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In the Name of Humanity

Eddie Banks

The "Ca'd'oro"

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Table 3: Victim Assistance Planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Funding 2002</th>
<th>Budget 2003</th>
<th>Mobilised</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Implementing the victim assistance strategy</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Developing sector's victim assistance strategy</td>
<td>$300</td>
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<td>$300</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Training 800/200 limb amputees per year, including three sighted assistant therapists</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Providing raw materials to the Tirana Orthopaedic Centre with €200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Training 400/100 limb amputees In Albania with €200,000 support</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Training the orthopaedic assistants in Albania in all surgical specialties (patients and osteopathy) over 3 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Training 500/100 limb amputees in technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Providing raw materials to assist in victim integration, basically helping long-term beneficiaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Training 500/100 limb amputees in microfinance</td>
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<td>10. Conducting economic rehabilitation of victims</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Mobilising $10,000</td>
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<td>12. Providing microfinance to assist in victim integration, basically helping long-term beneficiaries</td>
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<td>13. Conducting economic rehabilitation of victims</td>
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<td>14. Mobilising $5,000</td>
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</table>

Rehabilitation Institute with IFF assistance. The funds received were assisted by the ICRC to set up small enterprises. Several laws now afford the disabled social privileges. The Albanian monthly disability pension was recently increased. A broad integrated victim assistance strategy was adopted in Albania. The goal of this strategy is to build a sustainable Albanian mine action capacity by 2005. Its objectives are to achieve a level of victim assistance to provide broader legal and moral obligations. By removing the cause of the landmine threat quickly, other aspects of humanity and organisational development such as reparation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation, can proceed unpinned in areas that were suspected of, or contained hazardous material. Therefore, the essential requirements of speed, safety, quality and effectiveness are provided by the international community. The financial support, such as En titley Civil and military personnel in humanitarian and political and structural elements of the mine action programme, and proposed a more comprehensive victim assistance strategy.

In the Name of Humanity

The continued suffering inflicted by landmines and UXO must be eliminated in the shortest possible time, period. Indeed, the international community acknowledges that obligation. The Ottawa Treaty, Dayton Peace Agreement and the London and Bonn Peace Implementation Conferences all form legal obligations addressing mine action that BH has formally agreed to. BH was the Balkan country to destroy its entire stockpile of AP mines, with the exception of a few mines for training and research and development (R&D), allowed within the terms of the Ottawa Convention.

Underpinning the obligation to eliminate landmines is the financial support provided by the donor community to also make a significant contribution towards the elimination of forces and mechanisms that have already been cleared. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a strategic framework to ensure that the funds allocated for mine action, both internationally and nationally, are utilised in a balanced manner, integrating international objectives with the institutional support required for the implementation of the programme.

The main goal of victim assistance planning from 2003 is to establish an Albanian capacity by 2005. (see Table 3).

Transition Strategy

The Albanian government will assume full responsibility of its mine action programme by the end of 2005. After 2005, there will be a reduced mine action programme allowing for a leaner structure with only low-impact forces left to demine. An Albanian capacity for demining and victim assistance will be fully established by 2005; the MRE and victim assistance initiatives will mostly have been reached, and a solid resource mobilisation base will have been established.

Funding

Previous and current donors include the UNDP-EU, DFID, FTE, ICRC, and the Canadian, Danish, German, Swiss, Turkish and US governments. In June 2002, the EU reached a consensus to fund mine action in Albania "as far as possible" through the CARDS programme (Integrated Border Management Project). Of the $5.068 million budget for 2003, $4.49 million has already been funded, leaving a shortfall of $0.578 million. The total budget for 2003-2005 is $15.000.

Conclusions

There is a significant mine and UXO threat in northern Albania, but there is also an increased awareness and commitment to solving the problem. The year 2002 was the turning point for the Albanian mine action programme, and 2003 will be crucial. Albania can now set the pace in the region on issues such as stockpile destruction. The focus this year will be on accurately determining the extent of the mine and UXO problem and initiating the transition strategy to realise the strategic objective of making Albania free from mines and UXO by 2005.
analysed. It was also recognized that commercial organisations include all aspects in their costs, including profit margins, while NGOs could utilise multiple donations for the same project and might have equities donated, and/or replenished, through additional donations, thus considerably reducing operational costs. As a result, though NGOs do not make a profit, it could be reasonably expected that their costs should be considerably less than those of their commercial counterparts. The study results demonstrated that this was not the case.

