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From Kosovo to Afghanistan, Cluster Bombs Again

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similar environment, could potentially have cleared 57 million more sq meters for the same amount of money, as opposed to the 11.4 million sq meters that was achieved. A ten-million increase in 15.6 million sq meters or 400 percent. The estimate of possible achievement brings together a combination of factors, and illustrates the importance of the demining process, comparing organisation types and their impact on the effective use of donations. It should also be emphasised that with considerably more clearance could have been achieved had more emphasis been placed on the effective use of donations. This should also be emphasised that with comparatively little prioritised site selection the possible increase could have been achieved as high as 25 percent more than indicated. In other words, for a cost of KM 242 million, an estimated output of 116.9 million sq meters could have arguably been achieved.

**Summary**

The study attempted to review every aspect of the demining process, comparing organisation types and their individual and collective demining efforts. It also reviewed a number of other aspects that have an influence on effectiveness, such as the need for a balanced response to funding, the importance of timely donations and the selection of the most suitable ground conditions. In addition, an example the time taken, the demining method and costs illustrated the importance, not just of time and site selection, but also the selection of the most effective method. In order to work effectively throughout the year, many decisions about where, when and how to work need to be made. Realistically, it is not always possible to achieve the ideal effectiveness. The study proved that at present, many of the critical elements for achieving effectiveness are not even considered. The facts are that:

- Many donations are not made available in time to achieve the most effective results.
- Site selection, based on the best conditions to achieve effective clearing, is rarely considered.
- Commercial/NNGOs completed more sq meter/KM ($) than the non-commercial with fewer personnel.
- Commercial and NNGOs have completed more tasks/KM ($) than the non-commercial.
- Commercial and NNGOs have destroyed more mines/KM ($) than the non-commercial.
- The average cost per sq meter undertaken by the non-commercial groups is at least five times higher than the average cost per sq meter of the commercial/NNGOs groups.
- The commercial/NNGOs的工作 more hours per day and more days per month than the non-commercial sector.
- Many donors stated that they are “not interested” in their donation being utilised more effectively.
- In BHI, political, institutional and personal views have had a negative impact on the effective use of donations. Political and international objectives have delayed the effective creation of a sustainable national capacity.
- Donors are supporting more projects that have little or no effect on improving productivity, cost effectiveness or the removal of the cause.
- While annual output has remained at around 6 to 6.7 million sq meters, the number of tasks and mines destroyed has gradually decreased since 2000; yet, technical survey and the increased number of deminers since 1999 should have dramatically increased the sq meters cleared and number of tasks completed.

The lack of a balanced, business-like approach that addresses safety, quality, productivity and effectiveness, at international, institutional and organisational levels, as well as at the national mine action programme level, is obvious. The lack of that balanced approach, coupled with a lack of management, has been responsible for implementing donations unnecessarily, prolonging the suffering of affected populations. Yet, we still obtain the same amount of money, as opposed to the 11.4 million sq meters that was achieved.

In order to view the full study, check out www.candi.com.

*All graphics courtesy of the author.

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From Kosovo to Afghanistan, Cluster Bombs Again

Cluster bombs have created problems in several countries, as they are one of the many unexploded hazards often left behind after a conflict. This article gives an overview of the threat and shows how the intervention interests has been working to help clear up the problem.

by Fernando Termentini, Intersos

**Background**

Cluster bomb units (CBUs) are well known from the Gulf War to post- Dayton Bosnia, but they were completely forgotten by the Ottawa Treaty, which didn’t recognise them in APLs. In Kosovo and in Afghanistan, we have proven to be more dangerous than APLs.

Cluster bombs are UXO that became known in Italy when some fishermen found them in their nets in the Adriatic Sea. Apart from the fishermen, whose security was threatened, nobody at that time spoke out in Italy about the future danger: hundreds of these UXO would spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory, killing and injuring people, mostly children. In fact, CBUs don’t have a self-destructing device that disables them if they do not explode, so they remain as a long-lasting danger for civilians, and they can explode with a slight touch or upon removal.

