dominicans of Haitian descent feel, but this discrimination is normalized in the country and therefore was not effective in mobilizing the general public. Resources were not able to facilitate interim success or policy change because the organization lacked the financial funds for basic operational tasks. Symbolic representation, the last endogenous factor, did not help or hinder either type of goal because it was effectively nonexistent. The symbol was present in the office, but otherwise was not used as a public symbol to represent MONDHA or their goals.

The exogenous factors neither directly helped nor hindered MONDHA achieve their interim goals. This can again be attributed to the targeted population and the specific goals reached. MONDHA’s interim goals were heavily based on grassroots mobilization to extend into the rural populations where a majority of the affected live. The exogenous factors therefore were less important to these tasks that met with little resistance. Conversely, the manifestation of most
of the exogenous factors in MONDHA did hinder policy change. In spite of a closed political structure, MONDHA was still able to spread awareness and support the affected population and therefore did not hinder intermediate goals from occurring. An unfavorable political opportunity structure made it impossible for the voices of MONDHA to be heard and the elite controlled media sources in addition to a lack of access to the Internet for the majority of Dominicans halted the spread of grievances to the general population. A present and fully functioning transnational advocacy network would have ideally helped achieve policy change by opening up another channel to pressure the government and even provide funding for some of MONDHA’s basic operational tasks in the interim stage, but MONDHA chose not to seek out these partnerships, perhaps because of the bureaucratic process inherent to obtain funding or their desire to serve the immediate needs of the public. Whatever the case, MONDHA showed it was possible to achieve the intermediate goals without a strong transnational advocacy network.

After discussing the results it is clear that no single factor has the power to predict success for a social movement. This thesis mostly supports the finding that, for MONDHA, endogenous factors were most helpful for achieving interim success and exogenous factors hindered policy change. It is often the context and the specific goals that differentiate the factors that will become successful for an organization; the factors of importance shift as the goal does.

This study could benefit from several modifications, as well as further research. Results could have been improved first with more time in the field in the short term. Research collection for this thesis lasted one week and could only benefit from more time spent in the Dominican Republic interviewing members and the affected population, and spending a longer time observing the movement and its day-to-day actions. Subsequent research would also gain from a long-term study in the Dominican Republic. Policy change is the final stage of success and
therefore would be completed after the interim goals were met or at least, addressed. Long-term research would be able to monitor the political landscape and transnational advocacy networks in order to assess if the exogenous factors better service policy change, as I would hypothesize. Furthermore, a longer period spent researching would open up the possibility to study other social movements in the country fighting against Resolution 12, as well as other social movements around the globe.

An NPR program published on June 26, 2015 entitled, “Black Lives Matter Movement Transcends Borders” broadcasts the solidarity felt by the US based Black Lives Matter campaign towards the social movements protesting Resolution 12 and the greater issue of racial discrimination in the Dominican Republic (Alonso 2015). Activists “marched in protest of what they believe is the decades-long mistreatment of dark-skinned people” in the Dominican Republic and brought attention to what they thought was inherently the same fight playing out in both the DR and the United States, that black lives matter (ibid). This protest has the potential to open up other media outlets to further advocate for the Dominicans of Haitian descent and cultivate transnational advocacy networks due to the high amount of attention the Black Lives Matter campaign garners in the US. A further comparison between these two movements could add an interesting layer in regards to the racial aspects of both.

Both movements are protesting on a racial discrimination frame and similar in both movements, the frame faces cultural challenges. In both the Dominican Republic and the United States there are entrenched racial hierarchies. This makes it hard for the frame to inspire and mobilize people in the mainstream to the cause. Black Lives Matter has a bigger presence on social media than MONDHA, with an informative website, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Tumblr, and email. Black Lives Matter campaigns have also warranted news coverage, which
began with the shooting of Trayvon Martin and subsequent trial of George Zimmerman, but boomed after the trial of Darren Wilson, the police officer who shot and killed Michael Brown. The phrase “black lives matter” caught on to pop culture during this time. The phrase was referenced in TV shows *Law and Order* and *Empire*, was used by Hillary Clinton at a human rights gala, and was named as “word” of the year in January 2015 by the American Dialect Society (Black Lives Matter). Membership between the two organizations seems comparable although Black Lives Matter has three official founders, Patrisse Cullors, Opal Tometi, and Alicia Garza. These women represent the leaders of the movement while still seeking to keep a decentralized structure (ibid). This is another commonality Black Lives Matter has with MONDHA; the decentralized structure allows for a wider audience to be reached. One major difference between the two movements is their respective political opportunities.

Black Lives Matter operates in a democratic country where civil liberties and political rights are respected and while the Dominican Republic is also a democracy, the country has recently been lowered to “partly free” in Freedom House’s *Freedom of the World* data (2016). Black Lives Matter was also protesting throughout the term of the United States’ first African American president and is continuing to protest during an election year. This gives them a better platform to raise concern and mobilize the affected population to engage in social action and to pursue their long-term goal to leverage opportunity in the country. This represents an important difference between the two political opportunity structures; affected populations in Black Lives Matters have the right to vote in elections, members of MONDHA cannot. Black Lives Matter exhibits interim goals the same way MONDHA does. As outlined on the movement website, Black Lives Matter is a “forum intended to build connections between Black people and our allies to fight anti-Black racism, to spark dialogue among Black people, and to facilitate the
types of connections necessary to encourage social action and engagement” (Black Lives Matter).

Better research on social movements and the factors that help success could make social movements more effective in the future. This is especially true for how the factors interact with each other. It will become increasingly important to do a meta-analysis on social movement theory case studies. By comparing research and findings from many different case studies, we can enhance our understanding of what factors are most helpful for specific populations and their specific contexts. This thesis, while still only studying one case, highlights the importance of the salience of certain factors in specific cases. Some factors were helpful in achieving interim goals, but ultimately hindered policy change. Understanding the interplay between factors for a wide variety of social movements will help to make these movements more successful in the future.
Bibliography