### Selection of Implementing Groups

A number of performance-related exercises were undertaken that highlighted marked differences between various types of organisations, but also noticeable similarities between organisations. The study team grouped similar organisations together and identified them as Commercial, NGO (both international and national), National NGO (NNGO), Civil Protection and Emergency Armies. The individual organisations are self-explanatory, but the use of two types of NGOs should be explained. In late 1998, the Commission for Demining established the three bi-national NGOs, representing the different ethnic groups in BiH. They were initially supported by the USAID and the International Trust Fund (ITF). They were established to be non-profit but commercially oriented; in other words, they were expected to be both productive and cost-effective. Their results proved conclusively that NGOs can be as efficient, productive and effective as commercial organisations, but at a lower cost per square meter, if they are properly managed.

### Funding

While the funding problems of the BiH programme (1997-1999) are well known, the allegations of corruption by the BiH Commission for Demining, it is sufficient to note that even in instances of clear recognition of support for the INGOs, the evidence of corrupt action or improper use of power has been produced. However, the effects of the continuous reference to current and past members of the international community caused donors to take independent action that affected the structural components of the national programme, delaying and in many cases denying donations that had been planned to be utilised in BiH. The impact of these allegations on the BiH programme was substantial. The programme was restructured, integrated and extremely negative. The results of the allegations can be clearly seen on the chart.

![Chart: Analysis of the BiH Programme from March 2003.](http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol7/iss2/19)

The allegations against the BiH Commission for Demining were first circulated in early 1999, and the impact on commercial demining is almost immediately evident. Indeed the commercial tasks, being undertaken at considerably lower costs than the non-commercial tasks, gradually fell from 312 tasks in 1998 to 108 in 2002. The non-commercial tasks increased to 177 in 1999 and 221 in 2000 and 163 in 2001 and 215 in 2002. After an increase in financial support and with more than double the commercial workforce, a considerable increase in output should have taken place—no decrease.

Other factors can also enhance efficiency. For instance, inadequate understanding of prioritisation criteria, especially by project procurement and fund managers, were in the optimum period for work being missed. This is particularly apparent in late 1997, 1998 and early 1999, when commercial funding was at its highest, yet the majority of commercial tasks were started in the worst period for effective demining. The total of all tasks started in this five-month period (1996-2002) was 1,067 while in the most favourable months, (March and April, October and November) only 726 tasks were initiated, and therefore there was formal evidence of the more time-consuming and costly method of manual and mechanical demining.

### Analysis of Data: Effort

Commercial and NNGO organisations do not employ staff if there is no work, and therefore any contract does not have more than a few tasks. Non-commercial organisations on the other hand, tend to retain their staff for the complete year. This means that holidays are part of their contractual obligations. In addition, if there is not a work plan (moving teams from one site to the next without a downtime) they encounter additional delays with no impact on the square meters cleared.

Most commercial and NNGOs tend to use an eight-man team, including the team leader and medical orderly; increasing and decreasing the number of deminers when necessary. In 1997 and 1998, the United Nations had teams of 20 per site, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had teams of 30 and the Army Engineers usually had teams of ten. These numbers were estimated as follows: the most productive and effective the respective demining teams were. A table of the square meters cleared, tasks completed and days to complete the tasks is detailed in Table 1.

### Results of the Analysis of Data: Mines Destroyed, Land Cleared and Tasks Undertaken

Analysis of the mine data (both APM and AT mines) revealed that a number of cases matched the expected pattern with the number of mines, but the number varied. The overall clearance rate was a major indicator of the efficiency of the various methods from a time, effort and cost basis. The results illustrated that the manual and manual/machine methods were the most costly and time consuming, while the manual/EDD/machine methods were the most productive and effective as commercial organisations. The results of the allegations on the BiH programme were clearly evident. Indeed the number of tasks started were considerably less than those of their commercial counterparts.

### Analysis of Data: Methods

A separate study was also undertaken to assess the most effective methods from a cost, time and effort perspective. While the commercial organisations and the NNGOs utilised the most productive methods, the non-commercial ones were demonstrating that their implementation, where a firm understanding of the more time-consuming and costly method of manual and mechanical demining.

### Analysis of Data: Results

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![Table: Number of tasks, tasks, days and average daily performances.](http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol7/iss2/19)
Landmines in Europe & the Caucasus

The management of an integrated policy requires experience, knowledge of the assets and a sound, business-like approach to their utilization. What became evident was that while assets have been introduced by the non-commercial organizations over a long period of time, productivity has not noticeably increased. While commercial companies offer capital costs by improved productivity; donors provide non-commercial organizations with EDDs and machines but do not demand an increase in productivity and effectiveness. Therefore, there is no incentive for the non-commercial organizations to offer the cost. If assets are poorly managed, rather than having benefits (in terms of improved safety and/or quality or a greater output) organisations merely have a greater capital outlay. In effect, donors who provide additional resources such as machines and EDDs, but do not demand an increase in output, simply condemn inefficiency.