Moreover, CBUs differ from APLs in their appearance, the former being more colourful and intriguing, so that they can trigger people’s curiosity. An APL is basically a defensive ordnance with a local target, while a CBU is an offensive ordnance with a wide-area target. CBUs are real unexploded traps with much more explosive capacity than APLs, as an APL can kill in a range of 50 m, while a CBU can be fatal at a range of 150 m. In fact, CBUs are dropped during air raids in dispensers with a capacity of more than 200 bombs each, landing randomly on the ground. When they do not explode, they hide in the grass or under the ground, up to 50 cm deep, so that nobody can really tell where they are. In principle, APLs should be mapped, making their identification, marking and clearance easier and allowing civilians to avoid them. CBUs impact areas, instead, are very wide targets, difficult to identify and map before systematic surveys and clearance are carried out. They can be identified starting from their drop point, if known, or by tracing them on the ground in a sequence.

In those days, we knew exactly where 90 percent of Kosovo’s mines were, because the Serbs handed over the maps of registered mined areas to the international community. But we didn’t know with the same accuracy where CBUs had been dropped. In fact, we had little news of Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) coordinates of dropping points, which makes it virtually impossible to fix the area involved and quantify the real problem.

Immediately, the international community launched an appeal to quickly...
The U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program in Iraq

The United States government has developed a wide-ranging plan to build an indigenous mine action capability within Iraq. The plan will help rid Iraq of the threat of landmines and UXO so that the country can focus on rebuilding its society.

### CBUs in Other Countries

The threat of CBUs in the Balkans is not only a problem in Kosovo. In the Republic of Serbia, for example, UXO remain everywhere—even in public gardens—at the Interims Mine Action Unit's experts pointed out in June 2001 after an accurate assessment of the territory to define the magnitude of the problem. In Afghanistan, we found a rate as high as 50 percent in some case. It is to be mentioned that, prior to the Coalition Forces Military Campaign, battle area clearance (BAC) operations in Afghanistan were mainly conducted by surface clearing. The widespread use of CBUs during the air campaign and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Area Mined (in sq m)</th>
<th>Total number of CBUs dropped</th>
<th>Percent of the area cleared</th>
<th>Number of unexploded CBUs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karotı</td>
<td>363,500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-864 (60 percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosazajee</td>
<td>248,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>513 (43 percent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All figures courtesy of the author.

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### The Landmine/UXO Problem

Iraq has been the victim of violent conflict throughout its history, which, in recent years, has left the land plagued with landmines and UXO, disrupting the social, economic and environmental development of the country. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), an estimated 10-15 million landmines were deployed in Iraq, dating from conflicts as far back as World War II, with the majority of the landmines laid during the Iran/Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. International observers consider that landmines present a clear risk in Iraq, but a more significant threat is posed by UXO. The United Nations Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported in 2001 that UXO from previous conflicts have constituted the major humanitarian threat for the past several years in northern Iraq, along the border with Iran, as well as a throughout central and southern Iraq. The problem is now exacerbated by the widespread presence of abandoned munitions and unexploded remnants from the most recent conflicts. With the cessation of hostilities, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) set up procedures to identify minefield locations throughout Iraq. Over 2,500 minefields, 2,200 UXO sub-minefields and thousands of abandoned munitions sites have been identified, and more are found on a daily basis, USCENTCOM has also established mechanisms to transfer information to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) about the minefield and UXO locations as part of the effort to clear the land of these silent threats. Prior to OIF, the landmine/UXO problem was well-documented in northern Iraq only; thanks to a survey conducted by the United Nations. It was in the north that the only substantial mine action efforts took place, consisting of landmine/UXO clearance and mine risk education (MRE). The iraqi government, however, took a dim view of mine action in the north, attempting to bring such practices to a halt. According to the

n***FOCO stockists.***

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