An analysis of the NGO data for 2002 illustrated that several new organisations were established. Increased production was found to be a result of the commercial-style management of these organisations. In one case, a commercial company was also the owner of the NGO. In a number of other cases, the non-commercial organisations utilised commercial companies’ machinery and/or the supply of machines or EDDs. This prompts the question of what is the difference, from an effectiveness perspective, between an NGO and a commercial organisation? Both are undertaking mine action activities and both are, therefore, conducting humanitarian work to humanitarian standards. Any humanitarian activity should also require that work be conducted in an efficient and effective manner. The principle difference in one works for profit and the other does not. In the case of organisations that have no experience, no equipment and no manpower, but still use highly productive sub-contractors to work on their behalf, it also raises the question of what is the result of the donation and how it is used. In short, successfully pass a technical contract assessment and presumably undertake other more established organisations.

The cost to the donor or client of commercial demining in BiH, on a range of terrains, site difficulties and various methods, fell from an average of more than KM 4.16 ($2.08 U.S. per sq m in 1996-1997) to an average of KM 1.37 ($0.64) in 2002. The average price over the six-year period was KM 3.60 ($1.80) per sq m. The NGOs, also operating in a variety of areas and site conditions and using different methods, achieved a price of around KM 2.50 ($1.25) per sq m. The average commercial costs from 1998 were under KM 4.00 per sq m. From 2001 to 2002, commercial companies averaged less than KM 3.10 per sq m. The results illustrate that, if the commercial companies had conducted all of the demining, the total costs could have been greatly increased. The study was able to assess the actual costs for a number of organisations, and by so doing estimated how much land could have been cleared using the estimated funds donated by national authorities. Based on a commercial/NGO surplus, and using an assessment of their salary and associated insurance costs (each group was different) the costs per meter square range from $2.81 to as low as $2.10. While the figures show a considerable difference between the commercial/NGO and the non-commercial organisations, it should be noted that these figures do not include the so-called "missing" data. In other words, the costs per meter square of the Civil Protection and Enemy Armies. The facts are that the NGO organisations, working for no profit, in a

A minimum of 160 km ($ or as high as KM 210 million) has been used by the non-commercial groups. In addition to lower costs, the commercial/NGO option would have considerably reduced the time taken to complete the tasks, a factor deemed to be just as important. It is even more so, thus the reduction in costs.

What BiH Demining Could Have Achieved (Based on Available Finance and Known Costs)

If the non-commercial organisations had utilised the same funds as provided for commercial organisations and NGNs, then the amount of funds for which the cost could have been greatly increased. The study was able to assess the actual costs for a number of organisations, and by so doing estimated how much land could have been cleared using the estimated funds donated by national authorities. Based on a commercial/NGO surplus, and using an assessment of their salary and associated insurance costs (each group was different) the costs per meter square range from $2.81 to as low as $2.10. While the figures show a considerable difference between the commercial/NGO and the non-commercial organisations, it should be noted that these figures do not include the so-called "missing" data. In other words, the costs per meter square of the Civil Protection and Enemy Armies. The facts are that the NGO organisations, working for no profit, in a

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similar environment, could have cleared 57 million more sq meters for the same amount of money, as opposed to the 11.4 million sq meters that was achieved—an increase of 15.6 million sq meters or 400 percent. The estimate of possible achievement brings together a number of other aspects to funding, the importance of timely method and costs illustrated the importance, not just of time and site selection, but also the selection of the most effective method. In order to work effectively throughout the year, many decisions about where, when and how to work need to be made. Realistically, it will not always be possible to achieve the ideal effectiveness optimization. The study proved that at present, many of the critical elements for achieving effectiveness are not even considered. The facts are that:

- Many donations are not made available in time to achieve the most effective results.
- Site selection, based on the best conditions to achieve effective denuding, is rarely considered.
- Commercial and NNGOs completed more sq meter/KM ($) than the non-commercial with fewer personnel.
- Commercial and NNGOs have completed more tasks/KM ($) than the non-commercial.
- Commercial and NNGOs have destroyed more mines/KM ($) than the non-commercial.
- The average cost per sq meter under-taken by the non-commercial groups is at least five times higher than the average cost per sq meter of the commercial/NNGOs groups.
- The commercial/NNGOs work more hours per day and more days per month than the non-commercial sector.
- Many donors stated that they are “not interested” in their donation being utilised more effectively.
- In BIH, political, institutional and personal views have had a negative impact on the effective use of donations and political and institutional objectives have delayed the effective creation of a sustainable national capacity.
- Donors are supporting more projects that have little or no effect on improving productivity, cost effectiveness or the removal of the cause.
- While annual output has remained at around 6 to 6.7 million sq meters, the number of tasks and mines destroyed has gradually decreased since 2000.

The study attempted to review every aspect of the demining process, comparing organisation types and their individual and collective denuding effort. It also reviewed a number of other aspects that have an influence on effectiveness, such as the need for a balanced response to funding, the importance of timely donations and the selection of the most suitable ground conditions. In addition, an example of the time varying time, effort method and costs illustrated the importance, not just of time and site selection, but also the selection of the most effective method. In order to work effectively throughout the year, many decisions about where, when and how to work need to be made. Realistically, it will not always be possible to achieve the ideal effectiveness optimization. The study proved that at present, many of the critical elements for achieving effectiveness are not even considered. The facts are that:

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- While annual output has remained at around 6 to 6.7 million sq meters, the number of tasks and mines destroyed has gradually decreased since 2000. Technically, the survey and the increased number of deminers since 1999 should have dramatically increased the sq meters cleared and number of tasks completed. The lack of a balanced, business-like approach that addresses safety, productivity and effectiveness, at international, national and organisational levels, as well as at the national mine action programme level, is obvious. The lack of that balanced approach, coupled with a lack of effective management of those responsible for implementing donations unnecessarily, prolongs the suffering of affected populations. Yet, we still obtain those donations “in the name of humanit­ity.” If we are truly humanitarian we need to focus more on removing the threat of landmines as quickly and as safely as possible so that affected countries can begin the long process of post-conflict recovery.

It should also be emphasised that with properly prioritised site selection the possible increase could have been as high as 25 percent more than indicated. In other words, for a cost of KM 342 millions, an estimated output of 116.9 million sq meters could have arguably been achieved.

Summary

The study attempted to review every aspect of the demining process, comparing organisation types and their individual and collective denuding effort. It also reviewed a number of other aspects that have an influence on effectiveness, such as the need for a balanced response to funding, the importance of timely donations and the selection of the most suitable ground conditions. In addition, an example of the time varying time, effort method and costs illustrated the importance, not just of time and site selection, but also the selection of the most effective method. In order to work effectively throughout the year, many decisions about where, when and how to work need to be made. Realistically, it will not always be possible to achieve the ideal effectiveness optimization. The study proved that at present, many of the critical elements for achieving effectiveness are not even considered. The facts are that:

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In order to view the full study, check out www.eandii.com.

*All graphics courtesy of the authors.*

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From Kosovo to Afghanistan, Cluster Bombs Again

Cluster bombs have created problems in several countries, as they are one of the many unexploded hazards often left behind after a conflict. This article gives an overview of the threat and shows how the organization Interoses has been working to help clear up the problem.

by Fernando Terrentini, Interoses

Background

Cluster bomb units (CBUs) are well known from the Gulf War to post-Dayton Bosnia, but they were completely forgotten by the Ottawa Treaty, which didn’t recognize them as APLs. In Kosovo and in Afghanistan, they have proven to be more dangerous than APLs.

Cluster bombs are UXO that became well known in Italy when some fishermen found them in their nets in the Adriatic Sea. Apart from the fishermen, whose security was threatened, nobody at that time spoke out in Italy about the future danger: hundreds of these UXO would spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory, killing and injuring people, mostly children. In fact, CBUs don’t have self-destructing device that disables them if they do not explode, so they remain as a long-lasting danger: hundreds of these UXO would spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory, killing and injuring people, mostly children. In fact, CBUs don’t have self-destructing device that disables them if they do not explode, so they remain as a long-lasting
civilian.

Modern CBU models are BL-7 and BL-755, made in the United States, and MK-41, made in the United Kingdom. They are the “elder sisters” of the weapons used in Kuwait and of the KB-1 used by Soviet and Muslim Bosnian people during the Balkan Wars. CBUs differ from APLs in their appearance, the former being more colourful and intriguing, so that they can trigger people’s curiosity. An APL is basically a defensive ordnance with a

locally target, while a CBU is an offensive ordnance with a wide-area target. CBUs are real unexploded traps with more explosive capacity than APLs, as an APL can kill at a range of 50 m, while a CBU can be fatal at a range of 150 m.

In fact, CBUs are dropped during air raids in dispensers with a capacity of more than 200 bombs each, landing randomly on the ground. When they do not explode, they hide in the grass or under the ground, up to 50 cm deep, so that nobody can really tell where they are. In principle, APLs should be mapped, making their identification, marking and clearance easier and allowing civilians to avoid them. CBU impact areas, instead, are very wide targets, difficult to identify and map before systematic surveys and clearances are carried out. They can be identified starting from their drop point, if known, or by tracing them on the ground in a sequence.

CBUs in Kosovo

In those days, we knew exactly where 90 percent of Kosovo’s mines were, because the Serbs buried over the maps of registered mined areas to the international community. But we didn’t know with the same accuracy where CBUs had been dropped. In fact, we had little news on Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates of dropping points, which made it virtually impossible to fix the aerial-dropped area and quantify the real problem.

Immediately, the international community launched an appeal to quickly